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A N  
E S S A Y  
CONCERNING  
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

IN FOUR BOOKS.

WRITTEN BY  
JOHN LOCKE, Esq.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOLUME THE FIRST.

A NEW EDITION CORRECTED.

*As thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit, nor how  
the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child:  
even so thou knowest not the works of GOD, who maketh all  
things.* Eccl. xi. 5.


*Quam bellum est velle confiteri potius nescire quol nescias,  
quam ista effatientem naufragare, atque ipsum sibi displicere!*  
CIC. de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

EDINBURGH:

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M, DCC, LXXVII.



TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

T H O M A S

E A R L O F

PEMBROKE and MONTGOMERY,

Baron HERBERT of Cardiff, Lord Ross of Kendal, Par, Fitzhugh, Marmion, St Quintin, and Shurland; Lord President of his Majesty's Most Honourable Privy-Council, and Lord-lieutenant of the County of Wilts, and of South-Wales.

My LORD,

**T**HIS treatise, which is grown up under your Lordship's eye, and has ventured into the world by your order, does now, by a natural kind of right, come to your Lordship for that protection, which you several years since promised it. It is not that I think any name, how great soever, set at the beginning of a book, will be able to

cover the faults that are to be found in it. Things in print must stand and fall by their own worth, or the reader's fancy. But there being nothing more to be desired for Truth, than a fair unprejudiced hearing, nobody is more likely to procure me that than your Lordship, who are allowed to have got so intimate an acquaintance with her, in her more retired recesses. Your Lordship is known to have so far advanced your speculations in the most abstract and general knowledge of things, beyond the ordinary reach or common methods, that your allowance and approbation of the design of this treatise will at least preserve it from being condemned without reading; and will prevail to have those parts a little weighed, which might otherwise, perhaps, be thought to deserve no consideration, for being somewhat out of the common road. The imputation of novelty is a terrible charge amongst those who judge of mens heads, as they do of their perukes, by the fashion; and can allow

none to be right, but the received doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote any-where at its first appearance: new opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other reason, but because they are not already common. But truth, like gold, is not the less so for being newly brought out of the mine. Its trial and examination must give it price, and not any antique fashion: and though it be not yet current by the public stamp; yet it may, for all that, be as old as nature, and is certainly not the less genuine. Your Lordship can give great and convincing instances of this, whenever you please to oblige the public with some of those large and comprehensive discoveries you have made of truths hitherto unknown, unless to some few, from whom your Lordship has been pleased not wholly to conceal them. This alone were a sufficient reason, were there no other, why I should dedicate this *ESSAY* to your Lordship; and its having some little correspon-

dence with some parts of that nobler and vast system of the sciences your Lordship has made so new, exact, and instructive a draught of, I think it glory enough, if your Lordship permit me to boast, that here and there I have fallen into some thoughts not wholly different from your's. If your Lordship think fit, that, by your encouragement, this should appear in the world, I hope it may be a reason, some time or other, to lead your Lordship farther; and you will allow me to say, that you here give the world an earnest of something, that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their expectation. This, my Lord, shews what a present I here make to your Lordship; just such as the poor man does to his rich and great neighbour, by whom the basket of flowers, or fruit, is not ill taken, though he has more plenty of his own growth, and in much greater perfection. Worthless things receive a value, when they are made the offerings of respect, esteem, and gratitude: these you have given

me so mighty and peculiar reasons to have, in the highest degree, for your Lordship, that if they can add a price to what they go along with, proportionable to their own greatness, I can with confidence brag, I here make your Lordship the richest present you ever received. This I am sure, I am under the greatest obligation to seek all occasions to acknowledge a long train of favours I have received from your Lordship; favours, though great and important in themselves, yet made much more so by the forwardness, concern, and kindness, and other obliging circumstances, that never failed to accompany them. To all this, you are pleased to add that which gives yet more weight and relish to all the rest: you vouchsafe to continue me in some degrees of your esteem, and allow me a place in your good thoughts; I had almost said friendship. This, my Lord, your words and actions so constantly shew on all occasions, even to others when I am absent, that it is vanity in me to mention what every body

knows ; but it would be want of good manners, not to acknowledge what so many are witnesses of, and every day tell me, I am indebted to your Lordship for. I wish they could as easily assist my gratitude, as they convince me of the great and growing engagements it has to your Lordship. This I am sure, I should write of the UNDERSTANDING without having any, if I were not extremely sensible of them, and did not lay hold on this opportunity to testify to the world, how much I am obliged to be, and how much I am,

My LORD,

*Your Lordship's*

*Most humble, and*

*Most obedient servant,*

DORSET COURT, }  
 May 24. 1689. }

JOHN LOCKE.



T H E  
E S P I S T L E  
T O T H E  
R E A D E R.

R E A D E R,

**I** *HERE* put into thy hands, what has been the diversion of some of my idle and heavy hours : if it has the good luck to prove so of any of thine, and thou hast but half so much pleasure in reading, as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy money, as I do my pains, ill bestowed. Mistake not this for a commendation of my work ; nor conclude, because I was pleased with the doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it, now it is done. He that hawks at larks and sparrows, has no less sport, though a much less considerable quarry, than he that flies at nobler game : and he is little acquainted with the subject of this treatise, the UNDERSTANDING, who does not know, that as it is the most elevated faculty of the soul, so it is employed with a greater and more constant delight, than any of the other. Its searches after truth are a sort of hawking and hunting, wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the pleasure. Every step the mind takes in

*its progress towards knowledge, makes some discovery, which is not only new, but the best too, for the time at least.*

*For the understanding, like the eye, judging of objects only by its own sight, cannot but be pleased with what it discovers, having less regret for what has escaped it, because it is unknown. Thus he who has raised himself above the alms-basket, and not content to live lazily on scraps of begged opinions, sets his own thoughts on work to find and follow truth, will (whatever he lights on) not miss the hunter's satisfaction; every moment of his pursuit will reward his pains with some delight, and he will have reason to think his time not ill spent, even when he cannot much boast of any great acquisition.*

*This, reader, is the entertainment of those who let loose their own thoughts, and follow them in writing; which thou oughtest not to envy them, since they afford thee an opportunity of the like diversion, if thou wilt make use of thy own thoughts in reading. It is to them, if they are thy own, that I refer myself: but if they are taken upon trust from others, it is no great matter what they are, they not following truth, but some meaner consideration: And it is not worth while to be concerned what he says or thinks, who says or thinks only as he is directed by another. If thou judgest for thyself, I know thou wilt judge candidly; and then I shall not be harmed or offended, whatever be thy censure. For though it be certain, that there is nothing in this treat-*

*tise, of the truth whereof I am not fully persuaded ; yet I consider myself as liable to mistakes as I can think thee ; and know, that this book must stand or fall with thee, not by any opinion I have of it, but by thy own. If thou findest little in it new or instructive to thee, thou art not to blame me for it. It was not meant for those that had already mastered this subject, and made a thorough acquaintance with their own understanding ; but for my own information, and the satisfaction of a few friends, who acknowledged themselves not to have sufficiently considered it. Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this ESSAY, I should tell thee, that five or six friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong course ; and that, before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented ; and thereupon it was agreed, that this should be our first inquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this discourse, which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by in-*

*tracaty, written by incoherent parcels, and, after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my humour or occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement, where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest it.*

*This discontinued way of writing may have occasioned, besides others, two contrary faults, viz. that too little and too much may be said in it. If thou findest any thing wanting, I shall be glad, that what I have writ gives thee any desire, that I should have gone farther: if it seems too much to thee, thou must blame the subject; for when I first put pen to paper, I thought all I should have to say on this matter, would have been contained in one sheet of paper; but the farther I went, the larger prospect I had: new discoveries led me still on, and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in. I will not deny, but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower compass than it is; and that some parts of it might be contracted; the way it has been writ in, by catches, and many long intervals of interruption, being apt to cause some repetitions. But to confess the truth, I am now too lazy, or too busy to make it shorter.*

*I am not ignorant how little I herein consult my own reputation, when I knowingly let it go with a fault, so apt to disgust the most judicious, who are always the nicest readers. But they who know sloth is apt to content itself with any excuse, will pardon me, if mine has prevailed on me, where, I think, I*

have a very good one. I will not therefore alledge in my defence, that the same notion, having different respects, may be convenient or necessary to prove or illustrate several parts of the same discourse; and that so it happened in many parts of this: but waving that, I shall frankly avow, that I have sometimes dwelt long upon the same argument, and expressed it different ways, with a quite different design. I pretend not to publish this essay for the information of men of large thoughts and quick apprehensions; to such masters of knowledge, I profess myself a scholar, and therefore warn them before-hand not to expect any thing here, but what, being spun out of my own coarse thoughts, is fitted to men of my own size, to whom, perhaps, it will not be unacceptable, that I have taken some pains to make plain and familiar to their thoughts some truths, which established prejudice, or the abstractedness of the ideas themselves, might render difficult. Some objects had need be turned on every side; and when the notion is new, as I confess some of these are to me, or out of the ordinary road, as I suspect they will appear to others, it is not one simple view of it that will gain it admittance into every understanding, or fix it there with a clear and lasting impression. There are few, I believe, who have not observed in themselves or others, that what in one way of proposing was very obscure, another way of expressing it has made very clear and intelligible: though afterward the mind found little difference in the phrases, and

wondered why one failed to be understood more than the other. But every thing does not hit alike upon every man's imagination. We have our understandings no less different than our palates; and he that thinks the same truth shall be equally relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of cookery: the meat may be the same, and the nourishment good, yet every one not be able to receive it with that seasoning; and it must be dressed another way, if you will have it go down with some, even of strong constitutions. The truth is, those who advised me to publish it, advised me for this reason, to publish it as it is: and since I have been brought to let it go abroad, I desire it should be understood by whoever gives himself the pains to read it. I have so little affection to be in print, that if I were not flattered, this essay might be of some use to others, as I think it has been to me; I should have confined it to the view of some friends, who gave the first occasion to it. My appearing therefore in print, being on purpose to be as useful as I may, I think it necessary to make what I have to say, as easy and intelligible to all sorts of readers, as I can. And I had much rather the speculative and quick-sighted should complain of my being in some parts tedious, than that any one, not accustomed to abstract speculations, or prepossessed with different notions, should mistake, or not comprehend my meaning.

It will possibly be censured as a great piece of va-

nity or insolence in me, to pretend to instruct this our knowing age, it amounting to little less, when I own, that I publish this essay with hopes it may be useful to others. But if it may be permitted to speak freely of those, who with a feigned modesty condemn as useless, what they themselves write, methinks it savours much more of vanity or insolence, to publish a book for any other end; and he fails very much of that respect he owes the public, who prints, and consequently expects men should read that, wherein he intends not they should meet with any thing of use to themselves or others: and should nothing else be found allowable in this treatise, yet my design will not cease to be so; and the goodness of my intention ought to be some excuse for the worthlessness of my present. It is that chiefly which secures me from the fear of censure, which I expect not to escape more than better writers. Mens principles, notions, and relishes, are so different, that it is hard to find a book which pleases or displeases all men. I acknowledge the age we live in is not the least knowing, and therefore not the most easy to be satisfied. If I have not the good luck to please, yet nobody ought to be offended with me. I plainly tell all my readers, except half-a-dozen, this treatise was not at first intended for them; and therefore they need not be at the trouble to be of that number. But yet if any one thinks fit to be angry, and rail at it, he may do it securely: for I shall find some better way of spending my time, than in such kind of conversa-

tion. I shall always have the satisfaction to have aimed sincerely at truth and usefulness, though in one of the meanest ways. The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity: but every one must not hope to be a Boyle, or a Sydenham: and in an age that produces such masters, as the great—Huygenius, and the incomparable Mr Newton, with some other of that strain; it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge; which certainly had been very much more advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had not been much cumbered with the learned, but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms introduced into the sciences, and there made an art of, to that degree, that philosophy, which is nothing but the true knowledge of things, was thought unfit, or incapable to be brought into well-bred company, and polite conversation. Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language, have so long passed for mysteries of science; or hard or misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prescription, such a right to be mistaken for deep learning, and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade, either those who speak, or those who hear them, that they are but the covers of ignorance, and hindrance of



true knowledge. To break in upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance, will be, I suppose, some service to human understanding: though so few are apt to think they deceive or are deceived in the use of words; or that the language of the sect they are of, has any faults in it, which ought to be examined or corrected; that I hope I shall be pardoned, if I have in the third book dwelt long on this subject, and endeavoured to make it so plain, that neither the inveterateness of the mischief, nor the prevalency of the fashion, shall be any excuse for those who will not take care about the meaning of their own words, and will not suffer the significancy of their expressions to be inquired into.

I have been told, that a short epitome of this treatise, which was printed 1688, was by some condemned without reading, because innate ideas were denied in it; they too hastily concluding, that if innate ideas were not supposed, there would be little left, either of the notion or proof of spirits. If any one take the like offence at the entrance of this treatise, I shall desire him to read it through; and then I hope he will be convinced, that the taking away false foundations, is not to the prejudice, but advantage of truth; which is never injured or endangered so much, as when mixed with, or built on, falsehood. In the second edition, I added as followeth:

The bookseller will not forgive me, if I say nothing of this second edition, which he has promised, by the correctness of it, shall make amends for the

many faults committed in the former. He desires too, that it should be known that it has one whole new chapter concerning Identity, and many additions and amendments in other places. These I must inform my reader are not all new matter, but most of them either farther confirmation of what I had said, or explications, to prevent others being mistaken in the sense of what was formerly printed, and not any variation in me from it; I must only except the alterations I have made in book ii. chap. 21.

What I had there writ concerning liberty and the will, I thought deserved as accurate a view, as I was capable of: those subjects having in all ages exercised the learned part of the world with questions and difficulties, that have not a little perplexed morality and divinity; those parts of knowledge that men are most concerned to be clear in. Upon a closer inspection into the working of mens minds, and a stricter examination of those motives and views they are turned by, I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the last determination to the will in all voluntary actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the world with as much freedom and readiness, as I at first published what then seemed to me to be right, thinking myself more concerned to quit and renounce any opinion of my own, than oppose that of another, when truth appears against it; for it is truth alone I seek, and that will always be

welcome to me, when or from whence soever it comes.

But what forwardness soever I have to resign any opinion I have, or to recede from any thing I have writ, upon the first evidence of any error in it; yet this I must own, that I have not had the good luck to receive any light from those exceptions I have met with in print against any part of my book; nor have, from any thing has been urged against it, found reason to alter my sense, in any of the points that have been questioned. Whether the subject I have in hand requires often more thought and attention than cursory readers, at least such as are prepossessed, are willing to allow; or whether any obscurity in my expressions casts a cloud over it, and these notions are made difficult to others apprehension in my way of treating them: so it is, that my meaning, I find, is often mistaken, and I have not the good luck to be every-where rightly understood. There are so many instances of this, that I think it justice to my reader and myself, to conclude, that either my book is plainly enough written to be rightly understood by those who peruse it with that attention and indifferency, which every one, who will give himself the pains to read, ought to employ in reading; or else, that I have writ mine so obscurely, that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Which ever of these be that truth, it is myself only am affected thereby, and therefore I shall be far from troubling my reader with what I think might be said, in answer to those

*several objections I have met with, to passages here and there of my book: since I persuade myself, that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concerned, whether they are true or false, will be able to see, that what is said is either not well founded, or else not contrary to my doctrine, when I and my opposer come both to be well understood.*

*If any, careful that none of their good thoughts should be lost, have published their censures of my Essay, with this honour done to it, that they will not suffer it to be an Essay, I leave it to the public to value the obligation they have to their critical pens, and shall not waste my reader's time in so idle or ill-natured an employment of mine, as to lessen the satisfaction any one has in himself, or gives to others in so hasty a confutation of what I have written.*

*The booksellers preparing for the fourth edition of my Essay, gave me notice of it, that I might, if I had leisure, make any additions or alterations I should think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertise the reader, that besides several corrections I had made here and there, there was one alteration which it was necessary to mention, because it ran through the whole book, and is of consequence to be rightly understood. What I thereupon said, was this:*

*Clear and distinct ideas are terms, which though familiar and frequent in mens mouths, I have reason to think every one, who uses, does not perfectly understand. And possibly it is but here and there*

one, who gives himself the trouble to consider them so far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by them: I have therefore in most places chose to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and distinct, as more likely to direct mens thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By those denominations, I mean some object in the mind, and consequently determined, i. e. such as is there seen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a determinate or determined idea, when such as it is at any time objectively in the mind, and so determined there, it is annexed, and without variation determined to a name or articulate sound, which is to be steadily the sign of that very same object of the mind, or determinate idea.

To explain this a little more particularly. By determinate, when applied to a simple idea, I mean that simple appearance which the mind has in its view, or perceives in itself when that idea is said to be in it: by determinate, when applied to a complex idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas, joined in such a proportion and situation, as the mind has before its view, and sees in itself when that idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a man gives a name to it: I say should be; because it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is so careful of his language, as to use no word, till he views in his mind the precise determined idea, which he resolves to make it the sign of. The want

*of this, is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in mens thoughts and discourses.*


*I know there are not words enough in any language, to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into mens discourses and reasonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uses any term, he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that present discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear and distinct ideas; it is plain his are not so; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of which have not such a precise determination.*

*Upon this ground I have thought determined ideas a way of speaking less liable to mistake, than clear and distinct: and where men have got such determined ideas of all that they reason, inquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end. The greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words, or, which is the same, indetermined ideas, which they are made to stand for; I have made choice of these terms to signify, 1. Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it. 2. That this idea, thus determined, i. e. which the mind has in itself, and knows, and sees*

*there, be determined without any change to that name, and that name determined to that precise idea. If men had such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses, they would both discern how far their own inquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wranglings they have with others.*

*Besides this, the bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the reader, that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one, Of the Association of Ideas, the other, Of Enthusiasm. These, with some other larger additions, never before printed, he has engaged to print by themselves after the same manner, and for the same purpose, as was done when this Essay had the second impression.*

*In this sixth edition, there is very little added or altered, the greatest part of what is new, is contained in the twenty-first chapter of the second book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition.*





T H E  
G E N E R A L C O N T E N T S.

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O f I N N A T E N O T I O N S.

## C H A P.

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2. No innate speculative principles.
3. No innate practical principles.
4. Other considerations about innate principles,  
both speculative and practical.

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T H E  
P A R T I C U L A R   C O N T E N T S.

B O O K I.  
O f I N N A T E N O T I O N S.

C H A P. I.

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C H A P. II.

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SECT.

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14. If coming to the use of reason were the time of their discovery, it would not prove them innate.
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20. One and one equal to two, &c. not general nor useful, answered.
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*Other considerations about innate principles, both speculative and practical.*

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- 2, 3. Ideas, especially those belonging to principles, not born with children.
- 4, 5. Identity, an idea not innate.
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- 8—11. Idea of GOD, not innate.
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20. No ideas are remembered, till after they have been introduced.
21. Principles not innate, because of little use, or little certainty.
22. Difference of mens discoveries depends upon the different application of their faculties.
23. Men must think and know for themselves.
24. Whence the opinion of innate principles.
25. Conclusion.

## BOOK II.

## OF IDEAS.

## CHAP. I.

*Of ideas in general.*

## SECT.

1. Idea is the object of thinking.
2. All ideas come from sensation or reflection.
3. The object of sensation, one source of ideas.
4. The operations of our minds, the other source of them.
5. All our ideas are of the one or the other of these.
6. Observable in children.
7. Men are differently furnished with these, according to the different objects they converse with.
8. Ideas of reflection later, because they need attention.
9. The soul begins to have ideas, when it begins to perceive.
10. The soul thinks not always; for this wants proofs.
11. It is not always conscious of it.
12. If a sleeping man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking man are two persons.
13. Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they think.
14. That men dream without remembering it, in vain urged.
15. Upon this hypothesis, the thoughts of a sleeping man ought to be most rational.
16. On this hypothesis the soul must have ideas not derived from sensation or reflection, of which there is no appearance.
17. If I think when I know it not, no-body else can know it.

SECT.

18. How knows any one that the soul always thinks? for, if it be not a self-evident proposition, it needs proof.
19. That a man should be busy in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable.
- 20—24. No ideas but from sensation or reflection, evident, if we observe children.
25. In the reception of simple ideas, the understanding is most of all passive.

C H A P. II.

*Of simple ideas.*

SECT.

1. Uncompounded appearances.
- 2, 3. The mind can neither make nor destroy them.

C H A P. III.

*Of ideas of one sense.*

SECT.

1. As colours of seeing, sounds of hearing.
2. Few simple ideas have names.

C H A P. IV.

*Of solidity.*

SECT.

1. We receive this idea from touch.
2. Solidity fills space.
3. Distinct from space.
4. From hardness.
5. On solidity depends impulse, resistance, and protrusion.
6. What it is.

CH A P. V.

*Of simple ideas by more than one sense.*

CH A P. VI.

*Of simple ideas of reflection.*

SECT.

1. Are the operations of the mind about its other ideas?
2. The idea of perception, and idea of willing, we have from reflection.

CH A P. VII.

*Of simple ideas, both of sensation and reflection.*

SECT.

- 1—6. Pleasure and pain.
7. Existence and unity.
8. Power.
9. Succession.
10. Simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge.

CH A P. VIII.

*Other considerations concerning simple ideas.*

SECT.

- 1—6. Positive ideas from privative causes.
- 7, 8. Ideas in the mind, qualities in bodies.
- 9, 10. Primary and secondary qualities.
- 11, 12. How primary qualities produce their ideas;
- 13, 14. How secondary.
- 15—23. Ideas of primary qualities, are resemblances; of secondary, not.
- 24, 25. Reason of our mistake in this.
26. Secondary qualities twofold; first, immediately perceivable; secondly, mediately perceivable.



CHAP. IX.

*Of perception.*

SECT.

1. It is the first simple idea of reflection.
- 2—4. Perception is only when the mind receives the impression.
- 5, 6. Children, though they have ideas in the womb, have none innate.
7. Which ideas first, is not evident
- 8—10. Ideas of sensation often changed by the judgment.
- 11—14. Perception puts the difference between animals and inferior beings.
15. Perception, the inlet of knowledge.

CHAP. X.

*Of retention.*

SECT.

1. Contemplation.
2. Memory.
3. Attention, repetition, pleasure, and pain, fix ideas.
- 4, 5. Ideas fade in the memory.
6. Constantly repeated ideas can scarce be lost.
7. In remembering, the mind is often active.
8. Two defects in the memory, oblivion and slowness.
10. Brutes have memory.

CHAP. XI.

*Of discerning, &c.*

SECT.

1. No knowledge without it.
2. The difference of wit and judgment.
3. Clearness alone hinders confusion.
4. Comparing.

SECT.

5. Brutes compared but imperfectly.
6. Compounding.
7. Brutes compound but little.
8. Naming.
9. Abstraction.
- 10, 11. Brutes abstract not.
- 12, 13. Idiots and mad-men.
14. Method.
15. These are the beginnings of human knowledge.
16. Appeal to experience.
17. Dark room.

CHAP. XII.

*Of complex ideas.*

SECT.

1. Made by the mind out of simple ones.
2. Made voluntarily.
3. Are either modes, substances, or relations.
4. Modes.
5. Simple and mixed modes.
6. Substances single or collective.
7. Relation.
8. The abstrusest ideas from the two sources.

CHAP. XIII.

*Of space, and its simple modes.*

SECT.

1. Simple modes.
2. Idea of space.
3. Space and extension.
4. Immenfity.
- 5, 6. Figure.
- 7—10. Place.
- 11—14. Extension and body not the same.
- 15—17. Substance which we know not, no proof against space without body.

SECT.

- 18, 19. Substances and accidents of little use in philosophy.
- 20. A vacuum beyond the utmost bounds of body.
- 21. The power of annihilation proves a vacuum.
- 22. Motion proves a vacuum.
- 23. The ideas of space and body distinct.
- 24, 25. Extension being inseparable from body, proves not the same
- 26. Ideas of space and solidity distinct.
- 27. Men differ little in clear simple ideas.

C H A P. XIV.

*Of duration.*

SECT.

- 1. Duration is fleeting extension.
- 2—4. Its ideas from reflection on the train of our ideas.
- 5. The idea of duration, applicable to things whilst we sleep.
- 6—8. The idea of succession, not from motion.
- 9—11. The train of ideas has a certain degree of quickness.
- 12. This train, the measure of other successions.
- 13—15. The mind cannot fix long on one invariable idea.
- 16. Ideas, however made, include no sense of motion.
- 17. Time is duration set out by measures.
- 18. A good measure of time must divide its whole duration into equal periods.
- 19. The revolutions of the sun and moon, the properest measures of time.
- 20. But not by their motion, but periodical appearances.
- 21. No two parts of duration can be certainly known to be equal.
- 22. Time not the measure of motion.

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SECT.

23. Minutes, hours, and years, not necessary measures of duration.
24. The measure of time two ways applied.
- 25—27. Our measure of time applied to duration before time.
- 28—31. Eternity.

CHAP. XV.

*Of duration and expansion considered together.*

SECT.

1. Both capable of greater and less.
2. Expansion not bounded by matter.
3. Nor duration by motion.
4. Why men more easily admit infinite duration, than infinite expansion.
5. Time to duration, is as place to expansion.
6. Time and place are taken for so much of either as are set out by their existence and motion of bodies.
7. Sometimes for so much of either as we design by measure taken from the bulk or motion of bodies.
8. They belong to all beings.
9. All the parts of extension, are extension; and all the parts of duration, are duration.
10. Their parts inseparable.
11. Duration is as a line, expansion as a solid.
12. Duration has never two parts together, expansion altogether.

CHAP. XVI.

*Of number.*

SECT.

1. Number, the simplest and most universal idea.
2. Its modes made by addition.
3. Each mode distinct.

SECT.

4. Therefore demonstrations in numbers, the most precise.
- 5, 6. Names necessary to numbers.
7. Why children number not earlier.
8. Number measures all measurables.

CHAP. XVII.

*Of infinity.*

SECT.

1. Infinity in its original intention, attributed to space, duration, and number.
- 2, 3. How we come by the idea of infinity.
4. Our idea of space boundless.
5. And so of duration.
6. Why other ideas are not capable of infinity.
7. Difference between infinity of space, and space infinite.
8. We have no idea of infinite space.
9. Number affords us the clearest idea of infinity.
- 10, 11. Our different conception of the infinity of number, duration, and expansion.
12. Infinite divisibility.
- 13, 14. } No positive idea of infinite.
- 17, 18. }
- 15, 16, What is positive, what negative, in our idea
- 19. of infinite.
20. Some think they have a positive idea of eternity, and not space.
21. Supposed positive idea of infinity, cause of mistakes.
22. All these ideas from sensation and reflection.

CHAP. XVIII.

*Of other simple modes.*

SECT.

- 1, 2. Modes of motion.

SECT.

3. Modes of sounds.
4. Modes of colours.
- 5, 6. Modes of tastes.
7. Why some modes have, and others have not names.

CHAP. XIX.

*Of the modes of thinking.*

SECT.

- 1, 2. Sensation, remembrance, contemplation, &c.
3. The various attention of the mind in thinking.
4. Hence probable that thinking is the action, not essence of the soul.

CHAP. XX.

*Of modes of pleasure and pain.*

SECT.

1. Pleasure and pain, simple ideas.
2. Good and evil, what.
3. Our passions moved by good and evil.
4. Love.
5. Hatred.
6. Desire.
7. Joy.
8. Sorrow.
9. Hope.
10. Fear.
11. Despair.
12. Anger.
13. Envy.
14. What passions all men have.
- 15, 16. Pleasure and pain, what.
17. Shame.
18. The instance to shew how our ideas of the passions are got from sensation and reflection.

## CHAPTER XXI.

*Of power.*

## SECT.

1. This idea, how got.
2. Power active and passive.
3. Power includes relatives.
4. The clearest idea of active power had from spirit.
5. Will and understanding, two powers.
6. Faculties.
7. Whence the ideas of liberty and necessity.
8. Liberty, what
9. Supposes understanding and will.
10. Belongs not to volition.
11. Voluntary opposed to involuntary, not to necessary.
12. Liberty, what.
13. Necessity, what.
- 14—20. Liberty belongs not to the will.
21. But to the agent or man.
- 22—24. In respect of willing, a man is not free.
- 25—27. The will determined by something without it.
28. Volition, what.
29. What determines the will.
30. Will and desire must not be confounded.
31. Uneasiness determines the will.
32. Desire is uneasiness.
33. The uneasiness of desire determines the will.
34. This the spring of action.
35. The greatest positive good determines not the will, but uneasiness.
36. Because the removal of uneasiness is the first step to happiness.
37. Because uneasiness alone is present.


## SECT.

38. Because all who allow the joys of heaven possible, pursue them not. But a great uneasiness is never neglected.
39. Desire accompanies all uneasiness.
40. The most pressing uneasiness naturally determines the will.
41. All desire happiness.
42. Happiness, what
43. What good is desired, what not.
44. Why the greatest good is not always desired.
45. Why not being desired, it moves not the will.
46. Due consideration raises desire.
47. The power to suspend the prosecution of any desire, makes way for consideration.
48. To be determined by our own judgment, is no restraint to liberty.
49. The freest agents are so determined.
50. A constant determination to a pursuit of happiness, no abridgement of liberty.
51. The necessity of pursuing true happiness, the foundation of all liberty.
52. The reason of it.
53. Government of our passions, the right improvement of liberty.
- 54, 55. How men come to pursue different courses.
56. How men come to chuse ill.
57. First, from bodily pains. Secondly, from wrong desires arising from wrong judgment.
- 58, 59. Our judgment of present good or evil, always right.
60. From a wrong judgment of what makes a necessary part of their happiness.
- 61, 62. A more particular account of wrong judgments.
63. In comparing present and future.
- 64, 65. Causes of this.



SECT.

- 66. In considering consequences of actions.
- 67. Causes of this.
- 68. Wrong judgment of what is necessary to our happiness.
- 69. We can change the agreeableness or disagreeableness in things.
- 70—73. Preference of vice to virtue, a manifest wrong judgment.



O F  
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

B O O K I.

O F I N N A T E N O T I O N S .

C H A P. I.

T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N .

- § 1. *An inquiry into the understanding, pleasant and useful.* § 2. *Design.* § 3. *Method.* § 4. *Useful to know the extent of our comprehension.* § 5. *Our capacity suited to our state and concerns.* § 6. *Knowledge of our capacity a cure of scepticism, and idleness.* § 7. *Occasion of this essay.* § 8. *What idea stands for.*

**S**INCE it is the UNDERSTANDING that sets man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see, and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself: and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own object. But whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves; sure I am, that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not

only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search of other things.

§ 2. This, therefore, being my PURPOSE, to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowiede, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent; I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits, or alteration of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter or no: these are speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way, in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the object which they have to do with: and I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical plain method, I can give any account of the ways whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have, and can set down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the grounds of those persuasions, which are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted somewhere or other with such assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness, wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps

have reason to suspect, that either there is no such thing as truth at all; or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.

§ 3. It is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent, and moderate our persuasions. In order whereunto, I shall pursue this following method.

I. I shall inquire into the *original* of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

II. I shall endeavour to shew, what *knowledge* the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

III. I shall make some inquiry into the nature of the grounds of *faith* or *opinion*; whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge: and here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of assent.

§ 4. If by this inquiry into the nature of understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use, to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should

not then perhaps be so forward, out of an affection of an universal knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things, to which our understandings are not suited; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notion at all. If we can find out, how far the understanding can extend its view, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and in what cases it can only judge and guess; we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state.

§ 5. For though the comprehension of our understandings comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things; yet, we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our being, for that proportion and degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our mansion. Men have reason to be well satisfied with what GOD hath thought fit for them, since he hath given them, as St Peter says, *παντα απροσχητον & ευσεβειαν*, Whatsoever is necessary for the conveniencies of life, and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures their great concerns that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own duties. Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight, and satisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution, and throw away the bless-

sings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grasp every thing. We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us; for of that they are very capable: and it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it. It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant, who will not attend his business by candle-light, to plead that he had not bright sun-shine. The candle that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our purposes. The discoveries we can make with this, ought to satisfy us: and we shall then use our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are suited to our faculties, and upon those grounds they are capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will disbelieve every thing, because we cannot certainly know all things; we shall do much what as wisely as he, who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish because he had no wings to fly.

§ 6. When we know our own strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success: and when we have well surveyed the powers of our own minds, and made some estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing any thing; nor,

on the other side, question every thing, and disclaim all knowledge, because some things are not to be understood. It is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals, that may ruin him. Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures whereby a rational creature put in that state, which man is in in this world, may, and ought to govern his opinions and actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled, that some other things escape our knowledge.

§ 7. This was that which gave the first rise to this essay concerning the understanding. For I thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths that most concerned us, whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of being, as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its decisions, or that escaped its comprehension. Thus men, extending their inquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths, where they can find no sure footing; it is no wonder that they raise questions, and multiply disputes, which, never



coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism. Whereas were the capacities of our understandings well considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the horizon found, which sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things; between what is, and what is not comprehensible by us; men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the one, and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other.

§ 8. Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the occasion of this inquiry into human understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this subject, I must here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word *IDEA*, which he will find in the following treatise. It being that term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding, when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by *phantasm*, *notion*, *species*, or whatever it is, which the mind can be employed about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it (1).

(1) This modest apology of our author could not procure him the free use of the word *IDEA*. But great offence has been taken at it, and it has been censured as of dangerous consequence: to which you may here see what he answers. ‘The world, (saith the bishop of Worcester \*,) hath been strangely amused with *IDEAS* of late; and we have been told, that strange things might be done by the help of ideas;

\* Answer to Mr Locke's first letter, p 93.

I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such ideas in mens minds ; every one is

‘ and yet these ideas, at last, come to be only common notions of things, which we must make use of in our reasoning. You (*i. e.* the author of the essay on human understanding) say in that chapter, about the existence of God, you thought it most proper to express yourself in the most usual and familiar way, by common words and expressions. I would you had done so quite through your book ; for then you had never given that occasion to the enemies of our faith to take up your new way of ideas, as an effectual battery, as they imagined, against the mysteries of the Christian faith. But you might have enjoyed the satisfaction of your ideas long enough before I had taken notice of them, unless I had found them employed about doing mischief.’

To which our author replies\*. It is plain, that that which your lordship apprehends, in my book, may be of dangerous consequence to the article which you lordship has endeavoured to defend, is my introducing *new terms* ; that which your Lordship instances in, is that of IDEAS. And the reason your lordship gives, in every of these places, why your lordship has such an apprehension of ideas, that they may be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith, which your lordship has endeavoured to defend, is, because they have been applied to such purposes. And I might, your lordship says, have enjoyed the satisfaction of my ideas long enough, before you had taken notice of them, unless your lordship had found them employed in doing mischief. Which, at last, as I humbly conceive, amounts to thus much, and no more, *viz.* that your lordship fears ideas, *i. e.* the *term* ideas, may, some time or other, prove of very danger-

\* In his second letter to the bishop of Worcester, p 63, &c.

conscious of them in himself, and mens words and actions will satisfy him, that they are in others

ous consequence, to what your lordship has endeavoured to defend, because they have been made use of in arguing against it. For I am sure, your lordship does not mean, that you apprehended the things, signified by ideas, may be of dangerous consequence to the article of faith your lordship endeavours to defend, because they have been made use of against it: for (besides that your lordship mentions *terms*) that would be to expect that those who oppose that article, should oppose it without any thoughts; for the things signified by ideas, are nothing but the immediate objects of our minds in thinking: so that unless any one can oppose the article your lordship defends, without thinking on something, he must use the things signified by ideas; for he that thinks, must have some immediate object of his mind in thinking: *i. e.* must have ideas.

But whether it be the name or thing, ideas in sound, or ideas in signification, that your lordship apprehends *may be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith, which your lordship endeavours to defend*, it seems to me, I will not say a *new way* of reasoning, for that belongs to me; but were it not your lordship's, I should think it a very *extraordinary way* of reasoning to write against a book, wherein your lordship acknowledges they are not used to bad purposes, nor employed to do mischief; only because you find that ideas are by those who oppose your lordship, *employed to do mischief*; and so apprehend, *they may be of dangerous consequence* to the article your lordship has engaged in the defence of. For, whether ideas as terms, or ideas as the immediate objects of the mind, signified by those terms, may be, in your lordship's apprehension, *of dangerous consequence to that article*; I do not see how your lordship's writ.

Our first inquiry then shall be, how they come into the mind.

ting against the *notions of ideas*, as stated in my book, will at all hinder your opposers *from employing them in doing mischief*, as before.

However, be that as it will, so it is that your lordship apprehends these *new terms*, these *ideas with which the world hath, of late, been so strangely amused*, (though at last they come to be only common notions of things, as your lordship owns), *may be of dangerous consequence* to that article.

My lord, if any, in their answer to your lordship's sermons, and in other pamphlets, wherein your lordship complains they have talked so much of ideas, have been troublesome to your lordship with that term; it is not strange that your lordship should be tired with that sound: but how natural soever it be to our weak constitutions, to be offended with any sound, where-with an importunate din hath been made about our ears; yet, my lord, I know your lordship has a better opinion of the articles of our faith, than to think any of them can be overturned, or so much as shaken, with a breath formed into any sound, or term whatsoever.

Names are but the arbitrary marks of conceptions; and so they be sufficiently appropriated to them in their use, I know no other difference any of them have in particular, but as they are of easy or difficult pronunciation, and of a more or less pleasant sound; and what particular antipathies there may be in men to some of them upon that account, is not easy to be foreseen. This I am sure, no term whatsoever in itself bears, one more than another, any opposition to truth of any kind; they are only propositions that do or can oppose the truth of any article or doctrine: and thus no term is privileged from being set in opposition to truth.

There is no word to be found, which may not be

brought into a proposition, wherein the most sacred and most evident truths may be opposed; but that is not a fault in the term, but him that uses it. And therefore I cannot easily persuade myself (whatever your lordship hath said in the heat of your concern) that you have bestowed so much pains upon my book, because the word *idea* is so much used there. For, though upon my saying, in my chapter about the existence of GOD, 'that I scarce used the word IDEA in 'that chapter,' your lordship wishes, that *I had done so quite through my book*. Yet, I must rather look upon that as a compliment to me, wherein your lordship wished, that my book had been all through suited to vulgar readers, not used to that and the like terms, than that your lordship has such an apprehension of the word *idea*; or that there is any such harm in the use of it, instead of the word *notion*, (with which your lordship seems to take it to agree in signification), that your lordship would think it worth your while to spend any part of your valuable time and thoughts about my book, for having the word *idea* so often in it; for this would be to make your lordship to write only against an impropriety of speech. I own to your lordship, it is a great condescension in your lordship to have done it, if that word have such a share in what your lordship has writ against my book, as some expressions would persuade one; and I would, for the satisfaction of your lordship, change the *term* of *idea* for a better, if your lordship, or any one, could help me to it. For that *notion* will not so well stand for every immediate object of the mind in thinking, as *idea* does, I have, as I guess, somewhere given a reason in my book, by shewing that the term *notion* is more peculiarly appropriated to a certain sort of those objects, which I call *mixed modes*: and, I think, it would not sound altogether so well, to say, the *notion of red*, and the *notion of a horse*; as the *idea of red*, and the *idea of a horse*. But if any one thinks it will, I contend not; for I have no fondness for, no antipathy to

any particular articulate sounds: nor do I think there is any spell or fascination in any of them.

But the word *idea*, proper or improper, I do not see how it is the better or the worse, because *ill men* have made use of it, or because it has been made use of to *bad purposes*; for if that be a reason to condemn, or lay it by, we must lay by the terms, *scripture*, *reason*, *perception*, *distinct*, *clear*, &c. Nay, the name of God himself will not escape; for I do not think any one of those, or any other term, can be produced, which hath not been made use of by such men, and to such purposes. And therefore, if *the Unitarians, in their late pamphlets, have talked very much of, and strangely amused the world with ideas*; I cannot believe your lordship will think that word one jot the worse, or the more dangerous, because they use it; any more than, for their use of them, you will think *reason* or *scripture* terms ill or dangerous. And therefore what your lordship says, in the bottom of this ninety-third page, that *I might have enjoyed the satisfaction of my ideas long enough before your lordship had taken notice of them*, unless you had found them employed in doing mischief; will, I presume, when your lordship has considered again of this matter, prevail with your lordship to let me *enjoy still the satisfaction I take in my ideas, i. e.* as much satisfaction as I can take in so small a matter, as is the using of a proper term, notwithstanding it *should be employed by others in doing mischief*.

For, my lord, if I should leave it wholly out of my book, and substitute the word *notion* every-where in the room of it; and every body else do so too, (though your lordship does not, I suppose, suspect that I have the vanity to think they would follow my example), my book would, it seems, be the more to your lordship's liking: but I do not see how this would one jot abate the *mischief* your lordship complains of. For the Unitarians might as much employ *notions*, as they do now *ideas*, to do *mischief*; unless they are such

fools to think they can conjure with this notable word *idea*; and that the force of what they say, lies in the sound, and not in the signification of their terms.

This I am sure of, that the truths of the Christian religion can be no more battered by one word than another; nor can they be beaten down nor endangered by any sound whatsoever. And I am apt to flatter myself, that your lordship is satisfied that there is no harm in the word *ideas*; because you say, you should not have taken any notice of my *ideas*, if the *enemies of our faith had not taken up my new way of ideas, as an effectual battery against the mysteries of the Christian faith.* In which place, by *new way of ideas*, nothing, I think, can be construed to be meant, but my expressing myself by that of *ideas*; and not by other more common words, and of antienter standing in the English language.

As to the objection, of the author's way by *ideas* being *a new way*, he thus answers: *My new way of ideas, or my way by ideas*, which often occurs in your lordship's letter, is, I confess, a very large and doubtful expression; and may, in the full latitude, comprehend my whole Essay; because treating of the Understanding, which is nothing but the faculty of thinking, I could not well treat of that faculty of the mind, which consists in thinking, without considering the immediate objects of the mind in thinking, which I call *IDEAS*; and therefore in treating of the Understanding, I guess it will not be thought strange, that the greatest part of my book has been taken up, in considering what these objects of the mind, in thinking, are; whence they come; what use the mind makes of them in its several ways of thinking; and what are the outward marks, whereby it signifies them to others, or records them for its own use. And this, in short, is *my way by ideas*, that which your lordship calls *my new way by ideas*; which, my lord, if it be *new*, it is but a new history of an old thing. For I think it will not be doubted, that men always performed the actions of

*thinking, reasoning, believing, and knowing, just after the same manner that they do now: though whether the same account has heretofore been given of the way how they performed these actions, or wherein they consisted, I do not know. Were I as well read as your lordship, I should have been safe from that gentle reprimand of your lordship's, for thinking my way of ideas NEW, for want of looking into other mens thoughts, which appear in their books.*

Your lordship's words, as an acknowledgment of your instructions in the case, and as a warning to others, who will be so bold adventurers as to *spin any thing barely out of their own thoughts*, I shall set down at large: and they run thus; *Whether you took this way of ideas from the modern philosopher, mentioned by you, is not at all material; but I intended no reflection upon you in it, (for that you mean by my commending you as a scholar of so great a master), I never meant to take from you the honour of your own inventions: and I do believe you, when you say, that you wrote from your own thoughts, and the ideas you had there. But many things may seem new to one, that converses only with his own thoughts, which really are not so; as he may find, when he looks into the thoughts of other men, which appear in their books. And therefore, although I have a just esteem for the invention of such, who can spin volumes barely out of their own thoughts; yet I am apt to think, they would oblige the world more, if, after they have thought so much themselves, they would examine what thoughts others have had before them concerning the same things; that so those may not be thought their own inventions, which are common to themselves and others: If a man should try all the magnetical experiments himself, and publish them as his own thoughts, he might take himself to be the inventor of them: but he that examines and compares them with what Gilbert, and others have done before him, will not diminish the praise of his diligence, but may wish he had compared his thoughts*



*with other mens; by which the world would receive greater advantage, although he lost the honour of being an original.*

To alleviate my fault herein, I agree with your lordship, that *many things may seem NEW, to one that converses only with his own thoughts, which are really not so*: but I must crave leave to suggest to your lordship, that if in spinning of them out of his own thoughts, they *seem* new to him, he is certainly the inventor of them; and they may as justly be thought his *own invention*, as any one's; and he is as certainly the *inventor* of them, as any one who thought on them before him: the distinction of invention, or not invention, lying not in thinking first, or not first, but in borrowing, or not borrowing our thoughts from another: and he to whom, spinning them out of his own thoughts, they *seem new*, could not certainly borrow them from another. So he truly invented *printing* in *Europe*, who, without any communication with the *Chinese*, spun it out of his own thoughts; though it was ever so true, that the *Chinese* had the use of *printing*, nay, of printing in the *very same way*, among them, many ages before him. So that he that spins any thing out of his own thoughts, that *seems new to him*, cannot cease to think it his own invention, should he *examine* ever so far, *what thoughts others have had before him concerning the same thing*, and should find, by examining, that they had the same thoughts too.

But what great obligation this would be to the world, or weighty cause of turning over and looking into books, I confess I do not see. The great end to me, in conversing with my own or other mens thoughts, in matters of speculation, is to find truth, without being much concerned whether my own spinning of it out of mine, or their spinning of it out of their own thoughts, helps me to it. And how little I affect the *honour of an original*, may be seen in that place of my book, where, if any-where, that itch of vain-glory

was likeliest to have shewn itself, had I been so overrun with it, as to need a cure. It is where I speak of certainty, in these following words, taken notice of by your lordship in another place: *I think I have shewn wherein it is that certainty, real certainty, consists, which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess, to me heretofore, one of those desiderata, which I found great want of.*

Here, my lord, however *new* this seemed to me, and the more so because possibly I had in vain hunted for it in the *books of others*; yet I spoke of it as *new* only to myself; leaving *others*, in the undisturbed possession of what, either by invention or reading, was theirs before; without assuming to myself any other honour, but that of my own ignorance, till that time, if others before had shewn wherein certainty lay. And yet, my lord, if I had, upon this occasion, been forward to assume to myself the *honour of an original*, I think I had been pretty safe in it; since I should have had your lordship for my guarantee and vindicator in that point, who are pleased to call it *new*; and, as such, to write against it.

And truly, my lord, in this respect, my book has had very unlucky stars, since it hath had the misfortune to displease your lordship with many things in it, for their novelty; as a *new way of reasoning*; *new hypothesis about reason*; *new sort of certainty*; *new terms*; *new way of ideas*; *new method of certainty*, &c. And yet, in other places, your lordship seems to think it worthy in me of your lordship's reflection, for saying but what others have said before. As where I say, *In the different make of mens tempers, and application of their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for the confirmation of the same truth.* Your lordship asks, *What is this different from what men of understanding have said?* Again, I take it, your lordship meant not these words for a commendation of my book, where you say; *But if no more be meant by,* 'the simple ideas

'that come in by sensation or reflection, and their 'being the foundation of our knowledge,' but that our notions of things come in, either from our senses, or the exercise of our minds: as there is nothing extraordinary in the discovery, so your lordship is far enough from opposing that, wherein you think all mankind are agreed.

And again, *But what need all this great noise about ideas and certainty, true and real certainty by ideas; if, after all, it comes only to this, that our ideas only represent to us such things, from whence we bring arguments to prove the truth of things?*

But, *The world hath been strangely amused with ideas of late; and we have been told, that strange things might be done by the help of ideas, and yet these ideas, at last, come to be only common notions of things, which we must make use of in our reasoning. And to the like purposes in other places.*

Whether, therefore, at last, your lordship will resolve, that it is *new* or no; or more faulty by its being *new*, must be left to your lordship. This I find by it, that my book cannot avoid being condemned on the one side or the other; nor do I see a possibility to help it. If there be readers that like only *new* thoughts; or, on the other side, others that can bear nothing but what can be justified by received authorities in print; I must desire them to make themselves amends in that part which they like, for the displeasure they receive in the other: but if any should be so exact, as to find fault with both, truly, I know not well what to say to them. The case is a plain case, the book is all over naught, and there is not a sentence in it, that is not, either from its antiquity or novelty, to be condemned; and so there is a short end of it. From your lordship indeed, in particular, I can hope for something better; for your lordship thinks the *general design of it so good*, that that, I flatter myself, would prevail on your lordship to preserve it from the fire.

But as to the way your lordship thinks I should have taken to prevent the *having it thought my invention, when it was common to me with others*, it unluckily so fell out, in the subject of my *Essay of human understanding*, that I could not look into the thoughts of other men to inform myself. For my design being, as well as I could, to copy nature, and to give an account of the operations of the mind in thinking; I could look into no body's understanding but my own, to see how it wrought; nor have a prospect into other mens minds, to view their thoughts there, and observe what steps and motions they took, and by what gradations they proceeded in their acquainting themselves with truth, and their advance to knowledge: what we find in their thoughts in books, is but the result of this, and not the progress and working of their minds, in coming to the opinions or conclusions they set down and published.

All, therefore, that I can say of my book, is, that it is a copy of my own mind, in its several ways of operation. And all that I can say for the publishing of it, is, that I think the intellectual faculties are made, and operate like in most men; and that some, that I shewed it to before I published it, liked it so well, that I was confirmed in that opinion. And therefore, if it should happen that it should not be so, but that some men should have ways of thinking, reasoning, or arriving at certainty, different from others, and above those that I find my mind to use and acquiesce in, I do not see of what use my book can be to them. I can only make it my humble request, in my own name, and in the name of those that are of my size, who find their minds work, reason; and know in the same low way that mine does, that those men of a more happy genius would shew us the way of their nobler flights; and particularly would discover to us their shorter or surer way to certainty, than by *ideas*, and the observing their agreement or disagreement.

Your lordship adds, *But now it seems, nothing is intelligible but what suits with the new way of ideas.* My lord, *the new way of ideas*, and the old way of speaking *intelligibly* \*, was always, and ever will be, the same: and if I may take the liberty to declare my sense of it, herein it consists: 1. That a man use no words, but such as he makes the signs of certain determined objects of his mind in thinking, which he can make known to another. 2. Next, that he use the same word steadily, for the sign of the same immediate object of his mind in thinking. 3. That he join these words together in propositions, according to the grammatical rules of that language he speaks in. 4. That he unite those sentences in a coherent discourse. Thus, and thus only, I humbly conceive, any one may preserve himself from the confines and suspicion of jargon, whether he pleases to call these immediate objects of his mind, which his words do, or should stand for, *ideas* or no.

\* Mr Lecke's third letter to the bishop of Worcester, p. 353, &c.

## C H A P. II.

*No innate principles in the mind.*

§ 1. *The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate.* § 2. *General assent the great argument.* § 3. *Universal consent proves nothing innate.* § 4. *What is, is; and, It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, not universally assented to.* § 5. *Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, &c.* § 6, 7. *That men know them when they come to the use of reason, answered.* § 8. *If reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate.* § 9, 10, 11. *It is false that reason discovers them.* § 12. *The coming to the use of reason, not the time we come to know these maxims.* § 13. *By this, they are not distinguished from other knowable truths.* § 14. *If coming to the use of reason, were the time of their discovery, it would not prove them innate.* § 15, 16. *The steps by which the mind attains several truths.* § 17. *Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate.* § 18. *If such an assent be a mark of innate, then that one and two are equal to three: that sweetness is not bitterness; and a thousand the like, must be innate.* § 19. *Such less general propositions known before these universal maxims.* § 20. *One and one equal to two, &c. not general nor useful, answered.* § 21. *These maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate.* § 22. *Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.*

§ 23. *The argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching,*

§ 24. *Not innate, because not universally assented to.* § 25. *These maxims not the first known,* § 26. *And so not innate.* § 27. *Not innate, because they appear least, where what is innate shews itself clearest.* § 28. *Recapitulation.*

**I**T is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain *innate principles*; some primary notions. *Κοιναι εννοαι*, characters as it were, stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its very first being; and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince the unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only shew (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant, that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature, to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes, from external objects; and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature and innate characters, when we may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.

But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, when they lead him ever so little out of

the common road; I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one; which I leave to be considered by those, who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth, where-ever they find it.

§ 2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain principles both speculative and practical, for they speak of both, universally agreed upon by all mankind; which therefore, they argue, must needs be constant impressions, which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.

§ 3. This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths, wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in; which I presume may be done.

§ 4. But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are none such; because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent. I shall begin with the speculative, and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration; *Whatever is, is*; and, *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, which, of all others, I think have the most allowed title to innate. These have so settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that it will, no doubt, be thought strange, if any one should seem to question it. But yet I



take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind, to whom they are not so much as known.

§ 5. For, first it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them: and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent, which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction, to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify any thing, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived. For, to imprint anything on the mind, without the mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which, since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For, if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? And if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may; then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of.

knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind, which it never did, nor ever shall know: for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths, which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know, will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny innate principles. For no-body, I think, ever denied, that the mind was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity, they say, is innate, the knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be, between any truths the mind is capable of knowing, in respect of their original: they must all be innate, or all adventitious: In vain shall a man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding, as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words, *to be in the understanding*, have any propriety, they signify to be understood; so that, to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one, as to say, any thing is, and is not, in the mind or understanding. If therefore these two propositions, *Whatsoever is, is*; and, *It is impossible for*

*the same thing to be and not to be*, are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them; infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.

§ 6. To avoid this, it is usually answered, That all men know and *assent* to them, *when they come to the use of reason*, and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer,

§ 7. Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification, go for clear reasons to those who, being prepossessed, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say. For to apply this answer with any tolerable sense to our present purpose, it must signify one of these two things; either, that as soon men come to the use of reason, these supposed native inscriptions come to be known, and observed by them: or else, that the use and exercise of mens reasons assists them in the discovery of these principles, and certainly makes them known to them.

§ 8. If they mean, that by the *use of reason* men may discover these principles, and that this is sufficient to prove them innate; their way of arguing will stand thus, *viz.* that whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted on the mind; since that universal assent, which is made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this; that by the use of reason, we are capable to come to a certain knowledge of, and assent to them; and by this means there will be no difference between the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them: all must be equally allowed innate; they being all discoveries made by the use of reason, and truths that a

rational creature may certainly come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.

§ 9. But how can these men think the *use of reason* necessary to discover principles that are supposed innate, when reason, if we may believe them, is nothing else but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles or propositions that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate, which we have need of reason to discover, unless, as I have said, we will have all the certain truths that reason ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes discover visible objects, as that there should be need of reason, or the exercise thereof, to make the understanding see what is originally engraven in it, and cannot be in the understanding, before it is perceived by it. So that to make reason discover those truths thus imprinted, is to say, that the use of reason discovers to a man, what he knew before; and men have those innate, impressed truths originally, and before the use of reason, and yet are always ignorant of them till they come to the use of reason, it is in effect to say, that men know, and know them not, at the same time.

§ 10. It will perhaps be said, that mathematical demonstrations, and other truths that are not innate, are not assented to as soon as proposed, wherein they are distinguished from these maxims, and other innate truths. I shall have occasion to speak of assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow, that these maxims, and mathematical demonstrations, are in this different; that the one has need of reason, using

of proofs, to make them out, and to gain our assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge, which requires the *use of reason* for the discovery of these general truths: since it must be confessed, that in their discovery there is no use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give this answer, will not be forward to affirm, that the knowledge of this maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, is a deduction of our reason. For this would be to destroy that bounty of nature they seem so fond of, whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires pains and application. And how can it, with any tolerable sense, be supposed, that what was imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reason, should need the use of reason to discover it?

§ 11. Those who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding, will find, that this ready assent of the mind to some truths, depends not either on native inscription, or the *use of reason*; but on a faculty of the mind, quite distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter. Reason therefore having nothing to do in procuring our assent to these maxims, if by saying, that *men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason*, be meant, that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.

§ 12. If by knowing and assenting to them,

when we come to the use of reason, be meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind; and that as soon as children come to the use of reason, they come also to know and assent to these maxims; this also is false and frivolous. First, it is false: because it is evident, these maxims are not in the mind so early as the use of reason: and therefore the coming to the use of reason is falsely assigned as the time of their discovery. How many instances of the use of reason may be observed in children, long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be?* And a great part of illiterate people, and savages, pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking on this, and the like general propositions. I grant men come not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, because till after they come to the use of reason, those general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which these general maxims are, which are mistaken for innate principles, but are indeed discoveries made, and verities introduced, and brought into the mind by the same way, and discovered by the same steps, as several other propositions, which no-body was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this discourse. I allow therefore a necessity, that men should come to the use of reason, before they get the knowledge of those general truths; but deny, that mens coming to the use of reason is the time of their discovery.

§ 13. In the mean time, it is observable, that this saying, that men know and assent to these

maxims, *when they come to the use of reason*, amounts in reality of fact to no more but this, that they are never known, nor taken notice of, before the use of reason, but may possibly be assented to some time after, during a man's life; but when, is uncertain: and so may all other knowable truths, as well as these; which therefore have no advantage nor distinction from others, by this note of being known when we come to the use of reason; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.

§ 14. But secondly, were it true, that the precise time of their being known, and assented to, were, when men come to the *use of reason*; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous, as the supposition itself is false. For by what kind of logic will it appear, that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution, because it comes first to be observed and assented to, when a faculty of the mind, which has a quite distinct province, begins to exert itself? And therefore, the coming to the use of speech, if it were supposed the time that these maxims are first assented to, (which it may be with as much truth, as the time when men come to the use of reason), would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to say, they are innate because men assent to them, when they come to the use of reason. I agree then with these men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of reason is the precise time when they are first taken notice of; and, if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them in-

nate. All that can with any truth be meant by this proposition, that men *assent to them when they come to the use of reason*, is no more but this, that the making of general abstract ideas, and the understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names that stand for them, till having for a good while exercised their reason about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their ordinary discourse and actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation. If assenting to these maxims, when men come to the use of reason, can be true in any other sense, I desire it may be shown; or at least, how in this, or any other sense, it proves them innate.

§ 15. The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet; and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind proceeding farther, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty: and the use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these materials, that give it employment, increase. But though the having of general ideas, and the use of general words, and reason, usually grow together; yet I see not how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths, I confess, is very early in the mind; but in a way that shews them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired: it being about those first, which are imprinted by external things, with



which infants have earliest to do, which make the most frequent impressions on their senses. In ideas thus got, the mind discovers, that some agree, and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of memory; as soon as it is able to retain and receive distinct ideas. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of words, or comes to that which we commonly call the *use of reason*. For a child knows certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter, *i. e.* that sweet is not bitter, as it knows afterwards, when it comes to speak, that wormwood and sugar-plumbs are not the same thing.

§ 16. A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count to seven, and has got the name and idea of equality: and then upon explaining those words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the truth of that proposition. But neither does he then readily assent, because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting till then, because he wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him, as soon as he has settled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas that these names stand for: and then he knows the truth of that proposition, upon the same grounds, and by the same means, that he knew before that a red and cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same grounds also, that he may come to know afterwards, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*, as shall be more fully shewn hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas, about which these maxims are; or to know the signification of those general terms that stand for them; or to put together in

his mind the ideas they stand for; the later also will it be before he comes to assent to those maxims, whose terms, with the ideas they stand for, being no more innate than those of a cat or a weasel, he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first occasion that shall make him put together those ideas in his mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is, that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-seven, by the same self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three: yet a child knows this not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of reason; but because the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty-seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those which are signified by one, two, and three.

§ 17. This evasion therefore of general assent, when men come to the use of reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those supposed innate, and other truths, that are afterwards acquired and learned, men have endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims, by saying, they are generally *assented to as soon as proposed*, and the terms they are proposed in understood: seeing all men, even children, as soon as they hear and understand the terms, assent to these propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For since men never fail, after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these propositions were first lodged in the understanding, which, without any teaching, the mind, at the very first proposal,

immediately closes with, and assents to, and after that never doubts again.

§ 18. In answer to this, I demand, whether ready assent given to a proposition upon first hearing, and understanding the terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle? If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urged as a proof of them: if it be said, that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all such propositions to be innate, which are generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate principles. For upon the same ground, viz. of assent at first hearing and understanding the terms, that men would have those maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several propositions about numbers to be innate: and thus, *That one and two are equal to three; that two and two are equal to four;* and a multitude of other the like propositions in numbers, that every body assents to, at first hearing, and understanding the terms, must have a place amongst those innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propositions made about several of them; but even natural philosophy, and all the other sciences, afford propositions, which are sure to meet with assent as soon as they are understood. *That two bodies cannot be in the same place,* is a truth that no-body any more sticks at, than at this maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be; That white is not black; That a square is not a circle; That yellowness is not sweetness:* these and a million of other such propositions, as many at least as we have distinct ideas of, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If these men will be true to their

own rules and have assent, at first hearing and understanding the terms, to be a mark of innate, they must allow, not only as many innate propositions as men have distinct ideas, but as many as men can make propositions wherein different ideas are denied one of another. Since every proposition, wherein one different idea is denied of another, will as certainly find assent at first hearing and understanding the terms, as this general one, *It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*; or that which is the foundation of it, and is the easier understood of the two, *The same is not different*: by which account, they will have legions of innate propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other. But since no proposition can be innate, unless the ideas about which it is to be innate; this will be to suppose all our ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, figures, &c. innate; than which, there cannot be any thing more opposite to reason and experience. Universal and ready assent upon hearing and understanding the terms, is, I grant, a mark of self-evidence: but self-evidence, depending not on innate impressions, but on something else, as we shall shew hereafter, belongs to several propositions, which no-body was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate.

§ 19. Nor let it be said, that those more particular self-evident propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as, *That one and two are equal to three*; *That green is not red*, &c. are received as the consequences of those more universal propositions, which are looked on as innate principles; since any one, who will but take the pains to observe what passes in the understanding, will certainly find, that these, and the like less general propositions, are certainly known and firmly

assented to, by those who are utterly ignorant of those more general maxims; and so, being earlier in the mind than those, as they are called, first principles, cannot owe to them the assent wherewith they are received at first hearing.

§ 20. If it be said, that these propositions, *viz. Two and two are equal to four; Red is not blue, &c.* are not general maxims, nor of any great use. I answer, that makes nothing to the argument of universal assent, upon hearing and understanding. For, if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever proposition can be found, that receives general assent as soon as heard and understood, that must be admitted for an innate proposition, as well as this maxim, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be,* they being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote from being innate; those general and abstract ideas, being more strangers to our first apprehensions, than those more particular self-evident propositions; and therefore, it is longer before they are admitted and assented to by the growing understanding. And as to the usefulness of these magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as it is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered.

§ 21. But we have not yet done with *assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding their terms*; it is fit we first take notice, that this, instead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary: since it supposes, that several, who understand and know other things, are ignorant of these principles, till they are proposed to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these truths, till he hears them from o-

thers. For if they were innate, what need they be proposed, in order to gaining assent; when, by being in the understanding, by a natural and original impression, if there were any such, they could not but be known before? Or doth the proposing them, print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If so, then the consequence will be, that a man knows them better, after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whence it will follow, that these principles may be made more evident to us by other teaching, than nature has made them by impression; which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge, as they are pretended to be. This cannot be denied, that men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident truths, upon their being proposed: but it is clear, that whosoever does so, finds in himself, that he then begins to know a proposition, which he knew not before; and which, from thenceforth, he never questions; not because it was innate, but because the consideration of the nature of the things contained in those words, would not suffer him to think otherwise, how, or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is assented to at first hearing, and understanding the terms, must pass for an innate principle, every well-grounded observation drawn from particulars into a general rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain, that not all, but only sagacious heads, light at first on these observations, and reduce them into general propositions, not innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance, and reflection on particular instances. These, when observing

men have made them, unobserving men, when they are proposed to them, cannot refuse their assent to.

§ 22. If it be said, the understanding hath an *implicit knowledge* of these principles, but not an explicit, before the first hearing, (as they must, who will say, that they are in the understanding before they are known), it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding implicitly; unless it be this, that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such propositions. And thus all mathematical demonstrations, as well as first principles, must be received as native impressions on the mind: which, I fear, they will scarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition, than assent to it when demonstrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn, were but copies of those innate characters which nature had engraven upon their minds.

§ 23. There is, I fear, this farther weakness in the foregoing argument, which would persuade us, that therefore those maxims are to be thought innate, which men *admit at first hearing*, because they assent to propositions which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argument or demonstration, but a bare explication or understanding of the terms. Under which, there seems to me to lie this fallacy; that men are supposed not to be taught, nor to learn any thing *de novo*; when, in truth, they are taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For first it is evident, they have learned the terms and their signification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired know-

ledge in the case: the ideas themselves, about which the proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got afterwards. So that in all propositions that are assented to at first hearing, the terms of the proposition, their standing for such ideas, and the ideas themselves that they stand for, being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there is remaining in such propositions that is innate. For I would gladly have any one name that proposition, whose terms or ideas were either of them innate. We by degrees get ideas and names, and learn their appropriated connection one with another; and then to propositions, made in such terms, whose signification we have learned, and wherein the agreement or disagreement we can perceive in our ideas, when put together, is expressed, we at first hearing assent; though to other propositions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas not so soon or so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of assenting. For though a child quickly assents to this proposition, *That an apple is not fire*, when, by familiar acquaintance, he has got the ideas of those two different things distinctly imprinted on his mind, and has learned that the names *apple* and *fire* stand for them; yet it will be some years after, perhaps, before the same child will assent to this proposition, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*: because, that though, perhaps, the words are as easy to be learned, yet the signification of them, being more large, comprehensive, and abstract, than of the names annexed to those sensible things the child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their precise meaning, and it requires more time



plainly to form in his mind those general ideas they stand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child assent to a proposition made up of such general terms: but as soon as ever he has got those ideas, and learned their names, he forwardly closes with the one, as well as the other of the forementioned propositions; and with both for the same reason, *viz.* because he finds the ideas he has in his mind to agree or disagree, according as the words standing for them are affirmed or denied one of another in the proposition. But if propositions be brought to him in words, which stand for ideas he has not yet in his mind; to such propositions, however evidently true or false in themselves, he affords neither assent nor dissent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty sounds, any farther than they are signs of our ideas, we cannot but assent to them, as they correspond to those ideas we have, but no farther than that. But the shewing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds, and the grounds of several degrees of assent, being the business of the following discourse, it may suffice to have only touched on it here, as one reason that made me doubt of those innate principles.

§ 24. To conclude this argument of *universal consent*, I agree with these defenders of innate principles, that if they are innate, they must needs have universal assent. For that a truth should be innate, and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a man to know a truth, and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then, by these mens own confession, they cannot be innate; since they are not assented to by those who understand not the terms, nor by a great part of those

who do understand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of those propositions; which, I think, is at least one half of mankind. But were the number far less, it would be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby shew these propositions not to be innate, if children alone were ignorant of them.

§ 25. But that I may not be accused to argue from the thoughts of infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude from what passes in their understandings before they express it; I say next, that these two general propositions are not the truths that *first possess the minds* of children; nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions; which if they were innate, they must needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when children begin to think, and their words and actions do assure us that they do so. When therefore they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of assent, can it rationally be supposed, they can be ignorant of those notions that nature has imprinted, were there any such? Can it be imagined, with any appearance of reason, that they perceive the impressions from things without; and be at the same time ignorant of those characters, which nature itself has taken care to stamp within? Can they receive and assent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of those which are supposed woven into the very principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge, and future reasonings? This would be to make nature take pains to no purpose; or, at least, to write very ill; since its characters could not be read by those eyes, which saw other things very

well; and those are very ill supposed the clearest parts of truth, and the foundations of all our knowledge, which are not first known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of several other things may be had. The child certainly knows, that the *nurse* that feeds it, is neither the *cat* it plays with, nor the *blackmoor* it is afraid of; that the *wormseed* or *mustard* it refuses, is not the *apple* or *sugar* it cries for; this it is certainly and undoubtedly assured of: but will any one say, it is by virtue of this principle, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*, that it so firmly assents to these, and other parts of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition at an age, wherein yet it is plain, it knows a great many other truths? He that will say, children join these general abstract speculations with their sucking-bottles and their rattles, may perhaps, with justice be thought to have more passion and zeal for his opinion, but less sincerity and truth than one of that age.

§ 26. Though therefore there be several general propositions, that meet with constant and ready assent, as soon as proposed to men grown up, who have attained the use of more general and abstract ideas, and names standing for them; yet they not being to be found in those of tender years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent persons, and so by no means can be supposed innate: it being impossible, that any truth which is innate, if there were any such, should be unknown, at least to any one who knows any thing else. Since, if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts; there being nothing a truth in the mind that it has never thought on. Whereby

it is evident, if there be any *innate truths in the mind*, they *must necessarily be the first of any thought on*; the first that appear there.

§ 27. That the general maxims we are discoursing of, are not known to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind, we have already sufficiently proved; whereby it is evident, they have not an universal assent, nor are general impressions. But there is this farther argument in it, against their being innate, that these characters, if they were native and original impressions, *should appear fairest and clearest* in those persons, in whom yet we find no footsteps of them: and it is, in my opinion, a strong presumption that they are not innate; since they are least known to those, in whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots, savages, and illiterate people, being of all others the least corrupted by custom or borrowed opinions; learning and education, having not cast their native thoughts into new moulds, nor by superinducing foreign and studied doctrines, confounded those fair characters nature had written there; one might reasonably imagine, that in their minds these innate notions should lie open fairly to every one's view, as it is certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected, that these principles should be perfectly known to naturals, which being stamped immediately on the soul, as these men suppose, can have no dependence on the constitutions or organs of the body, the only confessed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these mens principles, that all these native beams of light, were there any such, should in those, who have no reserves, no arts of

concealment, shine out in their full lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleasure, and abhorrence of pain. But alas! amongst children, idiots, savages, and the grossly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? what universal principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from those objects they have had most to do with, and which have made upon their senses the frequentest and strongest impressions. A child knows his nurse and his cradle, and by degrees the play-things of a little more advanced age; and a young savage has, perhaps, his head filled with love and hunting, according to the fashion of his tribe. But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will expect these abstract maxims and reputed principles of sciences, will, I fear, find himself mistaken. Such kind of general propositions are seldom mentioned in the huts of Indians, much less are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and business of the schools and academies of learned nations, accustomed to that sort of conversation, or learning, where disputes are frequent; these maxims being suited to artificial argumentation, and useful for conviction; but not much conducing to the discovery of truth, or advancement of knowledge. But of their small use for the improvement of knowledge, I shall have occasion to speak more at large, *lib. 4. cap. 7.*

§ 28. I know not how absurd this may seem to the masters of demonstration; and probably, it will hardly down with any body at first hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with pre-

judice, and the forbearance of censure, till I have been heard out in the sequel of this discourse, being very willing to submit to better judgments. And since I impartially search after truth, I shall not be sorry to be convinced that I have been too fond of my own notions; which I confess we are all apt to be, when application and study have warmed our heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground to think these two famed speculative maxims innate; since they are not universally assented to; and the assent they so generally find, is no other than what several propositions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them: and since the assent that is given them, is produced another way, and comes not from natural inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following discourse. *And if these first principles of knowledge and science are found not to be innate, no other speculative maxims can, I suppose, with better right pretend to be so.*

## C H A P. III.

*No innate practical Principles.*

- § 1. *No moral principles so clear and so generally received, as the forementioned speculative maxims.*  
 § 2. *Faith and justice not owned as principles by all men.* § 3. *Obj. Though men deny them in their practice, yet they admit them in their thoughts, answered.* § 4. *Moral rules need a proof, ergo, not innate.* § 5. *Instance in keeping compacts.*  
 § 6. *Virtue generally approved, not because innate, but because profitable.* § 7. *Mens actions convince us, that the rule of virtue is not their internal principle.* § 8. *Conscience no proof of any innate moral rule.* § 9. *Instances of enormities practised without remorse.* § 10. *Men have contrary practical principles.* § 11—13. *Whole nations reject several moral rules.* § 14. *Those who maintain innate practical principles, tell us not what they are.* § 15—19. *Lord Herbert's innate principles examined.* § 20. *Obj. Innate principles may be corrupted, answered.* § 21. *Contrary principles in the world.* § 22—26. *How men commonly come by their principles.* § 27. *Principles must be examined.*

**I**F those speculative maxims, whereof we discoursed in the foregoing chapter, have not an actual universal assent from all mankind, as we there proved, it is much more visible concerning *practical principles*, that they *come short of an universal reception*: and I think it will be hard to in-

stance any one moral rule which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as, *What is, is*; or to be so manifest a truth as this, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*. Whereby it is evident, that they are farther removed from a title to be innate; and the doubt of their being native impressions on the mind, is stronger against these moral principles than the other. Not that it brings their truth at all in question: they are equally true, though not equally evident. Those speculative maxims carry their own evidence with them: but moral principles require reasoning and discourse, and some exercise of the mind, to discover the certainty of their truth. They lie not open as natural characters engraven on the mind; which, if any such were, they must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own light be certain and known to every body. But this is no derogation to their truth and certainty, no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones, because it is not so evident as *the whole is bigger than a part*, nor so apt to be assented to at first hearing. It may suffice, that these moral rules are capable of demonstration; and therefore it is our own fault if we come not to a certain knowledge of them. But the ignorance wherein many men are of them, and the slowness of assent wherewith others receive them, are manifest proofs that they are not innate, and such as offer themselves to their view without searching.

§ 2. Whether there be any such moral principles, wherein all men do agree, I appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys. Where is that



practical truth, that is universally received without doubt or question, as it must be if innate? *Justice*, and keeping of contracts, is that which *most men seem to agree in*. This is a principle, which is thought to extend itself to the dens of thieves, and the confederacies of the greatest villains; and they who have gone farthest towards the putting off humanity itself, keep faith and rules of justice one with another. I grant that outlaws themselves do this one amongst another; but it is without receiving these as the innate laws of nature. They practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities: but it is impossible to conceive, that he embraces justice as a practical principle, who acts fairly with his fellow-highwaymen, and at the same time plunders or kills the next honest man he meets with. Justice and truth are the common ties of society; and therefore, even outlaws and robbers, who break with all the world besides, must keep faith and rules of equity amongst themselves, or else they cannot hold together. But will any one say, that those that live by fraud and rapine have innate principles of truth and justice which they allow and assent to?

§ 3. Perhaps it will be urged, that the *tacit assent of their minds agrees to what their practice contradicts*. I answer, first, I have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts. But since it is certain, that most mens practice, and some mens open professions, have either questioned or denied these principles, it is impossible to establish an universal consent (though we should look for it only amongst grown men), without which, it is impossible to conclude them innate. Secondly, It is very strange and unrea-

sonable to suppose innate practical principles, that terminate only in contemplation. Practical principles derived from nature, are there for operation, and must produce conformity of action, not barely speculative assent to their truth, or else they are in vain distinguished from speculative maxims. Nature, I confess, has put into man a desire of happiness, and an aversion to misery: these indeed are innate practical principles, which, as practical principles ought, do continue constantly to operate and influence all our actions, without ceasing: these may be observed, in all persons and all ages, steady and universal; but these are inclinations of the appetite to good, not impressions of truth on the understanding. I deny not, that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men; and that, from the very first instances of sense and perception, there are some things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; some things that they incline to, and others that they fly: but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge, regulating our practice. Such natural impressions on the understanding, are so far from being confirmed hereby, that this is an argument against them: since if there were certain characters imprinted by nature on the understanding as the principles of knowledge, we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us, and influence our knowledge, as we do those others on the will and appetite; which never cease to be the constant springs and motives of all our actions, to which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us.

§ 4. Another reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles is, that I think

there cannot any one moral rule be proposed, whereof a man may not justly demand a reason: which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd, if they were innate, or so much as self-evident; which every innate principle must needs be, and not need any proof to ascertain its truth, nor want any reason to gain it approbation. He would be thought void of common sense, who asked, on the one side or on the other side, to give a reason, *Why it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be.* It carries its own light and evidence with it, and needs no other proof: he that understands the terms, assents to it for its own sake, or else nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But should that most unshaken rule of morality, and foundation of all social virtue, *That one should do as he would be done unto,* be proposed to one who never heard it before, but yet is of capacity to understand its meaning; might he not, without any absurdity, ask a reason why? And were not he that proposed it bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it to him? Which plainly shews it not to be innate; for if it were, it could neither want nor receive any proof; but must needs (at least, as soon as heard and understood) be received and assented to, as an unquestionable truth, which a man can by no means doubt of. So that the truth of all these moral rules plainly depends upon some other antecedent to them, and from which they must be deduced; which could not be, if either they were innate, or so much as self-evident.

§ 5. That men should keep their compacts, is certainly a great and undeniable rule in morality: but yet, if a Christian, who has the view of happiness and misery in another life, be asked, why

a man must keep his word? he will give this as a reason; because GOD, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us. But if an Hobbist be asked, why? he will answer, because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you if you do not. And if one of the old heathen philosophers had been asked, he would have answered, because it was dishonest, below the dignity of a man, and opposite to virtue, the highest perfection of human nature, to do otherwise.

§ 6. Hence naturally flows the great variety of opinions concerning the moral rules, which are to be found among men, according to the different sorts of happiness they have a prospect of, or propose to themselves: which could not be if practical principles were innate, and imprinted in our minds immediately by the hand of GOD. - I grant the existence of GOD is so many ways manifest, and the obedience we owe him so congruous to the light of reason, that a great part of mankind give testimony to the law of nature; but yet I think it must be allowed, that several moral rules may receive from mankind a very general approbation, without either knowing or admitting the true ground of morality; which can only be the will and law of a GOD, who sees men in the dark, has in his hand rewards and punishments, and power enough to call to account the proudest offender. For GOD having, by an inseparable connection, joined virtue and public happiness together, and made the practice thereof necessary to the preservation of society, and visibly beneficial to all with whom the virtuous man has to do; it is no wonder, that every one should not only allow, but recommend and magnify

those rules to others, from whose observance of them he is sure to reap advantage to himself. He may, out of interest, as well as conviction, cry up that for sacred, which if once trampled on and profaned, he himself cannot be safe nor secure. This, though it takes nothing from the moral and eternal obligation which these rules evidently have; yet it shews, that the outward acknowledgment men pay them in their words, proves not that they are innate principles; nay, it proves not so much, that men assent to them inwardly in their own minds, as the inviolable rules of their own practice: since we find that self-interest, and the conveniencies of this life, make many men own an outward profession and approbation of them, whose actions sufficiently prove, that they very little consider the Lawgiver that prescribed these rules, nor the hell he has ordained for the punishment of those that transgress them.

§ 7. For, if we will not in civility allow too much sincerity to the professions of most men, but think their actions to be the interpreters of their thoughts, we shall find, that they have no such internal veneration for these rules, nor so *full a persuasion of their certainty* and obligation. The great principle of morality, *To do as one would be done to*, is more commended than practised. But the breach of this rule cannot be a greater vice, than to teach others, that it is no moral rule, nor obligatory, would be thought madness, and contrary to that interest men sacrifice to, when they break it themselves. Perhaps conscience will be urged as checking us for such breaches, and so the internal obligation and establishment of the rule be preserved.

§ 8. To which I answer, that I doubt not,

but, without being written on their hearts, many men may, by the same way that they come to the knowledge of other things, come to assent to several moral rules, and be convinced of their obligation. Others also may come to be of the same mind, from their education, company, and customs of their country; which persuasion, however got, will serve to set conscience on work, which is nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions. And if conscience be a proof of innate principles, contraries may be innate principles; since some men, with the same bent of conscience, prosecute what others avoid.

§ 9. But I cannot see how any men should ever transgress those moral rules, with confidence and serenity, were they innate, and stamped upon their mind. View but an army at the sacking of a town, and see what observation, or sense of moral principles, or what touch of conscience for all the outrages they do. Robberies, murders, rapes, are the sports of men set at liberty from punishment and censure. Have there not been whole nations, and those of the most civilized people, amongst whom the exposing their children, and leaving them in the fields to perish by want or wild beasts, has been the practice, as little condemned or scrupled as the begetting them? Do they not still, in some countries, put them into the same graves with their mothers, if they die in child-birth; or dispatch them, if a pretended astrologer declares them to have unhappy stars? And are there not places, where, at a certain age, they kill, or expose their parents, without any remorse at all? In a part of Asia, the sick, when their case comes to be thought desperate, are car-

ried out and laid on the earth, before they are dead; and left there, exposed to wind and weather, to perish without assistance or pity. It is familiar among the Mengrelians<sup>1</sup>, a people professing Christianity, to bury their children alive without scruple. There are places<sup>2</sup> where they eat their own children. The Caribbees<sup>3</sup> were wont to geld their children, on purpose to fat and eat them. And Garcilasso de la Vega<sup>4</sup> tells us of a people in Peru, which were wont to fat and eat the children they got on their female captives, whom they kept as concubines for that purpose; and when they were past breeding, the mothers themselves were killed too and eaten. The virtues<sup>5</sup>, whereby the Tououpinambos believed they merited paradise, were revenge, and eating abundance of their enemies. They have not so much as the name for GOD; no acknowledgment of any GOD<sup>6</sup>, no religion, no worship. The saints, who are canonized amongst the Turks, lead lives, which one cannot with modesty relate. A remarkable passage to this purpose, out of the voyage of Baumgarten, which is a book not every day to be met with, I shall set down at large, in the language it is published in. *Ibi (sc. prope Belbes in Ægypto) vidimus sanctum unum Saracenicum inter arenarum cumulos, ita ut ex utero matris prodiit nudum sedentem. Mos est, ut didicimus, Mahometistis, ut eos qui amantes, et sine ratione sunt, pro sanctis colant*

<sup>1</sup> Gruber apud Thevenot, part iv. p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Lambert apud Thevenot, p. 38.

<sup>3</sup> Vossius de Nili Origine, cap. xviii, xix.

<sup>4</sup> P. Mart. Deo.

<sup>5</sup> Hist. des Incas, lib. i. cap. 12.

<sup>6</sup> Lery, cap. xvi. p. 231.

*et venerentur. Insuper et eos qui cum diu vitam egerint inquinatissimam, voluntariam demum pœnitentiam et paupertatem, sanctitate venerandos deputant. Ejusmodi vero genus hominum libertatem quandam effrœnem habent, domos quas volunt intrandi, edendi, bibendi, et quod majus est, concumbendi; ex quo concubitu, si proles secuta fuerit, sancta similiter habetur. His ergo hominibus, dum vivunt, magnos exhibent honores; mortuis vero vel templa vel monumenta extruunt amplissima, eosque contingere ac sepelire maximæ fortunæ ducunt loco. Audivimus hæc dicta et dicenda per interpretem a Mucrolo nostro. Insuper sanctum illum, quem eo loco vidimus, publicitus apprime commendari, eum esse hominem sanctum, divinum ac integritate præcipuum; eo quod, nec fœminarum unquam esset, nec puerorum, sed tantum modo asellarum concubitus atque mularum.* Peregr. Baumgarten, l. ii. c. i. p. 73. More of the same kind, concerning these precious saints amongst the Turks, may be seen in Pietro della Valle, in his letter of the 25th of January 1616. Where then are those innate principles of justice, piety, gratitude, equity, chastity? Or, where is that universal consent, that assures us there are such inbred rules? Murders in duels, when fashion has made them honourable, are committed without remorse of conscience; nay, in many places, innocence in this case is the greatest ignominy. And if we look abroad, to take a view of men, as they are, we shall find, that they have remorse in one place, for doing or omitting that, which others, in another place, think they merit by.

§ 10. He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind, and look abroad into the several tribes of men, and with indifferency survey their



actions, will be able to satisfy himself, that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named, or rules of virtue to be thought on, (those only excepted that are absolutely necessary to hold society together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct societies) which is not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men, governed by practical opinions, and rules of living, quite opposite to others.

§ 11. Here, perhaps, it will be objected, that it is no argument, that the *rule is not known, because it is broken*. I grant the objection good, where men, though they transgress, yet disown not the law; where fear of shame, censure, or punishment, carries the mark of some awe it has upon them. But it is impossible to conceive, that a whole nation of men should all publicly reject and renounce, what every one of them, certainly and infallibly, knew to be a law: for so they must, who have it naturally imprinted on their minds. It is possible men may sometimes own rules of morality, which, in their private thoughts, they do not believe to be true, only to keep themselves in reputation and esteem amongst those who are persuaded of their obligation. But it is not to be imagined, that a whole society of men should publicly and professedly disown, and cast off a rule, which they could not, in their own minds, but be infallibly certain was a law; nor be ignorant, that all men they should have to do with, knew it to be such: and therefore must every one of them apprehend from others, all the contempt and abhorrence due to one who professes himself void of humanity; and one, who confounding

wrong, cannot but be looked on as the professed enemy of their peace and happiness. Whatever practical principle is innate, cannot but be known to every one to be just and good. It is therefore little less than a contradiction, to suppose, that whole nations of men should, both in their professions and practice, unanimously and universally give the lie to what, by the most invincible evidence, every one of them knew to be true, right, and good. This is enough to satisfy us, that no practical rule, which is any-where universally, and with public approbation or allowance transgressed, can be supposed innate. But I have something farther to add, in answer to this objection.

§ 12. The breaking of a rule, say you, is no argument that it is unknown. I grant it: but the *generally allowed breach of it any-where*, I say, is a proof that it is not innate. For example, let us take any of these rules, which being the most obvious deductions of human reason, and conformable to the natural inclination of the greatest part of men, fewest people have had the impudence to deny, or inconsideration to doubt of. If any can be thought to be naturally imprinted, none, I think, can have a fairer pretence to be innate, than this; *Parents, preserve and cherish your children*. When therefore you say, that this is an innate rule, what do you mean? Either, that it is an innate principle, which, upon all occasions, excites and directs the actions of all men; or else, that it is a truth which all men have imprinted on their minds, and which therefore they know and assent to. But in neither of these senses is it innate. *First*, That it is not a principle, which influences all mens actions, is what I have proved by the examples before cited; nor need we seek

so far as Mengrelia or Peru, to find instances of such as neglect, abuse, nay, and destroy their children; or look on it only as the more than brutality of some savage and barbarous nations, when we remember, that it was a familiar and uncondemned practice among the Greeks and Romans, to expose, without pity or remorse, their innocent infants. *Secondly*, That it is an innate truth, known to all men, is also false. For, *Parents, preserve your children*, is so far from an innate truth, that it is no truth at all; it being a command, and not a proposition, and so not capable of truth or falsehood. To make it capable of being assented to as true, it must be reduced to some such proposition as this; *It is the duty of parents to preserve their children*. But what duty is, cannot be understood without a law; nor a law be known or supposed without a law-maker, or without reward and punishment: so that it is impossible that this, or any other practical principle, should be innate; *i. e.* be imprinted on the mind as a duty, without supposing the ideas of GOD, of law, of obligation, of punishment, of a life after this, innate. For that punishment follows not, in this life, the breach of this rule; and consequently, that it has not the force of a law in countries where the generally allowed practice runs counter to it, is in itself evident. But these ideas (which must be all of them innate, if any thing as a duty be so) are so far from being innate, that it is not every stupid or thinking man, much less every one that is born, in whom they are to be found clear and distinct: and that one of them, which of all others seems most likely to be innate, is not so, (I mean the idea of GOD), I think, in

the next chapter, will appear very evident to any considering man.

§ 13. From what has been said, I think we may safely conclude, that *whatever practical rule is, in any place, generally and with allowance broken, cannot be supposed innate*, it being impossible that men should, without shame or fear, confidently and serenely break a rule, which they could not but evidently know that GOD had set up, and would certainly punish the breach (of which they must, if it were innate) to a degree, to make it a very ill bargain to the transgressor. Without such a knowledge as this, a man can never be certain that any thing is his duty. Ignorance or doubt of the law, hopes to escape the knowledge or power of the law-maker, or the like, may make men give way to a present appetite: but let any one see the fault, and the rod by it, and with the transgression, a fire ready to punish it; a pleasure tempting, and the hand of the Almighty visibly held up, and prepared to take vengeance, (for this must be the case, where any duty is imprinted on the mind), and then tell me, whether it be possible for people, with such a prospect, such a certain knowledge as this, wantonly, and without scruple, to offend against a law, which they carry about them in indelible characters, and that stares them in the face whilst they are breaking it? Whether men, at the same time that they feel in themselves the imprinted edicts of an omnipotent Law-maker, can, with assurance and gaiety, slight and trample under foot his most sacred injunctions? And lastly, whether it be possible, that whilst a man thus openly bids defiance to this innate law, and supreme Law-giver, all the by-standers, yea, even the governors and rulers of the

people, full of the same sense, both of the law and law-maker, should silently connive, without testifying their dislike, or laying the least blame on it: Principles of actions indeed there are lodged in mens appetites; but these are so far from being innate moral principles, that if they were left to their full swing, they would carry men to the overturning of all morality. Moral laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant desires, which they cannot be but by rewards and punishments, that will over-balance the satisfaction any one shall purpose to himself in the breach of the law. If therefore any thing be imprinted on the mind of all men as a law, all men must have a certain and unavoidable knowledge, that certain and unavoidable punishment will attend the breach of it. For if men can be ignorant or doubtful of what is innate, innate principles are insisted on, and urged to no purpose; truth and certainty, the things pretended, are not at all secured by them: but men are in the same uncertain floating estate with, as without them. An evident indubitable knowledge of unavoidable punishment, great enough to make the transgression very uneligious, must accompany an innate law; unless with an innate law, they can suppose an innate gospel too. I would not be here mistaken, as if, because I deny an innate law, I thought there were none but positive laws. There is a great deal of difference between an innate law, and a law of nature; between something imprinted on our minds in this very original, and something that we being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our natural faculties. And, I think, they equally forsake the truth, who running into the contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that there is

a law knowable by the light of nature; *i. e.* without the help of positive revelation.

§ 14. The difference there is amongst men in their practical principles, is so evident, that, I think, I need say no more to evince, that it will be impossible to find\* any innate moral rules, by this mark of general assent: and it is enough to make one suspect, that the supposition of such innate principles, is but an opinion taken up at pleasure; since those who talk so confidently of them, are so sparing to *tell us which they are*. This might, with justice, be expected from those men who lay stress upon this opinion: and it gives occasion to distrust either their knowledge or charity, who declaring, that GOD has imprinted on the minds of men the foundations of knowledge; and the rules of living, are yet so little favourable to the information of their neighbours, or the quiet of mankind, as not to point out to them which they are, in the variety men are distracted with. But in truth, were there any such innate principles, there would be no need to teach them. Did men find such innate propositions stamped on their minds, they would easily be able to distinguish them from other truths, that they afterwards learned, and deduced from them; and there would be nothing more easy, than to know what, and how many they were. There could be no more doubt about their number, than there is about the number of our fingers; and it is like, then, every system would be ready to give them us by tale. But since no-body, that I know, has ventured yet to give a catalogue of them, they cannot blame those who doubt of the innate principles; since even they who require men to believe that there are such innate propositions, do

not tell us what they are. It is easy to foresee, that if different men of different sects should go about to give us a list of those innate practical principles, they would set down only such as suited their distinct hypothesis, and were fit to support the doctrines of their particular schools or churches: a plain evidence that there are no such innate truths. Nay, a great part of men are so far from finding any such innate moral principles in themselves, that by denying freedom to mankind, and thereby making men no other than bare machines, they take away not only innate, but all moral rules whatsoever, and leave not a possibility to believe any such, to those who cannot conceive, how any thing can be capable of a law, that is not a free agent: and upon that ground, they must necessarily reject all principles of virtue, who cannot *put morality and mechanism together*; which are not very easy to be reconciled, or made consistent.

§ 15. When I had writ this, being informed, that my Lord Herbert had, in his books *de Veritate*, assigned these innate principles, I presently consulted him, hoping to find, in a man of so great parts, something that might satisfy me in this point, and put an end to my inquiry. In his chapter *de Instinctu Naturali*, p. 76. edit. 1656. I met with these six marks of his *notitia communes*. 1. *Prioritas*. 2. *Independentia*. 3. *Universalitas*. 4. *Certitudo*. 5. *Necessitas*; i. e. as he explains it, *faciunt ad hominis conversationem*. 6. *Modus conformationis*; i. e. *assensus nulla interposita mora*. And at the latter end of his little treatise, *de Religione Laici*, he says this of these innate principles; *Adeo ut non uniuscujusvis religionis confinio arctentur quæ ubique vigent veritates. Sunt enim in ipsu*

*mente cœlitus descriptæ nullisque traditionibus, sive scriptis, sive non scriptis, obnoxia*, p. 3. And, *Veritates nostræ catholicæ, quæ tanquam indubia Dei effata in foro interiori descripta*. Thus having given the marks of the innate principles or common notions, and asserted their being imprinted on the minds of men by the hand of GOD, he proceeds to set them down; and they are these: 1. *Esse aliquid supremum numen.* 2. *Numen illud coli debere.* 3. *Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimam esse rationem cultus divini.* 4. *Respiciendum esse a peccatis.* 5. *Dari premium vel pœnam post hanc vitam transactam.* Though I allow these to be clear truths, and such as, if rightly explained, a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his assent to; yet I think he is far from proving them innate impressions *in foro interiori descriptæ*. For I must take leave to observe,

§ 16. *First*, That these five propositions are either not all, or more than all, those common notions writ on our minds by the finger of GOD, if it were reasonable to believe any at all to be so written. Since there are other propositions, which, even by his own rules, have as just a pretence to such an original, and may be as well admitted for innate principles, as, at least, some of these five he enumerates, *viz. Do as thou wouldst be done unto*: and perhaps some hundreds of others, when well considered.

§ 17. *Secondly*, That all his marks are not to be found in each of his five propositions, *viz.* his first, second, and third marks, agree perfectly to neither of them; and the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth marks, agree but ill to his third, fourth, and fifth propositions. For, besides that we are assured from history of many men, nay, whole



nations, who doubt or disbelieve some or all of them; I cannot see how the third, *viz. That virtue joined with piety, is the best worship of God*, can be an innate principle, when the name, or sound, VIRTUE, is so hard to be understood, liable to so much uncertainty in its signification, and the thing it stands for so much contended about, and difficult to be known. And therefore this can be but a very uncertain rule of human practice, and serve but very little to the conduct of our lives, and is therefore very unfit to be assigned as an innate practical principle.

§ 18. For let us consider this proposition as to its meaning, (for it is the sense, and not sound, that is and must be the principle and common notion), *viz. Virtue is the best worship of God*; i. e. is most acceptable to him; which, if virtue be taken, as commonly it is, for those actions, which, according to the different opinions of several countries, are accounted laudable, will be a proposition so far from being certain, that it will not be true. If virtue be taken for actions conformable to GOD's will, or to the rule prescribed by GOD, which is the true and only measure of virtue, when virtue is used to signify what is in its own nature right and good; then this proposition, *That virtue is the best worship of God*, will be most true and certain, but of very little use in human life: since it will amount to no more but this, *viz. That God is pleased with the doing of what he commands*; which a man may certainly know to be true, without knowing what it is that GOD doth command; and so be as far from any rule or principles of his actions, as he was before: and I think very few will take a proposition which amounts to no more than this, *viz. That GOD is pleased*

with the doing of what he himself commands, for an innate moral principle writ on the minds of all men, (however true and certain it may be), since it teaches so little. Whosoever does so, will have reason to think hundreds of propositions innate principles, since there are many, which have as good a title as this to be received for such, which no-body yet ever put into that rank of innate principles.

§ 19. Nor is the fourth proposition (*viz. Men must repent of their sins*) much more instructive, till what those actions are that are meant by sins be set down. For the word *peccata* or *sins*, being put, as it usually is, to signify in general ill actions, that will draw on punishment upon the doers; what great principle of morality can that be, to tell us we should be sorry, and cease to do that which will bring mischief upon us, without knowing what those particular actions are that will do so? Indeed, this is a very true exposition, and fit to be inculcated on, and received by those, who are supposed to have been taught what actions in all kinds are sins; but neither this, nor the former, can be imagined to be innate principles, nor to be of any use if they were innate, unless the particular measures and bounds of all virtues and vices were engraven in mens minds, and were innate principles also, which I think is very much to be doubted. And therefore, I imagine, it will scarce seem possible that GOD should engrave principles in mens minds, in words of uncertain significations, such as virtues and sins, which, amongst different men, stand for different things: nay, it cannot be supposed to be in words at all, which, being in most of these principles very general names, cannot be un-

derstood, but by knowing the particulars comprehended under them. And in the practical instances, the measures must be taken from the knowledge of the actions themselves, and the rules of them abstracted from words, and antecedent to the knowledge of names; which rules a man must know, what language soever he chance to learn, whether English or Japan, or if he should learn no language at all, or never should understand the use of words, as happens in the case of dumb and deaf men. When it shall be made out, that men, ignorant of words, or untaught by the laws and customs of their country, know that it is part of the worship of GOD, not to kill another man; not to know more women than one; not to procure abortion; not to expose their children; not to take from another what is his, though we want it ourselves, but on the contrary, relieve and supply his wants: and whenever we have done the contrary, we ought to repent, be sorry, and resolve to do so no more: when, I say, all men shall be proved actually to know and allow all these and a thousand other such rules, all which come under these two general words made use of above, *viz. virtutes et peccata, virtues and sins*, there will be more reason for admitting these and the like, for common notions and practical principles; yet, after all, universal consent (were there any in moral principles) to truths, the knowledge whereof may be attained otherwise, would scarce prove them to be innate; which is all I contend for.

§ 20. Nor will it be of much moment here, to offer that very ready, but not very material answer, *viz.* That the *innate principles of morality, may, by education and custom, and the general opi-*

*nion of those amongst whom we converse, be darkened, and at last quite worn out of the minds of men.* Which assertion of theirs, if true, quite takes away the argument of universal consent, by which this opinion of innate principles is endeavoured to be proved; unless those men will think it reasonable, that their private persuasions, or that of their party, should pass for universal consent; a thing not unfrequently done, when men, presuming themselves to be the only masters of right reason, cast by the votes and opinions of the rest of mankind, as not worthy the reckoning. And then their argument stands thus: The principles which all mankind allow for true, are innate; those that men of right reason admit, are the principles allowed by all mankind; we, and those of our own mind, are men of reason; therefore we agreeing, our principles are innate; which is a very pretty way of arguing, and a short cut to infallibility. For otherwise it will be very hard to understand, how there be some principles, which all men do acknowledge and agree in; and yet there are none of those principles which are *not, by depraved custom and ill education, blotted out of the minds of many men*: which is to say, that all men admit, but yet many men do deny, and dissent from them. And indeed the supposition of such first principles, will serve us to very little purpose; and we shall be as much at a loss with, as without them, if they may by any human power, such as is the will of our teachers, or opinions of our companions, be altered or lost in us: and notwithstanding all this boast of first principles, and innate light, we shall be as much in the dark and uncertainty, as if there were no such thing at all: it being all one to have no rule, and one that

will warp any way, or amongst various and contrary rules, not to know which is the right. But concerning innate principles, I desire these men to say, whether they can, or cannot, by education and custom, be blurred and blotted out: if they cannot, we must find them in all mankind alike, and they must be clear in every body: and if they may suffer variation from adventitious notions, we must then find them clearest and most perspicuous nearest the fountain, in children and illiterate people, who have received least impression from foreign opinions. Let them take which side they please, they will certainly find it inconsistent with visible matter of fact and daily observation.

§ 21 I easily grant, that there are great numbers of opinions, which, by men of different countries, educations, and tempers, are received and *embraced as first and unquestionable principles; many whereof*, both for their absurdity, as well as oppositions one to another, *it is impossible should be true*. But yet all those propositions, how remote soever from reason, are so sacred somewhere or other, that men, even of good understanding in other matters, will sooner part with their lives, and whatever is dearest to them, than suffer themselves to doubt, or others to question, the truth of them.

§ 22. This, however strange it may seem, is that which every day's experience confirms; and will not, perhaps, appear so wonderful, if we consider the ways and steps by which it is brought about; and how really it may come to pass, that doctrines, that have been derived from no better original than the superstition of a nurse, or the authority of an old woman, may, by length of time, and consent of neighbours, *grow up to the*

*dignity of principles in religion or morality.* For such, who are careful, as they call it, to principle children well, (and few there be who have not a set of those principles for them, which they believe in), insfil into the unwary, and, as yet, unprejudiced understanding (for white paper receives any characters) those doctrines they would have them retain and profess. These being taught them as soon as they have any apprehension; and still as they grow up, confirmed to them, either by the open profession or tacit consent of all they have to do with; or at least by those, of whose wisdom, knowledge, and piety, they have an opinion, who never suffer those propositions to be otherwise mentioned, but as the basis and foundation on which they build their religion or manners, come, by these means, to have the reputation of unquestionable, self-evident, and innate truths.

§ 23. To which we may add, that when men, so instructed, are grown up, and reflect on their own minds, they cannot find any thing more ancient there, than those opinions which were taught them before their memory began to keep a register of their actions, or date the time when any new thing appeared to them; and therefore make no scruple to conclude, *That those propositions, of whose knowledge they can find in themselves no original, were certainly the impress of God and nature upon their minds, and not taught them by any one else.* These they entertain and submit to, as many do to their parents, with veneration; not because it is natural; nor do children do it, where they are not so taught; but because, having been always so educated, and having no remembrance of the beginning of this respect, they think it is natural.

§ 24. This will appear very likely, and almost unavoidable to come to pass, if we consider the nature of mankind, and the constitution of human affairs; wherein *most men cannot live, without employing their time in the daily labours of their calling; nor be at quiet in their minds, without some foundation or principles to rest their thoughts on.* There is scarce any one so floating and superficial in his understanding, who hath not some revered propositions, which are to him the principles on which he bottoms his reasonings; and by which he judgeth of truth and falsehood, right and wrong; which, some wanting skill and leisure, and others the inclination; and some being taught, that they ought not to examine; there are few to be found, who are not exposed, by their ignorance, laziness, education or precipitancy, to take them upon trust.

§ 25. This is evidently the case of all children and young folks; and custom, a greater power than Nature, seldom failing to make them worship for divine, what she hath inured them to bow their minds and submit their understandings to, it is no wonder that grown men, either perplexed in the necessary affairs of life, or hot in the pursuit of pleasures, should not seriously sit down to examine their own tenets; especially when one of their principles is, That principles ought not to be questioned. And had men leisure, parts, and will, who is there almost, that dare shake the foundation of all his past thoughts and actions, and endure to bring upon himself the shame of having been a long time wholly in mistake and error? Who is there hardy enough to contend with the reproach, which is every-where prepared for those who dare venture to dissent from the received opinions of their country or party? And where is the man

to be found, that can patiently prepare himself to bear the name of whimsical, sceptical, or Atheist, which he is sure to meet with, who does in the least scruple any of the common opinions? And he will be much more *afraid to question those principles*, when he shall think them, as most men do, the standards set up by GOD in his mind, to be the rule and touch-stone of all other opinions. And what can hinder him from thinking them sacred, when he finds them the earliest of all his own thoughts, and the most revered by others?

§ 26. It is easy to imagine, how by these means it comes to pass, that men worship the idols that have been set up in their minds; grow fond of the notions they have been long acquainted with there; and *stamp the characters of divinity upon absurdities and errors*, become zealous votaries to bulls and monkeys; and contend too, fight, and die in defence of their opinions. *Dum solos credit habendos esse deos, quos ipse colit.* For since the reasoning faculties of the soul, which are almost constantly, though not always warily nor wisely, employed, would not know how to move, for want of a foundation and footing, in most men, who, through laziness or avocation, do not, or for want of time, or true helps, or for other causes, cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge, and trace truth to its fountain and original, it is natural for them, and almost unavoidable, to take up with some borrowed principles; which being reputed and presumed to be the evident proofs of other things, are thought not to need any other proofs themselves. Whoever shall receive any of these into his mind, and entertain them there, with the reverence usually paid to principles, never venturing to examine them, but



accustoming himself to believe them, because they are to be believed, may take up from his education, and the fashions of his country, any absurdity for innate principles; and by long poring on the same objects, so dim his sight, as to take monsters lodged in his own brain, for the images of the Deity, and the workmanship of his own hands.

§ 27. By this progress, how many there are, who arrive at principles, which they believe innate, may be easily observed in the variety of opposite principles held and contended for by all sorts and degrees of men. And he that shall deny this to be the method wherein most men proceed to the assurance they have of the truth and evidence of their principles, will, perhaps, find it a hard matter any other way to account for the contrary tenets, which are firmly believed, confidently asserted, and which great numbers are ready at any time to seal with their blood. And, indeed, if it be the privilege of innate principles to be received upon their own authority, without examination, I know not what may not be believed, or how any one's principles can be questioned. If they may, and ought to be examined and tried, I desire to know how first any innate principles can be tried; or at least it is reasonable to demand the marks and characters whereby the genuine, innate principles, may be distinguished from others; that so, amidst the great variety of pretenders, I may be kept from mistakes, in so material a point as this. When this is done, I shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful propositions; and till then I may with modesty doubt, since I fear universal consent, which is the only one produced, will scarce prove a sufficient mark to direct my choice, and assure

me of any innate principles. From what has been said, I think it past doubt, that there are no practical principles wherein all men agree; and therefore none innate.

#### C H A P. IV.

##### *Other Considerations concerning innate Principles, both speculative and practical.*

§ 1. Principles not innate, unless their ideas be innate. § 2, 3. Ideas, especially those belonging to principles, not born with children. § 4, 5. Identity, an idea not innate. § 6. Whole and part not innate ideas. § 7. Idea of worship not innate. § 8—11. Idea of God, not innate. § 12. Suitable to God's goodness, that all men should have an idea of him, therefore naturally imprinted by him, answered. § 13—16. Ideas of God, various in different men. § 17. If the idea of God be not innate, no other can be supposed innate. § 18. Idea of substance not innate. § 19. No propositions can be innate, since no ideas are innate. § 20. No innate ideas in the memory. § 21. Principles not innate, because of little use, or little certainty. § 22. Difference of mens discoveries depends upon the different application of their faculties. § 23. Men must think and know for themselves. § 24. Whence the opinion of innate principles. § 25. Conclusion.

§ 1. **H**AD those, who would persuade us that there are innate principles, not taken them together in gross; but considered separate-

ly the parts out of which those propositions are made, they would not, perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were innate. Since, if the ideas, which made up those truths, were not, it was impossible that the propositions made up of them should be innate, or our knowledge of them be born with us. For if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. For where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them.

§ 2. If we will attentively consider new-born children, we shall have little reason to think, that they bring many ideas into the world with them. For bating, perhaps, some faint ideas of hunger, and thirst, and warmth, and some pains which they may have felt in the womb, there is not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them; especially of ideas, *answering the terms which make up those universal propositions*, that are esteemed innate principles. One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards ideas come into their minds; and that they get no more, nor no other, than what experience, and the observation of things that come in their way, furnish them with; which might be enough to satisfy us, that they are not original characters stamped on the mind.

§ 3. *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*, is certainly, if there be any such, an innate principle. But can any one think, or will any one say, that *impossibility* and *identity*, are two innate ideas? Are they such as all mankind have, and bring into the world with them? And are they those that are the first in children, and

antecedent to all acquired ones? If they are innate, they must needs be so. Hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity, before it has of white or black, sweet or bitter? And is it from the knowledge of this principle, that it concludes, that wormwood rubbed on the nipple, hath not the same taste that it used to receive from thence? Is it the actual knowledge of *impossibile est idem esse, et non esse*, that makes a child distinguish between its mother and a stranger? or that makes it fond of the one, and fly the other? Or does the mind regulate itself and its assent by ideas that it never yet had? or the understanding draw conclusions from principles, which it never yet knew or understood? The names *impossibility* and *identity*, stand for two ideas, so far from being innate, or born with us, that I think it requires great care and attention to form them right in our understanding. They are so far from being brought into the world with us; so remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood, that I believe, upon examination, it will be found, that many grown men want them.

§ 4. If *identity*, to instance in that alone, be a native impression, and consequently so clear and obvious to us, that we must needs know it even from our cradles; I would gladly be resolved, by one of seven, or seventy years old, whether a man, being a creature consisting of soul and body, be the same man when his body is changed? Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the same soul, were the same man, though they lived several ages asunder? Nay, whether the cock too, which had the same soul, were not the same with both of them? Whereby, perhaps, it will appear, that our idea of sameness is not so settled

and clear, as to deserve to be thought innate in us. For if those innate ideas are not clear and distinct, so as to be universally known, and naturally agreed on, they cannot be subjects of universal and undoubted truths; but will be the unavoidable occasion of perpetual uncertainty. For, I suppose, every one's idea of identity will not be the same that Pythagoras, and thousands others of his followers have: and which then shall be the true? which innate? Or are there two different ideas of identity both innate?

§ 5. Nor let any one think, that the questions I have here proposed about the identity of man, are bare empty speculations; which, if they were, would be enough to shew, that there was in the understandings of men *no innate idea of identity*. He that shall, with a little attention, reflect on the resurrection, and consider, that divine justice shall bring to judgment, at the last day, the very same persons to be happy or miserable in the other, who did well or ill in this life, will find it, perhaps, not easy to resolve with himself, what makes the same man, or wherein identity consists; and will not be forward to think he and every one, even children themselves, have naturally a clear idea of it.

§ 6. Let us examine that principle of mathematics, *viz. That the whole is bigger than a part*. This, I take it, is reckoned amongst innate principles. I am sure it has as good a title as any to be thought so; which yet no-body can think it to be, when he considers the ideas it comprehends in it, *whole* and *part*, are perfectly relative; but the positive ideas, to which they properly and immediately belong, are extension and number, of which alone, whole and part are relations. So

that if whole and part are innate ideas, extension and number must be so too, it being impossible to have an idea of a relation, without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs, and in which it is founded. Now, whether the minds of men have naturally imprinted on them the ideas of extension and number, I leave to be considered by those who are the patrons of innate principles.

§ 7. That *God is to be worshipped*, is without doubt as great a truth as any can enter into the mind of man, and deserves the first place amongst all practical principles. But yet, it can by no means be thought innate, unless the ideas of GOD and worship are innate. That the idea, the term *worship* stands for, is not in the understanding of children, and a character stamped on the mind in its first original, I think, will be easily granted by any one, that considers how few there be amongst grown men, who have a clear and distinct notion of it. And, I suppose, there cannot be any thing more ridiculous, than to say, that children have this practical principle innate, *That God is to be worshipped*; and yet, that they know not what that worship of GOD is, which is their duty. But to pass by this.

§ 8. If any idea can be imagined innate, the idea of GOD may, of all others, for many reasons, be thought so; since it is hard to conceive, how there should be innate moral principles, without an innate idea of a Deity: without a notion of a law-maker, it is impossible to have a notion of a law, and an obligation to observe it. Besides the Atheists, taken notice of amongst the antients, and left branded upon the records of history, hath not navigation discovered, in these latter ages,

whole nations at the bay of Soldania, in Brasil <sup>1</sup>, in Boranday <sup>2</sup>, and the Caribbee islands <sup>3</sup>, &c. amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a GOD, no religion? Nicholaus del Techo, *in literis, ex Paraquaria de Caaiguarum conversione*, has these words <sup>4</sup>: *Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere, quod Deum et hominis animam significet, nulla sacra habet, nulla idola.* These are instances of nations where uncultivated nature has been left to itself, without the help of letters and discipline, and the improvements of arts and sciences. But there are others to be found, who have enjoyed these in a very great measure, who yet, for want of a due application of their thoughts this way, want the idea and knowledge of GOD. It will, I doubt not, be a surprize to others, as it was to me, to find the Siamites of this number. But for this, let them consult the king of France's late envoy thither, who gives no better account of the Chineses themselves <sup>5</sup>. And if we will not believe La Loubere <sup>6</sup>, the missionaries of China, even the Jesuits themselves, the great encomiasts of the Chineses, do all to a man agree and will convince us that the sect of the literati, or learned, keeping to the old religion of China, and the ruling party there, are all of them Atheists <sup>7</sup>. And perhaps, if we should,

<sup>1</sup> Rhoe apud Thevenot, pag. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Jo. de Lery, c. xvi.

<sup>3</sup> Martiniere  $\frac{1}{3} \frac{6}{2} \frac{1}{2}$  Terry  $\frac{1}{5} \frac{7}{3}$ , et  $\frac{2}{5} \frac{3}{4} \frac{1}{5}$ . Ovington

$\frac{4}{6} \frac{8}{3} \frac{9}{6}$

<sup>4</sup> Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaiguarum  $\frac{6}{7} \frac{3}{5}$ .

<sup>5</sup> La Loubere du Royaume de Siam, tom. i. c. ix.

§ 15, &c. xx. § 22, &c. xxii. § 6.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. tom. i. c. xx. § 4, &c. xxiii.

<sup>7</sup> Vid. Navarette in the collection of voyages, vol. i. and Historia cultus Sinenfium.

with attention, mind the lives and discourses of people not so far off, we should have too much reason to fear that many, in more civilized countries, have no very strong and clear impressions of a Deity upon their minds; and that the complaints of atheism made from the pulpit are not without reason. And though only some profligate wretches own it too bare-facedly now; yet, perhaps, we should hear more than we do of it from others, did not the fear of the magistrate's sword, or their neighbour's censure, tie up people's tongues, which, were the apprehensions of punishment or shame taken away, would as openly proclaim their atheism as their lives do<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> On this reasoning of the author against innate ideas, great blame hath been laid; because it seems to invalidate an argument commonly used to prove the being of a GOD, *viz. universal consent*. To which our author answers\*. *I think that the universal consent of mankind, as to the being of a God, amounts to thus much, That the vastly greater majority of mankind have, in all ages of the world, actually believed a God; that the majority of the remaining part have not actually disbelieved it; and consequently those who have actually opposed the belief of a God, have truly been very few.* So that comparing those that have actually disbelieved with those who have actually believed a GOD, their number is so inconsiderable, that in respect of this incomparably greater majority of those who have owned the belief of a GOD, it may be said to be the *universal consent* of mankind.

This is all the *universal consent* which truth of matter of fact will allow; and therefore all that can be made use of to prove a GOD. But if any one would extend it farther, and speak deceitfully for

\* In his third letter to the bishop of Worcester, page 147, &c.



§ 9. But had all mankind, every-where, a *notion of God*, (whereof yet history tells us the contrary), it would not from thence follow, that the idea of him was innate. For though no nation were to be found without a name, and some few dark

God; if this universality should be urged in a strict sense, not for much the majority, but for a general consent of every one, even to a man, in all ages and countries; this would make it either no argument, or a perfectly useless and unnecessary one. For if any one deny a God, such a perfect universality of consent is destroyed; and if no-body does deny a God, what need of arguments to convince Atheists?

I would crave leave to ask your lordship, were there ever in the world any Atheists or no? If there were not, what need is there of raising a question about the being of a God, when no-body questions it? What need of provisional arguments against a fault, from which mankind are so wholly free, and which, by an *universal consent*, they may be presumed to be secure from? If you say, as I doubt not but you will, that there have been Atheists in the world, then your lordship's *universal consent* reduces itself to only a great majority; and then make that majority as great as you will, what I have said in the place quoted by your lordship, leaves it in its full force; and I have not said one word that does in the least *invalidate this argument for a God*. The argument I was upon there, was to shew, that the idea of God was not innate; and to my purpose it was sufficient, if there were but a lets number found in the world who had no idea of God, than your lordship will allow there have been of professed Atheists; for whatsoever is innate, must be universal in the strictest sense. One exception is a sufficient proof against it. So that all that I said, and which was quite to another purpose, did not at all tend, nor can be made use of, to *invalidate the argu-*

notions of him; yet that would not prove them to be natural impressions on the mind, no more than the names of fire or the sun, heat or number, do prove the ideas they stand for to be innate; because the names of those things, and the

*ment for a Deity, grounded on such universal consent, as your lordship, and all that build on it, must own; which is only a very disproportioned majority: such an universal consent my argument there neither affirms nor requires to be less than you will be pleased to allow it. Your lordship therefore might, without any prejudice to those declarations of good-will and favour you have for the author of the Essay of human understanding, have spared the mentioning his quoting authors that are in print, for matters of fact to quite another purpose, as going about to invalidate the argument for a Deity from the universal consent of mankind, since he leaves that universal consent as entire and as large as you yourself do, or can own or suppose it. But here I have no reason to be sorry that your lordship has given me this occasion for the vindication of this passage of my book; if there should be any one besides your lordship, who should so far mistake it, as to think it in the least invalidates the argument for a God, from the universal consent of mankind.*

But because you question the credibility of those authors I have quoted, which you say were very ill chosen, I will crave leave to say, that he whom I relied on for his testimony concerning the Hotentots of Soldania, was no less a man than an ambassador from the king of England to the Great Mogul. Of whose relation Monsieur Thevenot, no ill judge in the case, had so great an esteem, that he was at the pains to translate it into French, and publish it in his (which is counted no injudicious) collection of Travels. But to intercede with your lordship for a little more fa-

ideas of them, are so universally received and known amongst mankind. Nor, on the contrary, is the want of such a name, or the absence of such a notion out of mens minds, any argument against the being of GOD, any more than it would be a

vourable allowance of credit to Sir Thomas Roe's relation; Coore, an inhabitant of the country, who could speak English, assured Mr Terry \*, that they of Soldania had no GOD. But if he too have the ill luck to find no credit with you, I hope you will be a little more favourable to a divine of the Church of England, now living, and admit of his testimony in confirmation of Sir Thomas Roe's. This worthy gentleman, in the relation of his voyage to Surat, printed but two years since, speaking of the same people, has these words †, *They are sunk even below idolatry, are destitute of both priest and temple, and saving a little shew of rejoicing, which is made at the full and new moon, have lost all kind of religious devotion. Nature has so richly provided for their convenience in this life, that they have drowned all sense of the God of it, and are grown quite careless of the next.*

But to provide against the clearest evidence of atheism in these people, you say, *That the account given of them, makes them not fit to be a standard for the sense of mankind.* This, I think, may pass for nothing, till somebody may be found that makes them to be a standard for the sense of mankind. All the use I have made of them was to shew, that there were men in the world that had no innate idea of GOD. But to keep something like an argument going (for, what will not that do?) you go near denying these Casers to be men. What else do these words signify? *A people so strangely bereft of common sense, that they can hardly be res-*

\* Terry's Voyage, p. 17. and 23.

† M. Ovington, p. 439.

proof that there was no loadstone in the world, because a great part of mankind had neither a notion of any such thing, nor a name for it; or be any shew of argument to prove, that there are no distinct and various species of angels, or intelligent beings above us, because we have no ideas of such distinct species, or names for them: for men being furnished with words by the common language of their own countries, can scarce avoid having some kind of ideas of those things, whose names those they converse with have occasion frequently to mention to them. And if it carry with it the notion of excellency, greatness, or something extraordinary; if apprehension and concernment accompany it; if the fear of absolute and irresistible power set it on upon the mind, the idea

*known among mankind, as appears by the best accounts of the Casers of Soldania, &c.* I hope if any of them were called Peter, James, or John, it would be past scruple that they were men: however, Courwee, Wewena, and Cousheda, and those others who had names, that had no places in your nomenclator, would hardly pass muster with your lordship.

My lord, I should not mention this, but that what you yourself say here, may be a motive to you to consider, that what you have laid such a stress on concerning the *general nature of man*, as a *real being*, and the *subject of properties*, amounts to nothing for the distinguishing of *species*, since you yourself own, that there may be *individuals wherein there is a common nature, with a particular subsistence proper to each of them*, whereby you are so little able to know of which of the ranks or sorts they are, into which you say *God has ordered beings*, and which *he hath distinguished by essential properties*, that you are in doubt whether they ought to be reckoned among mankind or no.

is likely to sink the deeper, and spread the farther; especially if it be such an idea as is agreeable to the common light of reason, and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge, as that of a GOD is. For the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of the creation, that a rational creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity: and the influence that the discovery of such a being must necessarily have on the minds of all, that have but once heard of it, is so great, and carries such a weight of thought and communication with it, that it seems stranger to me, that a whole nation of men should be any where found so brutish, as to want the notion of a GOD, than that they should be without any notion of numbers, or fire.

§ 10. The name of GOD being once mentioned in any part of the world, to express a superior, powerful, wise, invisible being, the suitability of such a notion to the principles of common reason, and the interest men will always have to mention it often, must necessarily spread it far and wide; and continue it down to all generations; though yet the general *reception of this name, and some imperfect and unsteady notions, conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of mankind, prove not the idea to be innate*; but only that they who made the discovery had made a right use of their reason, thought maturely of the causes of things, and traced them to their original; from whom other less considering people, having once received so important a notion, it could not easily be lost again.

§ 11. This is all could be inferred from the notion of a GOD, were it to be found universally

in all the tribes of mankind, and generally acknowledged by men grown to maturity in all countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a GOD, as I imagine, is extended no farther than that; which, if it be sufficient to prove the *idea of God innate*, will as well prove the idea of fire innate; since, I think, it may be truly said, that there is not a person in the world who has a notion of a GOD, who has not also the idea of fire. I doubt not, but if a colony of young children should be placed in an island where no fire was, they would certainly neither have any notion of such a thing, nor name for it, how generally soever it were received and known in all the world besides; and perhaps too, their apprehensions would be as far removed from any name, or notion of a GOD, till some one amongst them had employed his thoughts to inquire into the constitution and causes of things, which would easily lead him to the notion of a GOD; which having once taught to others, reason, and the natural propensity of their own thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst them.

§ 12. Indeed it is urged, that it is *suitable to the goodness of God to imprint upon the minds of men, characters and notions of himself*, and not to leave them in the dark, and doubt, in so grand a concernment; and also by that means to secure to himself the homage and veneration due from so intelligent a creature as man; and therefore he has done it.

This argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more than those, who use it in this case, expect from it. For if we may conclude, that GOD hath done for men all that men shall judge is best for them, because it is suitable to his good-

ness so to do, it will prove not only that GOD has imprinted on the minds of men an idea of himself; but that he hath plainly stamped there, in fair characters, all that men ought to know or believe of him, all that they ought to do in obedience to his will; and that he hath given them a will and affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think it better for men, than that they should, in the dark, grope after knowledge, as St Paul tells us all nations did after GOD, ACTS xvii. 27. than that their wills should clash with their understandings, and their appetites cross their duty. The Romanists say, it is best for men, and so suitable to the goodness of GOD, that there should be an infallible judge of controversies on earth; and therefore there is one: and I, by the same reason, say, it is better for men, that every man himself should be infallible. I leave them to consider, whether by the force of this argument they shall think, that every man is so. I think it a very good argument, to say, the infinitely wise GOD hath made it so: and therefore it is best. But it *seems to me a little too much confidence of our own wisdom, to say, I think it best, and therefore God hath made it so*; and in the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from such a topic, that GOD hath done so, when certain experience shews us that he hath not. But the goodness of GOD hath not been wanting to men without such original impressions of knowledge, or ideas stamped on the mind: since he hath furnished man with those faculties, which will serve for the sufficient discovery of all things requisite to the end of such a being; and I doubt not but to shew, that a man, by the right use of his natural abilities, may, without any innate principles, at-

tain the knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. GOD having endued man with those faculties of knowing which he hath, was no more obliged by his goodness to implant those innate notions in his mind, than that having given him reason, hands, and materials, he should build him bridges, or houses, which some people in the world, however, of good parts, do either totally want, or are but ill provided of, as well as others are wholly without *ideas of God*, and principles of morality; or at least have but very ill ones. The reason in both cases being, that they never employed their parts, faculties, and powers, industriously that way, but contented themselves with the opinions, fashions, and things of their country, as they found them, without looking any farther. Had you or I been born at the bay of Soldania, possibly our thoughts and notions had not exceeded those brutish ones of the Hotentots that inhabit there: and had the Virginia king Apochancana, been educated in England, he had, perhaps, been as knowing a divine, and as good a mathematician, as any in it. The difference between him and a more improved Englishman, lying barely in this, that the exercise of his faculties was bounded within the ways, modes, and notions of his own country, and never directed to any other, or farther inquiries: and if he had not any idea of a GOD, it was only because he pursued not those thoughts that would have led him to it.

§ 13. I grant, that if there were any idea to be found imprinted on the minds of men, we have reason to expect *it should be the notion of his Maker*, as a mark GOD set on his own workmanship, to mind man of his dependence and duty; and that herein should appear the first instances of human



knowledge. But how late is it before any such notion is discoverable in children? And when we find it there, how much more does it resemble the opinion and notion of the teacher, - than represent the true GOD? He that shall observe in children the progress, whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have, will think that the objects they do first, and most familiarly converse with, - are those that make the first impressions on their understanding: nor will he find the least footsteps of any other. It is easy to take notice how their thoughts enlarge themselves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of sensible objects, to retain the ideas of them in their memories, and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them, and several ways put them together. How by these means they come to frame in their minds an idea men have of a Deity, I shall hereafter shew.

§ 14. Can it be thought, that the ideas men have of GOD, are the characters, and marks of himself, engraven in their minds by his own finger, when we see that in the same country, under one and the same name, *men have far different, nay, often contrary and inconsistent ideas and conceptions of him?* Their agreeing in a name, or sound, will scarce prove an innate notion of him.

§ 15. What true or tolerable notion of a Deity could they have, who acknowledged and worshipped hundreds? Every deity that they owned above one, was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of him, and a proof that they had no true notion of GOD, where unity, infinity, and eternity, were excluded. To which if we add their gross conceptions of corporiety, expressed in

their images and representations of their deities; the amours, marriages, copulations, lusts, quarrels, and other mean qualities attributed by them to their gods; we shall have little reason to think that the heathen world, *i. e.* the greatest part of mankind, had such ideas of God in their minds, as he himself, out of care that they should not be mistaken about him, was author of. And this universality of consent, so much urged, if it prove any native impressions, it will be only this: that God imprinted on the minds of all men, speaking the same language, a name for himself, but not any idea: since those people, who agreed in the name, at the same time, had far different apprehensions about the thing signified. If they say, that the variety of deities, worshipped by the heathen world, were but figurative ways of expressing the several attributes of that incomprehensible Being, or several parts of his providence: I answer, what they might be in the original, I will not here inquire; but that they were so in the thoughts of the vulgar, I think no-body will affirm: and he that will consult the voyage of the bishop of Beryte, c. xiii. (not to mention other testimonies) will find, that the theolgy of the Siamites professedly owns a plurality of gods: or, as the Abbe de Choisy more judiciously remarks<sup>1</sup>, it consists properly in acknowledging no God at all.

§ 15. If it be said, that *wise men of all nations came to have true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the Deity*, I grant it. But then this,

1<sup>st</sup>, Excludes universality of consent in any thing, but the name; for those wise men being very few, perhaps one of a thousand, this universality is very narrow.

<sup>1</sup> In his journal *du Voiage de Siam*, 1707

2dly It seems to me plainly to prove, that the truest and best notions men had of GOD, were not imprinted, but acquired by thought and meditation, and a right use of their faculties: since the wise and considerate men of the world, by a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reason, attained true notions in this, as well as other things; whilst the lazy and inconsiderate part of men, making the far greater number, took up their notion by chance, from common tradition and vulgar conceptions, without much beating their heads about them. And if it be a reason to think *the notion of God innate*, because all wise men had it, virtue too must be thought innate, for that also wise men have always had.

§ 16. This was evidently the case of all Gentilism: nor hath, even amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans, who acknowledge but one GOD, this doctrine, and the care is taken in those nations to teach men to have true notions of a GOD, prevailed so far as to make men to have the same, and true ideas of him. How many, even amongst us, will be found, upon inquiry, to fancy him in the shape of a man sitting in heaven; and to have many other absurd and unfit conceptions of him? Christians, as well as Turks, have had whole sects owning, and contending earnestly for it, that the Deity was corporeal, and of human shape: and though we find few amongst us, who profess themselves Anthropomorphites, (though some I have met with that own it), yet, I believe, he that will make it his business, may find amongst the ignorant, and uninstructed Christians, many of that opinion. Talk but with country-people, almost of any age; or young people, almost of any condition, and you shall find, that though the name

of GOD be frequently in their mouths; yet the notions they apply this name to, are so odd, low, and pitiful, that no-body can imagine they were taught by rational men, much less that they were characters writ by the finger of GOD himself. Nor do I see how it derogates more from the goodness of GOD, that he has given us minds unfurnished with these ideas of himself, than that he hath sent us into the world with bodies unclothed; and that there is no art or skill born with us. For being fitted with faculties to attain these, it is want of industry and consideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if we have them not. It is as certain that there is a GOD, as that the opposite angles, made by the intersection of two straight lines, are equal. There never was any rational creature that set himself sincerely to examine the truth of these propositions, that could fail to assent to them: though yet it be past doubt that there are many men, who, having not applied their thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this, which is the utmost of its extent, universal consent, such an one I easily allow: but such an universal consent as this proves not the *idea of God*, no more than it does the idea of such angles, innate.

§ 17. Since then, though the knowledge of a GOD be the most natural discovery of human reason, *yet the idea of him is not innate*, as, I think, is evident from what has been said; I imagine there will be scarce any other idea found that can pretend to it: since if GOD had set any impression, any character on the understanding of men, it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some clear and uniform idea of himself, as far as

our weak capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an object. But our minds being, at first, void of that idea, which we are most concerned to have, it is a *strong presumption against all other innate characters*. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other.

§. 18. I confess there is another idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk, as if they had it; and that is the *idea of substance*, which we neither have, nor can have, by sensation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any idea, we might well expect it should be such, as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves: but we see, on the contrary, that since by those ways, whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no such clear idea at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word *substance*, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what (*i. e.* of some thing whereof we have no particular distinct positive) idea, which we take to be the *substratum*, or support of those ideas we do know.

§ 19. Whatever then we talk of innate, either *speculative or practical principles*, it may, with as much probability, be said, that a man hath 100 *l.* sterling in his pocket, and yet denied that he hath either penny, shilling, crown, or any other coin, out of which the sum is to be made up; as to think, that certain propositions are innate, when the ideas about which they are can by no means be supposed to be so. The general reception and assent that is given, doth not at all prove that the ideas expressed in them are innate: for in many cases, however the ideas came there, the assent to words expressing the agreement or disagreement

of such ideas, will necessarily follow. Every one that hath a true idea of GOD and worship, will assent to this proposition, *That God is to be worshipped*, when expressed in a language he understands: and every rational man, that hath not thought on it to-day, may be ready to assent to this proposition to-morrow; and yet millions of men may be well supposed to want one, or both those ideas to-day. For if we will allow savages, and most country-people, to have ideas of GOD and worship, (which conversation with them will not make one forward to believe); yet I think few children can be supposed to have those ideas; which, therefore, they must begin to have some time or other; and when they will also begin to assent to that proposition, and make very little question of it ever after. But such an assent upon hearing, no more proves the ideas to be innate, than it does, that one born blind (with cataracts, which will be couched to-morrow) had the innate ideas of the sun, or light, or saffron, or yellow; because when his sight is cleared, he will certainly assent to this proposition, *That the sun is lucid, or that saffron is yellow*: and therefore if such assent upon hearing cannot prove the ideas innate, it can much less the propositions made up of those ideas. If they have any innate ideas, I would be glad to be told what, and how many they are.

§ 20. To which let me add: if there be any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind, which the mind does not actually think on, they must be lodged in the memory, and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance; *i. e.* must be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unless remembrance can be without remembrance. For

to remember, is to perceive any thing with memory, or with a consciousness that it was known or perceived before; without this, whatever idea comes into the mind, is new, and not remembered: this consciousness of its having been in the mind before, being that which distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever idea was never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is either an actual perception, or else having been an actual perception, is so in the mind, that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is the actual perception of an idea without memory, the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding. Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a consciousness that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be not so, I appeal to every one's observation: and then I desire an instance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impression of it, by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember as an idea he had formerly known; without which consciousness of a former perception, there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind without that consciousness, is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be said to be in the mind before that appearance. For what is not either actually in view, or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if it never had been there. Suppose a child had the use of his eyes till he knows and distinguishes colours; but then cataracts shut the windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark;

and in that time perfectly loses all memory of the ideas of colours he once had. This was the case of a blind man I once talked with, who lost his sight by the small-pox, when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind. I ask, whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? And I think no-body will say, that either of them had in his mind any idea of colours at all. His cataracts are couched, and then he has the ideas, which he remembers not, of colours, *de novo*, by his restored sight, conveyed to his mind, and that without any consciousness of a former acquaintance. And these now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this case all these ideas of colours, which, when out of view, can be revived with a consciousness of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory, are said to be in the mind. The use I make of this is, that whatever idea, being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and if it be in the memory, it cannot, by the memory, be brought into actual view, without a perception that it comes out of the memory, which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembered. If therefore there be any innate ideas, they must be in the memory, or else nowhere in the mind; and if they be in the memory, they can be revived without any impression from without; and whenever they are brought into the mind, they are remembered, *i. e.* they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a constant and distinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or



in the mind; that what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new, and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever it is suggested by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, whether there be any innate ideas in the mind, before impression from *sensation* or *reflection*. I would fain meet with the man, who, when he came to the use of reason, or at any other time, remembered any of them; and to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say, there are ideas in the mind that are not in the memory; I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible.

§ 21. Besides what I have already said, there is another reason, why I doubt that neither these, nor any other principles are innate. I, that am fully persuaded that the infinitely wise God made all things in perfect wisdom, cannot satisfy myself, why he should be supposed to print, upon the minds of men, some universal principles; whereof those that are pretended innate, and *concern speculation, are of no great use; and those that concern practice, not self-evident; and neither of them distinguishable from some other truths, not allowed to be innate.* For, to what purpose should characters be graven on the mind, by the finger of God, which are not clearer there than those which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be distinguished from them? If any one thinks there are such innate ideas and propositions, which, by their clearness and usefulness, are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind, and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell

us which they are; and then every one will be a fit judge whether they be so or no. Since, if there be such innate ideas and impressions, plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himself. Of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims, I have spoken already; of their usefulness I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

§ 22. To conclude: some ideas forwardly offer themselves to all mens understandings; some sorts of truths result from any ideas, as soon as the mind puts them into propositions: other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be discovered and assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate: but the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts and sciences, though some of them, indeed, offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others, and therefore are more generally received; though that too be according as the organs of our bodies, and powers of our minds, happen to be employed; *God having fitted men with faculties and means to discover, receive, and retain truths, accordingly as they are employed.* The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind, is, from the different use they put their faculties to, whilst some, and those the most, taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of assent, by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others, in doctrines which it is their duty carefully to examine; and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow: others employing their thoughts only about some few things,

grow acquainted sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts loose in their search of other inquiries. Thus, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is a truth as certain as any thing can be; and, I think, more evident than many of those propositions that go for principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles: and he that certainly knows this proposition, may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions in mathematics itself, which are as clear and evident as this; because in his search of those mathematical truths, he stopped his thoughts short, and went not so far. The same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a Deity; for though there be no truth, which a man may more evidently make out to himself, than the existence of a GOD, yet he that shall content himself with things, as he finds them in this world, as they minister to his pleasures and passions, and not make inquiry a little farther into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of such a being: and if any person hath, by talk, put such a notion into his head, he may, perhaps, believe it: but if he hath never examined it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon trust, without examining the demonstration: and may yield his assent as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it; which yet his faculties, if care-

fully employed, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only by the bye, to shew how much our *knowledge depends upon the right use of those powers nature hath bestowed upon us*, and how little upon such innate principles, as are in vain supposed to be in all mankind, for their direction; which all men could not but know, if they were there, or else they would be there to no purpose: and which, since all men do not know, nor can distinguish from other adventitious truths, we may well conclude there are no such.

§ 23. What censure doubting thus of innate principles may deserve from men, who will be apt to call it, pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty, I cannot tell: I persuade myself, at least, that the way I have pursued, being conformable to truth, lays those foundations surer. This, I am certain, I have not made it my business either to quit or follow any authority in the ensuing discourse: truth has been my only aim; and where-ever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way, or no. Not that I want a due respect to other mens opinions; but after all, the *greatest reverence is due to truth*; and, I hope, it will not be thought arrogance to say, that perhaps we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain, *in the consideration of things themselves*; and made use rather of our own thoughts than other mens, to find it. For, I think, we may as rationally hope to see with other mens eyes, as to know by other mens understandings. So much as we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we pos-

sefs of real and true knowledge. The floating of other-mens opinions in our brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science, is in us but opiniatrety, whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation. Aristotle was certainly a knowing man; but no-body ever thought him so, because he blindly embraced, and confidently vented the opinions of another. And if the taking up of another's principles, without examining them, made not him a philosopher, I suppose it will hardly make any body else so. In the sciences, every one has so much as he really knows and comprehends: what he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreds; which, however, will in the whole piece make no considerable addition to his stock who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy-money, though it were gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use.

§ 24. When men have found some general propositions that could not be doubted of, as soon as understood, it was, I know, *a short and easy way to conclude them innate.* This being once received, it eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopped the inquiry of the doubtful, concerning all that was once stiled innate: and it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be masters and teachers, to make this the principle of principles, *That principles must not be questioned;* for, having once established this tenet, *That there are innate principles,* it put their followers upon a necessity of receiving some doctrines as such;

which was to take them off from the use of their own reason and judgment, and put them upon believing and taking them upon trust, without farther examination: in which posture of blind credulity, they might be more easily governed by, and made useful to some sort of men, who had the skill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a small power it gives one man over another, to have the authority to be the dictator of principles, and teacher of unquestionable truths; and to make a man swallow that for an innate principle, which may serve to his purpose, who teacheth them. Whereas, had they examined the ways whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves, when duly considered; and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them, when duly employed about them.

§ 25. *To shew how the understanding proceeds herein, is the design of the following discourse;* which I shall proceed to, when I have first promised, that hitherto, to clear my way to those foundations which I conceive are the only true ones whereon to establish those notions we can have of our own knowledge, it hath been necessary for me to give an account of the reasons I had to doubt of innate principles: and since the arguments which are against them do some of them rise from common received opinions, I have been forced to take several things for granted, which is hardly avoidable to any one, whose talk it is to shew the falsehood or improbability of any tenet; it happening in controversial discourses, as it does in assaulting of towns; where, if the ground be

but firm whereon the batteries are erected, there is no farther inquiry of whom it is borrowed, nor whom it belongs to, so it affords but a fit rise for the present purpose. But in the future part of this discourse, designing to raise an edifice uniform, and consistent with itself, as far as my own experience and observation will assist me, I hope to erect it on such a basis, that I shall not need to shore it up with props and buttresses, leaning on borrowed or begged foundations: or at least, if mine prove a castle in the air, I will endeavour it shall be all of a piece, and hang together. Wherein I warn the reader, not to expect undeniable cogent demonstrations, unless I may be allowed the privilege, not seldom assumed by others, to take my principles for granted; and then, I doubt not but I can demonstrate too. All that I shall say for the principles I proceed on, is, that I can only appeal to mens own unprejudiced experience and observation, whether they be true or no; and this is enough for a man who professes no more, than to lay down candidly and freely his own conjectures concerning a subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other design than an unbiassed inquiry after truth.

## B O O K II.

## O F I D E A S.

## C H A P. I.

*Of IDEAS in general, and their Original.*

- § 1. *Idea is the object of thinking.* § 2. *All ideas come from sensation or reflection.* § 3. *The objects of sensation, one source of ideas.* § 4. *The operations of our minds, the other source of them.* § 5. *All our ideas are of the one or the other of these.* § 6. *Observable in children.* § 7. *Men are differently furnished with these, according to the different objects they converse with.* § 8. *Ideas of reflection later, because they need attention.* § 9. *The soul begins to have ideas when it begins to perceive.* § 10. *The soul thinks not always; for this wants proofs.* § 11. *It is not always conscious of it.* § 12. *If a sleeping man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking man are two persons.* § 13. *Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they think.* § 14. *That men dream without remembering it, in vain urged.* § 15. *Upon this hypothesis, the thoughts of a sleeping man ought to be most rational.* § 16. *On this hypothesis the soul must have ideas not derived from sensation or reflection, of which there is no appearance.* § 17. *If I think when I know it not, no-body else can know it.* § 18. *How knows any one that the soul always thinks? for if it be not a self-evident proposition,*



*it needs proof.* § 19. *That a man should be busy in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very improbable.* § 20—23. *No ideas but from sensation or reflection, evident, if we observe children.* § 24. *The original of all our knowledge.* §. 25. *In the reception of simple ideas, the understanding is for the most part passive.*

§ 1. **E**VERY man being conscious to himself that he thinks, and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking, being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt, that men have in their minds several ideas; such as are those expressed by the words, *whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness,* and others: it is in the first place, then, to be inquired, *How he comes by them?* I know it is a received doctrine, *That men have native ideas, and original characters, stamped upon their minds, in their very first being.* This opinion I have at large examined already; and I suppose what I have said in the foregoing book, will be much more easily admitted, when I have shewn whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind, for which I shall appeal to every one's own observation and experience.

§ 2. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE: in

that all our knowledge is founded ; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employ'd either about *external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking.* These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

§ 3. First, *Our Senses*, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them : and thus we come by those ideas we have of *yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet*, and all those which we call sensible qualities, which, when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean they, from external objects, convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source, of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call SENSATION.

§ 4. Secondly, The other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the *perception of the operations of our own minds within us*, as it is employed about the ideas it has got ; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without ; and such are, *perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing*, and all the different actings of our own minds ; which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we

do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself: and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other SENSATION, so I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By REFLECTION, then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them; by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. These two, I say, *viz.* external material things as the objects of SENSATION, and the operations of our own minds within as the objects of REFLECTION, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term *operations* here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

§ 5. The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two. *External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.*

These, when we have taken a full survey of them and their several modes, combinations, and relations, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas; and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two

ways. Let any one examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly search into his understanding, and then let him tell me, whether all the original ideas he has there are any other than of the objects of his senses, or of the operations of his mind, considered as objects of his reflection; and how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has *not any idea in his mind but what one of these two have imprinted*; though, perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding, as we shall see hereafter.

§ 6. He that attentively considers the state of a child, at his first coming into the world, will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of ideas, that are to be the matter of his future knowledge. It is by degrees he comes to be furnished with them: and though the ideas of obvious and familiar qualities imprint themselves before the memory begins to keep a register of time and order, yet it is often so late before some unusual qualities come in the way, that there are few men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them: and if it were worth while, no doubt a child might be so ordered, as to have but a very few, even of the ordinary ideas, till he were grown up to a man. But all that are born into the world, being surrounded with bodies that perpetually and diversely affect them, variety of ideas, whether care be taken about it or no, are imprinted on the minds of children. Light and colours are busy at hand every-where, when the eye is but open; sounds, and some tangible qualities, fail not to solicit their proper senses, and force an entrance to the mind; but yet, I think,

it will be granted easily, that if a child were kept in a place, where he never saw any other but black and white, till he were a man, he would have no more ideas of scarlet and green, than he that from his childhood never tasted an oyster or a pine-apple, has of these particular relishes.

§ 7. Men, then, come to be furnished with fewer or more simple ideas from without, according as the objects they converse with afford greater or less variety; and from the operation of their minds within, according as they more or less reflect on them. For though he that contemplates the operations of his mind, cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them; yet unless he turn his thoughts that way, and considers them attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of any landscape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it. The picture, or clock, may be so placed, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confused idea of all the parts they are made up of, till he applies himself with attention to consider them each in particular.

§ 8. And hence we see the reason why it is pretty late before most children get ideas of the operations of their own minds; and some have not any very clear or perfect ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives. Because, though they pass there continually; yet, like floating visions, they make not deep impressions enough to leave in the mind clear, distinct, lasting ideas, till the understanding turns inwards upon itself, reflects

on its own operations, and makes them the object of its own contemplation. Children, when they come first into it, are furrounded with a world of new things, which, by a constant sollicitation of their senses, draw the mind constantly to them, forward to take notice of new, and apt to be delighted with the variety of changing objects. Thus the first years are usually employed and diverted in looking abroad. Mens business in them is to acquaint themselves with what is to be found without; and so growing up in a constant attention to outward sensations, seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them, till they come to be of riper years; and some scarce ever at all.

§. 9. To ask, *at what time a man has first any ideas?* is to ask when he begins to perceive; having ideas and perception being the same thing. I know it is an opinion, *that the soul always thinks*, and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itself constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul, as actual extension is from the body; which, if true, to inquire after the beginning of a man's ideas, is the same as to inquire after the beginning of his soul. For by this account, soul and its ideas, as body and its extension, will begin to exist both at the same time.

§ 10. But whether the soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coeval with, or some time after the first rudiments or organisation, or the beginnings of life in the body, I leave to be disputed by those, who have better thought of that matter. I confess myself to have one of those dull souls, that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas, nor can conceive it any

more necessary for the *soul always to think*, than for the body always to move; the perception of ideas being, as I conceive, to the soul, what motion is to the body, not its essence, but one of its operations: and therefore, though thinking be supposed never so much the proper action of the soul; yet it is not necessary to suppose, that it should be always thinking, always in action. That, perhaps, is the privilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of things, *who never slumbers nor sleeps*; but is not competent to any finite being, at least not to the soul of man. We know certainly by experience, that we sometimes think, and thence draw this infallible consequence, that there is something in us that has a power to think: but whether that substance perpetually thinks, or no, we can be no farther assured, than experience informs us. For to say, that actual thinking is essential to the soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question, and not to prove it by reason; which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident proposition. But whether this, *That the soul always thinks*, be a self-evident proposition, that every body assents to at first hearing, I appeal to mankind. It is doubted whether I thought all last night, or no; the question being about a matter of fact, it is begging it, to bring, as a proof for it, an hypothesis, which is the very thing in dispute; by which way one may prove any thing, and it is but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, think; and it is sufficiently proved, and past doubt, that my watch thought all last night. But he, that would not deceive himself, ought to build his hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact

because of his hypothesis, that is, because he supposes it to be so; which way of proving amounts to this, that I must necessarily think all last night, because another supposes I always think, though I myself cannot perceive that I always do so.

But men in love with their opinions, may not only suppose what is in question, but alledge wrong matter of fact. How else could any one make it an inference of mine, *that a thing is not because we are not sensible of it in our sleep?* I do not say there is no soul in a man, because he is not sensible of it in his sleep: but I do say, he cannot think at any time, waking or sleeping, without being sensible of it. Our being sensible of it, is not necessary to any thing, but to our thoughts; and to them it is, and to them it will always be necessary, till we can think without being conscious of it.

§ 11. I grant that the soul in a waking man is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake: but whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man's consideration: it being hard to conceive that any thing should think, and not be conscious of it. If the *soul doth think in a sleeping man*, without being conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such thinking, it has any pleasure or pain, or be capable of happiness or misery? I am sure the man is not, no more than the bed or earth he lies on. For to be happy or miserable, without being conscious of it, seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible; or if it be possible that the soul can, whilst the body is sleeping, have its thinking, enjoyments, and concerns, its pleasure or pain apart, which the man is not conscious of



nor partakes in; it is certain, that Socrates asleep, and Socrates awake, is not the same person: but his soul when he sleeps, and Socrates the man, consisting of body and soul when he is waking, are two persons; since waking Socrates has no knowledge of, or concernment for that happiness or misery of his soul, which it enjoys alone by itself whilst he sleeps, without perceiving any thing of it; no more than he has for the happiness or misery of a man in the Indies, whom he knows not. For, if we take wholly away all consciousness of our actions and sensations, especially of pleasure and pain, and the concernment that accompanies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place personal identity.

§ 12. The soul, during sound sleep, thinks, say these men. *Whilst it thinks* and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of delight or trouble, as well as any other perceptions; and *it must necessarily be conscious of its own perceptions*. But it has all this apart: the sleeping man, it is plain, is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us suppose then the soul of Castor, whilst he is sleeping, retired from his body, which is no impossible supposition for the men I have here to do with, who so liberally allow life without a thinking soul to all other animals. These men cannot then judge it impossible, or a contradiction, that the body should live without the soul; nor that the soul should subsist and think, or have perception, even perception of happiness or misery, without the body. Let us then, as I say, suppose the soul of Castor separated, during his sleep, from his body, to think apart: Let us suppose too, that it chuses, for its scene of thinking, the body of another man, v. g. Pollux, who is sleeping without a soul: for if Ca-

stor's soul can think whilst Castor is asleep, what Castor is never conscious of, it is no matter what place it chuses to think in. We have, here then, the bodies of two men with only one soul between them, which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns; and the soul still thinking in the waking man, whereof the sleeping man is never conscious, has never the least perception. I ask then, whether Castor and Pollux, thus, with only one soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one, what the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned for, are not two as distinct persons as Castor and Hercules, or as Socrates and Plato were? and whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miserable? Just by the same reason, they make the soul and the man two persons, who make the soul think apart what the man is not conscious of. For I suppose, no-body will make identity of persons to consist in the soul's being united to the very same numerical particles of matter: for if that be necessary to identity, it will be impossible, in that constant flux of the particles of our bodies, that any man should be the same person two days, or two moments together.

§ 13. Thus, methinks, every drowsy nod shakes their doctrine, who teach, *that the soul is always thinking*. Those, at least, who do at at any time *sleep without dreaming*, can never be convinced that their thoughts are sometimes for four hours busy without their knowing of it; and if they are taken in the very act, waked in the middle of that sleeping contemplation, can give no manner of account of it.

§ 14. It will perhaps be said, *That the soul thinks, even in the soundest sleep, but the memory retains it*

*not.* That the soul in a sleeping man should be this moment busy a-thinking, and the next moment in a waking man, not remember, nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and would need some better proof than bare assertion, to make it be believed. For, who can, without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine, that the greatest part of men do, during all their lives, for several hours every day, think of something, which if they were asked, even in the middle of these thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of? Most men, I think, pass a great part of their sleep without dreaming. I once knew a man that was bred a scholar, and had no bad memory, who told me, he had never dreamed in his life till he had that fever he was then newly recovered of, which was about the five or six and twentieth year of his age. I suppose the world affords more such instances: at least every one's acquaintance will furnish him with examples enough of such, as pass most of their nights without dreaming.

§ 15. *To think often, and never to retain it so much as one moment, is a very useless sort of thinking:* and the soul in such a state of thinking, does very little, if at all, excel that of a looking-glass, which constantly receives variety of images, or ideas, but retains none; they disappear and vanish, and there remains no footsteps of them: the looking-glass is never the better for such ideas, nor the soul for such thoughts. Perhaps it will be said, that in a waking man the materials of the body are employed and made use of in thinking; and that the memory of thoughts is retained by the impressions that are made on the brain, and the traces there left after such thinking; but that

in the thinking of the soul, which is not perceived in a sleeping man, there the soul thinks apart, and making no use of the organs of the body, leaves no impressions on it, and consequently no memory of such thoughts. Not to mention again the absurdity of two distinct persons, which follows from this supposition, I answer farther, that whatever ideas the mind can receive and contemplate without the help of the body, it is reasonable to conclude it can retain without the help of the body too, or else the soul, or any separate spirit, will have but little advantage by thinking. If it has no memory of its own thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its use, and be able to recal them upon occasion; if it cannot reflect upon what is past, and make use of its former experiences, reasonings, and contemplations, to what purpose does it think? They who make the soul a thinking thing, at this rate, will not make it a much more noble being, than those do whom they condemn for allowing it to be nothing but the subtlest parts of matter. Characters drawn on dust, that the first breath of wind effaces; or impressions made on a heap of atoms, or animal spirits, are altogether as useful, and render the subject as noble, as the thoughts of a soul that perish in thinking; that once out of sight, are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themselves behind them. Nature never makes excellent things for mean or no uses: and it is hardly to be conceived, that our infinitely wise Creator, should make so admirable a faculty, as the power of thinking, that faculty which comes nearest the excellency of his own incomprehensible being, to be so idly and uselessly employed, at least one fourth part of its time here, as to think constant-

ly, without remembering any of those thoughts, without doing any good to itself or others, or being any way useful to any other part of the creation. If we will examine it, we shall not find, I suppose, the motion of dull and senseless matter, any-where in the universe, made so little use of, and so wholly thrown away.

§ 16. It is true, we have sometimes instances of perception whilst we are asleep, and retain the memory of those thoughts: but how extravagant and incoherent for the most part they are, how little conformable to the perfection and order of a rational being, those who are acquainted with dreams need not be told. This I would willingly be satisfied in, whether the soul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were separate from the body, acts less rationally than when conjointly with it, or no: if its separate thoughts be less rational, then these men must say, that the soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body: if it does not, it is a wonder that our dreams should be, for the most part, so frivolous and irrational; and that the soul should retain none of its more rational soliloquies and meditations.

§ 17. Those who so confidently tell us, that the soul always actually thinks, I would they would also tell us, what those ideas are, that are in the soul of a child, before, or just at the union with the body, before it hath received any by sensation. The dreams of sleeping men are, as I take it, all made up of the waking man's ideas, though for the most part oddly put together. It is strange if the soul has ideas of its own, that it derived not from sensation or reflection, (as it must have, if it thought before it received any impression from the body), that it should never, in its private

thinking (so private that the man himself perceives it not) retain any of them the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make the man glad with new discoveries. Who can find it reasonable that the soul should, in its retirement, during sleep, have so many hours thoughts, and yet never light on any of those ideas it borrowed not from sensation or reflection; or at least preserve the memory of none but such, which being occasioned from the body, must needs be less natural to a spirit? It is strange, the soul should never once in a man's whole life, recal over any of its pure native thoughts, and those ideas it had before it borrowed any thing from the body; never bring into the waking man's view any other ideas but what have a tang of the case, and manifestly derive their original from that union. If it always thinks, and so had ideas before it was united, or before it received any from the body, it is not to be supposed, but that, during sleep, it recollects its native ideas, and during that retirement from communicating with the body, whilst it thinks by itself, the ideas it is busied about, should be sometimes at least, those more natural and congenial ones which it had in itself, underrived from the body, or its own operations about them: which, since the waking man never remembers, we must from this hypothesis conclude, either that the soul remembers something that the man does not, or else that memory belongs only to such ideas as are derived from the body, or the mind's operations about them.

§ 18. I would be glad also to learn from these men, who so confidently pronounce, that the human soul, or, which is all one, that a man always thinks, how they come to know it; nay, *how*

*they come to know that they themselves think, when they themselves do not perceive it.* This, I am afraid, is to be sure without proofs, and to know without perceiving; it is, I suspect, a confused notion, taken up to serve an hypothesis; and none of those clear truths, that either their own evidence forces us to admit, or common experience makes it impudence to deny. For the most that can be said of it is, that it is possible the soul may always think, but not always retain it in memory: and I say, it is as possible that the soul may not always think; and much more probable that it should sometimes not think, than that it should often think, and that a long while together, and not be conscious to itself the next moment that it had thought.

§ 19. To suppose the soul to think, and the man to perceive it, is, as has been said, to make two persons in one man: and if one considers well these mens way of speaking, one should be led into a suspicion that they do so. For they who tell us, that the soul always thinks, do never, that I remember, say, that a man always thinks. Can the soul think, and not the man? or a man think, and not be conscious of it? This, perhaps, would be suspected of jargon in others. If they say, the man thinks always, but is not always conscious of it; they may as well say, his body is extended without having parts. For it is altogether as intelligible to say, that a body is extended without parts, as that any thing *thinks without being conscious of it*, or perceiving that it does so. They who talk thus, may, with as much reason, if it be necessary to their hypothesis, say, that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it; whereas hunger consists in that very sen-

fation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks. If they say, that a man is always conscious to himself of thinking; I ask, how they know it? Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind. Can another man perceive that I am conscious of any thing, when I perceive it not myself? No man's knowledge, here can go beyond his experience. Wake a man out of a sound sleep, and ask him, what he was that moment thinking on? If he himself be conscious of nothing he then thought on, he must be a notable diviner of thoughts, that can assure him that he was thinking: may he not with more reason assure him, he was not asleep? This is something beyond philosophy; and it cannot be less than revelation, that discovers to another thoughts in my mind, when I can find none there myself; and they must needs have a penetrating sight, who can certainly see that I think, when I cannot perceive it myself, and when I declare that I do not; and yet can see that dogs or elephants do not think, when they give all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us that they do so. This some may suspect to be a step beyond the Rosicrucians; it seeming easier to make one's self invisible to others, than to make another's thoughts visible to me, which are not visible to himself. But it is but defining the soul to be a substance that always thinks, and the business is done. If such definition be of any authority, I know not what it can serve for, but to make many men suspect, that they have no souls at all, since they find a good part of their lives pass away without thinking. For no definitions that I know, no suppositions of any sect, are of force enough to destroy constant experience, and perhaps it is



the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive, that makes so much uselefs dispute and noise in the world.

§ 20. I see no reason therefore to believe, that the *soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on*; and as those are increased and retained, so it comes, by exercise, to improve its faculty of thinking in the several parts of it, as well as afterwards, by compounding those ideas, and reflecting on its own operations, it increases its stock, as well as facility, in remembering, imagining, reasoning, and other modes of thinking.

§ 21. He that will suffer himself to be informed by observation and experience, and not make his own hypothesis the rule of nature, will find few signs of a soul accustomed to much thinking in a new-born child, and much fewer of any reasoning at all. And yet it is hard to imagine, that the rational soul should think so much, and not reason at all. And he that will consider, that infants, newly come into the world, spend the greatest part of their time in sleep, and are seldom awake, but when either hunger calls for the teat, or some pain, (the most importunate of all sensations), or some other violent impression on the body, forces the mind to perceive and attend to it: he, I say, who considers this, will perhaps find reason to imagine, that a *fœtus in the mother's womb differs not much from the state of a vegetable*; but passes the greatest part of its time without perception or thought, doing very little but sleep in a place where it needs not seek for food, and is surrounded with liquor, always equally soft, and near of the same temper; where the eyes have no light, and the ears, so shut up, are not very susceptible of

sounds; and where there is little or no variety, or change of objects, to move the senses.

§ 22. Follow a child from its birth, and observe the alterations that time makes, and you shall find, as the mind by the senses comes more and more to be furnished with ideas, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on. After some time, it begins to know the objects, which being most familiar with it, have made lasting impressions. Thus it comes, by degrees, to know the persons it daily converses with, and distinguish them from strangers; which are instances and effects of its coming to retain and distinguish the ideas the senses convey to it: and so we may observe, how the mind, by degrees, improves in these, and advances to the exercise of those other faculties of enlarging, compounding, and abstracting its ideas, and of reasoning about them, and reflecting upon all these; of which I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

§ 23. If it shall be demanded then, *When a man begins to have any ideas?* I think the true answer is, when he first has any sensation. For since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind, before the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with sensation: which is such an impression or motion, made in some part of the body, as produces some perception in the understanding. It is about these impressions made on our senses by outward objects, that the mind seems first to employ itself in such operations as we call *perception, remembering, consideration, reasoning, &c.*

§ 24. In time, the mind comes to reflect on its own operations about the ideas got by sensation,

and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call *ideas of reflection*. These are the impressions that are made on our senses by outward objects that are extrinsecal to the mind; and its own operations proceeding from powers intrinsic and proper to itself, which, when reflected on by itself, become also objects of its contemplation, are, as I have said, *the original of all knowledge*. Thus the first capacity of human intellect is, that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions made on it; either through the senses, by outward objects, or by its own operations, when it reflects on them. This is the first step a man makes towards the discovery of any thing, and the ground-work whereon to build all those notions, which ever he shall have naturally in this world. All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here: in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas, which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation.

§ 25. In this part, the understanding is merely passive; and whether or no it will have these beginnings, and as it were materials of knowledge, is not in its own power. For the objects of our senses do many of them obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds whether we will or no: and the operations of our minds will not let us be without, at least some obscure notions of them. No man can be wholly ignorant of what he does, when he thinks. These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprint-

ed, nor blot them out, and make new ones itself, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce. As the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impressions, and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas that are annexed to them.

## CHAP. II.

### *Of simple Ideas.*

§ 1. *Uncompounded appearances.* § 2, 3. *The mind can neither make nor destroy them.*

§ 1. **T**HE better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that some of them are simple, and some complex.

Though the qualities that affect our senses, are, in the things themselves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind, enter by the senses simple and unmixed. For though the sight and touch often take in from the same object, at the same time, different ideas; as a man sees at once motion and colour; the hand feels softness and warmth in the same piece of wax; yet the simple ideas, thus united in the same subject, are as perfectly distinct as those that come in by different senses. The coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice, being as distinct ideas in the mind as the

smell and whiteness of a lily, or as the taste of sugar, and smell of a rose: and there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perceptions he has of those simple ideas; which being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas.

§ 2. These simple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the mind only by these two ways above mentioned, *viz.* *sensation* and *reflection* †. When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas, it has

‡ Against this, that the materials of all our knowledge are suggested and furnished to the mind only by sensation and reflection, the bishop of Worcester makes use of the idea of *substance*, in these words: *If the idea of substance be grounded upon plain and evident reason, then we must allow an idea of substance, which comes not in by sensation or reflection; so we may be certain of something which we have not by those ideas.*

To which our author answers \*: These words of your lordship's contain nothing that I see in them against me: for I never said, that *the general idea of substance comes in by sensation and reflection*; or that it is a simple idea of sensation or reflection, though it be ultimately founded in them; for it is a complex idea, made up of the general idea of something, or being, with the relation of a support to accidents. For general ideas come not into the mind by sensation or reflection, but are the creatures or inventions of the understanding, as I think I have shewn †; and also, how the mind makes them from ideas, which it has got by

\* In his first letter to the bishop of Worcester, p. 35, &c.

† Book iii. c. 3. book ii. c. 25, &c. c. 28. § 18.

the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thoughts, to invent or frame one new simple

sensation and reflection; and as to the ideas of relation, how the mind forms them, and how they are derived from, and ultimately terminate in ideas of sensation and reflection, I have likewise shewn.

But that I may not be mistaken what I mean, when I speak of ideas of sensation and reflection, as the materials of all our knowledge; give me leave, my lord, to set down here a place or two, out of my book, to explain myself; as I thus speak of ideas of sensation and reflection\*.

‘ That these, when we have taken a full survey of them and their several modes, and the compositions made out of them, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas, and we have nothing in our minds, which did not come in one of these two ways.’

This thought, in another place †, I express thus: ‘ These are the most considerable of those simple ideas which the mind has, and out of which is made all its other knowledge; all which it receives by the two fore-mentioned ways of sensation and reflection.’ And ‡,

‘ Thus I have in a short draught given a view of our original ideas, from whence all the rest are derived, and of which they are made up.’

This, and the like, said in other places, is what I have thought concerning ideas of sensation and reflection, as the foundation and materials of all our ideas, and consequently of all our knowledge: I have set down

\* Book ii. ch. 1. § 5.

† Book ii. ch. 7. § 10.

‡ Book ii. ch. 21. § 73.

idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned: nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there. The dominion of man, in this little world of his own understanding, being much what the same, as it is in the great world of visible things; wherein his power,

these particulars out of my book, that the reader having a full view of my opinion herein, may the better see what in it is liable to your lordship's reprehension. For that your lordship is not very well satisfied with it, appears not only by the words under consideration, but by these also: *But we are still told, that our understanding can have no other ideas, but either from sensation or reflection*

Your lordship's argument, in the passage we are upon, stands thus: *If the general idea of substance be grounded upon plain and evident reason, then we must allow an idea of substance, which comes not in by sensation or reflection.* This is a consequence which, with submission, I think will not hold, because it is founded upon a supposition, which I think will not hold, *viz.* that reason and ideas are inconsistent; for if that supposition be not true, then the general idea of substance may be grounded on plain and evident reason; and yet it will not follow from thence, that it is not ultimately grounded on and derived from ideas *which come in by sensation or reflection*, and so cannot be said to come in by sensation or reflection.

To explain myself, and clear my meaning in this matter. All the ideas of all the sensible qualities of a cherry, come into my mind by sensation: the ideas of *perceiving, thinking, reasoning, knowing* &c. come into my mind by reflection. The ideas of these qualities and actions, or powers, are perceived by the mind to be by themselves inconsistent with existence; or, as your lordship well expresses it, *we find that we can have no true conception of any modes or accidents,*

however managed by art and skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom of what is already in being. The same inability will every one find in

*but we must conceive a substratum, or subject, wherein they are, i. e. that they cannot exist or subsist of themselves. Hence the mind perceives their necessary connection with inherence, or being supported, which being a relative idea. superadded to the red colour in a cherry, or to thinking in a man, the mind frames the correlative idea of a support. For I never denied, that the mind could frame to itself ideas of relation, but have shewed the quite contrary in my chapters about relation. But because a relation cannot be founded in nothing, or be the relation of nothing, and the thing here related as a supporter, or a support, is not represented to the mind by any clear and distinct idea, therefore the obscure, indistinct, vague idea of *thing* or *something*, is all that is left to be the positive idea, which has the relation of a *support*, or *substratum*, to modes or accidents. and that general, indetermined idea of *something*, is, by the abstraction of the mind, derived also from the simple ideas of sensation and reflection; and thus the mind, from the positive, simple ideas got by sensation and reflection, comes to the general, relative idea of substance, which, without these positive, simple ideas, it would never have.*

This your lordship (without giving by retail all the particular steps of the mind in this business) has well expressed in this more familiar way: *We find we can have no true conception of any modes or accidents, but we must conceive a substratum, or subject, wherein they are; since it is a repugnancy to our conception of things, that modes or accidents should subsist by themselves.*



himself, who should go about to fashion in his understanding any simple idea, not received in by his senses, from external objects; or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any taste, which had never affected his palate; or frame the idea of a scent, he had never smelt: and when he can do this, I will also conclude, that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds.

§ 3. This is the reason why, though we cannot believe it impossible to GOD to make a crea-

Hence your lordship calls it the *rational idea of substance*; and says, *I grant, that by sensation and reflection we come to know the powers and properties of things; but our reason is satisfied, that there must be something beyond these, because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves*: so that, if this be that which your lordship means by the *rational idea of substances*, I see nothing there is in it against what I have said, that it is founded on simple ideas of sensation or reflection, and that it is a very obscure idea.

Your lordship's conclusion, from your foregoing words, is, *And so we may be certain of some things which we have not by those ideas*, which is a proposition, whose precise meaning your lordship will forgive me, if I profess, as it stands there. I do not understand For it is uncertain to me, whether your lordship means, we may certainly know the existence of something which we have not by those ideas, or certainly know the distinct properties of something which we have not by those ideas, or certainly know the truth of some proposition *which we have not by those ideas*, for to be certain of something may signify either of these: but in which soever of these it be meant, I do not see how I am concerned in it.

ture with other organs, and more ways to convey into the understanding the notice of corporeal things than those five, as they are usually counted, which he has given to man: yet, I think, it is not possible for any one to imagine any other qualities in bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides sounds, tastes, smells, visible and tangible qualities. And had mankind been made with but four senses, the qualities then, which are the object of the fifth sense, had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception, as now any *belonging to a sixth, seventh, or eighth sense*, can possibly be: which, whether yet some other creatures, in some other parts of this vast and stupendious universe, may not have, will be a great presumption to deny. He that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things; but will consider the immensity of this fabric, and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in other mansions of it, there may be other, and different intelligent beings, of whose faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehension, as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the senses or understanding of a man; such variety and excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the Maker. I have here followed the common opinion of man's having but five senses, though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more; but either supposition serves equally to my present purpose.

## C H A P III.

*Of Ideas of one Sense.*

§ 1. *Division of simple ideas.* § 2. *Few simple ideas have names.*

§ 1. **T**HE better to conceive the ideas we receive from sensation, it may not be amiss for us to consider them in reference to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to our minds, and make themselves perceivable by us.

*First,* Then, there are some which come into our minds *by one sense only.*

*Secondly,* There are others that convey themselves into the mind *by more senses than one.*

*Thirdly,* Others that are had from *reflection only.*

*Fourthly,* There are some that make themselves way, and are suggested to the mind, *by all the ways of sensation and reflection.*

We shall consider them apart under these several heads.

*First,* There are *some ideas which have admittance only through one sense,* which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colours, as white, red, yellow, blue, with their several degrees or shades, and mixtures, as green, scarlet, purple, sea-green, and the rest, come in only by the eyes: all kind of noises, sounds, and tones, only by the ears: the several tastes and smells by the nose

and palate. And if these organs, or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain, the mind's preference-room, as I may so call it, are any of them so disordered, as not to perform their functions, they have no postern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into view, and be perceived by the understanding.

The most considerable of those belonging to the touch, are heat and cold, and solidity; all the rest, consisting almost wholly in the sensible configuration, as smooth and rough; or else more or less firm adhesion of the parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

§ 2. I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular *simple ideas* belonging to each sense: nor indeed is it possible, if we would, there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses *than we have names for*. The variety of smells, which are as many almost, if not more, than species of bodies in the world, do most of them want names. *Sweet* and *stinking* commonly serve our turn for these ideas, which, in effect, is little more than to call them pleasing or displeasing; though the smell of a rose and violet, both sweet, are certainly very distinct ideas. Nor are the different tastes, that by our palates we receive ideas of, much better provided with names. Sweet, bitter, sour, harsh, and salt, are almost all the epithets we have to denominate that numberless variety of relishes, which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of creatures, but in the different parts of the same plant, fruit, or animal. The same may be said of colours and sounds. I shall therefore, in the account of simple ideas I am here giving, content myself

to set down only such as are most material to our present purpose, or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of, though they are very frequently the ingredients of our complex ideas, amongst which, I think, I may well account solidity, which therefore I shall treat of in the next chapter.

## C H A P. IV.

### *Of Solidity.*

§ 1. *We receive this idea from touch.* § 2. *Solidity fills space.* § 3. *Distinct from space.* § 4. *From hardness.* § 5. *On solidity depends impulse, resistance, and protrusion.* § 6. *What it is.*

§ 1. **T**HE idea of SOLIDITY we receive by our touch; and it arises from the resistance which we find in the body, to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses, till it has left it. There is no idea which we receive more constantly from sensation than solidity. Whether we move or rest, in what posture soever we are, we always feel something under us, that supports us, and hinders our farther sinking downwards; and the bodies which we daily handle, make us perceive, that whilst they remain between them, they do, by an insurmountable force, hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that press them. That which thus hinders the approach of two bodies, when they are moving one towards another, I call *solidity*. I will not dispute, whether this acceptation of the word *solid* be nearer to its original signification, than that which ma-

thematicians use it in : it suffices, that I think the common notion of solidity will allow, if not justify, this use of it ; but if any one think it better to call it *impenetrability*, he has my consent. Only I have thought the term *solidity* the more proper to express this idea, not only because of its vulgar use in that sense, but also because it carries something more of positive in it than *impenetrability*, which is negative, and is, perhaps, more a consequence of solidity than solidity itself. This, of all other, seems the idea most intimately connected with, and essential to body, so as no-where else to be found or imagined, but only in matter : and though our senses take no notice of it, but in masses of matter, of a bulk sufficient to cause a sensation in us ; yet the mind having once got this idea from such grosser sensible bodies, traces it farther, and considers it, as well as figure, in the minutest particle of matter that can exist ; and finds it inseparably inherent in body, where-ever or however modified.

§ 2. This is the idea belongs to body, whereby we conceive it *to fill space*. The idea of which filling of space, is, that where we imagine any space taken up by a solid substance, we conceive it so to possess it, that it excludes all other solid substances ; and will for ever hinder any two other bodies, that move towards one another in a strait line, from coming to touch one another, unless it removes from between them in a line, not parallel to that which they move in. This idea of it, the bodies which we ordinarily handle, sufficiently furnish us with.

§ 3. This resistance, whereby it keeps other bodies out of the space which it possesses, is so great, that no force, how great soever, can surmount it.

All the bodies in the world, pressing a drop of water on all sides, will never be able to overcome the resistance which it will make, as soft as it is, to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their way: whereby our idea of solidity is distinguished both from pure space, which is capable neither of resistance nor motion; and from the ordinary idea of hardness. For a man may conceive two bodies at a distance, so as they may approach one another, without touching or displacing any solid thing, till their superficies come to meet: whereby, I think, we have the clear idea of space without solidity. For (not to go so far as annihilation of any particular body) I ask, whether a man cannot have the idea of the motion of one single body alone, without any other succeeding immediately into its place? I think it is evident he can: the idea of motion in one body, no more including the idea of motion in another, than the idea of a square figure in one body, includes the idea of a square figure in another. I do not ask, whether bodies do so exist, that the motion of one body cannot really be without the motion of another? To determine this either way, is to beg the question for or against a vacuum. But my question is, whether one cannot have the idea of one body moved, whilst others are at rest? And, I think, this no one will deny: if so, then the place it deserted gives us the idea of pure space without solidity, whereinto another body may enter, without either resistance or protrusion of any thing. When the sucker in a pump is drawn, the space it filled in the tube is certainly the same, whether any other body follows the motion of the sucker or no: nor does it imply a contradiction, that upon the motion of

one body, another, that is only contiguous to it, should not follow it. The necessity of such a motion is built only on the supposition, that the world is full; but not on the distinct ideas of space and solidity: which are as different as resistance and not resistance, protrusion and not protrusion. And that men have ideas of space without body, their very disputes about a vacuum plainly demonstrate, as is shewed in another place. As,

§ 4. Solidity is hereby also differenced from hardness, in that solidity consists in repletion, and so an utter exclusion of other bodies out of the space it possesses; but hardness, in a firm cohesion of the parts of matter, making up masses of a sensible bulk, so that the whole does not easily change its figure. And indeed hard and soft are names that we give to things, only in relation to the constitutions of our own bodies; that being generally called hard by us, which will put us to pain, sooner than change figure by the pressure of any part of our bodies; and that, on the contrary, soft, which changes the situation of its parts upon an easy and unpainful touch.

But this difficulty of changing the situation of the sensible parts amongst themselves, or of the figure of the whole, gives no more solidity to the hardest body in the world, than to the softest; nor is an adamant one jot more solid than water. For though the two flat sides of two pieces of marble will more easily approach each other, between which there is nothing but water or air, than if there be a diamond between them; yet it is not that the parts of the diamond are more solid than those of water, or resist more; but because the parts of water, being more easily



separable from each other, they will by a side-motion be more easily removed, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of marble: but if they could be kept from making place by that side-motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of these two pieces of marble, as much as the diamond; and it would be as impossible by any force to surmount their resistance, as to surmount the resistance of the parts of a diamond. The softest body in the world will as invincibly resist the coming together of any two other bodies, if it be not put out of the way, but remain between them, as the hardest that can be found or imagined. He that shall fill a yielding soft body well with air or water, will quickly find its resistance: and he that thinks that nothing but bodies that are hard, can keep his hands from approaching one another, may be pleased to make a trial with the air inclosed in a football. The experiment I have been told was made at Florence, with a hollow globe of gold filled with water, and exactly closed, farther shews the solidity of so soft a body as water: for the golden globe thus filled, being put into a press, which was driven by the extreme force of screws, the water made itself way through the pores of that very close metal, and finding no room for a nearer approach of its particles within, got to the outside, where it rose like a dew, and so fell in drops, before the sides of the globe could be made to yield to the violent compression of the engine that squeezed it.

§ 5. By this idea of solidity is the extension of body distinguished from the extension of space. The extension of body being nothing but the cohesion or continuity of solid, separable, moveable

parts; and the extension of space, the continuity of unfolid, infeparable, and immoveable parts. *Upon the solidity of bodies also depends their mutual impulse, resistance, and protrusion.* Of pure space, then, and solidity, there are several (amongst which I confess myself one) who persuade themselves, they have clear and distinct ideas; and that they can think on space, without any thing in it that resists, or is protruded by body. This is the idea of pure space, which they think they have as clear as any idea they can have of the extension of body; the idea of the distance between the opposite parts of a concave superficies, being equally as clear without, as with the idea of any solid parts between; and on the other side, they persuade themselves, that they have, distinct from that of pure space, the idea of something that fills space, that can be protruded by the impulse of other bodies, or resist their motion. If there be others that have not these two ideas distinct, but confound them, and make but one of them, I know not how men, who have the same idea under different names, or different ideas under the same name, can, in that case, talk with one another, any more than a man, who, not being blind or deaf, has distinct ideas of the colour of scarlet and the sound of a trumpet, could discourse concerning scarlet-colour with the blind man I mentioned in another place, who fancied that the idea of scarlet was like the sound of a trumpet.

§ 6. If any one asks me, *what this solidity is*, I send him to his senses to inform him: let him put a flint or a foot-ball between his hands; and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a sufficient explication of so-

lidity, what it is, and wherein it consists; I promise to tell him, what it is, and wherein it consists, when he tells me, what thinking is, or wherein it consists; or explains to me what extension or motion is, which, perhaps, seems much easier. The simple ideas we have are such as experience teaches them us; but if beyond that, we endeavour by words to make them clearer in the mind, we shall succeed no better than if we went about to clear up the darkness of a blind man's mind by talking, and to discourse into him the ideas of light and colours. The reason of this I shall shew in another place.

## C H A P. V.

### *Of simple Ideas of divers Senses.*

**T**HE ideas we get by more than one sense, are of *space* or *extension*, *figure*, *rest*, and *motion*; for these make perceivable impressions both on the eyes and touch; and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of our extension, figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.

## C H A P. VI.

*Of simple Ideas of Reflection.*

§ 1. *Are the operations of the mind about its other ideas? § 2. The idea of perception, and idea of willing, we have from reflection.*

§ 1. **T**HE mind receiving the ideas, mentioned in the foregoing chapters, from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own actions about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things.

§ 2. The two great and principal actions of the mind, which are most frequently considered, and which are so frequent that every one that pleases may take notice of them in himself, are these two :

*Perception, or thinking ; and  
Volition, or willing.*

The power of *thinking* is called the UNDERSTANDING ; and the power of *volition* is called the WILL ; and these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated FACULTIES. Of some of the modes of those simple ideas of reflection, such as are *remembrance, discerning, reasoning, judging, knowledge, faith, &c.* I shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

## C H A P. VII.

*Of simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection.*

§ 1—6. *Pleasure and pain.* § 7. *Existence and unity.* § 8. *Power.* § 9. *Succession.* § 10. *Simple ideas, the materials of our knowledge.*

§ 1. **T**HERE be other simple ideas, which convey themselves into the mind, by all the ways of sensation and reflection, *viz.*

*Pleasure, or delight, and its opposite.*

*Pain, or uneasiness.*

*Power.*

*Existence.*

*Unity.*

§ 2. *Delight, or uneasiness,* one or other of them, join themselves to almost all our ideas, both of sensation and reflection: and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain. By *pleasure* and *pain*, I would be understood to signify whatsoever delights or molests us; whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds, or any thing operating on our bodies. For whether we call it satisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, &c. on the one side; or uneasiness, trouble, pain, torment, anguish, misery, &c. on the other, they are still but different degrees of the same thing, and belong to the ideas of *pleasure* and *pain*, *delight*, or *uneasiness*; which are the names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas.

§ 3. The infinite wise Author of our being,

having given us the power over several parts of our bodies, to move or keep them at rest, as we think fit, and also by the motion of them to move ourselves and our contiguous bodies, in which consists all the actions of our body; having also given a power to our minds, in several instances, to chuse amongst its ideas, which it will think on, and to pursue the inquiry to this or that subject with consideration and attention, to excite us to these actions of thinking and motion that we are capable of, has been pleased to join to several thoughts, and several sensations, a *perception of delight*. If this were wholly separated from all our outward sensations and inward thoughts, we should have no reason to prefer one thought or action to another; negligence to attention, or motion to rest. And so we should neither stir our bodies, nor employ our minds; but let our thoughts, if I may so call it, run adrift, without any direction or design; and suffer the ideas of our minds, like unregarded shadows, to make their appearances there, as it happened, without attending to them. In which state, man however, furnished with the faculties of understanding and will, would be a very idle unactive creature, and pass his time only in a lazy lethargic dream. It has therefore pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects, and to the ideas which we receive from them, as also to several of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in several objects, to several degrees, that those faculties which he had endowed us with, might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us.

§ 4. Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that, as to pursue

this: only this is worth our consideration, that *pain is often produced by the same objects and ideas, that produce pleasure in us.* This their near conjunction, which makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure, gives us new occasion of admiring the wisdom and goodness of our Maker, who, designing the preservation of our being, has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do; and as advices to withdraw from them. But he not designing our preservation barely, but the preservation of every part and organ in its perfection, hath, in many cases, annexed pain to those very ideas which delight us. Thus heat, that is very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increase of it, proves no ordinary torment; and the most pleasant of all sensible objects, light itself, if there be too much of it, if increased beyond a due proportion to our eyes, causes a very painful sensation: which is wisely and favourably so ordered by nature, that when any object does, by the vehemency of its operation, disorder the instruments of sensation, whose structures cannot but be very nice and delicate, we might, by the pain, be warned to withdraw, before the organ be quite put out of order, and so be unfitted for its proper functions for the future. The consideration of those objects that produce it, may well persuade us, that this is the end or use of pain. For though great light be insufferable to our eyes, yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them; because the causing no disorderly motion in it, leaves that curious organ unharmed, in its natural state. But yet excess of cold, as well as heat, pains us; because it is equally destructive to that temper,

which is necessary to the preservation of life, and the exercise of the several functions of the body, and which consists in a moderate degree of warmth; or, if you please, a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies, confined within certain bounds.

§ 5. Beyond all this, we may find another reason why GOD hath scattered up and down *several degrees of pleasure and pain in all the things that environ and affect us*; and blended them together, in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with; that we finding imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of complete happiness, in all the enjoyments which the creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of him, *with whom there is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore.*

§ 6. Though what I have here said may not, perhaps, make the *ideas of pleasure and pain* clearer to us than our own experience does, which is the only way that we are capable of having them; yet the consideration of the reason why they are annexed to so many other ideas, serving to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the sovereign Disposer of all things, may not be unsuitable to the main end of these inquiries: the knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts, and the proper business of all understandings.

§ 7. *Existence* and *unity* are two other ideas, that are suggested to the understanding by every object without, and every idea within. When ideas are in our minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us; which is, that they exist, or have existence; and whatever we can consider as



one thing, whether a real being or idea, suggests to the understanding the idea of *unity*.

§ 8. *Power* also is another of those simple ideas which we receive from *sensation and reflection*. For, observing in ourselves, that we can at pleasure move several parts of our bodies which were at rest; the effects also that natural bodies are able to produce in one another, occurring every moment to our senses, we both these ways get the idea of *power*.

§ 9. Besides these, there is another idea, which though suggested by our senses, yet is more constantly offered us by what passes in our own minds; and that is the idea of *succession*. For, if we look immediately into ourselves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our ideas always, whilst we are awake, or have any thought, passing in train, one going, and another coming, without intermission.

§ 10. These, if they are not all, are at least, as I think, the most considerable of those *simple ideas* which the mind has, and out of which is made all its other knowledge; all which it receives only by the two fore-mentioned ways of *sensation and reflection*.

Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious mind of man to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the stars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the world; that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmost expansion of matter, and makes excursions into that incomprehensible *inane*. I grant all this, but desire any one to assign any *simple idea*, which is not received from one of those inlets before mentioned; or any *complex idea* not made out of those *simple ones*. Nor will it be so strange to think

these few simple ideas sufficient to employ the quickest thought, or largest capacity; and to furnish the materials of all that various knowledge, and more various fancies and opinions of all mankind, if we consider how many words may be made out of the various composition of twenty-four letters; or if going one step farther, we will but reflect on the variety of combinations may be made with barely one of the above-mentioned ideas, *viz.* NUMBER, whose stock is inexhaustible, and truly infinite: and what a large and immense field doth *extension* alone afford the mathematicians?

### C H A P. VIII.

#### *Some farther Considerations concerning our simple Ideas.*

§ 1—6. *Positive ideas from privative causes.* § 7, 8. *Ideas in the mind, qualities in bodies.* § 9, 10. *Primary and secondary qualities.* § 11, 12. *How primary qualities produce their ideas.* § 13, 14. *How secondary.* § 15—22. *Ideas of primary qualities, are resemblances; of secondary, not.* § 23. *Three sorts of qualities in bodies.* § 24. *The first are resemblances; the second, thought resemblances, but are not; the third, neither are, nor are thought so.* § 25. *The reason of our mistake in this.* § 26. *Secondary qualities, twofold; first, immediately perceivable; secondly, mediately perceivable.*

§ 1. **C**ONCERNING the simple ideas of sensation, it is to be considered, that whatsoever is so constituted in nature, as to be able,

by affecting our senses, to cause any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the understanding a simple idea; which, whatever be the external cause of it, when it comes to be taken notice of by our discerning faculty, it is by the mind looked on and considered there to be a real positive idea in the understanding, as much as any other whatsoever; though, perhaps, the cause of it be but a privation in the subject.

§ 2. Thus the idea of heat and cold, light and darkness, white and black, motion and rest, are equally clear and positive ideas in the mind; though, perhaps, some of the causes which produce them, are barely privations in those subjects from whence our senses derive those ideas. These the understanding, in its view of them, considers all as distinct positive ideas, without taking notice of the causes that produce them; which is an inquiry not belonging to the idea, as it is in the understanding; but to the nature of the things existing without us. These are two very different things, and carefully to be distinguished; it being one thing to perceive and know the idea of white or black, and quite another to examine what kind of particles they must be, and how ranged in the superficies, to make any object appear white or black.

§ 3. A painter or dyer, who never inquired into their causes, hath the ideas of white and black, and other colours, as clearly, perfectly, and distinctly in his understanding, and perhaps more distinctly than the philosopher who hath busied himself in considering their natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cause positive or privative; and the idea of black is no less positive in his mind than that of white, however

the cause of that colour in the external object may be only a privation.

§ 4. If it were the design of my present undertaking to inquire into the natural causes and manner of perception, I should offer this as a reason *why a privative cause might, in some cases at least, produce a positive idea; viz.* that all sensation being produced in us only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits, variously agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion must as necessarily produce a new sensation, as the variation or increase of it; and so introduce a new idea, which depends only on a different motion of the animal spirits in that organ.

§ 5. But whether this be so, or no, I will not here determine, but appeal to every one's own experience, whether the shadow of a man, though it consists of nothing but the absence of light, (and the more the absence of light is, the more discernible is the shadow), does not, when a man looks on it, cause as clear and positive an idea in the mind, as a man himself, though covered over with clear sun-shine? And the picture of a shadow is a positive thing. Indeed, we have negative names, which stand not directly for positive ideas, but for their absence, such as *insipid, silence, nihil, &c.*; which words denote positive ideas; *v. g. taste, sound, being*, with a signification of their absence.

§ 6. And thus one may truly be said to see darkness. For supposing a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected, it is certain one may see the figure of it, or it may be painted; or whether the ink I write with makes any other idea, is a question. The privative causes I have

here assigned of positive ideas, are according to the common opinion; but in truth, it will be hard to determine whether there be really any ideas from a privative cause, till it be determined *whether rest be any more a privation than motion.*

§ 7. To discover the nature of our ideas the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them, as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds, and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us; that so we may not think, as perhaps usually is done, that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likenesses of something existing without us, than the names that stand for them are the likenesses of our ideas, which yet, upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.

§ 8. Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call *idea*; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call *quality* of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snow-ball having the power to produce in us the ideas of *white, cold, and round*, the powers to produce those ideas in us, as they are in the snow-ball, I call *qualities*; and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them *ideas*; which ideas, if I speak of them sometimes as in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which produce them in us.

§ 9. Qualities thus considered in bodies are, first, Such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what estate soever it be; such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force cau

be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter, which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses; *v. g.* take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has still *solidity, extension, figure, and mobility*; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on till the parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all those qualities. For division (which is all that a mill or pestle, or any other body does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter of that which was but one before; all which distinct masses, reckoned as so many distinct bodies, after division, make a certain number. These I call *original* or *primary qualities* of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, *viz.* solidity, extension, figure, motion, or rest, and number.

§ 10. Secondly, Such qualities, which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their *primary qualities*; *i. e.* by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts; as colours, sounds, tastes, &c. These I call *secondary qualities*. To these might be added a third sort, which are allowed to be barely powers, though they are as much real qualities in the subject, as those which I, to comply with the common way of speaking, call *qualities*, but for distinction, *secondary qualities*. For the power in fire to produce a new colour, or consistency in wax or clay by its

primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new idea or sensation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before, by the same primary qualities, *viz.* the bulk, texture, and motion of its insensible parts.

§ 11. The next thing to be considered is, how *bodies* produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by *impulse*, the only way which we can conceive bodies operate in.

§ 12. If, then, external objects be not united to our minds when they produce ideas in it, and yet we perceive *these original qualities* in such of them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident, that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves, or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the brain, or the seat of sensation, there to *produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them.* And since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion, which produces these ideas which we have of them in us.

§ 13. After the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive, that the *ideas of secondary qualities are also produced, viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our senses.* For it being manifest that there are bodies, and good store of bodies, each whereof are so small, that we cannot, by any of our senses, discover either their bulk, figure, or motion, as is evident in the particles of the air and water, and other extremely smaller than those, perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air or water, as the particles of air or water are smaller than

pease or hail-stones: let us suppose at present, that the different motions and figures, bulk, and number of such particles, affecting the several organs of our senses, produce in us those different sensations which we have from the colours and smells of bodies, *v. g.* that a violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions, causes the ideas of the blue colour, and sweet scent of that flower to be produced in our minds. It being no more impossible to conceive, that God should annex such ideas to such motions, with which they have no similitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no resemblance.

§ 14. What I have said concerning *colours* and *smells*, may be understood also of *tastes* and *sounds*, and other the like sensible qualities; which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us, and depend on those primary qualities, *viz.* bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts; as I have said.

§ 15. From whence, I think, it is easy to draw this observation, that the ideas of *primary qualities* of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these *secondary qualities* have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. There are in the bodies we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us: and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves, which we call so.



§ 16. FLAME is denominated *hot* and *light*; SNOW, *white* and *cold*; and MANNA, *white* and *sweet*, from the ideas they produce in us: which qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those bodies that those ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror; and it would by most men be judged very extravagant, if one should say otherwise. And yet he that will consider, that the same fire, that in one distance produces in us the sensation of *warmth*, does, at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different sensation of *pain*, ought to be-think himself, what reason he has to say, that his idea of *warmth*, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually *in the fire*; and his idea of *pain*, which the same fire produced in him the same way, is not in the fire, why is whiteness and coldness in snow, and pain not, when it produces the one and the other idea in us; and can do neither, but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid parts?

§ 17. The particular *bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow, are really in them*, whether any one's senses perceive them or no; and therefore they may be called *real qualities*, because they really exist in those bodies. But *light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them, than sickness or pain is in manna*. Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ears hear sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell, and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are such particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, *i. e.* bulk, figure, and motion of parts.

§ 18. A piece of manna of a sensible bulk, is

able to produce in us the idea of a round or square figure; and, by being removed from one place to another, the idea of motion. This idea of motion represents it, as it really is in the manna moving: a circle or square are the same, whether in idea or existence, in the mind or in the manna: and this, both *motion and figure are really in the manna*, whether we take notice of them or no: this every body is ready to agree to. Besides, manna, by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of its parts, has a power to produce the sensations of sickness, and sometimes of acute pains, or grippings in us. That these ideas of *sickness and pain are not in the manna*, but effects of its operations on us, and are no-where when we feel them not: this also every one readily agrees to. And yet men are hardly to be brought to think, that *sweetness and whiteness are not really in manna*; which are but the effects of the operations of manna, by the motion, size, and figure of its particles on the eyes and palate; as the pain and sickness caused by manna, are confessedly nothing but the effects of its operations on the stomach and guts, by the size, motion, and figure of its insensible parts; (for by nothing else can a body operate, as has been proved): as if it could not operate on the eyes and palate, and thereby produce in the mind particular distinct ideas, which in itself it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the guts and stomach, and thereby produce distinct ideas, which in itself it has not. These ideas being all effects of the operations of manna, on several parts of our bodies, by the size, figure, number, and motion of its parts, why those produced by the eyes and palate should rather be thought to be really in the manna, than those pro-

duced by the stomach and guts; or why the pain and sickness, ideas that are the effects of manna, should be thought to be no-where, when they are not felt; and yet the sweetness and whiteness, effects of the same manna on other parts of the body, by ways equally as unknown, should be thought to exist in the manna, when they are not seen nor tasted, would need some reason to explain.

§ 19. Let us consider the red and white colours in porphyre: hinder light but from striking on it, and its colours vanish; it no longer produces any such ideas in us: upon the return of light, it produces these appearances on us again. Can any one think any real alterations are made in the porphyre by the presence or absence of light; and that those ideas of whiteness and redness are really in porphyre in the light, when it is plain *it has no colour in the dark*. It has indeed such a configuration of particles, both night and day, as are apt, by the rays of light rebounding from some parts of that hard stone, to produce in us the idea of redness, and from others the idea of whiteness: but whiteness or redness are not in it at any time, but such a texture that hath the power to produce such a sensation in us.

§ 20. Pound an almond, and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one, and the sweet taste into an oily one. What real alteration can the beating of a pestle make in any body, but an alteration of the texture of it?

§ 21. Ideas being thus distinguished and understood, we may be able to give an account how the same water, at the same time, may produce the idea of cold by one hand, and of heat by the other; whereas it is impossible that the same water, if those ideas were really in it, should, at

the same time, be both hot and cold. For if we imagine *warmth*, as it is *in our hands*, to be *nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves, or animal spirits*, we may understand how it is possible that the same water may at the same time produce the sensation of heat in one hand, and cold in the other; which yet figure never does, that never producing the idea of a square by one hand, which has produced the idea of a globe by another. But if the sensation of heat and cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies, caused by the corpuscles of any other body, it is easy to be understood, that if that motion be greater in one hand than in the other; if a body be applied to the two hands, which has in its minute particles a greater motion than in those of one of the hands, and a less than in those of the other, it will increase the motion of the one hand, and lessen it in the other, and so cause the different sensations of heat and cold, that depend thereon.

§ 22. I have, in what just goes before, been engaged in physical inquiries a little farther than perhaps I intended. But it being necessary, to make the nature of sensation a little understood, and to make the *difference between the qualities in bodies, and the ideas produced by them in the mind, to be distinctly conceived*, without which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them; I hope I shall be pardoned this little excursion into natural philosophy, it being necessary in our present inquiry, to distinguish the *primary and real qualities* of bodies, which are always in them, (*viz.* solidity, extension, figure, number, and motion, or rest; and are sometimes perceived by us, *viz.* when the

bodies they are in are big enough singly to be discerned), from those *secondary* and *imputed qualities*, which are but the powers of several combinations of those primary ones, when they operate without being distinctly discerned; whereby we also may come to know what ideas are, and what are not resemblances of something really existing in the bodies we denominate from them.

§ 23. The qualities, then, that are in bodies, rightly considered, are of three sorts.

1<sup>st</sup>, The *bulk*, *figure*, *number*, *situation*, and *motion*, or *rest* of their solid parts; those are in them, whether we perceive them or no; and when they are of that size that we can discover them, we have by these an idea of the thing as it is in itself: as is plain in artificial things: these I call *primary qualities*.

2<sup>dly</sup>, The *power* that is in any body, by reason of its insensible primary qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas of several colours, sounds, smells, tastes, &c. these are usually called *sensible qualities*.

3<sup>dly</sup>, The *power* that is in any body, by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities, to make such a *change* in the *bulk*, *figure*, *texture*, and *motion* of another body, as to make it operate on our senses, differently from what it did before. Thus the sun has a power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid. These are usually called *powers*.

The first of these, as has been said, I think may be properly called *real*, *original*, or *primary qualities*, because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or no; and upon their

different modifications it is that the secondary qualities depend.

The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things, which powers result from the different modifications of those primary qualities.

§ 24. But though these two latter sorts of qualities are *powers barely*, and nothing but powers relating to several other bodies, and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities; yet they are generally otherwise thought of. For the *second sort*, viz. the powers to produce several ideas in us by our senses, are looked upon as *real qualities*, in the things thus affecting us: but the *third sort* are called and esteemed *barely powers*; v. g. the ideas of heat or light, which we receive by our eyes, or touch from the sun, are commonly thought *real qualities*, existing in the sun, and something more than mere powers in it. But when we consider the sun, in reference to wax, which it melts or blanches, we look upon the whiteness and softness produced in the wax, not as qualities in the sun, but effects produced by *powers* in it: whereas, if rightly considered, these qualities of light and warmth, which are perceptions in me when I am warmed or enlightened by the sun, are no otherwise in the sun, than the changes made in the wax, when it is blanched or melted, are in the sun: they are all of them equally powers in the sun, depending on its primary qualities; whereby it is able; in the one case, so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of some of the insensible parts of my eyes or hands, as thereby to produce in me the idea of light or heat; and in the other, it is able so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of the insensible

parts of the wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct ideas of white and fluid.

§ 25. The reason why the one are ordinarily taken for *real qualities*, and the other only for *bare powers*, seems to be, because the ideas we have of distinct colours, sounds &c. containing nothing at all in them of bulk, figure, or motion, we are not apt to think them the effects of these primary qualities, which appear not to our senses to operate in their production; and with which they have not any apparent congruity, or conceivable connection. Hence it is, that we are so forward to imagine, that those ideas are the resemblances of something really existing in the objects themselves: since sensation discovers nothing of bulk, figure, or motion of parts in their production; nor can reason shew, how bodies, by their bulk, figure, and motion, should produce in the mind the ideas of blue or yellow, &c. But in the other case, in the operations of bodies, changing the qualities one of another, we plainly discover, that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare effect of power. For though receiving the idea of heat, or light, from the sun, we are apt to think it is a perception and resemblance of such a quality in the sun; yet when we see wax, or a fair face, receive change of colour from the sun, we cannot imagine that to be the reception or resemblance of any thing in the sun, because we find not those different colours in the sun itself. For our senses being able to observe a likeness, or unlikeness of sensible qualities in two different external objects, we forwardly enough conclude the production of any sensible quality in any subject to be an effect

of bare power, and not the communication of any quality, which was really in the efficient, when we find no such sensible quality in the thing that produced it. But our senses not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us, and the quality of the object producing it, we are apt to imagine that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects, and not the effects of certain powers, placed in the modification of their primary qualities, with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance.

§ 26. To conclude; besides those before-mentioned primary qualities in bodies, *viz.* bulk, figure, extension, number, and motion of their solid parts; all the rest, whereby we take notice of bodies, and distinguish them one from another, are nothing else but several powers in them, depending on those primary qualities; whereby they are fitted, either by immediately operating on our bodies, to produce several different ideas in us; or else by operating on other bodies, so to change their primary qualities, as to render them capable of producing ideas in us, different from what before they did. The former of these, I think, may be called *secondary qualities, immediately perceivable*: the latter, *secondary qualities, mediately perceivable*.



## C H A P. IX.

## Of P E R C E P T I O N .

§ 1. *It is the first simple idea of reflection. § 2—4. Perception is only when the mind receives the impression. § 5, 6. Children, though they have ideas in the womb, have none innate. § 7. Which ideas first, is not evident. § 8—10. Ideas of sensation often changed by the judgment. § 11—14. Perception puts the difference between animals and inferior beings. § 15. Perception, the inlet of knowledge.*

§ 1. **P**ERCEPTION, as it is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas; so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection, and is by some called thinking in general. Though thinking, in the propriety of the English tongue, signifies that sort of operation of the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active; where it, with some degree of voluntary attention, considers any thing. For in bare, naked perception, the mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.

§ 2. *What perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, &c. or thinks, than by any discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind, cannot miss it: and if he does not reflect, all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it.*

§ 3. This is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind;

whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no perception. Fire may burn our bodies, with no other effect than it does a billet, unless the motion be continued to the brain, and there the sense of heat or idea of pain, be produced in the mind, wherein consists *actual perception*.

§ 4. How often may a man observe in himself, that whilst his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, and curiously surveying some ideas that are there, it takes no notice of impressions of sounding bodies, made upon the organ of hearing, with the same alteration that uses to be for the producing the idea of sound? A sufficient impulse there may be on the organ; but it not reaching the observation of the mind, there follows no perception: and though the motion that uses to produce the idea of sound, be made in the ear, yet no sound is heard. Want of sensation, in this case, is not through any defect in the organ, or that the man's ears are less affected than at other times, when he does hear: but that which uses to produce the idea, though conveyed in by the usual organ, not being taken notice of in the understanding, and so imprinting no idea on the mind, there follows no sensation. *So that where-ever there is sense or perception, there some idea is actually produced, and present in the understanding.*

§ 5. Therefore I doubt not but children, by the exercise of their senses about objects that affect them *in the womb*, receive some few ideas before they are born, as the unavoidable effects either of the bodies that environ them, or else of those wants or diseases they suffer; amongst which (if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable of

examination) I think the ideas of hunger and warmth are two; which probably are some of the first that children have, and which they scarce ever part with again.

§ 6. But though it be reasonable to imagine, that children receive some ideas before they come into the world, yet these simple ideas are far from those innate principles which some contend for, and we above have rejected. These here mentioned, being the effects of sensation, are only from some affections of the body, which happen to them there, and so depend on something exterior to the mind; no otherwise differing in their manner of production from other ideas derived from sense, but only in the precedency of time: whereas those innate principles are supposed to be quite of another nature; not coming into the mind by any accidental alterations in, or operations on the body, but as it were original characters impressed upon it in the very first moment of its being and constitution.

§ 7. As there are some ideas which we may reasonably suppose may be introduced into the minds of children in the womb, subservient to the necessities of their life and being there; so after they are born, those ideas are the *earliest imprinted, which happen to be the sensible qualities which first occur to them*; amongst which light is not the least considerable, nor of the weakest efficacy. And how covetous the mind is to be furnished with all such ideas as have no pain accompanying them, may be a little guessed, by what is observable in children new-born, who always turn their eyes to that part from whence the light comes, lay them how you please. But the ideas that are most familiar at first being various, according to

the divers circumstances of childrens first entertainment in the world, the order, wherein the several ideas come at first into the mind, is very various, and uncertain also; neither is it much material to know it.

§ 8. We are farther to consider concerning perception, that the *ideas we receive by sensation are often, in grown people, altered by the judgment, without our taking notice of it.* When we set before our eyes a round globe, of any uniform colour, v. g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain, that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle, variously shadowed with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes. But we having by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us; what alterations are made in the reflections of light, by the difference of the sensible figures of bodies, the judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into their causes: so that from that, which truly is variety of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark or figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure, and an uniform colour; when the idea we receive from thence, is only a plane variously coloured; as is evident in painting. To which purpose, I shall here insert a problem of that very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge, the learned and worthy Mr Molineux, which he was pleased to send me in a letter some months since; and it is this: *Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is*

*the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see: Quære, Whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell which is the globe, which the cube. To which the acute and judicious proposer answers, Not. For though he has obtained the experience of, how a globe, how a cube, affects his touch; yet he has not yet attained the experience, that what affects his touch so or so, must affect his sight so or so; or that a protuberant angle in the cube that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube. I agree with this thinking Gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this his problem; and am of opinion, that the blind man, at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say, which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw them; though he could unerringly name them by his touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference of their figures felt. This I have set down, and leave with my reader, as an occasion for him to consider, how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he thinks he has not the least use of, or help from them: and the rather, because this observing Gentleman farther adds, That having, upon the occasion of my book, proposed this to divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met with one that at first gave the answer to it which he thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they were convinced.*

§ 9. But this is not, I think, usual in any of our ideas but those received by sight; because sight, the most comprehensive of all our senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to that sense; and

also the far different ideas of space, figure, or motion, the several varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper object, *viz.* light and colours, we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This, in many cases, by a settled habit, in things whereof we have frequent experience, is performed so constantly, and so quick, that we take that for the perception of our sensation, which is an idea formed by our judgment; so that one, *viz.* that of sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself; as a man who reads or hears with attention on understanding, takes little notice of the characters or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them.

§ 10. Nor need we wonder, that this is done with so little notice, if we consider how very quick the actions of the mind are performed: for, as itself is thought to take up no space, to have no extension; so its actions seem to require no time, but many of them seem to be crowded into an instant. I speak this in comparison to the actions of the body. Any one may easily observe this in his own thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an instant, do our minds, with one glance, see all the parts of a demonstration, which may very well be called a long one, if we consider the time it will require to put it into words, and step by step shew it another? *2dly,* We shall not be so much surpris'd, that this is done in us with so little notice, if we consider how the facility which we get of doing things, by a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us without our notice. *Habits,* especially such as are begun very early, come at last to produce actions in us, which often escape our obser-

*vation.* How frequently do we, in a day, cover our eyes with our eye-lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark? Men, that by custom have got the use of a by-word, do almost in every sentence, pronounce sounds, which, though taken notice of by others, they themselves neither hear nor observe. And therefore it is not so strange, that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment, and make one serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.

§ 11. This faculty of perception seems to me to be that which *puts the distinction betwixt the animal kingdom, and the inferior parts of nature.* For however vegetables have, many of them, some degrees of motion, and upon the different application of other bodies to them, do very briskly alter their figures and motions, and so have obtained the name of sensitive plants, from a motion which has some resemblance to that which in animals follows upon sensation: yet, I suppose, it is all bare mechanism; and no otherwise produced, than the turning of a wild oat-beard by the insinuation of the particles of moisture, or the shortening of a rope by the affusion of water. All which is done without any sensation in the subject, or the having or receiving any ideas.

§ 12. Perception, I believe, is, in some degree, *in all sorts of animals*; though in some, possibly, the avenues, provided by nature for the reception of sensations, are so few, and the perception they are received with so obscure and dull, that it comes extremely short of the quickness and variety of sensations, which is in other animals: but yet it is sufficient for, and wisely adapted to, the state and condition of that sort of animals who

are thus made: so that the wisdom and goodness of the Maker plainly appear in all the parts of this stupendious fabric, and all the several degrees and ranks of creatures in it.

§ 13. We may, I think, from the make of an *oyster* or *cockle*, reasonably conclude, that it has not so many, nor so quick senses, as a man, or several other animals; nor if it had, would it, in that state and incapacity of transferring itself from once place to another, be bettered by them. What good would sight and hearing do to a creature, that cannot move itself to or from the objects, wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickness of sensation be an inconvenience to an animal, that must lie still where chance has once placed it; and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul water, as it happens to come to it?

§ 14. But yet I cannot but think there is some small dull perception, whereby they are distinguished from perfect insensibility. And that this may be so, we have plain instances, even in mankind itself. Take one, in whom decrepid old age has blotted out the memory of his past knowledge, and clearly wiped out the ideas his mind was formerly stored with; and has by destroying his sight, hearing, and smell, quite, and his taste to a great degree, stopped up almost all the passages for new ones to enter; or if there be some of the inlets yet half open, the impressions made are scarce perceived, or not at all retained. How far such an one (notwithstanding all that is boasted of innate principles) is, in his knowledge and intellectual faculties, above the condition of a *cockle* or an *oyster*, I leave to be considered. And if a man had passed sixty years in such a state, as it is



possible he might, as well as three days, I wonder what difference there would have been, in any intellectual perfections, between him and the lowest degree of animals.

§ 15. Perception, then, being *the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it*, the fewer senses any man, as well as any other creature, hath, and the fewer and duller the impressions are, that are made by them, and the duller the faculties are, that are employed about them, the more remote are they from that knowledge which is to be found in some men. But this being in great variety of degrees (as may be perceived amongst men) cannot certainly be discovered in the several species of animals, much less in their particular individuals. It suffices me only to have remarked here, that perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge in our minds. And I am apt too to imagine, that it is perception in the lowest degree of it which puts the boundaries between animals and the inferior ranks of creatures. But this I mention only as my conjecture by-the-bye, it being indifferent to the matter in hand which way the learned shall determine of it.

## C H A P. X.

*Of RETENTION.*

- § 1. *Contemplation.* § 2. *Memory.* § 3. *Attention, repetition, pleasure, and pain, fix ideas.*  
 § 4, 5. *Ideas fade in the memory.* § 6. *Constantly repeated ideas can scarce be lost.* § 7. *In remembering, the mind is often active.* § 8, 9. *Two defects in the memory, oblivion and slowness.*  
 § 10. *Brutes have memory.*

§ 1. **T**HE next faculty of the mind, whereby it makes a farther progress towards knowledge, is that which I call *RETENTION*, or the keeping of those simple ideas, which, from sensation or reflection, it hath received. This is done two ways. First, by keeping the idea, which is brought into it, for some time actually in view, which is called *CONTEMPLATION*.

§ 2. The other way of retention is the power to revive again in our minds those ideas, which, after imprinting, have disappeared, or have been, as it were, laid aside out of sight: and thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet, the object being removed. This is *MEMORY*, which is, as it were, the store-house of our ideas. For the narrow mind of man, not being capable of having many ideas under view and consideration at once, it was necessary to have a repository, to lay up those ideas, which, at another time, it might have use of. But our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind,

which cease to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory, signifies no more but this, that the mind has a power, in many cases, to revive perceptions which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And in this sense it is, that our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually no-where, but only there is an ability in the mind, when it will, to revive them again, and, as it were, paint them anew on itself, though some with more, some with less difficulty; some more lively, and others more obscurely. And thus it is, by the assistance of this faculty, that we are said to have all those ideas in our understandings, which, though we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in sight, and make appear again, and be the objects of our thoughts, without the help of those sensible qualities, which first imprinted them there.

§ 3. ATTENTION and REPETITION help much to the fixing any ideas in the memory: but those, which naturally at first make the deepest and most lasting impression, are those which are accompanied with PLEASURE or PAIN. The great business of the senses being to make us take notice of what hurts or advantages the body, it is wisely ordered by nature, as has been shewn, that pain should accompany the reception of several ideas; which supplying the place of consideration and reasoning in children, and acting quicker than consideration in grown men, makes both the young and old avoid painful objects, with that hate which is necessary for their preservation; and in both settles in the memory a caution for the future.

§ 4. Concerning the several *degrees of lasting,*

wherewith ideas are imprinted on the memory, we may observe, that some of them have been produced in the understanding, by an object affecting the senses once only, and no more than once; others, that have more than once offered themselves to the senses, have yet been little taken notice of; the mind either heedless, as in children, or otherwise employed, as in men, intent only on one thing, not setting the stamp deep into itself. And in some, where they are set on with care and repeated impressions, either through the temper of the body, or some other default, the memory is very weak: in all these cases, ideas in the mind quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the understanding, leaving no more footsteps, or remaining characters of themselves, than shadows do flying over fields of corn; and the mind is as void of them, as if they had never been there.

§ 5. Thus many of those ideas which were produced in the minds of children in the beginning of their sensation, (some of which, perhaps, as of some pleasures and pains, were before they were born, and others in their infancy), if in the future course of their lives, they are not repeated again, are quite lost, without the least glimpse remaining of them. This may be observed in those, who by some mischance have lost their sight when they were very young, in whom the ideas of colours having been but slightly taken notice of, and ceasing to be repeated, do quite wear out; so that some years after, there is no more notion nor memory of colours left in their minds, than in those of people born blind. The memory in some, it is true, is very tenacious, even to a miracle: but yet there seems to be a constant decay of all

our ideas, even of those which are struck deepest, and in minds the most retentive; so that if they be not sometimes renewed by repeated exercise of the senses, or reflection on those kind of objects which at first occasioned them, the print wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen. Thus the ideas, as well as children of our youth, often die before us; and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching; where, though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. *The pictures drawn in our minds, are laid in fading colours*; and if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear. How much the constitution of our bodies, and the make of our animal spirits are concerned in this, and whether the temper of the brain makes this difference, that in some, it retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others, like free-stone, and in others, little better than sand, I shall not here inquire, though it may seem probable, that the constitution of the body does sometimes influence the memory; since we oftentimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas, and the flames of a fever, in a few days, calcine all these images to dust and confusion, which seemed to be as lasting, as if graved in marble.

§ 6. But concerning the ideas themselves, it is easy to remark, that those that are ofteneft refreshed (amongst which are those that are conveyed into the mind by more ways than one) by a frequent return of the objects or actions that produce them, fix themselves best in the memory, and remain clearest and longest there; and therefore those which are of the original qualities of bodies, *viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion, and rest*;

and those that almost constantly affect our bodies, as *heat* and *cold*; and those which are the affections of all kinds of beings, as *existence*, *duration*, and *number*, which almost every object that affects our senses, every thought which employs our minds, bring along with them: these, I say, and the like ideas, are seldom quite lost, whilst the mind retains any ideas at all.

§ 7. In this secondary perception, as I may so call it, or viewing again the ideas that are lodged in the memory, the mind is *sometimes more than barely passive*, the appearance of those dormant pictures depending sometimes on the will. The mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea, and turns, as it were, the eye of the soul upon it; though sometimes too they start up in our minds of their own accord, and offer themselves to the understanding; and very often are roused and tumbled out of their dark cells, into open day-light, by turbulent and tempestuous passions; our affections bringing ideas to our memory, which had otherwise lain quiet and unregarded. This farther is to be observed, concerning ideas lodged in the memory, and upon occasion revived by the mind, that they are not only, as the word *revive* imports, none of them new ones; but also that the mind takes notice of them, as of a former impression, and renews its acquaintance with them, as with ideas it had known before. So that though ideas formerly imprinted, are not all constantly in view, yet in remembrance, they are constantly known to be such as have been formerly imprinted, *i. e.* in view, and taken notice of before by the understanding.

§ 8. Memory, in an intellectual creature, is necessary in the next degree to perception. It is

of so great moment, that where it is wanting, all the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless: and we in our thoughts, reasonings, and knowledge, could not proceed beyond present objects, were it not for the assistance of our memories, wherein there may be two defects.

1<sup>st</sup>, That it *loses the idea quite*, and so far it produces perfect ignorance. For since we can know nothing farther than we have the idea of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect ignorance.

2<sup>dly</sup>, That it moves slowly, and *retrieves not the ideas* that it has, and are laid up in store, quick enough to serve the mind upon occasions. This, if it be to a great degree, is stupidity; and he who, through this default in his memory, has not the ideas that are really preserved there ready at hand, when need and occasion calls for them, were almost as good be without them quite, since they serve him to little purpose. The dull man, who loses the opportunity, whilst he is seeking in his mind for those ideas that should serve his turn, is not much more happy in his knowledge, than one that is perfectly ignorant. It is the business therefore of the memory to furnish to the mind those dormant ideas, which it has present occasion for; in the having them ready at hand on all occasions, consists that which we call *invention, fancy*, and quickness of parts.

§ 9. These are defects we may observe in the memory of one man, compared with another. There is another defect, which we may conceive to be in the memory of man in general, compared with some superior created intellectual beings, which, in this faculty, may so far excel man, that they may have constantly in view the whole sense of all their former actions, wherein no one of the

thoughts they have ever had may slip out of their sight. The omniscience of GOD, who knows all things, past, present, and to come, and to whom the thoughts of mens hearts always lie open, may satisfy us of the possibility of this. For who can doubt, but GOD may communicate to those glorious spirits, his immediate attendants, any of his perfections, in what proportion he pleases, as far as created finite beings can be capable. It is reported of that prodigy of parts, Monsieur Pascal, that till the decay of his health had impaired his memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought in any part of his rational age. This is a privilege so little known to most men, that it seems almost incredible to those, who, after the ordinary way, measure all others by themselves: but yet, when considered, may help us to enlarge our thoughts towards greater perfections of it in superior ranks of spirits. For this of Mr Pascal was still with the narrowness that human minds are confined to here, of having great variety of ideas only by succession, not all at once: whereas the several degrees of angels may probably have larger views, and some of them be endowed with capacities able to retain together, and constantly set before them, as in one picture, all their past knowledge at once. This, we may conceive, would be no small advantage to the knowledge of a thinking man, if all his past thoughts, and reasonings could be always present to him. And therefore we may suppose it one of those ways, wherein the knowledge of separate spirits may exceedingly surpass ours.

§ 10. This faculty of laying up, and retaining the ideas that are brought into the mind, several other animals seem to have to a great de-



gree, as well as man. For to pass by other instances, birds learning of tunes, and the endeavours one may observe in them to hit the notes right, put it past doubt with me, that they have perception, and retain ideas in their memories, and use them for patterns. For it seems to me impossible, that they should endeavour to conform their voices to notes, as it is plain they do, of which they had no ideas. For though I should grant sound may mechanically cause a certain motion of the animal spirits in the brains of those birds, whilst the tune is actually playing; and that motion may be continued on to the muscles of the wings, and so the bird mechanically be driven away by certain noises, because this may tend to the bird's preservation: yet that can never be supposed a reason, why it should cause mechanically, either whilst the tune was playing, much less after it has ceased, such a motion in the organs of the bird's voice, as should conform it to the notes of a foreign sound, which imitation can be of no use to the bird's preservation: but which is more, it cannot, with any appearance of reason, be supposed, much less proved, that birds, without sense and memory, can approach their notes, nearer and nearer by degrees, to a tune played yesterday; which, if they have no idea of in their memory, is no-where, nor can be a pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated essays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no reason why the sound of a pipe should leave traces in their brains which, not at first, but by their after-endeavours, should produce the like sounds; and why the sounds they make themselves, should not make traces which they should follow, as well as those of the pipe, is impossible to conceive.

## C H A P. XI.

*Of DISCERNING, and other Operations  
of the Mind.*

§ 1. *No knowledge without discernment.* § 2. *The difference of wit and judgment.* § 3. *Clearness alone hinders confusion.* § 4. *Comparing.* § 5. *Brutes compare but imperfectly.* § 6. *Compounding.* § 7. *Brutes compound but little.* § 8. *Naming.* § 9. *Abstraction.* § 10, 11. *Brutes abstract not.* § 12, 13. *Idiots and madmen.* § 14. *Method.* § 15. *These are the beginnings of human knowledge.* § 16. *Appeal to experience.* § 17. *Dark room.*

§ 1. **A**NOTHER faculty we may take notice of in our minds, is that of DISCERNING and distinguishing between the several ideas it has. It is not enough to have a confused perception of something in general: unless the mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge; though the bodies, that affect us, were as busy about us, as they are now, and the mind were continually employed in thinking. On this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another, depends the *evidence and certainty of several*, even very general propositions, which have passed for innate truths; because men over-looking the true cause, why those propositions find universal assent, impute it wholly to native uniform impressions; whereas it in truth *depends upon this*

*clear discerning faculty of the mind*, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same, or different. But of this more hereafter.

§ 2. How much the imperfection of accurately discriminating ideas one from another, lies either in the dulness or faults of the organs of sense; or want of acuteness, exercise, or attention in the understanding; or hastiness and precipitancy, natural to some tempers, I will not here examine: it suffices to take notice, that this is one of the operations that the mind may reflect on, and observe in itself. It is of that consequence to its other knowledge, that so far as this faculty is in itself dull, or not rightly made use of, for the distinguishing one thing from another; so far our notions are confus'd, and our reason and judgment disturbed or mislead. If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand, consists quickness of parts; in this of having them unconfus'd, and being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another, where there is but the least difference, consists, in a great measure, the exactness of judgment, and clearness of reason, which is to be observed in one man above another. And hence, perhaps, may be given some reason of that common observation, that men who have a great deal of wit, and prompt memories, have not always the clearest judgment, or deepest reason. For *wit* lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures, and agreeable visions in the fancy: *judgment*, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another, ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude,

and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion, wherein, for the most part, lies that entertainment and pleasantry of wit, which strikes so lively on the fancy, and therefore is so acceptable to all people; because its beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labour of thought to examine what truth or reason there is in it. The mind, without looking any farther, rests satisfied with the agreeableness of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy: and it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it by the severe rules of truth and good reason; whereby it appears, that it consists in something that is not perfectly conformable to them.

§ 3. To the well distinguishing our ideas, it chiefly contributes, that they be *clear and determinate*: and where they are so, *it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them*, though the senses should, as sometimes they do, convey them from the same object differently, on different occasions, and so seem to err. For though a man in a fever should from sugar have a bitter taste, which, at another time, would produce a sweet one; yet the idea of bitter in that man's mind, would be as clear and distinct from the idea of sweet, as if he had tasted only gall. Nor does it make any more confusion between the two ideas of sweet and bitter, that the same sort of body produces at one time one, and at another time another idea, by the taste, than it makes a confusion in two ideas of white and sweet, or white and round, that the same piece of sugar produces them both in the mind at the same time. And the ideas of orange-colour and azure, that are produced in the mind by the same parcel of the infusion of *lignum nephriticum*,

are no less distinct ideas, than those of the same colours, taken from two very different bodies.

§ 4. The COMPARING them one with another, in respect of extent, degrees, time, place, or any other circumstance, is another operation of the mind about its ideas, and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas, comprehended under *relations*; which, of how vast an extent it is, I shall have occasion to consider hereafter.

§ 5. How far brutes partake of this faculty, is not easy to determine. I imagine they have it not in any great degree: for though they probably have several ideas distinct enough, yet it seems to me to be the prerogative of human understanding, when it has sufficiently distinguished any ideas, so as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and so consequently two, to cast about and consider in what circumstances they are capable to be compared. And therefore, I think, *beasts compare not their ideas*, farther than some sensible circumstances annexed to the objects themselves. The other power of comparing, which may be observed in men, belonging to general ideas, and useful only to abstract reasonings, we may probably conjecture beasts have not.

§ 6. The next operation we may observe in the mind about its ideas, is COMPOSITION; whereby it puts together several of those simple ones it has received from sensation and reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of composition may be reckoned also that of ENLARGING; wherein, though the composition does not so much appear as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheless a putting several ideas together, though of the same kind. Thus, by adding, several units together, we make the idea

of a dozen; and putting together the repeated ideas of several perches, we frame that of furlong.

§ 7. In this also, I suppose, brutes come far short of men. For though they take in and retain together several combinations, or simple ideas, as possibly the shape, smell, and voice of his master, make up the complex idea a dog has of him; or rather are so many distinct marks whereby he knows him; yet I do not think they do of themselves ever compound them, and make complex ideas. And perhaps even where we think they have complex ideas, it is only one simple one that directs them in the knowledge of several things which possibly they distinguish less by their sight than we imagine. For I have been credibly informed, that a bitch will nurse, play with, and be fond of young foxes, as much as, and in place of her puppies, if you can but get them once to suck her, so long that her milk may go through them. And those animals which have a numerous brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any knowledge of their number; for though they are mightily concerned for any of their young, that are taken from them whilst they are in sight or hearing, yet if one or two of them be stolen from them in their absence, or without noise, they appear not to miss them, or to have any sense that their number is lessened.

§ 8. When children have, by repeated sensations, got ideas fixed in their memories, they begin, by degrees, to learn the use of signs. And when they have got the skill to apply the organs of speech to the framing of articulate sounds, they begin to make use of words to signify their ideas to others: these verbal signs they sometimes borrow from others, and sometimes make themselves,

as one may observe among the new and unusual names children often give to things in their first use of language.

§ 9. The use of words, then, being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in should have a distinct name, names must be endless. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas, received from particular objects, to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existences, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called **ABSTRACTION**, whereby ideas taken from particular beings, become general representatives of all of the same kind; and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas. Such precise, naked appearances in the mind, without considering how, whence, or with what others they came there, the understanding lays up, with names commonly annexed to them, as the standards to rank real existences into sorts, as they agree with these patterns, and to denominate them accordingly. Thus the same colour being observed to-day in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, it considers that appearance alone, makes it a representative of all of that kind; and having given it the name *whiteness*, it by that sound signifies the same quality, where-soever to be imagined or met with; and thus universals, whether ideas or terms, are made.

§ 10. If it may be doubted, whether beasts compound and enlarge their ideas that way, to any degree; this, I think, I may be positive in,

that the power of abstracting is not at all in them; and that the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes; and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to. For it is evident we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine, that they have not the faculty of abstracting or making general ideas, since they have no use of words, or any other general signs.

§ 11. Nor can it be imputed to their want of fit organs to frame articulate sounds, that they have no use or knowledge of general words; since many of them, we find, can fashion such sounds, and pronounce words distinctly enough, but never with any such application. And on the other side, men, who, through some defect in the organs, want words, yet fail not to express their universal ideas by signs, which serve them instead of general words; a faculty which we see beasts come short in. And therefore, I think, we may suppose, that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from man; and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so vast a distance. For if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines, as some would have them, we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do some of them in certain instances reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they received them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not, as I think, the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction.

§ 12. How far idiots are concerned in the want



or weakness of any, or all of the foregoing faculties, an exact observation of their several ways of faltering would no doubt discover. For those who either perceive but dully, or retain the ideas that come into their minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little matter to think on. Those who cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to understand, and make use of language, or judge or reason to any tolerable degree: but only a little, and imperfectly, about things present, and very familiar to their senses. And indeed, any of the forementioned faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce suitable defects in mens understandings and knowledge.

§ 13. In fine, the defect in naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of reason; whereas madmen, on the other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme. For they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning; but having joined together some ideas very wrongfully, they mistake them for truths; and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles; for, by the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions from them. Thus you shall find a distracted man fancying himself a king, with a right inference, require suitable attendance, respect, and obedience: others, who have thought themselves made of glass, have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle bodies. Hence it comes to pass, that a man, who is very sober, and of a right understanding in all other things, may, in one particular, be as frantic as any in bedlam; if either, by any sudden very strong im-

pression, or long fixing his fancy upon one sort of thoughts, incoherent ideas have been cemented together so powerfully, as to remain united. But there are degrees of madness, as of folly; the disorderly jumbling ideas together, is in some more, and some less. In short, herein seems to lie the difference between idiots and madmen, that madmen put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions, but argue and reason right from them: but idiots make very few or no propositions, and reason scarce at all.

§ 14. These, I think, are the first faculties and operations of the mind, which it makes use of in understanding; and though they are exercised about all its ideas in general; yet the instances I have hitherto given, have been chiefly in simple ideas, and I have subjoined the explication of these faculties of the mind to that of simple ideas, before I come to what I have to say concerning complex ones, for these following reasons:

1<sup>st</sup>, Because several of these faculties being exercised at first principally about simple ideas, we might, by following nature in its ordinary method, trace and discover them in their rise, progress, and gradual improvements.

2<sup>dly</sup>, Because observing the faculties of the mind, how they operate about simple ideas, which are usually in most mens minds much more clear, precise, and distinct, than complex ones, we may the better examine and learn how the mind abstracts, denominates, compares, and exercises its other operations, about those which are complex, wherein we are much more liable to mistake.

3<sup>dly</sup>, Because these very operations of the mind about ideas, received from sensation, are themselves, when reflected on, another set of ideas, de-

rived from that other source of our knowledge, which I call *reflection*; and therefore fit to be considered in this place, after the simple ideas of *sensation*. Of compounding, comparing, abstracting, &c. I have but just spoken, having occasion to treat of them more at large in other places.

§ 15. And thus I have given a short, and, I think, true *history of the first beginnings of human knowledge*; whence the mind has its first objects, and by what steps it makes its progress to the laying in and storing up those ideas, out of which is to be framed all the knowledge it is capable of; wherein I must appeal to experience and observation, whether I am in the right: the best way to come to truth, being to examine things as really they are, and not to conclude they are as we fancy of ourselves, or have been taught by others to imagine.

§ 16. To deal truly, *this is the only way, that I can discover, whereby the ideas of things are brought into the understanding*: if other men have either innate ideas, or infused principles, they have reason to enjoy them; and if they are sure of it, it is impossible for others to deny them the privilege that they have above their neighbours. I can speak but of what I find in myself, and is agreeable to those notions; which, if we will examine the whole course of men in their several ages, countries, and educations, seem to depend on those foundations which I have laid, and to correspond with this method, in all the parts and degrees thereof.

§ 17. I pretend not to teach, but to inquire; and therefore cannot but confess here again, that external and internal sensation are the only passages, that I can find, of knowledge, to the under-

standing. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the windows by which light is let into this *dark room*. For, methinks, the *understanding* is not much unlike a closet, wholly shut from light, with only some little opening left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without; would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man, in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them.

These are my guesses concerning the means whereby the understanding comes to have, and retain simple ideas, and the modes of them, with some other operations about them. I proceed now to examine some of these simple ideas and their modes a little more particularly.

## CH A P. XII.

### Of COMPLEX IDEAS.

§ 1. *Made by the mind out of simple ones.* § 2. *Made voluntarily.* § 3. *Are either modes, substances, or relations.* § 4. *Modes.* § 5. *Simple and mixed modes.* § 6. *Substances single or collective.* § 7. *Relation.* § 8. *The abstrusest ideas from the two sources.*

§ 1. **W**E have hitherto considered those ideas, in the reception whereof the mind is only passive, which are those simple ones received from sensation and reflection before mentioned, whereof the mind cannot make one to itself, nor

have any idea which does not wholly consist of them. But as the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the rest, the other are framed. The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are chiefly these three: 1. Combining several simple ideas into one compound one; and thus all complex ideas are made. 2. The second is bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex, together; and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its ideas of relations. 3. The third is separating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence; this is called *abstraction*: and thus all its general ideas are made. This shews man's power, and its way of operation, to be much-what the same in the material and intellectual world: for the materials in both being such as he has no power over, either to make or destroy, all that man can do, is either to unite them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them. I shall here begin with the first of these, in the consideration of complex ideas, and come to the other two in their due places. As simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together; so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together, as one idea; and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as itself has joined them. Ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together, I call COMPLEX; such as are *beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe*; which, though complicated of various simple ideas, or complex ideas

made up of simple ones, yet are, when the mind pleases, considered each by itself, as one entire thing, and signified by one name.

§ 2. In this faculty of repeating and joining together its ideas, the mind has great power in varying and multiplying the objects of its thoughts, infinitely beyond what sensation or reflection furnished it with; but all this still confined to those simple ideas, which it received from those two sources, and which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions. For simple ideas are all from things themselves; and of these the mind can have no more, nor other than what are suggested to it. It can have no other ideas of sensible qualities than what come from without by the senses, nor any ideas of other kind of operations of a thinking substance, than what it finds in itself: but when it has once got these simple ideas, it is not confined barely to observation, and what offers itself from without; it can, by its own power, put together those ideas it has, and *make new complex ones*, which it never received so united.

§ 3. *Complex ideas*, however compounded and decomposed, though their number be infinite, and the variety endless, wherewith they fill and entertain the thoughts of men; yet, I think, they may be all reduced under these three heads:

1. *Modes.*
2. *Substances.*
3. *Relations.*

§ 4. First, *MODES*: I call such complex ideas, which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections of substances; such are the ideas signified by the words *triangle*, *gratitude*, *murder*, &c. And if

in this I use the word *mode* in somewhat a different sense from its ordinary signification, I beg pardon; it being unavoidable, in discourses differing from the ordinary received notions, either to make new words, or to use old words in somewhat a new signification, the latter whereof, in our present case, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two.

§ 5. Of these modes, there are two sorts, which deserve distinct consideration. First, there are some which are only variations, or different combinations of the same simple idea, without the mixture of any other, as a *dozen*, or *score*; which are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct units added together; and these I call *simple modes*, as being contained within the bounds of one simple idea. Secondly, there are others compounded of simple ideas of several kinds, put together, to make one complex one; *v. g.* *beauty*, consisting of a certain composition of colour and figure; causing delight in the beholder; *theft*, which being the concealed change of the possession of any thing, without the consent of the proprietor, contains, as is visible, a combination of several ideas of several kinds; and these I call *mixed modes*.

§ 6. Secondly, The ideas of SUBSTANCES are such combinations of simple ideas, as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed, or confused idea of *substance*, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus, if to substance be joined the simple idea of a certain dull whitish colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility, and fusibility, we have the idea of *lead*; and a combination of the ideas of a certain sort of figure, with the powers of motion, thought, and reason-

ing, joined to substance, make the ordinary idea of a *man*. Now of substances also, there are two sorts of ideas; one of single substances, as they exist separately, as of a *man*, or a *sheep*; the other of several of those put together, as an *army* of men, or *flock* of sheep; which collective ideas of several substances, thus put together, are as much each of them one single idea, as that of a man or an unit.

§ 7. Thirdly, The last sort of *complex ideas*, is that we call RELATION, which consists in the consideration, and comparing one idea with another: of these several kinds, we shall treat in their order.

§ 8. If we will trace the progress of our minds, and with attention observe how it repeats, adds together, and unites its simple ideas received from sensation or reflection, it will lead us farther than at first, perhaps, we should have imagined. And, I believe, we shall find, if we warily observe the originals of our notions, that even *the most abstruse ideas*, how remote soever they may seem from sense, or from any operation of our own minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself, by repeating and joining together ideas, that it had either from objects of sense, or from its own operations about them: so that those *even large and abstract ideas*, are derived from sensation or reflection, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may and does attain unto. This I shall endeavour to shew in the ideas we have of *space*, *time*, and *infinity*, and some few other, that seem the most remote from those originals.



## C H A P. XIII.

Of SIMPLE MODES; and first, of the  
*simple Modes of SPACE.*

§ 1. *Simple modes.* § 2. *Idea of space.* § 3. *Space and extension.* § 4. *Immensity.* § 5, 6. *Figure.* § 7—10. *Place.* § 11—14. *Extension and body, not the same.* § 15. *The definition of extension explains it not.* § 16. *Division of beings into bodies and spirits, proves not space and body the same.* § 17, 18. *Substance which we know not, no proof against space without body.* § 19, 20. *Substance and accidents, of little use in philosophy.* § 21. *A vacuum, beyond the utmost bounds of body.* § 22. *The power of annihilation proves a vacuum.* § 23. *Motion proves a vacuum.* § 24. *The ideas of space and body distinct.* § 25, 26. *Extension being inseparable from body, proves it not the same.* § 27. *Ideas of space and solidity, distinct.* § 28. *Men differ little in clear simple ideas.*

§ 1. **T**HOUGH in the foregoing part I have often mentioned simple ideas, which are truly the materials of all our knowledge; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the mind, than as distinguished from others more compounded, it will not be, perhaps, amiss to take a view of some of them again under this consideration, and examine those different *modifications of the same idea*; which the mind either finds in things existing, or is able

make within itself, without the help of any extrinſical object, or any foreign ſuggeſtion.

Thoſe *modifications of any one ſimple idea*, (which, as has been ſaid, I call *ſimple modes*), are as perfectly different and diſtinct ideas in the mind, as thoſe of the greateſt diſtance or contrariety. For the idea of *two* is as diſtinct from that of *one*, as *bluenefs* from *heat*, or either of them from any number: and yet it is made up only of that ſimple idea of an unit repeated; and repetitions of this kind joined together, make thoſe diſtinct *ſimple modes* of a *dozen*, a *grofs*, a *million*.

§ 2. I ſhall begin with the ſimple idea of SPACE. I have ſhewed above, ch. iv. that we get the idea of ſpace, both by our ſight and touch; which, I think, is ſo evident, that it would be as needleſs to go to prove, that men perceive by their ſight a diſtance between bodies of different colours, or between the parts of the ſame body, as that they ſee colours themſelves; nor is it leſs obvious, that they can do ſo in the dark by feeling and touch.

§ 3. This ſpace conſidered barely in length between any two beings, without conſidering any thing elſe between them, is called *diſtance*: if conſidered in length, breadth, and thickneſs, I think it may be called *capacity*: the term *extension* is uſually applied to it, in what manner ſoever conſidered.

§ 4. Each different diſtance is a different modification of ſpace, and *each idea of any different diſtance or ſpace, is a ſimple mode of this idea*. Men, for the uſe, and by the cuſtom of meaſuring, ſettle in their minds the ideas of certain ſtated lengths, ſuch as are an *inch*, *foot*, *yard*, *fathom*, *mile*, *diameter of the earth*, &c. which are ſo many diſtinct ideas made up only of ſpace,

When any such stated lengths or measures of space are made familiar to mens thoughts, they can in their minds repeat them as often as they will, without mixing or joining to them the idea of body, or any thing else; and frame to themselves the ideas of long, square, or cubic *feet, yards, or fathoms*, here amongst the bodies of the universe, or else beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies; and by adding these still one to another, enlarge their idea of space as much as they please. This power of repeating, or doubling any idea we have of any distance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any stop or stint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the idea of immensity.

§ 5. There is another modification of this idea, which is nothing but the relation which the parts of the termination of extension, or circumscribed space, have amongst themselves. This the touch discovers in sensible bodies, whose extremities come within our reach; and the eye takes both from bodies and colours, whose boundaries are within its view: where observing how the extremities terminate either in streight lines, which meet at discernible angles; or in crooked lines, wherein no angles can be perceived, by considering these as they relate to one another, in all parts of the extremities of any body or space, it has that idea we call *figure*, which affords to the mind infinite variety. For, besides the vast number of different figures that do really exist in the coherent masses of matter, the stock that the mind has in its power, by varying the idea of space, and thereby making still new compositions, by repeating its own ideas, and joining them as it pleases, is perfectly inexhaustible: and so it can multiply figures *in infinitum*.

§ 6. For the mind having a power to repeat the idea of any length directly stretched out, and join it to another in the same direction, which is to double the length of that streight line, or else join it to another with what inclination it thinks fit, and so make what sort of angle it pleases; and being able also to shorten any line it imagines, by taking from it one half, or one fourth, or what part it pleases, without being able to come to an end of any such divisions, it can make an angle of any bigness: so also the lines that are its sides, of what length it pleases, which joining again to other lines of different lengths, and at different angles, till it has wholly inclosed any space, it is evident, that it can multiply figures, both in their shape and capacity, *in infinitum*; all which are but so many different *simple modes of space*.

The same that it can do with streight lines, it can do also with crooked, or crooked and streight together; and the same it can do in lines, it can also in superficies; by which we may be led into farther thoughts of the endless variety of figures, that the mind has a power to make, and thereby to multiply the *simple modes of space*.

§ 7. Another idea coming under this head, and belonging to this tribe, is that we call PLACE. As in simple space, we consider the relation of distance between any two bodies or points; so in our idea of *place*, we consider the relation of distance betwixt any thing, and any two or more points, which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another, and so considered as at rest: for when we find any thing at the same distance now, which it was yesterday from any two or more points, which have not since changed their distance one with another, and with which

we then compared it, we say it hath kept the same *place*: but if it hath sensibly altered its distance, with either of those points, we say it hath changed its place: though vulgarly speaking, in the common notion of *place*, we do not always exactly observe the distance from precise points; but from larger portions of sensible objects, to which we consider the thing placed to bear relation, and its distance, from which we have some reason to observe.

§ 8. Thus a company of chess-men standing on the same squares of the chess-board, where we left them, we say, they are all in the *same place*, or unmoved; though perhaps the chess-board hath been in the mean time carried out of one room into another, because we compared them only to the parts of the chess-board, which keep the same distance one with another. The chess-board, we also say, is in the same place it was, if it remain in the same part of the cabin, though perhaps the ship which it is in, sails all the while: and the ship is said to be in the same place, supposing it kept the same distance with the parts of the neighbouring land; though perhaps the earth hath turned round; and so both chess-men, and board, and ship, have every one *changed place*, in respect of remoter bodies, which have kept the same distance one with another. But yet the distance from certain parts of the board, being that which determines the place of the chess-men; and the distance from the fixed parts of the cabin, with which we made the comparison, being that which determined the place of the chess-board, and the fixed parts of the earth, that by which we determined the place of the ship; these things may be said properly to be in the same place, in those re-

spects; though their distance from some other things, which, in this matter, we did not consider, being varied, they have undoubtedly changed place in that respect; and we ourselves shall think so, when we have occasion to compare them with those other.

§ 9. But this modification of distance we call *place*, being made by men for their common use, that by it they might be able to design the particular position of things, where they had occasion for such designation, men consider and determine of this place, by reference to those adjacent things, which best served to their present purpose, without considering other things, which, to another purpose, would better *determine the place of the same thing*. Thus in the chess-board, the use of the *designation of the place* of each chess-man being determined only within that chequered piece of wood, it would cross that purpose to measure it by any thing else: but when these very chess-men are put up in a bag, if any one should ask where the black king is, it would be proper to *determine the place* by the parts of the room it was in, and not by the chess-board; there being another use of *designing the place* it is now in, than when in play it was on the chess-board, and so must be determined by other bodies. So if any one should ask, in what place are the verses which report the story of Nisus and Eurialus, it would be very improper to determine this place, by saying, they were in such a part of the earth, or in Bodley's library: but the right designation of the place, would be by the parts of Virgil's works; and the proper answer would be, that these verses were about the middle of the ninth book of his *Æneid*; and that they have been always constant-

ly in the same place ever since Virgil was printed: which is true, though the book itself hath moved a thousand times; the use of the idea of place here, being to know only in what part of the book that story is, that so upon occasion we may know where to find it, and have recourse to it for our use.

§ 10. That our idea of place is nothing else, but such a relative position of any thing, as I have before mentioned, I think is plain, and will be easily admitted, when we consider that we can have no idea of the place of the universe, though we can of all the parts of it; because beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed, distinct, particular beings, in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of distance; but all beyond it is one uniform space or expansion, wherein the mind finds no variety, no marks. For to say, that the world is somewhere, means no more than that it does exist: this, though a phrase borrowed from place, signifying only its existence, not location; and when one can find out and frame in his mind, clearly and distinctly, the place of the universe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable *inane* of infinite space: though it be true, that the word *place* has sometimes a more confused sense, and stands for that space which any body takes up; and so the universe is in a place. The idea therefore of *place*, we have by the same means that we get the idea of space, (whereof this is but a particular limited consideration), *viz.* by our sight and touch; by either of which we receive into our minds the ideas of extension or distance.

§ 11. There are some that would persuade us, that *body and extension are the same thing*; who

either change the signification of words, which I would not suspect them of, they having so severely condemned the philosophy of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obscurity of doubtful or insignificant terms. If therefore they mean by *body and extension*, the same that other people do, *viz.* by *body*, something that is solid and extended, whose parts are separable and moveable different ways; and by *extension*, only the space that lies between the extremities of those solid coherent parts, and which is possessed by them, they confound very different ideas one with another. For I appeal to every man's own thoughts, whether the idea of space be not as distinct from that of solidity, as it is from the idea of scarlet-colour? It is true, solidity cannot exist without extension, neither can scarlet-colour exist without extension; but this hinders not, but that they are distinct ideas. Many ideas require others as necessary to their existence or conception, which yet are very distinct ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without space; and yet motion is not space, nor space motion: space can exist without it, and they are very distinct ideas; and so, I think, are those of space, and solidity. Solidity is so inseparable an idea from body, that upon that depends its filling of space, its contact, impulse, and communication of motion upon impulse. And if it be a reason to prove, that spirit is different from body, because thinking includes not the idea of extension in it; the same reason will be as valid, I suppose, to prove, that *space is not body*, because it includes not the idea of solidity in it; *space* and *solidity* being as *distinct ideas*, as *thinking* and *extension*, and as wholly separable in the mind one



from another. *Body*, then, and *extension*, it is evident, are two distinct ideas. For,

§ 12. First, *Extension* includes no solidity nor resistance to the motion of *body*, as *body* does.

§ 13. Secondly, The parts of pure space are inseparable one from the other; so that the continuity cannot be separated, neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even so much as in thought. To divide and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two superficies, where before there was a continuity: and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind two superficies, where before there was a continuity, and consider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done in things considered by the mind as capable of being separated; and by separation of acquiring new distinct superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of: but neither of these ways of separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure space.

It is true, a man may consider so much of such a space, as is answerable or commensurate to a foot, without considering the rest, which is indeed a partial consideration, but not so much as mental separation or division; since a man can no more mentally divide, without considering two superficies, separate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two superficies disjoined one from the other: but a partial consideration is not separating. A man may consider light in the sun, without its heat; or mobility in body, without its extension, without thinking of their separation. One is only a partial considera-

tion, terminating in one alone; and the other is a consideration of both, as existing separately.

§ 14. Thirdly, The parts of pure space are immoveable, which follows from their inseparability; *motion* being nothing but change of distance between any two things: but this cannot be between parts that are inseparable; which therefore must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another.

Thus the determined idea of simple space distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from body; since its parts are inseparable, immoveable, and without resistance to the motion of body.

§ 15. If any one ask me, *What this space I speak of is?* I will tell him, when he tells me what his *extension* is. For to say, as is usually done, that extension is to have *partes extra partes*, is to say only, that *extension is extension*: for what am I the better informed in the nature of *extension*, when I am told, that *extension is to have parts that are extended, exterior to parts that are extended, i. e. extension consists of extended parts?* As if one asking, what a fibre was? I should answer him, that it was a thing made up of several fibres: would he thereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was better than he did before? Or rather, would he not have reason to think, that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him?

§ 16. Those who contend, that *space and body are the same*, bring this dilemma; either this space is something or nothing; if nothing be between two bodies, they must necessarily touch; if it be allowed to be something, they ask, whether it be body or spirit? To which I answer, by another question, who told them that there was or could be nothing but solid beings which could not

think, and thinking beings that were not extended? Which is all they mean by the terms body and spirit.

§ 17. If it be demanded, as usually it is, whether this *space*, void of *body*, be *substance* or *accident*? I shall readily answer, I know not: nor shall be ashamed to own my ignorance, till they that ask shew me a clear distinct idea of *substance*.

§ 18. I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves, by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance to feign a knowledge, where we have none, by making a noise with sounds, without clear and distinct significations. Names made at pleasure, neither alter the nature of things, nor make us understand them, but as they are signs of, and stand for determined ideas. And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two syllables, *substance*, to consider, whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incomprehensible GOD, to finite spirit, and to body, it be in the same sense; and whether it stands for the same idea, when each of those three so different beings are called *substances*? If so, whether it will not thence follow, that GOD, spirits, and body, agreeing in the same common nature of *substance*, differ not any otherwise, than in a bare different modification of that *substance*; as a tree and a pebble, being in the same sense body, and agreeing in the common nature of body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter; which will be a very harsh doctrine. If they say, that they apply it to GOD, finite spirits, and matter, in three different significations; and that it stands for one idea, when GOD is said to be a *substance*; for another, when the soul is called *sub-*

*stance*; and for a third, when a body is called so. If the name *substance* stands for three several distinct ideas, they would do well to make known those distinct ideas, or at least to give three distinct names to them, to prevent, in so important a notion, the confusion and errors that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term; which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct, that, in ordinary use, it has scarce one clear distinct signification: and if they can thus make three distinct ideas of *substance*, what hinders, why another may not make a fourth?

§ 19. They who first ran into the notion of *accidents*, as a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word *substance* to support them. Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word *substance*, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it, and a tortoise to support his elephant: the word *substance* would have done it effectually. And he that inquired, might have taken it for as good an answer from an Indian philosopher, that *substance*, without knowing what it is, is that which supports the earth, as we take it for a sufficient answer, and good doctrine, from our European philosophers, that *substance*, without knowing what it is, is that which supports *accidents*. So that of *substance* we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.

§ 20. Whatever a learned man may do here, an intelligent American, who inquired into the nature of things, would scarce take it for a satisfactory account, if desiring to learn our architect-

ture, he should be told, that a pillar was a thing supported by a *basis*, and a *basis* something that supported a pillar. Would he not think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as this? And a stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of books, and the things they contained, if he should be told, that all learned books consisted of paper and letter, and that letters were things inhering in paper, and paper a thing that held forth letters: a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and paper! But were the Latin words, *inherentia* and *substantia*, put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called *sticking on*, and *under-proping*, they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of *substance* and *accidents*, and shew of what use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy.

§ 21. But to return to our idea of SPACE. If *body* be not supposed infinite, which, I think, no one will affirm, I would ask, whether, if GOD placed a man at the extremity of corporeal beings, he could not stretch his hand beyond his body? If he could, then he would put his arm where there was before *space* without *body*; and if there he spread his fingers, there would still be *space* between them without *body*: if he could not stretch out his hand, it must be because of some external hindrance; (for we suppose him alive, with such a power of moving the parts of his body that he hath now, which is not in itself impossible, if GOD so pleased to have it; or at least it is not impossible for GOD so to move him:) and then I ask, whether that which hinders his hand from moving outwards, be substance or accident, something or nothing? And when they have resolved that,

they will be able to resolve themselves what that is, which is, or may be between two bodies at a distance, that is not body, and has no solidity. In the mean time, the argument is at least as good, that where nothing hinders, (as beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies), a *body* put into motion may move on, as where there is nothing between, there two bodies must necessarily touch: for pure *space* between, is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual contact; but bare *space* in the way, is not sufficient to stop motion. The truth is, these men must either own, that they think body infinite, though they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm, that *space* is not *body*. For I would fain meet with that thinking man, that can, in his thoughts, set any bounds to *space*, more than he can to duration; or, by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of either: and therefore, if his idea of eternity be infinite, so is his idea of immensity; they are both finite or infinite alike.

§ 22. Farther, those who assert the impossibility of *space* existing without *matter*, must not only make body infinite, but must also deny a power in GOD to annihilate any part of matter. No one, I suppose, will deny, that GOD can put an end to all motion that is in matter, and fix all the bodies of the universe in a perfect quiet and rest, and continue them so as long as he pleases. Whoever then will allow, that GOD can, during such a general rest, annihilate either this book, or the body of him that reads it, must necessarily admit the possibility of a *vacuum*: for it is evident, that the *space* that was filled by the parts of the annihilated body, will still remain, and be a *space* without body. For the circumambient bodies being in perfect rest, are a wall of adamant, and in

that state make it a perfect impossibility for any other body to get into that space. And indeed the necessary motion of one particle of matter, into the place from whence another particle of matter is removed, is but a consequence from the supposition of plenitude, which will therefore need some better proof, than a supposed matter of fact, which experiment can never make out; our own clear and distinct ideas plainly satisfying us, that there is no necessary connection between *space* and *solidity*, since we can conceive the one without the other. And those who dispute for or against a *vacuum*, do thereby confess they have distinct ideas of *vacuum* and *plenum*, i. e. that they have an idea of *extension* void of *solidity*, though they deny its existence, or else they dispute about nothing at all. For they who so much alter the signification of words, as to call *extension* *body*, and consequently make the whole essence of body to be nothing but pure extension, without solidity, must talk absurdly whenever they speak of *vacuum*, since it is impossible for extension to be without extension: for *vacuum*, whether we affirm or deny its existence, signifies space without body, whose very existence no one can deny to be possible, who will not make matter infinite, and take from GOD a power to annihilate any particle of it.

§ 23. But not to go so far as beyond the utmost bounds of body in the universe, nor appeal to GOD's omnipotency, to find a *vacuum*, the *motion* of bodies that are in our view and neighbourhood, seem to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any one so to divide a solid body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the solid parts to move up and down freely every way within the bounds of that superficies, if there be

not left in it a void space, as big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid body. And if, where the least particle of the body divided is as big as a mustard-feed, a void space equal to the bulk of a mustard-feed be requisite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body within the bounds of its superficies, where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 less than a mustard-feed, there must also be a space void of solid matter, as big as 100,000,000 part of a mustard-feed: for if it hold in one, it will hold in the other, and so on *in infinitum*. And let this void space be as little as it will, it destroys the hypothesis of *plenitude*. For if there can be a space void of body, equal to the smallest separate particle of matter now existing in nature, it is still space without body, and makes as great a difference between space and body, as if it were *μικρα χωσμα*, a distance as wide as any in nature. And therefore, if we suppose not the void space necessary to motion, equal to the least parcel of the divided solid matter, but to one tenth or one thousandth part of it, the same consequence will always follow of space without matter.

§ 24. But the question being here, whether *the idea of space or extension be the same with the idea of body*, it is not necessary to prove the real existence of a *vacuum*, but the *idea* of it; which it is plain men have, when they inquire and dispute whether there be a *vacuum* or no? For if they had not the idea of space without body, they could not make a question about its existence: and if their idea of body did not include in it something more than the bare idea of space, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world; and it would be as absurd to demand, whether



there were space without body, as whether there were space without space, or body without body, since these were but different names of the same idea.

§ 25. It is true, the idea of extension joins itself so inseparably with all visible and most tangible qualities, that it suffers us to see no one, or feel very few external objects, without taking in impressions of extension too. This readiness of extension to make itself be taken notice of so constantly with other ideas, has been the occasion, I guess, that some have made the whole essence of *body* to consist in extension; which is not much to be wondered at, since some have had their minds, by their eyes and touch, the busiest of all our senses, so filled with the idea of extension, and, as it were, wholly possessed with it, that they allowed no existence to any thing that had not extension. I shall not now argue with those men, who take the measure and possibility of all being, only from their narrow and gross imaginations: but having here to do only with those who conclude the essence of *body* to be *extension*, because, they say, they cannot imagine any sensible quality of any *body* without extension. I shall desire them to consider, that had they reflected on their ideas of tastes and smells, as much as on those of sight and touch, nay, had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirst, and several other pains, they would have found, that they included in them no idea of extension at all, which is but an affection of *body*, as well as the rest discoverable by our senses, which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure essences of things.

§ 26. If those ideas, which are constantly joined to all others, must therefore be concluded to

be the essence of those things which have constantly those ideas joined to them, and are inseparable from them; then unity is without doubt the essence of every thing. For there is not any object of sensation or reflection, which does not carry with it the idea of one: but the weakness of this kind of argument we have already shewn sufficiently.

§ 27. To conclude; whatever men shall think concerning the existence of a *vacuum*, this is plain to me, that we have as clear an *idea of space distinct from solidity*, as we have of solidity distinct from motion, or motion from space. We have not any two more distinct ideas, and we can as easily conceive space without solidity, as we can conceive body or space without motion, though it be ever so certain, that neither body nor motion can exist without space. But whether any one will take space to be only a relation resulting from the existence of other beings at a distance, or whether they will think the words of the most knowing king Solomon, *The heaven, and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee*; or those more emphatical ones of the inspired philosopher St Paul, *In him we live, move, and have our being*, are to be understood in a literal sense, I leave every one to consider; only our idea of *space* is, I think, such as I have mentioned, and distinct from that of *body*. For whether we consider in matter itself the distance of its coherent solid parts, and call it, in respect of those solid parts, *extension*; or whether considering it as lying between the extremities of any body in its several dimensions, we call it *length*, *breadth*, and *thickness*; or else considering it as lying between any two bodies, or positive beings, without any consideration whe-

ther there be any matter or no between, we call it *distance*. However named or considered, it is always the same uniform simple idea of *space*, taken from objects about which our senses have been conversant, whereof, having settled ideas in our minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another, as often as we will, and consider the space or distance so imagined, either as filled with solid parts, so that another body cannot come there, without displacing and thrusting out the body that was there before; or else as void of solidity, so that a body of equal dimensions to that empty or pure space, may be placed in it without the removing or expulsion of anything that was there. But to avoid confusion in discourses concerning this matter, it were possibly to be wished, that the name *extension* were applied only to matter, or the distance of the extremities of particular bodies, and the term *expansion* to space in general, with or without solid matter possessing it, so as to say, *Space is expanded, and body extended*. But in this every one has his liberty; I propose it only for the more clear and distinct way of speaking.

§ 28. The knowing precisely what our words stand for, would, I imagine, in this, as well as in a great many other cases, quickly end the dispute. For I am apt to think, that men, when they come to examine them, find their simple ideas all generally to agree, though in discourse with one another, they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that *men* who abstract their thoughts, and do well examine the ideas of their own minds, *cannot much differ in thinking*; however, they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several schools or sects they have been bred

up in: though, amongst unthinking men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own ideas, and strip them not from the marks men use for them, but confound them with words, there must be endless dispute, wrangling, and jargon, especially if they be learned bookish men, devoted to some sect, and accustomed to the language of it, and have learned to talk after others. But if it should happen, that any two thinking men should really have different ideas, I do not see how they could discourse or argue one with another. Here I must not be mistaken, to think that every floating imagination in mens brains, is presently of that sort of ideas I speak of. It is not easy for the mind to put off those confused notions and prejudices it has imbibed from custom, inadvertency, and common conversation: it requires pains and assiduity to examine its ideas, till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones, out of which they are compounded; and to see which, amongst its simple ones, have or have not a necessary connection and dependence one upon another. Till a man do this in the primary and original notion of things, he builds upon floating and uncertain principles, and will often find himself at a loss.

## C H A P. XIV.

*Of DURATION, and its simple Modes.*

§ 1. *Duration is fleeting extension.* § 2—4. *Its idea from reflection on the train of our ideas.*  
 § 5. *The idea of duration applicable to things whilst we sleep.* § 6—8. *The idea of succession, not from motion.* § 9—11. *The train of ideas has a certain degree of quickness.* § 12. *This train the measure of other successions.* § 13—15. *The mind cannot fix long on one invariable idea.*  
 §. 16. *Ideas, however made, include no sense of motion.* § 17. *Time is duration set out by measures.* § 18. *A good measure of time must divide its whole duration into equal periods.* § 19. *The revolutions of the sun and moon, the properest measures of time.* § 20. *But not by their motion, but periodical appearances.* § 21. *No two parts of duration can be certainly known to be equal.*  
 § 22. *Time not the measure of motion.* § 23. *Minutes, hours, and years, not necessary measures of duration.* § 25—27. *Our measure of time applicable to duration before time.* § 28—32. *Eternity.*

§ 1. **T**HERE is another sort of distance or length, the idea whereof we get not from the permanent parts of space, but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession. This we call **DURATION**, the simple modes whereof are any different lengths of it, whereof we have distinct ideas, as *hours, days, years, &c. time* and *eternity*.

§ 2. The answer of a great man, to one who asked what time was, *Si non rogas intelligo*, (which amounts to this; the more I set myself to think of it, the less I understand it), might perhaps persuade one, that *time*, which reveals all other things, is itself not to be discovered. *Duration, time, and eternity*, are not, without reason, thought to have something very abstruse in their nature. But however remote these may seem from our comprehension, yet if we trace them right to their originals, I doubt not but one of those sources of all our knowledge, *viz sensation and reflection*, will be able to furnish us with these ideas, as clear and distinct as many other, which are thought much less obscure; and we shall find, that the idea of eternity itself is derived from the same common original with the rest of our ideas.

§. 3. To understand *time* and *eternity* aright, we ought with attention to consider what idea it is we have of *duration*, and how we come by it. It is evident to any one, who will but observe what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another in his understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas, one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the idea of *succession*: and the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call *duration*. For, whilst we are thinking, or whilst we receive successively several ideas in our minds, we know that we do exist; and so we call the existence, or the continuation of the existence of ourselves, or any thing else, commensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds, the *duration* of ourselves, or any such other thing co-existing with our thinking.

§ 4. That we have our notion of *succession* and *duration* from this original, *viz.* from reflection on the train of ideas, which we find to appear one after another in our own minds, seems plain to me, in that we have no perception of *duration*, but by considering the train of ideas that take their turns in our understandings. When that succession of ideas ceases, our perception of duration ceases with it; which every one clearly experiments in himself whilst he sleeps soundly, whether an hour or a day, a month or a year; of which duration of things, whilst he sleeps or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him; and the moment wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think again, seems to him to have no distance. And so I doubt not it would be to a waking man, if it were possible for him to keep only one idea in his mind without variation, and the succession of others: and we see, that one who fixes his thoughts very intently on one thing, so as to take but little notice of the succession of ideas that pass in his mind, whilst he is taken up with that earnest contemplation, lets slip out of his account a good part of that duration, and thinks that time shorter than it is. But if sleep commonly unites the distant parts of duration, it is because during that time we have no succession of ideas in our minds. For if a man, during his sleep, dreams, and variety of ideas make themselves perceptible in his mind one after another, he hath then, during such a dreaming, a sense of *duration*, and of the length of it. By which it is to me very clear, that men derive their ideas of duration from their *reflection on the train of the ideas* they observe to succeed one another in their own understandings;

without which observation they can have no notion of *duration*, whatever may happen in the world.

§ 5. Indeed a man having, from reflecting on the succession and number of his own thoughts, got the notion or idea of *duration*, he can apply that notion to things which exist while he does not think; as he that has got the idea of extension from bodies by his sight or touch, can apply it to distances, where no body is seen or felt. And therefore, though a man has no perception of the length of duration which passed whilst he slept, or thought not; yet having observed the revolution of days and nights, and found the length of their duration to be in appearance regular and constant, he can, upon the supposition that that revolution has proceeded after the same manner, whilst he was asleep or thought not, as it used to do at other times; he can, I say, imagine and make allowance for the length of *duration*, whilst he slept. But if Adam and Eve, when they were alone in the world, instead of their ordinary night's sleep, had passed the whole twenty-four hours in one continued sleep, the duration of that twenty-four hours had been irrecoverably lost to them, and been for ever left out of their account of time.

§ 6. Thus by reflecting on the appearing of various ideas, one after another, in our understandings, we get the notion of *succession*; which if any one should think we did rather get from our observation of motion by our senses, he will, perhaps, be of my mind, when he considers, that even motion produces in his mind an idea of succession, no otherwise than as it produces there a continued train of distinguishable ideas. For a man looking upon



a body really moving, perceives yet no motion at all, unless that motion produces a constant train of *successive ideas*, v. g. a man becalmed at sea, out of sight of land, in a fair day, may look on the sun, or sea, or ship, a whole hour together, and perceive no motion at all in either; though it be certain, that two, and perhaps all of them have moved, during that time, a great way: but as soon as he perceives either of them to have changed distance with some other body, as soon as this motion produces any new idea in him, then he perceives that there has been motion. But wherever a man is, with all things at rest about him, without perceiving any motion at all; if, during this hour of quiet, he has been thinking, he will perceive the various ideas of his own thoughts in his own mind, appearing one after another, and thereby observe and find succession where he could observe no motion.

§ 7. And this, I think, is the reason *why motions very slow, though they are constant, are not perceived by us*; because in their remove from one sensible part towards another, their change of distance is so slow, that it causes no new ideas in us, but a good while one after another: and so not causing a constant train of new ideas to follow one another immediately in our minds, we have no perception of motion; which consisting in a constant succession, we cannot perceive that succession without a constant succession of varying ideas arising from it.

§ 8. On the contrary, *things that move so swift, as not to affect the senses distinctly with several distinguishable distances of their motion, and so cause not any train of ideas in the mind, are not also perceived to move.* For any thing that moves

round about in a circle, in less time than our ideas are wont to succeed one another in our minds, is not perceived to move; but seems to be a perfect, entire circle of that matter or colour, and not a part of a circle in motion.

§ 9. Hence I leave it to others to judge, whether it be not probable, that our ideas do, whilst we are awake, succeed one another in our minds at certain distances, not much unlike the images in the inside of a lanthorn, turned round by the heat of a candle. This appearance of theirs in train, though perhaps it may be sometimes faster, and sometimes slower; yet, I guess, varies not very much in a waking man: there seem to be *certain bounds to the quickness and slowness of the succession of these ideas one to another in our minds, beyond which they can neither delay nor hasten.*

§ 10. The reason I have for this odd conjecture, is from observing, that in the impressions made upon any of our senses, we can but to a certain degree perceive any succession; which if exceeding quick, the sense of succession is lost, even in cases where it is evident that there is a real succession. Let a cannon-bullet pass through a room, and in its way take with it any limb, or fleshy parts of a man; it is as clear as any demonstration can be, that it must strike successively the two sides of the room: it is also evident, that it must touch one part of the flesh first, and another after, and so in succession: and yet I believe no-body, who ever felt the pain of such a shot, or heard the blow against the two distant walls, could perceive any succession, either in the pain or sound of so swift a stroke. Such a part of duration as this, wherein we perceive no succession, is that which we may call an *instant*; and is *that which takes up the time*

of only one idea in our minds, without the succession of another, wherein, therefore, we perceive no succession at all.

§ 11. This also happens where the motion is so slow, as not to supply a constant train of fresh ideas to the senses, as fast as the mind is capable of receiving new ones into it; and so other ideas of our own thoughts, having room to come into our minds between those offered to our senses by the moving body, there the sense of motion is lost; and the body, though it really moves, yet not changing perceivable distance with some other bodies, as fast as the ideas of our own minds do naturally follow one another in train, the thing seems to stand still, as is evident in the hands of clocks, and shadows of sun-dials, and other constant, but slow motions, where, though after certain intervals, we perceive by the change of distance that it hath moved, yet the motion itself we perceive not.

§ 12. So that to me it seems, that the constant and regular succession of ideas in a waking man is, as it were, the measure and standard of all other successions, whereof if any one either exceeds the pace of our ideas, as where two sounds or pains, &c. take up in their succession the duration of but one idea, or else where any motion or succession is so slow, as that it keeps not pace with the ideas in our minds, or the quickness in which they take their turns; as when any one or more ideas, in their ordinary course, come into our mind between those which are offered to the sight by the different perceptible distances of a body in motion, or between sounds or smells following one another, there also the sense of a constant

continued succession is lost, and we perceive it not, but with certain gaps of rest between.

§ 13. If it be so, that the ideas of our minds, whilst we have any there, do constantly change and shift in a continual succession, it would be impossible, may any one say, for a man to think long of any one thing; by which, if it be meant, that a man may *have one self-same single idea a long time alone in his mind, without any variation at all*, I think, in matter of fact, it is *not possible*; for which (not knowing how the ideas of our minds are framed, of what materials they are made, whence they have their light, and how they come to make their appearances), I can give no other reason but experience: and I would have any one try whether he can keep one unvaried single idea in his mind, without any other, for any considerable time together.

§ 14. For trial, let him take any figure, any degree of light or whiteness, or what other he pleases; and he will, I suppose, find it difficult to keep all other ideas out of his mind; but that some, either of another kind, or various considerations of that idea, (each of which considerations is a new idea), will constantly succeed one another in his thoughts, let him be as wary as he can.

§ 15. All that is in a man's power in this case, I think, is only to mind and observe what the ideas are that take their turns in his understanding; or else to direct the sort, and call in such as he hath a desire or use of: but hinder the constant succession of fresh ones, I think he cannot, though he may commonly chuse, whether he will heedfully observe and consider them.

§ 16. Whether these several ideas in a man's mind be made by certain motions, I will not here

dispute : but this I am sure, that they include no idea of motion in their appearance ; and if a man had not the idea of motion otherwise, I think he would have none at all, which is enough to my present purpose ; and sufficiently shews, that the notice we take of the ideas of our minds, appearing there one after another, is that which gives us the idea of succession and duration, without which we should have no such ideas at all. It is not then *motion*, but the *constant train* of ideas in our minds, whilst we are waking, *that furnishes us with the idea of duration*, whereof motion no otherwise gives us any perception, than as it causes in our minds a constant succession of ideas, as I have before shewed : and we have as clear an idea of succession and duration, by the train of other ideas succeeding one another in our minds, without the idea of any motion, as by the train of ideas caused by the uninterrupted sensible change of distance between two bodies, which we have from motion ; and therefore we should as well have the idea of duration, were there no sense of motion at all.

§ 17. Having thus got the idea of duration, the next thing natural for the mind to do, is, to get some *measure of this common duration*, whereby it might judge of its different lengths, and consider the distinct order wherein several things exist, without which a great part of our knowledge would be confus'd, and a great part of history be rendered very useles. This consideration of duration, as set out by certain periods, and marked by certain measures or epochs, is that, I think, which most properly we call TIME.

§ 18. In the measuring of extension, there is nothing more required but the application of the

standard or measure we make use of to the thing, of whose extension we would be informed. But in the measuring of duration this cannot be done, because no two different parts of succession can be put together to measure one another: and nothing being a *measure of duration but duration*, as nothing is of extension but extension, we cannot keep by us any standing unvarying measure of duration, which consists in a constant fleeting succession, as we can of certain lengths of extension, as inches, feet, yards, &c. marked out in permanent parcels of matter. Nothing then could serve well for a convenient measure of time, but what has divided the whole length of its duration into apparently equal portions, by constantly repeated periods. What portions of duration are not distinguished, or considered as distinguished and measured by such periods, come not so properly under the notion of time, as appears by such phrases as these, *viz. before all time, and when time shall be no more.*

§ 19. The diurnal and annual *revolutions of the sun*, as having been, from the beginning of nature, constant, regular, and universally observable by all mankind, and supposed equal to one another, have been with reason *made use of for the measure of duration*. But the distinction of days and years, having depended on the motion of the sun, it has brought this mistake with it, that it has been thought that motion and duration were the measure one of another. For men, in the *measuring of the length of time*, having been accustomed to the ideas of minutes, hours, days, months, years, &c. which they found themselves, upon any mention of time or duration, presently to think on, all which portions of time were mea-

fured out by the motion of those heavenly bodies, they were apt to confound time and motion; or at least to think, that they had a necessary connection one with another: whereas any constant periodical appearance, or alteration of ideas in seemingly equidistant spaces of duration, if constant and universally observable, would have as well distinguished the intervals of time, as those that have been made use of. For supposing the sun, which some have taken to be a fire, had been lighted up at the same distance of time that it now every day comes about to the same meridian, and then gone out again about twelve hours after, and that in the space of an annual revolution, it had sensibly increased in brightness and heat, and so decreased again; would not such regular appearances serve to measure out the distances of duration to all that could observe it, as well without as with motion? For if the appearances were constant, universally observable, and in equidistant periods, they would serve mankind for measure of time as well, were the motion away.

§ 20. For the freezing of water, or the blowing of a plant, returning at equidistant periods in all parts of the earth, would as well serve men to reckon their years by as the motions of the sun: and in effect we see, that some people in America counted their years by the coming of certain birds amongst them at their certain seasons, and leaving them at others. For a fit of an ague, the sense of hunger or thirst, a smell or a taste, or any other idea returning constantly at equidistant periods, and making itself universally be taken notice of, would not fail to measure out the course of succession, and distinguish the distances of time. Thus we see, that men born blind count time well

enough by years, whose revolutions yet they cannot distinguish by motions that they perceive not : And I ask, whether a blind man, who distinguished his years either by heat of summer, or cold of winter; by the smell of any flower of the spring, or taste of any fruit of the autumn, would not have a better measure of time than the Romans had before the reformation of their Calendar by Julius Cæsar, or many other people, whose years, notwithstanding the motion of the sun, which they pretend to make use of, are very irregular? And it adds no small difficulty to chronology, that the exact length of the years that several nations counted by, are hard to be known, they differing very much one from another, and I think I may say, all of them from the precise motion of the sun : and if the sun moved from the creation to the flood constantly in the equator, and so equally dispersed its light and heat to all the habitable parts of the earth, in days all of the same length, without its annual variations to the tropics, as a late ingenious author supposes, I do not think it very easy to imagine, that (notwithstanding the motion of the sun) men should, in the antediluvian world; from the beginning count by years, or measure their time by periods, that had no sensible marks very obvious to distinguish them by.

§ 21. But perhaps it will be said, without a regular motion, such as of the sun, or some other, how could it ever be known, that such periods were equal? To which I answer, the equality of any other returning appearances might be known by the same way that that of days was known; or presumed to be so at first, which was only by judging of them by the train of ideas which had passed in mens minds in the intervals : by which train of



ideas difcovering inequality in the natural days, but none in the artificial days; the artificial days, or *Νυχθημερα*, were gueffed to be equal, which was fufficient to make them ferve for a meafure: though exa<sup>c</sup>t fearch has fince difcovered inequality in the diurnal revolutions of the fun, and we know not whether the annual alfo be not unequal: thefe yet, by their prefumed and apparent equality, ferve as well to reckon time by, (though not to meafure the parts of duration exactly), as if they could be proved to be exactly equal. We muft therefore carefully diftinguifh betwixt duration itfelf, and the meafures we make ufe of to judge of its length. Duration in itfelf is to be confidered as going on in one conftant, equal, uniform courfe: but none of the meafures of it, which we make ufe of, can be known to do fo; nor can we be affured, that their affigned parts or periods are equal in duration one to another; for two fucceffive lengths of duration, however meafured, can never be demonftrated to be equal. The motion of the fun, which the world ufed fo long, and fo confidently, for an exact meafure of duration, has, as I faid, been found in its feveral parts unequal: and though men have of late made ufe of a pendulum, as a more fteady and regular motion than that of the fun, (or, to fpeak more truly) of the earth; yet if any one fhould be asked how he certainly knows that the two fucceffive fwings of a pendulum are equal, it would be very hard to fatisfy him that they are infallibly fo: fince we cannot be fure that the caufe of that motion, which is unknown to us, fhall always operate equally; and we are fure that the medium in which the pendulum moves, is not conftantly the fame: either of which varying, may alter the equality of fuch

periods, and thereby destroy the certainty and exactness of the measure by motion, as well as any other periods of other appearances; the notion of duration still remaining clear, though our measures of it cannot any of them be demonstrated to be exact. Since, then, no two portions of succession can be brought together, it is impossible ever certainly to know their equality. All that we can do for a measure of time, is to take such as have continual successive appearances at seemingly equidistant periods; *of which seeming equality we have no other measure, but such as the train of our own ideas have lodged in our memories, with the concurrence of other probable reasons, to persuade us of their equality.*

§ 22. One thing seems strange to me, that whilst all men manifestly measured time by the motion of the great and visible bodies of the world, *time* yet should be defined to be the *measure of motion*: whereas it is obvious to every one, who reflects ever so little on it, that to measure motion, space is as necessary to be considered as time; and those who look a little farther, will find also the bulk of the thing moved necessary to be taken into the computation, by any one who will estimate or measure motion, so as to judge right of it. Nor, indeed, does motion any otherwise conduce to the measuring of duration, than as it constantly brings about the return of certain sensible ideas, in seeming equidistant periods. For if the motion of the sun were as unequal as of a ship driven by unsteady winds, sometimes very slow, and at others irregularly very swift; or if being constantly equally swift, it yet was not circular, and produced not the same appearances, it would not at

all help us to measure time, any more than the seeming unequal motion of a comet does.

§ 23. *Minutes, hours, days, and years*, are then no more necessary to *time* or *duration*, than inches, feet, yards, and miles, marked out in any matter, are to extension. For though we in this part of the universe, by the constant use of them, as of periods set out by the revolutions of the sun, or as known parts of such periods, have fixed the ideas of such lengths of duration in our minds, which we apply to all parts of time, whose lengths we would consider: yet there may be other parts of the universe, where they no more use these measures of ours, than in Japan they do our inches, feet, or miles. But yet something analogous to them there must be: for without some regular periodical returns, we could not measure ourselves, or signify to others the length of any duration, though, at the same time, the world were as full of motion as it is now, but no part of it disposed into regular and apparently equidistant revolutions. But the different measures that may be made use of for the account of time, do not at all alter the notion of duration, which is the thing to be measured, no more than the different standards of a foot and a cubit, alter the notion of extension to those who make use of those different measures.

§ 25. The mind having once got such a measure of time, as the annual revolution of the sun, can apply that measure to duration, wherein that measure itself did not exist, and with which, in the reality of its being, it had nothing to do: for, should one say, that Abraham was born in the 2712 year of the Julian period, it is altogether as intelligible, as reckoning from the beginning of

the world, though there were so far back no motion of the sun, nor any other motion at all. For though the Julian period be supposed to begin several hundred years before there were really either days, nights, or years, marked out by any revolutions of the sun, yet we reckon as right, and thereby measure durations as well, as if really at that time the sun had existed, and kept the same ordinary motion it doth now. The idea of duration equal to an annual revolution of the sun, is as easily applicable in our thoughts to duration, where no sun nor motion was, as the idea of a foot or yard taken from bodies here can be applied in our thoughts to distances beyond the confines of the world, where are no bodies at all.

§ 26. For supposing it were 5639 miles, or millions of miles, from this place to the remotest body of the universe, (for being finite, it must be at a certain distance), as we suppose it to be 5639 years from this time to the first existence of any body in the beginning of the world, we can, in our thoughts, apply this measure of a yard to duration before the creation, or beyond the duration of bodies or motion, as we can this measure of mile to space beyond the utmost bodies; and by the one measure duration, where there was no motion, as well as by the other measure space in our thoughts, where there is no body.

§ 27. If it be objected to me here, that in this way of explaining of time, I have begged what I should not, *viz.* that the world is neither eternal nor infinite; I answer, that to my present purpose, it is not needful in this place to make use of arguments to evince the world to be finite, both in duration and extension: but it being at least as conceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the

liberty to suppose it, as well as any one hath to suppose the contrary; and I doubt not but that *every one*, that will go about it, may easily conceive in his mind *the beginning of motion, though not of all duration*; and so may come to a stop and *non ultra* in his consideration of motion: so also in his thoughts he may set limits to body, and the extension belonging to it, but not to space where no body is, the utmost bounds of space and duration being beyond the reach of thought, as well as the utmost bounds of number are beyond the largest comprehension of the mind; and all for the same reason, as we shall see in another place.

§ 28. By the same means therefore, and from the same original that we come to have *the idea of TIME*, we have also that idea which we call *ETERNITY*, *viz.* having got the idea of succession and duration, by reflecting on the train of our own ideas, caused in us either by the natural appearances of those ideas coming constantly of themselves into our waking thoughts, or else caused by external objects successively affecting our senses; and having from the revolutions of the sun got the ideas of certain lengths of duration, we can, in our thoughts, add such lengths of duration to one another, as often as we please, and apply them, so added, to durations past or to come: and this we can continue to do on, without bounds or limits, and proceed *in infinitum*, and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the sun to duration, supposed before the sun's, or any other motion, had its being; which is no more difficult or absurd, then to apply the notion I have of the moving of a shadow, one hour to-day upon the sun-dial, to the duration of something last night; *v. g.* the burning of a candle, which is now ab-

folutely feperate from all a<sup>c</sup>tual motion; and it is as impoffible for the duration of that flame for an hour laft night, to co-exift with any motion that now is, or for ever fhall be, as for any part of duration that was before the beginning of the world to co-exift with the motion of the fun now; but yet this hinders not, but that having the idea of the length of the motion of the fhadow on a dial between the marks of two hours, I can as diftinctly meafure in my thoughts the duration of that candle-light laft night, as I can the duration of any thing that does now exift: and it is no more than to think, that had the fun fhone then on the dial, and moved after the fame rate it doth now, the fhadow on the dial would have paffed from one hour-line to another, whilft that flame of the candle lafted

§ 29. The notion of an hour, day, or year, being only the idea I have of the length of certain periodical regular motions, neither of which motions do ever all at once exift, but only in the ideas I have of them in my memory derived from my fenfes or reflection, I can with the fame eafe, and for the fame reafon, apply it in my thoughts to duration antecedent to all manner of motion, as well as to any thing that is but a minute or a day antecedent to the motion that at this very moment the fun is in. All things paff are equally and perfectly at reft, and to this way of confideration of them are all one, whether they were before the beginning of the world, or but yesterday; the meafuring of any duration by fome motion, depending not at all on the real co-exiftence of that thing to that motion, or any other periods of revolution, but the having a clear idea of the length of fome periodical known motion, or other intervals of duration in

my mind, and applying that to the duration of the thing I would measure.

§ 30. Hence we see, that some men imagine the duration of the world, from its first existence, to this present year 1689, to have been 5639 years, or equal to 5639 annual revolutions of the sun; and others a great deal more; as the Egyptians of old, who in the time of Alexander counted 23,000 years from the reign of the sun; and the Chinese now, who account the world 3,269,000 years old, or more; which longer duration of the world, according to their computation, though I should not believe to be true, yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as truly understand and say one is longer than the other, as I understand that Methusalem's life was longer than Enoch's: and if the common reckoning of 5639 should be true, (as it may be, as well as any other assigned), it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the world 1000 years older, since every one may with the same facility imagine (I do not say believe) the world to be 50,000 years old, as 5639; and may as well conceive the duration of 50,000 years as 5639. Whereby it appears, that *to the measuring the duration of any thing by time*, it is not requisite that that thing should be co-existent to the motion we measure by, or any other periodical revolution; but it suffices to this purpose, *that we have the idea of the length of any regular periodical appearances*, which we can in our minds apply to duration, with which the motion or appearance never co-existed.

§ 31. For as in the history of the creation delivered by Moses, I can imagine that light existed three days before the sun was, or had any motion, barely by thinking that the duration of light, be-

fore the sun was created, was so long as (if the sun had moved then as it doth now) would have been equal to three of his diurnal revolutions; so by the same way I can have an idea of the chaos, or angels being created, before there was either light or any continued motion, a minute, an hour, a day, a year, or a 1000 years. For, if I can but consider *duration equal to one minute*, before either the being or motion of any body, I can add one minute more till I come to 60: and by the same way of adding minutes, hours, or years, (*i. e.* such or such parts of the sun's revolution, or any other period whereof I have the idea), proceed *in infinitum*, and suppose a duration exceeding as many such periods as I can reckon, let me add whilst I will, which, I think, is the notion we have of *eternity*; of whose infinity we have no other notion than we have of the infinity of number, to which we can add for ever without end.

§ 32. And thus, I think, it is plain, that from those two fountains of all knowledge before mentioned, *viz. reflection* and *sensation*, we get the ideas of *duration*, and the *measures* of it. For,

1<sup>st</sup>, By observing what passes in our minds, how our ideas there in train constantly some vanish, and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of *succession*.

2<sup>dly</sup>, By observing a distance in the parts of this succession, we get the idea of *duration*.

3<sup>dly</sup>, By sensation observing certain appearances at certain regular and seeming equidistant periods, we get the ideas of certain lengths or *measures of duration*, as minutes, hours, days, years, &c.

4<sup>thly</sup>, By being able to repeat those measures of time, or ideas of stated length of dura-



tion in our minds, as often as we will, we can come to *imagine duration, where nothing does really endure or exist*; and thus we imagine to-morrow, next year, or seven years hence.

5thly, By being able to repeat any such ideas of any length of time, as of a minute, a year, or an age, as often as we will, in our own thoughts, and adding them one to another, without ever coming to the end of such addition, any nearer than we can to the end of number, to which we can always add, we come by the idea of *eternity*, as the future eternal duration of our souls, as well as the eternity of that infinite Being, which must necessarily have always existed.

6thly, By considering any part of infinite duration, as set out by periodical measures, we come by the idea of what we call *time* in general.

## C H A P. XV.

*Of DURATION and EXPANSION, con- sidered together.*

- § 1. *Both capable of greater and less.* § 2. *Ex- pansion not bounded by matter.* § 3. *Nor dura- tion by motion.* § 4. *Why men more easily ad- mit infinite duration, than infinite expansion.* § 5. *Time to duration is as place to expansion.* § 6. *Time and place are taken for so much of ei- ther, as are set out by the existence and motion of bodies.* § 7. *Sometimes for so much of either, as we design by measures taken from the bulk or mo- tion of bodies.* § 8. *They belong to all beings.* § 9. *All the parts of extension are extension; and all the parts of duration are duration.* § 10. *Their parts inseparable.* § 11. *Duration is as a line, expansion as a solid.* § 12. *Duration has never two parts together, expansion altoge- ther.*

§ 1. **T**HOUGH we have in the precedent chap- ters dwelt pretty long on the considera- tions of space and duration; yet they being ideas of general concernment, that have something very abstruse and peculiar in their nature, the compar- ing them one with another may, perhaps, be of use for their illustration; and we may have the more clear and distinct conception of them, by taking a view of them together. Distance or space, in its simple abstract conception, to avoid confu- sion, I call EXPANSION, to distinguish it from EXTENSION, which by some is used to express

this distance only as it is in the solid parts of matter, and so includes, or at least intimates, the idea of body: whereas the idea of pure distance includes no such thing. I prefer also the word *expansion* to *space*, because *space* is often applied to distance of fleeting successive parts, which never exist together, as well as to those which are permanent. In both these (*viz.* *expansion* and *duration*) the mind has this common idea of continued lengths, capable of greater or less quantities: for a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour and a day, as of an inch and a foot.

§ 2. The *mind*, having got the idea of the length of any part of *expansion*, let it be a span, or a pace, or what length you will, can, as has been said, repeat that idea; and so adding it to the former, *enlarge its idea of length*, and make it equal to two spans, or two paces, and so as often as it will, till it equals the distance of any parts of the earth one from another, and increases thus, till it amounts to the distance of the sun, or remotest star. By such a progression as this, setting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can proceed and pass beyond all those lengths, and find nothing to stop its going on, either in or without body. It is true, we can easily in our thoughts come to the end of solid extension; the extremity and bounds of all body, we have no difficulty to arrive at: but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless expansion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end. Nor let any one say, that beyond the bounds of body there is nothing at all, unless he will confine GOD within the limits of matter. Solomon, whose understand-

ing was filled and enlarged with wisdom, seems to have other thoughts, when he says, *Heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee*: and he, I think, very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding, who persuades himself that he can extend his thoughts farther than GOD exists, or imagine any expansion where he is not.

§ 3. Just so is it in duration, *the mind having got the idea of any length of duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it*, not only beyond its own, but beyond the existence of all corporeal beings, and all the measures of time, taken from the great bodies of the world, and their motions. But yet every one easily admits, that though we make duration boundless, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. GOD, every one easily allows, fills eternity; and it is hard to find a reason, why any one should doubt that he likewise fills immensity. His infinite being is certainly as boundless one way as another; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to matter, to say, where there is no body, there is nothing.

§ 4. Hence, I think, we may learn the reason, why every one familiarly, and without the least hesitation, speaks of and supposes eternity, and sticks not to ascribe infinity to duration; but it is with more doubting and reserve that many admit, or suppose the infinity of space. The reason whereof seems to me to be this, that duration and extension being used as names of affections belonging to other beings, we easily conceive in GOD infinite duration, and we cannot avoid doing so: but not attributing to him extension, but only to matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the existence of expansion without matter, of

which alone we commonly suppose it an attribute. And therefore, when men pursue their thoughts of space, they are apt to stop at the confines of body, as if space were there at an end too, and reached no farther. Or if their ideas upon consideration carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the universe, imaginary space; as if it were nothing, because there is no body existing in it. Whereas duration, antecedent to all body, and to the motions which it is measured by, they never term imaginary; because it is never supposed void of some other real existence. And if the names of things may at all direct our thoughts towards the originals of mens ideas, (as I am apt to think that they may very much), one may have occasion to think by the name *duration*, that the continuation of existence, with a kind of resistance to any destructive force, and the continuation of solidity, (which is apt to be confounded with, and if we will look into the minute anatomical parts of matter, is little different from hardness), were thought to have some analogy, and gave occasion to words, so near of kin as *durare* and *durum esse*. And that *durare* is applied to the idea of *hardness*, as well as that of *existence*, we see in Horace, Epod. xvi. *Ferro duravit secula*. But be that as it will, this is certain, that whoever pursues his own thoughts, will find them sometimes launch out beyond the extent of body, into the infinity of space or expansion; the idea whereof is distinct and separate from body, and all other things: which may, to those who please, be a subject of farther meditation.

§ 5. *Time*, in general, is to *duration*, as *place* to *expansion*. They are so much of those boundless oceans of eternity and immensity, as is set out

and distinguished from the rest, as it were by landmarks; and so are made use of to denote the position of finite real beings, in respect one to another, in those uniform infinite oceans of duration and space. These rightly considered, are nothing but ideas of determinate distances from certain known points fixed in distinguishable sensible things, and supposed to keep the same distance one from another. From such points fixed in sensible beings we reckon, and from them we measure our portions of those infinite quantities; which so considered, are that which we call *time* and *place*. For duration and space being in themselves uniform and boundless, the order and position of things, without such known settled points, would be lost in them; and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable confusion.

§ 6. *Time* and *place* taken thus for determinate distinguishable portions of those infinite abysses of space and duration, set out or supposed to be distinguished from the rest by marks and known boundaries, have each of them a twofold acceptation.

*First*, TIME in general is commonly taken for so much of infinite duration, as is measured out by, and co-existent with the existence and motions of the great bodies of the universe, as far as we know any thing of them: and in this sense time begins and ends with the frame of this sensible world, as in these phrases before mentioned, *before all time*, or *when time shall be no more*. PLACE likewise is taken sometimes for that portion of infinite space, which is possessed by, and comprehended within the material world; and is thereby distinguished from the rest of expansion; though this may more properly be called EXTENSION

than *place*. Within these two are confined, and by the observable parts of them are measured and determined the particular time or duration, and the particular extension and place of all corporeal beings.

§ 7. *Secondly*, Sometimes the word TIME is used in a *larger sense*, and is applied to parts of that infinite duration, not that were really distinguished and measured out by this real existence and periodical motions of bodies that were appointed from the beginning to be for signs and for seasons, and for days and years, and are accordingly our measures of time; but such other portions too of that infinite uniform duration, which we, upon any occasion, do suppose equal to certain lengths of measured time; and so consider them as bounded and determined. For if we should suppose the creation, or fall of the angels, was at the beginning of the Julian period, we should speak properly enough, and should be understood, if we said, it is a longer time since the creation of angels, than the creation of the world, by 7640 years: whereby we would mark out so much of that undistinguished duration, as we suppose equal to, and would have admitted 7640 annual revolutions of the sun, moving at the rate it now does. And thus likewise we sometimes speak of place, distance, or bulk, in the great *inane* beyond the confines of the world, when we consider so much of that space as is equal to, or capable to receive a body of any assigned dimensions, as a cubic foot; or do suppose a point in it, at such a certain distance from any part of the universe.

§ 8. *Where* and *when* are questions belonging to all finite existences, and are by us always reckoned from some known parts of this sensible

world, and from some certain epochs marked out to us by the motions observable in it. Without some such fixed parts or periods, the order of things would be lost, to our finite understandings, in the boundless invariable oceans of duration and expansion; which comprehend in them all finite beings, and, in their full extent, belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to wonder, that we comprehend them not, and do so often find our thoughts at a loss, when we would consider them either abstractly in themselves, or as any way attributed to the first incomprehensible Being. But when applied to any particular finite beings, the extension of any body is so much of that infinite space, as the bulk of that body takes up. And place is the position of any body, when considered at a certain distance from some other. As the idea of the particular duration of any thing, is an idea of that portion of infinite duration, which passes during the existence of that thing; so the time when the thing existed is the idea of that space of duration, which passed between some known and fixed period of duration, and the being of that thing. One shews the distance of the extremities of the bulk, or existence of the same thing, as that it is a foot square, or lasted two years; the other shews the distance of it in place, or existence from other fixed points of space or duration; as that it was in the middle of Lincoln's-Inn-Fields, or the first degree of Taurus, and in the year of our Lord 1671, or the 1000th year of the Julian period: all which distances we measure by preconceived ideas of certain lengths of space and duration, as inches, feet, miles, and degrees; and in the other, minutes, days, and years, &c.

§ 9. There is one thing more, wherein *space*



and *duration* have a great conformity; and that is, though they are justly reckoned amongst our *simple ideas*, yet none of the distinct ideas we have of either is without all manner of *composition* \*; it is the very nature of both of them to consist of parts: but their parts being all of the same kind, and without the mixture of any other idea, hinder them not from having a place amongst simple ideas. Could the mind, as in number, come to so small a part of extension and duration, as excluded divisibility, that would be, as it were, the indivisible unit, or idea; by repetition of which, it would make its more enlarged ideas of extension

\* It has been objected to Mr Locke, that if space consists of parts, as it is confessed in this place, he should not have reckoned it in the number of simple ideas; because it seems to be inconsistent with what he says elsewhere, that a *simple idea is uncompounded, and contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception of the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas* \*. It is farther objected, that Mr Locke hath not given, in the second chapter of the second book, where he begins to speak of *simple ideas*, an exact definition of what he understands by the word SIMPLE IDEAS. To these difficulties Mr Locke answers thus: To begin with the last, he declares, that he has not treated this subject in an order perfectly scholastic, having not had much familiarity with those sort of books during the writing of his, and not remembering at all the method in which they are written; and therefore his readers ought not to expect definitions regularly placed at the beginning of each new subject. Mr Locke contents himself to employ the principal terms that he uses, so that from his use of them the reader may easily comprehend what he

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\* Book ii. ch. 2. § 1.

and duration. But since the mind is not able to frame an idea of any space without parts, instead thereof it makes use of the common measures, which by familiar use, in each country, have imprinted themselves on the memory, (as inches and feet, or cubits and parasangs; and so seconds, minutes, hours, days, and years, in duration); the mind makes use, I say, of such ideas as these, as simple ones; and these are the component parts of larger ideas, which the mind, upon occasion, makes by the addition of such known lengths, which it is acquainted with. On the other side,

means by them. But with respect to the term *simple idea*, he has had the good luck to define that in the place cited in the objection; and therefore there is no reason to supply that defect. The question then is to know, whether the idea of *extension* agrees with this definition? Which will effectually agree to it, if it be understood in the sense which Mr Locke had principally in his view; for that composition which he designed to exclude in that definition, was a composition of different ideas in the mind, and not a composition of the same kind, in a thing whose essence consists in having parts of the same kind, where you can never come to a part entirely exempted from this composition. So that if the idea of *extension* consists in having *partes extra partes*, (as the schools speak), it is always, in the sense of Mr Locke, a *simple idea*; because the idea of having *partes extra partes*, cannot be resolved into two other ideas. For the remainder of the objection made to Mr Locke, with respect to the nature of extension, Mr Locke was aware of it, as may be seen in chap. xv. § 9. of the second book, where he says, that the least portion of space or extension, whereof we have a clear and distinct idea, may perhaps be the fittest to be considered by us as a *simple idea of that kind*, out of which our complex

the ordinary smallest measure we have of either is looked on as an unit in number, when the mind by division would reduce them into less fractions. Though on both sides, both in addition and division, either of space or duration, when the idea under consideration becomes very big, or very small, its precise bulk becomes very obscure and confused; and it is the number of its repeated additions, or divisions, that alone remains clear and distinct, as will easily appear to any one who will let his thoughts loose in the vast expansion of space, or divisibility of matter. Every part of duration is duration too; and every part of ex-

modes of space and extension are made up. So that, according to Mr Locke, it may very fitly be called a *simple idea*, since it is the least idea of space that the mind can form to itself, and that cannot be divided by the mind into any less, whereof it has in itself any determinate perception. From whence it follows, that it is to the mind one *simple idea*; and that is sufficient to take away this objection; for it is not the design of Mr Locke, in this place, to discourse of any thing but concerning the ideas of the mind. But if this is not sufficient to clear the difficulty, Mr Locke hath nothing more to add, but that if the idea of *extension* is so peculiar, that it cannot exactly agree with the definition that he has given of those *simple ideas*, so that it differs in some manner from all others of that kind, he thinks it is better to leave it there, exposed to this difficulty, than to make a new division in his favour. It is enough for Mr Locke that his meaning can be understood. It is very common to observe intelligible discourses spoiled by too much subtilty in nice divisions. We ought to put things together as well as we can, *doctrinæ causa*; but, after all, several things will be bundled up together under our terms and ways of speaking.

ension is extension; both of them capable of addition or division *in infinitum*. But the least portions of either of them, whereof we have clear and distinct ideas, may, perhaps, be fittest to be considered by us, as the simple ideas of that kind, out of which our complex modes of space, extension, and duration, are made up, and into which they can again be distinctly resolved. Such a small part in duration may be called a *moment*, and is the time of one idea in our minds, in the train of their ordinary succession there. The other wanting a proper name, I know not whether I may be allowed to call a *sensible point*, meaning thereby the least particle of matter or space we can discern, which is ordinarily about a minute, and to the sharpest eyes seldom less than thirty seconds of a circle, whereof the eye is the centre.

§ 10. Expansion and duration have this farther agreement, that though they are both considered by us as having parts; yet their parts are not separable one from another, no not even in thought: though the parts of bodies, from whence we take our measure of the one, and the parts of motion, or rather the succession of ideas in our minds, from whence we take the measure of the other, may be interrupted and separated; as the one is often by rest, and the other is by sleep, which we call rest too.

§ 11. But there is this manifest difference between them, that the ideas of *length*, which we have of expansion, are turned every way, and so make figure, and breadth, and thickness; but duration is but, as it were, the length of one straight line, extended *in infinitum*, not capable of multiplicity, variation, or figure; but is one common

measure of all existence whatsoever, wherein all things, whilst they exist, equally partake. For this present moment is common to all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their existence, as much as if they were all but one single being; and we may truly say, they all exist in the same moment of time. Whether angels and spirits have any analogy to this, in respect of expansion, is beyond my comprehension: and, perhaps, for us, who have understandings and comprehensions suited to our own preservation, and the ends of our own being, but not to the reality and extent of all other beings, it is near as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner of expansion; as it is to have the idea of any real existence, with a perfect negation of all manner of duration. And therefore what spirits have to do with space, or how they communicate in it, we know not. All that we know is, that bodies do each singly possess its proper portion of it, according to the extent of solid parts; and thereby exclude all other bodies from having any share in that particular portion of space, whilst it remains there.

§ 12. *Duration* and time, which is a part of it, is the idea we have of perishing distance, of which no two parts exist together, but follow each other in succession; as expansion is the idea of lasting distance, all whose parts exist together, and are not capable of succession. And therefore though we cannot conceive any duration without succession, nor can put it together in our thoughts that any being does not exist to-morrow, or possess at once more than the present moment of duration; yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the

Almighty, far different from that of man, or any other finite being: because man comprehends not in his knowledge or power, all past and future things: his thoughts are but of yesterday, and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth. What is once past he can never recal; and what is yet to come, he cannot make present. What I say of man, I say of all finite beings, who, though they may far exceed man in knowledge and power, yet are no more than the meanest creature, in comparison with GOD himself. Finite of any magnitude, holds not any proportion to infinite. GOD's infinite duration being accompanied with infinite knowledge and infinite power, he sees all things past and to come; and they are no more distant from his knowledge, no farther removed from his sight, than the present: they all lie under the same view; and there is nothing which he cannot make exist each moment he pleases. For the existence of all things depending upon his good pleasure, all things exist every moment that he thinks fit to have them exist. To conclude, expansion and duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every part of space being in every part of duration, and every part of duration in every part of expansion. Such a combination of two distinct ideas, is, I suppose, scarce to be found in all that great variety we do or can conceive, and may afford matter to farther speculation.

## C H A P. XVI.

## Of N U M B E R .

§ 1. *Number, the simplest and most universal idea.*  
 § 2. *Its modes made by addition.* § 3. *Each mode distinct.* § 4. *Therefore demonstrations in numbers the most precise.* § 5, 6. *Names necessary to numbers.* § 7. *Why children number not earlier.* § 8. *Number measures all measurables.*

§ 1. **A**MONGST all the ideas we have, as there is none suggested to the mind by more ways, so there is none more simple than that of UNITY, or One: it has no shadow of variety or composition in it: every object our senses are employed about, every idea in our understandings, every thought of our minds, brings this idea along with it. And therefore it is the most intimate to our thoughts, as well as it is in its agreement to all other things, the most universal idea we have. For number applies itself to men, angels, actions, thoughts, every thing that either doth exist, or can be imagined.

§ 2. By repeating this idea in our minds, and adding the repetitions together, we come by the *complex ideas* of the modes of it. Thus by adding one to one, we have the complex idea of a couple: by putting twelve units together, we have the complex idea of a dozen, and of a score or a million, or any other number.

§ 3. The *simple modes* of number are of all other the most distinct; every the least variation, which is an unit, making each combination as clearly

different from that which approacheth nearest to it, as the most remote; two being as distinct from one, as two hundred; and the ideas of two, as distinct from the idea of three, as the magnitude of the whole earth is from that of a mite. This is not so in other simple modes, in which it is not so easy, nor perhaps possible, for us to distinguish betwixt two approaching ideas, which yet are really different. For who will undertake to find a difference between the white of this paper, and that of the next degree to it? Or can form distinct ideas of every the least excess in extension?

§ 4. The clearness and distinctness of each mode of number from all others, even those that approach nearest, makes me apt to think, that demonstrations in numbers, if they are not more evident and exact than in extension, yet they are more general in their use, and more determinate in their application. Because the ideas of numbers are more precise and distinguishable than in extension; where every equality and excess are not so easy to be observed or measured; because our thoughts cannot in space arrive at any determined smallness, beyond which it cannot go, as an unit; and therefore the quantity or proportion of any the least excess cannot be discovered: which is clear otherwise in number, where, as has been said, 91 is as distinguishable from 90, as from 9000, though 91 be the next immediate excess to 90. But it is not so in extension, where whatsoever is more than just a foot, or an inch, is not distinguishable from the standard of a foot, or an inch; and in lines, which appear of an equal length, one may be longer than the other by innumerable parts: nor can any one assign an angle, which shall be the next biggest to a right one.



§ 5. By the repeating, as has been said, the idea of an unit, and joining it to another unit, we make therefore one collective idea, marked by the name *two*. And whosoever can do this, and proceed on, still adding one more to the last collective idea which he had of any number, and give a name to it, may count, or have ideas for several collections of units, distinguished one from another, as far as he hath a series of names for following numbers, and a memory to retain that series, with their several names: all numeration being but still the adding of one unit more, and giving to the whole together, as comprehended in one idea, a new or distinct name or sign, whereby to know it from those before and after, and distinguish it from every smaller or greater multitude of units. So that he that can add one to one, and so to two, and so go on with his tale, taking still with him the distinct names belonging to every progression; and so again, by subtracting an unit from each collection, retreat and lessen them, is capable of all the ideas of numbers, within the compass of his language, or for which he hath names, though not, perhaps, of more. For the several simple modes of numbers, being in our minds but so many combinations of units, which have no variety, nor are capable of any other difference but, more or less, names or marks for each distinct combination, seem more necessary, than in any other sort of ideas. For without such names or marks, we can hardly well make use of numbers in reckoning, especially where the combination is made up of any great multitude of units; which put together without a name or mark, to distinguish that precise collection, will hardly be kept from being a heap in confusion.

§ 6. This I think to be the reason why some Americans, I have spoken with, (who were otherwise of quick and rational parts enough), could not, as we do, by any means count to a 1000; nor had any distinct idea of that number, though they could reckon very well to 20. Because their language being scanty, and accommodated only to the few necessaries of a needy simple life, unacquainted either with trade or mathematics, had no words in it to stand for 1000; so that when they were discoursed with of those greater numbers, they would shew the hairs of their head, to express a great multitude, which they could not number; which inability, I suppose, proceeded from their want of names. The Tououpinambos had no names for numbers above 5; any number beyond that they made out by shewing their fingers, and the fingers of others who were present\*: and I doubt not but we ourselves might distinctly number in words a great deal farther than we usually do, would we find out but some fit denomination to signify them by; whereas, in the way we take now to name them, by millions of millions of millions, &c. it is hard to go beyond eighteen, or at most four and twenty decimal progressions, without confusion. But to shew how much distinct names conduce to our well reckoning, or having useful ideas of numbers, let us set all these following figures, as the marks of one number: v. g.

*nonillions. octillions. septillions. sextillions. quintrillions.*

857324. 162486. 345896. 437918 423147.

*quatrillions. trillions. bilions. millions. units.*

248106. 235421. 261734 368149. 623137.

\* Histoire d'un voyage fait en la terre du Brasil, par Jean de Lery, c. xx.  $\frac{207}{57}$

The ordinary way of naming this number in English, will be the often repeating of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, (which is the denomination of the second six figures). In which way, it will be very hard to have any distinguishing notions of this number: but whether, by giving every six figures a new and orderly denomination, these, and perhaps a great many more figures, in progression, might not easily be counted distinctly, and ideas of them both got more easily to ourselves, and more plainly signified to others, I leave it to be considered. This I mention only, to shew how necessary distinct names are to numbering, without pretending to introduce new ones of my invention.

§ 7. Thus children, either for want of names to mark the several progressions of numbers, or not having yet the faculty to collect scattered ideas into complex ones, and range them in a regular order, and so retain them in their memories, as is necessary to reckoning, do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it very far or steadily, till a good while after they are well furnished with good store of other ideas; and one may often observe them discourse and reason pretty well, and have very clear conceptions of several other things, before they can tell twenty. And some, through the default of their memories, who cannot retain the several combinations of numbers, with their names annexed in their distinct orders, and the dependence of so long a train of numeral progressions, and their relation one to another, are not able all their life-time to reckon, or regularly go over any moderate series of numbers. For he that

will count twenty, or have any idea of that number, must know, that nineteen went before, with the distinct name or sign of every one of them, as they stand marked in their order; for where-ever this fails, a gap is made, the chain breaks, and the progress in numbering can go no farther. So that to reckon right, it is required, 1. That the mind distinguish carefully two ideas, which are different one from another only by the addition or subtraction of one unit. 2. That it retain in memory the names or marks of the several combinations from an unit to that number; and that not confusedly, and at random, but in that exact order that the numbers follow one another: in either of which, if it trips, the whole business of numbering will be disturbed, and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude, but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be attained to.

§ 8. This farther is observable in *number*, that it is that which the mind makes use of in measuring all things, that by us are measurable, which principally are *expansion* and *duration*; and our idea of infinity, even when applied to those, seems to be nothing but the infinity of number. For what else are our ideas of eternity and immensity, but the repeated additions of certain ideas of imagined parts of duration and expansion, with the infinity of number, in which we can come to no end of addition? For such an inexhaustible stock, number, of all other our ideas, most clearly furnishes us with, as is obvious to every one. For let a man collect into one sum as great a number as he pleases, this multitude, how great soever, lessens not one jot the power of adding to it, or brings

him any nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock of number, where still there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And this endless *addition*, or *addibility*, (if any one like the word better) of numbers, so apparent to the mind, is that, I think, which gives us the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity: of which more in the following chapter.

## C H A P. XVII.

## Of INFINITY.

§ 1. *Infinity, in its original intention, attributed to space, duration, and number.* § 2. *The idea of finite easily found.* § 3. *How we come by the idea of infinity.* § 4. *Our idea of space boundless.* § 5. *And so of duration.* § 6. *Why other ideas are not capable of infinity.* § 7. *Difference between infinity of space, and space infinite.* § 8. *We have no idea of infinite space.* § 9. *Number affords us the clearest idea of infinity.* § 10, 11. *Our different conception of infinity of number, duration, and expansion.* § 12. *Infinite divisibility.* § 13, 14. *No positive idea of infinite.* § 15. *What is positive, what negative, in our idea of infinite.* § 16, 17. *We have no positive idea of an infinite duration.* § 18. *No positive idea of infinite space.* § 19. *What is positive, what negative, in our idea of infinite.* § 20. *Some think they have a positive idea of eternity, and not of infinite space.* § 21. *Supposed positive ideas of infinity, cause of mistakes.* § 22. *All these ideas from sensation and reflection.*

§ 1. **H**E that would know what kind of idea it is, to which we give the name of INFINITY, cannot do it better than by considering to what infinity is by the mind more immediately attributed, and then how the mind comes to frame it.

*Finite and infinite, seem to me to be looked upon by the mind as the modes of quantity, and to*

be attributed primarily in their first designation only to those things which have parts, and are capable of increase or diminution, by the addition or subtraction of any the least part : and such are the ideas of space, duration, and number, which we have considered in the foregoing chapters. It is true, that we cannot but be assured, that the great GOD, of whom, and from whom are all things, is incomprehensibly infinite. But yet, when we apply to that first and supreme Being, our idea of infinite, in our weak and narrow thoughts, we do it primarily in respect of his duration and ubiquity ; and, I think, more figuratively to his power, wisdom, and goodness, and other attributes, which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, &c. For when we call them infinite, we have no other idea of this infinity, but what carries with it some reflection on, and imitation of that number or extent of the acts or objects of GOD's power, wisdom, and goodness, which can never be supposed so great, or so many, which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed, let us multiply them in our thoughts as far as we can, with all the infinity of endless number. I do not pretend to say how these attributes are in GOD, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities: they do, without doubt, contain in them all possible perfection : but this, I say, is our way of conceiving them, and these our ideas of their infinity.

§ 2. Finite, then, and infinite, being by the mind looked on as modifications of expansion and duration, the next thing to be considered, is, *how the mind comes by them.* As for the idea of *finite*, there is no great difficulty. The obvious portions of extension, that affect our senses, car-

ry with them into the mind the idea of finite: and the ordinary periods of succession, whereby we measure time and duration, as hours, days, and years, are bounded lengths. The difficulty is, how we come by those boundless ideas of *eternity* and *immensity*, since the objects which we converse with come so much short of any approach or proportion to that largeness.

§ 3. Every one, that has any idea of any stated lengths of space, as a *foot*, finds that he can repeat that idea; and joining it to the former, make the idea of two foot; and by the addition of a third, three foot, and so on, without ever coming to an end of his addition, whether of the same idea of a foot, or if he pleases of doubling it, or any other idea he has of any length, as a mile, or diameter of the earth, or of the *orbis magnus*: for whichever of these he takes, and how often soever he doubles, or any otherwise multiplies it, he finds, that after he has continued his doubling in his thoughts, and enlarged his idea as much as he pleases, he has no more reason to stop, nor is one jot nearer the end of such addition, than he was at first setting out; the power of enlarging his idea of space by farther additions remaining still the same, he hence takes the idea of *infinite space*.

§ 4. This, I think, is the way whereby the mind gets the idea of *infinite space*. It is a quite different consideration to examine, whether the mind has the idea of such a boundless space actually existing, since our ideas are not always proofs of the existence of things; but yet, since this comes here in our way, I suppose I may say, that we are apt to think, that space in itself is actually boundless, to which imagination the idea of space



or expansion of itself naturally leads us. For it being considered by us, either as the extension of body, or as existing by itself, without any solid matter taking it up, (for of such a void space we have not only the idea, but I have proved, as I think, from the motion of body, its necessary existence), it is impossible the mind should be ever able to find or suppose any end of it, or be stopped any-where in its progress in this space, how far soever it extends its thoughts. Any bounds made with body, even adamantine walls, are so far from putting a stop to the mind in its farther progress in space and extension, that it rather facilitates and enlarges it: for so far as that body reaches, so far no one can doubt of extension; and when we are come to the utmost extremity of body, what is there, that can there put a stop, and satisfy the mind that it is at the end of space, when it perceives that it is not; nay, when it is satisfied that body itself can move into it? For if it be necessary for the motion of body that there should be an empty space, though ever so little, here amongst bodies; and if it be possible for body to move in or through that empty space, nay, it is impossible for any particle of matter to move but into an empty space, the same possibility of a body's moving into a void space, beyond the utmost bounds of body, as well as into a void space, interspersed amongst bodies, will always remain clear and evident, the idea of empty pure space, whether within or beyond the confines of all bodies, being exactly the same, differing not in nature, though in bulk; and there being nothing to hinder body from moving into it; so that where-ever the mind places itself by any thought, either amongst or remote from all bodies, it can, in this uniform idea of space, no-where

find any bounds, any end; and so must necessarily conclude it, by the very nature and idea of each part of it, to be actually infinite.

§ 5. As by the power we find in ourselves of repeating, as often as we will, any idea of space, we get the idea of immensity; so, by being able to repeat the idea of any length of duration, we have in our minds, with all the endless addition of number, we come by the idea of *eternity*. For we find in ourselves, we can no more come to an end of such repeated ideas, than we can come to the end of number, which every one perceives he cannot. But here again, it is another question, quite different from our having an idea of eternity, to know whether there were any real being, whose duration has been eternal. And as to this, I say, he that considers something now existing, must necessarily come to something eternal. But having spoke of this in another place, I shall say here no more of it, but proceed on to some other considerations of our idea of infinity.

§. 6 If it be so, that our idea of infinity be got from the power we observe in ourselves, of repeating without end our own ideas, it may be demanded, why we do not attribute infinity to other ideas, as well as those of space and duration; since they may be as easily, and as often repeated in our minds as the other; and yet no-body ever thinks of infinite *sweetness*, or infinite *whiteness*, though he can repeat the idea of sweet or white, as frequently as those of a yard or a day? To which I answer, all the ideas that are considered as having parts, and are capable of increase by the addition of any equal or less parts, afford us by their repetition the idea of infinity; because with this endless repetition, there is continued an en-

largement, of which there can be no end. But in other ideas it is not so; for to the largest idea of extension or duration that I at present have, the addition of any the least part makes an increase; but to the perfectest idea I have of the whitest whiteness, if I add another of a less or equal whiteness, (and of a whiter than I have, I cannot add the idea), it makes no increase, and enlarges not my idea at all; and therefore the different ideas of whiteness, &c. are called degrees. For those ideas that consist of parts, are capable of being augmented by every addition of the least part; but if you take the idea of white, which one parcel of snow yielded yesterday to your sight, and another idea of white from another parcel of snow you see to-day, and put them together in your mind, they embody, as it were, and run into one, and the idea of whiteness is not at all increased; and if we add a less degree of whiteness to a greater, we are so far from increasing, that we diminish it. Those ideas that consist not of parts, cannot be augmented to what proportion men please, or be stretched beyond what they have received by their senses; but space, duration, and number, being capable of increase by repetition, leave in the mind an idea of an endless room for more; nor can we conceive anywhere a stop to a farther addition or progression, and so those ideas alone lead our minds towards the thought of infinity.

§ 7. Though our idea of infinity arise from the contemplation of quantity, and the endless increase the mind is able to make in quantity, by the repeated additions of what portions thereof it pleases; yet I guess we cause great confusion in our thoughts, when we join infinity to any supposed idea of quantity the mind can be thought to

have, and so discourse or reason about an infinite quantity, *viz.* an infinite space, or an infinite duration: for our idea of infinity being, as I think, an endless growing idea, but the idea of any quantity the mind has, being at that time terminated in that idea, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is), to join infinity to it, is to adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk; and therefore I think it is not an insignificant subtilty, if I say, that we are carefully to distinguish between the idea of the infinity of space, and the idea of a space infinite: the first is nothing but a supposed endless progression of the mind, over what repeated ideas of space it pleases; but to have actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite, is to suppose the mind already passed over, and actually to have a view of all those repeated ideas of space, which an endless repetition can never totally represent to it; which carries in it a plain contradiction.

§ 8. This perhaps will be a little plainer, if we consider it in numbers. The infinity of numbers, to the end of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach, easily appears to any one that reflects on it: but how clear soever this idea of the infinity of number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the absurdity of the actual idea of an infinite number. Whatsoever positive ideas we have in our minds of any space, duration, or number, let them be ever so great, they are still finite; but when we suppose an inexhaustible remainder, from which we remove all bounds, and wherein we allow the mind an endless progression of thought, without ever completing the idea, there we have our idea of infinity; which, though it seems to be pretty clear, when

we consider nothing else in it but the negation of an end, yet when we would frame in our minds the idea of an infinite space or duration, that idea is very obscure and confused, because it is made up of two parts, very different, if not inconsistent. For, let a man frame in his mind an idea of any space or number, as great as he will; it is plain, the mind rests and terminates in that idea; which is contrary to the idea of *infinity*, which consists in a supposed *endless progression*. And therefore, I think, it is that we are so easily confounded, when we come to argue and reason about infinite space or duration, &c. Because the parts of such an idea, not being perceived to be, as they are, inconsistent, the one side or other always perplexes whatever consequences we draw from the other, as an idea of motion not passing on, would perplex any one, who should argue from such an idea, which is not better than an idea of motion at rest; and such another seems to me to be the idea of a space, or (which is the same thing) a number infinite, *i. e.* of a space or number, which the mind actually has, and so views and terminates in; and of a space or number, which, in a constant and endless enlarging and progression, it can in thought never attain to. For how large soever an idea of space I have in my mind, it is no larger than it is that instant that I have it, though I be capable the next instant to double it; and so on *in infinitum*: for that alone is infinite which has no bounds; and that the idea of infinity, in which our thoughts can find none.

§ 9. But of all other ideas, it is *number*, as I have said, which, I think, furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct idea of *infinity* we are

capable of. For even in space and duration, when the mind pursues the idea of infinity, it there makes use of the ideas and repetitions of numbers, as of millions and millions of miles, or years, which are so many distinct ideas, kept best by number from running into a confused heap, wherein the mind loses itself; and when it has added together as many millions, &c. as it pleases, of known lengths of space or duration, the clearest idea it can get of infinity, is the confused incomprehensible remainder of endless addible numbers, which affords no prospect of stop or boundary.

§ 10. It will, perhaps, give us a little farther light into the idea we have of infinity, and discover to us, that it is nothing but the infinity of number applied to determinate parts, of which we have in our minds the distinct ideas, if we consider, that number is not generally thought by us infinite, whereas duration and extension are apt to be so; which arises from hence, that in number we are at one end, as it were: for there being in number nothing less than an unit, we there stop, and are at an end; but in addition, or increase of number, we can set no bounds: and so it is like a line, whereof one end terminating with us, the other is extended still forwards beyond all that we can conceive; but in space and duration it is otherwise. For in duration, we consider it, as if this line of number were extended both ways to an inconceivable, indeterminate, and infinite length; which is evident to any one, that will but reflect on what consideration he hath of eternity; which, I suppose, he will find to be nothing else but the turning this infinity of number both ways, *a parte ante*, and *a parte post*, as they speak. For, when we would consider eternity,

*a parte ante*, what do we, but beginning from ourselves, and the present time we are in, repeat in our minds the ideas of years, or ages, or any other assignable portion of duration past, with a prospect of proceeding, in such addition, with all the infinity of number : and when we would consider eternity *a parte post*, we just after the same rate begin from ourselves, and reckon by multiplied periods yet to come, still extending that line of number as before ; and these two being put together, are that infinite duration we call *eternity* ; which, as we turn our view either way, forwards or backwards, appears infinite, because we still turn that way the infinite end of number, *i. e.* the power still of adding more.

§ 11. The same happens also in space, wherein conceiving ourselves to be, as it were, in the centre, we do on all sides pursue those indeterminate lines of number ; and reckoning any way from ourselves, a yard, mile, diameter of the earth, or *orbis magnus*, by the infinity of number, we add others to them as often as we will ; and having no more reason to set bounds to those repeated ideas, than we have to set bounds to number, we have that indeterminable idea of *immensity*.

§ 12. And since in any bulk of matter, our thoughts can never arrive at the utmost *divisibility*, therefore there is an apparent infinity to us also in that, which has the infinity also of number, but with this difference, that in the former considerations of the infinity of space and duration, we only use addition of numbers ; whereas this is like the division of an unit into its fractions, wherein the mind also can proceed *in infinitum*, as well as in the former additions, it being indeed but the addition still of new numbers : though in the ad-

dition of the one, we can have no more the positive idea of a space infinitely great, than in the division of the other, we can have the idea of a body infinitely little; our idea of infinity being, as I may say, a growing and fugitive idea, still in a boundless progression, that can stop no-where.

§ 13. Though it be hard, I think, to find any one so absurd, as to say he has the positive idea of an actual infinite number; the infinity whereof lies only in a power still of adding any combination of units to any former number, and that as long and as much as one will; the like also being in the infinity of space and duration, which power leaves always to the mind room for endless additions; yet there be those, who imagine they have positive ideas of infinite duration and space. It would, I think, be enough to destroy any such positive idea of infinite, to ask him that has it, whether he could add to it or no; which would easily shew the mistake of such a positive idea. We can, I think, have no positive idea of any space or duration, which is not made up of, and commensurate to repeated numbers of feet or yards, or days and years, which are the common measures whereof we have the ideas in our minds, and whereby we judge of the greatness of these sort of quantities. And therefore, since an idea of infinite space or duration must needs be made up of infinite parts, it can have no other infinity than that of number, capable still of farther addition; but not an actual positive idea of a number infinite. For, I think, it is evident, that the addition of finite things together (as are all lengths, whereof we have the positive ideas) can never otherwise produce the idea of infinite, than as number does; which consisting of additions of



finite units one to another, suggests the idea of infinite, only by a power we find we have of still increasing the sum, and adding more of the same kind, without coming one jot nearer the end of such progression.

§ 14. They who would prove their idea of *infinite* to be *positive*, seem to me to do it by a pleasant argument, taken from the negation of an end; which being negative, the negation of it is positive. He that considers, that the end is in body, but the extremity or superficies of that body, will not, perhaps, be forward to grant, that the end is a bare negative: and he that perceives the end of his pen is black or white, will be apt to think, that the end is something more than a pure negation. Nor is it, when applied to duration, the bare negation of existence, but more properly the last moment of it. But if they will have the end to be nothing but the bare negation of existence, I am sure they cannot deny but the beginning is the first instant of being, and is not by any body conceived to be a bare negation; and therefore, by their own argument, the idea of *eternal a parte ante*, or of a duration without a beginning, is but a negative idea.

§ 15. The idea of infinite, has, I confess, something of positive in all those things we apply to it. When we would think of infinite space or duration, we at first step usually make some very large idea, as, perhaps, of millions of ages, or miles, which possibly we double and multiply several times. All that we thus amass together in our thoughts is positive, and the assemblage of a great number of positive ideas of space or duration. But what still remains beyond this, we have no more a positive distinct notion of, than a mariner has of

the depth of the sea, where, having let down a large portion of his sounding line, he reaches no bottom: whereby he knows the depth to be so many fathoms and more; but how much that more is, he hath no distinct notion at all: and could he always supply new line, and find the plummet always sink without ever stopping, he would be something in the posture of the mind reaching after a complete and positive idea of infinity. In which case, let this line be 10, or 10,000 fathoms long, it equally discovers what is beyond it; and gives only this confused and comparative idea, that this is not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the mind comprehends of any space, it has a positive idea of: but in endeavouring to make it infinite, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the idea is still imperfect and incomplete. So much space as the mind takes a view of in its contemplation of greatness, is a clear picture, and positive in the understanding: but infinite is still greater. 1. Then, the idea of *so much*, is *positive* and *clear*. 2. The idea of *greater* is also clear, but it is but a *comparative* idea. 3. The idea of *so much greater*, as cannot be comprehended; and this is plain *negative*, not positive. For he has no positive clear idea of the largeness of any extension (which is that sought for in the idea of infinite) that has not a comprehensive idea of the dimensions of it: and such no-body, I think, pretends to, in what is infinite. For to say a man has a positive clear idea of any quantity, without knowing how great it is, is as reasonable as to say, he has the positive clear idea of the number of the sands on the sea shore, who knows not how many they be, but only that they are more than twenty. For just

such a perfect and positive idea has he of an infinite space or duration, who says it is larger than the extent or duration of 10, 100, 1000, or any other number of miles, or years, whereof he has, or can have, a positive idea; which is all the idea, I think, we have of infinite. So that what lies beyond our positive idea towards infinity, lies in obscurity; and has the indeterminate confusion of a negative idea, wherein I know I neither do, nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow capacity: and that cannot but be very far from a positive complete idea, wherein the greatest part of what I would comprehend, is left out, under the indeterminate intimation of being still greater. For to say, that having in any quantity measured so much, or gone so far, you are not yet at the end, is only to say, that that quantity is greater. So that the negation of an end in any quantity, is, in other words, only to say, that it is bigger: and a total negation of an end is but carrying this bigger still with you, in all the progressions your thoughts shall make in quantity; and adding this idea of still greater, to all the ideas you have, or can be supposed to have of quantity. Now, whether such an idea as that be positive, I leave any one to consider.

§ 16. I ask those, who say they have a positive idea of eternity, whether their idea of *duration* includes in it *succession*, or not? If it does not, they ought to shew the difference of their notion of duration, when applied to an eternal being, and to a finite: since, perhaps, there may be others, as well as I, who will own to them their weakness of understanding in this point; and acknowledge, that the notion they have of duration forces them

to conceive, that whatever has duration, is of a longer continuance to-day than it was yesterday. If to avoid succession in eternal existence, they recur to the *punctum stans* of the schools, I suppose they will thereby very little mend the matter, or help us to a more clear and positive idea of infinite duration, there being nothing more inconceivable to me, than duration without succession. Besides, that *punctum stans*, if it signify any thing, being not *quantum*, finite or infinite, cannot belong to it. But if our weak apprehensions cannot separate succession from any duration whatsoever, our idea of eternity can be nothing but of infinite succession of moments of duration, wherein any thing does exist; and whether any one has, or can have a positive idea of an actual infinite number, I leave him to consider, till his infinite number be so great, that he himself can add no more to it; and as long as he can increase it, I doubt he himself will think the idea he hath of it, a little too scanty for positive infinity.

§ 17. I think it unavoidable for every considering rational creature, that will but examine his own, or any other existence, to have the notion of an eternal wise Being, who had no beginning; and such an idea of infinite duration, I am sure I have. But this negation of a beginning, being but the negation of a positive thing, scarce gives me a positive idea of infinity; which, whenever I endeavour to extend my thoughts to, I confess myself at a loss, and find I cannot attain any clear comprehension of it.

§ 18. He that thinks he has a positive idea of infinite space, will, when he considers it, find that he can no more have a positive idea of the greatest, than he has of the least space; for in this latter,

which seems the easier of the two, and more within our comprehension, we are capable only of a comparative idea of smallness, which will always be less than any one, whereof we have the positive idea. All our positive ideas of any quantity, whether great or little, have always bounds; though our comparative idea, whereby we can always add to the one, and take from the other, hath no bounds. For that which remains either great or little, not being comprehended in that positive idea which we have, lies in obscurity; and we have no other idea of it, but of the power of enlarging the one, and diminishing the other, without ceasing. A pestle and mortar will as soon bring any particle of matter to indivisibility, as the acutest thought of a mathematician: and a surveyor may as soon, with his chain, measure out infinite space, as a philosopher, by the quickest flight of mind, reach it; or by thinking, comprehend it, which is to have a positive idea of it. He that thinks on a cube of an inch diameter, has a clear and positive idea of it in his mind, and so can frame one of  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\frac{1}{3}$ ,  $\frac{1}{4}$ , and so on, till he has the idea in his thoughts of something very little: but yet reaches not the idea of that incomprehensible littleness, which division can produce. What remains of smallness, is as far from his thoughts, as when he first began; and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and positive idea of that smallness, which is consequent to infinite divisibility.

§ 19. Every one that looks towards infinity does, as I have said, at first glance, make some very large idea of that which he applies it to, let it be space, or duration; and possibly he wearies his thoughts, by multiplying in his mind that first

large idea : but yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a positive clear idea of what remains, to make up a positive infinite, than the country-fellow had of the water, which was yet to come, and pass the channel of the river where he stood :

*Rusticus expectat dum transeat annis, at ille  
Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis ævum.*

§ 20. There are some I have met with, that put so much difference between infinite duration and infinite space, that they persuade themselves that they have a positive idea of eternity; but that they have not, nor can have any idea of infinite space. The reason of which mistake I suppose to be this, that finding by a due contemplation of causes and effects, that it is necessary to admit some eternal being, and so to consider the real existence of that being, as taking up and commensurate to their idea of eternity: but on the other side, not finding it necessary, but, on the contrary, apparently absurd, that body should be infinite, they forwardly conclude they can have no idea of infinite space, because they can have no idea of infinite matter. Which consequence, I conceive, is very ill collected; because the existence of matter is no-wise necessary to the existence of space, no more than the existence of motion, or the sun, is necessary to duration, though duration uses to be measured by it: and I doubt not but a man may have the idea of 10,000 miles square, without any body so big, as well as the idea of 10,000 years, without any body so old. It seems as easy to me to have the idea of space empty of body, as to think of the capacity of a bushel without corn, or the hollow of a nut-shell without a kernel in it: it being no more

necessary that there should be existing a solid body infinitely extended, because we have an idea of the infinity of space, than it is necessary that the world should be eternal, because we have an idea of infinite duration: and why should we think our idea of infinite space requires the real existence of matter to support it, when we find, that we have as clear an idea of infinite duration to come, as we have of infinite duration past? Though, I suppose, no-body thinks it conceivable, that any thing does, or has existed in that future duration. Nor is it possible to join our idea of future duration with present or past existence, any more than it is possible to make the ideas of yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow, to be the same; or bring ages past and future together, and make them contemporary. But if these men are of the mind that they have clearer ideas of infinite duration than of infinite space, because it is past doubt that GOD has existed from all eternity, but there is no real matter co-extended with infinite space: yet those philosophers who are of opinion, that infinite space is possessed by GOD's infinite omnipresence, as well as infinite duration by his eternal existence, must be allowed to have as clear an idea of infinite space as of infinite duration; though neither of them, I think, has any positive idea of infinity in either case. For whatsoever positive ideas a man has in his mind of any quantity, he can repeat it, and add it to the former, as easy as he can add together the idea of two days, or two paces, which are positive ideas of lengths he has in his mind, and so on, as long as he pleases: whereby, if a man had a positive idea of infinite, either duration or space, he could add two infinites together, nay, make one infinite

infinitely bigger than another: absurdities too gross to be confuted.

§ 21. But yet, if after all this, there be men who persuade themselves, that they have clear positive comprehensive ideas of infinity, it is fit they enjoy their privilege: and I should be very glad (with some others that I know, who acknowledge they have none such) to be better informed by their communication. For I have been hitherto apt to think, that the great and inextricable difficulties, which perpetually involve all discourses concerning infinity, whether of space, duration, or divisibility, have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity, and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the comprehension of our narrow capacities. For whilst men talk and dispute of infinite space or duration, as if they had as complete and positive ideas of them as they have of the names they use for them, or as they have of a yard or an hour, or any other determinate quantity, it is no wonder if the incomprehensible nature of the thing they discourse of or reason about, leads them into perplexities and contradictions; and their minds be overlaid by an object too large and mighty to be surveyed and managed by them.

§ 22. If I have dwelt pretty long on the considerations of duration, space, and number; and what arises from the contemplation of them, infinity, it is possibly no more than the matter requires, there being few simple ideas whose modes give more exercise to the thoughts of men, than these do. I pretend not to treat of them in their full latitude: it suffices to my design to shew how the mind receives them, such as they are, from *sensation* and *reflection*; and how even the idea we have of infinity, how remote soever it



may seem to be from any object of sense, or operation of our mind, has nevertheless, as all our other ideas, its original there. Some mathematicians perhaps, of advanced speculations, may have other ways to introduce into their minds ideas of infinity: but this hinders not, but that they themselves, as well as all other men, got the first ideas which they had of infinity from sensation and reflection, in the method we have here set down.

## C H A P. XVIII.

*Of other SIMPLE MODES.*

- § 1, 2. *Modes of motion.* § 3. *Modes of sounds.*  
 § 4. *Modes of colours.* § 5, 6. *Modes of tastes.*  
 § 7. *Why some modes have, and others have not names.*

§ 1. **T**HOUGH I have, in the foregoing chapters, shewn how from simple ideas taken in by sensation, the mind comes to extend itself even to infinity; which however it may, of all others, seem most remote from any sensible perception, yet at last hath nothing in it but what is made out of simple ideas received into the mind by the senses, and afterwards there put together by the faculty the mind has to repeat its own ideas; though, I say, these might be instances enough of simple modes of the simple ideas of sensation; and suffice to shew how the mind comes by them; yet I shall, for method's sake, though briefly, give an account of some few more, and then proceed to more complex ideas.

§ 2. To *slide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, leap, skip*, and abundance of others that might be named, are words which are no sooner heard, but every one, who understands English, has presently in his mind distinct ideas, which are all but the different modifications of motion: *Modes of motion* answer those of extension: *swift* and *slow* are two different ideas of motion, the measures whereof are made of the distances of time and space put together, so they are complex ideas comprehending time and space with motion.

§ 3. The like variety have we in sounds. Every articulate word is a different modification of sound: by which we see, that from the sense of hearing by such modifications, the mind may be furnished with distinct ideas, to almost an infinite number. Sounds also, besides the distinct cries of birds and beasts, are modified by diversity of notes of different length put together, which make that complex idea called a *tune*, which a musician may have in his mind, when he hears or makes no sound at all, by reflecting on the ideas of those sounds, so put together silently in his own fancy.

§ 4. Those of colours are also very various: some we take notice of as the different degrees, or, as they are termed, *shades of the same colour*. But since we very seldom make assemblages of colours, either for use or delight; but figure is taken in also, and has its part in it, as in painting, weaving, needle-works, &c. those which are taken notice of, do most commonly belong to mixed modes, as being made up of ideas of divers kinds, viz. figure and colour, such as *beauty, rainbow, &c.*

§ 5. All *compounded tastes and smells*, are also

modes made up of the simple ideas of those senses. But they being such as generally we have no names for, are less taken notice of, and cannot be set down in writing; and therefore must be left without enumeration, to the thoughts and experience of my reader.

§ 6. In general it may be observed, that those *simple modes*, which are considered but as different degrees of the *same simple idea*, though they are in themselves many of them very distinct ideas; yet have ordinarily no distinct names, nor are much taken notice of as distinct ideas, where the difference is but very small between them. Whether men have neglected these modes, and given no names to them, as wanting measures nicely to distinguish them; or because when they were so distinguished, that knowledge would not be of general or necessary use, I leave it to the thoughts of others; it is sufficient to my purpose to shew, that all our simple ideas come to our minds only by sensation and reflection; and that when the mind has them, it can variously repeat and compound them, and so make new complex ideas. But though white, red, or sweet, &c. have not been modified, or made into complex ideas, by several combinations, so as to be named, and thereby ranked into species; yet some others of the simple ideas, *viz.* those of unity, duration, motion, &c. above instanced in, as also power and thinking, have been thus modified to a great variety of complex ideas, with names belonging to them.

§ 7. The reason whereof, I suppose, has been this, that the great concernment of men being with men one amongst another, the knowledge of men and their actions, and the signifying of them to one another, was most necessary; and there-

fore they made ideas of actions very nicely modified, and gave those complex ideas names, that they might the more easily record, and discourse of those things they were daily conversant in, without long ambages and circumlocutions; and that the things they were continually to give and receive information about, might be the easier and quicker understood. That this is so, and that men, in framing different complex ideas, and giving them names, have been much governed by the end of speech in general, (which is a very short and expedite way of conveying their thoughts one to another), is evident in the names, which in several arts have been found out, and applied to several complex ideas of modified actions, belonging to their several trades, for dispatch sake, in their direction or discourses about them. Which ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men not conversant about these operations. And thence the words that stand for them, by the greatest part of men of the same language, are not understood. *v. g. Colsbire, drilling, filtration, cobobation*, are words standing for certain complex ideas, which being seldom in the minds of any but those few, whose particular employments do at every turn suggest them to their thoughts, those names of them are not generally understood but by smiths and chymists; who having framed the complex ideas which these words stand for, and having given names to them, or received them from others, upon hearing of these names in communication, readily conceive those ideas in their minds; as by *cobobation* all the simple ideas of distilling, and the pouring the liquor distilled from any thing back upon the remaining matter, and distilling it again. Thus we see, that there are

great varieties of simple ideas, as of tastes and smells, which have no names; and of modes many more: which either not having been generally enough observed, or else not being of any great use to be taken notice of in the affairs and converse of men, they have not had names given to them, and so pass not for species. This we shall have occasion hereafter to consider more at large, when we come to speak of words.

## C H A P. XIX.

*Of the Modes of THINKING.*

§ 1, 2. *Sensation, remembrance, contemplation, &c.*

§ 3. *The various attention of the mind in thinking.*

§ 4. *Hence it is probable, that thinking is the action, not essence of the soul.*

§ 1. **W**HEN the mind turns its view inwards upon itself, and contemplates its own actions, *thinking* is the first that occurs. In it the mind observes a great variety of modifications, and from thence receives distinct ideas. Thus the perception, which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impression on the body, made by an external object, being distinct from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call *sensation*; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses. The same idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external sensory, is *remembrance*: if it be sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is *recollection*.

*tion* : if it be held there long under attentive consideration, it is *contemplation* : when ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the understanding, it is that which the French call *reverie* ; our language has scarce a name for it : when the ideas that offer themselves, (for as I have observed in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of ideas succeeding one another in our minds), are taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory, it is *attention* ; when the mind, with great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary solicitation of other ideas, it is that we call *intention* or *study* : sleep, without dreaming, is *rest* from all these : and *dreaming* itself, is the having of ideas (whilst the outward senses are stopped, so that they receive not outward objects with their usual quickness) in the mind, not suggested by any external objects, or known occasion ; nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all : and whether that, which we call *extasy*, be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined.

§ 2. These are some few instances of those various *modes of thinking*, which the mind may observe in itself, and so have as distinct ideas of, as it hath of *white* and *red*, a *square* or a *circle*. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this set of ideas, which are got from *reflection* : that would be to make a volume : it suffices to my present purpose, to have shewn here, by some few examples, of what sort these ideas are, and how the mind comes by them ; especially, since I shall have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of *reasoning*, *judging*, *volition*, and

*knowledge*, which are some of the most considerable operations of the mind, and modes of thinking.

§ 3. But perhaps it may not be an unpardonable digression, nor wholly impertinent to our present design, if we reflect here upon the different state of the mind in thinking, which those instances of attention, *reverie*, and dreaming, &c. before mentioned, naturally enough suggest. That there are ideas, some or other, always present in the mind of a waking man, every one's experience convinces him; though the mind employs itself about them with several degrees of attention. Sometimes the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness on the contemplation of some objects, that it turns their ideas on all sides; remarks their relations and circumstances; and views every part so nicely, and with such attention, that it shuts out all other thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made then on the senses, which at another season would produce very sensible perceptions: at other times, it barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the understanding, without directing and pursuing any of them: and at other times, it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadows, that make no impression.

§ 4. This difference of *intention*, and *remission* of the mind in thinking, with a great variety of degrees, between earnest study, and very near minding nothing at all, every one, I think, has experimented in himself. Trace it a little farther, and you find the mind in sleep, retired, as it were, from the senses, and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense, which at other times produce very vivid and sensible ideas. I need not, for this, instance in those who sleep

out whole stormy nights, without hearing the thunder, or seeing the lightning, or feeling the shaking of the house, which are sensible enough to those who are waking. But in this retirement of the mind from the senses, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call *dreaming*: and last of all, sound sleep closes the scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think, almost every one has experience of in himself, and his own observation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, that since the mind can sensibly put on, at several times, several degrees of *thinking*; and be sometimes even in a waking man so remiss, as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that degree, that they are very little removed from none at all; and at last, in the dark retirements of sound sleep, loses the sight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever: since, I say, this is evidently so in matter of fact, and constant experience, I ask, Whether it be not probable, that *thinking is the action, and not the essence of the soul*? Since the operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission: but the essences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation. But this by-the-bye.



## C H A P. XX.

*Of Modes of PLEASURE and PAIN.*

§ 1. *Pleasure and pain, simple ideas.* § 2. *Good and evil, what.* § 3. *Our passions moved by good and evil.* § 4. *Love.* § 5. *Hatred.* § 6. *Desire.* § 7. *Joy.* § 8. *Sorrow.* § 9. *Hope.* § 10. *Fear.* § 11. *Despair.* § 12. *Anger.* § 13. *Envy.* § 14. *What passions all men have.* § 15, 16. *Pleasure and pain, what.* § 17. *Shame.* § 18. *These instances do shew how our ideas of the passions are got from sensation and reflection.*

§ 1. **A**MONGST the simple ideas, which we receive both from *sensation* and *reflection*, PAIN and PLEASURE are two very considerable ones. For as in the body there is sensation barely in itself, or accompanied with *pain* or *pleasure*; so the thought, or perception of the mind, is simply so, or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you please. These, like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the simple ideas of the senses, only by experience. For to define them by the presence of good or evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us, than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to, or considered by us.

§ 2. Things then are good or evil, only in re-

ference to pleasure and pain. That we call GOOD, which is apt to *cause* or *increase* pleasure, or *diminish* pain in us; or else to *procure* or *preserve* us the possession of any other good, or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that EVIL, which is apt to *produce* or *increase* any pain, or *diminish* any pleasure in us; or else to *procure* us any evil, or *deprive* us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly distinguished; though in truth they be only different constitutions of the mind, sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body, sometimes by thoughts of the mind.

§ 3. Pleasure and pain, and that which causes them, good and evil, are the hinges on which our PASSIONS turn; and if we reflect on ourselves, and observe how these, under various considerations, operate in us; what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal sensations, if I may so call them, they produce in us, we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our passions.

§ 4. Thus any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call LOVE. For when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, or in spring, when there are none, that he *loves* grapes, it is no more, but that the taste of grapes delights him; let an alteration of health or constitution destroy the delight of their taste, and he then can be said to love grapes no longer.

§ 5. On the contrary, the thought of the pain which any thing present or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call HATRED. Were it my business here to inquire any farther than in-

to the bare ideas of our passions, as they depend on different modifications of pleasure and pain, I should remark, that our love and hatred of inanimate insensible beings is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain which we receive from their use and application any way to our senses, though with their destruction: but hatred or love, to being capable of happiness or misery, is often the uneasiness or delight which we find in ourselves, arising from a consideration of their very being or happiness. Thus the being and welfare of a man's children or friends, producing constant delight in him, he is said constantly to love them. But it suffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred, are but the dispositions of the mind, in respect of pleasure and pain in general, however caused in us.

§ 6. The uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing, whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call *DESIRE*, which is greater or less, as that uneasiness is more or less vehement. Where, by-the-by, it may perhaps be of some use to remark, that the chief, if not only spur to human industry and action, is uneasiness. For whatever good is proposed, if its absence carries no displeasure or pain with it; if a man be easy and content without it, there is no desire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare *velleity*, the term used to signify the lowest degree of desire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is so little uneasiness in the absence of any thing, that it carries a man no farther than some faint wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous use of the means to attain it. *Desire* also is stopped or abated by the opinion of the impossibi-

lity or unattainableness of the good proposed, as far as the uneasiness is cured or allayed by that consideration. This might carry our thoughts farther, were it seasonable in this place.

§ 7. JOY is a delight of the mind, from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a good; and we are then possessed of any good, when we have it so in our power, that we can use it when we please. Thus a man almost starved, has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleasure of using it; and a father, in whom the very well-being of his children causes delight, is always, as long as his children are in such a state, in the possession of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleasure.

§ 8. SORROW is uneasiness in the mind, upon the thought of a good lost, which might have been enjoyed longer; or the sense of a present evil.

§ 9. HOPE is that pleasure in the mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him.

§ 10. FEAR is an uneasiness of the mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to befall us.

§ 11. DESPAIR is the thought of the unattainableness of any good, which works differently in mens minds, sometimes producing uneasiness or pain, sometimes rest and indolency.

§ 12. ANGER is uneasiness or discomposure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a present purpose of revenge.

§ 13. ENVY is an uneasiness of mind, caused by the consideration of a good we desire, obtained by one we think should not have had it before us.

§ 14. These two last, ENVY and ANGER, not being caused by pain and pleasure simply in themselves, but having in them some mixed considerations of ourselves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them: but all the rest, terminated purely in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we *love, desire, rejoice,* and *hope,* only in respect of pleasure; we *bate, fear,* and *grieve,* only in respect of pain ultimately: in fine, all these passions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject, (at least, if a sensible or voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us, because the fear it leaves, is a constant pain: but we do not so constantly love what has done us good; because pleasure operates not so strongly on us as pain, and because we are not so ready to have hope, it will do so again. But this by-the-by.

§ 15. By *pleasure* and *pain,* delight and uneasiness, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean, not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatsoever *delight* or *uneasiness* is felt by us, whether arising from any grateful or unacceptable sensation or reflection.

§ 16. It is farther to be considered, that in reference to the passions, the removal or lessening of a pain is considered, and operates as a pleasure: and the loss or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.

§ 17. The passions too have most of them in most persons operations on the body, and cause

various changes in it; which not being always sensible, do not make a necessary part of the idea of each passion. For SHAME, which is an uneasiness of the mind, upon the thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the valued esteem which others have for us, has not always blushing accompanying it.

§ 18. I would not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a discourse of the *passions*; they are many more than those I have here named: and those I have taken notice of, would each of them require a much larger and more accurate discourse. I have only mentioned these here as so many instances of modes of pleasure and pain resulting in our minds, from various considerations of good and evil. I might perhaps have instanced in other modes of pleasure and pain more simple than these, as the pain of *hunger* and *thirst*, and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them; the pain of tender eyes, and the pleasure of music; pain from captious uninstrucive wrangling, and the pleasure of rational conversation with a friend, or of well-directed study in the search and discovery of truth. But the passions being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to instance in them, and shew how the ideas we have of them are derived from sensation and reflection.

## C H A P. XXI.

## O f P O W E R .

- § 1. *This idea, how got.* § 2. *Power, active and passive.* § 3. *Power includes relation.* § 4. *The clearest idea of active power had from spirit.* § 5. *Will and understanding, two powers.* § 6. *Faculties.* § 7. *Whence the ideas of liberty and necessity.* § 8. *Liberty, what.* § 9. *Supposes the understanding and will.* § 10. *Belongs not to volition.* § 11. *Voluntary opposed to involuntary, not to necessary.* § 12. *Liberty, what.* § 13. *Necessity, what.* § 14. *Liberty belongs not to the will.* § 15. *Volition.* § 16—19. *Powers belong to agents.* § 20. *Liberty belongs not to the will.* § 21. *But to the agent or man.* § 22—24. *In respect of willing, a man is not free.* § 25, 26. *The will determined by something without it.* § 27. *Freedom.* § 28. *Volition, what.* § 29. *What determines the will.* § 30. *Will and desire must not be confounded.* § 31. *Uneasiness determines the will.* § 32. *Desire is uneasiness.* § 33. *The uneasiness of desire determines the will.* § 34. *This is the spring of action.* § 35. *The greatest positive good determines not the will, but uneasiness.* § 36. *Because the removal of uneasiness is the first step to happiness.* § 37. *Because uneasiness alone is present.* § 38. *Because all who allow the joys of heaven possible, pursue them not.—But any great uneasiness is never neglected.* § 39. *Desire accompanies all uneasiness.* § 40. *The most pressing uneasiness naturally de-*

*termines the will. § 41. All desire happiness.*  
 § 42. *Happiness, what. § 43. What good is*  
*desired, what not. § 44. Why the greatest good*  
*is not always desired. § 45. Why not being*  
*desired, it moves not the will. § 46. Due confi-*  
*deration raises desire. § 47. The power to su-*  
*spend the prosecution of any desire, makes way*  
*for consideration. § 48. To be determined by*  
*our own judgment, is no restraint to liberty.*  
 § 49. *The freest agents are so determined. § 50.*  
*A constant determination to a pursuit of happiness,*  
*no abridgement of liberty. § 51. The necessity of*  
*pursuing true happiness, the foundation of liberty.*  
 § 52. *The reason of it. § 53. Government of*  
*our passions, the right improvement of liberty.*  
 § 54, 55. *How men come to pursue different cour-*  
*ses. § 56. How men come to chuse ill. § 57.*  
*First, from bodily pain. Secondly, from wrong*  
*desires arising from wrong judgment. § 58, 59.*  
*Our judgment of present good or evil, always right.*  
 § 60. *From a wrong judgment of what makes a*  
*necessary part of their happiness. § 61, 62. A more*  
*particular account of wrong judgments. § 63.*  
*In comparing present and future. § 64, 65.*  
*Causes of this. § 66. In considering consequences*  
*of actions. § 67. Causes of this. § 68. Wrong*  
*judgment of what is necessary to our happiness.*  
 69. *We can change the agreeableness or disagree-*  
*ableness in things. § 70. Preference of vice to*  
*virtue, a manifest wrong judgment. § 71—73.*  
*Recapitulation.*

§ 1. **T**HE mind being every day informed, by  
 the senses, of the alteration of those  
 simple ideas it observes in things without, and  
 taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases



to be, and another begins to exist, which was not before; reflecting also on what passes within itself, and observing a constant change of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things, by like agents, and by the like ways; considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that idea which we call POWER. Thus we say, fire has a *power* to melt gold, *i. e.* to destroy the consistency of its insensible parts, and consequently its hardness, and make it fluid; and gold has a power to be melted: that the sun has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to be blanched by the sun, whereby the yellowness is destroyed, and whiteness made to exist in its room. In which, and the like cases, the power we consider, is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas: for we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon any thing, but by the observable change of its sensible ideas; nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a change of some of its ideas.

§ 2. Power, thus considered, is two-fold, *viz.* as able to make, or able to receive, any change: the one may be called *active*, and the other *passive power*. Whether matter be not wholly destitute of active power, as its author GOD is truly above all passive power; and whether the intermediate state of created spirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and passive power, may be worth consideration. I shall not now enter into

that inquiry; my present business being not to search into the original of power, but how we come by the idea of it. But since active powers make so great a part of our complex ideas of natural substances, (as we shall see hereafter) and I mention them as such according to common apprehension; yet they being not perhaps so truly active powers, as our hasty thoughts are apt to represent them, I judge it not amiss, by this intimation, to direct our minds to the consideration of God and spirits, for the clearest idea of active powers.

§ 3. I confess, power includes in it some kind of relation, (a relation to action or change) as indeed which of our ideas, of what kind soever, when attentively considered, does not? For our ideas of extension, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the parts? Figure and motion have something relative in them much more visibly: and sensible qualities, as colours and smells, &c. what are they but the powers of different bodies, in relation to our perception? &c. And if considered in the things themselves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts? All which include some kind of relation in them. Our idea therefore of power, I think, may well have a place amongst other simple ideas, and be considered as one of them, being one of those that make a principal ingredient in our complex ideas of substances, as we shall hereafter have occasion to observe.

§ 4. We are abundantly furnished with the idea of *passive power* by almost all sorts of sensible things. In most of them we cannot avoid observing their sensible qualities, nay, their very

substances, to be in a continual flux: and therefore with reason we look on them as liable still to the same change. Nor have we of *active power* (which is the more proper signification of the word *power*) fewer instances: since whatever change is observed, the mind must collect a power somewhere able to make that change, as well as a possibility in the thing itself to receive it. But yet, if we will consider it attentively, bodies, by our senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds. For all power relating to action, and there being but two sorts of action, whereof we have any idea, *viz.* thinking and motion, let us consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers, which produce these actions.

1. Of thinking, body affords us no idea at all, it is only from reflection that we have that.
2. Neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion. A body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move; and when it is set in motion itself, that motion is rather a passion, than an action in it. For when the ball obeys the stroke of a billiard-stick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare passion: also when by impulse it sets another ball in motion, that lay in its way, it only communicates the motion it had received from another, and loses in itself so much as the other received; which gives us but a very obscure idea of an active power of moving in body, whilst we observe it only to transfer, but not produce any motion. For it is but a very obscure idea of power, which reaches not the production of the action, but the continuation of the passion. For so is motion in a body impelled by another: the continuation of the alteration made in it from rest.

to motion being little more an action, than the continuation of the alteration of its figure, by the same blow, is an action. The idea of the beginning of motion, we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find, by experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at rest. So that it seems to me, we have from the observation of the operation of bodies by our senses, but a very imperfect obscure idea of active power, since they afford us not any idea in themselves of the power to begin any action, either motion or thought. But if, from the impulse bodies are observed to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear idea of power, it serves as well to my purpose, sensation being one of those ways, whereby the mind comes by its ideas: only I thought it worth while to consider here by the way, whether the mind doth not receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations, than it doth from any external sensation.

§ 5. This, at least, I think evident, that we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action. This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and *vice versa*, in any particular instance, is that which we call the *will*. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call *volition* or *will*.

*ing*. The forbearance of that action, consequent to such order or command of the mind, is called *voluntary*. And whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the mind, is called *involuntary*. The power of perception is that which we call the *understanding*. Perception, which we make the act of the understanding, is of three sorts: 1. The perception of ideas in our minds. 2. The perception of the signification of signs. 3. The perception of the connection or repugnancy, agreement or disagreement, that there is between any of our ideas. All these are attributed to the *understanding*, or perceptive power, though it be the two latter only that use allows us to say we understand.

§ 6. These powers of the mind, *viz.* of *perceiving* and of *preferring*, are usually called by another name: and the ordinary way of speaking is, that the understanding and will are two faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be used as all words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in mens thoughts, by being supposed, (as I suspect it has been), to stand for some real beings in the soul, that performed those actions of understanding and volition. For when we say, the will is the commanding and superior faculty of the soul; that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior faculties; that it follows the dictates of the understanding, &c. though these, and the like expressions, by those that carefully attend to their own ideas, and conduct their thoughts more by the evidence of things than the sound of words, may be understood in a clear and distinct sense: yet I suspect, I say, that this way of speaking of faculties, has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us,

which had their several provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in questions relating to them.

§ 7. Every one, I think, finds in himself a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several actions in himself. From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himself, arise the ideas of *liberty* and *necessity*.

§ 8. All the actions that we have any idea of, reducing themselves, as has been said, to these two, *viz.* thinking and motion; so far as a man has power to think or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free. Where-ever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power; where-ever doing or not doing, will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it; there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary. So that the idea of *liberty* is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his *volition*, there he is not at *liberty*, that agent is under *necessity*. So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty. A little consideration of an obvious instance or two, may make this clear.

§ 9. A tennis-ball, whether in motion by the

stroke of a racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a free agent. If we inquire into the reason, we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and consequently not to have any volition, or preference of motion to rest, or *vice versa*; and therefore has not liberty, is not a free agent; but all its both motion and rest come under our idea of *necessary*, and are so called. Likewise a man falling into the water, (a bridge breaking under him), has not herein liberty, is not a free agent. For though he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the stop or cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition; and therefore therein he is not free. So a man striking himself, or his friend, by a convulsive motion of his arm, which it is not in his power, by volition or the direction of his mind, to stop, or forbear; no-body thinks he has in this liberty; every one pities him, as acting by necessity and constraint.

§ 10. Again, suppose a man be carried, whilst fast asleep, into a room, where is a person he longs to see and speak with; and be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himself in so desirable company, which he stays willingly in, *i. e.* prefers his stay to going away. I ask, is not this stay voluntary? I think no-body will doubt it; and yet being locked fast in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition, or preferring, but to the person having the power of doing or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall chuse or direct. Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power, and no farther. For where-

ever restraint comes to check that power, or compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability on either side to act, or to forbear acting; there liberty, and our notion of it, presently ceases.

§ 11. We have instances enough, and often more than enough, in our own bodies. A man's heart beats, and the blood circulates, which it is not in his power by any thought or volition to stop; and therefore, in respect of these motions, where rest depends not on his choice, nor would follow the determination of his mind, if it should prefer it; he is not a free agent. Convulsive motions agitate his legs, so that though he wills it ever so much, he cannot, by any power of his mind, stop their motion, (as in that odd disease called *Chorea sancti viti*), but he is perpetually dancing: he is not at liberty in this action, but under as much necessity of moving, as a stone that falls, or a tennis-ball struck with a racket. On the other side, a palsy or the stocks hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his mind, if it would thereby transfer his body to another place. In all these there is want of freedom; though the sitting still even of a paralytic, whilst he prefers it to a removal, is truly voluntary. *Voluntary*, then, is not opposed to *necessary*, but to *involuntary*. For a man may prefer what he can do, to what he cannot do; the state he is in, to its absence or change, though necessity has made it in itself unalterable.

§ 12. As it is in the motions of the body, so it is in the thoughts of our minds: where any one is such, that we have power to take it up or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind, there we are at liberty. A waking man being under the necessity of having some ideas constantly in



his mind, is not at liberty to think, or not to think; no more than he is at liberty, whether his body shall touch any other or no: but whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another, is many times in his choice; and then he is, in respect of his ideas, as much at liberty, as he is in respect of bodies he rests on: he can at pleasure remove himself from one to another. But yet some ideas to the mind, like some motions to the body, are such as in certain circumstances, it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use. A man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain, and divert himself with other contemplations: and sometimes a boisterous passion hurries our thoughts, as a hurricane does our bodies, without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather chuse. But as soon as the mind regains the power to stop or continue, begin or forbear any of these motions of the body without, or thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then consider the man as a free agent again.

§ 13. Where-ever thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear according to the direction of thought; there necessity takes place. This, in an agent capable of volition, when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to that preference of his mind, is called *compulsion*; when the hindering or stopping any action is contrary to his volition, it is called *restraint*. Agents that have no thought, no volition at all, are in every thing necessary agents.

§ 14. If this be so, as I imagine it is, I leave it to be considered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and, I

think, unreasonable, because unintelligible question, viz. *Whether man's will be free or no?* For, if I mistake not, it follows from what I have said, that the question itself is altogether improper; and it is as insignificant to ask, whether man's will be free, as to ask, whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square: liberty being as little applicable to the will, as swiftness of motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue. Every one would laugh at the absurdity of such a question as either of these; because it is obvious, that the modifications of motion belong not to sleep, nor the difference of figure to virtue: and when any one well considers it, I think he will as plainly perceive that liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will, which is also but a power.

§ 15. Such is the difficulty of explaining and giving clear notions of internal actions by sounds, that I must here warn my reader, that *ordering, directing, choosing, preferring, &c.* which I have made use of, will not distinctly enough express *volition*, unless he will reflect on what he himself does when he wills. For example, *preferring*, which seems perhaps best to express the act of *volition*, does it not precisely. For though a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it? Volition, it is plain, is an act of the mind, knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from any particular action. And what is the will, but the faculty to do this? And is that faculty any thing more in effect than a power, the power of the mind to determine its thought to the producing, continuing,

or stopping any action, as far as it depends on us? For can it be denied, that whatever agent has a power to think on its own actions, and to prefer their doing or omission either to other, has that faculty called *will*? *Will* then, is nothing but such a power. *Liberty*, on the other side, is the power a man has to do or forbear doing any particular action, according as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference in the mind, which is the same thing as to say, according as he himself wills it.

§ 16. It is plain then, that the will is nothing but one power or ability, and freedom another power or ability: so that to ask, whether the will has freedom, is to ask, whether one power has another power, one ability another ability; a question at first sight too grossly absurd to make a dispute, or need an answer. For who is it that sees not that *powers* belong only to *agents*, and are attributes only of *substances*, and not of *powers* themselves? So that this way of putting the question, *viz.* whether the will be free? is in effect to ask, whether the will be a substance, an agent? or at least to suppose it, since freedom can properly be attributed to nothing else. If freedom can, with any propriety of speech, be applied to power, it may be attributed to the power that is in a man to produce, or forbear producing, motion in parts of his body, by choice or preference; which is that which denominates him free, and is freedom itself. But if any one should ask, whether freedom were free, he would be suspected not to understand well what he said; and he would be thought to deserve Midas's ears, who knowing that rich was a denomination from the possession of riches, should demand whether riches themselves were rich.

§ 17. However the name *faculty*, which men have given to this power called the *will*, and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will as acting, may, by an appropriation that disguises its true sense, serve a little to palliate the absurdity; yet the will, in truth, signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or chuse: and when the *will*, under the name of a *faculty*, is considered as it is, barely as an ability to do something, the absurdity, in saying it is free or not free, will easily discover itself. For if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of *faculties* as distinct beings that can act, (as we do, when we say the will orders, and the will is free) it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty and a walking faculty, and a dancing faculty, by which those actions are produced, which are but several modes of motion; as well as we make the will and understanding to be faculties, by which the actions of chusing and perceiving are produced, which are but several modes of thinking: and we may as properly say, that it is the singing faculty sings, and the dancing faculty dances; as that the will chuses, or that the understanding conceives; or, as is usual, that the will directs the understanding, or the understanding obeys, or obeys not the will: it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say, that the power of speaking directs the power of singing, or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the power of speaking.

§ 18. This way of talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and, as I guess, produced great confusion. For these being all different powers in the mind, or in the man, to do several actions, he exerts them as he thinks fit: but the power to do one action, is not operated on by the power of

doing another action. For the power of thinking operates not on the power of chusing, nor the power of chusing on the power of thinking; no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of singing, or the power of singing on the power of dancing, as any one, who reflects on it, will easily perceive: and yet this is it, which we say, when we thus speak, that the will operates on the understanding, or the understanding on the will.

§ 19. I grant, that this or that actual thought may be the occasion of volition, or exercising the power a man has to chuse; or the actual choice of the mind, the cause of actual thinking on this or that thing: as the actual singing of such a tune, may be the cause of dancing such a dance, and the actual dancing of such a dance, the occasion of singing such a tune. But in all these, it is not one power that operates on another: but it is the mind that operates, and exerts these powers; it is the man that does the action, it is the agent that has power, or is able to do. For powers are relations, not agents: and that which has the power, or not the power to operate, is that alone which is, or is not free, and not the power itself: for freedom, or not freedom, can belong to nothing, but what has, or has not a power to act.

§ 20. The attributing to faculties that which belonged not to them, has given occasion to this way of talking: but the introducing into discourses concerning the mind, with the name of *faculties*, a notion of their operating, has, I suppose, as little advanced our knowledge in that part of ourselves, as the great use and mention of the like invention of faculties, in the operations of the body, has helped us in the knowledge of physic. Not that I deny there are faculties, both in the body

and mind : they both of them have their powers of operating, else neither the one nor the other could operate. For nothing can operate, that is not able to operate ; and that is not able to operate, that has no power to operate. Nor do I deny, that those words, and the like, are to have their place in the common use of languages, that have made them current. It looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by : and philosophy itself, though it likes not a gaudy dress, yet when it appears in public, must have so much complacency, as to be clothed in the ordinary fashion and language of the country, so far as it can consist with truth and perspicuity. But the fault has been, that faculties have been spoken of, and represented as so many distinct agents. For it being asked, what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs ? it was a ready, and very satisfactory answer, to say, that it was the *digestive faculty*. What was it that made any thing come out of the body ? The *expulsive faculty*. What moved ? The *motive faculty*. And so in the mind, the *intellectual faculty*, or the understanding, understood ; and the *elective faculty*, or the will, willed or commanded. This is in short to say, that the ability to digest, digested ; and the ability to move, moved ; and the ability to understand, understood. For *faculty*, *ability*, and *power*, I think, are but different names of the same things : which ways of speaking, when put into more intelligible words, will, I think, amount to thus much ; that digestion is performed by something that is able to digest ; motion, by something able to move ; and understanding, by something able to understand. And in truth it would be very strange, if it should be otherwise ;

as strange as it would be for a man to be free without being able to be free.

§ 21. To return then to the inquiry about liberty, I think the question is not proper, whether the *will* be free, but whether a *man* be free. Thus, I think,

1<sup>st</sup>, That so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the existence of any action, to the non-existence of that action, and *vice versa*, make it to exist, or not exist, so far he is free. For if I can, by a thought, directing the motion of my finger, make it move when it was at rest, or *vice versa*, it is evident, that in respect of that I am free; and if I can, by a like thought of my mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words or silence, I am at liberty to speak, or hold my peace; and as far as this power reaches, of acting, or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, so far is a man free. For, how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will? And so far as any one can, by preferring any action to its not being, or rest to any action, produce that action or rest, so far can he do what he will. For such a preferring of action to its absence, is the willing of it; and we can scarce tell how to imagine any being freer, than to be able to do what he will. So that in respect of actions, within the reach of such a power in him, a man seems as free, as it is possible for freedom to make him.

§ 22. But the inquisitive mind of man, willing to shift off from himself, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be by putting himself into a worse state than that of fatal necessity, is not content with this: freedom, unless it reaches

farther than this, will not serve the turn: and it passes for a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will, as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a man's liberty, there yet therefore is raised this farther question, *Whether a man be free to will?* which, I think, is what is meant, when it is disputed, whether the will be free. And as to that, I imagine,

§ 23. *2dly*, That *willing*, or *volition*, being an action, and freedom consisting in a power of acting, or not acting, a man in respect of willing, or the act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free. The reason whereof is very manifest: for it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will, should exist, or not exist; and its existence, or not existence, following perfectly the determination and preference of his will, he cannot avoid willing the existence, or not existence of that action; it is absolutely necessary that he will the one, or the other, *i. e. prefer* the one to the other, since one of them must necessarily follow: and that which does follow, follows by the choice and determination of his mind, that is, by his willing it: for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in respect of the act of willing, a man in such a case is not free: liberty consisting in a power to act, or not to act; which, in regard of volition, a man, upon such a proposal, has not. For it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man's power, which is once so proposed to his thoughts; a man must necessarily will the one or the other of them, upon which preference, or volition, the action, or its forbearance, certainly follows, and is truly voluntary: but the act



of volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man in respect of that act of willing is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless necessity and freedom can consist together, and a man can be free and bound at once.

§ 24. This then is evident, that in all proposals of present action, a man is not at liberty to will, or not to will, because he can forbear willing: liberty consisting in a power to act, or to forbear acting, and in that only. For a man that sits still, is said yet to be at liberty, because he can walk if he wills it. But if a man sitting still has not a power to remove himself, he is not at liberty; so likewise, a man falling down a precipice, though in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion if he would. This being so, it is plain, that a man that is walking, to whom it is proposed to give off walking, is not at liberty, whether he will determine himself to walk, or give off walking or no: he must necessarily prefer one or the other of them, walking or not walking; and so it is in regard of all other actions in our power so proposed, which are the far greater number. For considering the vast number of voluntary actions that succeed one another every moment that we are awake in the course of our lives, there are but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the will, till the time they are to be done: and in all such actions, as I have shewn, the mind in respect of willing has not a power to act, or not to act, wherein consists liberty: the mind in that case has not a power to forbear willing; it cannot avoid some determination concerning them, let the consideration be as short, the thought as quick as it will; it

either leaves the man in the state he was before thinking, or changes it; continues the action, or puts an end to it. Whereby it is manifest, that it orders and directs one in preference to or with neglect of the other, and thereby either the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary.

§ 25. Since then it is plain, that in most cases a man is not at liberty, whether he will *will*, or no; the next thing demanded, is, whether a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, *motion* or *rest*? This question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in itself, that one might thereby sufficiently be convinced that liberty concerns not the will. For to ask, whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or rest, speaking or silence, which he pleases, is to ask, whether a man can will, what he wills; or be pleased with what he is pleased with. A question, which, I think, needs no answer; and they, who can make a question of it, must suppose one will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that; and so on *in infinitum*.

§ 26. To avoid these, and the like absurdities, nothing can be of greater use, than to establish in our minds determined ideas of the things under consideration. If the ideas of *liberty* and *volition* were well fixed in our understandings, and carried along with us in our minds, as they ought, through all the questions that are raised about them, I suppose a great part of the difficulties that perplex mens thoughts, and entangle their understandings, would be much easier resolved; and we should perceive where the confused signification of terms, or where the nature of the thing caused the obscurity.

§ 27. *First* then, it is carefully to be remembered, that freedom consists in the dependence of the existence, or not existence of any action, upon our volition of it, and not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our preference. A man standing on a cliff, is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the sea, not because he has a power to do the contrary action, which is to leap twenty yards upwards, for that he cannot do: but he is therefore free, because he has a power to leap, or not to leap. But if a greater force than his either holds him fast, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that case; because the doing or forbearance of that particular action, is no longer in his power. He that is a close prisoner in a room twenty foot square, being at the north-side of his chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty foot southward, because he can walk, or not walk it; but is not, at the same time, at liberty to do the contrary, *i. e.* to walk twenty foot northward.

In this then consists freedom, *viz.* in our being able to act, or not to act, according as we shall chuse or will.

§ 28. *Secondly*, We must remember, that *volition*, or *willing*, is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word *action*, to comprehend the forbearance too of any action proposed; *sitting still*, or *holding one's peace*, when *walking* or *speaking* are proposed, though mere forbearances, requiring as much the determination of the will, and being often as weighty in their consequences, as the contrary actions, may, on that consideration, well

enough pass for actions too: but this, I say, that I may not be mistaken, if, for brevity sake, I speak thus.

§ 29. *Thirdly*, The will begins nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest, as far as they depend on such direction: To the question, what is it determines the will? The true and proper answer is, the mind. For that which determines the general power of directing to this or that particular direction, is nothing but the agent itself exercising the power it has, that particular way. If this answer satisfies not, it is plain the meaning of the question, *what determines the will?* is this, what moves the mind in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing to this or that particular motion or rest? And to this I answer, the motive for continuing in the same state or action, is only the present satisfaction in it; the motive to change, is always some uneasiness: nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action, which, for shortness sake, we will call *determining the will*; which I shall more at large explain.

§ 30. But in the way to it, it will be necessary to premise, that though I have above endeavoured to express the act of *volition* by *choosing*, *preferring*, and the like terms, that signify *desire* as well as *volition*, for want of other words to mark that act of the mind, whose proper name is *willing* or *volition*; yet it being a very simple act, whosoever desires to understand what it is, will better find it, by reflecting on his own mind, and observing what it does when it wills, than by any

variety of articulate sounds whatsoever. This caution of being careful not to be misled by expressions that do not enough keep up the difference between the will, and several acts of the mind that are quite distinct from it, I think the more necessary; because I find the will often confounded with several of the affections, especially *desire*; and one put for the other, and that by men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very distinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that shall turn his thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind when he wills, shall see that the will, or power of *volition*, is conversant about nothing but that particular determination of the mind, whereby, barely by a thought, the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop to any action, which it takes to be in its power. This well considered, plainly shews, that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire, which, in the very same action, may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon. A man, whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case, it is plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary way. A man, who, by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs, finds a doziness in his head, or a want of appetite in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands, (for wherever there is pain, there is a desire to be rid of it),

though yet, whilst he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action that may serve to remove this pain. Whence it is evident, that *desiring* and *willing* are two distinct acts of the mind; and consequently that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more distinct from desire.

§ 31. To return then to the inquiry, *What is it that determines the will in regard to our actions?* And that, upon second thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view; but some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a man is at present under. This is that which successively determines the will, and sets us upon those actions we perform. This uneasiness we may call, as it is, *desire*, which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good. All pain of the body, of what sort soever, and disquiet of the mind, is uneasiness: and with this is always joined desire, equal to the pain or uneasiness felt; and is scarce distinguishable from it. For desire being nothing but an uneasiness in the want of an absent good, in reference to any pain felt, ease is that absent good; and till that ease be attained, we may call it *desire*, no-body feeling pain, that he wishes not to be eased of, with a desire equal to that pain, and inseparable from it. Besides this desire of ease from pain, there is another of absent positive good, and here also the desire and uneasiness is equal. As much as we desire any absent good, so much are we in pain for it. But here all absent good does not, according to the greatness it has or is acknowledged to have, cause pain equal to that greatness; as all pain causes desire equal to itself;

because the absence of good is not always a pain, as the presence of pain is. And therefore absent good may be looked on, and considered without desire. But so much as there is any-where of desire, so much there is of uneasiness.

§ 32. That desire is a state of uneasiness every one, who reflects on himself, will quickly find. Who is there, that has not felt in desire, what the wise man says of hope, (which is not much different from it) that it being *deferred makes the heart sick*; and that still proportionable to the greatness of the desire, which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, *Give me children, give me the thing desired, or I die?* Life itself, and all its enjoyments, is a burden, cannot be born under the lasting and unremoved pressure of such an uneasiness.

§ 33. Good and evil, present and absent, it is true, work upon the mind: but that which immediately determines the will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the uneasiness of desire, fixed on some absent good, either negative, as indolence to one in pain; or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure. That it is this uneasiness that determines the will to the successive voluntary actions, whereof the greatest part of our lives is made up, and by which we are conducted through different courses to different ends, I shall endeavour to shew, both from experience and the reason of the thing.

§ 34. When a man is perfectly content with the state he is in, which is, when he is perfectly without any uneasiness, what industry, what action, what will is there left, but to continue in it? Of this every man's observation will satisfy him. And thus we see our all-wise Maker, suitable to

our constitution and frame, and knowing what it is that determines the will, has put into man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, and other natural desires, that return at their seasons, to move and determine their wills, for the preservation of themselves, and the continuation of their species. For I think we may conclude, that if the bare contemplation of these good ends, to which we are carried by these several uneasinesses, had been sufficient to determine the will, and set us on work, we should have had none of these natural pains, and perhaps, in this world, little or no pain at all. *It is better to marry than to burn*, says St Paul; where we may see what it is that chiefly drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life. A little burning felt, pushes us more powerfully than greater pleasures in prospect draw or allure.

§ 35. It seems so established and settled a maxim by the general consent of all mankind, that good, the greater good, determines the will, that I do not at all wonder, that when I first published my thoughts on this subject, I took it for granted; and I imagine, that by a great many I shall be thought more excusable for having then done so, than that now I have ventured to recede from so received an opinion. But yet, upon a stricter inquiry, I am forced to conclude, that *good*, the *greater good*, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until our desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it. Convince a man never so much, that plenty has its advantages over poverty; make him see and own, that the handsome conveniencies of life are better than nasty penury; yet as long as he is content with the latter, and finds no uneasiness in it, he moves not; his will



never is determined to any action that shall bring him out of it. Let a man be never so well persuaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as necessary to a man, who has any great aims in this world, or hopes in the next, as food to life: yet till he *hunger and thirsts after righteousness*, till he feels an uneasiness in the want of it, his will will not be determined to any action in pursuit of this confessed greater good; but any other uneasinesses he feels in himself, shall take place, and carry his will to other actions. On the other side, let a drunkard see, that his health decays, his estate wastes; discredit and diseases, and the want of all things, even of his beloved drink, attends him in the course he follows: yet the returns of uneasiness to miss his companions, the habitual thirst after his cups, at the usual time, drives him to the tavern, though he has in his view the loss of health and plenty, and perhaps of the joys of another life: the least of which is no inconsiderable good, but such as he confesses is far greater than the tickling of his palate with a glass of wine, or the idle chat of a soaking club. It is not for want of viewing the greater good; for he sees and acknowledges it, and in the intervals of his drinking hours, will take resolutions to pursue the greater good; but when the uneasiness to miss his accustomed delight returns, the greater acknowledged good loses its hold, and the present uneasiness determines the will to the accustomed action; which thereby gets stronger footing to prevail against the next occasion, though he at the same time makes secret promises to himself that he will do so no more; this is the last time he will act against the attainment of those greater goods. And thus he is, from time to time, in the state

of that unhappy complainer, *Videō meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*: which sentence, allowed for true, and made good by constant experience may this, and possibly no other way, be easily made intelligible.

§ 36. If we inquire into the reason of what experience makes so evident in fact, and examine why it is uneasiness alone operates on the will, and determines it in its choice, we shall find, that we being capable but of one determination of the will, to one action at once, the present uneasiness that we are under does naturally determine the will, in order to that happiness which we all aim at in all our actions: forasmuch as, whilst we are under any uneasiness, we cannot apprehend ourselves happy, or in the way to it. Pain and uneasiness being, by every one, concluded, and felt to be inconsistent with happiness; spoiling the relish, even of those good things which we have: a little pain serving to marr all the pleasure we rejoiced in. And therefore that which of course determines the choice of our will to the next action, will always be the removing of pain, as long as we have any left, as the first and necessary step towards happiness.

§ 37. Another reason why it is uneasiness alone determines the will, may be this; because that alone is present, and it is against the nature of things, that what is absent should operate where it is not. It may be said, that absent good may, by contemplation, be brought home to the mind, and made present. The idea of it indeed may be in the mind, and viewed as present there: but nothing will be in the mind as a present good, able to counterbalance the removal of any uneasiness which we are under, till it raises our desire, and the uneasi-

ness of that has the prevalency in determining the will. Till then, the idea in the mind of whatever good, is there only like other ideas, the object of bare unactive speculation; but operates not on the will, nor sets us on work: the reason whereof I shall shew by and by. How many are to be found, that have had lively representations set before their minds of the unspeakable joys of heaven, which they acknowledge both possible and probable too, who yet would be content to take up with their happiness here? and so the prevailing uneasinesses of their desires, let loose after the enjoyments of this life, take their turns in the determining their wills; and all that while they take not one step, are not one jot moved, towards the good things of another life, considered as ever so great.

§ 38. Were the will determined by the views of good, as it appears in contemplation greater or less to the understanding, which is the state of all absent good, and that which, in the received opinion, the will is supposed to move to, and to be moved by, I do not see how it could ever get loose from the infinite eternal joys of heaven, once proposed and considered as possible. For all absent good, by which alone, barely proposed and coming in view, the will is thought to be determined, and so to set us on action, being only possible, but not infallibly certain, it is unavoidable, that the infinitely greater possible good should regularly and constantly determine the will in all the successive actions it directs; and then we should keep constantly and steadily in our course towards heaven, without ever standing still, or directing our actions to any other end: the eternal condition of a future state infinitely out-weighing the expectation.

of riches or honour, or any other worldly pleasure, which we can propose to ourselves, though we should grant these the more probable to be attained: for nothing future is yet in possession, and so the expectation even of these may deceive us. If it were so, that the greater good in view determines the will, so great a good once proposed could not but seize the will, and hold it fast to the pursuit of this infinitely greatest good, without ever letting it go again: for the will having a power over, and directing the thoughts as well as other actions, would, if it were so, hold the contemplation of the mind fixed to that good.

This would be the state of the mind, and regular tendency of the will in all its determinations, were it determined by that which is considered, and in view the greater good; but that it is not so, is visible in experience: the infinitely greatest confessed good being often neglected, to satisfy the successive uneasiness of our desires pursuing trifles. But though the greatest allowed, even everlasting unspeakable good, which has sometimes moved and affected the mind, does not steadfastly hold the will, yet we see any very great and prevailing uneasiness, having once laid hold on the will, lets it not go; by which we may be convinced, what it is that determines the will. Thus any vehement pain of the body; the ungovernable passion of a man violently in love; or the impatient desire of revenge, keeps the will steady and intent: and the will thus determined, never lets the understanding lay by the object, but all the thoughts of the mind, and powers of the body, are uninterruptedly employed that way by the determinations of the will, influenced by that topping uneasiness, as long as it lasts; whereby

it seems to me evident, that the will, or power of setting us upon one action in preference to all other, is determined in us by uneasiness: and whether this be not so, I desire every one to observe in himself.

§ 39. I have hitherto chiefly instanced in the uneasiness of desire, as that which determines the will; because that is the chief and most sensible; and the will seldom orders any action, nor is there any voluntary action performed, without some desire accompanying it; which, I think, is the reason why the will and desire are so often confounded. But yet we are not to look upon the uneasiness which makes up, or at least accompanies most of the other passions, as wholly excluded in the case. Aversion, fear, anger, envy, shame, &c. have each their uneasiness too, and thereby influence the will. These passions are scarce any of them, in life and practice, simple and alone, and wholly unmixed with others; though usually in discourse and contemplation, that carries the name which operates strongest, and appears most in the present state of the mind. Nay, there is, I think, scarce any of the passions to be found without desire joined with it. I am sure, wherever there is uneasiness, there is desire: for we constantly desire happiness; and whatever we feel of uneasiness, so much, it is certain, we want of happiness; even in our own opinion, let our state and condition otherwise be what it will. Besides, the present moment, not being our eternity, whatever our enjoyment be, we look beyond the present, and desire goes with our foresight, and that still carries the will with it. So that even in joy itself, that which keeps up the action, whereon the enjoyment depends, is the desire to continue it,

and fear to lose it: and whenever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the mind, the will presently is by that determined to some new action, and the present delight neglected.

§ 40. But we being in this world beset with fundry uneasinesses, distracted with different desires, the next inquiry naturally will be, which of them has the precedency in determining the will to the next action? And to that the answer is, that ordinarily which is the most pressing of those that are judged capable of being then removed. For the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to some action, for some end, cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable: that would be to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end, only to lose its labour: for so it is to act for what is judged not attainable; and therefore very great uneasinesses move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure: they, in that case, put us not upon endeavours. But these set apart, the most important and urgent uneasiness we at that time feel, is that which ordinarily determines the will successively, in that train of voluntary actions which make up our lives. The greatest present uneasiness is the spur to action, that is constantly felt; and for the most part determines the will in its choice of the next action. For this we must carry along with us, that the proper and only object of the will is some action of ours, and nothing else. For we producing nothing, by our willing it, but some action in our power, it is there the will terminates, and reaches no farther.

§ 41. If it be farther asked, what it is moves *desire*? I answer, *happiness*, and that alone.

*Happiness and misery* are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not; it is what *eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive.* But of some degrees of both, we have very lively impressions, made by several instances of delight and joy on the one side, and torment and sorrow on the other, which, for shortness sake, I shall comprehend under the names of pleasure and pain, there being pleasure and pain of the mind, as well as the body: *with him is fulness of joy, and pleasure for evermore:* or, to speak truly, they are all of the mind; though some have their rise in the mind from thought, others in the body from certain modifications of motion.

§ 42. Happiness then, in its full extent, is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, and misery the utmost pain: and the lowest degree of what can be called happiness, is so much ease from all pain, and so much present pleasure, as without which any one cannot be content. Now because pleasure and pain are produced in us by the operation of certain objects, either on our minds or our bodies, and in different degrees; therefore what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us, is that we call *good*, and what is apt to produce pain in us, we call *evil*; for no other reason, but for its aptness to produce pleasure and pain in us, wherein consists our happiness and misery. Farther, though what is apt to produce any degree of pleasure, be in itself good; and what is apt to produce any degree of pain, be evil; yet it often happens, that we do not call it so, when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort; because when they come in competition, the degrees also of pleasure and pain have justly a preference. So

that if we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil, we shall find it lies much in comparison: for the cause of every less degree of pain, as well as every greater degree of pleasure, has the nature of *good*, and *vice versa*.

§ 43. Though this be that which is called good and evil, and all good be the proper object of desire in general; yet all good, even seen and confessed to be so, does not necessarily move every particular man's desire; but only that part, or so much of it, as is considered, and taken to make a necessary part of his happiness. All other good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not a man's desires, who looks not on it to make a part of that happiness, wherewith he, in his present thoughts, can satisfy himself. Happiness, under this view, every one constantly pursues, and desires what makes any part of it: other things, acknowledged to be good, he can look upon without desire, pass by, and be content without. There is no-body, I think, so senseless, as to deny that there is pleasure in knowledge: and for the pleasures of sense, they have too many followers to let it be questioned, whether men are taken with them, or no. Now, let one man place his satisfaction in sensual pleasures, another in the delight of knowledge: though each of them cannot but confess, there is great pleasure in what the other pursues; yet neither of them making the other's delight a part of his happiness, their desires are not moved, but each is satisfied without what the other enjoys, and so his will is not determined to the pursuit of it. But yet as soon as the studious man's hunger and thirst makes him uneasy, he whose will was never determined to any pursuit of good cheer, poignant fauces, delicious wine, by the



pleasant taste he has found in them, is, by the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, presently determined to eating and drinking, though possibly with great indifferency what wholesome food comes in his way. And, on the other side, the epicure buckles to study, when shame, or the desire to recommend himself to his mistress, shall make him uneasy in the want of any sort of knowledge. Thus, how much soever men are in earnest, and constant in pursuit of happiness; yet they may have a clear view of good, great and confessed good, without being concerned for it, or moved by it, if they think they can make up their happiness without it. Though as to pain, that they are always concerned for; they can feel no uneasiness without being moved. And therefore being uneasy in the want of whatever is judged necessary to their happiness, as soon as any good appears to make a part of their portion of happiness, they begin to desire it.

§ 44. This, I think, any one may observe in himself and others, that the greater visible good does not always raise mens desires in proportion to the greatness it appears, and is acknowledged to have: though very little trouble moves us, and sets us on work to get rid of it. The reason whereof is evident from the nature of our happiness and misery itself. All present pain, whatever it be, makes a part of our present misery: but all absent good does not at any time make a necessary part of our present happiness, nor the absence of it make a part of our misery: if it did, we should be constantly and infinitely miserable; there being infinite degrees of happiness, which are not in our possession. All uneasiness therefore being removed, a moderate portion of good serves at present

to content men; and some few degrees of pleasure in a succession of ordinary enjoyments make up a happiness, wherein they can be satisfied. If this were not so, there could be no room for those indifferent and visibly trifling actions, to which our wills are so often determined, and wherein we voluntarily waste so much of our lives; which remissness could by no means consist with a constant determination of will or desire to the greatest apparent good. That this is so, I think, few people need go far from home to be convinced. And indeed in this life there are not many whose happiness reaches so far, as to afford them a constant train of moderate mean pleasures, without any mixture of uneasiness; and yet they could be content to stay here for ever: though they cannot deny, but that it is possible there may be a state of eternal durable joys after this life, far surpassing all the good that is to be found here; nay, they cannot but see, that it is more possible, than the attainment and continuation of that pittance of honour, riches, or pleasure, which they pursue, and for which they neglect that eternal state: but yet in full view of this difference, satisfied of the possibility of a perfect, secure, and lasting happiness in a future state, and under a clear conviction that it is not to be had here whilst they bound their happiness within some little enjoyment, or aim of this life, and exclude the joys of heaven from making any necessary part of it, their desires are not moved by this greater apparent good, nor their wills determined to any action, or endeavour for its attainment.

§ 45. The ordinary necessities of our lives fill a great part of them with the uneasiness of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, weariness with labour,

and sleepiness, in their constant returns, &c. To which, if besides accidental harms, we add the fantastical uneasiness (as itch after honour, power, or riches, &c.) which acquired habits by fashion, example, and education, have settled in us, and a thousand other irregular desires, which custom has made natural to us, we shall find that a very little part of our life is so vacant from these uneasinesses, as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter absent good. We are seldom at ease, and free enough from the sollicitation of our natural or adopted desires, but a constant succession of uneasinesses out of that stock, which natural wants, or acquired habits have heaped up, take the will in their turns; and no sooner is one action dispatched, which by such a determination of the will we are set upon, but another uneasiness is ready to set us on work. For the removing of the pains we feel, and are at present pressed with, being the getting out of misery, and consequently the first thing to be done in order to happiness, absent good, though thought on, confessed, and appearing to be good, not making any part of this unhappiness in its absence, is jostled out, to make way for the removal of those uneasinesses we feel, till due and repeated contemplation has brought it nearer to our mind, given some relish of it, and raised in us some desire; which then beginning to make a part of our present uneasiness, stands upon fair terms with the rest, to be satisfied; and so according to its greatness and pressure, comes in its turn to determine the will.

§ 46. And thus, by a due consideration, and examining any good proposed, it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby, in its turn and place,

it may come to work upon the will, and be pursued. For good, though appearing, and allowed never so great, yet till it has raised desires in our minds, and thereby made us uneasy in its want, it reaches not our wills; we are not within the sphere of its activity; our wills being under the determination only of those uneasinesses which are present to us, which, whilst we have any, are always soliciting, and ready at hand to give the will its next determination. The balancing, when there is any in the mind, being only which desire shall be next satisfied, which uneasiness first removed. Whereby it comes to pass, that as long as any uneasiness, any desire, remains in our mind, there is no room for good, barely as such, to come at the will, or at all to determine it. Because, as has been said, the first step in our endeavours after happiness, being to get wholly out of the confines of misery, and to feel no part of it, the will can be at leisure for nothing else, till every uneasiness we feel be perfectly removed: which, in the multitude of wants and desires we are beset with in this imperfect state, we are not like to be ever freed from in this world.

§ 47. There being in us a great many uneasinesses, always soliciting, and ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I have said, that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action; and so it does for the most part, but not always. For the mind having in most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another, is at liberty to consider the objects of them; examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has; and from the not

using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into, in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon before due examination. To prevent this, we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire, as every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that which is (as I think, improperly) called *free-will*. For during this suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due examination, we have judged, we have done our duty, all that we can, or ought to do, in pursuit of our happiness; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according to the last result of a fair examination.

§ 48. This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it; it is not an abridgement, it is the end and use of our liberty; and the farther we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifferency in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side. A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it rest quiet:

he is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that power, if he were deprived of that indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection, if he had the same indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would save his head or eyes from a blow he sees coming: it is as much a perfection, that desire, or the power of preferring, should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the will; and the certain-er such determination is, the greater is the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free. The very end of our freedom being, that we may attain the good we chuse. And therefore every man is put under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment, what is best for him to do: else he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have at the time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present thoughts before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other, unless he can have and not have it, will and not will it at the same time; a contradiction too manifest to be admitted.

§ 49. If we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge, that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we; and

yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are, to pronounce what infinite wisdom and goodness could do, I think we might say, that GOD himself cannot chuse what is not good; the freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.

§ 50. But to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty: let me ask, Would any one be a changeling, because he is less determined by wise considerations than a wise man? Is it worth the name of freedom to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man's self? If to break loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment, which keeps us from chusing or doing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, madmen and fools are the only free men: but yet, I think, no-body would chuse to be mad for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already. The constant desire of happiness, and the constraint it puts upon us to act for it, no-body, I think, accounts an abridgement of liberty, or at least an abridgement of liberty to be complained of. GOD Almighty himself is under the necessity of being happy; and the more any intelligent being is so, the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happiness. That in this state of ignorance we short-sighted creatures might not mistake true felicity, we are endowed with a power to suspend any particular desire, and keep it from determining the will, and engaging us in action. This is standing still, where we are not sufficiently assured of the way: examination is consulting a guide: the determination of the will, upon inquiry, is following the direction of that guide:

and he that has a power to act or not to act, according as such determination directs, is a free agent; such determination abridges not that power wherein liberty consists. He that has his chains knocked off, and the prison-doors set open to him, is perfectly at liberty, because he may either go or stay, as he best likes; though his preference be determined to stay, by the darkness of the night, or illness of the weather, or want of other lodging: he ceases not to be free, though the desire of some convenience to be had there, absolutely determines his preference, and makes him stay in his prison.

§ 51. As therefore the highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness; so the care of ourselves, that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness, is the necessary foundation of our liberty. The stronger ties we have to an unalterable pursuit of happiness in general, which is our greatest good, and which, as such, our desires always follow, the more are we free from any necessary determination of our will to any particular action, and from a necessary compliance with our desire, set upon any particular, and then appearing preferable good, till we have duly examined, whether it has a tendency to, or be inconsistent with our real happiness: and therefore till we are as much informed upon this inquiry, as the weight of the matter, and the nature of the case demands, we are, by the necessity of preferring and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good, obliged to suspend the satisfaction of our desire in particular cases.

§ 52. This is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings in their constant en-



deavours after, and a steady prosecution of true felicity, that they can suspend this prosecution in particular cases, till they have looked before them, and informed themselves, whether that particular thing, which is then proposed or desired, lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is their greatest good; for the inclination and tendency of their nature to happiness, is an obligation and motive to them to take care not to mistake or miss it; and so necessarily puts them upon caution, deliberation, and wariness, in the direction of their particular actions, which are the means to obtain it. Whether necessity determines to the pursuit of real bliss, the same necessity, with the same force, establishes suspense, deliberation, and scrutiny of each successive desire, whether the satisfaction of it does not interfere with our true happiness, and mislead us from it. This, as seems to me, is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings; and I desire it may be well considered, whether the great inlet, and exercise of all the liberty men have, are capable of, or can be useful to them, and that whereon depends the turn of their actions, does not lie in this, that they can suspend their desires, and stop them from determining their wills to any action, till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the thing requires. This we are able to do; and when we have done it, we have done our duty, and all that is in our power; and indeed all that needs. For, since the will supposes knowledge to guide its choice, all that we can do, is to hold our wills undetermined, till we have examined the good and evil of what we desire. What follows after that, follows in a chain of consequences link-

ed one to another, all depending on the last determination of the judgment, which, whether it shall be upon an hasty and precipitate view, or upon a due and mature examination, is in our power; experience shewing us, that in most cases we are able to suspend the present satisfaction of any desire.

§ 53. But if any extreme disturbance, as sometimes it happens, possesses our whole mind, as when the pain of the rack, an impetuous uneasiness, as of love, anger, or any other violent passion, running away with us, allows us not the liberty of thought, and we are not masters enough of our own minds to consider thoroughly, and examine fairly; GOD, who knows our frailty, pities our weakness, and requires of us no more than we are able to do, and sees what was, and what was not in our power, will judge as a kind and merciful Father. But the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires, the moderation and restraint of our passions, so that our understandings may be free to examine, and reason unbiassed give its judgment, being that whereon a right direction of our conduct to true happiness depends; it is in this we should employ our chief care and endeavours. In this we should take pains to suit the relish of our minds to the true intrinsic good or ill that is in things, and not permit an allowed or supposed possible great and weighty good to slip out of our thoughts without leaving any relish, any desire of itself there, till, by a due consideration of its true worth, we have formed appetites in our minds suitable to it, and made ourselves uneasy in the want of it, or in the fear of losing it. And how much this is in every one's power, by making resolutions to him-

self, such as he may keep, is easy for every one to try. Nor let any one say, he cannot govern his passions, nor hinder them from breaking out, and carrying him into action; for what he can do before a prince or a great man, he can do alone, or in the presence of GOD, if he will.

§ 54. From what has been said, it is easy to give account, how it comes to pass, that though all men desire happiness, yet their wills carry them so contrarily, and consequently some of them to what is evil. And to this I say, that the various and contrary choices that men make in the world, do not argue that they do not all pursue good; but that the same thing is not good to every man alike. This variety of pursuits shews, that every one does not place his happiness in the same thing, or chuse the same way to it. Were all the concerns of man terminated in this life, why one followed study and knowledge, and another hawking and hunting; why one chose luxury and debauchery, and another sobriety and riches, would not be, because every one of these did not aim at his own happiness; but because their happiness was placed in different things. And therefore it was a right answer of the physician to his patient that had sore eyes: If you have more pleasure in the taste of wine than in the use of your sight, wine is good for you; but if the pleasure of seeing be greater to you than that of drinking, wine is naught.

§ 55. The mind has a different relish, as well as the palate; and you will as fruitlessly endeavour to delight all men with riches or glory (which yet some men place their happiness in) as you would to satisfy all mens hunger with cheese or lobsters; which, though very agreeable and delicious fare,

to some, are to others extremely nauseous and offensive: and many people would with reason prefer the griping of an hungry belly to those dishes, which are a feast to others. Hence it was, I think, that the philosophers of old did in vain inquire, whether *summum bonum* consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation; and they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best relish were to be found in apples, plumbs, or nuts; and have divided themselves into sects upon it. For as pleasant tastes depend not on the things themselves, but their agreeableness to this or that particular palate, wherein there is great variety; so the greatest happiness consists in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasure; and in the absence of those which cause any disturbance, any pain. Now these, to different men, are very different things. If therefore men in this life only have hope; if in this life they can only enjoy, it is not strange, nor unreasonable, that they should seek their happiness, by avoiding all things that displease them here, and by pursuing all that delight them; wherein it will be no wonder to find variety and difference. For, if there be no prospect beyond the grave, the inference is certainly right, *Let us eat and drink, let us enjoy what we delight in, for to-morrow we shall die.* This, I think, may serve to shew us the reason, why, though all mens desires tend to happiness, yet they are not moved by the same object. Men may chuse different things, and yet all chuse right, supposing them only like a company of poor insects, whereof some are bees, delighted with flowers and their sweetness; others beetles, delighted with other kind of viands;

which having enjoyed for a season, they should cease to be, and exist no more for ever.

§ 56. These things, duly weighed, will give us, as I think, a clear view into the state of human liberty. Liberty, it is plain, consists in a power to do, or not to do; to do, or forbear doing, as we will. This cannot be denied. But this seeming to comprehend only the actions of a man consecutive to volition, it is farther inquired, whether he be at liberty to will or no? And to this it has been answered, that in most cases a man is not at liberty to forbear the act of volition; he must exert an act of his will, whereby the action proposed is made to exist, or not to exist. But yet there is a case wherein a man is at liberty in respect of willing, and that is the chusing of a remote good as an end to be pursued. Here a man may suspend the act of his choice from being determined for or against the thing proposed, till he has examined, whether it be really of a nature in itself and consequences to make him happy or no. For when he has once chosen it, and thereby it is become a part of his happiness, it raises desire, and that proportionably gives him uneasiness, which determines his will, and sets him at work in pursuit of his choice on all occasions that offer. And here we may see how it comes to pass, that a man may justly incur punishment, though it be certain, that in all the particular actions that he wills, he does, and necessarily does will that which he then judges to be good. For though his will be always determined by that which is judged good by his understanding, yet it excuses him not: because, by a too hasty choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil;

which, however false and fallacious, have the same influence on all his future conduct, as if they were true and right. He has vitiated his own palate, and must be answerable to himself for the sickness and death that follows from it. The eternal law and nature of things must not be altered to comply with his ill-ordered choice. If the neglect or abuse of the liberty he had to examine what would really and truly make for his happiness, misleads him, the miscarriages that follow on it, must be imputed to his own election. He had a power to suspend his determination: it was given him, that he might examine, and take care of his own happiness, and look that he were not deceived. And he could never judge, that it was better to be deceived than not, in a matter of so great and near concernment.

What has been said, may also discover to us the reason why men in this world prefer different things, and pursue happiness by contrary courses. But yet since men are always constant, and in earnest, in matters of happiness and misery, the question still remains, how men come often to prefer the worse to the better; and to chuse that which, by their own confession, has made them miserable?

§ 57. To account for the various and contrary ways men take, though all aim at being happy, we must consider whence the various uneasinesses, that determine the will in the preference of each voluntary action, have their rise.

1<sup>st</sup>, Some of them come from causes not in our power; such as are often the pains of the body from want, disease, or outward injuries, as the rack, &c. which, when present and violent, operate for the most part forcibly on the will, and

turn the courses of mens lives from virtue, piety, and religion, and what before they judged to lead to happiness; every one not endeavouring, or through disuse not being able, by the contemplation of remote and future good, to raise in himself desires of them strong enough to counterbalance the uneasiness he feels in those bodily torments; and to keep his will steady in the choice of those actions which lead to future happiness. A neighbour-country has been of late a tragical theatre, from which we might fetch instances, if there needed any, and the world did not, in all countries and ages, furnish examples enough to confirm that received observation, *Necessitas cogit ad turpia*; and therefore there is great reason for us to pray, *Lead us not into temptation.*

2dly, Other uneasinesses arise from our desires of absent good: which desires always bear proportion to, and depend on the judgment we make, and the relish we have of any absent good; in both which we are apt to be variously misled, and that by our own fault.

§ 58. In the first place, I shall consider the wrong judgments men make of future good and evil, whereby their desires are misled. For as to present happiness and misery, when that alone comes in consideration, and the consequences are quite removed, a man never chuses amiss; he knows what best pleases him, and that he actually prefers. Things in their present enjoyment, are what they seem; the apparent and real good are, in this case, always the same. For the pain or pleasure being just so great, and no greater, than it is felt, the present good or evil is really so much as it appears. And therefore were every action of ours concluded within itself, and drew no

consequences after it, we should undoubtedly never err in our choice of good; we should always infallibly prefer the best. Were the pains of honest industry, and of starving with hunger and cold, set together before us, no-body would be in doubt which to chuse: were the satisfaction of a lust, and the joys of heaven offered at once to any one's present possession, he would not balance, or err in the determination of his choice.

§ 59. But since our voluntary actions carry not all the happiness and misery that depend on them, along with them in their present performance, but are the precedent causes of good and evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are passed and cease to be; our desires look beyond our present enjoyments, and carry the mind out to absent good, according to the necessity which we think there is of it, to the making or increase of our happiness. It is our opinion of such a necessity that gives it its attraction: without that we are not moved by absent good. For in this narrow scantling of capacity, which we are accustomed to, and sensible of here, wherein we enjoy but one pleasure at once, which, when all uneasiness is away, is, whilst it lasts, sufficient to make us think ourselves happy; it is not all remote, and even apparent good, that affects us. Because the indolency and enjoyment we have, sufficing for our present happiness, we desire not to venture the change: since we judge that we are happy already, being content, and that is enough. For who is content, is happy. But as soon as any new uneasiness comes in, this happiness is disturbed, and we are set afresh on work in the pursuit of happiness.

§ 60. Their aptness therefore to conclude, that



they can be happy without it, is one great occasion that men often are not raised to the desire of the greatest absent good. For while such thoughts possess them, the joys of a future state move them not; they have little concern or uneasiness about them; and the will, free from the determination of such desires, is left to the pursuit of nearer satisfactions, and to the removal of those uneasinesses which it then feels, in its want of and longings after them. Change but a man's view of these things; let him see, that virtue and religion are necessary to his happiness; let him look into the future state of bliss or misery, and see there GOD, the righteous Judge, ready to *render to every man according to his deeds; to them who by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for glory, and honour, and immortality, eternal life; but unto every soul that doth evil, indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish*: to him, I say, who hath a prospect of the different state of perfect happiness or misery, that attends all men after this life, depending on their behaviour here, the measures of good and evil, that govern his choice, are mightily changed. For since nothing of pleasure and pain in this life, can bear any proportion to endless happiness, or exquisite misery of an immortal soul hereafter, actions in his power will have their preference, not according to the transient pleasure or pain that accompanies, or follows them here; but as they serve to secure that perfect durable happiness hereafter.

§ 61. But to account more particularly for the misery that men often bring on themselves, notwithstanding that they do all in earnest pursue happiness, we must consider how things come to be represented to our desires, under deceitful ap-

pearances: and that is by the judgment pronouncing wrongly concerning them. To see how far this reaches, and what are the causes of wrong judgment, we must remember that things are judged good or bad in a double sense.

1. That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely pleasure or pain.

2. But because not only present pleasure and pain, but that also which is apt, by its efficacy or consequences, to bring it upon us at a distance, is a proper object of our desires, and apt to move a creature that has foresight; therefore things also that draw after them pleasure and pain, are considered as good and evil.

§ 62. The wrong judgment that misleads us, and makes the will often fasten on the worse side, lies in misreporting upon the various comparisons of these. The wrong judgment I am here speaking of, is not what one man may think of the determination of another; but what every man himself must confess to be wrong. For since I lay it for a certain ground, that every intelligent being really seeks happiness, which consists in the enjoyment of pleasure, without any considerable mixture of uneasiness; it is impossible any one should willingly put into his own draught any bitter ingredient, or leave out any thing in his power, that would tend to his satisfaction, and the completing of his happiness, but only by wrong judgment. I shall not here speak of that mistake which is the consequence of invincible error, which scarce deserves the name of wrong judgment: but of that wrong judgment which every man himself must confess to be so.

§ 63. I. Therefore, as to present pleasure and pain, the mind, as has been said, never mistakes

that which is really good or evil; that which is the greater pleasure, or the greater pain, is really just as it appears. But though present pleasure and pain shew their difference and degrees so plainly, as not to leave room for mistake; yet when we compare present pleasure or pain with future, (which is usually the case in the most important determinations of the will), we often make wrong judgments of them, taking our measures of them in different positions of distance. Objects, near our view, are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger size, that are more remote: and so it is with pleasures and pains, the present is apt to carry it, and those at a distance have the disadvantage in the comparison. Thus most men, like spendthrift heirs, are apt to judge a little in hand, better than a great deal to come; and so for small matters in possession, part with great ones in reversion. But that this is a wrong judgment, every one must allow, let his pleasure consist in whatever it will: since that which is future, will certainly come to be present; and then, having the same advantage of nearness, will shew itself in its full dimensions, and discover his wilful mistake, who judged of it by unequal measures. Were the pleasure of drinking accompanied, the very moment a man takes off his glass, with that sick stomach and aking head, which, in some men, are sure to follow not many hours after, I think no-body, whatever pleasure he had in his cups, would, on these conditions, ever let wine touch his lips; which yet he daily swallows, and the evil side comes to be chosen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time. But if pleasure or pain can be so lessened only by a few hours removal, how much more will it be so, by a farther di-

stance, to a man that will not by a right judgment do what time will, *i. e.* bring it home upon himself, and consider it as present, and there take its true dimensions? This is the way we usually impose on ourselves, in respect of bare pleasure and pain, or the true degrees of happiness or misery: the future loses its just proportion, and what is present, obtains the preference as the greater. I mention not here the wrong judgment, whereby the absent are not only lessened, but reduced to perfect nothing; when men enjoy what they can in present, and make sure of that, concluding amiss, that no evil will thence follow: for that lies not in comparing the greatness of future good and evil, which is that we are here speaking of; but in another sort of wrong judgment, which is concerning good or evil, as it is considered to be the cause and procurement of pleasure or pain, that will follow from it.

§ 64. The cause of our judging amiss, when we compare our present pleasure or pain with future, seems to me to be the weak and narrow constitution of our minds: we cannot well enjoy two pleasures at once, much less any pleasure almost, whilst pain possesses us. The present pleasure, if it be not very languid, and almost none at all, fills our narrow souls, and so takes up the whole mind, that it scarce leaves any thought of things absent: or if among our pleasures, there are some which are not strong enough to exclude the consideration of things at a distance; yet we have so great an abhorrence of pain, that a little of it extinguishes all our pleasures: a little bitter, mingled in our cup, leaves no relish of the sweet. Hence it comes, that at any rate, we desire to be rid of the present evil, which we are apt to think nothing

absent can equal; because, under the present pain, we find not ourselves capable of any the least degree of happiness. Mens daily complaints are a loud proof of this: the pain that any one actually feels, is still of all other the worst; and it is with anguish they cry out, *Any rather than this; nothing can be so intolerable as what I now suffer.* And therefore our whole endeavours and thoughts are intent to get rid of the present evil, before all things, as the first necessary condition to our happiness, let what will follow. Nothing, as we passionately think, can exceed, or almost equal, the uneasiness that sits so heavy upon us. And because the abstinence from a present pleasure that offers itself, is a pain, nay, oftentimes a very great one, the desire being inflamed by a near and tempting object; it is no wonder that that operates after the same manner pain does, and lessens in our thoughts what is future; and so forces us, as it were, blindfold into its embraces.

§ 65. Add to this, that absent good, or which is the same thing, future pleasure, especially if of a sort we are unacquainted with, seldom is able to counter-balance any uneasiness, either of pain or desire, which is present. For its greatness being no more than what shall be really tasted when enjoyed, men are apt enough to lessen that, to make it give place to any present desire; and conclude with themselves, that when it comes to trial, it may possibly not answer the report or opinion that generally passes of it, they having often found, that not only what others have magnified, but even what they themselves have enjoyed with great pleasure and delight at one time, has proved insipid or nauseous at another; and therefore they see nothing in it, for which they should

forego a present enjoyment. But that this is a false way of judging, when applied to the happiness of another life, they must confess, unless they will say, GOD cannot make those happy he designs to be so. For that being intended for a state of happiness, it must certainly be agreeable to every one's wish and desire: could we suppose their relishes as different there as they are here, yet the manna in heaven will suit every one's palate. Thus much of the wrong judgment we make of present and future pleasure and pain, when they are compared together, and so the absent considered as future.

§ 66. II. As to things good or bad in their consequences, and by the aptness is in them to procure us good or evil in the future, we judge amiss several ways.

1. When we judge that so much evil does not really depend on them, as in truth there does.

2. When we judge, that though the consequence be of that moment, yet it is not of that certainty, but that it may otherwise fall out; or else by some means be avoided, as by industry, address, change, repentance, &c. That these are wrong ways of judging, were easy to shew in every particular, if I would examine them at large singly: but I shall only mention this in general, *viz.* that it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater good for a less, upon uncertain guesses, and before a due examination be made, proportionable to the weightiness of the matter, and the concernment it is to us not to mistake. This, I think, every one must confess, especially if he considers the usual causes of this wrong judgment, whereof these following are some.

§ 67. I. *Ignorance*. He that judges without informing himself to the utmost that he is capable, cannot acquit himself of judging amiss.

II. *Inadvertency*. When a man overlooks even that which he does know. This is an affected and present ignorance, which misleads our judgments as much as the other. Judging is, as it were, balancing an account, and determining on which side the odds lies. If therefore either side be huddled up in haste, and several of the sums, that should have gone into the reckoning, be overlooked and left out, this precipitancy causes as wrong a judgment, as if it were a perfect ignorance. That which most commonly causes this, is the prevalency of some present pleasure or pain, heightened by our feeble passionate nature, most strongly wrought on by what is present. To check this precipitancy, our understanding and reason was given us, if we will make a right use of it, to search and see, and then judge thereupon. Without liberty, the understanding would be to no purpose: and without understanding, liberty, if it could be, would signify nothing. If a man sees what would do him good or harm, what would make him happy or miserable, without being able to move himself one step towards or from it, what is he the better for seeing? And he that is at liberty to ramble in perfect darkness, what is his liberty better, than if he were driven up and down as a bubble by the force of the wind? The being acted by a blind impulse from without, or from within, is little odds. The first therefore, and great use of liberty, is to hinder blind precipitancy; the principal exercise of freedom, is to stand still, open the eyes, look about, and take a view of the consequence of what we are going to do, as

much as the weight of the matter requires. How much sloth and negligence, heat and passion, the prevalency of fashion, or acquired indispositions, do severally contribute, on occasion, to these wrong judgments, I shall not here farther inquire. I shall only add one other false judgment, which I think necessary to mention, because perhaps it is little taken notice of, though of great influence.

§ 68. All men desire happiness, that is past doubt: but, as has been already observed, when they are rid of pain, they are apt to take up with any pleasure at hand, or that custom has endeared to them, to rest satisfied in that; and so being happy, till some new desire, by making them uneasy, disturbs that happiness, and shews them that they are not so, they look no farther; nor is the will determined to any action in pursuit of any other known or apparent good. For since we find that we cannot enjoy all sorts of good, but one excludes another; we do not fix our desires on every apparent greater good, unless it be judged to be necessary to our happiness: if we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not. This is another occasion to men of judging wrong, when they take not that to be necessary to their happiness, which really is so. This mistake misleads us both in the choice of the good we aim at, and very often in the means to it, when it is a remote good. But, which way ever it be, either by placing it where really it is not, or by neglecting the means, as not necessary to it, when a man misses his great end, happiness, he will acknowledge he judged not right. That which contributes to this mistake, is the real or supposed unpleasantness of the actions, which are the way to this end, it seeming so preposterous a thing to men, to make



themselves unhappy in order to happiness, that they do not easily bring themselves to it.

§ 69. The last inquiry therefore concerning this matter is, whether it be in a man's power to change the pleasantness and unpleasantness that accompanies any sort of action? and to that, it is plain in many cases he can. Men may and should correct their palates, and give a relish to what either has, or they suppose has none. The relish of the mind is as various as that of the body, and like that too may be altered; and it is a mistake to think, that men cannot change the displeasingness or indifferency that is in actions, into pleasure and desire, if they will do but what is in their power. A due consideration will do it in some cases; and practice, application, and custom, in most. Bread or tobacco may be neglected, where they are shewn to be useful to health, because of an indifferency or disrelish to them; reason and consideration at first recommends, and begins their trial, and use finds, or custom makes them pleasant. That this is so in virtue too, is very certain. Actions are pleasing or displeasing, either in themselves, or considered as a means to a greater and more desirable end. The eating of a well-seasoned dish, suited to a man's palate, may move the mind by the delight itself that accompanies the eating, without reference to any other end: to which the consideration of the pleasure there is in health and strength, (to which that meat is subservient), may add a new gusto, able to make us swallow an ill-relished potion. In the latter of these, any action is rendered more or less pleasing, only by the contemplation of the end, and the being more or less persuaded of its tendency to it, or necessary connection with it; but the pleasure of the action it-

self, is best acquired or increased by use and practice. Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a distance we looked on with aversion; and by repetitions, wear us into a liking of what possibly, in the first essay, displeased us. Habits have powerful charms, and put so strong attractions of easiness and pleasure into what we accustom ourselves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at least be easy in the omission of actions, which habitual practice has suited, and thereby recommends to us. Though this be very visible, and every one's experience shews him he can do so; yet it is a part, in the conduct of men towards their happiness, neglected to a degree, that it will be possibly entertained as a paradox, if it be said, that men can make things or actions more or less pleasing to themselves; and thereby remedy that, to which one may justly impute a great deal of their wandering. Fashion and the common opinion having settled wrong notions, and education and custom ill habits, the just values of things are misplaced, and the palates of men corrupted. Pains should be taken to rectify these; and contrary habits change our pleasures, and give a relish to that which is necessary, or conducive to our happiness. This every one must confess he can do; and when happiness is lost, and misery overtakes him, he will confess, he did amiss in neglecting it, and condemn himself for it: and I ask every one, whether he has not often done so?

§ 70. I shall not now enlarge any farther on the wrong judgments, and neglect of what is in their power, whereby men mislead themselves. This would make a volume, and is not my business. But whatever false notions, or shameful neglect of what is in their power, may put men out of

their way to happiness, and distract them, as we see, into so different courses of life, this yet is certain, that morality, established upon its true foundations, cannot but determine the choice in any one, that will but consider: and he that will not be so far a rational creature, as to reflect seriously upon infinite happiness and misery, must needs condemn himself, as not making that use of his understanding he should. The rewards and punishments of another life, which the Almighty has established as the enforcements of his law, are of weight enough to determine the choice, against whatever pleasure or pain this life can shew, when the eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility, which no-body can make any doubt of. He that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here, and the contrary state the possible reward of a bad one, must own himself to judge very much amiss, if he does not conclude, that a virtuous life, with the certain expectation of everlasting bliss, which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the fear of that dreadful state of misery, which it is very possible may overtake the guilty; or at best, the terrible uncertain hope of annihilation. This is evidently so, though the virtuous life here had nothing but pain, and the vicious continual pleasure; which yet is, for the most part, quite otherwise, and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their present possession; nay, all things rightly considered, have, I think, even the worst part here. But when infinite happiness is put into one scale, against infinite misery in the other; if the worst that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes, be the best that the wicked can attain to, if he be in

the right, who can, without madness, run the venture? Who, in his wits, would chuse to come within a possibility of infinite misery, which, if he mis, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas, on the other side, the sober man ventures nothing against infinite happiness to be got, if his expectation comes to pass. If the good man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he mistakes, he is not miserable, he feels nothing. On the other side, if the wicked be in the right, he is not happy; if he mistakes, he is infinitely miserable. Must it not be a most manifest wrong judgment, that does not presently see to which side, in this case, the preference is to be given? I have forbore to mention any thing of the certainty or probability of a future state, designing here to shew the wrong judgment, that any one must allow he makes upon his own principles, laid how he pleases, who prefers the short pleasures of a vicious life upon any consideration, whilst he knows, and cannot but be certain, that a future life is at least possible.

§ 71. To conclude this inquiry into human liberty, which, as it stood before, I myself from the beginning fearing, and a very judicious friend of mine, since the publication, suspecting to have some mistake in it, though he could not particularly shew it me, I was put upon a stricter review of this chapter: wherein, lighting upon a very easy, and scarce observable slip I had made, in putting one seemingly indifferent word for another, that discovery opened to me this present view, which here, in this second edition, I submit to the learned world, and which, in short, is this: "*Liberty* is a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs." A power to direct

the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances, is that which we call the *will*. That which, in the train of our voluntary actions, determines the will to any change of operation, is some present *uneasiness*, which is, or at least is always accompanied with, that of *desire*. Desire is always moved by *evil*, to fly it; because a total freedom from pain, always makes a necessary part of our happiness: but every *good*, nay, every *greater good*, does not constantly move desire, because it may not make, or may not be taken to make any necessary part of our happiness. For all that we desire, is only to be happy. But though this general desire of happiness operates constantly and invariably, yet the satisfaction of any particular desire can be suspended from determining the will to any subservient action, till we have maturely examined, whether the particular apparent good, which we then desire, makes a part of our real happiness, or be consistent or inconsistent with it. The result of our judgment upon that examination, is what ultimately determines the man, who could not be free, if his will were determined by any thing, but his own desire guided by his own judgment. I know that liberty, by some, is placed in an indifferency of the man, antecedent to the determination of his will. I wish they who lay so much stress on such an antecedent indifferency, as they call it, had told us plainly, whether this supposed indifferency be antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding as well as to the decree of the will. For it is pretty hard to state it between them; *i. e.* immediately after the judgment of the understanding, and before the determination of the will, because the determination of the will immediately follows the

judgment of the understanding; and to place liberty in an indifferency antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding, seems to me to place liberty in a state of darkness, wherein we can neither see nor say any thing of it; at least it places it in a subject incapable of it, no agent being allowed capable of liberty, but in consequence of thought and judgment. I am not nice about phrases, and therefore consent to say with those that love to speak so, that liberty is placed in indifferency, but it is an indifferency which remains after the judgment of the understanding; yea, even after the determination of the will: and that is an indifferency, not of the man, (for after he has once judged which is best, *viz.* to do or forbear, he is no longer indifferent), but an indifferency of the operative powers of the man, which remaining equally able to operate, or to forbear operating after, as before the decree of the will, are in a state, which, if one pleases, may be called indifferency; and as far as this indifferency reaches, a man is free, and no farther. *V. g.* I have the ability to move my hand, or to let it rest, that operative power is indifferent to move, or not to move my hand: I am then, in that respect, perfectly free. My will determines that operative power to rest, I am yet free, because the indifferency of that my operative power to act, or not to act, still remains; the power of moving my hand is not at all impaired by the determination of my will, which at present orders rest; the indifferency of that power to act, or not to act, is just as it was before, as will appear, if the will puts it to the trial, by ordering the contrary. But if during the rest of my hand, it be seized by a sudden palsy, the indifferency of that operative

power is gone, and with it my liberty; I have no longer freedom in that respect, but am under a necessity of letting my hand rest. On the other side, if my hand be put into motion by a convulsion, the indifferency of that operative faculty is taken away by that motion, and my liberty in that case is lost: for I am under a necessity of having my hand move. I have added this, to shew in what sort of indifferency liberty seems to me to consist, and not in any other, real or imaginary.

§ 72. True notions concerning the nature and extent of liberty, are of so great importance, that I hope I shall be pardoned this digression, which my attempt to explain it has led me into. The idea of *will*, *volition*, *liberty*, and *necessity*, in this chapter of power, came naturally in my way. In a former edition of this treatise, I gave an account of my thoughts concerning them, according to the light I then had: and now, as a lover of truth, and not a worshipper of my own doctrines, I own some change of my opinion, which I think I have discovered ground for. In what I first writ, I with an unbiaſſed indifferency followed Truth, whither I thought she led me. But neither being so vain as to fancy infallibility, nor so disingenuous as to dissemble my mistakes for fear of blemishing my reputation, I have, with the same sincere design for truth only, not been ashamed to publish what a severer inquiry has suggested. It is not impossible, but that some may think my former notions right, and some (as I have already found) these latter; and some neither. I shall not at all wonder at this variety in mens opinions: impartial deductions of reason in controverted points being so very rare, and exact ones in abstract notions not so very easy, especially if of any length.

And therefore, I should think myself not a little beholden to any one, who would, upon these, or any other grounds, fairly clear this subject of liberty from any difficulties that may yet remain.

But before I close this chapter, it may perhaps be to our purpose, and help to give us clearer conceptions about power, if we make our thoughts take a little more exact survey of action. I have said above, that we have ideas but of two sorts of action, *viz. motion* and *thinking*. These, in truth, though called and counted actions, yet, if nearly considered, will not be found to be always perfectly so. For, if I mistake not, there are instances of both kinds, which, upon due consideration, will be found rather passions than actions, and consequently so far the effects barely of passive powers in those subjects, which yet on their account are thought agents. For in these instances, the substance that hath motion or thought, receives the impression whereby it is put into that action purely from without, and so acts merely by the capacity it has to receive such an impression from some external agent; and such a power is not properly an active power, but a mere passive capacity in the subject. Sometimes the substance, or agent, puts itself into action by its own power, and this is properly active power. Whatsoever modification a substance has, whereby it produces any effect, that is called action; *v. g.* a solid substance by motion operates on, or alters the sensible ideas of another substance; and therefore this modification of motion, we call action. But yet this motion, in that solid substance, is, when rightly considered, but a passion, if it received it only from some external agent. So that the active power of motion, is in no substance



which cannot begin motion in itself, or in another substance, when at rest. So likewise in thinking, a power to receive ideas, or thoughts, from the operation of any external substance, is called a power of thinking: but this is but a passive power, or capacity. But to be able to bring into view ideas out of sight at one's own choice, and to compare which of them one thinks fit, this is an active power. This reflection may be of some use to preserve us from mistakes about powers and actions, which grammar, and the common frame of languages, may be apt to lead us into: since what is signified by verbs that grammarians call active, does not always signify action; *v. g.* this proposition, I see the moon, or a star, or I feel the heat of the sun, though expressed by a verb active, does not signify any action in me, whereby I operate on those substances; but the reception of the ideas of light, roundness, and heat, wherein I am not active, but barely passive, and cannot, in that position of my eyes or body, avoid receiving them. But when I turn my eyes another way, or remove my body out of the sun-beams, I am properly active; because of my own choice, by a power within myself, I put myself into that motion. Such an action is the product of active power.

§ 73. And thus I have, in a short draught, given a view of our original ideas, from whence all the rest are derived, and of which they are made up; which, if I would consider as a philosopher, and examine on what causes they depend, and of what they are made, I believe they all might be reduced to these very few primary and original ones; *viz.*

*Extension,*

*Solidity,*

*Mobility,* or the power of being moved ;  
which, by our senses, we receive from body :

*Perceptivity,* or the power of perception,  
or thinking ;

*Motivity,* or the power of moving ;

which, by reflection, we receive from our minds.  
I crave leave to make use of these two new words,  
to avoid the danger of being mistaken in the use of  
those which are equivocal. To which if we add

*Existence,*

*Duration,*

*Number,*

which belong both to the one and the other, we  
have, perhaps, all the original ideas on which  
the rest depend. For by these, I imagine, might  
be explained the nature of colours, sounds, tastes,  
smells, and all other ideas we have, if we had but  
faculties acute enough to perceive the severally  
modified extensions and motions of these minute  
bodies, which produce those several sensations in  
us. But my present purpose being only to inquire  
into the knowledge the mind has of things, by those  
ideas and appearances which GOD has fitted it to  
receive from them, and how the mind comes by that  
knowledge, rather than into their causes or manner  
of production, I shall not, contrary to the design  
of this essay, set myself to inquire philosophi-  
cally into the peculiar constitution of bodies, and  
the configuration of parts, whereby they have the  
power to produce in us the ideas of their sensible  
qualities: I shall not enter any farther into that  
disquisition; it sufficing to my purpose to ob-  
serve, that gold or saffron, has a power to pro-  
duce in us the idea of yellow; and snow or milk,

the idea of white; which we can only have by our sight, without examining the texture of the parts of those bodies, or the particular figures or motion of the particles which rebound from them, to cause in us that particular sensation: though when we go beyond the bare ideas in our minds, and would inquire into their causes, we cannot conceive any thing else to be in any sensible object whereby it produces different ideas in us, but the different bulk, figure, number, texture, and motion of its sensible parts.

*The End of the FIRST VOLUME.*

