The Struggle for Independence	139
insulated as far as may be, as a wedge of British-controlled terri-
tory'; and lie comments in his apologia Loyalties: 'A small
independent state of under three millions seemed a retrograde,
almost anarchic step. . . . My imagination envisaged some form
of protectorate which might develop ere long into a fully-fledged
Arab state with Dominion status under the British crown.'
Having determined in November 1918 to obtain confirmation for
his thesis by holding a plebiscite, he was at some pains to ensure
that it produced the desired result. His instructions to his Divisional
Officers stated, 'When public opinion appears likely to take a
definitely satisfactory line, you are authorized to convene an
assembly of all leading notables and sheikhs . . . informing them
that their answers will be communicated to me for submission to
the Government. Where public opinion appears likely to be sharply
divided, or in the unlikely event of its being unfavourable, you
should defer holding a meeting and report to me for instructions.
The effect on the British cabinet of the plebiscite so conducted was
less serious than its effect on Wilson himself, since it led him in-
creasingly to find reasons for disregarding the views of those with
whom he disagreed. Thus, characterizing the Iraqi nationalist
officers with the Amir Faisal in Syria as 'such small fry' and re-
garding the Shi'i mujtahids and other religious dignitaries with
much justification as 'spiritual tyrants whose principal ambition
was to stem the rising tide of emancipation', he 'underestimated
the influence of the Nationalists, and the susceptibility to their pro-
paganda and that of the dissident 'ulama of the mass of the people
on the Middle Euphrates', as he himself later admitted.1 He was
not, however, averse to cautious constitutionalprogress; he proposed
to the Interdepartmental Committee on Eastern Affairs in April
1919: 'The legitimate demand for active participation in the
government and administration can best be met, not by creating
central legislative and deliberative councils, but by giving carefully
selected Arabs of good birth and education from the very outset
positions of executive and administrative responsibility. I would
propose to instal selected Arab officials as governors of (the
principal towns) with a specially chosen British official of ability
and character as principal commissioner and adviser to the
governor.' The Allied Powers were, however, still fully occupied
with imposing terms on Germany, and had not yet approached the
1 Loyalties, 11,254.