136 A Short History of the Middle East
will enjoy a special position and precedence5, etc. This memoran-
dum, which provided the basis for Anglo-Egyptian relations until
1946, was received not unfavourably in Egypt, though Zaghlul
had made the significant counter-proposal that British troops
should be specifically limited in number and confined to the Canal
Zone. The main opposition came from the British cabinet, parlia-
ment, and public, 'many of whom had come to regard Egypt as an
integral part of the British Empire and were beyond measure
astonished that Milner, whose imperialism was unimpeachable,
should have proposed what they regarded as the surrender and
abandonment of British territory*.1 Milner, however, showed
how untenable historically this unaccommodating attitude was:
4 Unless all our past declarations have been insincere and all our
professions hypocritical, the establishment of Egypt as an inde-
pendent state in intimate alliance with Britain is the goal to which
all our efforts have been directed. It may indeed be argued that the
goal has not yet been reached, that Egypt is not yet strong enough
to stand on her own feet. Such arguments are entitled to respectful
consideration. But what cannot be maintained, with any regard
for historical accuracy, is that these changes in themselves are not
absolutely in accordance with the constantly declared policy of
Great Britain.'2
During 1921 the British government carried on negotiations
with moderate Egyptian ministers drawn from the Turkish
ruling class; but these broke down on the Egyptian insistence that
the British garrison should in peace-time be confined to the Canal
Zone, where it could not be used so readily to exert pressure upon
Egyptian internal politics. The British Army? on the other hand,
apparently insensible of the constant irritant presented to Egyptian
susceptibilities by the presence of a British garrison in their capital,
stubbornly opposed its withdrawal from Cairo. A familiar theme
of those who opposed any concessions was that 'the real fellahin, if
their voice could be heard, preferred British rule to that of their
own leaders; yet all the evidence conclusively proved that these
misguided peasants preferred indifferent government by their own
compatriots to the efficient and honest administration of an alien
power'.3 The Cabinet, dependent on an unstable coalition in the
1 Round Table, December, 1936,110 ff.
2 Preface to the thirteenth edition of England in Egypt, October, 1920,
3 N. G. D., reviewing Lord Wavell's 'Allenby in Egypt? in Royal Central Asian
Journal, XXXI (1944), 213.