The Struggle for Independence 171
Sidqi formed round himself a new party, which he cynically called
the Sha*b or People. At the election in May 1921 the Sha'b and the
Ittihad 'King's Friends5 won a comfortable majority. The Wafd
tried to organize the growing Trades Union movement to make
political difficulties for the government, to which Sidqi replied by
dissolving the unions. In 1933, however, he had to resign, as his
health had been impaired by overwork. There followed what
amounted to the virtual dictatorship of the Director of the Royal
Estates. Palace rule did not prove to be appreciably better for Egypt
than so-called democratic rule, since public money was now poured
out on an enormous civil list and other expenditure without much
value to the public.1
The Italian invasion of Abyssinia in the summer of 193 5 brought
a new note of urgency to the question of an Anglo-Egyptian settle-
ment. In December a united front composed of Nahlias, Sidqi, and
Mohammed Mahmud sent a note to the High Commissioner
declaring their readiness to conclude the draft treaty of 1930. The
British replied, however, that in the light of the Abyssinian War the
military clauses needed revision, and that it was desirable to reach a
preliminary agreement on the status of the Sudan. Negotiations
began in March 1936 with an all-party delegation consisting of
seven Wafdists and six non-Wafdists. There was still a considerable
gap to be bridged between the views of the British and the Egyp-
tian negotiators, and the unaccommodating attitude of the British
service advisers, unsympathetic as ever towards Egyptian national
aspirations, called forth a reproof from The Times: *It is natural
enough that the technical advisers of ELM. Government should
recommend such a miEtary agreement as would achieve an ideal
security for this country's interests for ever .. . but the military
ideal of 100 per cent, security takes no account of the political side
of the question. .. . An alliance, if it is to have any real value, must
be based on respect for national feeling. It must be freely negotiat-
ed, not dictated; and one of its primary conditions... is that it
should be inspired by a spirit of mutual trust. This spirit will
hardly be encouraged by efforts to persuade the delegates to make
concessions for which their countrymen would never forgive
them, in the hopeless quest for the unattainable ideal of a perfect
military security for all time and in all circumstances. An alliance
based upon common interests and confidence is surely worth
1 Round Table, December 1936,110 fL