Russia and the Middle East 275

12 August the Soviet Ambassador handed to the Persian Prime
Minister for signature a draft oil-treaty on the lines agreed at
Moscow in the previous year.1 When the Persian Government
pointed out that it was necessary first to obtain the consent of the
Majlis, a second Soviet Note was presented on 15 September
demanding swift action without 'delaying tactics'. On 22 October
the Majlis, against the advice of the Prime Minister, adopted by
102 votes to 2 a bill rejecting the oil-agreement of 1947 and pro-
posing new negotiations. A third Soviet Note on 20 November
accused the Persian Government of 'treacherously violating' its
undertakings. By this time Qavam as-Sultani was hopelessly
isolated in the Majlis, partly as a scapegoat for the rejected agree-
ment and partly on account of the corruptness of his administration
(though by Persian standards it was probably not outstanding in
this respect); and though he made a desperate bid for popularity
in an anti-foreign broadcast, he fell to a vote of no-confidence on
10 December. On 31 January 1948 a fourth Soviet Note accused
the Persian government of lending itself to American plans for
converting Persia into a 'military-strategic' base, and darkly re-
minded it of the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1921 (which gave Russia
the right to send troops into Persia 'if a third party should desire
to use Persian territory as a base for operations against Russia').2
The Persian Government in reply accused the Russians of har-
bouring the Azerbaijani and Kurdish rebels against Persian
authority.

As a result of her wartime alliance with Britain, Russia was able
for the first time to open legations in the Middle Eastern capitals—
Cairo, Beirut and Damascus, Baghdad. In this new international
relationship it was no longer possible for Middle Eastern govern-
ments to repress left-wing movements as indiscriminately as
hitherto; the prestige won by the Red Armies in the war caused a
considerable increase in the membership of left-wing parties in the
Middle East; and in Egypt Nahhas welcomed the establishment of a
Russian Legation, which might enable him to drive a harder bar-
gain with Britain in the future. The tone of Soviet propaganda has
been critical of the Arab League, as a British creation representing
in the main conservative interests; but it is always ready to abet the

1 Times diplomatic correspondent, 18 August 1947.
2 do., 3 and 4 February 1948.