EFFECT OF THE DEGREE OF DISPLACEMENT 695
civilization varies in its effectiveness in inverse ratio to the degree of the
geographical displacement of the affiliated society's cradle from its pre-
decessor's ? If we now go on to complete our survey, we shall find our
tentative 'law' vindicated on the whole.

For example, in the history of the offshoot of the Far Eastern Civiliza-
tion in Japan, on ground lying right outside the domain of the antecedent
Sinic Civilization, even at its widest extent, a ghost of the Sinic universal
state that had been successfully resuscitated in the main body of the
Far Eastern Society in the shape of the Sui and Tang Empire was duly
introduced into Japan tel quel\ but, as we have seen,1 this unimagina-
tively exact replica of the T'ang regime was too exotic a plant in Japan
to strike root there effectively; and accordingly a resuscitation of the
Han regime that was against nature even in China was soon reduced in
Japan to a political facade thinly masking a free play of native Japanese
political forces on original lines of their own.

The offshoot of Orthodox Christendom in Russia resembled the off-
shoot of the Far Eastern Civilization in Japan in lying right outside the
geographical limits of the antecedent civilization, even at their widest;
and here Moscow's claim to be 'the Third Rome'2 was not belied by her
performance so conclusively as Kyoto's claim (if ever made) to be 'the
third Ch'ang Ngan'. Yet, though a Muscovite Tsardom was a more
effective avatar of the Roman Empire than a Western 'Holy Roman
Empire' ever contrived to be, the native Russian element in its ethos,
which was the source of its vitality, made it a much less exact replica of its
Roman model than was reproduced in an East Roman Empire which had
retained the authentic 'Second Rome' to serve as its own imperial capital.

If we pass on to take a synoptic view of the two Islamic societies
affiliated to the Syriac Civilization, we shall find our 'law* holding good
here again. In an Arabic Muslim World whose cradle included Syria
itself, a reintegrated Syriac universal state, in the shape of an * Abbasid
Caliphate, was revived, in a beleaguered fortress which had Syria for its
glacis and Egypt for its donjon, within less than three and a half years
after the extinction of the original * Abbasid Caliphate in its residual
metropolitan territory in 'Iraq.3 On the other hand, in an Ottoman
extension of the Iranic Muslim World into Anatolian territory that had
not been embraced in the domain of the Syriac Civilization at any time
since its inclusion, from 547 B.C. to 334 B.C., in the dominions of the
Achaemenian Empire, the Caliphate enjoyed so little prestige that, as
we have seen,* Sultan Selim I, the Ottoman conqueror who overthrew
the Egyptian Mamluk power and annexed its dominions, never took the
trouble to usurp the title of Caliph from the last scion of the Mamluks
Cairene 'Abbasid puppets; and Istanbul's potential claim to be the
Third Baghdad' was not exploited by Ottoman statesmanship_tuTdie
rapid break-up of the Ottoman Empire after the Great Russp-Turkish
War of A.D. 1768-74 moved the Porte to bring its dusty title to the
Caliphate out of its muniment room as a long-neglected pohtical asset
which might perhaps be used to offset the Ottoman Empire s grievous