

From what he said - may God be pleased with him -

Concerning

TADBIR AL-MUTAWAHHID

(The régime of the Solitary)

Abū Bakr Ibn al-Şā'igh

- may God have mercy with him -

said:

ARTICLE I

The expression Tadbīr "régime" in the language of the Arabs, is used in many(different) ways, which are enumerated by their philologists. The most common usage, in general, is to indicate the arrangement of actions in relation to ¹ an intended end. Hence it is not used in relation to a person who performs one single action by which he intends a certain end. If a man believes an action to be single, he would not call it Tadbīr: if he believes it to be manifold and deals with it as an action having Tartīb (arrangement), then he calls that arrangement Tadbīr. Thus they say that God is the Mudabbir (manager) of the world. This Tadbīr might be potential or actual, but it more frequently and obviously indicates what is ² potential. It is clear that if the arrangement belongs to potential affairs it must be intellectual, for this is particular to the intellect and is possible through it alone. Therefore it exists only for man. When the expression Mudabbir (manager) is used, it is done so in an analogical way, for Tadbīr refers to priority and posteriority. The expression Tadbīr might be used as the name for the process of bringing this arrangement into existence - insofar as it is created. This is more frequent and apparent in man's actions, less so in the actions of the irrational animal. When Tadbīr is used in this way, it is employed in generality and particularity. When used in gen-

erality it refers to all man's actions, whatever they may be.

Although used in relation to both the professions (the practical arts) and the capacities,³ it is more frequent and evident in relation to the capacities. That is why [Fol. 165 v] it is used to indicate the arrangement of the crafts of shoemaking and weaving. When thus used it again possesses (both) generality and particularity. When it possesses generality it is employed in relation to all actions included in the arts which are called capacities, as I have summarized in the book of al-'Ilm al-Madani (Political Science)⁴ Possessing particularity, it is used in relation to the Tadbir of the cities.

Some things for which the expression Tadbir is used are above others in honour and perfection; the noblest of these is the Tadbir of the cities and that of the home. Yet it is rarely used in relation to the latter, and then not without qualification and restraint. As for the Tadbir of war and similar subjects, they are divisions of these two kinds. God's Tadbir of the world is of a different nature which is very far from even the closest meaning. This is the absolute "régime", and the most noble. It is called Tadbir only on account of the supposed similarity between it and God's creation of the world. Evidently this type of analogical term is farthest from being univocal; it is almost purely equivocal. The common people use it in an analogical way, while philosophers apply it in a purely equivocal way. They enumerate it among the analogical terms only insofar as an object is called by the name of its likeness. This type is not included among the analogical terms on account of its rarity. That is

why common people do not describe God's Tadbīr correctly. They say that His Tadbīr of the world is "correct", "precises", "perfect", and the like. These expressions imply more than just correctness. According to common people, "correct action" is the genus designated for all precise and perfect actions, the discussion of this is to be found elsewhere.

When the expression Tadbīr is used in a general sense, as we use it, it indicates the Tadbīr of the cities; when used in a particular sense, it is divided into correct and false. It is sometimes believed that the Tadbīr is free of these two opposites; when examined and pursued, however, it appears that they necessarily adhere to it. This is knowable even for those with the least knowledge of political philosophy. Therefore the two types which are characterized by the expression Tadbīr may be divided into correct and false.

As for the Tadbīr of the cities, Plato has clarified its nature in his Political Science (the Republic). He also clarified the meaning of "correctness" in relation to it and how "falsity" applies to it. He has undertaken the task of dealing with what had already been said concerning it, and has confirmed the meaning of virtue, ignorance and vice in relation to it.

As for the Tadbīr of the home, it is - as such - a part of

the city. He (Plato) has there explained that the home is natural for man alone. He has explained also that the best existence for a part is its being just a part; that is why he has not made the Tadbīr of the home part of Political Science. He has already spoken of it in regard to Political Science⁵ explaining there what the home is, how it exists, that its best existence is communal, and the nature of its communality. As for the home in cities other than the perfect city - namely, the four types which were enumerated⁶ - its existence is imperfect, and it has unnatural elements. That first home is the only perfect one, to which no additional element may be added without its turning into a defect, as in the case of a sixth finger. It is the characteristic of the perfect home that any additional element in it [Fol. 166 v] is a defect. It is its characteristic also that all other homes are imperfect and diseased in relation to it, because the states by which a home differs from the perfect home lead to its destruction and perdition. That is why these states are like sickness.

Some people have undertaken the task of dealing with the Tadbīr of these imperfect homes - namely, the sick homes. The declarations of those whose books have reached us are eloquent (i.e., unscientific). What we have said - that all homes, except the perfect one, are sick and distorted, and that they do not exist in a natural way but rather in an artificial way - is clear. That is why their virtues, except for those which they share with the perfect home are also artificial. The doctrine of the perfect home has a

necessary and known order. As a result of this shared part, the doctrine (of the imperfect home) is also necessarily scientific, since no home is devoid of many things - natural parts of it - which are in common with the perfect home. If a home were devoid of these it would be unable to continue to exist, and it would be a home in name only. Let us abandon this discussion and leave it to one who has free time to deal with it.

Furthermore, the perfection of the home is not among the things which are desirable in themselves; rather, it is desirable for the perfection of the city or for the realization of the natural end of Man. It is clear that concern for the latter case forms part of concern for Man's "régime" for himself. Either the home is part of the city and concern for it is part of concern for the cities, or it is a preliminary step towards another end and concern for it is part of that end. From this it becomes clear that concern for the régime of the home, as is well known, neither has benefit nor is a science. If it were so, it would be so only temporarily, as occurs (accidentally) in the literary books of the rhetoricians which they call psychological - such as Kalīlah wa Dimnah⁷ and Hukamā' ul-'Arab⁸ (The Wise Men of the Arabs), which contain recommendations and admonitory discourses. Most of this exists as chapters of a book: e.g., in the chapters concerning the company of the Sultan, association with friends and so on. What is true in most of this is true only at a certain time and in certain types of way of life. When the way of

life changes, the ideas which are universal also change; they become particular after having been universal, and harmful and re-nounced after having been beneficial. You can see that clearly if you become acquainted with the contents of the books written on that subject and if you compare each idea with those of a later time.

The perfect city is characterized by the absence of the arts of medicine and jurisprudence, because relations among all the citizens are based on love and there is no dispute among them at all. When a part of it is devoid of love and disputes occur, then there is need for the establishment of justice and a necessity for someone to establish it; namely, the Qāḍī (judge). Further, all actions in the perfect city are proper; this is its characteristic. Hence its people do not eat harmful foods. Therefore they do not need knowledge of remedies for choking caused by (poison) mushrooms or other similar things. Nor (do they require) knowledge of how to cure (excessive) drinking, since nothing which is not properly in order exists there. Similarly, when the citizens forsake [Fol. 166 v] physical exercise, many types of sickness appear. It is clear that all this does not occur in the perfect city, where there is need for perhaps nothing more than extracting (teeth), etc., and in general, (to provide for) those sicknesses, the immediate causes of which are external and which the healthy body cannot by itself resist. It has been observed that severe wounds of healthy people cure themselves spontaneously; other instances prove the same. Therefore, the

characteristic of the perfect city is the absence of both doctor and judge, while one of the common characteristics of the four simple⁹ (types of) cities is to be in need of both doctors and judges. The further a city is removed from the perfect city, the more it needs them, and the more honourable is the rank of these two kinds of people.

It is clear that in the perfectly virtuous city every citizen is given the best of that for which he is prepared. All of its opinions are correct; none are false. Its actions are exclusively and absolutely virtuous ones; every action - outside it if it is virtuous - is so (only) in relation to certain existent corruption. Cutting an organ from the body is essentially harmful, but it may be accidentally useful for one whom an adder has stung; for his body regains soundness by cutting away the organ. Similarly, scammony is essentially harmful, but it is useful for one who has (certain kinds) of sickness. These matters have been summarized in the Nicomachean¹⁰ Ethics. It is clear then that every view - different from that of the citizens - which comes into existence in the perfect city is false, and every action different from what usually takes place in it, is wrong. The false neither has any definite nature nor is able to be known as explained in the Book of Proof.¹¹ As for wrong action, it is possible that it be done in order to achieve another goal. Books have been written concerning actions which are possible to be observed,

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such al-Hiyal of "Banu Shakir!" The contents of these books are in the nature of amusement and are intended as objects of wonder. They have no purpose concerning the essential perfection of man; concern with them is device and ignorance. Thus in the perfect city there is no place for the ideas of those who believe and act in a way different from that of the perfect city. Such is possible in the four other cities. There a man may fall short in respect to an action, and (still) be led (to the good) naturally or by learning it from another and performing it. It is possible there to hold a false opinion, and yet a certain man may recognize its falsity. (It is possible there also) to have false sciences in none of which the citizens believe or in most of which contradictions are accepted and that a man may, either naturally or by learning it from another, find the correct alternative of two contradictories. There is no name for he who discovers proper actions and learns correct knowledge not existing in the city. These men who hit upon correct views that do not exist in a city, or the contraries of which are held in the city, are called al-Nawābit (weeds).

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The more numerous their ideas and the greater their effect, the more does this name apply to them. Although this name is used specifically for them, it can be applied in a general way to any man who does not share the belief of the citizens of the city, whether true or false. This name was transferred to them from those plants which grow up spontaneously among the sown crops. Let us use it exclusively to mean those who have correct views. It is clear that one of the characteristics of the

perfect city is the absence of al-Nawābit (weeds) [Fol. 167 v]; whether we use this expression in its special sense - for there are no false views therein, or in the general sense - for if it had "weeds", it would become sick, lose its nature and cease to be perfect. The four other types of cities may have "weeds". This is the cause of the occurrence of the perfect city, as is explained elsewhere.

All the cities both at the present time and previously, according to most of what has reached us - except what Abū Naṣr tells about the early type of Persian cities - are composed of the five types. Most of what exists are among the four (imperfect) types of cities. Discussion of this we leave to someone who has time for dealing with the types that exist at the present time. The three groups (classes of people), the "weeds", the judges and the doctors, exist or can exist in these types. Happy people, if they exist in these cities, have only the happiness of the solitary man; and the sound Tadbīr (for them) would be the Tadbīr of the solitary, whether there be one such solitary person or more than one, so long as neither a nation nor a city agrees on their view. These are the persons meant by the Sufis when they speak of "strangers", for although they live in their countries and among their comrades and neighbours they are strangers in their views and have travelled in their thoughts to other levels which become for them their countries - and so on.

In this essay we intend to discuss the Tadbīr of this solitary man. It is clear that (by living in an imperfect city) he lives in unnatural circumstances. We shall discuss how he should guide himself to attain the best of his existences. Similarly the doctor - in the case of a sick man in these cities - discusses how to manage in order that the patient be well, either by preserving his health as Galen wrote in the Book of Preservation of Health, or by restoring it when it ceases to exist as I have written in the Art of Medicine.

This discourse is similarly applicable to the Mufarrad (solitary) "weed"; viz. how he is to obtain happiness when it does not exist, or how he is to eliminate the obstacles which prevent him from obtaining happiness or as much of it as possible, is measured by the limit of his insight or by what has settled in his soul. Preserving happiness, which is similar to preserving health, is possible neither in the three types of city, nor in what is composed of them. The view of Galen or others concerning this matter is like alchemy and astrology.

The one (the weed) establishes the medicine of souls; the other (the doctor), the medicine of bodies; the ḥukkām (government), the medicine of social relations. It is clear then that these two latter kinds of people are eliminated completely from the perfect city. Therefore these (two types of medicine) are not reckoned among

the sciences. Similarly, both what we are discussing (here) and its usefulness are eliminated when the city becomes perfect. Similarly the science of medicine, the art of judicature and other sciences derived from the imperfect Tadbir are eliminated. Just as sound views in medicine rest upon the physical sciences and (sound) jurisprudence upon the science of politics, in similar fashion this (science) is based upon both the natural (physical) sciences and the science of politics.

ARTICLE II

CHAPTER:

Every living being (plant) shares some qualities with inanimate beings, as does every animal with living beings and every man with irrational animals. Living and inanimate beings share with each other the elements of which they are composed, like (the quality of) descending naturally but rising only forcibly, etc. Animals share [Fol. 167 v] these qualities with living beings since both are made of the same element. They also have in common the actions of the nutritive and generative souls, as well as the soul of growth. In a similar way, man shares all these faculties with irrational animals, as well as perception, imagination, memory and the acts resulting from them. These constitute the animal soul. But man is distinguished from all these species by the rational faculty and what cannot exist except through it. Thus he is the only one who possesses rationality. What distinguishes man from the irrational animal has already been investigated.

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Since man is composed of the elements, he is linked with necessary actions wherein he has no choice, such as falling from above, being burned with fire, and so on. Hence he is associated with living beings in one of their aspects - viz., the plant -

and this also links him with actions in which he has no choice at all, such as retention. A form of necessity might fall among these actions, like what a man may commit under the stress of extreme fear, and like cursing a friend and killing his father or brother over a matter of property. In these last actions, however, there is a choice. An account of all this is given in the Nicomachean Ethics.

All that exists naturally for man and all actions that are particular to him are governed by choice, and every action governed by man's choice is not found in other types of bodies. The human actions by which (man) is particularized are those which are governed by choice because everything which man does by his choice is a human act, and every human action is an act of choice. I mean by the expression "choice" the will which is the result of deliberation. The inspirations, revelations and, in general, intellectual affections (impressions) - if it is possible for the intellect to have affections - which are associated with man are particular to him alone. The conditions surrounding man's choice of actions which are connected with the animal soul should be established because the action of irrational animals is preceded by whatever affection occurs in the animal soul. Man might act that way also, as when he runs away out of fear. This (kind of) action belongs to man in respect to the animal soul. For example, one who breaks a stone which strikes him or a stick which scratches him performs animal actions. The man who, however, breaks a stick so that it may not scratch another or

because of certain deliberations which necessitated its breakage, performs a human action. The same is true for every action which man performs for no other purpose but the mere doing of it, or one which he performs with no purpose intended (in mind), at all. Yet if there is a purpose to be served of which he is unaware, then his action is animal and comes exclusively from the animal soul.

An example is that of a man who eats plums because of his desire for them and accidentally gets diarrhea of which he was in need. Such an act is (essentially) animal and accidentally human. If a man is aware of the nature of plums and eats them, not because of his desire for them but rather to stimulate diarrhea, and it also happens accidentally that he desires the plums, then such an act is (essentially) human and accidentally animal, for only accidentally was the useful action desirable. Animal action is that which is preceded only by a psychological affection in the soul, such as desire, anger, fear and the like. Human action is that which is preceded by something necessitated in the agent by the intellect, and it is the same whether the psychological affection precedes the intellectual act or follows it. [Fol. 168 v] What is important here is that man's motive is necessitated by the intellect as such, etc., whether the thought is certain or arbitrary. The motive of the animal action is the affection that occurs in the animal soul, and the motive of human action is the opinion or belief that exists in the soul.

The majority of human actions in the four "ways of life" and their composition, consists of human and animal elements. Rarely is the animal element isolated from the human, because it is necessary for a man in his natural state except in unusual circumstances, even though the cause of his motion be affection - to think how he should act. Therefore, the human part makes use of his animal nature in order to restrict its action. As for the human element, it can exist apart from the animal; medical treatment is part of this kind of element. But in the latter case (the human element) may be accompanied by certain affection in the animal soul. ²⁴ If this affection supports a human view, then its realization is more frequent and stronger, and if it opposes a view, its realization is weaker and less frequent.

The man who acts for the sake of (right) opinion and judgment (truth), without any regard of his animal soul or of what takes place in it, deserves his action to be (considered) divine rather than human. Therefore, that man is of necessity excellently endowed with the moral virtues, so that when his rational soul decides upon something, his animal soul ²⁵ does not oppose it. Rather it decides upon the same thing because the intellect has decided upon it. For the animal soul to be in this state is to have obtained the moral virtues. The moral virtues are the entelechy of the animal soul. Hence the divine man is necessarily excellently endowed with the moral virtues; for if he lacked these virtues and his animal

soul opposed the intellect, then his action would either be imperfect or defective or would not have existed at all. He would perform that action only when forced to do so and it would be very difficult for him, because it is the nature of the animal soul to hearken to and obey the rational soul, except in the case of a man who is not in his natural (state) as, for example, a man who has the character of a beast. Hence, one overcome by anger at the time resembles a beast in character. That is why he whose animal soul overcomes his rational soul, so that he is in accordance with his desire which continually opposes his intellect, is an evil man. The beast is better than he. It is well said of him that he is a beast, but he has a man's ability to think by which he perfectly performs that action. Hence his ability to think in that instance is an evil additional to his original evil. It is like good food given to a sick body. As Hippocrates says: "The more you feed a sick body the more you add evil to it".²⁶ We explained this in the commentary we wrote on the seventh of De Auditione,²⁷ and we have inquired into it there.

It is now clear what human, animal and [inanimate] actions are. These are all actions that exist in man, and each is a genus (designation) for what falls under it. As for the inanimate action, it is clear that it is a matter of compulsion and that there is no choice in it, as we have. It has no purpose at all. Hence, we cannot refrain from doing it, because we do not do it by our will.²⁸ Animal action also has no purposes, but it is done by our will.

That is why we can refrain from it whenever we wish. It is clear then that purposes are set in respect of human actions only.

ARTICLE III

Discourse Concerning the Spiritual Forms:

Al-Suwaru al-Rūhāniyya

The expression ruh (spirit) is used in the language of the Arabs to mean the same thing for which the expression nafs (soul) is used, but the philosophers used it in an equivocal way. Sometimes they mean by it the (natural) instinctive heat which is the first organ of the soul. Hence the physicians say that the spirits are of three kinds: the natural spirit, the perceptive spirit and the motivative spirit. They mean by the natural spirit the nutritive one, because in their art they apply the expression "nature" to the nutritive soul. The expression "spirit" is used for the soul but not for the soul as such, rather from the viewpoint that it is a motivative soul. "Soul" and "spirit" are different expressions but they have the same substratum. The expression "spiritual" is related to the spirit if it indicates the second meaning (i.e. the perceptive spirit). They indicate by it the immobile substances which set other substances in motion. By necessity these are not bodies, but rather forms of bodies, because every body is necessarily in motion.

The pattern of this expression (rūhānī) is not Arabic. It is a (foreign) expression in the language of the Arabs, of a type which has no pattern according to the Arab grammarians because one says rūhī, according to their rule, (and not rūhānī). The philosophers use this form in rare expressions, such as Jismāniyya (corporeality) and nafsāniyya (psychicness). As for the expression hayūlāniyya (Materiality) it is also a foreign expression in their language. The farther the substance is removed from corporeality the more it deserves this name (rūhānī). That is why the philosophers believe that the substances which deserve this name more than any other are the active intellect and the substances which set the celestial bodies in motion.

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The spiritual forms are of (four) different types: the first is the forms of the celestial bodies, the second is the active (intellectus in actu) and the acquired (intellectus acquisitus) intellects, the third is the corporeal intelligibles, and the fourth is the concepts which exist in the (different) faculties of the soul, namely in the sensus communis, the imaginative faculty and the recollective faculty. The first is not material in any sense. As for the third ³¹ it has a direct relation with matter, and it is said to be material because it is constituted of the material intelligibles which are not essentially spiritual since they exist in matter. As for the second it is absolutely non-material since it has never at any time been necessarily material. Nevertheless, it has relation with matter,

because it either perfects the material intelligibles as in the case of the intellectus acquisitus, or it creates them as in the case of the intellectus in actu. As for the fourth type, it is in the middle, intermediary between the material intelligibles and the spiritual forms.

Since the first kind has nothing to do with what we are concerned with in this discourse, we leave it out. We shall be concerned here only with the absolute spiritual form, which is the intellectus in actu and what is related to it, namely, the intelligibles. We shall call these intelligibles the universal spiritual forms, and we shall call what comes below, down to the forms existing in the Sensus Communis, the particular spiritual forms. We shall explain later why we specify the latter as particular and the former as [Fol. 169 v] universal. The universal spiritual forms have only one particular relation, and that is with the man who conceives them. The particular spiritual forms have two relations. The first is particular, and that is their relation with the object of sense; the other is universal, namely their relation with the sense - organ that perceives them. An example of all this is the form of the mountain of ³²'Uhud as it exists in a person who has perceived it without actually seeing the mountain. That is its particular spiritual form because it has particular relation to the mountain. We call it mountain. It makes no difference to us whether we say "this is Mount 'Uhud" referring to it in its place as a visual perception or

indicating it as existing in the Sensus Communis after having been perceived in a particular perception such as the imagination. Its universal relation is its relation to each one of those who has seen the mountain, and many people have seen it. The matter of the particular spiritual form and its types is explained in al-Hissah al-Mahsusi (De Sensu et Sensibili) where they were investigated as natural phenomena. These two relations are discussed in that book without an explanation of their different types.

The human "régime" makes use of the different types of these relations as can be seen in what is explained later (in the book). It is clarified there ³³ that (the spiritual forms) existing in the Sensus Communis are the lowest level of spiritual forms, then come those existing in the imaginative faculty, then those existing in the recollective faculty. The highest and most perfect of the spiritual forms are those existing in the rational faculty. The first three of these are all corporeal, but the corporeality present in the Sensus Communis is greater than the corporeality present in the imaginative faculty, and the corporeality present in imaginative faculty is greater than that present in the forms of the recollective faculty. There is no corporeality at all in the form of the rational faculty. Hence, the particular relation between it (the rational faculty) and the person eliminated. Whenever there is a particular relation, corporeality occurs; and because of corporeality a particular relation occurs. When corporeality is eliminated (the forms)

become purely spiritual; nothing remains except their universal relation which is their relation with their individuals. Similarly, when corporeality is eliminated completely from these forms, they will have relation to it only in a different aspect.

It is clear now that predication is the result of the difference between the two relations. As for the universal relation it consist of predicating a universal (concept) of one of its individuals. The outcome is a particular proposition which has a universal predicate. As for the particular relation, its outcome is particular proposition, the predicate of which is a particular individual. The other types of propositions, whatever the relation (between their subject and their predicates), are discussed elsewhere. We have already explained all that in what we have written concerning the intelligibles.³⁴ Our claim that corporeality is included in these spiritual forms is discussed in the second part of the book De Sensu et Sensibili.

CHAPTER:

The different types of concepts (spiritual forms) which we have are either true or false, essential or accidental and certain or doubtful. It is clear - for one who has sight (knowledge) concerning the art of logic - that the certain concept is necessarily true (while) the doubtful concept could be false as well as true.

Our concern here is that we consider what is accidental [Fol. 169v] as part of what is doubtful and true. The spiritual forms of all types, can be viewed as true or false, because our senses could be false. An example of that is one who speaks to imaginary persons owing to hallucination or one who has a false taste due to certain sickness. Thus, man might have a true or false impression concerning the various spiritual forms. The best of the spiritual forms are those which are true or those which have passed through the Sensus Communis. We can have concepts of ancient well established matters without direct experience, such as the famous poet Umrū' I-Qays, as well as having concept of the imaginary world of Yajūg wa Majūg without perceiving it. These spiritual rusūm (images) have not passed through the Sensus Communis, and thus most of them are false. An account of how they could be true is to be found in the second article of De Sensu et Sensibili.

It is a condition of these to pass through the Sensus Communis. If some true concepts have not passed through the Sensus Communis, then, some things taking their place should pass through it. These alternatives are either their names or what indicates them, which should pass through the representative faculty also and reside in the recollective faculty. These could be real as in the case of Umrū'l-Qays, or imaginary as in the case of Kalīla wa Dimna. The imaginary ones are found in fabricated stories. There might be another type of spiritual form which neither its person nor its name

nor what indicates it has passed through the Sensus Communis; this might be coming from the active intellect and by the intermediation of the rational faculty, especially concerning future events which are still in potentiality such as true visions and common divinations. An account of this is to be found in the last part of II De Sensu. These forms do not exist by man's choice nor has he any influence, which may concern our subject, in bringing them into existence. Furthermore they exist in the individual man only on rare occasions. Hence this type of existent cannot constitute an art at all, nor can such a thing be a human "régime". That is why it does not belong to our subject. Divine inspirations are similar to these. The person who has this type of inspiration is called "an inspired person". 'Umar b. al-Khattāb ³⁷ - May God be pleased with him - is one of this group of people, according to what is related by the traditionists. The possessors of the true opinions belong to this group too, but the difference between them and inspired people is that one of the two parts which comprise (necessarily) every contradictory proposition (namely the true part) comes to the person of true opinion prior to the other part. This is necessary for all men, but with men (other than the possessors of true opinions) the false part (of the proposition) is prior, in most cases; they think that it is not derived from a syllogism. For the inspired person, on the other hand, the true part alone emerges without its contrary, and without a reminder which calls his attention to it. He does not have a desire for knowing that contrary (false part) neither by his intellect nor

through a syllogism. The correct part is not therefore a part of a contradiction at all, according to him. Confirmation only emerges before the possessor of the true opinion; and both conception and confirmation emerge before the inspired person. Aristotle has an account of all that in the II De Sensu et Sensibili. Qualities (of the inspired person) such as these exceed the natural custom; that is, they are divine talents. They cannot produce an art, because they exist in only a few people.

Most people belong to an intermediary position which is a mixed state. The best position among these various possibilities is to have most of one's opinions true and not confused, except in those cases where opinions are naturally confused. [Fol. 170 v]. The lowest of all positions is to have most of one's opinions false - that is, always to accept the least of them only; anyone occupying this position is known as a person of remote opinions. The opposite to this is to accept most of the opinions which belong either to a subject or to what is connected with it as true. These opinions are not articulated because of their obscurity or because of their multiplicity. Such a person renders opinions of equal truth and falsity or of less truth than falsity either necessary or most probable. This condition has no proper name and it appears mostly in a person of great experience, who gives attentive consideration to relations. Such persons are known as "experienced people". They can rarely be cheated, while the young (i.e. inexperienced) are more able to be

cheated. Aristotle has an account of that in Rhetoric.

The false spiritual forms are those which do not exist either because their subject do not exist, as in the case of proverbs, or because the subjects exist but have no predicates. The predicate in a false proposition can be tenfold.

(a) Impossible. The example of this is what the Arabs used to relate about Zarqā ul-Yamāma³⁸ or Ta'abbata Sharran³⁹ and what the Christians used to relate about a group of people who have built temples, giving their names to them, then have been killed and brought back into existence and then burned and brought again to life; they used to see it as a divine affair. What has been told by the Arabs is also included in doubtful opinions.

(b) Possible in reality. The example of this is the claim that Zayd is a grammarian when he, in fact, is not a grammarian because grammar may exist as a possibility for a certain man even though he has not actually learned it. Yet he is thought to have learned it.

The certain predicates of particular forms are those predicates the individuals of which exist in the corporeal forms, and hence are perceived by (external) senses. These should necessarily pass through the Sensus Communis. It is sufficient with regard to certainty in some of them, to perceive them by one of the senses only. This group comprises the particular objects of sense such as colour

for sight, sound for hearing and so on of what was mentioned in the *De Sensu et Sensibili* regarding the necessary conditions of that. It is not sufficient in some others, namely, the common objects of sense, to perceive them by one sense only. Certainty can be achieved only when all the senses cooperate together, and they may require the rational faculty. Take for example the claim that a visible person is alive; it is not sufficient here to use sight alone without touch, because he might have fainted, or sight without the rational faculty, because he might have had obstruction in the veins, so that he does not breathe and loses all manifestations of life except those which touch can determine, for touch can lead to certainty in relation to them. Therefore we use the rational faculty for other things which can be perceived in him; for example, we open a vein and let hot blood flow out or place a piece of cotton or a mirror near his mouth in order to see the humidity of his breathing, because breathing could be so hidden that senses cannot perceive it. Certainty in the particular forms could occur through the (external) senses or through syllogism, as for example (the certainty that) a wall must have a builder. But syllogism recalls the rational spiritual form of a thing. Thus the form which occurs in the *Sensus Communis* is different from the shapes which the thing has now or has had before and which are perceived by sense. That is why the *Sensus Communis* varies in persons who have seen that construction in recalling the form of the builder. The reason for this difference is that the form has not existed in all three faculties which recall the

spiritual forms as they were in their corporeal existence. If the three faculties agree, [Fol. 170 v] then the spiritual form would appear to be tangible. Whenever the three faculties agree, truth becomes necessary and they reveal wonder at their union.

This is what the Sufis (mystics) thought to be the final end for man, and they used to say in their prayers: "May God unite you and assign your unity"⁴⁰ because, by falling short of catching the pure spiritual forms, they consider the previous spiritual forms instead of the pure one. And since these previous ones are false upon their separation, they felt that these are always true upon their unity. They thought that the unity of the forms is the ultimate happiness. When these faculties agree, they bring to the person unusual forms, and potential objects of sense which have excellent sight and soul of greater dignity in this world. Thus they thought that the (ultimate) end is to attain this state. Hence al-Ghazali says that he has attained high spiritual experience and that he has witnessed the spiritual substances. He mentioned the greatness of his visions in⁴¹ the words of the poet.

"Something happened of what I do not remember"

That is why the Sufis claim that attainment of the ultimate happiness may occur without learning, but rather through devotion and dedication⁴² of oneself to the continual remembrance of God. When the person does that, the (different) faculties agree and the attainment of that state

becomes possible. All this is a matter of opinion. The effect of what the Sufis thought is unnatural phenomena. The end which they thought to be the ultimate end, if it were to be a true one and an end for the solitary man, then it should be obtained essentially and not accidentally, but it is in fact obtained accidentally (here) and not essentially. This means that the most honourable part of man is an appendage which has no role to play. It follows that this part (the intellect) exists in vain. This fact renders false, not only all doctrines and the three sciences which constitute theoretical wisdom (philosophy), but also the conceptual arts such as grammar and the like. The rational method is the essential way to attain the certainty of the predicates of the spiritual forms. Certainty might occur - accidentally - in the chain of traditions, but that occurs only through the agreement of the rational with the recollective faculty. If sense does not agree with both of them the form of a thing would not appear as it is in external existence. Take for example the certainty that the Nile ⁴³ is in Egypt. If the Sensus Communis does not agree with the other two faculties, then the spiritual form of Egypt and the location of the Nile in relation to it in the Sensus Communis of the person who did not see them in their external existence is not certain. If they agree for a certain man, ⁴⁴ then the City of Fustat, and the location of the Nile in relation to it would be for him as they are in the external existence. He would witness the objects of the spiritual forms (exactly) as they are in their existence. As for the spiritual forms which occur in

the recollective faculty of a thing and which the other faculties acquire from the recollective faculty, all these and their predicates are probable, except for forms certainty of which had occurred to them in the way which we have already mentioned, namely, accidentally. The false spiritual forms occur in many ways, sometimes, in the particular objects. These are accidental as in the case of a man who stays a long time in the smoke of pine wood, so his face becomes black in a way that it is thought to be actually black. Similarly in the case of sounds and all other objects of sense. The common object of sense, some of which are the illusions of the senses, like a person moving in the sea who would see the mountains also moving. Some of the magicians' arts are also among these. If something cannot be perceived, not because it is imperceptible, but because it is absent, or because the substance [Fol. 171 v] which possesses^{es} its spiritual form has decayed, it is considered absent in relation to the senses, although it is present in reality. This is even more so in the case of things which remain absent for a long time. Such things have other causes which are not difficult to enumerate, but counting causes lies beyond our concern. We do not aim here to count all kinds of "régime" but rather to ascertain the true "régime" which is the most excellent Tadbîr, for it is just possible that through it the Solitary man may attain essential happiness. As for the practice of lying it enters only into the attainment of happiness by the inhabitants of imperfect cities; yet not lying as such but lying by means of symbols. All

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this was investigated in the political sciences. Our (sole) concern here is the "Régime" of the Solitary. The false spiritual forms produce hypocrisy, cunning and other similar abilities. These and similar things have great importance in the cities existing (in this time) to the extent that the person who knows them is considered to be wise, and they are considered as wisdom itself. The common people consider these (vices) and other characteristics of imperfect cities to be rationality (itself), of which Aristotle speaks in the Sixth.⁴⁷ When they hear the conditions set by Aristotle concerning reasoning, that the reasonable person is virtuous, their minds reject what they hear. Many of them believe that this is frivolity, defective understanding and a kind of stupidity. Hence some people esteem Mu'āwiya more higher than 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib - May God be pleased with him - with respect to Firmness.⁴⁸ If all this is examined carefully, it appears that the reality is contrary to what they believe. We will clarify this later on.

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The essential conditions for the absolute spiritual forms is that the Intelligibles are their essential predicates. An account of this is to be found in the Demonstration.⁴⁹ As in the case of the particular spiritual forms, they existed only for the corporeal bodies in a certain way. We do not need to set the condition that each of the rational forms exist through a corporeal object, as this condition was set for the corporeal forms. We need this condition for the existence of the corporeal forms only, because the spiritual

forms of corporeal bodies are particular as we have said before. These forms are accidental if they do not belong to corporeal bodies, as is evident in the case of colours or sensory illusions, or other similar instances which we have enumerated before. This may (sometimes) be due to the falsity of the rational faculty which shares these particular spiritual forms with the objects of reasoning, such as when two existents appear together in a certain time and people think that they are the same thing.

CHAPTER:

Since we want our discussion to be of practical use, we limit ourselves to that which fulfills this end. We will not include that which drives the soul to Tadbīr. Hence, in this chapter, we choose to discuss the type of propositions which are known as ⁵⁰ infi'āliya in addition to the ⁵¹ balāghiyā propositions which describe the fulfillment (attainment) of Tadbīr. When the concepts by which Tadbīr is fulfilled (attained) are conceived they are not merely independent entities (concepts) but they are accompanied by a shadow which belongs to the animal soul. It is because of the shadow that the animal soul desires the attainment of Tadbīr, and obeys and moves in accordance with the demands of Tadbīr.

In a similar way this occurs in all the arts, for example,

the art of calligraphy. The art of calligraphy subsists in the soul by means of the proposition which contains that art. The motive for bringing the action of that art into practice and the confirmation of that art and its action is due to other things which belong to the animal soul.

So we say: the form of every corruptible and existing body has three levels of existence; the first level is the universal spiritual one [Fol. 171 v] , which is the rational level, i.e., the species. The second is the particular spiritual level; and the third is the corporeal level. As for the particular spiritual level, it also has three levels; the first is the conceptual level, which exists in the recollective faculty; the second is the level of image, which exists in the faculty of imagination; and the third is the level of reflection, which exists in the Sensus Communis. Thus a form is either universal or particular. The universal form comprises the universal objects of reasoning, while the particular form is either spiritual or corporeal.⁵²

According to the discussion above, every man has different genera of faculties. The first is the rational one, the second is comprised of the three spiritual faculties,⁵³ the third is the perceptive faculty, the fourth is the reproductive faculty, the fifth is the nutritive faculty and that which belongs to it,⁵⁴ and the sixth is the corporeal faculty.⁵⁵ As for what man has of the sixth and

fifth ones, they do not belong to the essence of the living being (animal) at all; that is why some people call them natural faculties and they call the fifth, the natural faculty.⁵⁶

As for the actions of the sixth faculty, they are absolutely necessary and they have nothing in common with free actions. And as for the actions of the fifth faculty, they likewise are not at all free yet (on the other hand) they are not absolutely obligatory (either), but differ from obligatory actions in that their motivating (causes) are in the body, and yet they require the object of motion which is in the matter, namely, the food; and generally speaking, the object of motion is like the healing of a wound and the like. As for the actions of the fourth they are also similar to those of the fifth, but they are closer to free will, because food is necessary for the sustenance of the body, while fecundation of the sperm in a fertile woman is neither necessary nor does desire lead necessarily (directly) to it. That is clear in itself. Thus, that which leads to fecundation is an act of free will. We will speak about the different kinds of actions later on. One (group of) people consider these actions to be actions of free will, while another group may consider them to be actions of obligation. As for the third faculty, its actions are similar to the previous ones. We consider them also to be necessary actions because they are emotions, but some of them are closer to free will, for example, sight, while some of them are closer to obligation, for example, touch. But we can, if we wish, resist being acted upon by

any of them, for we can escape from heat and secure protection from cold and the like. As for the second faculty, it has actions and emotions; the emotions which emanate (occur-spring out) from it are similar to sense, while the actions are voluntary ones if they are human and obligatory; if they are animal; as we have explained in our commentary in the VII De Auditu Physico. As for the first faculty, both affirmation and apprehension with regard to it are obligatory, because if they were voluntary, we would be able to run away from what harms us, and there would be no justification for Al-Mutanabbi's words: "I run away from it to lie (in vain)"⁵⁷ if the actions which sprang out from it were absolutely voluntary ones.

Each of the faculties one through four or every faculty of the four ones,⁵⁸ or a combination of them - has something to do with rationality and with free will (choice); and, since the human actions are voluntary ones, each of the actions of these four faculties has connection with rationality. The organization and the arrangement of man's actions are for the sake of rationality. They belong to rationality for the sake of the goal which people customarily call the result.⁵⁹

CHAPTER:

Some human actions are voluntary in all their details; that is why it is possible for man to refrain from doing them whenever he

wishes as in the case of weaving, shoemaking and other similar arts. Some other human actions are voluntary in the majority of their details, but their goals are directed towards something else. ⁶⁰ These are the human actions in which the rational faculty shares with an irrational element, and such actions include navigation [Fol. 172 v] and farming. Some human actions are only initiated by man. When man has initiated the action another mover takes the responsibility for the completion of the action. An example is procreation, for when man deposits sperm in the womb, he has nothing else to do with the formation of the child.

The first type of action takes the name, of the generic noun; this type is called "the arts and the professions". The second type includes farming and navigation, and it is called capacities. This type is explained in the book of political science ⁶¹ (politics). The third type of action is composed of two different parts; the first part is like a cause which is voluntarily initiated by man, while choice has nothing to do with the second part. Hence, the voluntary part belongs to man's free will while the second does not.

CHAPTER:

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Some spiritual forms have states in the soul while others do not. Those which do not have states in the soul are those spiritual forms which occur in an abstract way and which are the result of com-

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monly existing species. For example, when a man sees a man, a spiritual form occurs in his soul. But this spiritual form does not have status ⁶⁴ or any effect in his soul. If the form of the man who was seen is recalled and remembered by the mind it is accidental. For when a man comes across a man who has common features and customary dress, the spiritual form occurring as a result of seeing that man is not recalled except accidentally, because when a part is recalled by the mind only a part of the totality is recalled, and this is accidental also.

When a man sees an individual of a species with which he is not acquainted, like when the people of the North see an elephant, the status of the spiritual form of that individual belongs to the species rather than to the individual elephant, and the form serves as a spiritual form for a species.

Among these forms which have no state in the soul, another type is illustrated by a man who sees a thief. Seeing a thief produces fear and effect in the soul. This effect is general because it is similar to that produced by any thief. Therefore this form also replaces the species. These forms do not call for discussion; they only have incidental importance, as we have said.

The forms which have states are also of different types. Some have natural states such as that of the son and the father; and,

generally, the mammals (animals possessing wombs) because they possess spiritual forms of their immediate relatives (parents and offspring) and there may be discussion of these. Other forms have natural states also, but their states are either of imperfection or perfection. The states of imperfection are, for example, deformity and sickness. Let us (here) call the form which has a state of imperfection "a form which does not have a state", as when we call a person of bad voice "a person who does not have a voice". The states of perfection are psychic and corporeal states. The corporeal states include a beautiful face and a well proportioned body. The psychic states include all (ethical) virtues. In general, when the states are natural and not acquired, they are either corporeal, psychic and intellectual virtues or the opposite of these. Among the states are those which are acquired. These are different types; either arts, capacities, manners, rational faculties or the actions of all these. Among these forms there is also a type which implies relationship; it is divided into dignity and vileness.

Each one of these two parts has benefit and harm for the possessor of the forms. We shall speak about (all) this in detail if we get that far.

Furthermore the spiritual forms are of different levels depending upon their objects. Some levels are more spiritual than others. The form residing in the Sensus Communis makes up the lowest

spiritual level, and it is the form closest to corporeality. That is why this form is expressed by Şanam (the image); hence it is said that the Sensus Communis has within itself the Şanam of an object of senses. Next, is the form existing in the imaginative faculty which is both more spiritual and less corporeal than the previous form. The psychic virtues are related to it. [Fol. 172 v] Next is the form (projected) in the recollective faculty. This form is the highest level of the particular spiritual forms.

By nature, each of these forms is dear to man, and it is rare to find a man without the influence of one of these spiritual forms. All man's actions, if he is a part of a city, are directed towards the city itself, but that is true only in the perfect city. In the four other cities or in any combination of them (we find) every citizen chooses any one of these (forms) as his final goal and is preoccupied with the pleasure of this goal. Then preliminary steps of the perfect city become goals of other cities.

ARTICLE IV

The human actions (are of three main categories:) 65

1. The goal of actions of the first category is to bring into existence the corporeal forms only, as in the case of eating, drinking, clothing oneself and seeking shelter. The elementary aspects of these actions are basic and necessary (to all species), but excess in the variety of food desired, the use of perfume, and, in general, everything which is desired for pleasure only is purely corporeal. These actions include getting intoxicated, playing chess and hunting for pleasure. The person who makes these actions his goal is purely corporeal, but this type of person is very rare. Such a person does not have respect for his spiritual form, nor does he feel it because of the excess of his corporeality. This type of person appears mainly among the successors of the highly ancedered families, and they are responsible for the downfall of nobility. Hence the dynasties of the different nations change at the hands of such persons. Any man can comprehend this on his own, if he gives thought to it. This is not a suitable place to discuss it.

All authorities and well-established opinions agree on rebuking persons of this type. The poet said concerning them:

Oh you, you got gray hair and did not abandon childish
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 manners.

These are the ones who incline to the earthly world and about whom
 God says:

...the tale of him to whom we gave Our revelations,
 but he sloughed them off, so Satan overtook him and
 he became of those who lead astray. And had We willed
 we could have raised him by their means, but he clung
 to the earth and followed his own lust. 67

These do not pay any attention to the actions of the spiritual forms.
 When these actions come to their attention they disregard them. It
 serves no purpose to blame a person of this type or to ignore him, for

His likeness is as the likeness of a dog;
 if thou attacked him he panteth with his tongue out, 68
 and if thou leavest him he panteth with his tongue out.

These are, as we have said, rare, but they exist. Many are overcome
 by this nature, but they vary in their corporeality and spirituality.

2. The goal of actions of the second category is directed toward the
 spiritual forms, and this category of actions is of different types:

- the first, is directed towards the spiritual forms of the Sensus

Communis and this type is frequently associated with the first
 category. These actions are higher because they belong to the second
 category and lower because they belong to the first category. These
 actions are either acquired or natural. The acquired ones are states
 of the natural ones. The most pleasing one is clothing oneself. We
 find that clothing oneself belongs to the natural class while the
 colours of the cloth belong to the acquired class. The spiritual

forms of the Sensus Communis comprehend at one and the same time the clothes and the colours, as they are associated with the clothes, or other similar details of the setting they need not have to do with the clothes. The conditions of housing and the appearance of eating and drinking and their instruments belong to the acquired class. Both the acquired and the natural classes of actions are found combined in many people, and rebuking them becomes difficult.

It is possible to find some unauthoritative opinions [Fol. 173 v] which praise this type of action and consider it an honour. The value of this type is very high in some ways of life, while it is very low in others. These two classes are rarely found separated, but the natural one is more frequent. The acquired class is considered honourable because of its relation with the spiritual form. At the hands of persons of the acquired class of actions, the states (dynasties) fall (change) in most cases. However their claims to nobility are not lost, because some people consider persons with these acquired actions to be virtuous, especially when the majority of their actions belong to the spiritual forms. These acquired actions dominate some people to the point that they wear ragged underclothes while they are very concerned about their outer garments. That some do this is well known in the time in which I am writing this book. This used to be a common practice in this country during the period of the kings of the Tawā'if. Most of these are known as

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Al-Mutajammilūn and their way of life is called al-Tajammul. Hence it is said that al-Tajammul dissipates wealth, for they use it in order to fulfill their wish to impress the notables of the time. They praise and get praised by wealth. This class of actions (usually) brings the actor to disrepute and regret, but most people of the above mentioned way of life love it secretly while rejecting and criticizing it openly.

- The second is directed towards the spiritual forms of the imaginative faculty. And this type is of different classes too. Some actions of this type express a certain kind of emotion, such as wearing weapons in peace time, frowning and all other psychic dispositions. Another example is found in the histories of different nations where the kings obtain (and utilize) frightful instruments and wear weapons in their courts (in order to impress) when they meet common and foreign envoys. Some other actions of this type are meant for pleasure only such as smiling, amity and charity. Joking also belongs to this type as well as some sorts of clothing, housing and fashions which produce wonder. Eloquent talk and memorization of tales, proverbs and poetry are considered to be among this type. Still other actions have perfection as their essential aim; if some other aim is associated with them it is only accidental. These are the rational virtues, namely: the sciences and the intellect mentioned by Aristotle in the VI,⁷² and such actions as giving sound advice and making correct deduction. Some of the arts are included in these actions too, an

account of which will be given later on. In this type of action we find ideal (moral) virtues such as generosity, succouring, familiarity, good association, kindness, amity, honesty; and recognized virtues such as wealth, extreme jealousy, extreme pride as well as all that we have mentioned in the first type. These are meant to produce solemnity in the soul, to be followed by respect and all external interests. In some cases nothing is aimed at by these actions other than that the person likes to perform them, and performing them leads to the perfection of his spiritual form. In still other cases he may perform the actions because he is familiar with them or because he believes that he is familiar with them, and not for the sake of the spiritual form. When a person knows something very well, he can perform it in a better or in a more perfect way; but when he is not certain that he knows, he does not do it; and if he does perform the action, he does it only when obliged or unaware. The true actions among these do not have a proper name, while the accidental or false actions are named "Hypocrisy". This name is also applicable to all actions expressing emotion, because when a person performs such actions he performs an action of desire if he seeks respect (Fol. 173v] or the like. The action is similar to that of desire if the person seeks solemnity through it, or if he thinks that the action is perfect. The first (true) group of actions, do not have a proper name, but it is known by the generic name "virtuous actions and actions in the pursuit of virtue". Those persons who perform these actions are rewarded by God, and they are referred to in the (following) sound

Hadith:

Who immigrates for God's sake, immigrates for God;
and who immigrates because of certain worldly interests
which he wants to obtain or because of a woman whom he
wants to marry, immigrates for what he immigrates for 73

In general recompense is in accordance with what is in the (following)
sound Hadith:

Actions are judged according to the agent's intention
and every person is recompensed by what he intended 74

- The third are the actions by which man obtains the perfection of
the forms of the recollective faculty. These actions are preferred
in themselves by most people to the extent that many of them think
that these actions are happiness itself, especially when these actions
are associated with previous actions and correct. More than any other
nation, the Arabs hold remembrance in high regard; hence one of their
poets said:

Oh Māwiya, wealth comes and goes;
what remains of it is stories and memory 75

They believe that the remembrance of a person is his immortality.

Therefore the poet said:

The memory left after a man is his second life. 76

And that is why the daughter of Haram b. Sinān said to the daughter
of Zuhayr, the poet:

We have given you something temporal and you
have given us something eternal. 77

Proverbs and poems concerning this remembrance are many and well
known. These actions are hidden in some ways of life while they are

obvious in others.

The perfection of the form of remembrance is obtained most frequently and perfectly by way of the actions which we enumerated in reference to the imaginative faculty. The perfection cannot be obtained, or is rarely obtained, by way of the actions of the Sensus Communis. Disrepute is obtained through all corporeal actions, but not through these actions per se, because through these actions the forms of the imaginative faculty are obtained. The forms of the recollective faculty are obtained through these actions only in association with something else; association occurs either when the community practices the memorizing of poetry as when a poet describes something and the people make frequent use of it, as al-Muhalabī has done with the poet al-'A'shā,⁷⁸ or when an action is unusual and fascinating, and people recall it frequently because of that. In general whenever the mentioning of an action stirs the emotions, people like to make it their own. That is how their posterity inherit it. Similarly are all perfect actions such as the construction and the establishment of 'Iwān al-Madā'im⁷⁹ and the statues of al-Khālidiyyāt.⁸⁰ Most books, poems and speeches are among these. The intention of the poet, has nothing to do with (the performance of) a virtuous action, rather it is related to his desire, etc. As for the unusual and fascinating action - because of rarity, immensity and oddity - it may be performed by virtuous people not in order to be remembered, but rather for the sake of the perfection of the action. Since this is

very common and frequent among the high-spirited people and among those who are capable of the Tadbīr of the city, the Tadbīr should be fulfilled by these people. Hence acting for the sake of fame is denounced along with other defects like hypocrisy and corporeal actions. This explains what was declared in the "Ḥadīth" and the "Zabur"⁸¹ concerning the person who seeks fame (in Zabur): "He who seeks fame, God shall order that the fame which he seeks shall become an adder of fire"⁸² and in the Hadīths: "God creates scorpions which sting each other and then emit their poison to be mixed with a curse and given as drink to the person who seeks fame".⁸³

Just as there is a particular activity in the recollective faculty of a virtuous person, there is also a particular emotion appropriate to this person; therefore the spiritual form in his recollective faculty continues to exist longer and is recalled more frequently. This is not a voluntary human action, it is simply the possession of the [Fol. 174 v] truth. Truth exists in other than the possessor of remembrance (recollective), as Aristotle has clarified in II. De Sengu. It exists by agreement of the three previous⁸⁴ faculties; that is how a person is able to witness truth, because it is impossible that the three faculties agree and not tell the truth. This agreement is not perceived and one hardly feels it. For this reason truth comes so frequently from the tongues of men and continues to exist among them, while falsity, which is related to the recollective faculty, destroys itself; its destruction is very fast, and it

comes rarely from the tongues of men. We shall explain this later on.

3 - The third category is made up of actions which are related to the universal spirituality. These are the most perfect of all spiritual actions, for it is as though they were the boundaries between actions which are mixed with corporeality - if we may call that mixing - and absolutely pure spirituality. These actions are many and include teaching, deduction and the like. We leave this now until we come to the end of the book.

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CHAPTER:

Some people are overcome by corporeality; these are the lowest. Others possess a very refined spirituality (universal spirituality). And still others have both (corporeality and universal spirituality), which vary in their proportions.

The first two types are very rare. The first of them is more frequent (than the other). The second, which is the most perfect spirituality, is less frequent: 'Uways al-Qurani and Ibrahim b. Adham belong to this type. Hermes belongs to the corporeal extremes of this type (third type), as Aristotle says in the book Nicomachean Ethics. The individuals of this type vary in their proportions by having elements of the other types or by acting in keeping with part or all of the other types. Hence this type has two opposite

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extremes; the expression Khissah (vileness) is used for one of them, not absolutely, but rather in a particular sense. The expression Sharaf (nobility) is used in an absolute sense for the other extreme, without any qualification (or restraint). The vile individual performs actions related to the spiritual form, but only when nothing separates them from corporeal actions. He is vile in this way, and noble because the spiritual form resides in him. The individual of the extreme is one who performs corporeal actions only if they are not separated from the spiritual ones, because if they are separated, then the spiritual action is very little while the corporeal action is very great. This kind of nature is usually praised; that is why the poet says:

They refused to run away, although the spears
were at their chests, they were facing death

and then adds:

If they had run away, they would have lived in respect

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This type of person does not pay attention to corporeal actions, but rather they burden his body with patience towards poverty, hunger and the burden of difficult tasks, in order to achieve the action by which his spiritual form is beautified. Some people are known to be of this type. Learning and teaching and perseverance in sciences are contained in it. The mystics, ⁹⁰ in reality, are of this type, but according to the intention which they propose, they are included in the type of the universal spirituality which is the entalechia of the rational faculty. We shall explain that when we reach it -

if God wills.

CHAPTER:

We have previously explained that all spiritual actions are either actions of desire or actions similar to these in pattern. For the other goals which are associated with the essential goal of these actions are accidental goals (only) but the essential goal is either a goal of desire or a goal of similar pattern. Such is the case with the person who seeks perfection of the spiritual form of the imaginative or the recollective faculties, for the sake of nobleness and fame, to become great or obtain other rewards of external benefits. Another person performs that type of action simply because it is virtuous and beautiful. Hence he performs it whether he knows that it is beneficial or not, and he performs it more worthily when he does not know that it is beneficial. This type of person is characterized by if he is given credit for his action [Fol. 174 v] or being praised on account of it. This type does not seek gratitude. If obliged to mention his acts, he would not do so out of pride. Hence the prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace - said: "I am the master of mankind" ⁹¹. Yet he says this without pride, rather he was speaking about one of his attributes, much as he would speak about attributes that have no suggestion of pride, as when one says: "I am in good health today."

As for the person of desire, he usually seeks gratitude and

he likes to receive credit for his good deeds, because his goal is external benefit. And if he does not obtain it, then his action would be in vain. As for the righteous person, he obtains a goal which he does not aim for, and of which most people do not know, not to mention aiming for it. Only the philosophers of natural science and of ethics know of this goal. The philosophers obtain what the person of desire aimed for and proposed, and in a way that is of benefit extraneous to the essential goal, as discussed previously. All such benefits are divine gifts and the actions of the righteous person are similar, for example, to the getting of nourishment with agreeable food, as is the usual practice of people of sound health. They do not realize that the food is suitable for health, and yet good health occurs through it without their intention.

Similar to the health which occurs to the person of righteous desire - whether he intends it or not - is this noble and pure spirituality which occurs to the person of righteous character - whether he intends it or not. And similar to desire, which is righteous if it aims for actions which give health essentially, is the person of righteous character who gains spirituality by performing the actions which give this spirituality. Essentially both righteous desire and character are divine gifts which God - the Most High - gives to whom he will of His creatures. A man has no power concerning this, and God may send him wealth through another person. So this second man would have a share in the giving. That is when a man may sometimes

be described as a wealth-giver. This applies also to all gifts which are not divine. As for divine gifts, man cannot share in giving them. What we have been concerned with here is one of these divine gifts - not the highest one nor the lowest, but rather closer to the highest. We shall speak about the ranking of these gifts with respect to nobility and vileness when we speak about the rational faculty.

CHAPTER:

As for the natural actions:

- Some of them are accidental and they follow the pattern of the necessary action in which there is no choice for the possessor of spiritual form such as the nobility of ancestors.

- Others are essential (and of two kinds): either common (for animals and human beings) or human (only). An example of the actions is the parents' love of their children, because parents love the spiritual forms of children. When the offspring is absent from his parents - whether they are irrational animals or human beings - in a way they cannot perceive its form, they would forget about it. And if they confuse him with another in a way that they perceive its form in the other, they would love this other offspring. If they were to love his corporeal form it would be impossible for them to love other than their own. This is clear with camels and their inclination towards al-Baw,⁹² which the Arabs use in order that the milk of the

mother-camel flows. This is the form which contains the entelechy of
 93
 the offspring of the perfect animal. and similar animals such as
 animals which suckle their offspring and (fowl) which hatch their eggs.
 These conditions of the spiritual forms apply to offspring as far as
 they are not able to feed themselves. After that stage, such condit-
 ions are human only, except that some people relate that a horse would
 never mate its mother. As for all other relations of parents and
 children, they are human only and most of them are governed by social
 94
 customs and the religious laws. A sufficient account of this is to
 be found in Plato's V Politics.

CHAPTER:

Insofar that particular spiritual forms have the universal
 relation, we say about their conditions what we have already said
 about human actions. Thus, the particular spiritual forms, in having
 the universal relation, are either perceptions or imagination, through
 which the animal performs its particular actions. This has been ex-
 plained on many different occasions. Hence every being which has
 spontaneous movement is sensible and every sensible (being) has spont-
 aneous movement. As for the spheres, they do not move spontaneously
 except in a relative way, because they cannot stop their movements,
 and every being which has spontaneous movement has spontaneous rest
 also. These spheres have in common (the fact) that all of them are
 composed of motives and objects of motion, yet they differ in other

things.

Our only concern here is the affairs which are related to man. The stages of a man are brought into existence by his different faculties, some stages by one faculty, other by another. These stages are made final by the stars of life.

a. -The first of man's stages exists during his infancy, namely, from the first moment of his birth until he becomes able to move his whole body towards what he desires. As long as he remains in this stage of his life, he acts solely in accordance with the nutritive soul. As for the development and change which occur in him these are not specific to one stage only, and our concern here does not include them.

b. -As for his stage from the time he moves toward what he desires until the time in which he gains reflection, it has no commonly used name in the language of the Arabs, except perhaps by those who know the rarely used Arabic expressions. Let us transfer to it the name of the next age, childhood. It is clear that in this stage of life he is animal only, because he acts in accordance with the animal soul only.

c. -The stage which starts when reflection starts is a stage in which he is entirely a human being who controls himself, and

who is not in need of another person to be responsible for him. The spiritual forms of the first stage exist naturally for all animals which care for their young. And some of the spiritual forms of the second stage exist for certain of these animals, such as chicken and partridge. The highest state of life is for man only, because the stages of irrational animals do not include deliberation; rather the stages of these animals are distinguished by other conditions. An account of this is to be found in ten articles of The History of
⁹⁵
Animals. The states of the third age (stage) are artificial in the sense that they are man-made, since taking responsibility for children was not necessarily included in this stage by some societies. The condition with which the spiritual forms of children exist (for their parents) is different and unnatural, a kind of love which is more correctly thought of as artificial (not natural); but human nature is also involved with it. This relation (between parents and their children) varies with different ways of life. [Fol. 175 v] For ex-
⁹⁶
 ample in the democratic way of life we find children more loved than in any other way of life, because of the cooperation among people to protect their homes. That is evident among the Arabs and the Berbers, where social breakdown occurs so often.

In other stages of middle age, advanced age, and the age of the very elderly, the spiritual forms vary with each of them, knowing this is easy for he who has time to consider the matter. Hence when a person is a certain age and does not perform actions appropriate

to that age, he would be still in the previous stage, not having progressed beyond it. This is due to a defect in his faculties; then this would be a defect in his nature, as is the case with mentally ill persons. And if he has the faculties and does not act appropriately, then he is also mentally ill, though to a lesser degree than in the first case. Or he may act according to this age but towards what he used to aim towards in the previous age, making use of the newly acquired faculties in order to improve (do well) the actions of the old faculties. In this he is then an animal, and there is no difference between him and the animal, except that he performs the action of that animal in better and improved way through deliberation.

It is clear that the condition of every age is a preliminary step and servant to the next age. When a man acts in the way which we have described, he makes the preliminary step an end and the end a preliminary step, and the master a servant and the servant a master. Hence Aristotle says in I. Nicomachean : "The defects lie not in the age, but rather in the character and customs". It is considered improper for the man in advanced age to act as a youth because of the distance between the two ages, with middle age between them. It is preferable for person choosing playing as arbitrator to choose playing with swords for it has place for seriousness; and it is approved of the youth to rejoice and joke, because these are the first actions of deliberation lying between playing and seriousness. Middle-aged people properly show charity and amity, because these are the serious

part of rejoicing and joking. Persons of advanced age properly show soundness of opinion, soundness of advice, wisdom and intellect, and in general all the rational virtues. When they have these virtues, they are not usually considered particularly intelligent or intellectual, because it is their natural state, and to be considered intelligent and intellectual at this age requires yet additional growth of the emotional faculty.

Then, rejoicing and joking are for youth, sound opinions for the middle aged, and sound deliberation for the person of advanced age, and the very elderly person should have in actuality all the human potentialities.

The state of the very elderly is similar to that of the first age, because a person in the first age is not a human being in the absolute sense, but rather a growing human being. In the last age, he is a decaying human being. Hence the person in this last age should have wisdom only, for wisdom alone is suitable for him. That is why Socrates considers the possessor of this age, if he is wise, to be in a state of rejoicing and happiness. As to what we mean by this "happiness", an account is to be found in the Art of Politics.

Similarly, when we find some of the states of a latter age present in a person at an early age, particularly at a very early age, as when respectfulness, charity, amity, and more than all these,

advice, appear in the youth that would be either because of a defect in his nature, as has been witnessed, such that when he gets old his fire would extinguish faster than the fire of Heraclites, ⁹⁹ or because of what we find in our time among children of these who live in luxury and children of those of noble ancestral claims. It is clear that they affect what they do not possess. If this is to be found in the city and thought to be virtuous, [Fol. 176 v] it would be the gravest and most powerful reason of corruption in it, whichever of the four cities it is. It is the Imām-city in which this is in no way possible. Mostly it happens in the timocracy, then the democracy, then in the ¹⁰⁰ tyranny.

ARTICLE V

CHAPTER:

The ends which are intended by the (actions of the) "Solitary" are three kinds, because they belong either to his corporeal form, his particular spiritual form, or his universal spiritual form. The ends of the "Solitary", when he is part of the Imam-city, have been spoken of in Political Science. Some of the actions of these other cities - when he is part of them - are suitable to the ends of the "Solitary". An account of all affairs of the city is to be found in Political Science.

Deliberation, searching, deduction and, in general, rationalization are used in order to obtain each one of these ends because if rationalization is not used, then obtaining that end would be an animal action which has no share of humanity in any respect, except that the acting agent has features similar to those of man. If a person's ends are animal ones, his actions fall in the same pattern with the actions of animals, whether his ends are obtained through human thought or not. There is no difference between a real animal and a man whose features are human but who conceals animality within. It is clear that the type of person whose ends are obtained by animal actions cannot estab-

lish a city nor be a part of a city at all. This is possible for the "Solitary" only, whose ends have been already described.

The ends of the animal (person) belong to the first of the three (above-mentioned categories of ends), and this (first type) does not belong to the universal spiritual form, because the universal spiritual form belongs to the intellect through reasoning. It is clear then that the animal ends belong to the two other categories, namely: corporeality and particular spirituality. The animals may have actions by which they obtain particular spirituality, such as the shyness of a lion, ¹⁰³ the pride of a peacock, the hypocrisy of a dog, the generosity of a cock and the deception of a fox. When these qualities exist for animals, they exist naturally for the whole species, and not for one individual only, and when an animal perceives through the particular spiritual forms, the nature of the species gives the animal that quality of perception. When an animal possesses a noble quality, the quality belongs to the species, and only in mankind may qualities belong to the individual. Animal species which have noble qualities are the noblest among the species but these qualities are not virtues, because animals practice them at all times, whether they should be practiced or not. Hence they are not virtues except in an equivocal way. An account of the nature of this matter is to be found elsewhere. Thus, a person of corporeal ends is on an equality with animals.

Perfections, in general, are either moral or intellectual. Some moral perfections can be shared by animals, and the qualities which exist for the spiritual forms and which are moral virtues can be shared by animals. But they exist for the species only, as in the case of the succour and the shyness of the lion. They do not exist for one lion alone, but for every lion. If a certain lion were to have a special quality belonging to his particular spiritual forms - exceeding the nature of the species, for example - that would be accidental. The spiritual forms of the animals are expressed in perfections which represent the whole species, and if any animal has some perfection different from the perfections representative of the species, this perfection is accidental. But when any perfection exists in [Fol. 176 v] the human spiritual forms, it belongs to an individual in a particular way, and does not constitute an alternative for the species in an accidental way.

The intellectual perfections constitute particular conditions for the human spiritual forms and are not shared by any other type of forms. Examples are soundness of view, excellence of advice, correctness of opinion, and many other arts and faculties by which man is characterized, such as speech-making, leading armies, medical treatment, managing the home and the like. Philosophical wisdom is the most perfect of the human spiritual qualities, except in relation to those who do not know it, because for them it falls in the same pattern as other qualities. An example is the rank of the scholar

(man of science) in the view of the common people. His kind of perfection, according to them, exists for knowledge accidentally, as secondary matter, while the perfection of (philosophical) wisdom is (for the possessor of wisdom) an essential and primary matter. It is not a quality of something else but rather an absolute perfection.

As for what is acquired by eating, drinking, dressing, dwelling, travelling and the like, if they are sought for themselves and considered as ends they are qualities of corporeal forms. What is acquired by these qualities and by the actions of moral virtues - such as soundness of view and perfection of advice when they are sought for themselves and considered as ends - are qualities of the spiritual forms. The same is true for all arbitrary and demonstrative arts in relation to the person who does not seek them as essential ends. Rational actions and the sciences are absolute perfections and are used with no restraint. They are man's characteristics which are not shared by others. They either give man immortality (eternity) or connect him with it.

The particular spiritual forms lead to rational existence, while the corporeal forms lead to corporeal existence which is the shortest existence. The existence which deserves more than any other to be annihilated is the corporeal, while that which deserves more than any other to continue to exist is the rational existence. Spiritual existences continue for long periods because of their connection

with the rational one, and they rightly deserve that. They are composed of two opposites, namely, the spiritual and the rational existences. They gained their lengthy existence from the rational existence and the limitation of living from the corporeal one. Everything which has a limited time to exist, has length and shortness which are equal in relation to eternity, because nothing can be compared with it. ¹⁰⁵

The length and shortness of the limited existence of a being are equal. Since man loves to add an additional year to his life; then even more does he desire to add not only tens but also hundreds and thousands of years. We find in the minds of men the memories of the possessors of different arts enduring some additional years, philosophers and kings like Alexander ¹⁰⁶ thousands, and Hippocrates ¹⁰⁷ and similar men many thousands of years.

CHAPTER:

Some people, as we have already mentioned, concern themselves with the corporeal form only. These are vile people. Some other concern themselves with the spiritual form only. These are noble and eminent people. The lowest type of corporeal people is that which does not respect the spiritual form nor pay attention to it when occupied with the corporeal one. Similarly the most noble type is the person who is not occupied by his corporeal form nor does he pay attention to it. Yet the person who does not pay attention to the corporeal form shortens his life. This type of person is similar to the vile

type in being extraordinary, [Fol. 177] both types do not exist. We may find a type of person who damages the corporeal forms by obeying the spiritual ones. Thus Ta'abbata Sharran ¹⁰⁸ says:

Our lot is captivity or obligation or death;
but free man prefers death.

He considered death better for him than bearing the favour of others concerning his freedom. Among this type is the person who prefers to kill himself during war (instead of being captured). The examples ¹⁰⁹ are: what al-Marawānī did in the war of 'Ubaid Allāh b. al-'Abbās who said:

Humiliation of life and aversion of death, both -
I consider - are mischievous and evil.
If there must be choice between them,
Then let's march joyfully to death.

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and what al-Zibā did with 'Amr when she said:

With my own hand not yours, oh 'Amr

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and the story of the Queen of Egypt with Augustus which is mentioned in historical accounts, or other people such as those mentioned by Aristotle ¹¹² who burned themselves and their cities when they became

certain that their enemies would overcome them. All this seems to be immoderation except on certain occasions, when corporeality is destroyed without spirituality because of haughtiness of the heart and great endeavour as Fāṭima 'Um al-Rabī' and all Banū Ziyād (the clan of Ziyād have done when she threw herself from her camel which she was riding and died because Qays b. Zuhayr ¹¹³ had pursued her.

These are special instances of situations in which death is better

than life. Preferring death to life is a correct human action. We shall give an account of this afterwards.

Among noble, great-spirited people there is a type less immoderate than the previous one, and more numerous than the first. This type of person does not pay attention to the corporeal form compared with the spiritual one, but he does not destroy his corporeality (completely), either because the spiritual form does not force him to do so, or because - although it does - he prefers to keep his corporeal form. An example of this is what Ḥātim al-Ṭā'ī ¹¹⁴ did when he slaughtered his horse (for his guests) and did not eat nor feed his family with it, although his children were suffering extreme hunger. Another example is found in the way of life of thieves. Their purpose is to train their bodies, and in doing this they sacrifice their bodies for their bodies. They prefer one corporeal state over another. There is no reason to refrain from admitting that actions such as the actions of al-Ṭā'ī and the like are honourable and noble, and that such a nature is sublime, brilliant and spiritual, and that it is the most brilliant, ranking below wisdom only. The philosophically natured person must necessarily have this quality, for if it does not have it, he would be a corporealist and a false philosopher. If the philosophically natured person is determined to reach his ultimate perfection, he acts like the great-spirited person. Thus every person who prefers his corporeality over any part of his spirituality cannot reach the ultimate goal. Therefore not a single corporealist is

happy, and every happy person is a pure spiritualist.

The spiritualist must perform some corporeal actions, but not essentially, while he performs spiritual actions essentially. Similarly, the philosopher must perform many spiritual actions, but not essentially, while he performs all intellectual actions essentially. 115

Through corporeality the philosopher is an existing being, through rationality divine and superior. The possessor of wisdom (the philosopher) [Fol. 177v], then, is necessarily a divine and superior man. He chooses from every kind of action that which is the best, and he shares with every class (of men) the best of their particular qualities; he is distinguished from all others by the most glorious and superior actions. When he reaches the ultimate goal and communicates with the simple substantial intellects which are mentioned in Metaphisica, De Anima and De Sensu et Sensibili, he becomes one of these intellects and properly deserves the title "divine" only. The other two qualities, corrupted corporeality and high spirituality, are eliminated. He merits the title: "A simple (pure) divine". The Mutawahhid (solitary) may have all these qualities without being a 116 citizen of the perfect city. He cannot be a citizen of the perfect city by means of the first two classes (of qualities), nor can he be the city's aim, its agent, or its protector. As for the third class of quality, it does not make him belong to the perfect city, but rather he is its proposed aim, for he cannot be its protector or agent while he is Mutawahhid (solitary). Thus it is evident that

spirituality ranks above corporeality. We shall explain later the different levels of spirituality in relation to one another.

Let us now speak about spirituality as having the universal relation of the spiritual forms. The universal relation is either essentially universal, like species and genera, or accidentally universal, like the particular spiritual forms as they exist for many individuals, not as attributes of the agent in which they exist, but rather as having a universal relation with that agent. An example of the accidental universal relation is the perceived form of the sun or the imaginary form of the mountain of Uhud in relation to the persons who have seen it. Accordingly, these forms are called "imagination", and the perceiving faculty is called "imaginative".

The faculties by which the perceptions are accomplished are of three types:

- The first type is the faculty by which the corporeal forms are perceived. It is the perceptive faculty and its divisions appear as physical embodiments which are organs of an organic (natural) body; the organs constitute five senses and the perceptions occurring in them are spiritual forms, which are of the first level of spirituality.
- The second type is the faculty which conceives spiritual forms which are called "imagination", and which are reflected in the *Sensus Communis*, as was explained elsewhere. The faculty which conceives

these "imagination" is called "imaginative", and the reflections which occur in the imaginative faculty are not conceived by divisions within the faculty, but rather the conceived object sets the faculty in motion. Thus colour sets the sense of sight in motion, and the spiritual form occurring in sight sets the imaginative faculty in motion. The grammatical form of the names of these faculties are confused, because the grammatical form which is used for the faculty (al-Mudrik) is similar to the form of the object which sets the faculty in motion (Muharrik). The grammatical form for the object of perception, al-Mudrak, according to the language of the Arabs, is a form which indicates the condition of being acted upon which is contrary to our use. Hence all these spiritual forms are particular and not universal. The animal (the living being) does not have another faculty which is set in motion by the forms occurring in the *Sensus Communis*, after which the ability of motion ceases and loses all benefit (in the animal). [Fol. 178 v] If such a faculty exists in an animal, it exists in vain. At the first level, we seek what is agreeable to us and run away from the harmful bodies by means of forms which occur in the senses. Similarly we seek the hidden bodies which appear in the imagination and set it in motion, and we run away from them when they are harmful by means of the spiritual forms which occur in the imaginative faculty, namely, the imaginations. These bodies are either present or hidden in relation to us, as is common for all living beings.

The first is common to all animals, but it is thought to exist only in some animals, such as flies and worms. We have explained that in our discourse concerning the soul. ¹¹⁷ As for the second, it is clear that it cannot be separated from the first, for it exists through it. The third exists in animals having motion in actuality, because this faculty is the actualization of corporeal affairs. The animals having the third faculty do not have a name in the language of the Arabs, so let us call this type of animal the perfect actualized animal. This is the animal which takes care of its offspring, and in general loves and hates - emotions which seem almost necessary because they are the lowest kind of agitation. This animal may possess another category of qualities which is more perfect than the previous one and which is also common to both man and irrational animals which possess some skill or the like, such as bees, ants, spiders. This category of quality and other categories which include actions similar to the human being's skill of milking occur either naturally or not naturally which could be either through habit or reasoning. Habit is common to man and some irrational animals such as the starlings, if we do not call two different existents i.e. habit and skill "habit by way of equivocality". Reasoning belongs to man alone, and does not exist in others. Reasoning in turn occurs through man's intellect as happens frequently - this is particularized by the term "deduction" - or it occurs suddenly in which case it is called "inspiration" and similar names. It is clear that this kind of manifestation of the imaginative faculty does not require the external senses as an agent for it, but

external senses are required for the existence of the bodies which receive this type of spiritual forms. There is no need to discuss this here or to enumerate its different types. (Because the existence of bodies requires the external senses) the manifestation of the imaginative faculty cannot exist without the sense of perception. It may be thought that this manifestation requires forms of the Sensus Communis because the forms of the imaginative faculty are composed of forms which have passed through the Sensus Communis and had previously passed through the external senses. An account explaining the nature of this is to be found elsewhere. If this were true, the forms of the imaginative faculty would not have only one aspect. In any case, the external senses are necessary, because if a form of the imaginative faculty were to be void of them it would be a useless addition and it would have a false existence. For its existence is usually actualized in bodies and this is impossible without the external senses. Thus we must examine the possibility of having an invented spiritual form the species of the immediate matter of which has not passed through the Sensus Communis. It is impossible for the remote genus not to pass through the Sensus Communis, because, if it were possible, then the invented spiritual form would not necessarily be in need of the external senses in order to come into existence. Rather, it would be in need of the external senses for its corporeal existence only, for it cannot exist in a body except through an external sense. We must examine [Fol. 178 v] this thoroughly.

These are, according to general inquiry, the different types of the imagined spiritual forms. Through these forms the animal, whether man or irrational animal, moves, because when any of these forms are present in actuality, they are present as imagined. Then the forms connect with the appetitive faculty. They are suited to the appetitive faculty; the latter move and set the organs in motion as long as the suitability is there. When the suitability ceases to exist, neither the appetitive faculty nor the organs are in motion, and the forms continue to exist but give no benefit to the animal either for a certain time or for a particular type of animal. Through this suitability, the appetitive soul is set potentially in motion, and through this suitability the appetitive soul changes, and the lowest degree of its change is the decay of suitability which is called ennui, boredom and similar names. The movement from non-suitability to suitability which is the development of suitability, has no name in the language of the Arabs. Rather the Arabs have terms for the decay of suitability (only).

The spiritual forms do not change because they are not divided, while the appetitive forms have no obstacle to be divided essentially either primarily or secondarily. Hence the appetitive form is thought to be the form of a body, and that body is the Hār
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Gharīzī (instinctive heat) which is in correspondence with the external appearance. Examples are found in the warmth and redness of the body of an angry man, and the coldness and paleness of a frightened

man and the speedy and vigorous movement of a lustful person. The state which leads to these opposing pairs (of conditions) is called "activity" in Arabic, while the slow movement of a weak person and his weakness are called laziness. Activity is necessarily followed by pleasure during action and pain during rest. Laziness, in opposition to activity, gives pleasure during rest and pain during action.

If what we have already explained concerning pleasure and pain is true, then the appetitive soul is in an unnatural state during activity. That state gives the appetitive soul the spiritual forms like hunger and thirst. That same soul would be in a natural state during laziness. Hence the spiritual forms are given either by the latter state, in which case they do not set the soul in motion, or by another state, in which case it is an unnatural state and alienates the soul from it, as with food and a satisfied person. Hence when the appetitive faculty is set in motion by a spiritual form, in an equal way to what that faculty requires in order to be moved, then the form would occur continuously. If that measure were less than equal then the form would not occur continuously, but rather in a certain time only. Thus the form needs several discrete times in order to exist, but this may be severed and not completed. Witnessing that is attainable through the least amount of consideration. Let us suppose that a form sets in motion the appetitive faculty of a healthy body which has a substratum for that form, and let us suppose that that form sets the faculty in motion where there is suitability equal to the required time

in which the form exists in that substratum in a way that they disappear together. If the spiritual form is to continue after the ceasing of the substratum, it would have no function nor would it be a soul in actuality. This case has no term in Arabic, so let us transfer it to the term of the closest thing to it, such as estimation, imagination and similar terms, expressions and compound names. [Fol. 179 v] This is in similar way to that of the Arabs when they say "that which does not call people's concern" and the like

Similarly, if that form sets the appetitive soul in motion towards the natural state which we have called "Suitability", it either finds no substratum, or it does find one, but that substratum requires a longer time in order to receive the form. Thus the form does not occur in the substratum, or only a part of it occurs. In this case, the spiritual form is a soul. In the previous case it was similar to the spiritual form which belongs to "demonstration" or in general to "syllogism" because syllogism does not function at all times, but rather in a certain man at a certain time and not in all men at all times. This is similar to what occurs in demonstration and deductive arguments. It exists primarily in syllogisms composed of generally accepted premises.

ARTICLE VI

CHAPTER:

The particular spiritual forms and their universal relation, as we have already explained, either have passed firstly through the Sensus Communis or they emanated without passing through the external senses. Let us now first speak about them in the way of descriptive definition which defines them in a general way. Thus they are of four types:

1. The best known are those which reside in the senses. This is self-evident.

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2. The second are in nature because a thirsty person finds in himself a spiritual form of water and the hungry person finds a form of food, and so on in the same pattern as nature, such as a lover with his beloved and in general the subject and object of
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desire.

3. The third are the spiritual forms, the outcome of ideas, or those which are the result of reflection and deliberation.

4. The fourth type contains the forms which are born in the Intellectus in Actu without the help of reflection and deliberation. This last

category contains inspiration and true revelation.

Bringing back accidentally the spiritual form called remembering is related by us to the senses. We shall explain this later on, but now we shall explain what we have just said.

CHAPTER:

The forms which are related to the external senses are either essential or accidental. An example of the essential forms is that of the objects of external senses; of the accidental, what occurs in dreams or during the state called remembering and recalling. Thus when a man sees another riding a horse and later sees the horse (alone), that (horse) reminds him of the man. This type (of form) is of many classes. Poetry is composed of these classes of forms. An example is the saying of MĀlik b. Asmā's:

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With each breeze of rose or jasmin in every garden
I hold the hope of finding you at my next glimpse or turn.

Weeping over one's old home, and having sorrow because of the remnants (also) belong to this type. The great majority of the poems of the Arabs are of this type as are most tales and pleasant talks. This is particularly true for old persons because of the multitude of their experiences. This is obvious for one who considers it. This is not the remembrance, mentioned by Aristotle in the second part of De Sensu, because it does not come after forgetfulness and is recalled from

within instead of from without. The spiritual forms which occur essentially in the senses are clear in themselves.

Those forms occurring naturally are also either accidental or essential. The essential are not particular forms of bodies, as has already been stated because a thirsty person has no desire of specific water; rather, he desires all that belongs to the species of the desired object. Hence Galen thought that animals can conceive the species.¹²³ These objects produce particular spiritual forms only by accident. An example of the accidental forms in a thirsty man who recalls in his mind what he had enjoyed in a certain glass, or a hungry man [Fol. 179 v] who recalls the form of food and remembers a certain food which he had eaten. Nature does not produce essentially except proper and true spiritual forms. Thus when a feverish person desires to cool his stomach, he desires coldness which is necessarily useful for him; but coldness does not reach him necessarily with cold objects because they contain other elements. That is why a cold object, although it is cold and moist, may be tough for the feverish person and mixed with earthly elements such as (special) conditions of water. Therefore Plato says that nature does not make mistakes concerning what it lays down in the soul. Nature gives the soul the (suitable) form, as when nature requires cooling the stomach of a feverish person whose soul recalls water. Water is not cooling nor does the soul recall the water, but rather water is a cold object with other elements which are not recalled by nature and which may harm the

feverish person.

This spiritual form which is the result of nature is not similar to that produced by the senses. Perhaps it resembles forms produced by the intellect and reason. This form is in the nature of the animal, like matter which is constituted naturally to receive the species, but not to receive the species as such, but rather in a different aspect. We have explained that on many occasions. The sustenance of the nature of the animal is through this spiritual form, and this form is the controller of the animal. Since the nature of the animal is compounded, it needs many forms. The explanation of this will be discussed on another suitable occasion.

CHAPTER:

The spiritual forms which are the result neither of the external senses nor of nature, are the result of reasoning or the active intellect. These are only for man, while the first two types exist in the Muhassal animal. The forms which result from reasoning only are either true or false. These forms are more frequently false than true in some Siyar (ways of life). Hopes are included in the false type as in the following saying of a poet:

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Hopes, if they be true, they would be the best hope,
Or at least, we live by them a pleasant time.

Thus man may hope for the impossible, knowing it to be so, like his wish to speak with dead persons. There is no harm in knowing that these hopes are false, for the virtue of such forms is that man recognizes their falsity, because if he does not know that, he would be misled or mistaken and the like. The truth of these forms varies with different ways of life with regard to quantity.

All forms which are the result of the Intellectus in Actu are true essentially, not accidentally. The same is true of all these which result from true reasoning. These latter forms are not of specific bodies in order to be particular, nor are they (completely) free from matter in order to be universal intelligibles. They have no particular relation nor the states of universal intelligibles. Rather they are intermediaries between the particular forms and the intelligibles. This is their most proper position because they have elements of each of the two extremes. They share with the particular forms the faculty by which they are particular, and they are universal because this faculty receives the forms from the intellect by which they gain universality. This faculty is intermediary between the materialistic and the intelligible existents. It receives the forms from and resembles, the two extremes. These are, as we have already said, the forms which are the results of nature. They are for the sake of one's safety and are common to all animals; even plants may have a share in them in one way or another. The forms which are the results of nature for the sake of perfection [Fol. 180 v] exist in some Muhassal animals

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such as bees and ants. Every noble animal is a Muḥaṣṣal animal, and every Muḥaṣṣal animal has the spiritual forms of perception, and every noble animal has these forms of perception and the intermediary forms which we have already described. It is evident that the forms of perception do not lead essentially to deduction nor to any spiritual conception such as reasoning and its alternatives. When we perceive a body, and the particular spiritual form of that body occurs to us and we want to recall later a similar form, we transfer it to this status and free it from its particularity concerning its subject, for we cannot recreate that subject since it has already existed. Rather we recall through the intermediary spiritual form the subject which does not exist actually, but only potentially. That is evident to one who considers it briefly.

Therefore, the actions are few of a person who receives only the amount of spirituality which results from perception, consideration, and imagination, while the actions of a person who receives the (complete) spiritual forms are a kind of spiritual excess. That is why a person whose forms of perception are limited by the spirituality resulting from the external senses (only) is a foolish person, because the image of the particular spiritual form which is caused by external senses is the perfect (Muḥaṣṣala) local movement only. All other movements belong to forms resulting from man's nature. We have already said that these are similar (of the same genus) to the intermediary forms. Such a person who has this nature, namely, the one

whose forms of perception are limited by the particular amount of spirituality, is lazy. He has few actions and does not have many performances. This is similar case to that of some irrational animals such as sheep, cows and swine. If these animals have either natural organs like strong hands or defensive organs and they do not use these organs, they are foolish, such as bears, swine.

Foolish people are easily known. Noble and intelligent animals are those whose particular spiritual forms are more or less similar to the intermediary ones. This type contains all Muhassal animals such as the fox, the bear and all cunning animals. Among men, this type contains those who have many movements. Thus noble men have moving eyes with moist pupils as if they were liquid, while lazy and foolish men have hard eyes which rarely move because the imaginary forms are transferred to the faculties with the same states that are given to them by sight. That is why every man who is in his natural condition and who recalls in his mind a certain spiritual form does so in the very state which he perceives when he stares at it. The pupils of a noble person have frequent movements without repetition. This is so because of the multiplicity of the spiritual states of his forms of perception which are the result of the frequency of the eyes' movements and their glances, just as if he were looking at each state separately, because these glances are recalled, as notions of the spiritual states. A lazy person is calm while an energetic person has pupils with frequent movements, with quick repetitions. For this

reason experts of physiognomy consider the fast movement of the eye as a sign of an unsteady person. These two targets, I mean, the speedy movement of the eye and its frequency on one hand, and the quick, unsteadiness on the other, belong to one category, namely, the spiritual form has abundance of spirituality by which the similarity occurs, whether the form belongs to perception or to any other faculty; and, hence, the movements of the eye become more frequent. This is true because similarity [Fol. 180 v] is not seen in order to give every state of the form that which it deserves. For this reason we hasten the transfers of the sight in order to see all the similarities which exist in it, especially in the obscure ones. An account of the similarities is to be found in II De Sensus. The multiplicity of the spiritual forms is repeated in the senses simultaneously. For this reason the movement of the eye increases. A person who has excellent sight, receives a surfeit of spirituality concerning the perceived form and hence his glances are frequent and consequently repeated. Since he considers what he sees, he spends a long time with the form. Therefore, his glances vary in time. The finer his glances, the faster the movement of his eye; the more excellent his sight, the greater the variation. The man who has a natural disposition for demonstrative reasoning has frequent eye movements with variation in the movements of his pupils. When thinking, he recalls in his mind what he has already demonstrated, so he does not need to reflect on it. That is why the variation here is less than on other occasions where the idea is not clear. There he deliberates and his pupils become calm, and the

variation increases and becomes longer, and the difference and repetition are not regulated. The experts of physiognomy have done well when they took from the eye the signs which indicate the psychic actions, especially those actions related to the faculties by which conceiving occurs.

ARTICLE VII

CHAPTER:

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The particular and the intermediary spiritual forms should not be considered as final causes (goals), because they are forms, most of which occur naturally; and, in general, they are not the result of man's free will. The best among them and those which appear to be good are the result of free will and are contained in the following three categories:

1. They are either contained in corporeal forms and lead to benefits such as farming and other similar arts; or
2. They are contained in the particular spiritual forms which are the objects of other different arts; or
3. They are contained in the intelligible forms which are the
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objects of mathematics, poetry, etc.

These do not constitute the final causes (goals), but rather through them the final causes take place, and they are the causes of the final causes. Let us suppose now that there is a completely virtuous man,
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like al-Mahdi and another completely vile man, like the poet Abu
130
Dulāma. Each of them possess the particular form of the other, and

each spiritual form causes the motion of the body in which it resides. The form of Abū Dulāma causes pleasure and laughter in al-Mahdī, while the form of al-Mahdī causes frowning and integrity in Abū Dulāma. It is evident that frowning and integrity are better than pleasure and laughter. Through the form of the superior man the inferior becomes higher than before, and through the form of the inferior man the superior man become lower. Therefore, the inferior man claims and attaches himself to the name of the superior one, while the superior man hides the effect of the inferior and does not reveal it except in isolation. In a similar way, each man causes others to move towards his own state, and the poet Zayd Ibn 'Adī al-'Abbadī had reason to say:

Do not ask about a person himself,
but rather about his companions,
because every man is led by his companions.

It is evident that the Mutawahhid, ought not to associate with merely corporeal beings nor with any whose end is a spirituality mixed with corporeality. Rather should he seek the company of the adepts in the sciences. These men of science are now more numerous, now less and even non-existent in some ways of life wherefore the Mutawahhid is obliged in some ways of life to return altogether from the society of men as much as this is possible for him. He should not mix with them except in necessary matters [Fol. 181 v] and in necessary measure. Or, he should emigrate to ways of life in which the sciences are (practiced) - if such way of life does exist. This is not contrary

to what is said in the political science nor to what is made clear in science of nature. For it is made clear in the science of nature that man is by nature political; and it had been demonstrated in the political science that isolation is wholly evil. ¹³⁷ But this is only so in essence; it is good by accident, as it may happen in some natural phenomenas. ¹³⁸ The example of this is that bread and meat are healthy nutriment by nature, while opium and colocynth are deadly poison; but the body may be in unnatural states where these latter two can be useful and must be used, and natural diets harmful and must be avoided. These conditions are necessarily unnatural sicknesses; for opium and colocynth are rarely useful and by accident, while nutriments are usually useful and by essence. The relation of these different conditions to bodies is similar to the relation of the different ways of life to the soul. Similar to health - which is supposed to be the only natural state of the body and opposite to ¹³⁹ these different conditions which are unnatural is the Imām-city which is the natural condition for the soul. It is one and opposes all other ways of life which are numerous, and these numerous ways of life are not natural for the soul.

CHAPTER:

The intermediary forms are not (final) goals (for the Mutawahhid) nor does any Mutawahhid act in accordance with them. If he were to do so, he would do so for the sake of one of the three

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above mentioned categories of benefits. Most the arts which are capacities and professions are limited by these categories. Professions and capacities produce these three (categories of benefits). These forms which are not the result of free will among the intermediary forms are not acquired. How could they be considered as final goals while knowing them does not give the Mutawahhid the knowledge of what he should aim for? Rather it gives him only knowledge of the causes which lead him towards his goal.

Furthermore, since it is the way of life of the Mutawahhid to explain how the knowledge of the spiritual forms should be, and since this (knowledge) is part of his way of life, it is necessary to be concerned about this knowledge if one wants to establish a practical discourse concerning the science of this way of life. In addition to all that, it would clearly appear that this knowledge is one of those sciences which essentially deserves to be known. Since the real Mutawahhid is the one who is directed towards the theoretical sciences, this theoretical knowledge (meaning, knowledge of the spiritual forms) becomes of great value. Then, being concerned about this science, in addition to what we have already said, produces accidentally part of the Mutawahhid's final goal.

ARTICLE VIII

CHAPTER:

The human actions which are related to the Mutawahhid and which he may perform are of three types, as we have already enumerated. Some of these actions are related to the corporeal forms, others to the particular spiritual forms as having the particular relations; ¹⁴¹ and some are related to the universal forms which are the intelligible ones. The particular spiritual (forms), from the point of view of having particular relations, and the intermediary (forms) are not final goals, rather through them the final goals are conceived as we have already explained.

We still have to consider the intelligible spiritual (forms) which are the other aspect of the particular forms, for the subjects of these (spiritual) forms on which the forms depend and by which they exist as true forms are the same. The subject in which the form resides is multiple, and the subject to which it belongs is multiple (too). The form is, by relation to its subject a goal, except in the case of intelligibles which have one individual (only). In the latter case it is the particular spiritual form of the subject. That is true if it is particular in the same way as that of tangible bodies, that

is, to perceive the subject itself (directly), although the subjects of perception are the lowest subjects, because such subjects do not have particular spiritual forms except through (direct) relations, for if they are not conceived by the senses they will not [Fol. 181 v] be conceived by the imaginative faculty. In general, none of these particular forms belongs to the science of (the final goals). Our aim here, is to be concerned with what belongs to man only. If we speak about what does not belong only to man that is a secondary consideration in relation to our subject.

The intelligible forms contain all kinds of substance. Man is one of these kinds. The intelligible forms of man is his universal form i.e. the form of man's species which is the most excellent of all spiritual forms, as we shall explain later on. It does not have direct relation to the individual man as in the case of the particular spiritual form nor does it resemble the celestial bodies ¹⁴² in any of their states. Let us suppose that the form of Zayd has been in a state of vileness in 'Amr's soul, and it is now in virtuous and noble state (in the soul of the same person, 'Amr): one state has occurred and another has been dismissed. In this sense (the intelligible form) resembles the celestial bodies, although it is not one of them. The above mentioned change in Zayd's form is different from the change in Zayd's form when 'Amr thinks that Zayd is vile and then changes his mind and thinks that Zayd is noble. In the latter case Zayd has changed in 'Amr's opinion (only), while in the first case he had actually changed from one state to another, and this was reflected in

the particular form which 'Amr has had of Zayd. We should distinguish between the two spiritual existents because they are completely different. In the first case of change which reflects the real change, the spiritual (form) acquires from the corporeal existence a state of vileness or a state of nobility. Thus, through the corporeal existence, the spiritual (form) acquires different states. The opposite is true of the intelligible (forms). They do not acquire nobility nor vileness from the corporeal existences. That is clear with the least amount of consideration, because if Zayd is noble and 'Amr is vile, the intelligibles form (concept) of them is described as being both noble and vile. This is impossible (in relation to each one alone). If one is noble and one is vile, and nobility belongs to other than Zayd and vileness to other than 'Amr, that is possible only because the nature of the species accepts the two opposites together.

The species accepts the two opposites either in (two) different times or in (two) different subjects, because the predicates of the propositions which have universal subject, are either: neces-
 143 sary. and in this case they (necessarily) belong to each of their
 144 individuals, or they are partial, and in this case they belong to some individuals which belong to the universal subject. Therefore, the (universal) subject includes what belongs to it either in a necessary universal way or a partial way. The things which are impossible to exist in the individuals which are subject of that universal (form) are limited and numbered. This was explained on many occasions.

Then, no single subject of the subjects of the universal (form) gives that universal (form) any state. The universal form does not resemble the celestial bodies, rather these bodies have a different kind of existence. If the species of a universal form has a virtuous state then the subject should have a virtuous state (also), because the species has that state. If the specie does not have that state then the subject does not have it either. Now if the subject is noble the individual of that subject would be virtuous also and vice versa, because the species gives the existing individual the state of nobility or vileness and the individual gives the species affirmation. [Fol. 182 v] and permanency. The subject is the cause of variation and impermanency (of the species). Therefore, man cannot change his universal form, while he can change his particular form, as we have already seen when we were considering some of his actions.

Let us now examine the relation of man's form and the subject (substratum) which exists in man at his faculty. It is clear that the intelligible (form) does not exist except for man alone, and it is clear that man is the subject of a species in a way that he is described by that species as having existence and (rational) faculty. This is in contrary to the particular form because when 'Amr' has the particular form of Zayd, he has that form as (representing the) thing which exists (externally) in Zayd, and not only as (pure) description of Zayd (as in the case of the intelligible form). If the particular form of Zayd is a description (impression) in 'Amr' it would be a

(faculty of the) soul as we have already said. If the form of man sets its substratum in motion, then its subject which the form qualifies is the (same) subject which the form describes (as impression) or resembles an impression.

The universal (form) of man according to the previous explanation) is all the intelligibles, because the subject of the intelligibles is the universal (form). For example, when you say "the universal (form) of the elephant", the subject of this (universal) form of elephant is a certain elephant which was influenced by its genus. Similarly, the subject of man by which he is described is a certain individual of the various individuals of man which are the subjects of the universal (form) of man.

Thus, similar to the fact that man is different from all other substances, in his form which is different from all other forms of other corrupted beings. It rather resembles the forms of the celestial bodies, because the celestial bodies comprehend themselves and the substratum which they qualify and which is their substratum in another sense (which he is going to describe below). If we may use the term substratum for this other aspect. We employ the expression "substratum" in the two following senses, either for the thing which relatively receives the impression, or, for the corporeal substratum in relation to its intelligible form. The celestial bodies are the substrata for the intelligibles by which they are celestial

bodies, and they are not (simple) substrata for the existence of the forms in them, because the celestial bodies do not receive these forms in a way that they are matter (hyla) for these forms, in order that these forms gain their existence through the celestial bodies. In fact, these received forms exist by themselves, and the cause of the cause of their existence exists before them in the same way which the (two) parts of definition precede the defined object.

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They are different from the species of the corrupted bodies, because these latter bodies are substrata in a way that the universal
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(forms) are forms for them. This is similar to the case of man who comprehends the intelligible (forms) in a way that he receives these
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intelligible (forms) which exist in him. In this way (man resembles the hyla (matter) and) the intelligible forms resemble the impression in the matter (hyla). As for man's specie, by which the substratum is
148
qualified, it is man's substratum in the second sense.

In fact, man has a nature which gives rise to growing confusion, because this nature - as it seems - is like intermedium be-
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tween the eternal celestial bodies and the corrupted bodies. It is, however, the natural state of man to be an intermedium, for in nature the difference between one genus and another is always through an intermedium. We (usually) observe that in all general of existing being, but sometimes we cannot precisely determine whether a certain intermedium between mineral and plant belongs to the first (genus)

or the second. Similarly, between plant and animal is an inter-medium which has a share of each. This has been explained on many occasions, and we have explained it previously. Therefore it is necessary that man has a share with the eternal celestial bodies and another share with the corrupted bodies; by the first he is eternal and by the second he is a corrupted body.

What is the nature of these two shares? [Fol. 182 v] This is what must be examined: Furthermore, if we examine man from another point of view, we find that man belongs to his specie. Now when the (individual) man receives the specie of man, then, the substratum receives the form of man in two different ways ¹⁵⁰ in the same time which is a dreadful contradiction. Moreover, if the individual man - as being a man - can receive the man (as specie), we would say that man (as specie) belongs to the definition of man, and the (two) parts of the definition precede the defined man. That means that man has existed before he has become a man, and that he has existed before he has existed. This is impossible and dreadful contradiction.

It is necessary then, to examine this analogical expression (man) and to give each of its two parts its share of explanation. In fact, it seems that man is one of the wonders of nature. We say that man contains in himself many facts, and he is a man by all of them. He has (first) the nutritive faculty which does not receive his (real) form; then he has the perceptive, the imaginative and the recollect-

ive faculties. All these do not receive his real essences. Finally,
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he has the rational faculty which belongs to him only...

This is the end of what was found of this discourse,
praise be to God just as He merits and deserves.

NOTES

TRANSLATION

1. Nahwa is read behaq in [AS], contrary to [MT] and Munk.
2. Al-Tartib (arrangement or organization) is used here to mean Tadbir.
3. It means the capacities of high practical arts such as medicine and the like, in opposition to manual arts.
4. Most probably he means his book, Fuṣūl...fi al-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya..., which is mentioned by Ibn Abī 'Uṣaybi'a in Talaqāt al-Aṭibbā, p. 87.
5. D. M. Dunlop in his "Ibn Bājjā's Tabīr", J.R.A.S., p. 74, changes the first Political Science and translates Republic. He notes that this "correction seems necessary, but the passage remains obscure, he translates the second Political Science by Politics, then he explains that he "Aristotle's Politics (I, 3 Seg.), here apparently ascribed to Plato. There seems to have been no Arabic version of the Politics however." This last remark seems correct, and Ibn Rushd's statement that he commented upon Plato's Republic because he had not yet seen Aristotle's Politics hold good for the Falāsifa to date.

[AS] always makes reference to Aristotle's Politics. E.I.J. Rosenthal in his article "The Place of Politics in the philosophy of Ibn Bājjā" I.C. p. 199., notes that "Asin whenever al-'Ilm al-Madani or al-Sinā'a al-Madaniya which are used by Ibn Bājjā synonymously, occur makes a reference to Aristotle's Politics: This is very misleading and we have failed to locate even one of the numerous references so given, also in other places.

There is, moreover, no need to go outside Plato quite apart from the difficulty to ignore the text which clearly means Plato..."

6. The four imperfect cities as enumerated by Plato are: Monarchy, Aristocracy, Oligarchy and Democracy. This is what Ibn Bājjā means when he speaks about "The four cities". But this is not all, because Plato has a more complicated classification, he speaks about arbitrary cities such as: tyranny, extreme democracy and

so on. All these appear in al-Fārābī's Der Musterstaat or al-Madina al-Fadilo p. 62, where they have Arabic names. Ibn Bājjā who read the Republic in Arabic either as independent work or through al-Fārābī (we are inclined to believe, that he read both Plato and al-Fārābī) uses in the Tadbīr al-Farabi's terminology as we shall see later.

Ibn Bājjā always refers to Plato's Republic and to Aristotle's works, with the supposition that the reader is well acquainted with the Greek works which were translated into Arabic either completely or partially.

7. Well known stories translated into Arabic from their Persian source by Abdullah b. al-Muqaffa' a Persian who adopted Islam, and died in 757 A.D.
8. It was not possible to identify this book. [AS] suggests that it could be an indication to all stories of wise men among the Arabs.
9. The term basīta (simple) should be understood as opposite to composed cities, that is to say the simple imperfect cities and not their compositions: otherwise the term is very strange.
10. Arist., Eth. Nicom., I. III, c.1. thus in [AS], but E. Rosenthal doubts all references of [AS] supra n. 5. We are not going to identify Ibn Bājjā's references to Greek philosophers not only because it is impossible to do so sometimes but also because we do not have the Arabic versions of these books which Ibn Bājjā has used. They are certainly different, sometimes they contain more chapters as the case with Nicomachean Ethics, sometimes they are related to different authors as the case with some Neoplatonic books which were related to Aristotle.
11. This is a reference to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.
12. Muhammad, Ahmad and al-Hasan the sons of Musā the son of Shakir, they are known as Banū Musā and sometimes Banū Shākīr. cf. Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, (Cairo, 1348 H.) p. 378. They were experts in al-Hiyal and in arithmetic. In [AS] we find that Banū Shākīr are one person called Dhu Shākīr or Dū Sākīr according to M.A. Palacios' reading. Palacios added saying: "Faltá on Brockelmann, Geschichte, el título y el autor de este libro". It is true that Brockelmann did not mention the book, simply because Banū Musā b. b. Shākīr did not write a collected book, but they were known to be masters in this science, or in this subject of physics.
13. Supra, Introductory Study, n. 9.
14. Al-Fārābī.

15. The four imperfect cities and the perfect one.
16. The expression "Solitary" here is not a translation of the Mutawahhid rather it is a translation of the Arabic expression Mufarrad or Mufrad which means to be singled out or isolated.
17. Supra, Introductory Study, n. 6.
18. "Sick" is translation of the Arabic expression Mufarrad, for Ibn Bājjā means by it the man who is in unnatural state of physical health.
19. Ibn Bājjā wrote several books in medicine; we do not know which one he means, cf. Ibn Abī 'Usaybā'a, Tabaqat al-'Atibbā', pp. 85,86.
20. Dunlop notes (p. 78 n.l.) "a slip for 'four' probably". But E. Rosenthal notes In the Place of Politics n.64 that "no change is necessary in view of al-Fārābī's K. al-Siyasāt, 57.11 where three states are opposed to the Ideal State". We agree with Rosenthal that the whole passage is very interesting "for Ibn Bājjā's contention that medicine and judicature are no sciences since they do not exist in the Ideal State, and for his attack on Galen".
21. It means that the rational faculty comprises all what distinguishes man from irrational animals, and mentioning the rational faculty includes all what distinguishes man from other.
22. He does not mean that every action of man is an act of choice but he means that all particular human actions which are not shared by animals are acts of choice.
23. The expression "soul" here means the higher faculty of the soul, namely, the intellect or the rational faculty as will be shown clearly later.
24. Ibn Bājjā being a physician knows the relation between bodily part and psychic part of man, as clear above.
25. The portrait of the philosopher here is very close to that of the Stoics' "Sage" .
26. This saying of Galen's was very common and well known in the medieval writings Ibn Gebirol the Jewish philosopher of the XII century repeats the same saying, see Munk p. 263.
27. This book of Ibn Bājjā's is included among the list of Ibn Bājjā's works which is mentioned by Ibn Abī 'Usaybī'a, Tabaqāt, pp. 85, 86.

28. The expression "purpose" here means intellectual or rational purpose only.
29. cf. Munk, p. 394 who adds the quality "separées" to the "immobile substances" and notes that Ibn Bājja means to speak about the "intelligences des sphères, appeles intelligences se-
es".
30. By the expression "spiritual form" it should be understood the pure forms without any matter and the abstract concepts of all the faculties of the soul. The forms can exist by themselves without matter, while the matter cannot exist without form. cf. De Boer, History of Philo. p. 178.
31. Different from Munk the Arabic text does not speak about the second type before the third, cf. Munk p. 394. In Munk there is also additional material in relation to the third type which reads as follows: "Ce sont en quelque sorte des formes (qui restent) dans la faculté rationnelle (de l'âme), lorsque le rapport particulier qu'il y avait entre elle et la chose individuelle a cessé d'exister; car, tant que ce rapport particulier existe, elle (la faculté rationnelle) est toujours affectée d'une certaine corporeité qui fait que le rapport est corporel; mais lorsque la corporeité cesse et que la faculté devient purement spirituelle, elle ne conserve que le rapport universel, c'est-à-dire, le rapport à tous les individus.
32. It is a mountain in Arabia north to Medīna.
33. It is strange that Asin Palacios makes reference here to Aristotle's De Sensu, instead of making reference to the Tadbīr itself. cf. infra pp. 118, 119.
34. Here again we find in [AS] reference to Aristotle's De Anima instead of to the writings of Ibn Bājja.
35. Imaginary legend which is repeatedly mentioned in Islamic books of theology. It is an equivalent to Gog and Magog in the Bible.
36. Supra, n. 7.
37. The second Muslim Khalif.
38. A legend about a person who was able to see from a very long distance. cf. Yāqūt, Irshād al-Arib ilā Ma'rifat al - Adab (Cairo, 1910). Vol. IV, p.1032.
39. Is the famous poet Thābit b. Jāber, about whom the Arabs relate some imaginary stories, see Jamharat Ansāb al-Arab, Ed. E.Lévi - provençal (Cairo: Ma'ārif, 1948) p. 232. See also Ibn Qutayba,

al-Shi'r wal - Shu'arā; (Beirut, Dār al - Thaqa'fa, 1964)
pp. 562-564.

40. Al - Jam' (unity) according the mystics is: " the removal of disorder and separation between eternity and creation. When the sight of the soul becomes attracted to see the beauty of (the truth of) God; then the light of the intellect, which separates things, would be covered by God's light, and the separation between what is eternal and what is created vanishes. Because falsity vanishes when truth comes". Al-Tahān ancy, A Dictionary of the technical terms used in the Sciences of the Muslims, Ed. M. W. Abd al - Haqq and G. Kadir (Kalkuta : W. N. Lee's Press, 1862) Part I, p. 234.
41. Al - Gazālī, al - Munqidh minal - Dalāl, Ed. with French trans. Farīd Jābr (Beirut: al-Lajna al-Dawā'iyya lil-Tarjama, 1959) p.40.
42. Dhikr al-Maṭlūb this clause is read in [AS] Dhikr al-Maḡhlūm which makes no sense as far as we know, while al-Maṭlūb is God, for it means "the one whom we seek" or "the one who is sought after - the sought one".
43. This example may be an addition from the scribe who was living in Egypt.
44. This is another example which supports our claim in the previous note.
45. If lying is to bring happiness, it does so for the inhabitants of the imperfect cities only and not directly. It is clear that happiness in the perfect is not through symbols but rather through direct unity with truth.
46. Here again [AS] refers to Aristotle with no reason.
47. It means VI. Nicom. Eth. as suggested by [AS].
48. Supra, Introductory Study n. 38.
49. Supra, n. 11.
50. This means the propositions which lead to certain agitation in the soul.
51. Proposition of beautiful style which affect the soul.
52. Ibn Bājja has two kinds of classification of the forms. They are

either three types of forms as mentioned in the beginning of this passage or two types only: universal and particular, but the particular are either spiritual or corporeal.

53. He means the recollective faculty, the imaginative faculty and the Sensus Communis.
54. The faculties which belong to the nutritive are the digestive and the like.
55. He means the four elements.
56. There is a clear repetition, we do not know whether it is due to the scribe or to Ibn Bājjā himself.
57. It is said that al-Mutanabbī said this poem when he received the news concerning the death of Sayf al-Dawla's sister. cf. Dīwan al-Mutanabbī, (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1958) p. 433.
58. It means from one to four of the classification of the previous paragraph.
59. [MT] read: the "health" instead of the "result".
60. It means the goals have nothing to do with being Mudabbir. See Risālat al-Ittisāl, p. 38.
61. [AS] refers to Aristotle.
62. He means by "states" particular concept or agitation which the forms leave in the soul.
63. The common and usual things.
64. [AS] reads Zīna instead of rutba, and he translates it ornaments (ornament) which makes no sense at all.
65. This paragraph is continuation of last chapter according to the MS. but it is the beginning of a new article according to Munk.
66. It was impossible to identify the poet who said this line but I found that 'Ubayd b. al-'Abrās has said something very close to this. Hence this line of poetry may have been composed by Ibn Bājjā himself who could not remember the exact words of the poet.
67. Sura XII, verse 174.
68. Sura XII, verse 175.

69. Between 1085 and 1138 A.D.
70. Between 1009 and 1085.A.D.
71. Those who beautify themselves, and al-Ta'jammul is "beautification". It is also a title for a group of poets who were very famous with regard to poems of love.
72. Supra, n. 47.
73. Related by al-Bukhārī, Muslim and Abū Dāwūd, cf. Wensinck, corcordance de la tradition Musulman, (Leiden, 1962)
74. Related by al-Bukhārī, Muslim and Abū Dāwūd, cf. ibid.
75. Hatim al-Ṭā'ī speaking to Māwiya the daughter of 'Avnzar. cf. Ibn Qutayba, al-Shi'r, pp. 167, 168.
76. It is said that when Abū Shujā' known as al-Majnūn went to Cairo and got in touch with al-Mutanabbī, the latter said this poem in praising him. cf. Dūwān p. 490.
77. cf. Ibn Qutayba, al-Shi'r, p. 82 where the story is different, it says that 'Umar the second calif asked one of Haram b. Zinan's children to recite some of what Zuhayr has composed concerning Haram. After 'Umar heard the poetry, he said: "it is good poetry" b. Haram said: "we used to be generous with him (Zuhayr)", and 'Umar answered: "You have given him something temporal and he has given you something eternal".
78. cf. Ibn Qutayba, al-Shi'r, p. 178 ff.
79. cf. Encyclopedia of Islam, al-Madā'in.
80. cf. Encyclopedia of Islam, al-Khālidiyyāt.
81. Al-Zabur is the Book of Psalms.
82. [AS] claims that this verse refers to V. 5 of Solomon LVII, which means that [AS] refers to the Bible while it is clear from the text that the verse refers to the Book of Psalms. Of course there is still a place for similarity between the Bible and the Book of Psalms.
83. I could not identify this Hadith.
84. cf. supra, p. 78.
85. Ibn Bājjā always makes such remarks without keeping his promises, cf. supra, p. 49.

86. He is a mystic from Yemen; a contemporary of the Prophet who adopted Islam. cf. M. m. Ḥilmī, al-Ḥayāt al-Rouḥiyya fi al-Islām, (Cairo, 1933) p. 10.
87. He is Ibrāhīm b. Adham b. Mansur b. Yazīd b. Jabir Abū Ishāq from Balakj, died between 160-166 H./ 776-783 A.D. cf. Enculopedia of Islām, Ibrahim b. Adham.
88. A Greek god (hero) who serves as herald and messenger of other gods, presides over roads, commerce, invention, eloquence, cunning and theft, and conducts the dead to Hades.
89. This is a verse related to a poet from the tribe of 'Abd al-Qays, see al-Buḥturī, al-Ḥamāsa, ed. Cheikho (Beirut, 1910) p. 37.
90. cf. supra, Introductory Study, n. 7.
91. Related by Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Mājja and Ah mad b. Ḥanbal, cf. Wensinck, Corcordance.
92. A skin of a young unweaned camel stuffed with straw (or with panic grass or with dry herbage), to which a she-camel is made to incline when her young one has died: it is brought near to the mother of the young camel (that has died), in order that she may incline to it, and yield her milk over it. Lane's "Arabic - English Lexicon", al-Baw.
93. He means the higher kinds of animal. Of course this is unusual term to be used for animals. Ibn Bājja has another term for such animals, namely, al-Muḥassal.
94. Translation of the term al-Waḍ'
95. Ibn Abī 'Uṣaybi'a mentions that Ibn Bājja has commented on Aristotles De Animalibus. cf. Tabaqat, p. 85 and cf. also Munk, p. 386.
96. cf. al-Fārābī, K. al-Siyasa al-Nadaniyya, ed. F. M. Najjār (Beirut: al-Matba'a al-Kāthūlikiyya, 1964) pp. 88, 99, 100, 101. Al-Fārābī explains the nature of this city, and Ibn Bājja supposes that his reader is acquainted with al-Fārābī's writings.
97. This is how Ibn Bājja quotes Aristotle, but the quotation is not very clear.
98. He wants to say that if the middle aged person is to play, he has to play with ~~swo~~swords, because playing with swords implies seriousness.

99. The MS. has Appocritis , but from the context we know that the person who is meant is Heraclites or Hercules who was a hero of classical mythology noted for great strength and especially for achieving twelve labors imposed on him by Hera.
100. Here Ibn Bājja mentions the names of the cities for the first time, cf. supra, n. 6.
101. cf. supra, p. 31.
102. al-Fārābī, K. al-Siyāsa , p. 87. cf. Al-Fārābī takes a similar stand, but different from Ibn Bājja he considers al-Nawābit as harmful and useless like "thorns among plants and poisoned herbs among grass".
103. It is strange to hear about the shyness of a lion.
104. In Arabic al-Ṣanā'ī' al Dhunūniya wal-Burhāniyya.
105. The limited is not compared with the unlimited and the definite is not compared with the indefinite; similarly the temporal is not compared with the eternal.
106. Alexander the Great.
107. This shows who Ibn Bājja used to think about, Hippocrites. The whole passage is interesting; it explains Ibn Bājja's view concerning eternity, cf. supra, p. 41, and because he gives Greek names only.
108. cf. supra, n. 39.
109. Ibn Bājja refers here to the war between the 'Umayyades and the Abbasides, when Ibn Abbas who was leading the armies of the Abbasides defeated Marwān II.
110. cf. al-Mufaḍḍal al-Ḍabbī, Amthāl al-'Arab, (Qusṭantīna: Maṭba' at al-Jawā'ib, 1300 H.) p. 66, where the story is given in detail that al-Zibā' poisoned herself saying to 'Amr who overcame her "with my hands not yours". In Tadbīr we find "my hand" and in Amthāl al-'Arab "my two hands".
111. The Roman emperor.
112. Ibn Bājja was very fond of the Greeks as well as the Arabic literatures as is clear.
113. cf. al-Ḍabbī, Amthāl, p. 31, where the story is different for we learn from al-Ḍabbī that Faṭīma'um al-Rabī' did not die, rather she faced Zuhayr etc.

114. cf. supra, n. 75.
115. There is an addition in Munk, p. 398, which reads as follows: Il ne prendra du corporel que ce qui doit servir d'instrument pour prolonger son existence, mais il ne le bannira pas complètement du spirituel; il ne prendra également du spirituel même le plus élevé que ce qui est nécessaire pour l'intelligible et il s'en tiendra finalement à finalement à l'intelligible absolu.
116. Different from the Arabic MS. Munk reads as follows: Toutes lesdites qualités sont celles du solitaire, citoyen de la république parfaite.
117. cf. supra, Introduction, n. 6.
118. cf. Risālat al-Ittiṣāl, p. 11, 12 and K. al-Nafs . (The Arabi version) p. 27.
119. The difference between this type and the first is that the forms this second type do not exist without the help of the imaginative faculty.
120. There is an addition in Munk which reads as follows: Cette forme qui vient de la nature ne correspond point à un corps particulier; car celui qui a soif ne désire pas telle eau en particulier, mais une eau quelconque de l'espèce qu'il désire. C'est pourquoi Galien a prétendu que les animaux perçoivent les especes (ou les universaux.)
121. cf. Munk, p. 95, n. 1.
122. cf. Ibn Qutayba, al-Shi'r, p. 666.
123. This is not the first time when Ibn Bājjā attacks Galen. cf. supra, n. 20.
124. It was not possible to identify the poet.
125. Munk reads, differently, as follows: "Les animaux qui n'ont pas de sang comme les abeilles et les fourmis". Certainly the Arabic MS does not mention anything about animals without blood.
126. Ibn Bājjā mentions the bear both here and in the previous passage as two opposite types of animal.
127. By "intermediary" Abū Bakr means the third and fourth types of particular spiritual forms as we have seen in the previous article.

128. It is al-ta'lim in Arabic which means mathematics, cf. al-Fārābī, Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm, ed. 'Uthmān Amin (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1931) p. 34 ff.
129. Munk makes a mistake in referring to the twelfth Shi'ite Imām instead of the Abbaside Khalif, the father of Hārūn al-Rashīd. For the story of al-Mahdi and Abū Dulāma, cf. Ibn Qutayba, al-Shi'r, p. 662.
130. Ibid, p. 660.
131. Munk translates "modesty" and suggests that the Arabic word is al-Ḥayā' which makes more sense than "frowning", but the Arabic MS. does not allow such reading.
132. There is an addition in Munk, p. 401, which reads as follows:
parce que celui-ci s'humiliera par la conception de la nature élevée du Mahdi et de sa noble forme.
133. cf. Ibn Qutayba, al-Shi'r, p. 153.
134. There is an addition in Munk, p. 402, which reads as follows: ni même avec celui qui n'a pour but que le spirituel absolu.
135. By "people of science" we should understand "the philosopher" or those who have the intelligible forms.
136. Munk has a long addition which reads: Il doit les écarter de lui, car ils ne sont pas de son espèce; il ne se mêlera pas à eux, ni n'entendra leur bavardage, afin qu'il n'ait pas besoin de démentir leurs mensonges, de poursuivre de sa haine les ennemis de Dieu et de porter son jugement contre eux. Convient-il au solitaire isolé de se faire le juge de ceux au milieu desquels il séjourne? Certes, il vaut mieux qu'il se livre à son culte divin et qu'il rejette loin de lui ce lourd fardeau, en se perfectionnant lui-même et en brillant pour les autres comme une lumière. C'est en secret qu'il doit se livrer au culte du Créateur, comme si c'était là une chose honteuse, et c'est ainsi qu'il se perfectionnera autant dans sa science que dans sa religion et qu'il plaira à Dieu.....; où bien, il ira dans les endroits - s'il s'en trouve - où fleurissent les sciences, et il se liera avec les hommes d'un âge mûr, qui excellent par leur jugement, leur science et leur intelligence et, en général, par les vertus intellectuelles, avec des hommes accomplis, et non pas avec des jeunes gens inexpérimentés....
137. cf. supra, pp. 17, 18.
138. Munk reads "vin" (wine) instead of "meat".

139. cf. supra, pp. 30, 31.
140. cf. supra, p. 134.
141. It means the relation of the particular form to its object in opposition to its relation with the different individuals who have the form. This second relation is called the universal relation of the particular form in opposition to the particular relation.
142. The Arabic MS says "al-Ajsām al-Mutaharrika" which means moving bodies, but from the context we should understand "the celestial bodies".
143. Darūriya in Arabic.
144. Juz'iyya in Arabic.
145. It means temporal in opposition to eternal.
146. It means the generic forms which are universal, are their forms.
147. It means; he receives them as their substratum.
148. Munk has an addition which explains the last clause, it says: et dans ce qui est homme on trouve l'espece de l'homme, quoique ce qui la reçoit reçoive la forme de l'homme de deux manières à la fois, je veux dire, une fois en tant que forme et une autre fois comme perception; et cela n'est pas inadmissible, car c'est à deux points de vue différents.
149. Man on one hand is temporal and corrupted body, but on the other hand he may attain eternity through the rational faculty.
150. Ibn Bājjā wants to raise a logical problem concerning the contradiction between the universality of Man's form, and the temporality of the individual man.
151. Munk has additional materials which cover the following pages. The reason we are quoting all these pages instead of making reference to them only, is to give a kind of result which throws light on some ambiguous paragraphs of the text as it stands in the MS. Munk reads (p. 405 ff.):

terme de tous les êtres, étant devenu lui-même les choses intelligibles en acte, alors, pensant l'être qui est intellect en acte, il ne pense d'autre être que lui-même; mais il se pense lui-même sans abstraction; car son être en lui-même, avant de penser, est intellect ou intelligible en acte. Et en cela il diffère des autres objets intelligibles; car, ceux-ci sont pensés tout d'abord par cela qu'ils sont abstraits de leurs matières dans lesquelles ils existent. Or, si après avoir été intelligibles en puissance ils sont pensés une seconde fois, leur être n'est plus l'être précédent, mais est séparé de leur matière; car ce sont des formes qui ne sont plus dans leur matière et des choses intelligibles en acte. Ainsi donc, lorsque l'intellect en acte pense les choses intelligibles, qui sont ses formes en tant qu'elles sont intelligibles en acte, ce même intellect, que nous avons appelé d'abord intellect en acte, est désormais l'intellect acquis.

Or, comme il y a des êtres qui sont de (pures) formes sans matière, des formes qui n'ont jamais été dans la matière, ces êtres, quand on les pense, existent comme des choses (purement) intelligibles, tels qu'ils existaient avant d'avoir été pensés. Car si, comme nous l'avons dit penser une chose de prime abord, c'est abstraire les formes hyliques de leur matière, elles (les formes) acquièrent par là une existence autre que leur première existence. Mais, comme il s'agit ici de choses qui sont de (pures) formes sans matière, la substance n'a pas besoin d'être abstraite de sa matière; au contraire, l'intellect, étant en acte, les trouve abstraites et les pense telles qu'elles existent en elles-mêmes (c'est à dire) comme choses intelligibles et immatérielles. Et quant il les pense, son propre être, comme chose intelligible, devient un intellect second, dont l'être (pourtant), avant de penser, était ce même intellect; ce qu'il faut entendre dans ce sens que, comme il s'agit de formes immatérielles, celles-ci, quand elles sont pensées, existent absolument telles qu'elles existaient en elles-mêmes, étant intelligibles dans toute la force du terme. Car, de même que nous disons de l'intellect qui est en nous, qu'il est en nous en acte, de même absolument on doit le dire de ces intellects qui sont dans le monde (en dehors de nous). Ces formes peuvent être pensées dans toute leur perfection, quand tous les objets de notre intelligence, ou du moins la plupart, sont devenus intelligibles en acte; l'intellect alors devient intellect acquis, et lesdites formes intelligibles deviennent des formes pour l'intellect en tant qu'intellect acquis. L'intellect acquis est en quelque sorte le substratum de ces formes, tandis qu'il est lui-même une forme pour l'intellect en acte, lequel, à son tour, est comme un substratum et une matière pour l'intellect acquis; (d'autre part) l'intellect en acte est une forme pour la substance (dans laquelle il réside), et cette substance est comme une matière.

Puis donc que l'intellect actif est indivisible, je veux dire, puisque toutes les formes spécifiques ensemble ne sont dans lui qu'une seule, ou du moins, puisque leurs essences sont des choses indivisibles [je veux dire, puisque chacune des formes spécifiques existe comme unité dans lui], la science de cet intellect séparé, en raison de son élévation, est une, bien que les objets de cette soient multiples, selon la multiplicité des espèces. Si les formes qui viennent de lui sont multiples, ce n'est que parce qu'elles se produisent dans des matières (différentes). En effet, les formes qui se trouvent aujourd'hui dans certaines matières sont, dans l'intellect actif, une (seule) forme abstraite; mais non pas dans ce sens qu'elles aient été abstraites, après avoir existé dans les matières, comme cela a lieu pour l'intellect en acte. Rien n'empêche l'intellect en acte de faire des efforts pour rapprocher de lui peu à peu ces formes séparées, jusqu'à ce qu'arrive la conception (purement) intelligible, c'est-à-dire l'intellect acquis; c'est pourquoi l'essence de l'homme, ou l'homme par ce qui forme son essence, est ce qu'il y a de plus rapproché de l'intellect actif. Rien non plus n'empêche cet intellect (acquis) de donner à la fois ce que les autres intellects ont donné d'abord, c'est-à-dire, le mouvement pour se penser soi-même; et alors arrive la véritable conception intelligible, c'est-à-dire la perception de l'être qui, par son essence même, est intellect en acte, sans avoir en besoin, ni maintenant, ni auparavant, de quelque chose qui le fit sortir de l'état de puissance. C'est là la conception de l'intellect séparé, je veux dire de l'intellect actif, tel qu'il se conçoit lui-même, et c'est là la fin de tous les mouvements.