168	ON THE DIVINE INTUITION
evil nor good, for it has nothing in itself to make
this perceptible.
 10.	And so then we can philosophize concerning
the will of God, and say :  If the hidden God, who
is a single existence and will, had not by his will
brought himself out of himself, out of the eternal
wisdom in the temperament,  into divisibility of
will, and had not,introduced this same divisibility
into an inclusiveness for a natural and creaturely
life, and had this possibility of separation in life not
found expression in strife; how could then the hidden
will of God, which in itself is one only, be revealed
to himself ?    How can there be in a single will a
knowledge of itself ?,
 11.	But  if there be a  divisibility in the  one
will,  so that the  divisibility  disposes itself into
centra and self-will, so that thus in that which is
separated there is a will of its own, and thus in
a single will unfathomable and innumerable wills
arise,  like  branches  from  a  tree;    then  we  see
and understand that in such a divisibility each
separated will brings itself into a special form, and
that the conflict of the wills is about the form, so
that one form in the partibility is not as another,
and yet all have their subsistence in one ground.
 12.	For a single will cannot break itself asunder
in pieces, just as the soul (Gemuth) breaks not in
pieces  when it separates into  an evil and  good
willing;   but the out-going of sense only separates
into a willing of evil and of good, and the soul
remains in itself entire, and  suffers  an evil and
good willing to arise and dwell in it.
 13.	Now saith Reason :  Whereto is this good or