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
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THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
OF
ARISTOTLE.

BAXTER, PRINTER, OXFORD.

THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

OF

ARISTOTLE,

WITH ENGLISH NOTES.

BY

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Non nisi ex Aristotele ipso discas demum Aristotelem intelligere.

BUHLE.

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PREFACE.

IN preparing this edition of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* for the press, I have followed the text of Bekker's smaller edition, published in the year 1831, from which I have seldom ventured to deviate except upon the authority of the MSS. or ancient commentators; and on such occasions I have always retained the rejected reading in the notes. In dividing the books into chapters and subdividing the chapters into paragraphs, as their previous division rested not on the sanction of antiquity, I have allowed myself unreserved liberty, incorporating two or more chapters into one, or breaking up one chapter into several, where by so doing the unity of the subject was better preserved, or the argument rendered more intelligible. But in order to obviate any inconvenience consequent upon such alterations, I have retained in the inner margin the numbering of the chapters as they are marked in Bekker's edition.

The advantage to be derived from thus dividing the chapters into paragraphs, and distinguishing each paragraph with a capital letter, upon the introduction of a new argu-

ment, is too obvious to require specific mention ; especially as this edition is intended merely for the use of those who are commencing the study of Aristotle. But as the interpretation of a passage sometimes depends on such a division, it becomes necessary to advertise the reader, that in this respect, I have been guided by a merely arbitrary rule; and by what appeared to be the sense of the author.

It now only remains for me to state the authorities which I have principally followed in compiling the notes and illustrations to the text. However imperfectly the design has been realized, my chief object has been to illustrate Aristotle by himself; a mode of interpretation more necessary for the Ethics than for many of his other writings, inasmuch as the diffusive yet inaccurate Scholia of Eustratius, or the more meagre labors of Michaelis Ephesius or Aspasius, furnish but a poor substitute for the learned commentaries of an Alexander, a Simplicius, or a Johannes Philoponus.

The earliest commentaries upon the Ethics appeared in the shape of a Paraphrase; and to some attempt of this kind in all probability we owe the *Magna Moralia* and the *Eudemian Ethics*^a. Of these, the most valuable is that

^a This accounts for the reason why such copious extracts and even entire books of the Ethics occur verbally in these

which is generally attributed to Andronicus Rhodius, which was first published by Daniel Heinsius at Leyden in 1607, reprinted at Cambridge in 1679, and finally at Oxford in 1809.

Next to these are the Greek Scholia published by Aldus at Venice in 1536, folio^b, of which a Latin version by Gio. Bern. Feliciano^c was printed at Paris in 1543, folio,

treatises. For where the subject was not very intricate, or very difficult, such extracts would coincide with the design of the author. These works, however, have often been attributed to Aristotle; but a strong internal evidence may be urged against this supposition; not so much from the style, as on account of their remarkable discrepancy from the Nicomachean Ethics, and his other writings.

^b Of this collection, the commentaries on the first, second, third, and fourth books are attributed to Eustratius, Bishop of Nice; on the fifth to Michaelis Ephesius, the sixth to Eustratius, the seventh and eighth to Aspasius, the ninth and tenth to Eustratius. But it is not probable that Eustratius is the author of the commentary on the tenth book, because the author of that book calls Heracleitus of Ephesus his fellow-citizen, and because, from the commentary on the third chapter of the first book, it is clear that Eustratius was a warm supporter of Plato against the objections of Aristotle; while on the other hand, from the commentary upon the second and third chapters of the tenth book, we should infer quite the contrary. This collection I have generally quoted by the term "Scholia."

^c For the use of this book I am indebted to the kindness of my friend, the present Librarian of New College. The publisher of Felician pretends, that another MS. of the Greek original was collated for this book; but in all the difficult and corrupt passages I have observed, that the Translator does not give a faithful version as on other occasions, but merely a paraphrase.

and dedicated to Cardinal Alexander Farnese.

The merit of the writers in this collection is very unequal; for while the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisium, Simplicius, and others, upon the physical and metaphysical writings of Aristotle, have preserved to us not only some valuable notices of the state and history of philosophy, but also several fragments of the lost writings of Aristotle, they exhibit a much deeper acquaintance with the Peripatetic system than either Eustratius or Aspasius, who possess none of the other advantages. Besides, the Platonic partialities of Eustratius, his evident anxiety to vindicate his master, and to reconcile at any rate his tenets with those of Aristotle, render him an unsafe guide wherever his prejudices are brought into action. And this liability is more frequent than at first sight would appear when it is considered, that indirect references to Plato occur throughout this treatise; that in most instances no specific mention is made of Plato's name, nor the particular passages or treatises verbally or definitely quoted, against which the whole force of an objection is directed. To this may be added, that several of the most important writings of Plato have been lost, and that consequently, did we but possess them all, instances would be found of this commentator's misrepresentations more numerous than can

easily now be determined. These difficulties, in conjunction with the practice of Aristotle, who seldom quotes his authorities, or the names of the writers whom he is refuting, frequently occasion great obscurity, and must furnish my apology if I have often brought forward in the notes parallel passages from Plato and other writers which appear to bear but little on the text.

Of the almost innumerable Latin Commentators, the most valuable are Albertus Magnus^d and Thomas Aquinas^e. But their labors are far more adapted to those who are already conversant with the philosophy of Aristotle, than to those who are only commencing the study.

From the date of these Schoolmen till the commencement of the fifteenth century, nothing was done towards explaining the text of the Ethics or the moral philosophy of Aristotle. Men were content to follow the steps of the scholastic commentators, rather than to consult the original; to comment and compose annotations on the commentaries already existing

^d See Alberti Magni Ethica, vol. iv. of his Works, published at Lyons (Lugduni), 1651.

^e I do not mean his professed commentary upon the Ethics, which is little else than a paraphrase, but his Summa Totius Theologiæ; particularly the second and third parts, known by the names of Secunda Summa and Tertia Summa.

without attempting to seek for fresh information from authentic and original sources.

But the revival of learning under the auspices of Pope Nicholas V. breathed fresh vigor and animation into the lifeless and attenuated form of Greek literature, and especially of Greek philosophy. By the indefatigable research of this most illustrious Pontiff, Greek books and manuscripts were procured from all parts of the globe; and the most celebrated scholars of every nation were invited to his court to transcribe and translate them. Poggio, George of Trebizond, Leonardo Bruni of Arezzo, Giannozzo Manetti, Fr. Filelfo, Laur. Valla, Theod. Gaza, and Guarini, formed part of this illustrious circle, who were encouraged by his bounty, and preferred to places of honor and emolument. By their exertions, a flood of light burst forth upon the astonished world, and penetrated through the dusky regions of monastic seclusion. Where the Master of the Sentences, Aquinas and Scotus, had ruled with an undisputed and undivided sway, a new race of literary champions were springing up, prepared to dispute their claims, and to question the supremacy even of Aristotle and of Plato.

Men of the greatest literary eminence were now earnestly engaged in the no very philosophical contest of placing the one or the other of these philosophers on the highest pinnacle of literary renown, to the utter degradation of

his rival. The world rung with the disputes of the Aristotelian and the Platonist; nor can the days of romance produce an instance where greater zeal and devotion were displayed by rival knights and squires in the service of some earthly goddess of their idolatry, than was shown by the rival champions of Aristotle and Plato in vindicating the peerless superiority of their respective masters^f.

This dispute, however, although perhaps trivial in itself, was great and beneficial in its consequences. These literary skirmishes taught men to feel their own powers, opened their eyes to a more perfect appreciation of the ancient philosophy; and they who had been engaged

^f This controversy commenced in an amusing way, originating with Gemistius Plethon, who had inspired Cosmo di Medici with a predilection for Platonism. This brisk and staunch old scholar had been sent to the Council of Ferrara to take part in the conferences between the two Churches; upon which occasion he combated so warmly for his own, that, contrary to the example of several of his compatriots, he refused to make a single confession. He wrote a treatise in Greek upon the difference between the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, in which he turned into ridicule the opinions of those who thought the two philosophers could be reconciled, and treated with much contempt both Aristotle and his followers. Upon this the Aristotelians took fire, and entered the lists against him; but Plethon died before he could reply. Two of the most earnest and eminent who engaged in this quarrel were Cardinal Bessarion and George of Trebisonde. See Ginguené, *Hist. Litt. d'Italie*, iii. p. 357.

in contending for others, had now learned to venture for themselves. The names of some who were most eagerly engaged in these disputes, are still illustrious in the annals of literature, and Europe still venerates the memory of Bessarione, Don. Acciajuoli, Argiropulo, Erm. Barbaro, Marsiglio Ficino, Giov. Pico dalla Mirandola, Cristoforo Landino, Poliziano, Alexander and his son Franc. Piccolomini, Laur. Donati, Franc. Patrizi, Charpentier, and Bembo.

But it would be superfluous to enter here into a detail of the merits of this controversy, to show what advantages it produced towards the illustration of Aristotle generally, or of the Ethics in particular; nor shall I weary the reader's patience by enumerating the host of modern commentators, who have devoted their time to the illustration of this treatise, particularly after the labors of Buhle, Zell, and Hoffman. I shall therefore only mention those which after some examination appear to me to be the most deserving of notice.

1. The earliest of these is Jo. Argiropulo with his disciple Acciajuoli, to whose deserts the celebrated Victor has paid a merited eulogium^s. Argiropulo was a native of Byzantium, and upon the capture of that city by the Turks retired to Florence, where he was liberally received by Cosimo di Medici. In this splendid

^s See p. 357, note to this Edition.

retreat he became tutor to Peter the son, and Lorenzo the grandson, of Cosmo; and numbered among other pupils the celebrated Angelo Poliziano. To avoid the plague which devastated Tuscany during the latter part of his life, he retired to Rome, where he died in 1480. His Latin version of the Ethics was first published in 1488, and republished several times within that century. In 1535 it was reprinted at Venice, with the commentary of his pupil Acciajuoli^b, and again at Paris more accurately in 1555.

2. The next and most important is the commentary of Victorius (Pietro Vettori), born of noble parents at Florence, July 11, 1499. The attentions of this eminent scholar were not confined merely to literary exertions; he took an active part in the political divisions which agitated his country. Upon the tragical death of Alexander of Medici, he intended to settle at Rome, but was diverted from his purpose by the Grand Duke Cosmo di Medici, who appreciated his talents, and recalled him the following year (1538) to Florence. Here he was appointed Professor of the Greek and Latin tongues; and having filled the chair with much reputation and ability, was elected by acclama-

^b This commentary is attributed by Buhle to Argiropulo incorrectly. See the dedication prefixed to the Paris Edition of this version and commentary, and Acciajuoli's own dedication to Cosmo di Medici.

tion President of the Florentine Academy in 1542. He died at an advanced age at Florence, loaded with civil and literary honours, December 18, 1585, a year after the publication of his Commentary upon the Ethics¹.

3. Johannes Magirus, Doctor of Medicine, and Professor of Natural Philosophy in the Academy of Marpurg; author of an ingenious commentary upon the Ethics, which he was prevented from completing by a premature death. His work was published at Frankfort in 1601, 12mo^k.

4. Hubert Van Giffen, (Giphanius), a celebrated jurist, born in 1534 at Burn, a little village in the ancient duchy of Gueldres. After commencing his studies at Louvain, he removed to Paris, and finally to Orleans in 1566, where he received a Doctor's degree the subsequent year. Having travelled over Italy, he at length fixed himself at Strasbourg, where he taught philosophy and civil law. In consequence of his reputation he was appointed Professor of Civil Law at Ingolstadt; but attracting the notice of Rodolph the Second, was

¹ Petri Victorii Commentarii in X libros Aristotelis de Moribus ad Nicomachum. Positis ante singulas declarationes Græcis verbis auctoris: iisdemque ad verbum Latine expressis. Florentiæ ex officina Junctarum 1584. fol. On the reverse is a portrait of him in his 81st (86th?) year.

^k Dr. Joannis Magiri Philosophiæ professoris in Academia Marpurgensi in clyti, Corona virtutum Moralium, &c.

by that Emperor invited to Prague, where he died 26th July, 1604. His commentary upon the Ethics was not printed till after his death in 1608.

Of all the critics now mentioned, Acciajuoli is most valuable for his acuteness, and the knowledge he displays of the other writings of Aristotle. Magirus furnishes a clear and easy interpretation and paraphrase of the argument, aiming at little else than rendering the terse and sometimes involved reasoning of Aristotle familiar and intelligible to the beginner. The commentary of Vettori is more distinguished for its critical scholarship, and its illustrations produced principally from the Latin classics; but in explaining the philosophy of Aristotle, or the systems of others which he is employed in supporting or refuting, this commentator is inferior to any of the others. The most valuable is the commentary of Giphanius, who, to an intimate knowledge of the writings of Aristotle and great natural acuteness, united the study of the other Greek philosophers. In the labors of this excellent scholar the reader will frequently find that satisfaction which elsewhere will be sought in vain. Of the notes of Zell (1820) and Michelet (1833) it is needless to speak; with the former I am no otherwise acquainted than through the extracts of Dr. Cardwell, whose selections from the ancient commentators are extremely useful, and had they

been given in English would have rendered needless an edition like the present. The notes of Michelet in the earlier part of his book generally display considerable ingenuity, but his patience and industry seem to have failed towards the latter part, where his labors become jejune and unimportant.

But though the attention of scholars in our own country, and more particularly abroad, is now being attracted to Aristotle, and the use and advantage of improved editions of his works, little has been done of late years for the elucidation of his philosophy, more particularly the *Ethics*. That field is still open to one who, to a sound judgment, accurate scholarship, and a familiar acquaintance with the other writings, more particularly the logic, of Aristotle, shall unite a calm and chastised love of philosophical investigations. But if he come to such a task with a mind already pre-possessed with other systems, with a desire to torture the philosophy of antiquity to the measure of his own conceptions, he must, as others have done, experience only a miserable failure.

For this edition I have only to observe, that these notes were compiled without any intention of publication: and had I not since the time in which they were originally written been engaged in occupations of an entirely different and opposite nature, I should gladly have re-

modelled the whole. But my only object was to present Aristotle's Ethics in a form less repulsive to beginners; to no higher merits does this book pretend; and if it should not entirely fail of this end, I shall fully have attained the object of my wishes. Should I not succeed even thus far, but be found to have mistaken the meaning of my author in more instances than I myself suspect, or than a difference of opinion may plead my excuse, I must defend myself in the words of a passage, which will ever be applicable to those who are engaged in enquiries after moral as well as physical truth, and which furnishes the best encouragement for the feeble and diffident, the best reproof for the able and overconfident enquirer. ἡ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας θεωρία τῇ μὲν χαλεπή, τῇ δὲ ῥαδία. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτε ἀξίως μηδένα δύνασθαι τυχεῖν αὐτῆς, μήτε πάντας ἀποτυγχάνειν, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον λέγειν τι περὶ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ καθ' ἓνα μὲν μηδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἐπιβάλλειν αὐτῇ, ἐκ πάντων δὲ συναθροισζομένων γίνεσθαι τι μέγεθος. —οὐ μόνον δὲ χάριν ἔχειν δίκαιον τούτοις ὧν ἄν τις κοινωνήσαι ταῖς δόξαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἔτι ἐπιπολαιότερον ἀποφνηαμένοις, καὶ γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι συμβάλλονται τι. Arist. Metaphys. ii. 1.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

SINCE our knowledge of the *moral* nature of man, as well as of the nature of every other class of beings, must depend upon our previous knowledge of the end of his existence; for those actions and habits only which have reference to this end can be considered as his proper characteristics, and the perfection of his being must be considered as the perfect adaptation of his faculties for energizing upon those objects for which he was produced; therefore before we can proceed to the consideration of the nature and perfection and consequently the Happiness of man, we must first learn what is the object of his being. And first, whether he have any such particular object.

If he has such a particular object, it must be marked by these properties; that every other end must be subordinate to it; that whatever be its nature, whether some result independent and beyond the mere action that produced it, or whether it be an action itself, it must be the chief end of all, including within it all other ends, and consequently superior to them in value and completeness.

But such an end as this is the end of the Political Science, for to that end all the ends of all other energies and sciences are subordinate; we know therefore thus much touching the nature of the end we are investigating, that it is identical with the end of the Political Science; that is to say, εἰς ζῆν and εἰς κατάρτην, for such is the end of the Political Science.

But the advantages to be derived to our subsequent inquiries from the result at which we have now arrived, are more apparent than real. For in their notions and interpretation of this perfection or happiness (εἰς ζῆν) all men are at variance,

and every one forms his conceptions of it according to his own particular fancies. Thus one person calls it Pleasure, another Honor, another Wealth, another Virtue, and Plato an *Ideal Good*. But the perfection of *man*, as man, cannot consist in Pleasure, in its vulgar sense, for this is common to brutes. Nor in Honor, as neither in Wealth, for these are not final; we seek Wealth with a view to some other good, and Honor with a view to be thought virtuous, so that Virtue would possess a better claim. But neither is Virtue Happiness, for this perfection is an energy ($\epsilon\delta\ \zeta\eta\upsilon$), Virtue a habit; Misery may coexist with Virtue, but not with Happiness. Neither is it the *Ideal Good*, because such a notion is contrary to the general practice and sense of mankind; and such a good is rather the unreal creation of a philosopher's brain; and to say the least, has no practical influence with mankind. All these notions respecting this Chief Good of man are therefore deficient in some essentials, nor can all be at once correct; both because Nature has produced men for *one* object, and therefore their Perfection or Happiness must be uniform; and secondly, because Truth is never at variance with itself, nor changes its colours according to the passions and prejudices and habits of men.

Our investigation then has not advanced beyond the first steps of our inquiry.

What then is this $\epsilon\delta$, or $\epsilon\delta\ \zeta\eta\upsilon$, which men interpret so variously? That it is both final or perfect we infer from our introductory remarks; from which it would also seem to follow, that it is a complete and independent Good, not requiring other subordinates to increase its essence or improve it.

But to resume. If, as we have already stated, an instrument or agent can only then be said to be perfect when it is so adapted as perfectly to perform the end and object of

* I use this term technically, not according to its usual acceptance. The

Greek reader will at once understand the meaning.

its being, to discover the perfection ($\tauὸ \sigmaὺ$) of any thing, we must first look to the object of its being ($\tauὸ ἔργον$): in other words, its characteristic. For as Nature never produces (as man often does) one thing for two uses, it must necessarily follow, that its characteristic, or, to speak logically, its *differentia*, must have reference to its $\dot{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$; consequently, if we can discover the differentia of man we shall be able to discover his $\dot{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\omicron\nu$, consequently his $\sigmaὺ \zeta\eta\nu$. That differentia then is reason, or, more correctly, the exercise of reason, or $\zeta\eta\nu \kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha} \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\nu$, consequently the perfection of man must be, the living perfectly ($\sigmaὺ$ or $\kappa\alpha\tau' \acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\acute{\eta}\nu$) according to reason; and the highest perfection of man, when he lives according to reason in the highest perfection, ($\kappa\alpha\tau' \acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\eta\nu \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\sigma\tau\eta\nu$): the Happiness of man, therefore, will be a life, or $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$, for the terms are synonymous, perfectly according to reason; or $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma \kappa\alpha\tau' \acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\eta\nu \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\sigma\tau\eta\nu$, adding to our definition what common sense teaches us, that such a life must be exercised for a length of time; so that the complete definition of Happiness will be $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma \kappa\alpha\tau' \acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\eta\nu \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\sigma\tau\eta\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu \beta\iota\omicron\upsilon \tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\omega$.

If then this definition be correct, as it seems to be in theory, it must also be correct in practice, and in some degree meet the general apprehensions of mankind. Let it then be examined in conjunction with those theories of Happiness which we have already discussed and rejected, and see how it agrees with what is true in them, and avoids what is false and reprehensible.

With their notions then who consider Happiness to be the highest of all goods, this definition is found to agree; for the goods of the soul are the highest of all, and such are the energies of the soul ($\acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha\iota \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$). Likewise by defining it to consist in energy, we agree with those who consider it to be $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\nu}\rho\gamma\iota\alpha$ and $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{\nu}\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\alpha$.

Nay, even *all* the qualities which mankind attach to Happiness may be found in this definition. For if we look to Socrates and others who consider virtue to be synonymous

with Happiness; our definition, by describing it as an energy according to Virtue, will meet with their view, for the energies according to Virtue are Virtue. And further, an *energy* according to Virtue avoids the objection, which may be urged against their tenets, that Virtue may be inactive, whereas they only that run receive the crown, they only are happy who energize.

Or whether, on the other hand, with Aristippus and his followers, we consider Happiness to consist in Pleasure, we shall find that Pleasure is essentially included in our definition of Happiness. For they only can be called virtuous actions and energies which spring from perfect habits, and the exercise of such habits is necessarily attended with Pleasure, Pleasure being the criterion of the perfection of the habit. Whereas Pleasure, according to the notion of the generality of mankind, is ever varying and fluctuating, like a wave of the troubled sea, tossed hither and thither according to the caprices of mankind. In short, our definition includes all that is desirable in life; for since the good man is the only unerring standard, and judges that the virtuous energies are the most beautiful, most eligible, most perfect, most pleasant of all actions, the virtuous energies do possess all these qualities, so consequently must the Happiness which is according to those energies.

Yet may it not be questioned whether our definition is in all parts complete? For not to say that we can hardly suppose a person to be happy who is sunk in the very depths of poverty, whose children are vicious, or his own life burthened with personal disease and deformity, can virtuous energies be exercised without external means, and must we not therefore add to our definition, that the happy man must be competently furnished with external goods? The affirmative of this question certainly coincides with the opinions of a great number, who consider good fortune and prosperity as essential to Happiness.

To this we reply, that such a question necessarily involves another; what is the cause of Happiness? If man, (for we omit the consideration of divine agency, as not within the scope of this treatise, as well as from other considerations,) the former question receives an immediate answer: and that man is the cause of his own happiness appears from what has been said already, that Happiness is the end of the Political Science, and it would be absurd to suppose that we should be directed to its acquisition, (as we are by the Political Science), if the attainment of it were not in our own power. But if Fortune be the cause of Happiness, then certainly Good Fortune must bear a much more important part in our definition than it at present possesses. But is it not inconsistent with the whole course of nature, and contrary to analogy, to attribute the noblest good to an uncertain and ignoble cause?

Nevertheless, as the opinion that external prosperity is essential to Happiness, is supported not only by the consent of the many, but seems also countenanced by the adage of Solon; it will be right to consider what was Solon's opinion, and thus more explicitly to determine the question.

According to Solon then, no one can be called happy as long as he lives. By which assertion Solon did *not* mean to say that he might be called happy when he was *dead*, but that during the whole of his life he was so completely within the power of Fortune, that she could at any time render him miserable; from whose thralldom Death only could release him. But granting this position to be true, we are reduced to this alternative; either that no one can be happy at any time, (which is contrary to the general feeling of mankind), or that we are not to call a man happy when he really is so (during life) for fear of some eventual unhappiness, which is absurd. Neither, if Solon objected to calling a man happy while he was alive from fear of such an event, but allowed him to have been happy when dead as being then beyond the power of fortune, has he entirely avoided the difficulty as he imagined.

For death does not appear entirely to remove man from the effects of good or ill fortune. At all events, we often call a dead man happy or miserable in reference to the fate and conduct of his descendants, which seems to imply that they are affected by what happens upon this earth^b.

But indeed this whole view of the Happiness of man seems to be erroneous; for the good and evil of life (τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς) does not consist in good or evil fortune; although Happiness cannot exist without a degree of good fortune, if Happiness consist in virtuous energies, and energies cannot be exercised without external means. And this very consideration that Happiness is a virtuous energy, removes it at once from the objections which militate against a theory which would make it depend upon the caprice of fortune. For nothing is more stable, more uniform, than the virtuous energies, none are so much in the power of man, or so independent of the fickleness of fortune. And unless ill fortune befall the happy man (such as we have described him) to so great an extent as to prevent his energizing, ill fortune can scarcely deprive the virtuous, that is, the happy man of his Happiness. And this will be more certain and evident should it hereafter appear, that Happiness is of that chief and highest class of goods which do not, like the moral energies, depend upon external means.

Having thus confirmed his definition, and refuted the objections which might be brought against it, Aristotle now proceeds in his analysis. For to define Happiness to be an energy of the soul according to Virtue, or in perfection (κατ' ἀρετήν), and yet not to explain the terms, virtue and perfection, must leave the whole indistinct; at the least, useless for practical purposes.

If man therefore be a compound animal, the perfection of man will be the perfection of all the parts which compose him; and so also if the soul of man be compounded, whether

^b Compare Cicero De Senect. c. 23.

in reality (as some have supposed) or merely in formality (*ἐν λόγῳ*), the virtue of the soul^c, in other words, the virtue of man, will be twofold. In its most extensive division, we may separate the soul into rational and irrational; and consequently its virtues into two, rational and irrational. The reality of this definition seems apparent from this consideration; for (to omit a subdivision of the irrational, the merely vegetative) we certainly imply a division of this kind, when we praise the temperate man; as though he possessed a twofold virtue, one of reason to direct him aright, the other of an irrational part which obeys the dictates of that reason. Virtue then is divisible, according to this difference, into Rational and Irrational; in other words, into Intellectual and Moral.

Moral or Ethical Virtue (*ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*), as the name indicates, is derived from habit (*ἔθος*); hence it would seem, that Moral Virtue is not the gift of nature. 1st, Because natural gifts can not, as are all the Moral Virtues, be altered by habit. 2dly, Of those gifts which we have by nature, we have the faculties first, and then exercise them; but in the Moral Virtues, on the contrary, the faculties are acquired by previous exercise. 3dly, The conduct of legislators points us to the same conclusion; for they would never institute rules and laws for the acquirement of those excellencies which nature only can bestow. 4thly, Moral Virtue is both produced and destroyed by the same efficient cause, viz. actions, which is never the case in nature; the same efficient cause in nature never being productive as well as destructive of the same effects. These observations bring us to the following results, that Moral Virtue is not the gift of Nature, but of ourselves; that it is generated, increased, and destroyed by action; good actions being productive of good habits, evil actions of the contrary.

We have then discovered thus much of the nature of Moral

^c We have no adequate term to express the Greek word *ψυχὴ*, life and soul being equally implied in it. And therefore I employ the word soul in this extensive sense.

Virtue, that it is a good habit produced by a repetition of good actions. But yet, as far as regards practice, we have still to learn what are *good* actions.

Leaving then, for the present, the consideration that all such actions must be done according to reason, it may serve for a general observation, that good actions are destroyed by excess and defect. For instance, too much exercise as well as too little, is prejudicial to health, whereas moderate exercise promotes and preserves it. The same remark applies to the habits of temperance, courage, and the like ; men becoming temperate by the performance of actions avoiding either extremes, and virtuous generally by the performance of such actions. But not only, as we have already observed, are the Virtues produced by good or moderate actions (*ἐν μέτρῳ*), and destroyed by the excessive and defective, but upon those actions by which a habit has been produced, on the same will it reoperate, the actions and habits reciprocally acting upon each other, the actions producing the habit, the habit assisting in the production of the actions. Thus by a continual abstinence from unlawful and immoderate Pleasures, men acquire a habit of temperance, and that habit, when acquired, gives a greater facility to the practice of that abstinence. This furnishes a solution to the question, how are we to know when we have acquired the habit, and what is the criterion of its perfection? That criterion is to be found in the pleasure or pain resulting from the performance of the actions ; for he to whom the performance of a moral action causes pleasure, has acquired the perfect habit, as he who feels pain is without it. Thus Moral Virtue, then, is chiefly occupied with Pleasure and Pain ; Moral Virtue being a proper disposition in reference to Pleasure and Pain ; all our actions being guided by them, all our motives derived from them. Thus far then we have learnt what is the origin of Moral Virtue, and what are the causes of its destruction, its object-matter, and the effect which it produces upon actions. We may then proceed at once

to its definition; but before doing this, it may be as well to meet an objection, which might be brought against some previous observations.

It has been stated, that Virtue is the result of a repetition of good actions; consequently, virtuous actions, or actions resulting from Virtue (*κατ' ἀρετήν*), cannot be performed at once; in other words, men by doing virtuous actions become virtuous, gain a habit of virtue, and then only when the habit is gained, perform the virtuous actions, properly so called. Of what character then are those actions to be considered which are done previous to the acquirement of the habits? are they not virtuous? A temperate act done previous to the acquirement of temperance, and with a view to acquire it, is it not an act of temperance? And a bold action, before the habit of bravery, a brave action? Is it not so in the case of another class of habits, the arts? Do not they have all their perfection in themselves? Thus he who can perform on an instrument is a musician, and he who makes a watch is a watch-maker, whether he has acquired the habit or not.

To this we reply, that this objection is not valid; for even in reference to the Arts, he who performs the act of an artist is not at once an artist; something more is required. And even granting it to be true, the cases are not parallel; for in the Arts we look to little else than the excellence of the production; in the Virtues, not to the action but the disposition of the agent. In the case of the Arts, we require knowledge as the chief; in the Virtues, knowledge has but little weight towards constituting the character of a virtuous act.

We proceed then to the definition of Virtue. And first to discover its *genus*.

Since in the moral part of the soul the Affections (*τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα*) are only three; passions, faculties, and habits; Moral Virtue must be one of these. By passions, I mean those affections of the mind which are attended by pleasure or pain; by faculties (*δυνάμεις*), the capacities of being affected

by the passions; by habits, certain dispositions according to which we are rightly or wrongly disposed in reference to the passions. Now Virtue is neither a passion nor a faculty, since we are not praised or blamed with reference to the mere possession either of the passions, or of the capacities of being influenced by them, but in being influenced by them in an improper degree; in other words in being wrongly disposed in respect to them; consequently Virtue and Vice are habits. But since Virtue is ever productive of good actions, making not only its possessor good, but his actions, (as the virtue of the eye makes the eye perfect and its act perfect,) Virtue must be a habit of this nature, he who possesses it must be a good man, and his actions will be good likewise. The good man therefore and his actions will be our rule for the discovery of Virtue, as we have frequently observed. What then are his actions? such as we have already stated, as avoid excess, defect, and are in a mean, (*ἐν μεσότητι*).

But the mean is of two kinds, either absolute, (in which case it is equally distant from the extremes, as in surfaces and solids, and never varies,) or relative, in respect to us, in which instance it is continually fluctuating. To this mean, Moral Virtue always directs its aim, the absolute mean being seldom the mean to us. Virtue then is, *ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὐσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν*—a mean in its essence and definition, an extreme in its quality and excellence. Not that *all* actions admit of a mean, some always being extremes, and consequently always culpable, otherwise there would be a mean of excess and a defect of excess, which is absurd. But Virtue being a relative mean, as we have stated, it will frequently happen that it is further removed from one extreme than the other, and this for two reasons; either from the nature of the things themselves, or from our being more inclined to one extreme than the other. Thus illiberality is further removed from the mean than prodigality from the nature of the habits themselves; but in the

case of the man who is inclined to prodigality, prodigality is further removed from the mean than illiberality; and, consequently it is his duty, if he be desirous to arrive at the mean, to go to the opposite extreme, that the influence of his favorite habit may cause him to recoil, as it were, upon the mean. To give more exact rules at present for the attainment of this purpose, is difficult; much must be left to circumstances; but as a general rule we ought to avoid excess and defect, and follow the example of the good man.

But since praise or blame, and consequently Virtue and Vice, are attributed only to voluntary acts, and one species of the voluntary enters into the definition of Virtue, it will be requisite to consider the nature of the voluntary and involuntary. Involuntary acts then appear to be such as are done from compulsion or ignorance. The compulsion is that whose principle is external, the agent or patient contributing nothing to the action (*οὐ ἢ ἀρχῇ ἔξωθεν τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ἣ μὴδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων*). There are however another class of actions, in which, although the principle is external, yet the agent or patient do contribute to the act; as the throwing one's goods overboard in a storm. These actions can be considered neither as voluntary, since absolutely every one would avoid them; nor yet involuntary, as they want part of the character which constitutes an involuntary act. They may, therefore, be considered as of a mixed nature. Their attributes also, as their nature, are mixed and variable; sometimes being praised or blamed like the voluntary, at other times pardoned or pitied like the involuntary acts. But their character as moral acts must depend much upon the actions themselves, and the consequences they involve; being praised or blamed, pardoned or pitied, accordingly as they involve great honor or great disgrace, or not involving either great honor or great disgrace, are done under the influence of overwhelming pain.

Of the involuntary from ignorance, a distinction must be

made; for actions done from ignorance are not always involuntary; some being even voluntary, (as when men are themselves the authors of their own ignorance); some, though not voluntary, yet at the same time not being involuntary; as when after an act has been done from ignorance, no pain and no repentance, but rather pleasure, is felt for the evil which has been done; and lastly (which alone can be properly considered the involuntary acts of ignorance), when men are not themselves the cause of their own ignorance, and feel sorrow when subsequently conscious of the wrong which they have done. Involuntariness of this kind can only take place when men are ignorant of some particulars connected with the fact, for ignorance of the principle can only arise from wilful blindness brought on by a continued repetition of evil acts. Voluntary acts, therefore, are those whose principle is internal, the agent knowing the particulars of the act (*τὸ ἐκούσιον δοξάειν ἂν εἶναι οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἶδότε τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις*).

Having thus then determined the essentials of voluntary and involuntary acts, we are naturally led to the consideration of choice (*προαίρεσις*), for all *προαίρεσις* is voluntary, although not all acts that are voluntary are done from deliberate choice. Things done on the sudden are often voluntary, but manifestly not the result of deliberate choice. Further, children and brute animals act voluntarily, but not from deliberate choice. Nor is *προαίρεσις* the same as desire or anger, for both are common to brutes with man, whereas *προαίρεσις* is not; both are also opposed to *προαίρεσις*. Neither is it will (*βούλησις*), although having a great resemblance to it. For will is often of the impossible, *προαίρεσις* is not. Will is often of things over which we have no control, not so *προαίρεσις*. Will is rather of the end, *προαίρεσις* of means to the end. Nor yet is *προαίρεσις* the same as opinion. For opinion is equally of things impossible and eternal, as of things in our own power. Opinion is distinguished by truth

and falsehood, *προαίρεσις* by its virtuousness and viciousness. Neither is it the same with any particular opinion. For our characters are determined by our deliberate choice of good or evil, not by the opinion we form concerning them. Opinion is inert, *προαίρεσις* is an active principle. *Προαίρεσις* is praised for being of what it ought, rather than for any correctness in itself; opinion for being true. And not unfrequently they who form the best opinions are the least likely to form and act upon a good *προαίρεσις* ^d.

But although *προαίρεσις* is none of these, yet, from what has been already stated, and from its name, it should seem that it is attended with reason and deliberation, being a choice after *deliberation* formed between two alternatives; (ἀλλ' ἄρα γὰρ τὸ προβουλεύμενον; ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῦνομα ὡς ὃν πρὸ ἐπίτητον αἰρετόν). Before then we can satisfactorily determine its definition, we must first examine into the nature of *Deliberation*. And this may be more easily discovered by first determining what is its object-matter.

No one then deliberates concerning those things whose existence depends upon nature, necessity, or chance. Nor even upon those things of which man himself is the cause, but over which he has no control. But we deliberate each of us only concerning those things which are in our own power; more especially, of those things whose results are uncertain and contingent; and in all cases where there is greater room for doubt. Thus we deliberate more concerning the inexact than the exact arts and sciences. Consequently, we deliberate upon means, not ends; for fixing upon some end, we then proceed to deliberation, and seek for means to the accomplishment of the end in view. Deliberation, therefore, is a kind of search (*ζήτησις*) but not identical with it, for search ranges over a much wider object-

^d Compare Butler's Anal. l. 5.

matter, as mathematical and physical truths. *Βούλευσις* and *προαίρεσις* then appear almost to be the same, yet there is this difference between them; *βούλευσις* is previous in point of time to *προαίρεσις*, for when *βούλευσις* is completed, then *προαίρεσις* begins. As in states, *βούλευσις* is the deliberative, so *προαίρεσις* is the executive faculty, acting according to and after the dictates of *βούλευσις*. Gathering up then the threads of our previous conclusions, it would seem that *προαίρεσις* is *βουλευτική ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν*. Having thus determined the nature of those faculties which are employed upon the means, we proceed to some observations upon that which is employed upon ends (*βούλησις*).

According to the opinion of some philosophers, *βούλησις* is only of the good; according to the opinion of others, of the apparent good. Both of these opinions have their difficulties. For if *βούλησις* be only of the good, bad men cannot exercise *βούλησις*; or, if so, then the object of their will (*βούλησις*) is not always an object of will (for then it must be a real good), whereas it is generally an evil. If, on the contrary, *βούλησις* be only of the apparent good, then it will follow, that nature has implanted a faculty within us without any specific object-matter upon which it is to be exercised. Perhaps then the difficulty might be solved by the following consideration; that, absolutely speaking, the real good only can be the object of *βούλησις*, but in the case of the individual, the apparent good. To the good man, therefore, (since to him the real is always the apparent good), the real good will always be the object of *βούλησις*; and that only is in truth an object of *βούλησις*, which is an object of *βούλησις* to him, he only being capable of forming a correct judgment in morals, and being an unerring standard by whom we are to form our judgments.

If then the end be the object of the will, and the mean the object of *προαίρεσις* and deliberation, actions which have regard to them must be voluntary; and consequently Virtue

and Vice (being formed by such actions) must be voluntary likewise. For if we have the power of doing an act (and that act constitutes Virtue), we must also have the power of abstaining from doing it (which constitutes Vice), and vice versa; so that if Virtue (as some are willing to concede) be voluntary, Vice must be voluntary likewise. That Vice is as equally voluntary as Virtue, seems apparent from the following considerations. 1st. If man, and man only, be the principle of his own actions, his actions must be voluntary. 2dly. The fact of reward being attached to good and punishment to bad actions, proves them to be voluntary; for we never exhort men to or dissuade them from actions, which are not in their own power. 3dly. In the case of ignorance which is *self-caused*, men are punished; and so also in cases where, from their own carelessness or neglect, they acquire bad habits; nor is it allowed to be a sufficient exculpation, or shelter from punishment, to say that they did not know that their ignorance would be productive of such ill effects; since such ignorance is a proof of Vice. 4thly. Where a man has acquired a confirmed evil habit which he cannot change, and acts in obedience to that habit, without being able to withstand its influence, he is considered a voluntary agent, since he was a voluntary agent through every step that led to this evil habit. And his own wishing to change it after it has been formed, can no more constitute him an involuntary agent, than it can prove that man to be who having thrown a stone voluntarily, repents after it is out of his hand. 5thly. This is also confirmed by the distinction we observe in reference to bodily deformities, blaming and punishing them only in such instances where they are self-inflicted.

But it may be urged, that each one aims at the good which his *phantasy* presents to him, and is not master of his phantasy (*phantasy*), and consequently is not a voluntary agent.

To this we reply; 1st, That if every man's *φαιρασία* is regulated by his moral habits, (and that it is so, has been already shown), if men are masters of their moral habits, they are also masters of their *φαιρασία*. 2dly, If it be not so, and if no one has the power of fixing upon the end, but as nature presents it to him so must he view and take it, and do every thing in reference to it, if it be the case with the bad man it is also the case with the good man; and if one be not voluntary, then neither is the other; or if the latter (as is conceded) be voluntary, so also is the former. So that whether a man can influence his apprehension of the end or whether he cannot, he is still a voluntary agent. Therefore even if we grant this latter alternative to be true, if the good man is a voluntary agent from putting in practice the means to an end (the apprehension of which end he cannot alter), so also is the bad man in the same way a voluntary agent. Nevertheless, actions are more within our *ὄνα* control than are our habits; for the one are entirely in our power, and each part of them perceptible. But of habits only the commencement, and each progressive step is hidden from us and imperceptible.

(Having thus far analyzed his definition of Virtue, Aristotle now applies it to particular instances, devoting an entire book to Justice, when he comes to treat of that virtue, as being more important than the rest, and a *ἕξις ἐν μεσότητι* in a different way from the other habits. We forbear to follow him into this detail, as not only unnecessary but also prejudicial to the general outline of the treatise.)

Although then we have proceeded thus far in our explanation of the definition of Virtue and the questions connected with it, yet a very important and vital part of it still remains for discussion.

It has been stated that Virtue is a habit in a mean determined by reason (*ἕξις ἐν μεσότητι ὁρισμένη λόγῳ*), and not only determined by reason, but determined in such a way as he

who possessed *φρόνησις* would determine it (*ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνησιμος ὀρίσσειεν*). We have therefore to examine what is *λόγος*, and if there be several kinds of it, what is that *λόγος* which directs us to this true mean; secondly, what is *φρόνησις*, and further to determine the true nature of *πραγαίσεις*, which was left undecided in the third Book. Last of all to examine the intellectual virtues, according to the division at the conclusion of the first Book.

We have already seen that there are two divisions of the soul, the one without the other possessing reason (*λόγον ἔχον*): the nature of this latter then we now proceed to investigate, in order to acquaint ourselves with the nature of that reason (*λόγος*) of which we are in search.

If, then, all matter upon which the soul can operate be twofold, it would seem from analogy that the nature of the soul is twofold, to correspond to that matter. That one part of the soul does not energize upon both matters, but each upon its own peculiar matter, is also probable. Thus if all matter be necessary and contingent, it is reasonable to expect that there should be two parts of the soul, each respectively operating upon its peculiar matter. The one upon contingent matter, which we may term the deliberative (deliberation being only employed, as we have already shown, upon contingent matter), the other upon necessary matter, which may be termed the scientific.

Our object then is to discover what are the virtues of each part. But the *ἄ*, or virtue and excellence of every thing, is to be found in reference to its *ἔργον* (as we have already seen); if therefore we can discover the *ἔργον* of each part of the soul, we shall discover the virtues of each part.

All the *ἔργα* of the soul of man (as distinguished from brutes) must be moral action and truth; and the principles of all operations are, *αἰσθησις*, *νοῦς*, and *ὄρεξις*; or putting aside *αἰσθησις* (as being no cause of moral action), *νοῦς*, and *ὄρεξις*. Since then all deliberation is for action, the delibe-

rative part of the soul must have *πραξις* for its *ἔργον*. But all good moral action flows from a correct *προαίρεσις*, and all *προαίρεσις* is, as we have already seen, *ὄρεξις* directed by *νοῦς*, directed of course in such a way that *νοῦς* shall discover and dictate the truth, and *ὄρεξις* be obedient to its dictates. Truth in practice, then, or practical truth (*ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτική*), is the *ἔργον* of this part of the soul; and its virtues will be those habits which give it an aptitude for the discovery of such truth. But since science has reference merely to abstract truth, abstract truth will be the *ἔργον* of the scientific part of the soul. And its virtues will be those habits which direct it aright in the search of that truth.

Since then the *ἔργα* of the soul are, of the Deliberative practical truth, of the Scientific abstract truth, the habits which direct each part in the truth will be five, *τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς*.*

1. Of these habits, that which is employed in discovering truth in necessary matter by means of demonstration is science (*ἐπιστήμη*); or *ἔξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ἀποδεικτική, κ. τ. λ.* For of whatever things we possess science, we are convinced that those things cannot be otherwise; that is, they are necessary; and likewise that they are demonstrative, that demonstration proceeding from certain principles already laid down and determined.

2. Of those habits, that which is employed upon production, (for this may be considered as a division of contingent matter), that is, producing according to certain true principles (*ἔξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική*), is art. For art is not only employed in production (*περὶ γένεσιν*), but in theorizing also respecting production, and therefore requires true reason equally as science.

3. Of these habits, that which is upon the other division of contingent matter, viz. moral action, in directing us

* In what way this division is discovered, see the Introduction to Book VI. p. 212.

aright in them by right reason (ἔξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικῆ) is φρόνησις. That φρόνησις is such a habit as here described, is plain from considering who they are whom we call φρόνιμοι, and for what reason we apply this term to them; who are they whom we conceive to be good reasoners and counsellors, with reference to some good end of which there is neither art nor science; consequently φρόνησις must be a distinct habit from either art or science. And this is also that habit, of which we have already spoken in our definition of virtue as directing us to the true mean in morals (ἀρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν); and hence, because temperance preserves this right conception, we give it the name σωφροσύνη—ὡς σώζουσα τὴν φρόνησιν,—temperance preserving φρόνησις in its integrity, and enabling it to judge aright, our intellectual being influenced by our moral habits as to moral actions, and he only being competent to exercise φρόνησις in perfection who possesses the moral habits in perfection. Φρόνησις consequently cannot exist without Moral Virtue, as we shall presently see at greater length.

4. It has already been stated that Science must proceed from certain given principles, without a right and true conception of which there can be no science; consequently there must be some habit which has these for its peculiar province (ἔξις τις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν), and such is σοῦς; for no other habit which is employed in the contemplation of truth can have this peculiar province. Not ἐπιστήμη, for the reasons stated; not σοφία, for σοφία is of demonstration as well as the principles of demonstration; not φρόνησις or τέχνη, because they are confined to contingent matter.

5. A fifth habit remains for investigation; a habit employed in discovering the truth not only of first principles, but deductions and demonstrations from first principles (μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶδέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀλη-

θεσίην), and this is σοφία; which is farther apparent from considering what persons we call σοφοί, whom we conceive to be not partially wise and partially ignorant, but wise universally and entirely, σοφοὶ ἅλως. This term originally was applied to those who were most perfect and accurate in their respective arts, and it would therefore appear that σοφία was the most perfect and complete of all the sciences; more excellent even than φρόνησις, since its object-matter is more excellent; the object-matter of the first being in a continual state of change and fluctuation, that of the latter eternal and immutable. The former being attributed, in some degree, even to brutes, the other possessed only by men of the highest intellectual attainments. From these remarks it is evident, that σοφία is a habit essentially distinct from φρόνησις, and from every kind of φρόνησις, if there be more than one according to the general opinion of mankind. And this would be more evident by instituting a parallel between them at greater length: for φρόνησις is employed not only upon universals but also upon particulars; nay, to such a degree, that it would seem that particulars were the more important of its object-matter, and that he who possessed merely a φρόνησις of particulars (if such a thing were possible) would have a better claim to the title of φρόνιμος than he who merely possessed a φρόνησις of universals; as he who is a mere empiric and can heal in particular instances without a knowledge of the general principle, has a better claim to be considered φρόνιμος in this particular subject, than he who is acquainted with the general principle which he cannot apply; particularly since φρόνησις is essentially practical. Not but that to possess φρόνησις in perfection both are necessary, a φρόνησις of the universal, and a φρόνησις of the particular; but the knowledge of the particular is only to be gained by experience; and thus it is that young men may possess science, but never can possess φρόνησις, and for the same reason we are bound to pay particular respect

to aged and experienced men, since they only can possess this kind of knowledge in perfection.

From these remarks it will be seen in what way σοφία differs from φρόνησις; from the same it may be inferred in what respect it differs from νοῦς. For νοῦς is of extremes both speculative and practical of which there is no demonstration; the first principles both in morals and science.

Having then shown in what way εὐβουδία, σύνεσις, and γνῶμη are connected with φρόνησις, Aristotle proceeds to show the utility of φρόνησις and σοφία, and what place they occupy in the Happiness of man. For it might be objected, that σοφία having nothing to do with moral action, must be entirely useless as far as our happiness is concerned; and that even φρόνησις, although it is practical, might easily be dispensed with. To the good man it is certainly of no use; for he will do good and just, and such like actions, from the very fact of his being a good man; and mere knowledge, or φρόνησις, will not make him at all more practical (πρακτικώτερος), especially since the virtues are habits; so that to the good man the possession of φρόνησις will be of no use. Neither will it be of use to men who are not good, but are desirous of becoming such; for why should they not be able to follow the directions of others who have already arrived at that desired point, without possessing φρόνησις, just as to a sick man it is not necessary to learn the art of physic to be healed; it is enough for him to follow the directions of his physician?

To this we reply, 1st, That if it be granted that they are virtues (as we have seen), each of each part of the soul respectively, they are eligible for their own sakes, even were they no otherwise productive of beneficial consequences, as the objector states.

2dly, They are useful, useful as constitutive parts, and not as the conditions and causes of Happiness. Happiness is

an energy according to Virtue, and they are parts of Virtue, and consequently of Happiness.

3dly, Happiness is an energy according to Virtue, but it is impossible to energize according to Virtue without *φρόνησις*. For to every virtuous action a good end, as well as good means, are required. Now, though Moral Virtue fixes upon the good end, *φρόνησις* is requisite to direct us to the true means to that end. With reference then to the objection that we are not at all more practical of what is good and just by means of *φρόνησις*, let us examine the subject more deeply.

To perform a just or a virtuous act it is not sufficient (as the objector has supposed) to follow certain orders and directions, but they must be performed from a certain disposition in the agent himself, from a correct principle (*προαίρεσις*) and right motives. Virtue then makes the *προαίρεσις* correct, but whatever is done with a view to this principle must be directed by some other faculty. That faculty, then, which fixes upon the competent means to any end, is *δαιμότης*, a faculty given us by nature; but if it be improved by experience, and be directed to a virtuous end, if, in other words, it be attended with Moral Virtue, it becomes *φρόνησις*, consequently he who is *φρόνιμος* must at the same time be virtuous.

The virtuous man must also be *φρόνιμος*. For the same relation which *δαιμότης* (a natural faculty) has to *φρόνησις*, Natural Virtue has to Moral Virtue. For as *δαιμότης* regards not the end, so that it but fix on sufficient means for the attainment of its object, so Natural Virtue, if it has determined the right end, cares not for the means which it uses for its object. But since to constitute a perfectly virtuous action, good means as well as good ends are requisite, and that faculty which fixes upon good means, the end being good, is, as we have shown, *φρόνησις*, Moral Virtue is not without *φρόνησις*, nor *φρόνησις* without Moral Virtue. Consequently *φρόνησις* is indispensably requisite for the very existence of Moral Virtue and the happiness of man, and not (as the objector supposes) an otiose

faculty removed from all moral action. Indeed, from the great necessity of φρόνησις to Moral Virtue, Socrates went so far as to suppose that Virtue itself was φρόνησις, incorrectly; for though Virtue cannot exist without it, Virtue is rather, as we have seen, a habit according to right reason, which right reason is φρόνησις. Now therefore we may substitute the more definite terms for the more general in our definition of Virtue. Instead of describing Virtue as ἕξις κ. τ. λ. ἀρισμένη λόγῳ, we shall say ἀρισμένη φρονήσσει, as we have now discovered what that λόγος is which directs us to the true mean, and which was the inquiry proposed at the commencement of this book.

(Having proceeded thus far in the examination of his definition, having discussed both the Moral and now the Intellectual Virtues, Aristotle proceeds to investigate the nature of certain habits and their kindred dispositions, such as Temperance and Intemperance, and the like. The reasons for which arrangement have been already stated in the Introduction of the Seventh Book, where a brief analysis is given of their contents, to which the reader is referred; that Book, with the Eighth and Ninth, entering too much into detail to be included in a general introduction to the Ethics.)

We proceed then to a question which has been already briefly handled; which both from its own intrinsic importance, and the mistakes which have arisen concerning it, demands the utmost attention. It was stated that they who possessed the Happiness we described in our first Book, would necessarily possess the greatest pleasure, the energies according to Virtue, involving in themselves the greatest of all pleasures^f. In order to show this more clearly, as well as for the reasons just stated, it is necessary to examine the nature of Pleasure, and first the theories which have been promulged concerning it. All these may very well be classed under two heads; the system of Eudoxus, and its opposite, the system of Plato. The

^f See p. 30.

first considering Pleasure to be the greatest of all goods, the other to be no good at all. Probably in this as in many other instances, the truth will be found to lay between the two.

1. Eudoxus supposed Pleasure to be the greatest good, because all things aimed at it; for that which is a good to *all*, and at which *all* things aim, must be the Good. To this reasoning Plato objected, by saying, that it did not necessarily follow that that was a good at which all things aimed. For the greater part of mankind are guided by their irrational appetites, and can therefore afford no criterion to the philosopher. To this objection of Plato, Aristotle replies: if only they who are swayed by irrational appetites sought after Pleasure, there might be some plausibility in this reasoning, but such is not the fact; for the rational and philosophical as well as the irrational and uneducated seek after Pleasure. And even granting that none but the irrational did seek for it, yet as they are guided in this impulse by a natural instinct, that very fact shows that Pleasure is a good. The assertion that the common consent of mankind can prove nothing, is too absurd to need refutation. They who would annihilate such a testimony, what better can they substitute in its room?

2. Eudoxus asserted, that that which is opposite to the greatest evil is the greatest good; that Pain is the greatest evil, (being universally avoided,) and consequently Pleasure is the greatest good. To this argument Plato objected, that Pleasure is not opposed to Pain in the manner here stated; that there are two kinds of opposition, the one of evil to evil, as extremes to extremes, the other of evil to good, as extremes to the mean; that Pleasure was not opposed to Pain in the latter, but in the former way, as an extreme to an extreme, and that consequently as Pain was an evil, Pleasure was an evil.

Aristotle meets this objection by saying, that if both were extremes, both must be the objects of aversion (*φεικτά*), all

extremes being of that character; but such is not the case in this instance; for though Pain may be, Pleasure is not, an object of avoidance, and consequently not opposed to Pain as one extreme to another.

3. In support of his doctrine Eudoxus further alleged, that Pleasure is eligible entirely for its own sake, which is the characteristic of the greatest good: no one ever thinking of asking another for what object, or with what view, he feels pleasure; which consequently is a proof that Pleasure is most final, most perfect, (*τελειότατον*).

4. Last of all he asserted, that the good could only be increased by itself; but *all* good is the more eligible with the addition of Pleasure, therefore Pleasure is the good^s. Upon this Aristotle remarks, that the conclusion which Eudoxus wishes to infer, does not follow from these premises; any one good added to any other makes the whole more eligible it is true, not because the essence of the one is necessarily increased, but because two goods are better than one; and so Pleasure added to every other good makes the whole more eligible, but does not necessarily increase the essence of the good to which it is added. By a similar objection Plato overturned this conclusion of Eudoxus: for if, said Plato, the addition of one good to another makes that good more eligible, and the compound is more eligible than either of the single goods, Pleasure singly cannot be the chief good, since it becomes more eligible in conjunction with another good, whatever that good may be. So that a compound good is the chief good, according to this argument, whereas the chief good is single, and can never be made more eligible by the addition of any other good.

Having thus stated the arguments of Eudoxus, in support of Pleasure being the chief good, Aristotle passes on to examine the reasons of Plato against Pleasure being a good at all.

^s See this explained at greater length in the note, p. 400.

1. All goods, they say, are qualities, but Pleasure is not a quality, and therefore not a good. Aristotle denies the major; the virtuous energies, he says, are not qualities, and yet they are in the class of goods[†].

2. All good is definite, but Pleasure is indefinite (because it admits of more and less), therefore Pleasure is not a good. Aristotle replies, by denying the minor and its proof, and by a distinction. The term Pleasure, he says, is ambiguous, and may mean, either the act of being pleased, or Pleasure in the abstract. If then, from seeing men more or less pleased, Plato infers that Pleasure itself admits of more or less, and is consequently indefinite, he might object in the same way to Virtue being a good, because some men are more or less virtuous, and then by the same argument Virtue must be indefinite. Thereupon must follow one or other of these alternatives; either that the abstract does not necessarily admit of more and less because the concrete does, and then the minor is false; or that whatever admits of more or less is not necessarily indefinite, and then the major is false.

But, secondly, if they mean Pleasure in the abstract (*ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς*), it is not true universally that Pleasure admits of more and less. And if some pleasures do, yet, as health, they may be perfectly definite although admitting of degrees.

3. Plato said, All good is perfect, but Pleasure is not perfect (because it is a motion and a generation), therefore it is not a good.

Aristotle replies by denying the minor: and first as to the first member of it, that Pleasure is a motion. All motions, he says, must be attended with quickness or slowness, either absolute or relative, but neither of these are compatible with Pleasure itself. It is true a man may pass from a state of Pain or neutrality to Pleasure (*ἡσθηναί*) quicker or slower, but

[†] I am not certain that this argument is intended against the Platonists; I should rather think not.

when in the state of pleasure (*ἡδονῆαι*), the terms quickness or slowness or any mood of progression cannot be applied to him. So a man may pass from motion to rest, or from rest to motion, quickly or slowly, but when in a state of rest the terms quickly or slowly are wholly inapplicable to that state.

Secondly, as to Pleasure being a generation. Every thing generated is produced from some fixed and adequate generating cause; men gather not grapes off thorns, nor figs off thistles; and further, from what any thing is generated, into that it is resolved. But can it ever be shown that Pleasure is resolved into any thing similar to that from which it was generated? It is impossible; and these notions, he subjoins, have originated from a very incomplete and partial view of the subject, from considering merely bodily pleasures; and it was conceived, that because there is in them an apparent process or generation from a state of want to a state of fulness, that Pleasure must be a kind of change or progression from one state to another state. But in the purer and more perfect kind of pleasures, nothing of this kind takes place; for as they arise from no previous deficiency, so neither do they have or end in any repletion.

To those who bring forward vicious pleasures as an argument against Pleasure generally, it is sufficient to state, that there are various kinds of pleasure, differing as the sources from which they are derived; differing also in respect to different persons. And so, on the other side, against those who would assert that Pleasure is the Chief Good, it might be said that then a life of pleasure would be of itself the most eligible; yet no one would wish to pass through a mere life of pleasure, such as the life of a child, with the intellect and the amusements of a child, though he should never feel any pain. Consequently Pleasure alone is not the Chief Good, nor singly most eligible. But some pleasures are eligible and some are not, as they differ in species, or in the sources whence they are derived.

Having thus examined those theories of Pleasure which were most popular in his own time, Aristotle now proceeds to his own definition of it.

Pleasure, he says, is not a *κίνησις*, for time and place constitute specific differences in motions, but not in pleasures. Further, Motion is divisible, and the parts of it differ essentially from the whole, and from each other; and Motion requires time and duration for its perfection; but Pleasure does not. Pleasure is perfect without time, as actual sight, a point, or a unit: Pleasure, then, resembles actual sensation. But since Pleasure attends every act of sensation, the most perfect Pleasure will attend the most perfect act of sensation. That then will be the best act or energy, when the sense or faculty is disposed in the most perfect manner to its most perfect object of sensation; so that the most perfect energy will be the most pleasant, and the most pleasant the most perfect; so that Pleasure, in a sense, perfects the energy. But Pleasure perfects the energy in a different way, either from the habit or the object-matter; as a superadded end, following upon the exercise of the energy, by a simultaneous consequence. But if Pleasure follows upon the exercise of the energies, it may be asked, why do not men constantly energize, since they would, by so doing, constantly experience pleasure? To this it is sufficient to reply, that human nature is not adapted for such energies, the faculty becomes weary, and no longer perfectly adapted for energizing upon its proper object-matter, the energies accordingly become imperfect, and consequently not attended with pleasure. From what has been previously stated, that Pleasure perfects the energies, it will appear that Pleasure is the perfection of life, since life is an energy.

But since Pleasure perfects the energies, and things differing in species are perfected by things differing in species, if the energies differ in species, Pleasure must differ in species. 2dly, Since certain pleasures are proper to certain energies,

and the properties of things essentially different are themselves essentially different, Pleasures are essentially different. 3dly, Since the pleasure resulting from one energy frequently destroys the pleasure resulting from another energy and that other energy itself, consequently Pleasures must be specifically different, since they produce the very opposite effects. 4thly, Since the pleasures differ according to the energies, and the energies differ in virtuousness and viciousness, pleasures must differ in the same way. And like the energies also they must differ in degrees of virtuousness and viciousness. And further they must differ relatively; the pleasure of each man, or of each animal, being that of his peculiar *ἕργον*, or rather energy. Consequently, the peculiar pleasure of man, as man, must be that of his *ἕργον*. But is it so in reality? Would it not then follow that all men's pleasures should be alike? But such is not the fact. Are we then to reject this conclusion? Certainly not. For if we apply it to the case of the good man, we shall find that his pleasure is the pleasure which results from the proper energies of man, the energies of a life according to Virtue. He, as we have already said, is to be our criterion for judging of the truth; nor are we to forego it, if we find mankind, who are debased or diseased, pursuing those pleasures which are not the real pleasures of man.

From what has been stated, it is apparent that a life according to Virtue, such as we have described in our first book, is not only the Happiness of man, but necessarily the greatest pleasure, nay rather *the* pleasure of man, as man. Recapitulating then the whole subject, this will be more apparent, and will more clearly show the connection and mutual coherency of the several parts of the argument.

We have stated that Happiness is not a habit, for then it would be compatible with a life of inaction and misery. It is therefore rather an energy; but since the energies are eligible either as means to an end, or for their own sakes, it is evident that Happiness must be of this latter class of energies. But

of this class not only are the virtuous energies, but likewise those of mere amusement. It might therefore be thought that Happiness was a kind of amusement; not only because those energies are self-eligible, but because it is found that those whom the generality of the world call happy, and whom the sophists have brought men to think so, spend their lives in these kind of energies, and promote those to honor who can invent and discover new ways of amusement. We are not however to infer from the conduct of the fortunate and powerful the true nature of Happiness, since they afford us no criterion to those energies of Virtue and Intellect from which good energies, and consequently Happiness, is derived. For, as we have frequently stated, the only guide in these things is the good man. Happiness does not therefore consist in amusement; first, because amusement is not final, for we seek amusement in order to exercise higher and more serious energies, and not the reverse; and further, if a life of happiness were a life of amusement, it would be compatible with a life of a slave, or of a child; that is, with the state of those who have not the free use of their energies, who as far as they are slaves or children, have no independent, and consequently no energies of their own. Happiness then is an energy according to Virtue, that is, according to the best Virtue; in other words, Happiness is the most perfect energy. But the most perfect energy is, as we have stated, that of the most perfect faculty^b. If then that faculty be *νοῦς*, which seems to be the noblest and most royal of all, whether from being in itself divine, or divine in comparison with our other faculties, its perfect energy will be perfect Happiness. That energy then, as we have seen, is *θεωρία*. That this inference is correct will appear from another view of the subject; for if the energies of this faculty possess to a greater degree than any other energy the qualities which reason tells us ought to be

^b See page xlvi. See also Introd. to Book VI.

found in Happiness, Happiness and this energy (Happiness being an energy) must be identical. And such it is. For it is the noblest of all our energies, being that of the noblest faculty on the noblest object-matter. It is the most continuous, man having power to continue his theoretical energies longer than he can act or produce. It is the most pleasant, for all exercise of the intellect is pleasant, and, as we have already seen, its energies are more pure and perfect than any other class of energies; but the energy of *νοῦς*; or *δυναμις* is the most perfect of all the intellectual energies, inasmuch as actual knowledge surpasses an advance to knowledge. This energy is also the most independent, the moral energies being dependent upon external goods, and upon the existence of others for their instruments and object-matter; whereas the energies of the mind require neither. It is likewise most final, having its end entirely in itself, and not seeking any result extraneous to itself. Last of all, if Happiness consist in a life of ease and freedom from trouble and disturbance, such are this class of energies and this only. If therefore this energy possesses all the qualities which we attribute to Happiness, it must be Happiness. But a life with such qualities would be too high for man, as man; such only in its perfection is the life of a god; and only as far as man lives according to the divinity within him, will such a life be within his reach. If then, in comparison with the rest of man, *νοῦς* is divine, the energies or life according to *νοῦς* will be divine in comparison with human life. This then is the faculty which man is bound to cultivate and obey, which is to exalt him above himself; these are the energies peculiarly his own, and consequently must possess those pleasures which are the most exquisite, and properly the pleasures of man; since, as we have already stated, the greatest pleasures for each are those to be derived from his own peculiar energies.

Nevertheless as man is a compound being, he will still require the energies of his properly human nature to complete

his Happiness. These, indeed, will be his Happiness, but in a secondary sense; since they possess in a degree very inferior to the intellectual energies the requisites for Happiness; and as being the energies of the inferior part are necessarily of themselves inferior. And further they are less independent, requiring external means; and the nobler and more excellent they are, the greater means will they require. For although, for the mere habit and existence of the principle, external means would not necessarily be required, yet for the exertion of that habit, in other words, for its energies, they are needful. Which is not the case with the intellectual habits and energies. Perfect Happiness then is a theoretical energy; and this inference is confirmed by considering in what the Happiness of the happiest beings consists, namely the Gods. These we can suppose to exercise no other than the intellectual energies: for they cannot exercise the moral, the very existence of such energies presupposing a state of vice and imperfection. If, therefore, the Gods are happy (as we suppose them to be), they must energize, and if so, their energies must be those of *θεωρία*. Consequently the greatest Happiness consists in *θεωρία*.

But although it has been stated that external means and external prosperity are requisite for man, for he is not sufficient of himself to employ merely his intellectual energies to the neglect and exclusion of all others, but those of his inferior nature must also be regarded, in order to the perfect exercise of the others, it does not follow that he must necessarily possess great means, and great good fortune. For sufficiency consists not in excess, neither are great means requisite for perfect moral actions; it is possible to be just and generous without possessing seas and mountains, and still more to exercise our other moral habits. And this is a sufficient explanation of the assertion of Solon, which has been already examined in the first Book. But he who exercises the theoretical energies, he who cultivates in the highest degree his intellectual

faculties, as he is the most perfect of men, so is he (in all probability) the most favoured and beloved by the Gods, as most resembling themselves. Him, it is probable, they regard with peculiar interest and benevolence, watching over his welfare as a friend. Such a one then truly possesses the most exquisite Happiness; the most perfect of men, the most dear to the Gods, regarding and regarded by them with somewhat of those feelings which arise from a common and kindred nature. But such blessings belong only to the wise.

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INTRODUCTION TO BOOK I.

HUMAN happiness being the object of all our investigation, Aristotle in this treatise proposes to teach men the means by which they may as far as possible arrive at it. For since, according to the opinions of the Peripatetics, the soul of man is but a *tabula rasa*, (*ἄσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηδὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχία γεγραμμένον*. De Anim. iii. 4. see also De Mem. I.) not possessing innate perfection as Plato thought, but only the powers and capacities of attaining it, Aristotle conceived that it was highly useful and necessary that we should have some knowledge of the ultimate end to which we are to direct all our actions, as archers, by first seeing the mark at which they have to shoot, are more likely to hit it. We ought, therefore, to know *what* is Happiness.

But before this can be done, we must first inquire, whether there *is* such a thing as Happiness, or the chief Good? and, if so, whether it be attainable by man?

Having first shewn, then, that there *is* such a thing as a chief or ultimate Good, Aristotle next proceeds to define it; first, examining into the accuracy of such notions concerning it as were afloat in his time. And having arrived at his definition synthetically, he proposes to analyse and examine its component parts, which occupies the other nine books.

This book, then, divides itself into the following parts. In the 1st Chap. he proves that there *is* such an ultimate Good, and also *what it is*. In the 2d and 3d Chap. he explains its name, and the various opinions of mankind and philosophers concerning it. In the 4th and 5th he propounds his definition of it. In the 6th he examines

the correctness of his definition, by comparing it with the approved opinions of others. In the 7th, the efficient cause of it. This leads him to consider, in the 8th, how far Solon's opinion of that cause was correct; and to examine in the remainder of the book other circumstances and questions connected with his definition.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. I.



CHAP. I.

That there is a chief and ultimate Good—and that it is the end of the Political Science.

ΠΑΣΑ τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ How to discover the
 πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι finality of
ends.

In this chapter Aristotle examines the question, Whether there is such a thing as Happiness, or an ultimate Good ; and if so, whether it is attainable by man ? He proves that there is, by the following syllogism.

If the chief Good is most final, (τελειότατον) then it is the end of the Political Science. It is τελειότατον, and therefore it is the end of the Political Science. The major is proved from §. 1 and 3 ; the minor from §. 1.

By the term πολυκινή we are to understand that Science which embraces all others whatsoever which have any reference to man, or in any degree contribute to his happiness. As Aristotle himself says, ἐρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐπιμετωτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὐσας κ. τ. λ. p. 6

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἰδίῳ δι' ἑνὸς πάσης ἰσιστάμενης καὶ δυνάμεως ἰσσί τι τέλος, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν οὐδὲμία γὰρ οὐκ

ἰσιστάμη οὐκ δύνάμη ἵσκειν κακοῦ ἰσσι. εἰ οὖν πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, ὅλοι ὡς καὶ τοῦ βελτίστου βελτίστος ἂν εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἦγι πολυκινή βελτίστη δύνάμη· ὅστις τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν· ὑπερ ἀγαθοῦ ἄρα, ὡς ἵσκειν, ἡμῖν λιπτόν. Mag. Moral. p. 3. See the Pol. iii. 7.

1. πᾶσα εἴχνη κ. τ. λ.] The arrangement of these words, if we may credit the Greek Scholiast, is not accidental. Τέχνη is placed before μέθοδος and πρᾶξις before προαίρεσις, according to the custom of Aristotle, imitating nature, progressing from the more imperfect genera (ἐν γασίσει) to the more perfect ; τέχνη being less perfect than μέθοδος, πρᾶξις than προαίρεσις. f. 2. b. But Acciajulus thinks that Aristotle here progresses from the better to the less known, according to his usual custom.

— μέθοδος] μέθοδος δὲ ἴσκειν ἕξει ἴσο-

δοκεῖ διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τάγαθόν, οὐδὲ πάντ' ἐφίεται. διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνεργεῖαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά. ὧν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα. 5 πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπισημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν

σημειῶσι μετὰ λόγου. Eustratus f. 2. b. See an admirable Dissertation on this subject in the Preface to the Encyclopædia Metropol. by Coleridge.

It is to be observed, that Aristotle has brought forward these four, εἴχνη, μίθδοι, πράξις, προαιρέσεις, to prove his conclusion. Because there are two principles of all human operations and actions; intellect (νοῦς), and appetite (ἐρεξίς). Intellect is divided into two, speculative (θεωρητικὴ) and active (πρακτικὴ); so also appetite is divided into two, deliberative (προαιρετικὴ) and executive. Under active intellect is placed εἴχνη, and all the mixed or active sciences: under speculative intellect, all the pure sciences. Under the deliberative or elective appetite is included προαιρέσεις: under the executive appetite, action (πράξις, in its extensive signification). Acciaj.

1. καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τάγαθόν] ἰσταντὶ τοὺς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπογράφαντας, ὅτι καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι οὐ πάντα ἰφίστανται. ὅστις ἐξ ἰκαρογῆσι τινὸς πρῶτον τὴν ὑπογραφήν πιστεύσασιν. ὅτι δὲ οὐχ ἔρος (definition), τὸ ἰρημίον ἰστίς ἀλλ' ὑπογραφή (description), δηλον ἐν τοῦ ληφθῆναι ἐν τῶν ὑστέρων. τοῦ γὰρ κεινῶ ἰφιστῶ πάντα τὰ ἰφίματα ὅστις. ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ἰκίσιου

πάντα καὶ ἰκίσιου τοῦ εἶναι τοῖς πᾶσι αἴτιον. Schol.

— τάγαθόν] This word is used indiscriminately to signify either the real or apparent Good; and frequently τάγαθόν appears to have been used by the philosophers of the time to signify Good simply, as well as the chief Good. The sense, however, will amount, in this place, to the same. For if we here interpret it by the chief Good, then we must understand the argument thus; art and every thing else aims at some Good, and through that, as a mean, at the chief Good. (καὶ διὰ μέσου ἰκίσιου πρῶτος τὸ κεινὸν αἴτιον.) Eustrath. f. 2.

2. φαίνονται] φαίνονται means certain knowledge, δῆλα uncertain knowledge. Plato arranges the different states in this order, science, opinion, ignorance; φαίνονται applies to the first, δῆλα to the second, which is continually wavering between the other two. See Repub. p. 478.

3. ἔργα τινά] Some results, remaining after the energies have ceased or been withdrawn. Thus walking, if it be for walking sake, has no end beyond the energy: if it be for health's sake, health is the ἔργον remaining after the energy has ceased.

τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἵππικὴν ἢ χαλινοποικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἵππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσὶν· αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον 5 ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἑτέρας· ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν κάκεῖνα διώκεται. διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ 10 ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν. Εἰ δὲ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τᾶλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἰρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη

The chief Good most final.

1. μίαν—δύναμιν] Δύναμιν διὰ τὴν τέχνην ἀνάμειξις διὰ τὸ ἵππων· ἢ γὰρ ὄλη δύναμις, ὡς ἐν τῷ δύναμι θεωρουμένη. ἢ τε ἀπλῶς καὶ ἢ τῆ δ' ἢ καὶ αἱ τέχναι δύναμις, ὡς ἰδιόχρηται καὶ τὸ ἰσαμφοτερίζειν ἴχουσαι περὶ τὴν ἀπότηξιν καὶ κατὰρῶσιν· ἀπλῶς δὲ ὄλην λέγομεν τὴν πᾶσι τοῖς γινομένους ποιήν· τῆ δὲ τὴν προσεχῆ (peculiar) ἐπίστασθ. Schol. f. 3. b. ἀφίξει δὲ ἐπιστήμη δύναμις, ὅτι ἢ μὴ γινώσκεις ἴστιν ἐξ ἀναγκάσιον προτάσιον τὴν σύντασιν ἴχουσα καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἢ αὐτὸ καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἐπίσταν καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπίρασματος. ἢ ἐκ συμπίρασμάτων ἢ ἐκ ταιούτων συντάσσει, ὡς μὴ ἰδιόχρηται ποτε ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο συμπίρασμα τοῖς προσηγουμένοις ἐπιστημονικῶς ἐπίσταται. ἄλλ' αἶε τὸ αὐτὸ· ἢ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπινοαλῶν καὶ μὴ αἶε ἐπίσταται μέρει ἀποβαίνου τῆς ἀντιφάσιος ἴχουσα, ἄλλ' ἴστιν ὅτι καὶ ἴστιον, δύναμις λέγομένη διὰ τὸ ἰσαμφοτερίζειν. ὡς γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν ἰσωνίων ἢ δικτύων αὐτῶν ὄλη δύναμις λείγεται, διὰ

τὸ ἐκείστιον ἀνὰ μέρει δύναμη εἶναι διχρηταί, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ταιούτων τῶν τεχνῶν δύναμις λείγεται, ἴτι· οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποβαίνειν ἐπίσταν μέρει ἴχουσα, ἄλλ' ἴστιν οὐ καὶ τὸ ἴστιον. ταιούτων δὲ εἶναι ἴτι διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἢ ἴστορικὴ ἐφ' ἐκείστιον τε γὰρ καὶ ἄμφω ἐπιχειροῦσι τὰ τῆς ἀντιφάσιος μέρει ἐν τῷ προσηγουμένῳ προβλήματι. καὶ οὐδὲ κείσταν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καθὰ τὸ ἴστιον, ἀλλὰ κείσταν ποτε καὶ καθὰ τὸ ἀντικείσταν καὶ αἱ στοχαστικαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν ἀσάτως αἶον ἢ κυβερνητικὴ καὶ ἢ ἴστορικὴ ἴστιον γὰρ ἢ πρὸς σωτηρίαν ἐπιτεθῆσταν οὐ κατ' αὐτὰς ἐπιχειροῦντες εἰς κείσταν ἀποβαίνουσι. Schol. f. 4. b. In a more extensive sense δύναμις appears sometimes to be used, signifying any natural or acquired faculty, or the organ by which it is exercised. For further observations upon this term, see Metaph. VIII. chap. 1. sq. p. 174. (Ed. Tauchn.)

14. ματαία] If nature has implanted in us a desire of reaching to some final

τάγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. (ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες, μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος ; εἰ δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων.) Δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. τοιαύτη δ' ἢ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἐκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει. ὀρῶ-10 μεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας, οἶον στρατηγικὴν, οἰκονομικὴν, ῥητορικὴν. χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος 15 περιέχει ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὰνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ

The chief Good the end of the chief science ; the Political.

end of all our energies, then it is probable that there is such an end ; or otherwise we must suppose that nature has employed a superfluous degree of power, has created instruments without any matter or object to employ them on, which is contrary to all those of her proceedings which we are able to trace. (οὐδὲν γάρ, ὅτι φανερὸν, μάτην ἢ φύσει ποιῶ. Pol. I. 1. p. 4. Ed. Goettling.) This argument, as the reader will remember, is frequently employed by Butler in his Analogy. Michelet quotes the following passage from the Metaphysics II. 2. p. 37. (Ed. Tauch.) ἐν οὗ ἵσται τέλος, ποιῶντες δὲ ἢ μὴ ἄλλου ἵσται, ἀλλὰ τὰλλα ἵσται. ἔσθ' εἰ μὴ ἵσται ποιῶντες ἐν ἵσται, οὐκ ἵσται ἔσθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴδὲ ποιῶντες, οὐκ ἵσται ἐν οὗ ἵσται. Ἄλλ' εἰ ἐν ἔσθαι ποιῶντες λαμβάνουσιν ἔσθαι τὸν ἀγα-

θῶ φύσει. καίτοι οὐδὲν ἂν ἰσχυρῶν οὐδὲν πράττειν μὴ μίλλον ἰσθαι πείρας ἔσθαι οὐδ' ἂν εἴη τοῦς ἐν τοῖς ποιῶντες ἵσται γὰρ τίνος εἰς πράττειν ἢ γὰρ τοῦ ἵσται τοῦτο γὰρ ἵσται πείρας. τὸ γὰρ τέλος πείρας ἵσται. Compare de part. Animal. I. 1. p. 8. ἢ φύσει ἵσται τοῦ ποιῶ πάντα.

7. ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς] ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικῆς τῆς ἀσχετοῦσης ἢ γινώσκουσα τίνος ἵσται ἵσται πρακτικῶν ἵσται. Τοῦτο δ' ἵσται ἐν ἀγαθῶν ἐκάστων ἵσται δὲ ἐν ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πείρας. ἔσθ' ἀπάντων οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἵσται τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πείρας τὸ ζητούμενον ἵσται (sc. σοφία). διὸ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πείρας ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικῆς καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἵσται ἐν τῶν αἰτιῶν ἵσται. Metaph. I. 2. p. 5.

καὶ πόλει, μείζον γὰρ καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θεϊότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὖσα.

Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἰκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην Nature of the subject ἕλην διασαφηθεῖ· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως being con-

3. *Ἴναι καὶ πλείον*] Thus then we have arrived at three conclusions. I. That there is some perfect and ultimate end of all human actions. II. That since it is conducive to the perfection of our being, it deserves to be investigated. III. That it is the end of the political science; and consequently the good of man, as man, (*ἐάνθρωπῶν ἀγαθόν*.)

Aristotle now proceeds to explain the nature of the argument, which is to be employed in this treatise,—how it is to be received,—and by whom.

4. *πολιτικὴ τις*] *A part of the political Science.* *Μέρος ἴσθι ἄρα, ὡς ἔστι, καὶ ἀρχὴ ἢ περι τὰ ἴδη πραγματεία τῆς πολιτικῆς· ἐν δ' ἔλει καὶ τὴν ἰσωνμίαν δικαίως δευτῷ ἂν μοι ἔχων ἢ πραγματεία οὐκ ἴσθι ἄλλὰ πολιτικῆς.* Mag. Mor. p. 1. (Ed. Tauchn.)

Declarat Aristoteles, ethicæ et politicæ eundem esse finem; quæret enim utraque summum bonum, quod sine virtute adipisci non possumus. Sed etiam altera sine altera ne existere quidem potest. Politicæ enim opus est virtute singulorum, quæ ipse in societate tantum hominum efficitur et colitur. Est igitur ethicæ δύναμις, quæ in politica sola ad ἰέργειαν perducitur. De fine bonorum et virtute adipiscenda locuturi veteres philosophi jam inde a Pythagora, ut dicit Zellius, “nuncquam homines sibi informant solitarios

et a commercio rerum publicarum sejunctos.” Quod Aristoteles ita explicat loco celeberrimo Politicorum. (I. 2. p. 4. Ed. Goettling.) “Civitate igitur singulis hominibus esse priorem perspicuum est. Si enim singuli separati non sint satis instructi bonis (*ἀντάρεται*) similiter atque alias partes ad totum se habebunt. Nam sublato toto non est pes neque manus.” Sic nec singuli civitate sublata existere possunt. Quocirca ambæ scientiæ ethicæ et politica, arctissimo vinculo inter se coherent, ita ut una sint plane eademque disciplina, sicut in fine Ethicorum Nicomacheorum et initio M. Moralium a philosopho exponitur. Ex quo factum est ut hi libri de Moribus cum opere de Republica unum corpus efficiant. Conjunctionem illam optime in sua civitate expressit Plato, cum Stoici et Epicurei politica neglecta soli ethicæ operam dederint, Aristoteles autem et diversitatem et conjunctionem solus perspexerit. Eustratius: *ἐν ταύτηντα καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἔστιν εἶναι διὰ τούτων ἢν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἰδίχισται ἢ ἰσθαμνία ὡς εἶλεσ ὅσα πολιτικῆς ἔχουσ ἠικῆς ἄρα, καὶ πολιτικῆς ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς.* MICH.

7. *ἔλην*] *ἕλην* and *ὑποκειμένην* generally signify the subject matter or substratum in which a thing inheres, and without which it cannot exist. Thus Aristotle, in his treatise *De*

tingent, will not admit of scientific reasoning.

ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. τὰ δὲ κατὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ ἡ τὰ γὰθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύφῳ τάληθές ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺν 10 καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρῶν ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰκριβές ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται 15 παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικῷ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικῶν ἀποδείξεις

And therefore our hearers must be those who can and will duly appreciate such arguments.

Anima, illustrates it by a familiar instance. 'Ὁ δ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὄλη ὄψεως, ἢ ἀπολιούσης, οὐκ ἴσται ὀφθαλμὸς πλὴν ἰμανόμενος. p. 27. (Ed. Tauch.) See also the Categories: ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λίγω, ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἴσται· ὅτι ἢ σὺν ἡ σὺν γεγραμματοσὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μὴ ἴσται τῇ ψυχῇ. p. 27. (Ed. Tauch.)

With reference to the passage before us the Scholiast observes; ὄλη ἐφ' ἕκαστης μεθόδου καὶ τέχνης λίγεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον αὐτῆς περὶ ὃ καταγίνεσθαι ὑποκείμενον δὲ τῇ ἡδυσίᾳ καὶ πολιτικῇ τὰ ἐν βίῃ ἴσται πράγματα, καὶ αἱ περὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράξεις τὸ καὶ ἐνέργειαι. Therefore here ὄλη is the object rather than the subject matter.

1. ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις] In the

creative arts. δημιουργικαὶ δὲ λίγεται τέχναι αἱ ποιητικαὶ, καὶ δημιουργούμενα τὰ ὡς αὐτῶν ἀπολιούμενα ἔργα. Schol. Thus in these arts the same degree of accuracy is not required. The material of the statuary is more unmanageable than that of the painter, and consequently less exactness is required from the one than the other.

10. ἐνδείκνυσθαι] ἐνδείκνυσθαι is put in opposition to ἀποδείκνυσθαι according to Eustratius: ἀποδείξεις μὲν γὰρ καθαροῦς καὶ βεβαίως τὸ ζητούμενον παριστᾷ. ἐνδείξεις δὲ αἱ τινος ἐκαστώσεως καὶ μιμήσεως καὶ ἰμφάσεων.

— περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺν] "And speaking generally on contingent matter, from contingent premises to be allowed to draw contingent conclusions."

ἀπαιτεῖν. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ
 τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα ὁ
 πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος.
 διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκείος ἀκροατῆς ὁ
 νεὸς· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ
 λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς
 πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὧν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ
 ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ
 πράξις. διαφέρει δ' οὐθέν νεὸς τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ
 10 ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἔλλειψις,
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα.
 τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόητος ἢ γνῶσις γίνεται,
 καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς
 ὀρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι πολυωφελῆς ἂν
 15 εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ,
 καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφρο-
 μιάσθω τοσαῦτα.

3. *πειραδευμένος*] Experienced. " Ἄλλη μὲν γνῶσις ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἰσίστασθαι καὶ ἄλλη ἢ κατὰ τὸ πειραδιδῆσθαι. ἢ τις πολυπραγμία οὔσα ἰκανόσητα τῇ κινήσει καὶ ἀπέχεται πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν ἰσθῶς τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστάμας καὶ τὰς τέχνας ἀποτιλούμενα εἰς θεωρητικὰς καὶ πραγματικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς. Schol. See also de part. Animal. I. 1. p. 1. and the Metaph. IV. c. 4. p. 67. " Ἔστι γὰρ ἀπειρία εἰς τὸ μὴ γινώσκειν τίνας δι"

ζητεῖν ἀπέδωξεν, καὶ τίνας οὐ διῖ.

5. *ὁ νέος*] Following his passions, and consequently not exercising his reason, at least not upon the subject of morals as far as they tend to practice: therefore having no experience of them he is incapable of judging of them. The eye of his soul is darkened and must be exercised before it can see and discriminate. (See below, VI. 6 and 7, near the end.)

CHAP. II.

The different notions of Happiness briefly considered.

The argu-
ment re-
sumed from
p. 7.

Nominal
Definition
of Happi-
ness.

The incon-
sistency of
our notions
respecting
it.

ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ δ' ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα 2
 γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται, τί
 ἐστὶν οὐ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί
 τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὀνό-
 ματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολο- 5
 γεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ
 χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν
 ταῦτόν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν. περὶ δὲ
 τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστὶν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ
 ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. οἱ μὲν 10
 γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ
 πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ
 ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενό-
 μενος δὲ πλοῦτον· συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν
 τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμά- 15
 ζουσιν. ἔνιοι δ' ὥντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα
 ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσδε πᾶσιν
 αἰτίον ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν
 ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἰκα-
 νὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας 20
 ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον.

Resuming our subject, we proceed to discover the definition of Happiness. Now all men call it εὖ ζῆν or εὖ πράττειν, but when they come to explain their notion of εὖ, all are at variance; every person interpreting it according to his situation, life, manners,

or prejudices. One calls it pleasure, another honour, a third virtue, a fourth money, a fifth abstract good. To all of which there are many objections.

17. ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτό] The opinion of Plato; which is more fully discussed in the next chapter.

Μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐξήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός, ὡσπερ ἐν 5 τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. ἀρκτέον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἤχθαι καλῶς τὸν περι καλῶν 10 καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο

Two methods of investigation ;
1. Terminus a quo :
2. Terminus ad quem.

2. ἀρχῶν] All ἀρχαὶ and αἰτια and reduced under four heads : sc.

I. *Efficiens* ; unde profuit motus : ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως.

II. *Finalis* ; cuius gratia cætera fiunt : τὸ εὖ ἵππου καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

III. *Materialis* ; quod est primum subjectum : ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὀνομαζόμενον.

IV. *Formalis* ; id quo res habet esse. ἡ αἰτία καὶ τὸ εἶ ἢ ἴσται.—See *Metaph.* I. 3. p. 7.

3. Πλάτων] See the end of the 6th Book of the Republic.

3. ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ] "It is the difference, in short, which modern writers commonly mark by the terms *analysis* and *synthesis*. In the former, we take the facts of human nature as we find them, and resolve them into the principles and laws of our nature ; in the other, we assume certain general truths as the elements of our reasoning, and deduce the particular rules of conduct from them. We have apposite illustrations of these different methods in the works of Clarke and of Butler." Hampden's *M. P. Lectures*, p. 241.

7. ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς] Compare *Analyt. Post.* I. 2. p. 148. (Ed.

Tauch.) πρότερα δ' ἴσται καὶ γνωριμότερα διχῶς. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀπὸ τῆ φύσεως καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον οὐδὲ γνωριμότερον καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμότερον. λίγου δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμότερα τὰ ἰγγυτέρον τῆς αἰσθήσεως· ἀπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωριμότερα τὰ ποιετέτερα. ἴσται δὲ ποιετέτατα τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα· ἰγγυτάτα δὲ τὰ καθόλου. See also Ammonius on the *Categories*, *De Substantia* ; and *Phys. Ausc.* I. 1. with the learned Commentary of Simplicius, f. 4.

11. τὸ ἴσται] Ζητοῦμεν τίτταρα· τὸ ἴσται, τὸ δίδου, εἰ ἴσται, εἰ ἴσται. ἴσται μὲν γὰρ πρότερον τῶν εἰ τῶν ζητούμεν . . . εἶον, πρότερον ἐκλήσει εἰ ἴσται ἢ οὐ ; τὸ ἴσται ζητοῦμεν.—ἴσται δὲ εἰδόμεν εἰ ἴσται τὸ δίδου ζητούμεν. εἶον, εἰδόμεν ἴσται ἐκλήσει . . . τὸ δίδου ἐκλήσει . . . Ζητούμεν. ἴσται δὲ ἄλλου πρότερον ζητούμεν. εἶον, εἰ ἴσται ἢ μή ἴσται . . . τίς. γιόντις δὲ ἴσται ἴσται, εἰ ἴσται ζητούμεν. εἶον, εἰ οὐ ἴσται τίς ; *Post. Anal.* II. 1. p. 202. Now since, in the system and proceedings of nature, the cause (τὸ δίδου) is the ἀρχὴ καὶ γνωριμότερα to her, for she commences with it ; but to man, sometimes the cause (τὸ δίδου), as in mathematics, and some-

ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἢ ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. φῖ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου·

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νόησιν,
ἔσθλός δ' αὖ κάκεινος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι κίθηται.
ὃς δὲ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νόησιν μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήσιος ἀνήρ.

5

The subject resumed.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. τὸ γὰρ 3 ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκόασιν 10 ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν, διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα

times the matters of fact, the effects (τὸ ὄν), as in morals and politics; and we ought to commence from those things which are better known to us: therefore this, being a moral treatise, is analytical, commencing with the (τὸ ὄν), with actions and affections from which the habits (αἱ ἀρεαί) of moral conduct spring. These lead on to perfect energies, and thence to happiness, the final end and ἀρετὴ of all things. Aristotle has adopted this method as being the same which we must follow in practice, commencing with actions and proceeding to habits. Since, therefore, we commence from certain things which are supposed to be granted, from things known to us, the reader of this treatise must at least be able to judge of these things, and have a competent knowledge of them. But he only can judge ὁ πρῶτος ἀπολαυστικὸς καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶν.

1. οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι.] As being self-evident. Thus if a person

has learnt to overcome vicious appetites, he will assent at once, when he is told that temperate habits are produced by temperate acts, and will not wait to inquire why.

2. ἀρεαί.] That is, the effects, in this treatise. Since we commence with effects.

3. Ἡσιόδου.] See Op. et Di. v. 291—5.

9. ἡμῶν δὲ.] Error eorum quorum opiniones hoc capite Aristoteles refutat, in eo consistit, quod unum alterumque naturalis hominis appetitum seu finem pro summo habeant bono: error Platonis est contra, summum bonum seu ideam boni prorsus ab istis naturalis hominis finibus sejungere; cum vera sit sententia, quam secutus est Aristoteles, bonum in regendis et ad rationem perducendis appetitibus ponere. MICH.

13. τρεῖς.] The first and most imperfect, in whom appetite has the chief influence; the second, with whom appetite and reason govern with divided sway; the third, with whom life

οἱ προὔχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικός
καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. Οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ ^{Not pleasure, and}
παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων ^{why.}
βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ
5 πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδα-
ναπάλῳ. Οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμῆν ^{Not honour, and why.}
τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. φαί-
νεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου·
δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ
10 τιμωμένῳ, τὰγαθὸν δὲ οἰκειόν τι καὶ δυσσφαίρετον
εἶναι μαντεύμεθα. ἔτι δ' εἰκότασι τὴν τιμὴν διώ-
κειν, ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι
γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς
γιγνώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῆ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατὰ
15 γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. Τάχα δὲ καὶ ^{Not virtue, and why.}
μᾶλλον ἂν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην
ὑπολάβοι. φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὐτῆ·
δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν
ἀρετὴν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτους
20 κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω
ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν δια-
φυλάττων. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλισ· ἰκανῶς

is free from the storms of passion, and brute appetite has no influence.

11. *μαντεύμεθα*] Upon the use of this word, see Stallbaum's note on the Charmides of Plato, p. 148. or the *Repub.* I. p. 349. A.

13. *γοῦν*] *As a proof of this.* Such is the force of this word universally with Thucydides; generally with Aristotle: unless the exceptions are corruptions.

17. *ἀντιστρέφα καὶ ἀρετῆ*] Since

virtue is a habit only, it is incomplete in itself: and cannot be happiness which is an energy (*ἰσπράττων*.)

21. *εἰ μὴ θείῃ διαφυλάττων*] *θεῖσι δὲ ἰστίῃ δὴ ἀρετῆς ἀρετῆς—σχιδὸν δὲ οὖν πάντα τὰ διαλεπτικὰ θεῖσι καλοῦνται.* *Topics*, I. 9. p. 107. (Ed. Tauch.) The Stoics did however, in after times, affirm the sufficiency of Virtue alone for constituting Happiness. See the Second Paradox of Cicero.

γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν.
τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, περὶ οὗ τὴν ἐπί-

Not money,
and why.

σκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. Ὁ δὲ
χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος
δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον
γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον
λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ
ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ
λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν
ἀφείσθω.

10

CHAP. III.

The chief Good of man is not the ideal Good.

Plato's *Idea*
of Good
examined.

ΤΟ Δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ 4
διαπορήσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς

1. *ἰγνακλίαις*] Of the *ἰγνακλίαις* see Buhle "De libris Aristot. exotericis, &c." p. 133. as published in the first vol. of Arist. Works, Bipont. 1791. His opinion is, that they correspond with the *λόγοι ἱστορικοί*, being delivered to his disciples and hearers in a certain course or routine. *Ἐγνακλίαι φιλοσοφίματα καλεῖ* (Aristoteles) *τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιπέδους ἀρχῆς πολλοὺς ἀποσθήματα εἶναι καὶ ἱστορικὰ καλεῖν ἴσθαι*. The subjects which they included were, gymnastics, dancing, painting, music (in a strict sense), grammar (in an extended sense), geometry, arithmetic, and sometimes rhetoric. Michelet has a long disquisition on this word in his notes to the Ethics. Berolini, 1835.

CHAP. III.

The principal argument of this

chapter may be resolved into the following hypothetical syllogism.

If there be more definitions of Good than one, there are more Goods than one, (i. e. the notion of the *one Ideal Good* being the only Good, is not true.)

There are more definitions of Good than one; therefore,

The doctrine of the *Ideal Good* is not true.

The rest of the Chapter is then taken up with proving the minor, which of course must be the conclusion of every syllogism.

In the first part Aristotle considers the *Idea* in reference to *all goods*: in the second, in reference merely to *absolute goods*.

11. *τὸ δὲ καθόλου*] In reference to this theory of Plato, the Logicians divided Genus into *universale post multa*

τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἀνδρας
 εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον
 εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρία γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ
 οἰκεῖα ἀναρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας
 ἅμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοι φίλιον ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν
 ἀλήθειαν. Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην

First proof
 of the mi-
 nor.

and *universale ante multa*. Plato used the terms *Genus* and *Species* promiscuously to express *ἰδία*. It is here employed in the latter sense.

5. *προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν*] More is conveyed in this passage than appears at first sight. For Plato in the commencement of the tenth book of his Republic, when he brings forward his reasons why Homer should not be admitted into his Commonwealth, as all imitative poetry is pernicious to the intellect (*λόβη ἵσκει εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκούοντων διανοίας*), before he enters into a discussion, which seems to detract from the merits and glory of so great a poet, makes the following apology. 'ῤητίον ἦν δ' ἰγώ. καί-τοι φιλία γί τίς με καὶ αἰδώς ἐν παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὀμήρου ἀσπασίου λόγιον.— ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ περὶ γι τῆς ἀληθείας τιμη-τίος ἀνήρ, ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος, ῤητίον. To this passage Aristotle seems silently to refer, as if implying, that the same indulgence which Plato claimed for attacking Homer, ought to be allowed to himself when examining the theories of Plato.

6. *οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες*] All the other Categories are subsequent to Essence (*οὐσία*). But good is predicated in Essence as well as in all the other Categories. Good therefore is predicated in priority and posteriority: and consequently there is no one *ἰδος* of good more than there is of number. 2dly, since genus is predicated of things differing in species, and species of things

differing in number, of which it is equally predicated at all times, it is clear that as far as numbers exist according to priority and posteriority, there can be no species or common noun of number. Furthermore, as numbers as far as they exist in priority and posteriority are relative, their *summum genus* must necessarily be in the category of Relation (*περὶ τι*); but the *Idea* of Plato is the *summum genus* in the Category of Essence (*οὐσία*), being *τὸ ὄντως ὄν*. See Met. I. 7. p. 27. *πασὰ δὲ τὰ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς δόξας τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν* (the *Ideas*), *οἱ ἴσται μισητὰ τὰ εἶδη, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἰδίας εἶναι μέγιστον*. Consequently there is no *Idea* of numbers.

The following is Trendelenburg's remark upon this obscure passage, which will be considered at greater length in the Appendix. "Ethica N. I. 4. (*οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες*, &c.) per se obscura et difficilia, collato vero alio loco (Metaph. xiii. 6. M. p. 271.) longe difficiliora, . . . accuratius tractanda erunt. Hoc vero potissimum . . . sibi velle videntur, prius et posterius, quorum alterum alterius est conditio in ideas non esse admissa; unde nec numerorum vulgarium quorum alii ex aliis gignuntur ideoque alii aliis sunt priores vel posteriores, unam quandam ideam factam esse. Quæ si est sententia, singulorum numerorum, in quibus non est prius et posterius, ideas esse posse, non excluditur." Trend. p. 69.

Because Good is posterior and prior.

οὐκ ἐποίουν ιδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ιδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι· παρα-5 φύαδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτων ιδέα. Ἔτι

2d Proof. Different definitions of Good in the different categories.

ἐπεὶ τὰγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῶ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν 10 τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρὸς, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαίτα, καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἔν' οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μᾶ μόνῃ.

3d Proof. Different definitions of Good under the same category.

Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, 15 καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν στρατηγική, ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρική, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρική, ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική.

The Idea, and that of which it is

Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις 20 τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ

12. *Δίαιτα*] τόποις ἐν ᾗ εἰδὲ διάγομι. Paraph.

15. *μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη*] Plato, following the tenets of Cratylus and Heraclitus, asserted that the objects of sense could never be the objects of science, as being in a continual flux; ὡς ἀπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ μέντων, καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὐσης. Arist. Met. I. 6. Compare xiii. 9. p. 288. ἄνω μὲν γὰρ τῶν καθόλου οὐκ ἴσται ἐπιστήμη λαβεῖν.

Real essence he attributed only to

the Ideas; upon them only can real science be employed. Each science has its peculiar object matter, and consequently each Idea has its appropriate science. If therefore there is but one Idea of Good, there can only be one science of it. See Timæus, p. 28—9. Parm. 134. Cic. Tusc. I. 24. Acad. I. 8.

21. *αὐτοέκαστον*] Illo aóte nominibus præfixo eorum ideam indicari Aristoteles luculenter docet, Metaph. VII. 16. z. p. 161. qui et Platonis usus in

ἐν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἰς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ^{the Idea,}
 λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ἢ γὰρ ἀνθρωπος, ^{are essen-}
 οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ἢ ἀγαθόν. ^{tially the}
 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ αἰδίῳ εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ^{same.}
 ἔσται, εἴπερ μὴδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ
 ἐφημέρου. Πιθανώτερον δ' εὐόκασιν οἱ Πυθα- ^{The opinion}
 γόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ^{of the Py-}
 θαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ^{thagoreans}

Sophista, Phædone, &c. Aristoteles sicut nostro loco, ita pluribus voce αὐτοίμαστοι utitur ut universam ideam denotet. Cf. Mag. Mor. i. 1. Metaph. i. 6. and xiii. 8. M. p. 281. (Brand.) Quam ideæ vocandæ rationem sive Aristoteles invenit, sive accepit (apud Platonem autem legere non memini) hoc subtiliter sane, quod ideis proprium est, comprehenditur. Id enim in ea conjunctam, ut idea, quamquam genus et communis definitio, ad unum tamen et certam formam (ἵκαστοι) revocetur, ut generalis notio solummodo in cogitando sita et singularis species ex intuendo nata in unum coalescant, neutra vero restinguatur. Trendelenburg de Ideis, &c. p. 39.

3. οὐδ' ἢ ἀγαθόν] But granting there is such a thing as an *Ideal Good*, the examination of it cannot be of any service, for if one and the same definition apply to two things, then those two things are not essentially different; consequently the *ideal* differs nothing from the *particular* and *aesthetical* Good. Neither does it make any essential difference, as Plato thought, that the first is eternal, the other not; for duration constitutes no specific difference. For whiteness is not more essentially white, whether it exist one day or a thousand years.

ἢ δὲ γὰρ οὐσία οὐδὲ μᾶλλον οὐσία λίγι-
 ται οὐδὲ ἔσται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρωπος μᾶλ-

λον οὐν ἀνθρωπος ἢ κρείττερον λίγιται· οὐδὲ
 γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἴσα εἶναι οὐσία·
 ἔσται οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδίχωντο ἢ οὐσία ἐν μᾶλλον
 καὶ ἐν ἴσῳ. Arist. Cat. iii. p. 34.
 (Ed. Tauch.)

7. τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστασίῳ] The Pythagoreans held, that the elements of numbers (τὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν συστασία) were the elements of all things (τῶν ἔσται πάντων). Thus they supposed that such and such a combination (πάθος) of numbers constituted justice; another, the soul and intelligence; another, opportunity; and so on. They thought that number was not only the material and efficient, but also the formal cause of all things. The elements of number they called odd and even; unity, according to them, was formed of both of these, being both odd and even, and number of unity. But others of them thought there were ten principles of all things, which they exemplified in the following column, generally called the *συστασία* of the Pythagoreans.

πίεσις, ἄπειρον·
 πικροτάτον, ἄρτιον·
 ἴσος, ἀλήθεια·
 διζήσιον, ἀριστοιζόν·
 ἄρτιον, θῆλυ
 ἡγεμονίαν, πισυόμενον·
 εἰδύ, παμπύλον·
 φῶς, σκοτός·
 ἀγαθόν, κακόν·
 τιστράγωνον, ἐτερόμηκες.

and of
Speusippus.

1. Objec-
tion.

ἀγαθῶν συστοιχία τὸ ἐν οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθήσῃ δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος. Τοῖς δὲ λεχθείσιν ἀμφισβήτησις τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρησθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν εἶδος ἢ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον.

Its answer.

Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τὰγαθά, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. χωρίσαντες 10 οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἂν; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὀρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν 15 καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἂν. ἢ οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν

The invention of this table is attributed by some to Alcmaeon of Crotona. See Arist. *Metaph.* i. 5.

1. Σπεισίππος] Diog. Laertius (v. §. 25.) Aristotelem singularem librum de Speusippo scripsisse affirmat. Doctrina Speusippi, quam hoc loco respicit, exponitur forsitan in *Metaph.* vii. 2. (p. 129. Ed. Tauch.) Σπεισίππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδῆς ἀρχέμινος, καὶ ἀρχῆς ἰδέας οὐσίας ἄλλων μὲν ἀρετῶν. ἄλλην δὲ μογῶν, ἰσχυρῆς ψυχῆς; καὶ ταῦτοι δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἰσχυρῆς τὰς οὐσίας. xii. 7. (p. 250.) ἴσοι δὲ ἀπολαμβάνουσι δόξασι οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεισίππος τὸ ἄριστον καὶ κάλλιστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φτωχῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τίμιον ἐν τοῖς ἐκνούται οὐκ ἰσῶς εἶναι. Bonum Speusippo nempe non tantum unum ab-

stractum neque in initio est ante multa, sed finis. MICH.

3. ἀμφισβήτησις] A disciple of Plato objects to Aristotle's arguments, because Aristotle has made no distinction between what are properly and what improperly called Goods. Aristotle then applies the same reasoning to that class of Goods which the Platonist allows to be properly so called, the self-eligible: and even then, says Aristotle, they will not all come under one and the same definition. For instance, the intellectual faculties, sight and so on: either these must be self-eligible; or nothing else than the Idea is so. That is, there will be an empty species (*εἶδος*), a species or *nomen universale*, to which no individuals are referable.

- πλὴν τῆς ιδέας; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτά, τὸν ἀγαθοῦ λόγον ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμμουθίᾳ τὸν τῆς
 5 λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ἢ ἀγαθά. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν. Ἄλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ
 10 εἶναι, ἢ πρὸς ἐν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετεόν τὸ νῦν· ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειώτερον. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ
 15 περὶ τῆς ιδέας· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται. τάχα δὲ τῷ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ πρὸς

2. Objection: and its answer.

Dismissal of the subject, with some general remarks.

7. ἀλλὰ πῶς] But if there be so many things which we call *Good*, and yet these are all different and cannot be referred to one common species, how is it that we call them all by the same name *Good*? Does not their having one and the same name, shew that there is one common essence running through the whole of them?

Aristotle replies, No; that they are so called perhaps from all contributing to one common end, (*Happiness*); or perhaps from analogy.

8. τύχης ἰσωνύμοις] This appears to have reference and to throw some light on that very obscure passage in the *Met.* i. 6. p. 19. where Aristotle,

describing Plato's doctrine of Ideas, says: τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα τῶν ἰσων (sc. Universals) ἰδίαις ἀροσηγήρευσι, τὰ δ' αἰσθητὰ περὶ τὰ παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα λίγισθαι πάντα παρὰ μίθῃς γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἐπισημάτων (Univocal) ἰσώνυμα τοῖς ἰδίαις. Here μίθῃς evidently denotes the relation of an individual to its species, or a species to its genus, &c. being continually used in this sense. See Porphyry's *Isagog.* x. 3. xi. 3. passim.

10. ἐν σώματι ὄψις] A favourite expression with Aristotle. Compare *Top.* p. 117. (Ed. Tauch.) ὡς ὄψις ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ.

τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. Πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ὁ λόγος, ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμας διαφωνεῖν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεές ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικούτων ἅπαντας τοὺς τεχνίτας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μηδ' ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον. ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφελήθησεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς αὐτὸ τὰγαθόν, ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ιδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

CHAP. IV.

Of certain qualities and conditions requisite to Happiness.

Resumption of the argument from Chap. I.

ΠΑΛΙΝ δ' ἐπανελθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἡμῶν ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο

1. *παράδειγμα*] As Plato had asserted in his Republic. See particularly, p. 505. 596, sq. This is more fully confuted in Metaph. xii. 5. p. 269.

10. *ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων*] See Plato's Republic. p. 596.

ing the subject, by considering certain conditions and qualities which belong to it; for which he appears to be indebted to the Philibus of Plato. This is his usual way of proceeding; describing first those parts of the definition which are common and better known, and afterwards advancing to what is peculiar and essential. *ἴσως δ' οὐ μόνον τὸ τί ἐστι γινῶναι χερίσμων εἶναι πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖσθαι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβε-*

CHAP. IV.

Aristotle now proceeds to his own definition of Happiness: first narrow-

ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. τί οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; ἢ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῃ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. ὥστ' εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ 10 πλείω, ταῦτα. μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτον ἀφίικται. τοῦτο δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δ' αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερα, οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὄλωσ τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι 15 πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τελειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν τι μόνον τελειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τῶν 20 καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τελειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ἀεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. τοιοῦτον δ' ἢ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ

That the best Good is τελειότερον, and in what way.

βητέων ταῖς εὐδαίμοις, . . ἄλλὰ καὶ ἀνάστασις τὰ συμβιβητέα συμβάλλεται μέγα μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἶησαι τὸ τί ἐστιν ἰσχυρὰν γὰρ ἰσχυροὺς ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν πρὸς τῶν συμβιβητέων (the phenomena), ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείονων, τότε καὶ πρὸς τῆς εὐδαίμοις ἴσχυρὸν τι λέγουσιν ἔτι κάλλιστα. De Anima, i. 1, 11.

10. μεταβαίνων] By digressing has come to the same point; viz. That the chief Good is most final (τελειότερον.) The question therefore now is; What

is the most final Good?

12. ἴσασι δὲ πλείω] Ea partitione usus est et Plato, Repub. II. in principio. Et Cicero, Invent. II. in extremo. Eadem partitione primus ni fallor usus est Archytas ut est apud Stobæum, CIII. GIPH.

21. μεδέποτε δι' ἄλλο] "Quærimus igitur quid sit extremum, quid ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia, tale debet esse ut ad id omnia referri oporteat: ipsum autem nusquam." Cicero de Fin. I. 9.

ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα αἰεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων δὲ ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' αὐταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος. τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὄρος τις· ἐπεκτείνουντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαυθίς ἐπισκεπτέον, τὸ δ' αὐταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηθενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἴομεθα εἶναι. ἔτι δὲ πάντων

That it is
αὐταρκεῖς.

16. *εἰσαυθίς*] Qui modus quis sit hoc loco non explicat : sed *εἰσαυθίς*, hoc est posterius infra, nempe Lib. II. cap. 8. et Polit. IV. c. 11. ut ego quidem existimo : nam iis in locis bonorum fortunæ mediocritatem quandam non excellentiam viro bono necessariam utilemque esse ostendit. GIPH.

19. *ἴσι δὲ πάντων*] Compare X. 2. οὐδένος γὰρ προστιθέντος αὐτῷ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἂν εἴη, ἢ μετὰ τῆς εἰς καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. This passage is generally so interpreted, as if Aristotle intended to say that Happiness being united with any other good

is more eligible than without it. But if Happiness is most eligible (*αἰρετωτάτη*), to say the addition of some other good increases that eligibility is to say that a thing can be more eligible than what is most eligible, which seems to be absurd. According to Giphanius, Aristotle distinguishes Goods into two kinds, *συναριθμούμενα* and *μὴ συναριθμούμενα*. — Dicuntur bona quædam esse *συναριθμούμενα* quæ aliis addita eorum quibus adiunguntur numerum et cumulum augent eaque exrescere faciunt : ut *prudentiæ* addita *nobilitas* reddit *prudentiæ* bonum cumulatius. — *μὴ συναριθμούμενα* sunt ea quæ aliis adjuncta ea

αἰρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην, συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἰρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μείζον αἰρετώτερον αἰεὶ. ὅ τελεῖον δὴ τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐτάρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος.

CHAP. V.

The definition of Happiness.

6 ΑΛΛ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' The definition of Happiness

non augeat. v. g. *doctrinae* addita *perceptio* non augeat *doctrinae* bonum, quia *doctrina* in se continet *perceptionem*.— Et sic Aristoteles hoc verbo usus est hoc loco, et Rhet. II. 37. et Mag. Mor. I. 2. Idem valet *συναριθμῆσθαι* quo verbo usi sunt interpretes hic Eustratius et in Topic. iii. Alexander. Explicata jam verbi ratione, sciendum praeterea est plura bona paucioribus esse anteponenda (Arist. Top. iii.) nisi sint ex eo genere quod diximus esse μὴ συναριθμώμενα. Nam in his ea regula locum non habet, ut recte eo loco Alexander. V. g. *bona valetudo et curatio* et si plura sunt bona, tamen non sunt magis expetenda quam una *bona valetudo*. Sic *beatitudo et virtutes* plura sunt bona, non tamen optabilliora quam sola *beatitudo*, propterea quod eas *beatitudo* omnes in se complectitur. Nunc quaeritur, ex quo genere sit *beatitudo*, et ait Aristoteles esse ex iis quae diximus μὴ συναριθμώμενα, hac usus conclusione a repugnantibus :

Si *beatitudo* est *συναριθμώμενη* ergo

cum altero vel minimo bono conjuncta erit magis expetenda ; i. e. non erit summe expetenda per se ;

Falsum est *secundum*, ergo et primum. Quae Stoicorum fuerit sententia de hac re vid. Cic. De Finibus iii. iv.

The natural and obvious interpretation, however, that Happiness is increased by the addition of other Goods, seems countenanced by the following passages from Cicero : “ De summo quidem, atque naturali bono sic agunt [sc. Peripatetici] : cetera autem pertinere ad id putant, aut *adiugendum* aut tuendum ut divitias, ut opes, ut gloriam, ut gratiam.” Acad. i. 5. “ Omnis illa antiqua philosophia sensit in una virtute esse positam beatam vitam : nec tamen beatissimam nisi adjungerentur et corporis et cetera . . . ad virtutis usum idonea.” Ib. c. 6.

CHAP. V.

All men seem to agree in calling *εὐδαιμονία* εὐ ζῆν or εὐ πράττειν ; but

investi-
gated and
settled.

ἐναργέστερον· τί ἐστὶν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὴ
γένουτ' ἂν τοῦτ', εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώ-
που. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῆ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῶ καὶ
παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον τι καὶ
πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ,⁵
οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον
αὐτοῦ. πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἐστὶν

when they come to explain their notions of this *εἶδος* all are at variance, interpreting it according to their different situations and habits of life. One man calls it pleasure, another honour, a third virtue, a fourth wealth, others again an abstract Good. But all these opinions are not and cannot at once be true; we have shown how they cannot; we have not therefore advanced further into our inquiry as to the nature of Happiness (the *εὖ εἶδος*) by this digression (*μισαβαίωσις*), and must therefore commence afresh by examining what *εἰδαιμόνια*, that is, what the *εἶδος* of man in reality is.

In what then is the *εἶδος* of every thing to be found? Plainly in the perfect performance of the object of its being (its *ἔργον*); and consequently to discover what the *εἶδος* of every thing is, we must first discover its *ἔργον*, and therefore to discover what is the *εἶδος* of man we must discover his *ἔργον*.

Now as every thing has only one *ἔργον* (for nature does not act like man, making one instrument for two uses), it is clear that the *ἔργον* must be that which essentially distinguishes one thing from another, constituting its logical differentia; consequently to discover the *ἔργον* of man, we must discover his logical differentia.

What then is the differentia of man? Man is distinguished from mere sub-

stance by vegetation; from plants by animation; from animals by rationality or the exercise of reason. Consequently the *ἔργον* of man is an energy according to reason, and his *εἶδος* will be that energy performed perfectly (*κατ' ἀρετῆς*), or rather *κατ' ἀρίστην ἀρετήν*. If therefore this be *εἶδος*, then *εἶδος* ζῴου (as life is an *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς*), will be an energy of the soul according to the best virtue; dropping the word rationality as included under the term *ἀρετή*. Now the whole of this argument has proceeded on this supposition, that man has an *ἔργον*, which however we might be induced to grant, from considering that each part of man has a peculiar employment (*ἔργον*), and therefore the whole, as a whole, has in all probability also.

The Happiness therefore of man is *an energy of the soul according to the best virtue*. But as the reasoning by which Aristotle arrives at this conclusion, starting on a presumption, a strong one it may be said, that man has an *ἔργον*, is not necessarily conclusive, Aristotle deems it requisite again to caution his readers against expecting pure demonstration on moral subjects.

7. *πότερον οὖν*] See Plato's *Republica*, p. 40. (Ed. Tauch.) *δοκῆτι σοὶ εἶναι ἴσασθαι ἔργον;* — *Ἐμοίως.* — *Ἄρα οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ἴσασθαι καὶ ἄλλου ἰσοῦν ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἢ μένῃ ἰσίνῃ ποιῆ*

ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν,
 ἀλλ' ἄργον πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ
 χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων
 φαίνεται τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα
 5 ταῦτα θεῖη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη
 ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ
 τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. ἀφοριστέον ἄρα
 τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν. ἐπομένη δὲ
 αἰσθητικὴ τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ
 10 καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ. λείπεται δὴ
 πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. τούτου δὲ τὸ
 μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ δια-
 νοούμενον. διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν
 κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ
 15 λέγεσθαι. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέρ-
 γεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φαμεν
 ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου,
 (ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ
 ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων), προστιθεμένης τῆς
 20 κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, (κιθαριστοῦ
 μὲν γὰρ τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ), εἰ δ'
 οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωὴν τινα,
 ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου,
 σπουδαίου δ' ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, (ἐκάστον
 25 δ' εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται)· εἰ δ'

τικ, ἢ ἀριστα; . . . "Ἐστ' ὅσα ἐν ἄλλῳ
 ἴσθαι ἢ ἰφθαλμοῖς; Οὐ δῆτα.—Τί δὲ;
 ἀπούσαι ἄλλῳ ἢ ὄσιν;—Οὐδαμῶς.—
 Οὐνοῦν δικαίως ἂν ταῦτα τούτων φαίμεν
 ἔργα εἶναι; . . . Οὐνοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεῖ
 σο εἶναι ἰσάσθη. ἄτις καὶ ἔργον τι προσ-
 τίταται; . . . "Ἰδί δὲ, μετὰ ταῦτα

τῶν ἐπίψαι . . . Ψυχῆς φέρομεν ἔργον
 εἶναι;—Μάλιστα γ' ἴση.—Οὐνοῦν καὶ
 ἀρετῆν φαμέν εἶναι ψυχῆς εἶναι;—Φαμέν.

21. σπουδαίου] See note p. 33.

Good and ill constitutes not an essential difference in an act.

25. κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν] By

οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται
κατ' ἀρετὴν. εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν
ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην. ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.
μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἕαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα
οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα
οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος. Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν
τὰ γὰθὸν ταύτη· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον,
εἰδ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. δόξειε δ' ἂν παντὸς εἶναι
προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῆ
περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρετῆς ἢ
συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γε-
γόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ
ἐλλείπον. μεμῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή,
καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν,
ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ
τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν

Some re-
marks upon
the nature
of this in-
vestigation.

reason of its proper excellence; since, as he afterwards shows, actions done by chance or outward force are not good actions. See that subject discussed, ii. 3 and 5.

3. In βίῳ τελείῳ] A similar definition was afterwards adopted by Potamon of Alexandria, the founder of the Eclectic philosophy. τίλος δὲ ἵσται ἐφ' ὃ πάντα ἀναφίεσθαι, ζῶν κατὰ πάσαν ἀρετὴν τίλιος, οὐκ ἔστι τῶν τοῦ σώματος κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἰατῆς. Diog. Laert. i. §. 21. p. 10. Ed. Tauch.

— βίῳ τελείῳ] τίλιος δ' ἂν εἴη χρεῖος ὅτι ἀθροῦσι βιω. Mag. Moral. p. 10. But this life would, surely, be perfect, when a man has acquired the perfect habits which produce these energies (ἐνεργείαι ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετάς),

see p. 13, 20; and these ἔτι will be perfect when pleasure arises from the exertion of them. See ii. 2. If a person then can reach this state of perfect habits, he will be a perfectly happy man; if not, then no further than he can reach it. But Aristotle does not appear to think that this happiness is perfectly attainable by man, at least in this present life. See x. 5. This notion of τίλιος is also confirmed by the definition which Aristotle constantly gives of that term. Thus in his Phys. Ausc. vii. 3. he observes: ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ τίλιος ἐστὶ ἵσται [γὰρ] λάβη, τὸν ἰατροῦ ἀρετὴν τότε λίγισται τίλιος ἵσται. τότε γὰρ ἵσται μάλιστα τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἄσπερ κύβλος τίλιος, ἵσται μάλιστα γίνεσθαι κύβλος βίλιος.

ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον,
ὁ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι θεατῆς γὰρ τάληθούς.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον,
ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίγνηται.
5 οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν
ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἰκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι
καλῶς, οἶον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον
καὶ ἀρχή. τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦν-
ται, αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῶ τινί, καὶ ἄλλαι
10 δ' ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἐκάστας ἢ πεφύ-
κασιν, καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως ὀρισθῶσι καλῶς·
μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ροπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. δοκεῖ
γὰρ πλείον ἢ ἡμῖν παντὸς εἶναι ἢ ἀρχή, καὶ
πολλὰ συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητου-
15 μένων.

7. οἶον καὶ περὶ] *As in first princi-*
ples. εἰ γὰρ ζητούμενον τῶν ἀρχῶν αἰτίας,
οὐδίσποτε ἀρξίμιστα, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἅπασιν
βαδιόμιστα. Paraph.

9. αἱ δ' ἰθυσμῶ] *ἰθυσμῶ δὲ αἱ ἀρχαὶ*
ταῦ ἴθιπῶ γινώσκονται. καὶ γὰρ ἀδύ-
νατοι εἰς γινῶσι ἰλθῶν τῶν περὶ ἀρετῆς
λόγων, μὴ ἐν ἴθι γινώσκονται τῶν σπου-
δαίων ἀρετῶν. . . . Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο φαί-

νεται πλέον ἢ τὸ ἡμῖν τῆς ἀποδείξεως
δύνασθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πολλὰ τῶν
ζητούμενων ἰμφανῶ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς·
ἐν γὰρ τῇ μείζονι προτάσει αἱ ἢ ἀρχὴ
σφραλαμβάνεται ἢ δὲ μείζον προτάσει,
τὸ αὖν δύναται τῆς ἀποδείξεως σχεδόν.
Καὶ ἴσως εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλων αἰτίων, ἀλλὰ
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μείζον καλύψαι. Paraph.

CHAP. VI.

How far this definition of Happiness agrees with the correct opinions of mankind.

Happiness
is *εὐδαιμονία*
ψυχῆς.

ΣΚΕΠΤΕΟΝ δὴ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ 9
συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν
λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα
συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ δια-
φωνεῖ τὰ ληθῆς. νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῆ, 5
καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν
καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ
μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ. τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας
τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. ὥστε καλῶς ἂν
λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν 10
καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούτων.
'Ορθῶς δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ
ἐνεργεῖαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν
ἀγαθῶν γίνεται, καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτὸς. συνάδει δὲ τῷ

It is an
ἐνέργεια.

Aristotle now proceeds to analyse his definition, which occupies the rest of the Treatise. In the 2d Chap. the opinions of which the consideration is resumed in this chapter were shewn to be more or less incorrect, not wholly destitute of truth. In this chapter Aristotle shews, that whatever was correct in those opinions accords with his definition. *τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ καὶ παλαιὰ λεγόμενα, τὰ δὲ ἕλγιστοι καὶ ἰσχυροὶ ἄνθρωποι· οὐδιστίους δὲ τούτων ἰδίων διαμαρτάνει τοῖς ἴλαις ἀλλ' ἴσ' ἂν γί' τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείω καταρθεῖν.* p. 29, 8.

2. *ἢ δὲ ἡ ἰδέα*] *The premises*

from which that definition or conclusion was derived. *οὐ μόνον τὸν ὁρισμὸν αὐτῆς ἔξετάσαντες καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοῦ συμπεράσματος αὐτῆς.* Paraph.

3. *πάντα τὰ ὑπάρχοντα*] *All that is real. ὁ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο ἢ σαφῆς ἐν τῷ πράγματι ὅταν εἴη τὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῷ πράγματι συνάδει τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις ὅλον ἂν εἴη εἶναι ἀληθὲς ὁ λόγος ἰσχύει.* Schol.

5. *νενεμημένων*] A division which originated with the Pythagoreans, and was adopted by the Peripatetics. See Cicero's Acad. i. 5. Tusc. v. 85.

14. *ὡς τῶν ἰσχυρῶν*] *If Happiness be a*

λόγῳ καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωΐα τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία.

9 Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ All requisites are in this definition of Happiness.

5 ἀρετῇ, τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις, ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν σὺμπαραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι

10 ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἔν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ 1. As being virtue, not a mere habit, but active virtue.

15 ἀρετὴν τινα συνφδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ταύτης γὰρ ἐστιν ἢ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ἐν ἔξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξιν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, οἶον τῷ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηρηγκότι,

good of the soul, it must be an energy of the soul, because the soul does not exist unless it energizes. 2. If Happiness be an energy, it must be a good of the soul, for the soul is the only principle of energy or action.

2. εὐζωΐα] The same etymological argument is used by Plato in his Gorgias, p. 507. in the Charmides, p. 172. where for other passages see the notes either of Heindorf or Stallbaum. See also Chap. viii. and note 1.

3. τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα] The qualities required in happiness.

4. τοῖς μὲν] These different opinions concerning Happiness are likewise enumerated in the Eudem. Ethics, p. 103. (Ed. Tauch.) The first, that

virtue is Happiness, is attributed to Socrates, as also to Zeno and the Cyrenics. (See Clem. Alex. ii. 199. Ed. Klotz. Plato, Gorgias p. 507, sq. Cic. Ac. i. 10.) The second, that φρόνησις is Happiness, is also attributed to Socrates. (See vi. 10. and the Phædon, p. 69.) The third, that σοφία is Happiness, to Thales and Anaxagoras. (Eud. Eth. p. 100.) The fourth, that it was not without pleasure, to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics; (Diog. Laert. ii. 75.) and subsequently to Callipho. (See Cic. de Fin. ii. 11. Clem. Alex. ii. p. 198.) Of the last opinion was Xenocrates the Chalcedonian, the friend and disciple of Plato. (See Clemens, ib. p. 202. Wypersse de Xenocrate, p. 178.)

τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἶόν τε· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφανοῦνται ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν), οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν κάγαθῶν οἱ πράτ-

2. In being essentially pleasant.

τοντες ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν, ἐκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ 10 τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ φιλοκάλοις ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα. τοιαῦτα δ' αἰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ 15 τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδεῖαι καὶ καθ' αὐτάς. οὐδὲν δὴ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ. πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθός ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδεὶς ἂν 20 εἴποι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτ' ἐλευθέριον τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὐτάς ἂν εἶεν αἰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδεῖαι. Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, 25 καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον, εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει

3. In containing all excellent qualities.

8. ἡδίστα] As being an energy or at least inseparably allied to it.

17. ἀμύλατον] As an amulet. περιέσσης enim hæc Græci vocabant quæ a superstitionis mulieribus infantium collo ad fascinationes amoliendas ap-

pendebantur. VICTOR.

26. εἴτε] If, as is the fact. This particle gives a precision and firmness to the word to which it belongs. See some ingenious remarks upon it in Mr. Sewell's *Hora Philol.* p. 42.

περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ' ὡς εἶπομεν.
ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἡδιστον ἢ εὐδαι-
μονία, καὶ οὐ διώριστα ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν
ἐπίγραμμα·

5 κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῆστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
ἡδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις·
ταύτας δέ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμέν
εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. Φαίνεται δ' ὁμως καὶ Yet it re-
quires
external
goods.
10 τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἶπομεν·
ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ράδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν
ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται,
καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ πλούτου καὶ
πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι
15 τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας, εὐτεκνίας, κάλλους·
οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ιδέαν παναίσχης
ἢ δυσγενῆς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ' ἴσως

27. κρίνει—ὁ σπουδαῖος] The good man is the rule and measure of all things: whatever he says is true. He says that energies according to virtues are the noblest, the most pleasant, the most excellent of all things; therefore, this definition of Happiness, as consisting of such energies, has all these qualities.

4. ὑγιαίνειν] Compare the *εὐδαιμονία* in Athenæus, 694. E. and Plato's *Gorg.* p. 44. n. Stallb.

8. φαίνεται ὁ ὁμοῖος] Certum est Aristotelem et Peripateticos omnes et in primis Theophrastum (quem gravissime reprehendit hoc nomine Cicero de Finibus, v. 5. et Tuscul. v. 30.) multum his bonis tribuisse adeo ut sine iis beatitudinem non consistere posse

dicerent. GIPH. But Theophrastus carried out this doctrine to a far greater extent than his master: asserting that with ill fortune, or grief, or bodily pain, Happiness could by no means consist, (conjugi beatam vitam nullo modo posse putavit. Cic. de Fin. v. 26. and Acad. i. 9. with the notes of Goerenz.) But according to Aristotle, Happiness requires external goods, not as part of its essence, but its instruments. Sciences and arts are in themselves perfect: the science of physic is in itself perfect, yet cannot be exercised without external means, as drugs, &c. yet no one would say that these make part of the science of *physic*. See Cic. Acad. I. 6.

ἦττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνᾶσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἶπομεν, εἰκοε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαυτῆς εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταῦτὸ τάπτουσιν ἔνιοι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.

5

CHAP. VII.

Whether man is the cause of his own happiness or not.

Of the ἀρετὴ
of Happi-
ness.

ΘΘΕΝ καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν 10
ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατὰ τινα
θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν

23. *ἴμαι*] The Cyrenaics, and subsequently the Epicureans; *ἴτραυ* the Cynics, and the Stoics. Mich.

CHAP. VII.

After having discussed the definition of Happiness, and considered it in the Category of *εὐδαιμία*, Aristotle now proceeds to examine it in reference to the other Categories. In this chapter of its efficient cause ἢ ἀρετὴ ὅθεν ἢ κίνησις. In the next *πρὸς*. In the 8th, *πρὸς* *εἰς*. In the 9th, *πρὸς*. In the 10th, *πρὸς*. All which *accidentia* arise out of the definition, and are of great service in clearing and explaining it.

The question discussed in this chapter arises from the final remarks of the last: for since external goods are needful to Happiness, insomuch that some have considered them as an essential part of it, we must immediately inquire whether it arises from external or internal causes. Aristotle says, granting that *both* may have an influence in producing it, the consider-

ation of the first is no part of a moral or political treatise. That man is the cause of his own happiness, is clear from its falling in with the general feeling and practice of mankind as exemplified in the conduct of legislators; and also from the definition which we have formed of it in our Fifth Chapter.

7. *θείαν μοῖραν*.] He glances at Plato, who in his dialogue of Meno, p. 93, rejecting all other causes, asserted that God only was the cause of virtue, and consequently Happiness. (See, however, Stallbaum's Introduction to the Protagoras and the Laches.) Of course it is not to be imagined that the different and conflicting opinions respecting the origin and nature of virtue put forth by Plato in these dialogues were seriously held by him. What were Plato's real opinions we have yet to learn. For the object of almost all his dialogues, particularly on this subject, was not to build new theories, but to expose the emptiness and folly of such as were already

οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ θεῶν δῶρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὐλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσφ βέλτιστον. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, 5 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ τινα μάθησιν ἢ ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον· δυνατόν γάρ 10 ὑπάρξει πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὐλογον ἔχειν οὕτως, εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἶόν τε

Notchance;
and why.

popular. To clear the ground for true philosophy, and a right apprehension of things by the removal of error and prejudice, by showing men how little they knew of those very things of which they fancied they knew most. Thus illustrating the interpretation of the Delphic oracle given by his master Socrates. Who being asked, why Apollo had declared him to be the wisest man of Greece; replied, that whereas others thought they *knew something*, he was convinced he *knew nothing*. See Cicero's Acad. i. 4.

9. *κοινοῦσιν*] *And must be common to all*: which it would not be, if the Gods only were the authors of it.

13. *εἴπερ—πίθουσι*] *If, as is the fact, things according to nature are, and are so produced, as is the best way possible for them to be*. In reasoning upon morals, Plato and Aristotle were perhaps, the first of all philosophers who considered things not as they *are*, but as they *ought to be*; not as they actually appear to us externally, and

upon a superficial view, but as they would appear if their tendencies were allowed unlimited scope. The argument from final causes was perfectly understood and recognized, and was carried out to its fullest extent in the Republic of Plato, particularly in the discussion concerning Justice and Injustice. From this view of the transcendental nature of moral philosophy, from seeing that man's moral energies are in this present life confined and pinioned, and that vice is an imperfect and unnatural state, Aristotle assumed it for an indisputable fact, that whatever is best, is natural, and conversely whatever is natural, is best. On the same ground, he constantly refers to the *good man*, his principles and actions, as the standard and criterion of all moral truth, he alone being in a state of nature, and alone, from the standard within himself, capable of judging of what is right and wrong. (*διὸ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὰ φύσει, καὶ*

κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον

Proved also from the Definition,

ἐπιτρέψαι τύχην λίαν πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη. Συμ-φανὲς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον· 5

εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ποιά τις. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς.

And from its being the end of the Political Science.

Ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, 10

αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούσ τινος καὶ ἀγαθοῦς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικῶς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βουὴν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμον λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἶόν τε κοινωνῆσαι 15 τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδέ

μὴ ἐν τοῖς διαφθερμένοις. διὰ καὶ ἐν βέλτεστα διακείμενοι καὶ κατὰ εἶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπων διακρίσει. Pol. i. 2.) Equally as Plato, he conceived that man when depraved by vice, when his moral tendencies were perverted or prevented from developing themselves, was no more in a state of nature, than a tree whose growth has been stunted, whose leaves are become discoloured from disease, can be considered in its natural condition; nor would it be more unphilosophical to draw inferences from such a specimen as to the nature of trees, than it would be to argue as to the nature of man, his *ἔργα* or his habit, from what is generally and incorrectly considered to be his natural condition. Phys. Ausc. iii. 3—9. vii. 3. Metaph. i. 3. Cic. Acad. i. 5 and 6.

and Butler's ii. Serm. on Human Nature.

4. *τύχη*] Since Happiness is a most excellent effect, it is contrary to analogy to attribute its production to an ignoble cause, to chance. For in all other cases, in nature and art, effects the most perfect are produced in the best way for them to be produced, that is to say, from the best causes, or causes which have the best tendency to produce them. It is probable, therefore, that as Happiness is the most perfect and valuable of all effects, it is produced by such a cause.

9. *ταῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ*] *With what was said at the commencement of the treatise.* Namely, that the chief Good, or Happiness, is the end of the Political Science.

παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· οὐπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐθηνούντα μεγάλας συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρωσ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡρωϊκοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα 10 ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

CHAP. VIII.

Whether internal prosperity be an adjunct of, or essential to, Happiness.

11 ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῆ, κατὰ Σόλωνα The opinion of Solon in favour of

Having observed in the last chapter, that he who dies involved in the greatest misfortunes could not be called happy, Aristotle is led further to enquire, can no one then be happy whilst he lives, since all are subject to die in such calamities? Solon affirmed that no one could. The truth of which opinion must now be examined. For if it be true, that external prosperity is essential to Happiness, it ought to have been included in the definition, and it is wrong to consider it as a mere adjunct. And here it is worthy to be observed, the attention paid by the ancient philosophers to the opinions and sayings of the wise, and of the generality of mankind; according to Aristotle's own sentiments, *δενε δι' ἑσ-*

ἴχην τῶν ἱμπτίρων καὶ πρῆσβυτέρων ἢ φροῖμων παῖς ἀναποδύκτοις φάσισι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἥσσον τῶν ἀποδείξων διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχην ἐκ τῆς ἱμπτίρας ἄμμα ἐρῶσιν ἐρῶσιν. vi. 9. ult. Hence the very general reference both in Plato and Aristotle to proverbs and the sayings of the poets: and the constant recurrence to nominal definitions as expressing the general sense of mankind, as records of their analysis and observation. See Cic. Acad. i. 8. p. 29, 2. n.

11. *πότερον οὖν*] De hac questione multa extant veterum testimonia in utramque partem.—Plato quoque in Epinomide existimat in hac vita neminem præter sapientem esse beatum, post mortem autem alios quoque qui

external
prosperity
discussed.

δὲ χρῶν τέλος ὄραν ; εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον
οὕτως, ἀρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων τότε ἐπειδὴν
ἀποθάνῃ ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον, ἄλλως
τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν
εὐδαιμονίαν ; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα
εὐδαίμονα, μηδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι
τηνικαῦτα ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον
ὡς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχη-
μάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησιν τινα·
δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ 10
ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αισθανομένῳ δέ,
οἶον τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ ὅλως ἀπο-
γόνων εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι. ἀπορίαν δὲ
καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι
μέχρι γήρως καὶ τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέ- 15
χεται πολλὰς μεταβολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς
ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ
τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας.
δηλὸν δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς
γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται. ἄτοπον 20
δὴ γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ συµμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς
καὶ γίνοιτο ὅτε μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν δ' ἄθλιος.
ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον

vixerant et sapientes maxime. Cum
Aristotele faciunt Stoici. (Cic. de
Finib. iii. 22.) Et Cicero ipse. (Ib. ii.
27.) GIPH. This question is dis-
cussed by Cicero in the passages above
quoted.

15. κατὰ λόγον] In a state of prospe-
rity in accordance with his life.

19. τοῖς ἀποστήμασι] ἀπέστημα
plerumque loci intervallum et spatium

significat. Sed hic de tempore non-
nulli accipiunt : hoc est, fieri posse
longo temporis intervallo, ut liberi a
parentibus suis et majoribus degene-
rent : ut avus fortasse fuerit vir bonus,
nepos nequam. Ego cum Eustratio
ἀπέστημα idem quod ἀποστάσις, hoc
est degenerationem seu defectionem a
parentum moribus, valere existimo.
GIPH. See Aristot. Rhet. ii. 15.

συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν. ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθεῖη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ ἐκείνου. Εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὄραν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν Solon's opinion reduced ad absurdum.
 5 ἕκαστον οὐχ ὡς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτ' ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
 10 ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον, τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς; δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν
 15 φαίνοντες καὶ σαθρῶς ἰδρυμένον. Ἡ τὸ μὲν External prosperity no part of Happiness.
 ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἶπαμεν, κύριαί δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ
 20 δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν. περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως

16. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς] Cicero, following the Stoics, went farther, and asserted the sufficiency of virtue alone to make a man happy, denying the doctrine both of Solon and Aristotle. Thus he argues in his Tusc. Disput. v. 13. "Et si omne beatum est, cui nihil deest, et quod in suo genere expletum atque cumulatam est, idque virtutis est proprium: certe omnes virtutis compotes beati sunt. Et hoc quidem mihi cum Bruto convenit, item cum Aristotele, Xenocrate,

Speusippo, Polemone. Sed mihi videntur etiam beatissimi. quid enim deest ad beate vivendum ei qui confidit suis bonis? aut qui diffidit beatus esse qui potest? at diffidat necesse est qui bona dividit tripertito. Qui enim poterit aut corporis firmitate aut fortunæ stabilitate confidere? atqui nisi stabili et fixo et permanente bono beatus esse nemo potest." See also Wynperse Dissert. de Xenocrate Chalcedonio (Lugd. Bat. 1822.) p. 174, sq.

ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὡς
περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν· μονιμώτεραι
γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.
τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονιμώταται διὰ
τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐταῖς
τοὺς μακαρίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ
γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰ λήθην. ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ζητού-
μενον τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος·
αἰεὶ γὰρ ἢ μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει
τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἷσει κάλλιστα καὶ
πάντη πάντως ἐμμελῶς ὃ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς
καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου. Πολλῶν δὲ γινο-
μένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφερόντων μεγέθει καὶ
μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπήν
τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ γιγνόμενα
μὲν εὖ μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ γὰρ
αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν
καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίγνεται), ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμ-
βαίνοντα θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον
λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς
ἐνεργείαις. ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ
καλόν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς καὶ

In what
way good
or ill for-
tune can
affect Hap-
piness.

2. *μονιμώτεραι*] Because the operation and exercise of Virtue is continually called into action.

12. *τετράγωνος*] See Stallbaum on Plato's *Protag.* p. 339. B.

20. *λυμαίνεται*] Compare Archytas *De bono viro*: *ὅσοι μακρὰ σώματος καὶ πηρώσις αἰσθηταρίων ἀπομαραίνοντι τὰν εὐθάλειαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας.* *Frag. Pythag.* p. 15. Ed. Gale. 1671.

Stobæus, i. p. 40. Gaisf.

20. *τὸ μακάριον*] *ἄνδρα δὲ οὐκ ἴσσοι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμελαι, ἐν ἃν ἀμάχαιος συμφορὰ καθίλη.* Plato, from *Simonides, Protag.* p. 344. C. Where see more upon this subject.

24. *φίξη τις*] Compare Archytas, *ib.* p. 19. *ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ οὕτω διάκυσται ποσ' εὐτυχίαν ὄσσοι καὶ ὁ τῷ σώματι καλῶς ἔχων καὶ ἰσχυρῶς. καὶ γὰρ*

μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι' ἀναληγσίαν, ἀλλὰ γεν-
 νάδας ὧν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι
 κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν
 γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει
 ὅτ' αὐτὸς μισητὰ καὶ φαῦλα. τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν
 καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημό-
 νως φέρειν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλ-
 λιστα πράττειν, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν
 τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα
 10 καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλ-
 λιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ
 τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος
 μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν
 μακάριός γε, ἂν Ἡριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ.
 15 Οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ
 ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥαδίως, οὐδ' ὑπὸ
 τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ
 πολλῶν, ἕκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν
 εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν πολλῷ
 20 τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ
 γενόμενος ἐπήβολος. τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαί-
 μονα τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς
 ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον, μὴ τὸν

Happiness
not varia-
ble.

ἰαῖνεσ οἷός τε καὶ θάλασσι καὶ ψύχοσ ὑπο-
 μῖνεσ, καὶ βάρουσ ἄραι μύγασ, καὶ πολλὰσ
 ἀτίρασ ἐν χερσῶσ ὑπομῖνεσ κανοσαθείασ.
 Stobæus, i. p. 44.

22. τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς] The discus-
 sion of this question, how far external
 goods are requisite to Happiness, is
 necessarily incomplete at this stage of
 the inquiry. External goods are re-
 quisite to Happiness as instruments:

as his paint, brushes, and easel to the
 artist; for though he has the faculty
 within himself, and these are no part
 of it, yet he cannot exercise it without
 them. External goods, therefore, are
 requisite to Happiness, as means for
 the development, employment, and
 preservation of its energies. Until,
 however, it has been determined in
what energies, and according to *what*

τυχόντα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετόν
 καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ
 λόγον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν, τὴν εὐδαι-
 μονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον τίθεμεν πάντη πάντως.
 εἰ δ' οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν ζώντων οἷς⁵
 ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρίους δ'
 ἀνθρώπους. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
 διωρίσθω. Τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ
 τῶν φίλων ἀπάντων τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλ-
 λεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις¹⁰
 ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων δια-
 φορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον
 συνικνουμένων τῶν δ' ἦττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν
 διαιρεῖν μακρὸν καὶ ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου
 δὲ λεχθέν καὶ τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν ἰκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δὴ,¹⁵
 καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν
 ἔχει τι βριθὸς καὶ ῥοπήν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὰ δ'
 ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς φίλους
 ὁμοίως ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον
 περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν πολὺ²⁰

How far the
 prosperity
 or adversity
 of others
 can affect
 the dead.

virtues, Happiness principally consists,
 it cannot be determined how far ex-
 ternal means are requisite to it. For
 should it hereafter appear that Hap-
 piness principally consists in the intel-
 lectual energies which can operate
 without external means, and in the
 moral energies no further than as man
 is an imperfect being; and if, for the
 employment even of the moral ener-
 gies, but little means are requisite, (as
 the Widow was just, pious, and gene-
 rous, even with her two mites,) it will
 be immediately seen that external

means are not extensively requisite
 even as instruments; and that few
 people are so situated as not to possess
 them to a sufficient degree for the at-
 tainment and preservation of Happi-
 ness. The reader must rest satisfied
 with thus much of this argument, till
 he arrives at the tenth Book.

8. ἀπογόνων τύχαις] Having ex-
 plained the principal question, he re-
 turns to the other mentioned at p.
 36, 10. whether the prosperity or
 adversity of friends and relatives affect
 the dead.

μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνουῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων· ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ δικνεῖται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τὸναντίον, ἀφαιρὸν τι καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μή, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας μὴδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. συμβάλλεσθαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν μήτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μὴδέν.

CHAP. IX.

In what class of Goods Happiness ought to be placed.

12 ΔΙΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΩΝ δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ Happiness not of the
τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπάμει.

1. προϋπάρχειν] *To exist before the play.* As, for instance, in the *Œdipus Coloneus* of Sophocles, where *Œdipus* is brought upon the stage, having already committed the dreadful deeds upon which the play turns. Such are also many of the plays of *Euripides*, where the previous history of the plot is narrated in the prologue.

CHAP. IX.

Before proceeding further in his Analysis, and examining that part of

it which occupies the next six books, Aristotle interposes a question concerning the dignity of Happiness, and enquires among what class of Goods it is to be placed: whether among the faculties, the praiseworthy, or the honourable. *Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν θῆα φασὶν τὰ δὲ ἀνθρώπινα, καὶ τὰ μὲν θῆα τίμια λέγουσιν, ὡς ἀπάμειστος ὄντι Ἰσπανοί, καὶ τιμῆς διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦμενα· Ἰταινὰ δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, ὡς τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι μὲν λυσόμενα ἰταῖνον δὲ μόνου συγχάνοντα· εἰδὶ δὲ καὶ Ἰταῖνα ἀνθρώπινα μὲν καὶ ταῦτα, ἰσχυροτικί-*

Nor of the
Iramé.

μᾶλλον τῶν τιμίων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε
δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν. Φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ
ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τί πως
ἔχειν ἐπαινείσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν
ἀνδρείον καὶ ὅλως τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν⁵
ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὸν
ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον
τῷ ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἀγα-
θόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν
περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαινῶν· γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται¹⁰
πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ
τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ
εἵπαμεν. εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιούτων,
δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ
μείζον τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται· τοὺς¹⁵
τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ
τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν. ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν
ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς θειότερόν τι
καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξος²⁰
καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῆ

ζῶσα δὲ, ὡς καὶ κατορθῶν δύνασθαι καὶ
ἀμαρτάνει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δυνάμεις λεγι-
μια. ὡς τις τῶν τυχῶν ὑπάρχει
ἰδρῶν. . . ζῆτι ἢ τίσι τούτων τὴν εὐδαι-
μονίαν σκεπτόν.— καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτῆν
τινὰ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπαγορεύει, ὅτι μὴ
ἰσαμφοτερίζει. ἀμαρτάνει γὰρ ἢ εὐδαι-
μονία οὐκ ἰδιόχεται ποτὶ τὸν εὐδαιμόνισ-
τα. See note p. 5, 1.

17. μακαρίζομεν] Compare Hip-
podamus de Beat. ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπος εἶναι
τῆ φύσει εὐδαιμόνιος, ἀλλὰ μαθήσιος καὶ
προνοίας ποτιδίεται, ποτὶ μὲν τὸ γίνε-
σθαι ἀγαθός, τῆς ἀρετῆς ποτὶ δὲ τὸ

γίνεσθαι εὐδαιμόνιος, τῆς εὐτυχίας. καὶ
διὰ τοῦτο ἢ δύο τούτων ἢ ἀκρωσίτια
εὐδαιμονία συγχιφαιλούται, ἰσάτω τὴ
καὶ μακαρισμῶ ἰσάτω μὲν τῷ ἔξ ἀρε-
τῆς, μακαρισμῶ δὲ τῷ ἔξ εὐτυχίας. τὰς
μὲν ὦν ἀρετὰς ἴχου διὰ τὰς θείας μοίρας.
τὰς δὲ εὐτυχίας, διὰ τὰς θιατάς.—
Fragm. Pyth. p. 3. Stob. iii. 339.
See also Archytas ib. p. 15. Stob.
i. 40.

21. συνηγορήσαι] To have advocated
the claims of pleasure to the ἀρετῆς: sc.
to have claimed for it the praise of being
the most excellent of all things.

ἡδονῆ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐσαν
 μνηύειν ᾤετο ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῶν ἐπαινετῶν,
 τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰγαθόν· πρὸς
 ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 5 ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν
 ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ
 τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν. Ἄλλὰ ταῦτα ^{But of the}
 μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν τοῖς περὶ τὰ ^{τίμα.}
 ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις, ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
 10 εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ
 τελείων. ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι
 ἀρχή· ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες
 πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῶν
 ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.

CHAP. X.

Of Virtue.

13 ΕΠΕΙ Δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά ^{The consi-}
 τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον· ^{deration of}
^{Virtue re-}
^{quisite.}

10. τιμίων καὶ τελείων] τιμῆ δ', ὡς
 ἴσως εἰσὶν ἡμῶν οὐδαίς ἐρθῶς, δεκτὶ δέ.
 θεῖον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν σου τιμή· τῶν δὲ κακῶν
 οὐδαίς τίμιον. Plato de Leg. 727. By
 this Aristotle indistinctly indicates that
 Happiness is σοφία. See vi. 6. x. 6.

CHAP. X.

Having proceeded thus far in analysing his Definition of Happiness, Aristotle is now brought to the examination of a most important part of it.

It was said that Happiness is an energy of the soul according to Virtue, or the best of the Virtues: what then Virtue is, now remains to be considered. Until this be known, no *practical* benefit can be derived from this treatise. For how can we act according to Virtue, till we know what Virtue is, much less according to the best Virtues? This then remains to be discovered what Virtue is, and then what are the *best* Virtues.

Now the term *Virtue* (ἀρετή) is ar-

τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσασμεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην μάλιστα πεπονηῆσθαι· βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινας ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγέννηται. εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὕτη, δῆλον ὅτι γένοιτ' ἂν ἡ ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν. περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι 10 καὶ γὰρ τὰ γὰθὸν ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην. Ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν. εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ 15 τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πως τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον ὄσφ τιμωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἢ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς. τῶν δ' ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰπραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος 20

Not that of the Body, but the Soul.

plied equally to inanimate as animate things: meaning no more than the perfection of their nature, or that quality which causes and enables them perfectly to execute the *ἔργον* or object of their being. But we are not seeking Virtue in this general sense, but the peculiar Virtue of man, which must consequently inhere in some part peculiar to him from all other animals, inasmuch as his *ἔργον* is distinct from all other animals; and such is the rational soul. Before, therefore, we can discover the nature of Virtue, it

will be requisite to consider the nature of the soul; for if this be of more parts than one and they be distinct, virtue will probably be of more kinds than one. For if each part has its praiseworthy habits, then each part must have its peculiar virtues.

9. *Ἐξ ἀρχῆς*] *δοκεῖ δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ ζήτησις αὕτη ἐπιλόουσι ἂν εἴη τῇ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ λόγου σκοπῇ· ἢ γὰρ καὶ οὗτος περὶ τοῦ εἴλους τῆς πολιτικῆς.* Paraph.

17. *ὀφθαλμοῦς*] This simile is taken from Plato. See the beautiful passage in the Charmides, p. 156.

γνώσιν. Θεωρητέον δὴ καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον ἰκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλείον ἔξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν
 5 προκειμένων. Λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἓνια, καὶ χρη-
 στέον αὐτοῖς. οἶον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. ταῦτα δὲ πότερον διώρισται
 καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη καὶ πᾶν τὸ
 10 μεριστόν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυ-
 κότα καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ
 κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν. Τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ, λέγω
 δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι· τὴν
 15 τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς
 τρεφομένοις θείη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν
 αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις· εὐλογώτερον
 γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά. ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινὴ τις ἀρετὴ
 καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
 20 ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μέρος τοῦτο καὶ ἡ
 δύναμις αὕτη, ὃ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἦκιστα
 διάδηλοι καθ' ὕπνον, ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν
 τὸ ἦμισυ τοῦ βίου τοὺς εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων.

Therefore
the nature
of the Soul
must be
considered.

The soul is
divided
into,
I. Rational.
II. Irra-
tional.

Irrational
subdivided
into; 1.
Vegetative.

7. τὸ μὲν ἄλογον] This division originated with Plato. See Mag. Mor. p. 2. and the De Repub. iv. p. 349. For the opinions of philosophers previous to Aristotle touching the soul, see Aristotle De Anima, i. 2. And for the subject here discussed, Ib. ii. 2. and iii. 9. From this latter place we learn that Aristotle did not

consider that the soul was really divisible, or that the rational part of it differed from the irrational as one member of the body from another. In the passage alluded to, he shows the absurdity which must necessarily result from instituting such a division as this, which Plato appears to have done. See also Trend. de Anima, p. 528.

συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ἀργία γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φαύλη, πλὴν εἴ πη κατὰ μικρὸν δικνύονται τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλοι, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἑατέον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέφυκεν. Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πη λόγου. τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ὀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται τε καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινήσαι τὸναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως· ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ ὀρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὀρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὀρῶμεν. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναί τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον. πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. Λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἶπομεν· πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς. ἔτι δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὄλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πῶς, ἢ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς

2. Appetitive.


Which latter may in one point of view be considered rational.

καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμέν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μὴνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησις τε καὶ παράκλησις. εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι. **Διορίζεται** Virtus divided according to δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην.


1. λόγον] Using the words λόγον mathematicians. ἔχειν in such a sense, as when we say, the son has the reason of his father, when he obeys his father : and not in the sense that the words are used by

7. Διαφερόν] According to the sense in which you understand the Differentia, you will make a different division of the Soul.

I. If by Rational you mean obedient to Reason, you will divide thus ;



II. If by Rational you mean exercising Reason, you will divide thus ;



these divisions of the Soul, into I. Moral. II. Intellectual.

λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικὰς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικὰς. λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἡθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων, δ ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.

Under II. and III. combined fall all the moral Virtues. Perfect moral virtue is, when the *ἕξεις* of the one, and the *φρόνησις* of the other, are in perfect Harmony. Since, therefore, Happiness was defined to be an energy of the soul according to Virtue, or the best Virtues, we may now develop the Definition, and say that Happiness is an energy of the Soul according to *φρόνησις* and *σοφία* in a perfect life, &c.

4. λέγοντες γὰρ] Aristotle subjoins this remark, to show that the moral and intellectual virtues are really distinct, a doctrine virtually denied by Socrates, and oppugned by Plato, both in the *Menon* and *Protagoras*.

The argument is an induction. If, when we praise a man for his moral

habits, we never call him wise, prudent, &c. then wisdom, prudence, &c. are not moral habits. We never do call him wise, &c. when we praise his moral habits; therefore, &c. The same argument to the intellectual habits.

6. *ἰσπανῶμεν—τὸν σοφόν*] Here again the author of the *Mag. Mor.* p. 12. differs from Aristotle. For after observing that in the rational part of the soul are produced *φρόνησις, ἀγχίνοια, σοφία, ἀμάρτυα, μνήμη* καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα and in the irrational *σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, καὶ ἴσα ἄλλα τοῦ ἡθους* *δοκοῦσι ἰσπανῶσθαι εἶναι* he immediately subjoins, *κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας* (sc. the moral virtues) *ἰσπανῶται λογίματα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς τοῦ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντος οὐδὲς ἰσπανῶσθαι.*

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK II.

IN the previous book it has been shown that Virtue is *essential* to Happiness^a; before therefore we can attain to Happiness, we must first inquire into the nature of Virtue. But since all systematic treatises should commence with that which is easier and more familiar, Aristotle, repeating the division of Virtue mentioned in the last chapter, first proceeds to the examination of the Moral Virtues, which are more known and dispose us better for the reception of the Intellectual. This investigation occupies the four succeeding Books.

The following book is divided into three parts :

- I. The investigation of the *origin* of Moral Virtue.
- II. The *definition* of Moral Virtue.
- III. The application of that definition to particulars.

In considering the first division of his subject, Aristotle tacitly refutes much of the doctrines of the Sophists. So long had these pretenders to universal knowledge been accustomed to trifle with words, and to argue indifferently upon either sides of a question, that at last they ventured to deny that there was any thing fixed or certain, or any real distinction between virtue and vice. The dogmas of the early philosophers, by which they endeavoured to solve the difficulties which encountered them in their physical enquiries, the Sophists applied to morals. Protagoras, the disciple of the celebrated Democritus^b, to whom Aristotle not unfrequently refers, asserted that man was the measure of all things^c,

^a ψυχῆς ἰστέγμα κατ' ἀρετήν. p. 26.
1. See also n.

^b See Clem. Alex. Strom. i. §. 64.

^c ὅσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, λίγων πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἔστι ἀνθρώπου,

ὡς ἄρα εἶα μὲν ἂν ἰμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἴσθην ἰμοὶ, εἶα δ' ἂν σοί, τοιαῦτα δ' αὖ σοί. Cratylus p. 385. E. n. Stallb. 386. G. Compare also Theæt. 152. A. where this

that all things were in a continual change, that there was no other science except that of the senses^d, and no other criterion of truth^e. Thence it was inferred that truth was whatever any one thought it to be, and consequently that no one could form false opinions.^f

Following these principles they asserted that Virtue and Justice did not exist by nature, but merely by arbitrary enactments^g, that one thing was beautiful and excellent by nature, another thing by law: they denied the existence of natural justice or moral sense, affirming that the will of the stronger was the rule of right; that obedience to nature dictated the unlimited gratification of the desires; in short, that he who was the greatest tyrant, and had the fullest means of gratifying every appetite, and followed the dictates of those appetites implicitly, was most in a state of nature, and possessed the greatest share of Happiness^h.

From this to the next step the transition was easy, that no one acted justly except he was induced to it by the hope of reward, or the dread of punishment. That justice was a mutual compact extorted by the fear of mankind. That Virtue was surrounded with pain and labourⁱ, that the pretender to it was as equally virtuous as the real possessor of it, and that he who acted virtuously merely from fear of the laws, was equally as

dictum is explained and refuted. See particularly, 161. D. 171. C. 177. C. sq. Diog. Laert. ix. §. 51; and Menag. ib. Sext. Emp. Hyp. i. 32; and Geel's Hist. Soph. p. 92.

^d *ἰσιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλῃ τι ἰσότης ἢ αἰσθησις.* Plato's Theæt. 160.

^e These notions he appears to have derived from his master. See the Metaph. iii. 5. p. 76. *διὸ Δημόκριτος γὰρ φησιν, ἦτοι οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῶν γ' ἀληθινόν.* Compare also Cic. Acad. i. 12. ii. 23. and Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. §. 135.

^f *οὐδὲν ψευδῆ δεξιόζυ.* Theæt. 167. Euthyd. 286. *τὰ δυνούμενα πάντα ἰσότης*

ἀληθῆ. Arist. Met. iii. 5. p. 75. Compare also Theæt. 161. D. *ἰσόντες ἀληθῆ ἴσται ἢ δὴ δι' αἰσθησιῶν δεξιόζυ, καὶ μήτις τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βίβλιον διακρινῆ, μήτις τὴν δεξιάν κυριώτερος ἴσται ἰσιστήσασθαι ἴσταις τὴν ἰσότην, ἰσότης ἢ ψευδῆς, ἀλλ' ἢ πολλὰς εἰρηται. αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἴσταις μόνος δεξιόζυ, ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ἰσότης καὶ ἀληθῆ.* See also Cic. Acad. ii. 46.

^g *ὃ οὐ φύσει θεῶν δι' μίον.* Schol. in Theæt. 166. E.

^h De Legg. 288. Repub. i. and ii.

ⁱ *διὰ δεξιάν ἰσιστησιῶν αὐτὸς δι' αὐτὸ φρονεῖν, ὡς ἔν χαλσιόν.* Rep. 368.

virtuous as he who acted from principle; and, consequently, that men were to be judged wise, brave, just, and temperate, not from possessing the habits of wisdom, courage, justice, and temperance, but by performing the external acts.

These notions are indirectly refuted throughout the following book, and with them other opinions on the same subject advanced by Plato, in several of his dialogues, particularly in the Menon, Phædrus, Protagoras, and Phædon; where it is asserted that the moral virtues are not produced in us by teaching or nature, but that they are the gift of the divinity. According to Plato, the soul in its original state traversed Heaven with the Gods, contemplating the real essence of every Virtue, both speculative and practical, and when enclosed in the body did not lose those virtues, but reacquired the use of them by habit and exercise.

Aristotle, omitting all consideration of the divine origin of Virtue, as foreign to this treatise, only inquires whether they are produced by teaching, habit, or nature? And the sum of his reasoning is, that nature and teaching have some, but habit the greatest share in producing them. We are by nature, he says, endowed with an aptitude for the reception of moral virtue,—which aptitude he calls *natural virtue* in the last chapter of the Sixth book. Instruction and knowledge only teach us how to direct our actions, how to distinguish the good from the bad, and order our conduct for the attainment of Happiness; but as these are of only minor importance to the acquisition of Virtue, we infer that habit has the greatest share in its production. The Stoics, differing both from Plato and Aristotle, agreeing with them however in many points, rejected the division of the soul into rational and irrational, which the former had adopted^k and placed all the virtues in the rational

^k See Cicero Acad. i. 10, and Plutarch. de Virt. Mor. ix. 32. Hutten. *νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ*

ἄλογον διαφορῶν εἶναι καὶ θέναι ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικῆ διακεκριμένον ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ψυχῆς μέρος (ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν

part of the soul; and made the goodness or turpitude of actions consist in the truth or falsity of the judgment. They attributed accordingly almost every thing to instruction¹ and but little to habit. They taught that the seeds or sparks of Virtue, which they called *κοινὰ ἐννόια*, and Cicero the "*semina innata virtutum*," were innate, that these when fostered by right education, become perfect Virtue, but if depraved by the contrary, these sparks are extinguished, and vice springs up in their room. Such an opinion was wholly at variance with the tenets of Aristotle, according to whom the soul possesses the capacities for receiving and retaining Virtue; as Cicero correctly expresses it, "*ad comprehendam ingeniis virtutem idonea*," but not the incipient and undeveloped habits.

This book divides itself into the following parts. In the 1st chapter, Aristotle treats of the efficient cause of Virtue; in the 2nd and 3rd, of its object-matter; in the 4th and 5th, of its definition; in the 6th, he applies the definition to particular cases; and in the 7th and 8th, explains certain questions respecting the mean.

καὶ ἡγμονικῶς) διόλου κραιώμενοι. They differed also from the earlier philosophers in banishing all emotions from the breast of the wise and good man. (See Cic. Acad. ii. 44.) Consequently they did not consider moral virtue to consist in the proper regulation of the passions.

¹ See Diog. Laert. vii. 91, and Fischer in *Æschin. Socrat.* p. 21.

² Tusculan. Disp. iii. 2. De Fin.

v. 15.

² Est enim natura sic generata vis hominis ut ad omnem virtutem percipiendam facta videatur: ob eamque causam parvi virtutum simulacris, quarum in se habent semina, sine doctrina moventur. Sunt enim prima elementa naturæ; quibus auctis, virtutis quasi carmen efficitur. Cic. de Fin. v. 15. Compare also c. 21. and Acad. i. 5.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. II.

CHAP. I.

Of the causes of the origin and decay of moral virtue—that it is a habit produced by a repetition of certain actions—that the actions and habits reciprocally operate on each other.

ΔΙΤΤΗΣ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοη-
τικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἣ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον
ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν
αὔξησιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου· ἣ
5 δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα

Difference of the Moral and Intellectual Virtues.

1. Διττῆς] διῷ ἄρα . . . στῶτον ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς ἐπιπῶν, τί τί ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίνεται. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἴσως ὄφελος εἰδέναι μὴ τὴν ἀρετὴν. πῶς δὲ ἂν καὶ ἐκ τίνων μὴ ἐκταῖον. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὅπως εἰδήσομεν τί ἐστι σκοπεῖσθαι διῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἐστὶ σκίψασθαι ἅμα γὰρ εἰδῆσαι βουλόμην, καὶ αὐτὰ εἶναι τοιοῦτα. Mag. Moral. p. 1.

2. τὸ πλεῖον] Intellectual virtue is not *entirely* produced by teaching. For some men are born with a greater degree of natural wisdom and genius than others, and have a greater natural aptitude to acquire and perfect these virtues.

4. ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους] καὶ τί διῷ τὰ πολλὰ λέγουσι; καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἦθος ἴσως ἐστὶ πολυχρόνιον καὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ἰθικὰς ἂν τις λίγη, οὐκ ἂν τι πλημμελεῖν δέξωιν. Plutarch. de Liberis Educ. vol. vii. p. 8. ed. Hutten.

The word ἦθος (moral character), is derived from ἴθος (habit), and the ἠθικὰ ἀρετὰς are called ἰθικὰί. But they are very distinct: for the ἴθος is the energy, but the ἦθος is a quality produced by this energy in the moral or pathological (παθητικῆ) part of the soul. It is the end and ἔργον (object) of ἴθος.

The Moral Virtues are not given us by nature. 1. Because they are altered by habit.

2. Because we must perform the acts before we obtain the virtues.

3. And this is proved

ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. Ἐξ οὐ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίξῃ τις ἄνω ρίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. Ἐτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν. τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἅ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μαθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεία ἀνδρεῖοι. Μαρτυρεῖ

3. *οὐθὲν—τῶν φύσει*] The scholiast explains the τὰ τῶν φύσει thus: οὐδ' ἢ τελειότης ἐκ φύσεως περιγίνισται, ἢ σὺμφυτος οὕσα ὡς τῶ λίθῳ ἢ βαρῦτης, ἢ ὕστερον λαμβανόμενῃ ὡς ἢ ἰδίῳ βλάστησις ἢ γενεῖσι. Those things which act naturally (φύσει), either act only, or act and are acted upon. If they act only, from their energy their principle of action is not changed; and

whilst it remains, their inclination to act remains likewise. If they be acted on, unless the effect produced be such as to remove their innate principle of action, that natural inclination still remains. But if they be so acted on that their innate principle of action be entirely removed, they are no longer natural. See Thos. Aquinas, in loc.

δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ by the conduct of legislators. νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τούτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν, ἀμαρτάνουσιν· καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας, ἀγαθὴ φαύλης.

Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται 4. Because Virtue and Vice (opposite effects) are produced from the same efficient cause. πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἱ οἰκοδόμοι

10 καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ

15 τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς

20 ὀργάς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σῶφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἱ δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεισθαι, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι·

6. *ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν*] In nature the same efficient cause cannot produce two opposite effects. But actions do produce two opposite effects; good actions produce virtue, bad actions destroy it; consequently nature is not the efficient cause of moral virtue. To make his argument more plain, Aristotle uses an illustration drawn from

another class of habits, viz. the arts. If the moral virtues are produced and destroyed in the same way as the arts; but the arts, inasmuch as they are produced by energies, are not innate (*οὐ φύσει*); neither therefore are the virtues. See Phys. Ausc. iv. 3.

24. *ἀποδιδόναι*] To perform energies of a certain quality.

κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

CHAP. II.

That moral virtues are habits avoiding excess and defect—that they are perfect when we feel pleasure in exercising them—that their object matter (ἕλη) is pleasure and pain.

What kind of actions produce virtuous habits.

ΕΠΕΙ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας 2
 ἕνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἴν' εἰδῶμεν
 τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἴν' ἀγαθοὶ
 γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαιὸν ἐστὶ σκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς
 πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γὰρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ τοῦ 10
 ποιᾶς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ
 μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν
 καὶ ὑποκείσθω, ῥηθήσεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ,

If then virtue be a habit, and every habit is produced by the repetition of single acts, and as are the acts such are the habits resulting from them ; it is plain that as virtue is a *good* habit, it must be produced by *good* actions.

What then are *good* actions? Till we know this we cannot acquire virtue, or proceed to practise the precepts of this treatise.

Omitting at present the consideration, that they must be done according to right reason, we gather by an in-

duction of several instances, that *good* actions are generally those which avoid excess and defect, and are in a mean ; consequently as the habit is similar to the acts by which it is produced, virtue will be *ἕξις ἐν μέσῳ*. This chapter divides itself into three parts ;

The I. question, is ; From what quality of actions are good habits produced ?

II. How shall we know that we have attained them ?

III. What is the object matter of them ?

- καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. Ἐκείνο δὲ προδιομολογείσθω, ^{Probable reasons ought only to be required in a moral treatise.} ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἶπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἐστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δει δ' αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν.
- 16 Πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ^{1. Actions which avoid excess and defect generally produce good habits.} πέφυκεν ὑπὸ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθειρεσθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὀρώμεν· τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σώζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ

1. *ἰσθίς λόγος*] Which subject is resumed in the sixth Book.

10. *παραγγελίας*] Set of precepts.

16. *ἰδίας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς*] Perhaps Aristotle when introducing this argument had in view the celebrated sentence, written by the seven wise men of Greece, and placed in the temple of Apollo; *μηδὲν ἄγαν*. (See Plato's *Protag.* p. 343. D. Clem. Alex. ii. p. 45.) The merit of the discovery,

however, that virtue is a mean situated between two vices, which are its extremes, appears to be due to the Pythagoreans. Compare Theages de *Virtutibus*: *τῷ μὴ δύνοντι εἶδει δύο· τὸ μὲν ὑπερβολὰ τὸ δὲ ἱλλυψίς. καὶ ἂ μὲν ὑπερβολὰ τὸ πλείον τοῦ δύνοντός ἐστιν· ἂ δ' ἱλλυψίς τὸ ἕλαττον. ἂ δ' ἀρετὰ ἕξις εἰς ἐπὶ τοῦ δύνοντος.* *Frag. Pythag.* p. 32. See also Fran. *Patricii Diss.* *Perip.* p. 271.

ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν· ὃ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὃ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγροῖκοι, ἀναίσθητός τις· φθείρεται γὰρ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σώζεται. Ἄλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αἱ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παλλήν τροφήν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐπιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρείοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

The same actions which produce, are produced by the habits.

1. τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν] *Of the rest of the moral Virtues.* For of the intellectual Virtues there cannot be any excess. But the moral Virtues, consisting of reason and appetite governed by reason, it is the object of philosophy not to expel the appetites, as wholly evil, but to make them subservient to the better purposes of our

nature. The reason is essentially and absolutely good, and cannot therefore be too highly cultivated. The appetite only relatively so, and when in any other state than that of moderation, becomes a positive evil.

6. ἀκόλαστος] *The intemperate: αἱ ἀγροῖκοι, the ascetic.* See c. 6.

Σημείον δὲ δεῖ ποιείσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπι- II. Pleasure and pain the criterion of the perfection of the habits.
 γινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν
 γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῶ
 τούτῳ χαίρων σῶφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος,
 5 καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ
 λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρείος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός.
 Περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ· III. Pleasure and pain the object-matter of Virtue, proved from eight considerations.
 διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ
 δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ
 10 ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν,
 ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ
 ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. Ἔτι δ' εἰ ἀρεταί· 2.
 εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ
 πάσῃ πράξει ἔπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ
 15 τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.
 Μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τού· 3.

7. *περὶ ἡδονῶν*] D. Thomas I. Secundæ Art. 2. Quæst. 60. virtutum circa animi affectum versari dicit dupliciter; vel ut hunc producit actionique suæ habet annexum, vel ut eundem regit, qui est pro subjecta materia. Priore modo dictum est ab Aristotele omnes virtutes morales versari circa voluptatem et dolorem. Quoniam virtutum habitus conformati cognoscuntur ex voluptate quæ actionibus est adjuncta. Posteriore vero virtutes quædam dicuntur versari in regendis actionibus, ut justitia in emptione et venditione, liberalitas in largitione pecuniæ, aliæ in affectibus ut temperantia et continentia. Vid. Jac. Carpentarius in Alcin. Institut. ii. p. 134.

— *ἡδονὰς γὰρ*] Aristotle proves that pleasure and pain are the object-

matter of virtue, by eight reasons. Four of which are derived from considering virtue itself, four from the nature of man. In another Treatise Aristotle thus discusses the same subject: *ἄσασα ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικῶν. αὐταὶ δὲ ἢ ἐν τῷ ἀνάγκῃ, ἢ ἐν τῷ μιμησθαι, ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλατίζεσθαι. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ ἀνάγκῃ παρὰ τὴν αἰσθησὶν εἰσὶ, ἄσασ' ὅσοι αἰσθητοῦ εἶναι κινῶνται. αἱ δ' ἐν τῷ μιμησθαι καὶ τῷ ἐλατίζειν ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰσὶ, ἢ γὰρ εἰς ἴσους μιμησθῆναι ἡδονῶν, ἢ ἐλατίζοντες οἷα μίμουσιν. ἄσασ' ἀνάγκῃ πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἡδονὴν ὅσοι τῶν αἰσθητῶν γίγνεται.* Phys. Ausc. vii. 3. See Mag. Mor. p. 13.

10. *Πλάτων*] See Plato de Leg. p. 653. and Simplicius upon Aristot. Phys. Ausc. f. 149.

των ἰατρείαι γὰρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρείαι διὰ
 4. τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι. Ἔτι, ὡς καὶ
 πρότερον εἴπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὑφ' οἷων
 πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα
 καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ
 λύπας φαῦλαι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ
 φεύγειν, ἢ ἄς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἢ
 ὅσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ
 τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας
 τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς λέγουσιν, 10
 ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα
 ἄλλα προστίθεται. ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι
 ἢ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων
 5. πρακτικῆ, ἢ δὲ κακία τούναντίον. Γένοιτο δ'
 ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ἔτι περὶ τῶν 15
 αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἰρέσεις
 καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς, καλοῦ συμφέροντος

13. πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις] See 55, 6. Every moral habit of the soul derives its complexion from the kind of acts by which it is improved or deteriorated, and employs itself upon them. But these are pleasure and pain; in pursuing pleasure or avoiding pain, when or as we ought not, we acquire vicious habits; in pursuing or avoiding them when and as we ought, we acquire virtuous habits. Virtue moderates and directs the perturbations occasioned by pleasure or pain, hence Virtue was called by the Stoics an apathy or serenity (ἡρέμια). But in that they called it an apathy *absolutely* without reference to a mean, or consideration of different circumstances, this definition is incorrect. Aristotle of course does not

refer to the Stoics who existed not as a sect until a later period, but to opinions disseminated by Socrates, and afterwards adopted by the Stoics and others.

9. ἐρίζονται] The Cynics, from whom the Stoics borrowed this tenet. But he alludes particularly to Speusippus, who according to Clem. Alex. and. (Strom. ii. p. 202.) introduced the word ἀσχλησία afterwards used by the Epicureans. So also Democritus according to Diog. Laert. ix. §. 45. τίλος δὲ εἶναι τὴν εὐθυμίαν, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν οὔσαν τῇ ἡδονῇ ὡς ἴσιν παραποιούσαντες ἐξιδέξαντο, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἣν γαληνῶς καὶ εὐσταθῶς ἡ ψυχὴ διάγει, ὑπὸ μηδενὸς παραταραχῆς φόβου ἢ δυσδαιμονίας ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς πάθους. See Michelet in loco.

ἡδέος, καὶ τριῶν τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ
 λυπηροῦ, περὶ πάντα μὲν ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορ-
 θωτικός ἐστὶν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικός, μάλιστα
 δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν· κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς
 5 ζώοις, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακο-
 λουθεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ
 φαίνεται. Ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέ- 6.
 θραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ
 πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. Κανονίζομεν 7.
 10 δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δ' ἦττον,
 ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ· διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
 περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ
 μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ
 λυπεῖσθαι. Ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μά- 8.
 15 χεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, περὶ
 δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ
 ἀρετῇ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ
 διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγ-
 ματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 20 εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, ὁ δὲ κακῶς
 κακός. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετῇ περὶ ἡδονᾶς
 καὶ λύπας, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων
 καὶ αὔξεται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων,
 καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ,
 25 εἰρήσθω.

15. Ἡράκλειτος] ἴσκει δὲ καὶ Ἡρά-
 κλειτος λίγην εἰς τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῦ θυμοῦ
 βλέψας, ὅτι λυπηρὰ ἢ καίως αὐτοῦ
 χαλεπὸν γὰρ. φησι, θυμῷ μάχισθαι Eth.

Eud. ii. 7. Aristot. Pol. v. 10. See
 also Plutarch, περὶ ἀρετῆς. ix. p.
 434. Hutten.

CHAP. III.

The distinction between doing *virtuous acts* and doing *virtuously*.

Objection. ΑΠΟΡΗΣΕΙΕ δ' ἂν τις, πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ 3
 τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ
 δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ
 δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ
 σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μου- 5
 σικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. Ἡ οὐδ' ἐπὶ
 τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμ-
 ματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου
 ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἔαν
 καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς· 10
 τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικὴν.
 Ἔτι οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν
 ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα
 τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα
 γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ 15
 ἔαν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔαν ὁ πράττων πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον
 μὲν ἔαν εἰδῶς, ἔπειτ' ἔαν προαιρούμενος, καὶ
 προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ ἔαν
 βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ· ταῦτα 20
 δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συνα-

Answer :
 that even
 in the arts
 we require
 somewhat
 more than
 the thing
 produced,
 to prove a
 man an
 artist.

2. The cases
 are not
 similar.

It was said (p. 58), that by doing brave actions men *become* brave, and by doing temperate actions, temperate, and by doing just actions, just. But it may be asked; how can it be said that he who desires to become just, must do just actions? In another class of habits, the arts, he who produces a good piece of mecha-

nism is a mechanic, and he who can play the harp is an harper, we say, without any reference to his *ξῆς*. To this objection Aristotle replies, by showing that they are not parallel cases: for in the arts we look only to the excellence of the thing produced, but in virtuous actions, almost entirely to the disposition of the agent.

ριθμείται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλακίς πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται. Τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ἢ τοιαῦτα οἶα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ σώφρονες πράττουσιν. εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὁμοίον τι ποιῶντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' οὐθὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἔξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, 20 οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφούντες.

The previous conclusion resumed.

2. τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι] καὶ γὰρ ἰδιόχρεια μὴδὲν ἀπειρίως περὶ ἀρετῆς ἰσχυρῶν εἰδέναι σπουδαῖοι εἶναι. Paraph.

5. εὖ οὖν λέγεται] Cicero giving a short analysis of the doctrines of the old Academy and Peripatetics, (nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academicam differebat,) thus describes their doctrine of moral virtue. "Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi consuetudinem (*ἥθος*): quam partim exercitationis assiduitate, partim ratione formabant; in quibus erat philosophia ipsa. in qua quod inchoatum est neque absolutum progressio que-

dam ad virtutem appellatur: quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturæ." Acad. i. 5.

5. δίκαια πράττειν] Although the acts done previous to the acquirement of the habit be not only imperfect, but also spring from unworthy motives, they may still lead to a perfect habit, and then the habit produces the perfect act. See Butler's Remarks upon the assertion of Lord Shaftesbury, that acts of obedience springing from selfishness only generate habits of selfishness. Analogy, i. 5.

CHAP. IV.

Virtue is either *πάθος*, *δύναμις*, or *ἔξις*—it is neither *πάθος* nor *δύναμις*, (for we are not praised according to them, but we are according to Virtue,)—and therefore it is *ἔξις*.

The Genus
of Virtue
investi-
gated.
Virtue, not
πάθος.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεν. 4
ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί, πάθη
δυνάμεις ἔξεις, τούτων ἅν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. Λέγω
δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν, ὀργήν, φόβον, θράσος,
φθόνον, χαράν, φιλίαν, μῖσος, πόθον, ζῆλον, 5

After having thus proved that the virtues are not implanted in us by nature, but are acquired by the repetition of certain actions, and having shown what those actions are, next how we may understand when we have attained the virtues, and upon what object-matter those virtues are employed; Aristotle now proceeds to discover the definition of Virtue. This order of treating the subject was necessary; for if the opinion of some, that virtue is innate, had not been refuted in the outset, the definition which Aristotle presently gives of virtue (*ἔξις προαιρετική*) would be vain and nugatory.

We proceed therefore to discover first the *genus* of Moral Virtue. Now since the virtues of the soul are in the soul, and the Moral Virtues in the moral or appetitive part of the soul, and since pleasure and pain are the object matter upon which they are employed, it will be necessary to consider what those faculties are in the moral part of the soul, which are at all concerned with pleasure and pain. There are three, *πάθη*, *δυνάμεις*, *ἔξις*.

Pleasure and pain follow the *πάθη*.—the *δυνάμεις* are the capabilities of being affected by the *πάθη*, consequently by pleasure and pain,—the *ἔξις* are those by which we are well or ill disposed to them, and consequently well or ill disposed in reference to pleasure and pain; Virtue is neither of the former, consequently it is the latter.

2. *εἴρια*] Compare Plutarch de Virt. Morali. c. 4. (Vol. ix. p. 399. Ed. Hutten): *εἴρια γὰρ δὲ ταῦτά φασι εἶναι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχοντα, δύναμις, πάθος, ἔξις. ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ἀρχὴ καὶ ὕλη τοῦ πάθους, αἶον ἐργιλιότης, αἰσχρὸν σημία, θαρραλιότης. τὸ δὲ πάθος κίνησις τις ἢ δὴ τῆς δυνάμειος ἐξ ἴσου ἐργιλιότης. καμία μὲν ἂν φαύλωι, ἀριστὸν δὲ ἂν καλῶι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου σαιδαγωγῆται τὸ πάθος. According to Giphanius, Aristotle enumerates only *πάθος*, *δύναμις*, and *ἔξις*, because as Virtue is a quality and these three with form (*σχῆμα*), which pertains only to material things, are the only species of quality, consequently Virtue must be one or more of these. See Categ. c. vi. (Ed. Tauch.)*

ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη, δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι, ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ 5 κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τάλλα. πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὔθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ 10 τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα 15 ἢ ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαι πῶς. 20 Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. καὶ

Virtue not δύναμις.

19. διακίεσθαι πῶς] Virtue is an affection by which we are disposed or conformed (διακίεσθαι) in a certain manner. Virtue is not however a disposition (διάθεσις), but a habit (ἔξις). In what way διάθεσις differs from ἔξις Aristotle thus explains in his Categories, cap. vi. (p. 48. ed. Tauchn.) διαφέρει δὲ ἔξις διαθέσει τῷ χρονιώτερον εἶναι καὶ μοιμώτερον τοιαῦτα δὲ αἱ εἰσι πισισθῆναι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί· ἥτις γὰρ πισισθήναι δοκεῖ τῶν παραμοιμωτέρων εἶναι

καὶ δυσκινήτων. — διαθέσις δὲ λέγονται ἃ εἰσὶν ἐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα· εἶον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης, καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. διάκειται μὲν γὰρ πῶς κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει, ἐκ θερμῶς ψυχρὸς γινόμενος, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιάνειν εἰς τὸ νοσεῖν.

20. δύναμις] Capacities of feeling, or being acted upon. In which the present use of the term differs from that of p. 5, and elsewhere.

ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν ἔσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἵπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. Εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξις αὐτὰς εἶναι. ὃ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἢ ἀρετῇ, εἴρηται. 5

Virtue is
ἕξις.

CHAP. V.

That Virtue is a habit in a mean (ἡ μισότητι) relative to ourselves.

The Differ-
entia of
Virtue in-
vestigated.

ΔΕΙ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ 5
καὶ ποία τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετῇ, οὐδ' ἂν ἢ ἀρετῇ, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἢ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον 10 αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὀρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετῇ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μείναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετῇ 15

Having thus discovered the *Genus* of Virtue, it remains to investigate the *Differentia*. Now considering *ἀρετῇ* in its widest sense, we say, it is that which must produce good *ἔργα*; but good *ἔργα*, as we have said before (p. 57), are those which avoid excess and defect; therefore virtue, since every *ἕξις* reproduces the same *ἔργα* by which it was produced, (p. 58), must be a habit avoiding excess and defect, or *ἕξις ἡ μισότητι*.

II. Virtue is of the more difficult, the mean is the more difficult; therefore Virtue is of the mean.

But the mean is of two kinds, the absolute and relative which is the mean to us; and this is the mean which Moral Virtue aims at. Therefore Virtue is *ἕξις ἡ μισότητι πρὸς ἡμᾶς*.

12. *ἀρετῇ*] The reader must again be cautioned not to apply the restricted signification of *moral* Virtue to this term. The meaning of the word is well expressed by Cicero, de *Legibus* l. 8. "Est autem virtus nihil aliud, quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura." This is a literal translation of Aristotle. See n. p. 26, 3.

εἷη ἂν ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ
 ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. πῶς δὲ τοῦτ'
 ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται
 φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις
 5 αὐτῆς. Ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ ἐστὶ The mean of
two kinds,
absolute
and rela-
tive.
 λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον,
 καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς
 τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως.
 λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον
 10 ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ταῦτὸν
 πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε
 ἐλλείπει. τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἓν, οὐδὲ ταῦτὸν πᾶσιν,
 οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἕξ
 μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ
 15 ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται, τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ
 κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς
 ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μυαῖ
 φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτῃς ἕξ μυᾶς
 προστάξει· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ
 20 ληφομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ
 δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ
 δρόμου καὶ πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν
 ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἐλλείψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ
 μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ
 25 τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Εἰ δὴ Virtue aims
at the rela-
tive mean.
 πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς

5. συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ] Discrete or continuous. Of the former are numbers; of the latter are lines, surfaces and solids.

26. ἐπιστήμη] This is an argument a minori. If every art, which is infe-

rior to virtue, aims at the mean, and performs its *ergon* well by looking to that mean, much more will virtue, which is superior to every art, do the same; as also does nature. Nature is superior to art, for art imitates nature;

τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα
 (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργους
 ὅτι οὐτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς
 μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ
 εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σωζούσης), οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ 5
 τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργά-
 ζονται, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα
 καὶ ἀμείνων ἔστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου
 ἂν εἴη στοχαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν· αὕτη
 γὰρ ἔστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις 10
 ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἶον
 καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ
 ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὄλωσ' ἠσθῆναι καὶ
 λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, καὶ ἀμφο-
 τερα οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς 15
 οὓς καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον,
 ὅπερ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς
 πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλειψις καὶ τὸ
 μέσον. ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἔστιν,
 ἐν οἷς ἢ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἢ ἐλλειψις 20
 ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται·
 ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἔστιν
 ἢ ἀρετῆ, στοχαστικὴ γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου.

Virtue is of the mean because it is more difficult.

Ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπειρίου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον, τὸ δ' 25

but virtue is still better, for it is the perfection of nature, nature itself capable of obtaining its proper end.

The word *ισοτιμία* is sometimes used by Aristotle to denote an art as well as a science.

9. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν] Moral virtue only aims at the mean, and

not the Intellectual. For it is not required in Intellectual virtue that we should understand but moderately, and avoid excess in knowledge. See p. 58. n.

25. Πυθαγόρειοι] See the *συνοχία* of the Pythagoreans, quoted above, p. 17, 7. n.

ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπὸν, ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν. καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἢ δὺπερβολῆ καὶ ἢ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἢ μεσότης·
 “ ἔσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.”

*Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικῆ, ἐν μεσό-
 τῆτι οὔσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ Complete definition of Virtue.
 ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν,
 10 τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν·
 καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν
 τοῦ δέοντος ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι,
 τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὐρίσκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσ-
 θαι. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν
 15 τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ, κατὰ

2. χαλεπὸν] ἴσως γὰρ. ὃ Σώ-
 κρηταις, τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθὲς, ὅτι χα-
 λιστὰ τὰ καλὰ. Plato, de Rep.
 p. 435.

6. ἰσθλοί] Cujus poetæ versus sit
 nescitur: Zwingero et Giphanio vide-
 tur esse Theognidis. ZELL.

12. πάθεισι—πράξεσιν.] The object
 matter of some moral virtues are pas-
 sions, of others, actions. See the divi-
 sion in the succeeding chapter.

14. κατὰ—τὴν οὐσίαν] Virtue is
 both a mean and an extreme. A
 mean if you look to its essence and
 definition (κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν
 λόγον σὺν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα), but an
 extreme if you look to its excellence
 and its quality.

15. τί ἦν εἶναι] Quum fixæ et
 constantis Aristotelis dicendi formulæ
 τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι s. τὸ τί ἦν mentio inci-
 derit, liceat mihi occasione oblata ita
 uti, ut, quod in hoc dicendi modo ob-

scurum videatur, paucis illustrem.
 Quæritur, quæ tandem in hac dictione
 propria sit formæ imperfecti ἦν ratio
 et conditio? Omni linguæ usui facile
 aptius putaveris τὸ τί ἴσται. Sed disertis
 verbis Aristotelis alterum ab altero
 discernit, Metaphys. vii. 4. Z. p. 134.
 Brand. διὸ καὶ οὖν ἴσται τὸ λεγόμενον
 φανερόν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἰμοίως ὑπάρξει
 πρώτως μὲν καὶ ἀπλῶς τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἴστα
 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄσσει καὶ τὸ τί ἴσται
 οὐχ ἀπλῶς τί ἦν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ποσῶ ἢ
 ποσῶ τί ἦν εἶναι. (Illius τὸ τί ἴσται ex-
 empla v. Metaph. vii. 9. Z. p. 144.
 xiii. 4. p. 266. Brand.) E loco lau-
 dato intelligitur, τὸ τί ἴσται ab Aris-
 totele severius adstringi ad rationem,
 quale quid sit vel quantum sit, ut τὸ τί
 ἦν generalius et totius dicatur. Quod
 discrimen quomodo inest his formis
 inter se diversis (ἴσται—ἦν)? Fortasse
 Aristoteles propterea imperfectum τὸ
 τί ἦν elegit, quod οὐσία, forma, in qua

Some ac-
tions and
passions
never admit
of a mean.

δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. Οὐ πᾶσα
δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσό-
τητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα
μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἀναι-
σχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία⁵
κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα ψέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ
αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν
οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' αἰ
ἀμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ¹⁰
τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἦν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν,
ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὅτιοῦν τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν
ἐστίν. ὅμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν
καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα
καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω¹⁵
γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης καὶ ὑπερ-
βολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως. ὥσπερ
δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή

hoc ἐν τῷ ἦν positum est, ante mate-
riam et prior menti informatur. Unde
ἐν τῷ ἦν proprie illud, quod res esset,
si a materia secretum et per se pone-
retur abstractum. Etsi hanc explica-
tionem Platonis ideas quodammodo
olere judicaveris, egregie tamen pro-
batur loco Aristotelis Metaph. vii. 7.
Z. p. 140. Brand. *ἄσται συμβαίνοι σφό-*
πον τινὰ τὴν ὑγιάν ἐξ ὑγιάν γίνεσθαι
καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐξ οἰκίας. τῆς ἄνευ ὕλης
τὴν ἔχουσαν ὕλην· ἢ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ ἴσσι
καὶ οἰκοδομικὴ τὰ εἶδος τῆς ὑγιάν καὶ
τῆς οἰκίας. λίγω δ' οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ
εἶ ἦν εἶναι. Cf. vii. 7. Z. p. 139. Br.
Trendelenburg l. l. p. 41.

1. οὐ πᾶσα—πρᾶξις] Having ob-
served that we ought to aim at the

mean in all our actions, Aristotle sub-
joins, in order that men may not con-
tinue in vice, through pretence of
aiming at a mean in it, that not all
actions admit of a mean, but some
are always extremes, whether followed
more or less, and consequently always
culpable. Of this he brings several
instances. Were it not so, he ob-
serves, we should be reduced to this
absurdity, that there would be an ex-
cess of defect, and a defect of excess.
For, if there is a mean of excess, there
is also a defect of excess, and the re-
verse. And so likewise would there
be an excess and defect of that which
has no excess and defect, that is, the
mean. Which is absurd.

καὶ ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πως ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδὲ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν πράττηται ἀμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἐστίν, οὐτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις.

CHAP. VI.

An application of this general principle to particular instances.

7 ΔΕΙ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ^{In AC-TIONS.} ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κενώτεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροί·
 10 περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. Περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ^{i. ἀδρεία.} ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν ^{i. θρασύτης.} ^{ii. δουλ.} τῇ ἀφοβία ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα),
 15 ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δὲ τῷ

6. καθόλου] In the Politics, Aristotle thus uses this term: *ἄλλοι δὲ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπισκοπεῖσι· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λίγοντες ἕκαστων ἰκανοὺς.* i. 5. (p. 24. ed. Goett.)

9. κενώτερον] Too vague for practical purposes. Aristotle says it is not sufficient to give a mere abstract definition of virtue, but we must apply the definition to particulars. For in moral science particulars have a greater weight and more influence on the mind than universals; for universals appear to derive their certainty from

particulars, and moral science is intended for practice which turns upon particulars. We must therefore descend and apply our definition to each single virtue, that the nature of them may be more clearly understood, and the definition confirmed by those instances which appeal directly to the senses.

10. *ἴσι—συμφωνεῖν*] It is necessary to apply it to particulars, and shew that it agrees with them.

12. *διαγραφῆς*] A diagram or delineation; such as he gives in the subsequent books.

In AC-
TIONS. μὲν φοβείσθαι ὑπερβάλλον τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλεί-
 2. σωφροσύνη. πων δειλός. Περὶ ἡδονᾶς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὐ
 i. ἀκολασία.
 ii. Anon. πάσας, ἦττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας, μεσότης
 μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλεί-
 ποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· 5
 διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι,
 ἕστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. Περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρη-
 μάτων καὶ λήψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερ-
 βολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία.
 ἐναντίως δ' ἑαυταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· 10
 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν
 δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει
 ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν
 τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν, ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ
 τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν 15
 διορισθήσεται. Περὶ δὲ τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι
 4. μεγαλο-
 φρέπεια.
 i. βαναυσία.
 ii. μικροπρέ-
 πεια. διαθέσεις εἰσὶ, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ
 μεγαλοπρεπῆς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ
 ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέ- 20
 πεια· διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευ-
 θεριότητα, πῆ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ρηθήσεται.
 5. μεγαλο-
 ψυχία.
 i. χαυνότης.
 ii. μικρο-
 ψυχία. Περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγα-
 λοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη,
 ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία· Ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν 25
 6. Anon.
 i. φιλοτιμία.
 ii. ἀφιλο-
 τιμία. πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ
 μικρὰ διαφέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν
 μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ

4. σωφροσύνη] This and its opposite habit is considered at greater length in the Seventh Book. See also iii. 7.

15. ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον] See iv. 1.

22. ὕστερον ρηθήσεται] See iv. 2.

περὶ μικρὰν οὔσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι ^{In AC-}
 τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἤττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ ^{TIONS.}
 μὲν ὑπερβάλλον ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δ'
 ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώ-
 5 νυμοὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου
 φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροὶ τῆς μέσης
 χώρας. καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον
 φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ
 ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δ'
 10 ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο
 ποιούμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ρηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ περὶ
 τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑψηγημένον τρόπον.
 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργῆν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ^{7. Anon.}
 καὶ μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν ^{i. ὀργιλότης.}
^{ii. ἀοργησία.}
 15 τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα
 καλέσομεν· τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλον
 ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀργιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
 ἀοργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία. ^{Εἰσὶ} ^{8. ἀλήθεια.}
^{i. ἀλαζονεία.}
^{ii. ἀοργησία.}
 20 ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' ἀλλήλων·
 πᾶσαι μὲν γὰρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοι-
 νωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔστι περὶ τάληθές
 τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν
 ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ρητέον
 25 οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν
 πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὐτ' ὀρθὰ
 οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τού-

6. [ἐπιδικάζονται] Comparatio est a fundis seu possessionibus vacantibus sumpta; nam ut in vacuum fundum viam utrimque invadere et occupare

student ita et nomen locumque medi hujus nomine vacantis occupare student extremi. GIPH.

11. [ἠθίσιται] See iv. 3.

In AC-
TIONS.

των τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα· πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἔνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθές ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθῆς τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησης ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ 5 μείζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων. Περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ

9. εὐτρα-
πελία.
i. βωμολο-
χία.
ii. ἀγροικία.

διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀγροϊ-10 κός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία. Περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν

10. φιλία.
i. ἀφίσπεια
στ καλακία.
ii. δυσκολία.

ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὦν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα, ἄρεσκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδῆς δύσερίς τις καὶ 15 δύσκολος.

In PAS-
SIONS.1. αἰδώς.
i. κατὰ-
σπληξ.
ii. ἀναί-
σχυστία.

Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδώς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλ- λων, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ, ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' 20 ἐλλείπων ἢ ὁ μηδὲ ὄλως ἀναίσχυντος· ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων.

2. νέμεσις.
i. φθόνος.
ii. ἐπιχαι-
ρεκακίας.

Νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπι- χαιρεκακίας. εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εἰς 25 πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. ἀλλὰ

20. ὁ καταπλήξ] οὔτε ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ
ἐν παντὶ καὶ πάντως εὐλαβηθήσεται.22. νέμεσις] See the Rhetoric,
ii. 9.

Mag. Mor. i. 30.

περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐρούμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἁρετῶν.

CHAP. VII.

That the Virtues and Vices are in mutual opposition.

8 ΤΡΙΩΝ δὲ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, The mean and extremes in mutual opposition. τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαι ἀντίκεινται πῶς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις
 10 ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέσῃ ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλαττον μείζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μείζον ἔλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν.
 16 ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρείος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν

2. δικαιοσύνης] See the Fifth Book.

3. πῶς μεσότητος] See v. 7. near the end.

4. λογικῶν] In the Sixth Book.

10. ἰσωνίας] Correctly speaking, one thing only can be opposed to one thing, as white to black, and this is

called absolute opposition. White is opposed to grey, black, brown, &c. by another kind of opposition; called by the logicians, *oppositio secundum quid*, according to which the extremes are opposed to the mean. On this subject see the Categories, Chap. viii.

ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἐκάτερος πρὸς ἐκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρείον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον.

The opposition between extremes greater than between the mean and extremes.

Some extremes more opposed to the mean than others. 1. From the nature of the things themselves.

Οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείων ἢ ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου. Ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτία πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης. τὰ δὲ πλείστον ἀπέχοντα ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὀρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλείον ἀπέχοντα. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἢ ἔλλειψις ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἢ ὑπερβολὴ οἷον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἢ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὐσα, ἀλλ' ἢ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὐσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνη οὐχ ἢ ἀνασθησία ἐνδεια οὐσα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὐσα. διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄντικεινον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον

3. ἐπὶ ἀνδρείῳ] "Timidus vocat se cautum parcum sordidus." Ter.

7. πορρωτέρω—ἀφίστησιν] Some extremes are further from the mean than others; and this for two reasons.

Either because they have naturally less resemblance and are further from the nature of the mean; or because our appetites are more inclined to them.

δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλείον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. Μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ 2. From the
 πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ disposition
 5 γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον of mea to-
 ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἶον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον wards them.
 πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκατάφοροί
 ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιό-
 τητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς
 10 ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ
 ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὕσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ
 σωφροσύνη.

CHAP. VIII.

Recapitulation of the whole Book.

9 ΟΤΙ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, Recapitula-
 καὶ πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' tion.
 15 ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη
 ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν
 τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἰκανῶς εἴρηται. διὸ
 καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἐκάστῳ γὰρ
 τὸ μεσὸν λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἶον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ
 20 παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργι-
 σθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ράδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον
 καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ᾧ, καὶ ὅσον, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ οὐ
 ἔνεκα, καὶ ὡς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ράδιον· διόπερ

10. ἐπίδοσις] Our inclination is late this term by the word incrementum, greater. Some writers, however, trans- progressio. See Plato de Leg. p. 676.

τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν. διὸ
 δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν
 ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου καθάπερ καὶ ἡ
 Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ “ τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύμα- 5
 τος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε νῆα” τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν
 ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον, τὸ δ' ἦττον. ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ
 μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν, κατὰ τὸν δευτέρον
 φασὶ πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν
 τοῦτο δ' ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν
 λέγομεν. Σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἅ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατά- 10
 φοροὶ ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν.
 τοῦτο δ' ἔσται γνῶριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς
 λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς τούναντίον
 δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπαγαγόντες
 τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἤξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ 15
 διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. ἐν
 παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν
 ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ
 οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην,

General
 rules for at-
 taining the
 mean.

3. τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου] *From the further extreme.*

4. Καλυψὼ] Supposed to be an oversight for Circe. See Hom. Od. xii. 108, and 219.

7. τὸν διότερον πλοῦν] Plato likewise uses this proverb in the Philebus, p. 19. See Stallb. *ibid.* διότερος δ' εἶναι πλοῦς δεκτὴ μὴ λαθάνειν αὐτὸν αὐτόν. The Scholiast upon the Phædon (Bekk. p. 381.) thus explains it: *παροιμία διότερος πλοῦς ἐστὶ τῶν ἀσφαλῶς τι πρατίντων, παρ' ἧσιν οἱ διαμαρτάνοντες κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον πλοῦν ἀσφαλῶς παρακινεῖσθαι τὸν διότερον.*

18. ἀδίκαστοι] *Translatum est verbum a forensibus judiciis. Nam hæc*

corrumpere qui conabantur ñ decuriis judicium aliquid polliceri atque largiri solebant; quæ erat decuratio quædam, id est, distinctio judicium aut tributum ad dandam pecuniam emendaque suffragia. CAM.

19. Ἑλένη] Hom. Il. iii. 156.

οὐ νόμισις Τρωῶς καὶ ἰωνήμιας Ἀχαιῶς

τοῖδ' ἀμφὶ γυναῖκι πλοῦν χρεῖος ἔλγεια πάσχαυ

αἰῶς ἀθανάτησι θεῆσι εἰς ἴσα ἵσταν

ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς τοῖα σὺν ἰούσ' ἐν νηυσὶ νίσθω

μηδ' ἡμῖν εἰκίσει τ' ἐπόσω τῆμα λίπυνο.

τούτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν,
 καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω
 γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἦττον ἀμαρτησόμεθα.
 ταῦτ' οὖν ποιῶντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν,
 5 μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν. **Χα-** To give
 λεπὸν δ' ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' exact rules
 ἕκαστον· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον διορίσαι πῶς καὶ τίσι not pos-
 καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ sible.
 γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὅτε μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν
 10 καὶ πράους φαμέν, ὅτε δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας
 ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦμεν. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ
 εὖ παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον
 οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἦττον, ὁ δὲ πλεόν· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ
 λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς
 15 οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο
 οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ'
 ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσει. τὸ μὲν ἄρα
 τοσοῦτο δῆλον ὅτι ἡ μέση ἕξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετή,
 ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὅτε
 20 δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾶστα τοῦ μέσου
 καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.

6. ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον] In particular cases. The senses only take cognizance of individual acts, and as these cannot be reduced under one

unvarying rule, they will not admit of the certainty of Science.

11. τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων] Compare iv. 5, near the end.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK III.



HAVING thus far considered the nature of moral virtue, Aristotle now proceeds to the investigation of a question which had occupied the attention not only of the poet and philosophers^a in the early periods of Greek literature, but had also lately been revived with fresh energy, and occupied a prominent part in the discourses of Socrates, and the dialogues of Plato. Socrates had asserted that Vice is the mere result of ignorance, and that no one acts viciously, except against his will and from want of knowledge. A doctrine which might have been expected from one who asserted that the Virtues are sciences, that pure reason is the type of all that is excellent, that nothing done without reason is good, nothing with it is bad. Thus he argues: πάντας γὰρ οἶμαι προαιρουμένους ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἃ ἂν οἴωνται συμφοράτατα αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ταῦτα πράττειν. νομίζω οὖν τοὺς μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντας οὔτε σοφοὺς οὔτε σώφρονας εἶναι. ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι. τὰ τε γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πάντα ὅσα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι· καὶ οὔτ' ἂν τοὺς ταῦτα εἰδότες ἄλλο ἀντὶ τούτων οὐδὲν προελέσθαι, οὔτε τοὺς μὴ ἐπιστάμενους δύνασθαι πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν ἀμαρτάνειν. οὕτω καὶ τὰ καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ τοὺς μὲν σοφοὺς πράττειν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ σοφοὺς οὐ δύνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν ἀμαρτάνειν. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ τε δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄλλα καλὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἀρετῇ πράττεται, δῆλον εἶναι ὅτι καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πᾶσα ἀρετὴ σοφία ἐστὶ". And again, in the Gorgias, he endeavours to show that the wicked man does not act as he *will*, but as he thinks to be best^c, that the

^a See a discussion upon this subject in the Pythagorean fragments in Gale's *Opuscula Mythol.* p. 47.

^b Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 4. Compare

Arist. Eth. vi. 10. near the end.

^c οὐδὲν γὰρ σκεῖν ἂν βούλοινται, ὡς ἴσως ἰστέιν σκεῖν μῖνται ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δέξῃ βίβηταισιν εἶναι. Gorg. 466. E.

will is universally directed towards good; that the exercise of virtuous habits is voluntary, since the reason is unimpeded and the principles of action free; but that vice is altogether involuntary; as much as the actions of the body which are influenced by a disease which impedes and clogs its natural energies^d.

That the will in its natural, that is, its perfect state, is invariably towards good, Aristotle appears to concede^e, but it by no means follows that every wicked action must necessarily be involuntary, or that the deterioration of the will is not self-caused. Men do on their own confession act contrary to conviction; they do submit to have their reason mastered by their desires, and submit themselves *deliberately* to such subjection. And they do all this knowing the effects which must be consequently brought upon themselves by such actions, that every evil act places them in a less advantageous position for the resisting of evil, and of distinguishing between virtue and vice, depraves the will, and eventually renders it incapable of exertion towards good. But then such persons have *voluntarily* submitted to lose this freedom, and having been perfect masters of all the single steps which led to this state must be considered voluntary agents. And even granting the assumption made by Socrates, that he who pursues vice or performs a vicious act does so from want of knowledge, from not being able to see how much more Virtue is his real interest and eventually a greater good, it still remains to be enquired how far he has been and is the author of his own ignorance. For if from carelessness or from any other cause he has brought upon

^d De Legib. ix. The principal sources of information upon this subject are, Xenophon's Memorab. i. 2, 49. iii. 95. iv. 2, 22, and 31. Plato's Protagor. p. 352. sq. Gorg. p. 468. B. 509. E. Hipp. Min. 374. Phæd. p. 68. The entire dialogue of the Menon and De Legibus, p. 860. sq.

^e ἄρα φανίον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλευτὸν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, ἐκείνου δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἐπινοοῦμαι τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ φησὶν τὸ τυχόν, ἴσως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακριμένοις ὀγκυνέ εἶναι τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα εἶναι, τοῖς δ' ἐπινοοῦσι ἴτιμα. iii. 4.

himself a degree of blindness so as not to be able fairly to weigh and appreciate the difference of good and evil, and so consequently pursues evil as a greater good, he is nevertheless a voluntary agent^f. For most if not all men are by nature endowed with capacities sufficient for such discrimination, and with a natural bias towards good^g; nor are these lost except from our own fault. That men, under the influence of temptation, suffer a temporary dereliction of knowledge, may be the case, but then it is their own fault to be so influenced by temptation; for nothing from without can tempt a man, unless there be something from within to correspond to that temptation to render him susceptible of impressions from it^h. And over these inward feelings he has almost unlimited control, otherwise he must ever be tempted alike by the same objects; which self-denial, if he has omitted to acquire, he has himself to blame if, having let slip the opportunities of acquiring it, when the time of temptation arrives he sinks under its influence. And this is evident from the general sense and conduct of mankind, who punish those who break the laws without stopping to consider whether they have had the means of knowing or capacity of obeying those laws, as taking it for granted that they ought to have had and consequently could have acquired themⁱ.

This book then is divided into the following parts. In the 1st chapter Aristotle considers the nature of the Voluntary and Involuntary generally. In the 2d, the principle of Moral Action, or *προαίρεσις*. In the 3d, of Deliberation, which is antecedent to *προαίρεσις*, and which is employed upon the means. In the 4th, of Will,

^f εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῦν τις κρᾶττον ἢ δὴ ἴσται ἄδικον, ἰκὸν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν ἰὼν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ἂν κἀνάσσει. iii. 5.

^g πᾶσι γὰρ δοκῶ ἴκανα τῶν ἡδῶν ὑπέχειν φύσει. vi. 10. Compare also x. 2. καὶ ἐν τοῖς φασίλοις ἰστί τι φωνικὸν ἀγαθὸν κριτέον ἢ κατ' αὐτά, ἰ ἰφίεται τοῦ οὐκ αἰσίου ἀγαθοῦ. These are

the same as the opinions of Socrates, and probably were derived from him.

^h See Butler's Analogy i. 4. Compare also p. 89, 2. γιγίσκει δὲ ἐν αἰτιῶσθαι τὰ ἰστίς, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὸν αἰσθητοῦ ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων.

ⁱ See this point fully discussed in vii. 3.

which is antecedent to deliberation, and is directed to ends. In the 5th, how far man is a voluntary agent in the formation of his good and evil habits. And in the remainder of the book, how far his general definition is applicable to particular instances.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. III.

CHAP. I.

Of Voluntary and Involuntary Actions.

ΤΗΣ ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθῃ τε καὶ πράξει
οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκούσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ
ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκούσίοις συγ-
γνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ

Involuntary
actions proceed either
from compulsion or
ignorance.

In the second Book Aristotle after explaining the Genus of Virtue, (Chap. 4.) by investigating its origin and its efficient cause, (Chaps. 1. 2.) completed his definition, (Chap. 5.) and explained several other questions necessary for a clearer understanding of its nature. In this third Book he proceeds to the discussion of each of the virtues singly; more fully describing those parts he had briefly touched before, in order that our knowledge of virtue and of the nature of the Chief Good, which is the end and aim of his treatise, may be perfect and complete. But before he can proceed to this part of his inquiry, it is necessary to resolve certain doubts and to meet certain objections which would be immediately raised against his definition of Virtue. For it may

be asked, how far he is correct in stating that Virtue is in our power, that it depends upon our actions, that it is ἕξις προαιρετική. p. 69. To answer these objections he branches out into a somewhat wider field of investigation in order to grapple with that much disputed question, so prominent in the mythology, poetry, history and philosophy of his nation, the necessity or spontaneity of human actions; accurately describing and defining the nature of the Voluntary and Involuntary, before he speaks directly of προαιρέσεις.

Ἐπειδὴ οὖν φαίνεται ἡμῖν ὅτι τὸ σπουδαῖον εἶναι, ἀναγκαῖον τὸ μὴ τὰ ταῦτα εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ ἐκούσιου, τί ἴσται τὸ ἐκούσιον; τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσται τὸ πυριώτατον κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, τὸ ἐκούσιον. Mag. Mor. p. 19.

ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι ταῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. δοκεῖ δὲ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα.

The compulsory defined.

Βίαιον δὲ οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὐσα ἐν ἧ δὲ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσει ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες.

The difficulties respecting mixed actions (partly voluntary partly involuntary) explained.

Ἔοσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος προστάττει αἰσχροῦ τι πράξει κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ 10 πράξαντος μὲν σώζονται, μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκουσιν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἐκούσια. τοιοῦτον δὲ τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἀπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἐκῶν, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' 15 αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἅπαντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, εἰκόασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκουσίους· αἰρεται γάρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν. καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, 20

1. *ἴσως*] There is some difficulty in this term. The Greek Scholiast thinks that Aristotle does not question whether it is necessary or not to define the nature of the *voluntary* or *involuntary*; but whether it is necessary at this point of the investigation. He therefore understands *ἴσως*, with this sense: perhaps it is necessary before we proceed further, before we complete our definition of Virtue, and what we have to say about it. Probably the word is here used merely to avoid an appearance of dogmatism, of which Aristotle is very cautious; even

in those points where his reasoning is most conclusive. See x. 1.

7. *ἀβίαι ἴσως*] *Stronger than ourselves.*

19. *εἰ δὲ εἴλες*] At the time when the action was done, the agents were voluntary, they could either throw their goods overboard, or they could forbear. And the nature of the action is to be determined, according to what it was at the time it was doing; the end of every action is at that time. It is then done and finished, nothing subsequent can alter its nature, or make it spontaneous or otherwise.

ὅτε πράττει, λεκτέον. πράττει δὲ ἐκῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν· ὧν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μὴ. ἐκούσια δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο καθ' αὐτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. Ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχρὸν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν· ἂν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχισθ' ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου. Ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἢ μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομεῖναι. Ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανεῖόν παθόντι τὰ δευότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα

7. *ἰσὶ ταῖς πράξεσι*] It sometimes happens that the authors of those actions which are called mixed are *praised* for their conduct; when, for instance, they suffer some great indignity or pain for the attainment of a great and noble object. On the contrary they are *blamed* if rather than incur pain they endure disgrace. Thirdly, if after having endured pain men give way at last through the excess of torment as surpassing what human nature can bear, they are *pitied* or *pardoned*, if they do not thereby incur very great disgrace. And with reference to the first class of actions, some things, says Aristotle, bring such infamy upon us, (such as would Isabella's acceding to Angelo's proposal in "Measure for Measure,") that we ought not to submit to them, whatever may be the benefit resulting from such submission. As Cicero observes in his *De Officiis*, i. 45. "Sunt

enim quædam partim ita foeda, partim ita flagitiosa, ut ea, ne conservandæ quidem patriæ causa sapiens facturus sit." But how to direct our conduct and form our choice in many cases is very difficult, especially when the disgrace and labour to be undergone is about equal to the glory to be obtained. And still more difficult is it to adhere to their purpose in such instances, where our resolution has been formed; for although we perceive that those things are disgraceful to which we are compelled, yet from the dread of coming pain we are too frequently induced to change our purposes. And hence it is that they who, without compulsion, endure pain for a good purpose, are praised; and they blamed, who suffer themselves to be overcome by pain and do what is disgraceful.


16. *Εὐριπίδου*] Euripides p. 349. (Ed. Oxon. 1833.)

Involuntariness from ignorance distinguished and defined.

Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, 2
ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυτον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ
γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μηδὲν δὲ δυσχεραίνων
ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὃ γε
μὴ ἦδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δ'
δὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ,
ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος ἔστω, οὐχ
ἐκὼν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν
ἴδιον. ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν
τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος 10
οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τι τῶν
εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δέ, ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν. ἀγνοεῖ
μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν
ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμαρτίαν ἄδικοι

9. δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν] To act through ignorance. That is, an ignorance of particulars; which, as they are extraneous to ourselves, if we are ignorant of them, we are not blameworthy. Such an ignorance as this is an external cause (*ἀρχή*), a kind of external instrument although within ourselves. Hence these actions are said to be done, δι' ἄγνοιαν, as though ignorance, and not we ourselves, were the agent. But to act in a state of ignorance (*ἀγνοοῦντα σμῦν*), an igno-

rance of principles, is an ignorance of which we ourselves are the authors, and for which we are culpable. Thus to drink a glass of brandy instead of wine, not knowing that it was brandy, and so to cause drunkenness, is to act δι' ἄγνοιαν, and is excusable if it be followed by repentance; but to get drunk, not knowing that drunkenness is a vice, is to act ἀγνοῶν, and is not excusable. The following table will make the division of these actions more clear.



καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται. τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἢ καθόλου (ψέγονται δὲ γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἢ πράξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει. Ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἔνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσῃε μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα· πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γε; ὁ δὲ πράττει, ἂν ἀγνοήσῃεν ἂν τις, οἷον λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς, ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. οἰηθείη δ' ἂν τις καὶ

In what ignorance of the fact can consist.

2. ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον] Is ignorant of his own good.

3. ἢ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια—οὐδ' ἢ καθόλου] There is a difference between one and the other. The ignorance of the Universal (ἢ καθόλου) is when a person has lived so long in a state of vice as not to be able to distinguish good from bad, virtue from vice. (See vii. 2. n. ad fin.) He knows not what end he ought to pursue. The ignorance ἐν προαιρέσει is not yet arrived to such a desperate state as this; it distinguishes between good and bad, it knows what end it should pursue, but does not select the proper means to that end. The first is the ignorance of the intem-

perate (ἀκρίβητος), who knows not that intemperance is a vice; the second is the ignorance or rather error of the incontinent (ἀκρατής), who knows that lust should be avoided and continence observed, but who being overcome by his passions prefers their gratification, and moves out of the line which leads to the end he ought to pursue. See Mag. Mor. p. 19.

The first then is a general ignorance, as when a man is ignorant that adultery is a crime; the second a particular, as when he is ignorant (overborne by his passions) that this particular instance of adultery is a crime.

τὸν υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσσηριν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρία παίσας ἀποκτείνειν ἄν· καὶ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειρίζομενοι, πατάξειεν ἄν. περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἄγνοίας οὐσης, ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, ὁ τούτων τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα. τοῦ δὴ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ.

The voluntary defined.

Actions done from passion or desire are voluntary, and why.

Ὅντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βία καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξειεν ἄν εἶναι οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότει τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. Ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων ἐκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες.

2. Εἴτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ἀκουσίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἐνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπὶ τισι

14. *ἴσως γὰρ*] Excludit quemdam errorem: et primo ponit ipsum. Quidam enim putabant non omne id esse voluntarium cujus principium est intra, cum scientia circumstantiarum. Potest enim contingere quod illud principium, quod est intra, non sit appetitus rationalis qui dicitur voluntas, a qua denominatur voluntarium, sed aliqua passio appetitus sensitivi, puta ira vel concupiscentia vel aliquid aliud huiusmodi, quod Philosophus dicit non esse bene dictum. Et notandum quod quia

passiones appetitus sensitivi excitantur a rebus exterioribus apprehensis per sensum, hic error ejusdem rationis esse videtur cum eo quem supra removit, secundum quem dicebatur quod res exteriores inferunt violentiam. Sed illud fuit ibi dicendum, ubi agebatur de violento cujus principium est extra. Hoc autem est hic agendum ubi agitur de voluntario cujus principium est intra, nam passiones intra nos sunt. —Thos. Aquin.

καὶ ἐπιθυμῆναι τινῶν, οἷον ὑγιείας καὶ μαθήσεως. 4.
 Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ
 κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέα. Ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῶν 5.
 ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἀμαρτη-
 5 θέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἡττον
 ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη. αἱ δὲ πράξεις
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. ἀτοπον
 δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

CHAP. II.

Of Choice or προαίρεσις.

4 ΔΙΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΩΝ δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκούσιου καὶ τοῦ προαίρεσις
 10 ἐκούσιου, περὶ προαιρέσεως ἔπεται διελεῖν· οἰκειό-
 αλλῶς ἐπὶ τῆ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ
 ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. Ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ 1. προαί-
 ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταυτόν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ 2. Προαί-
 πλέον τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκούσιου καὶ 3. ἐκούσιον
 15 παῖδες καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ'
 οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαιφνης ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ
 προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ. Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπι- 2. Προαί-
 4. ἐπιθυμία 5. ἀκούσια 6. ἀκούσια 7. ἀκούσια 8. ἀκούσια 9. ἀκούσια 10. ἀκούσια 11. ἀκούσια 12. ἀκούσια 13. ἀκούσια 14. ἀκούσια 15. ἀκούσια 16. ἀκούσια 17. ἀκούσια 18. ἀκούσια 19. ἀκούσια 20. ἀκούσια

6. τὰ ἄλογα πάθη] The irrational passions and appetites appear to be a part of man as man, (*ἀνθρωπικὰ*), inasmuch as they can be made obedient to reason. Therefore the acts which spring from them must be considered the actions of man as such, and consequently voluntary, since no involuntary action (involving neither praise nor blame, and having nothing to do with his moral nature) is attributed to man.

10. περὶ προαιρέσεως] Concerning

choice. This word is generally translated *deliberate choice*. But all choice implies deliberation. It is evident from the nominal definition given of it at the end of this chapter, (*σχεδὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν αἰρεσίς*) that choice is the proper and primary meaning of the word. But unless we also give a secondary sense to these words, neither choice nor *deliberate choice* will convey the full meaning of the term as technically employed by Aristotle.

- θυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ εἰ-
 1. κασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. Οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἢ προαίρεσις
 2. καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. Καὶ ὁ
 ἀκρατῆς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ'
 οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατῆς δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν,³
 3. ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. Καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία
 4. ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. Καὶ ἡ μὲν
 ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἢ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε
 3. Nor
ἀσπεί.
 λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος. Θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἦττον· ἦκιστα
 γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. 10
 4. Nor
will.
 Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς
 φαινόμενον· προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν
 ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν
 ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον
 2. ἀθανασίας. Καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἔστι καὶ περὶ 15
 τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἂν, οἷον ὑποκρι-
 τήν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητήν. προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι'
 3. αὐτοῦ. Ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἔστι
 μᾶλλον, ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον 20
 ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν
 ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ
 φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἀρμόζει· ὅλως
 γὰρ ἔοικεν ἢ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῶν εἶναι.
 Nor opi-
nion.
 Οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ 25

6. *προαίρεσις μὲν ἐπιθυμία*] De-
 sire is opposed to *προαίρεσις* as in
 the incontinent person; the evil that
 he would not that he does. Two
 opposites cannot exist together at the
 same time in the same subject, but
 two desires may possess a man at the
 same time, consequently desire cannot

be the opposite (*ἰσχυρία*) of desire;
 but bad desires and *προαίρεσις*, which is
 a pure and perfect principle, inducing
 men to feel and act virtuously, cannot
 exist in the same mind simultaneously,
 and consequently are *ἰσχυρία*. See
 the Categories chap. viii.

πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεὶ καὶ ἀληθεὶ διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον. ὅπως μὲν οὖν δόξῃ
 5 ταυτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεὶς. Ἄλλ' οὐδέ Nor any particular opinion. τινὶ τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ
 ποιοὶ τινὲς ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὐ. Καὶ προαι- 2.
 ρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ πῶς·
 10 λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνν δοξάζομεν. Καὶ ἢ 3.
 μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινέται τῷ εἶναι οὐ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἢ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. Καὶ προαι- 4.
 ρούμεθα μὲν ἂ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἂ οὐ πάνν ἴσμεν. Δοκοῦσί τε οὐχ οἷ 5.
 15 αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαί τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' εἵνοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι

5. *ἐπὶ τῷ*] Aristotle says, that *προαίρεσις* is not opinion generally; nor is it any particular opinion; that is to say, it is not merely a correct opinion respecting morals, concerning what is good or bad, virtuous or vicious. For *προαίρεσις* is a vital active principle, mere opinion is not.

Hujus differentis autem ratio est, quia bonus vel malus dicitur aliquis non secundum potentiam, sed secundum actum, ut habetur in nono Metaphysicæ; id est non ex hoc quod est potens bene operari, sed ex hoc quod bene operatur: ex hoc autem, quod homo est perfectus secundum intellectum fit homo potens bene operari, non autem bene operatur; sicut ille qui habet habitum grammaticæ ex hoc ipso est potens bene loqui congrue. Sed ad hoc, quod congrue loquatur, requiritur quod hoc velit, quia habitus

est quo quis agit cum voluerit, ut dicit Com. in 3. de Anima. Unde patet quod bona voluntas facit hominem bene operari secundum quamcumque potentiam vel habitum rationi obedientem. Et ideo aliquis dicitur simpliciter bonus homo ex hoc, quod habet bonam voluntatem. Ex hoc autem quod habet bonum intellectum non dicitur bonus homo simpliciter sed secundum quid, puta bonus grammaticus. Et ideo quia electio pertinet ad voluntatem, opinio autem ad intellectum, ex electione dicimur boni vel mali non autem ex opinione.—Thos. Aquinas.

12. *ἢ δὲ δόξα*] Compare the Philebus, p. 40. ΣΩ. τί δέ; σοφείας δόξας καὶ χρυσῶς ἄλλας ἢ ἄντι ἀληθείας καὶ ψευδοῦς γυγνωμόνας ἔχουσι εἰσὶν; ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἄλλως.

οὐχ ἂν δεῖ. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταυτόν ἐστι δόξη τινί. Τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐθέν; ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον οὐ πάντῃ προαιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἄρα γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῦνομα ὡς ὃν πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν.

Nominal definition of προαίρεσις.

CHAP. III.

Of Deliberation, or βούλωνσι.

What is the object-matter of deliberation.

ΒΟΥΛΕΥΟΝΤΑΙ δὲ πότερα περὶ πάντων καὶ ὅσων πάντων βουλευτόν ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ' ἴσως βουλευτόν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσασαί' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου 15

1. εἰ δὲ προγίνεται] Sciendum tamen quod opinio cum pertineat ad vim cognoscitivam, per se loquendo, præcedit electionem, quæ pertinet ad vim appetitivam quæ movetur a cognoscitiva. Per accidens tamen contingit quandoque quod opinio sequitur electionem. Puta, cum aliquis ex affectu eorum quæ diligit, mutat opinionem quam prius habebat.—Thos. Aquinas.

7. μετὰ λόγου] See vi. 1.

15. τῆς διαμέτρου] The side of the square is incommensurable with its diagonal. It is somewhat remarkable that some should have thought that Aristotle alludes here to the quadrature of the circle, since it was not till the time of Archimedes that it was

shown that the circumference and diameter of a circle are incommensurable. See Trendelenburg in Aristot. de Anima, p. 500. Quadratum proximum est, ad quod exemplum pertineat. Hujus enim latera cum linea diagonali communem mensuram non habent. Quod e Pythagoreo, quod vocatur, theoremate facile intelliges. Redit enim linea diagonalis ad radicem e duobus invenendam.

$$1^2 + 1^2 = 2^2$$

$$2 = 2^2$$

$$\sqrt{2} = 2$$

Est autem $\sqrt{2}$ numerus irrationalis i. e. numerus cujus ratio cum uno comparata in infinitum abit. Unde facile sequitur ἡ διάμετρος ἀσύμμετρος.

καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτὰ γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶτε καὶ φύσει ἢ διὰ τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. οὐδὲ περὶ βῆτων ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων. οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλευέται. οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων
 10 οὐθέν δι' ἡμῶν. Βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν We deliberate merely concerning that which is in our power. ἐφ' ἡμῖν πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. αἰτία γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν
 15 πρακτῶν. καὶ περὶ μὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι βουλή, οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς γραπτέον)· ἀλλ' ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ' αἰεὶ, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατὰ ἰατρικὴν
 20 καὶ χρηματιστικὴν, καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλλον ἢ γυμναστικὴν, ὅσφ' ἤττον διηκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰς

13. πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου] That is anger, desire, or whatever else may be included under the term appetite, (*ἡεῖς*).

22. περὶ τὰς τέχνας] For the arts are in contingent, the sciences, properly so called, in necessary matter. See vi. c. 2. 3. But the Greeks generally divided the sciences into two classes; the exact (*ἀκριβεῖς, ἀνάρχεις*) and the conjectural (*στοχαστικαί*.)

Of the first are Geometry, in the general use of those terms, Physics, Grammar, &c.; among the second are Politics, Medicine, Rhetoric, Dialectics; &c. The latter, being acquired by care and experience, are more the subject of deliberation than the former, because they proceed not upon unvarying rules, and their results are uncertain.

διατάζομεν· τὸ βουλευέσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἀδήλοισι δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον. συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνώναι. Βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν, ἅλλα περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρός βουλευέται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἅλλα θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι, καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἐνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κάκεινο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν· ὃ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε 15 ζῆτεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα. Φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικάι, ἡ δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις, καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ

And therefore not concerning ends but means.

Βούλευσις not the same as ζήτησις.

5. οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν] Since deliberation is only of things in our own power, it cannot be of ends but of means to ends, for the first are not in our power, upon them βούλευσις energizes. Compare the Rhetoric, I. 1. ἔτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐτε τέλος οὐτε γίνεσθαι ἀφορισμένου ἢ ῥητορικῆ. . . φαίνεται. καὶ ἔτι οὐ τὸ πῦσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἅλλα τὸ ἰδίῳ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πῦσαι περὶ ἴατρον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις πάσαις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιᾶ σωῆσαι. ἅλλα μίχρη οὐ ἰδιόχεται, μίχρη ταύτου προαιγαγῆναι· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοῦς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβῆναι ὑγίαιας ἕμους θεραπεύσαι καλῶς.

17. ζήτησις] Sec vi. 7.

19. καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει] This is familiarly and easily explained by Simplicius in his Introduction to the Categories, and also by Ammonius on the same. καθύλου γὰρ τῆς μὲν θεωρίας τὸ τέλος γίνεσθαι ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως ἱμασταλιν δὲ, τῆς πράξεως τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας. οἷον, ἰ οἰκοδόμος κατασκευάζει οἶκον ἀλγυ καὶ ἰατρον, ἰατρογὰγον οἶκον σωῆσαι, ὅπερ ἔστι ἐπίπρασμα καλυπτικὸν ἕμβρον καὶ καυμάτων, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἂν γίνετο μὴ γινομένης ὀρεφῆς. ἰατροῦ οὖν ἀρχεται τῆς θεωρίας, προβαίνων δὲ φησιν ἅλλα ταῦτο οὐκ ἂν γίνετο μὴ γινομένων τοίχων, οὗτο δὲ οὐκ ἂν γίνετο μὴ ὑποβληθέντων θεμελίων, αἱ δὲ θεμίλια οὐκ ἂν βλαβῆναι μὴ ἀρυχθείσης

ἀναλύσει πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει. κὰν μὲν ἀδυνατῶ ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι· εἴαν δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνεται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. δυνατὰ δὲ ἅ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἂν· τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. ζητεῖται δ' ὅτε μὲν τὰ ὄργανα, ὅτε δ' ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅτε μὲν δι' οὐ, ὅτε δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ τίνος. ἔοικε δὴ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, 10 ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴ τῶν πράξεων· ἢ δὲ βουλῆ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶ πρακτῶν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἔνεκα. οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ αἰσθήσεως γὰρ 15 ταῦτα. εἰ δὲ αἰεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἤξει.

τῆς γῆς ἑαυτῶν κατέληξιν ἢ θεωρία, ἐπιτύθει οὐκ ἀρχεται ἢ ἀρχῆς. ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἐκείνου τὴν γῆν, εἴθ' οὕτω βάλλει τὴν θημίλιον, οὕτω ἐγγίσει τοῖς τοῖς, καὶ ὅσοις ἐπιτύθει τὴν ἐκείνου, ἢ τίς ἐστὶ τέλος τῆς ἀρχῆς· ἢ δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς τέλος τῆς θεωρίας.

10. ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχή] From what has been said, it is evident that man is the principle of his own actions, and that all things do not happen by fate or necessity. For if man deliberates merely upon actions which are in his own power, it is plain that there must be such actions, or otherwise there would be no such thing as deliberation. Since actions also are for something ulterior, it follows that deliberation is not of ends but of means: that is to say, not of ends as ends. For in our progress to some final end, each end becomes a mean to the final end, and all the ends are therefore means

and the subject of deliberation, except the last. As, for instance, A deliberates whether he shall go to Town. In this case it might appear that the going to Town was in itself an end, and consequently that ends are the subject of deliberation. But in reality it is not. For the end which the mind bears in view is the welfare of A, and the deliberation is in reality, whether his going to Town will be the means of promoting a certain end, his welfare, &c. This point then being determined, that which was before a mean, the going to Town, becomes an end, and he now deliberates concerning the means to this end, the conveyance or such like, which in its turn becomes an end, until he arrives at the last point in this analysis, so that each end in its turn becomes a mean and the subject of deliberation.

Difference
of βούλησις
and προαί-
ρεσις.

Βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, πλὴν ἀφω-
ρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετὸν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς
βουλῆς προκριθὲν προαιρετὸν ἔστιν. πάνεταί γὰρ
ἕκαστος ζητῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνά-
γαγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον· 5
τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ
ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ἃς Ὅμηρος ἐμμεῖτο·
οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἅ προέλοιτο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ
δήμῳ. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ
τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἶη βουλευτικὴ 10
ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσασθαι γὰρ
κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν. ἡ μὲν
οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποιῶν ἔστι,
καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Will, or βούλησις.

Whether
the Will is
invariably
towards
Good or
not?

Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἔστιν, 6
εἴρηται, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ
τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν
τὸ βουλευτὸν τὰγαθὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλευτὸν

5. ἡγούμενον] That is, to the νοῦς
πρακτικῆς within himself. This phrase-
ology was probably suggested by the
reasoning of Plato in the Philebus,
p. 28, sq. who compares the one
supreme Intelligence (νοῦς βασιλεύς)
which rules and orders the universe,
to the lesser intelligence directing the
little world, which man calls himself.

7. Ὅμηρος] See the Iliad ii. 53, sq.
and 83, sq.

10. προαίρεσις] This consideration
is resumed in vi. 1. For Aristotle is
compelled to defer the further explana-
tion of it until he treats of the Intel-
lectual Virtues; προαίρεσις consisting
partly of our Intellectual (νοῦς), and
partly of our moral nature (δραξις).

18. τὸ βουλευτὸν τὰγαθόν] Compare
Plato, Philebus p. 22. Εἰ δὲ τις ἄλλα
ἡρεῖτ' ἡμῶν, κατὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀλα-
θῶς αἰετοῦ ἐλάμβανον ἄπαν, ἐξ ἀγνοίας

ὁ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλητόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν τὸ βουλητόν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλητόν, ἀλλ' ἐκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ' ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τάναντία. εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἄρα φατέον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλητόν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινὰ ἔστι τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ' ἐπινόσοις ἕτερα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα· ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τἀληθῆς αὐτῷ φαίνεται. καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἰδιά ἔστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεί-

ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ ἰσθαίματος See also this question discussed in Plato's dialogue, Gorgias, p. 466. and in Cudworth's Im. Moral. p. 38. sq.

4. ἀλλ' ἰδέσθῃ τὸ δοκοῦν] This was, in effect, the doctrine of the celebrated Sophist Protagoras. καὶ γὰρ ἰαῖνος ἴθη πάντων ἴσται χρημάτων μίτρην τὸν ἀφραστον· οὐδὲν ἴσταισι λίγων, ἢ τὸ δοκοῦν ἰδέσθῃ τοῦτο καὶ ἴσται παγίως. τοῦτου δὲ γινόμενον, τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει καὶ ἴσται καὶ μὴ ἴσται. καὶ παντὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἴσται.—μίτρην ὅ ἴσται τὸ φαινόμενον. (Arist. Metaph. X. 6. p. 221.) Of this sentiment, however, he was not the author, but probably derived it from Heraclitus. (See Arist. Metaph. iii. 3. p. 66. ed. Tauch.) At all events, Anaxagoras and Democritus held it

before him, using the same arguments as Protagoras, for the supposed proof of it. Of the former Aristotle says; 'Αναξαγόρου δὲ καὶ ἀπόφθιγμα μνημονεύεται πρὸς τῶν ἰσθαίμων τινός. ὅτι ταυῦτα αὐτοῖς τὸ ἴσται ἢ ἰσθαίβωσι. Met. iii. 5. The whole chapter should be consulted for the history and refutation of this celebrated dogma. See also Geel's Hist. Sophistarum, p. 87. Plato's Theætetus, p. 152. See Introduction to Book ii. p. 49.

8. τὸ φαινόμενον] Compare Arist. Met. xi. 7. p. 248. Ed. Tauch. ἰσθαίμων μὲν τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν, βουλητόν δὲ τὸ πρῶτον τὸ ὄν καλόν. ἀργόμεθα δὲ ὅτι δοκῶ, μᾶλλον ἢ δοκῶ δίδωμι ἀργόμεθα· ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ ἰήσις.

στον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τάληθές ἐν ἐκάστοις ὀράν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὄν. τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι οὐ γὰρ οὐσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἰροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.

CHAP. V.

That Vice, as well as Virtue, is voluntary and in our own power.

Virtue and
Vice are
voluntary.

ONTOΣ δὴ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βου-
7
λευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος,

2. *μίτρον*] Aristotle seems to have derived the particular use of this phraseology from Protagoras and the Sophists, as also did Plato. Compare the expressions: *μίτρον—τὸν ἀνθρώπου*, and *μίτρον τὸ φαινόμενον*. See the note, p. 101, 4. The sum of the reasoning is this; the *good man only*, and not every one, as Protagoras thought, is the rule and measure (*κανὼν καὶ μέτρον*) of what is good and true.

CHAP. V.

Having thus determined the nature of the voluntary, of *προαίρεσις*, of deliberation, and will, which are the principles of human action, Aristotle now applies what has been said to Virtue and Vice.

His object in the following Chapter is to show, that Vice is as voluntary as Virtue. Virtue was generally acknowledged to be voluntary in his time: this indeed could not consistently be denied by men, who praised others and required praise in

return for their good actions. The reasoning in this chapter appears, however, to be chiefly directed against Socrates, whose opinions on this subject are thus briefly stated in the *Meg. Mor.* i. 9. (p. 16. Ed. Tauch.) *Σωκράτης ἔφη, οὐκ ἰφ' ἡμῶν γινέσθαι τὸ σπουδαῖος εἶναι ἢ φαῦλος. εἰ γὰρ τις, φησί, ἱερῆσι μὴ ἰσχυροῦσιν, πότιτρον ἂν βούλοιο δίκαιος εἶναι ἢ ἀδικος, οὐδὲς ἂν λίγαιτο τὴν ἀδικίαν. ἡμοῖσι δ' ἰσ' ἀνδρείας καὶ δουλίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἢ ἀσπύτως, δήλον ὡς εἰ φαῦλοί τινές εἰσι, οὐκ ἂν ἰκόντες εἴησιν φαῦλοι. [ἄσπετι δὴλον, ὅτι οὐδὲ σπουδαῖοι.]* See Plato de *Legibus* v. 731. ix. 860. And Butler's *Analogy* i. 5. and 6.

7. *ὄντος δὴ βουλευτοῦ*] If *βούλησις* is of the ends, and *βούλευσις* of the means, and *βούλευσις* is only of actions in our own power, moral actions as being the objects of *βούλευσις* must also be in our power. And if the actions are, so must the habits which spring from them; and these habits are virtues or vices. Consequently Virtue and Vice is in our own power.

αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἴεν
καὶ ἐκούσιοι, αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ
ταῦτα, ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἡ κακία. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ
5 τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ ναί
ὥστ' εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὄν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ
τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχροὺς ὄν, καὶ
εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὄν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ
πράττειν αἰσχροὺς ὄν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ
10 καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχροῦς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ
μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς
εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοισι εἶναι.
Τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων
μάκαρ, ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ μακάριος
15 μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον.
ἡ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν
ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν
τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα
φαίνεται καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν
20 παρὰ τὰς ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ

If man is
the ἀρχὴ of
his own ac-
tions, his
actions are
voluntary.

1. περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις] Actions which
have reference to the end. αἱ δὲ τῶν
ἀρετῶν κ. σ. λ. but the energies of
Virtue are upon acts done with a view
to a certain end: that is, with a view
of becoming virtuous and happy.

11. ταῦτα δ' ἦν] See p. 63.

13. ἐκὼν] Compare Plato's Protag.
p. 345. D. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαιδευτος
ἦν Σιμωνίδης ὥστε ταύτους φάναι ἰπαι-
νῆν, δεῖ ἂν ἰπὸν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῆ, ὡς
ἴπταν τῶν εἰ ἐκόντες κατὰ ποιῆσιν.
ἐγὼ γὰρ σχιδὸν τι εἶμαι ταῦτο. δεῖ
οὐδὲς τῶν τοφῶν ἀνδρῶν ἠγύεται οὐδὲνα
ἀθρόσων ἰκόντα ἱξαμαρτάνει, οὐδὲ αἰ-

σχιδὸν τι καὶ κατὰ ἰκόντα ἱξαμαρτάνει,
ἀλλ' εὐίστως δεῖ πάντας εἰ τὰ αἰσχροῦς
καὶ κατὰ ποιῆσιν ἄκωντες ποιῶσι.
Where see Stallbaum's note for further
authorities.

Παρανομία γὰρ ταῦτο, ἧ καὶ Ἐπί-
χαρμος ἢ Συρακούσιος κίχρηται. ἐν οἷς
φησὶν ἄλλὰ μὴ ἰγὼν ἀναγκαῖος ταῦτα
πάντα ποιῆσαι. εἶμαι δὲ ὡς οὐδὲς ἰπὸν
ἀνθρώπος οὐδ' ἄσταν ἔχων. Ἐν Ἡρακλεῖ
δὲ ταῦτα τῆ Παραφίση κῆται. Schol.
in loco.

20. δεῖ καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ] This is other-
wise expressed and at more length
by the author of the Mag. Mor.

The fact of reward being attached to good, and punishment to bad actions, proves they are voluntary.

αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσια. Τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδία ὑφ' ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρώντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἢς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες, τοὺς δὲ καλύσοντες. καίτοι ὅσα μὴτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μὴθ' ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὄν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων 10 οὐθὲν γὰρ ἤττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά. Καὶ γὰρ

For even for bad actions done through ignorance, if

ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἶον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ

p. 17, 18. That argument may be thus represented. Every principle is productive of something similar to itself, a dog of a dog, a tree of a tree, and so on. And as are the principles such are their results. If then the actions of men are constantly varying and he has power to change them, as we see he has, so also he has power to change his principles, and of form good to bad, and vice versa, and consequently he is master of his own principles and accordingly of his moral conduct.

3. κολάζουσι] Not only from the way we punish, but also resent injuries.

4. δι' ἄγνοιαν] See p. 90.

12. κολάζουσιν] The difference observable in our treatment of bad actions done from ignorance is a proof, that we punish men only for their voluntary actions. For we pardon them when they are not the cause of their own ignorance, we punish them when they are.

— αἴτιος—εἴης ἀγνοίας] A man is

the cause of his ignorance in two ways, either directly or indirectly. Directly, as in the case of the drunkard who inebriates himself, and places himself in a state of ignorance: and who consequently deserves a double punishment. One for intoxication, and another for doing what he ought not in that state. For both are voluntary. Drunkenness is the cause of his ignorance, and he himself is the cause of his drunkenness.

Indirectly a man is the cause of his own ignorance, when he neglects to do that which he ought to do. When he neglects to make himself acquainted with the plain laws of his country. Or when in youth he neglects to cultivate those habits and capacities which are to fit him for the state of manhood. That such ignorance is culpable and consequently voluntary is clear, from men being punished for it.

13. διπλᾶ] Such was the law of Pittacus. Of which see Pol. ii. 12. Rhet. ii. 25.

ἐπιτίμια· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ the igno-
 μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. καὶ rance be
 τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ self-caused,
 ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν. men are
 5 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν punished.
 ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὄν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν
 τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι. Ἄλλ' ἴσως And even
 τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ if from na-
 τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, tural care-
 10 καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν lessness and
 κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις neglect
 διάγοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους they ac-
 ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς quire bad
 ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν· διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνερ- habits,
 15 γοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν those ha-
 περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῆ ἀναισθήτου. bits are vo-
 Ἔτι δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀδικον luntary.
Nay more,
if men have

7. ἀλλ' ἴσως] Aristotle now examines into the origin of the objections against the spontaneity of evil, dividing them into two heads. Those which are drawn from a consideration of the disposition of the agent, by which he is inclined to evil contrary to his will, and those from a consideration of a defective apprehension (*φαντασία*.)

8. μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι] One objects, and says that some men are naturally careless, that their vices are to be ascribed to nature rather than themselves, and that having unwillingly acquired a confirmed bad habit, they can no longer help acting in conformity to that habit. To which Aristotle replies; they are themselves the authors of that habit, willingly per-

forming the single acts which led to it, and are therefore voluntary agents, even although their conduct may now occasion them pain.

If a person should further object, that he did not know that performing the single acts would lead to a habit, Aristotle says this is incredible. For all men are born with a certain degree both of virtue and prudence. (See Introduction, p. 83.)

17. ἴσι δ' ἄλογον] Aristotle meets a second objection. If it be in our power, says the objector, to become vicious, it would also be in our power, when we pleased to cease being vicious: but this is by no means the case; for many after living in a state of vice, have become so habituated to

acquired a confirmed bad habit for which they are sorry, that habit is voluntary.

εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἐκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἶη, οὐ μὴν ἕάν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὧν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιῆς. καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ ρίψαι· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσὶν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἕξεστι μὴ εἶναι. Οὐ μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι

So also for bodily

it, that they can no longer desist from it; many have lived so long in a course of intemperance, that intemperance has become necessary to their very existence; and though they fervently desire it, they cannot return to temperance. Aristotle says, such men performed the single acts, which led to this confirmed bad habit, spontaneously, and they know that these single acts would lead to such a habit; it is absurd therefore to suppose, that a man who has done every thing voluntarily and knew that such effects must follow from such a cause, to say that wishing for the cause he did not wish for the effect. For though it may be that he did not wish the effect of his ill actions to follow, absolutely and in itself, yet he wished that the effect should be, rather than that the cause should not be. But that this man cannot correct the vicious habits he has contracted, that is, cannot make undone the single acts which led to these habits, though he is desirous of so doing,

proves not he is an involuntary agent. As when a man has it in his power to fling or forbear flinging a stone, if he flings it, he acts voluntarily, however anxious he may be when it is out of his hand to have recalled the act. So though the recalling of it is no longer in his own power, the act is voluntary, and was so at the time of his doing it. See p. 35, 15.

13. *ὁ μὲν*] This is a tacit reply to Socrates, who, wishing to show that a man's moral deformities were contrary to his inclination, instanced, as a parallel, bodily diseases and deformities. "Now no one," said Socrates, "blames a man for these, thereby acknowledging that they are involuntary." Be it so, says Aristotle, but then we do blame men even for bodily deformities, where they have themselves been the causes of them. And our making this distinction, and blaming them only for those of which they themselves are the cause, is a proof that these actions, for which we

ἐκούσιοι εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος, deformities, where they are self-inflicted, we blame men.
οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν
αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾶ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν
καὶ ἀμέλειαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ
5 πῆρωσιν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὄνειδίσαιε τυφλῶ φύσει
ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεῆσαι·
τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς
ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ
ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔ. εἰ
10 δ' οὔτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμῶμεναι τῶν
κακιῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι And even if men are

blame mankind, are voluntary ; since, therefore, we blame them for vicious habits, such habits are voluntary. A similar argument on the same subject is urged by the sophist Protagoras. *Ἰσα γὰρ ἠγοῦνται ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἀνθρώπων φύσει ἢ τύχῃ οὐδαίς θυμῶνται οὐδὲ νοσήσιν οὐδὲ διδάσκου οὐδὲ κολάζου τοὺς ταῦτα ἔχοντας, ἴσα μὴ τοιούτων ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἑλισσῶσιν οἷον τοὺς αἰσχροῦς ἢ σμικροῦς ἢ ἀσθενῶς τίς οὔτως ἀνάστος ὅσσοι τι τοῦτων ἰσχυροῦν αἰετῶν ; ἴσα δὲ ἐξ ἰσχυροῦ καὶ ἀσθενείας καὶ διδασχῆς οἴονται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις, ἴσων τις ταῦτα μὴ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ πάντων τούτων κακὰ, ἰσὶ τοῦτοις αὐτοῦ εἰ τι θυμῷ γίγνεσθαι καὶ αἱ κολάσεις καὶ αἱ νοσήσεις.* Plato's Protag. p. 323.

11. *εἰ δὲ τις*] This was the principal objection of the day, which Aristotle now proceeds to refute. The objection may be thus stated :

To pursue Good, we must first desire it, but to desire it we must first apprehend it. But that apprehension is not in our own power, but is a natural faculty, a species of mental vision, over which we have no control, and which we receive from nature as

any other sense or outward faculty. Since every one therefore follows what he apprehends to be good, and cannot alter his apprehension, he who mistakes good for evil, as does the wicked man, and acts according to that apprehension, is not blameable, but his errors are to be referred to nature or necessity. Consequently Vice is involuntary.

1. To this objection Aristotle replies, that we have power to regulate this apprehension. For since our apprehension of good and evil is regulated by our habits, and our habits are in our own power, consequently so is our apprehension (*φαντασία*.) See p. 101, 15.

2. But if it be not so, if we have no power over our apprehension of the end, but it is fixed by nature unchangeably in every one, if it be the case with the bad man it is also the case with the good man ; and then Virtue is in no respect more voluntary than Vice, which is contrary to the objector's own acknowledgment.

Or if, notwithstanding such a theory, good men are voluntary agents because

not masters
of their ima-
gination,
they are
still volun-
tary agents.

πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ
φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὅποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός
ἐστί, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν
οὖν ἕκαστος ἐαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος,
καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος. εἰ δὲ ὅ
μή, οὐθεὶς αὐτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακὰ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι'
ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ τούτων
οἴομενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσσεσθαι, ἡ δὲ τοῦ
τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ ἀυθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φύναι δεῖ
ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἧ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' 10
ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφύης, ᾧ
τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν· (τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ
κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ' ἐτέρου μὴ οἶόν τε λαβεῖν
μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἶον ἔφυ, τοιοῦτον ἕξει, καὶ
τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία 15

they put in practice the means, that is, the single acts leading to this natural end, (*φυσικὸν τέλος*), so also, notwithstanding such a theory, vicious men are voluntary agents. So that whether we have power over this apprehension, or whether we have not, we are nevertheless voluntary agents. Virtue and Vice is voluntary and in our own power.

Such is the reasoning of this somewhat intricate passage, in which Aristotle has not at all entered into an examination of the nature of *φαντασία*, as he has done in his *Treatise de Anima* iii. 3. And this is somewhat remarkable, for, as Aquinas observes, there may be two kinds of apprehension (*φαντασία*). One which is purely speculative, which does not depend upon any particular disposition, which neither regulates nor is regulated by the conduct; and one which is prac-

tical, of which Aristotle here speaks, depending upon the habits or the temper of the moment; so that this also is of two kinds. For an object may appear good not absolutely, but at this or that particular time, or in this and that frame of mind, since the desire is influenced as well by the accidental temper of mind as by the habit. According to the former is the apprehension of an object being good which is only accidentally good; as to men who are in fear of shipwreck, the casting of their goods overboard appears to be good. But the apprehension of that which is really and absolutely good, is to be derived only from the cultivation of virtuous habits.

5. *εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς*] But if not, and if no one, &c. *ἢ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις* and if the aiming at the end, &c. The apodosis is at *εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἴσται κ. τ. λ.* p. 109, 1.

καὶ ἀληθινῇ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα·) εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὅπως δὴποτε φαίνεται καὶ
 5 κείται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὅπως δὴποτε. εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἐκάστῳ φαίνεται οἷον δὴποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστίν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἐκουσίως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ
 10 ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιόν ἐστίν, οὐθὲν ἦττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτόν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταὶ (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν,
 15 καὶ τῷ ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἴεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.

8 Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν Brief recapitulation of the subject. τό τε γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ' ὧν τε γίνονται, καὶ ὅτι τούτων πρακ-
 20 τικαὶ καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ. Οὐχ That actions are more in our own ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἕξεις·

14. *συναίτιαι*] *Joint authors*. By which expression he seems to acknowledge that nature and chance (for instance, being born of good parents) may have some influence in forming our habits.

20. *καθ' αὐτάς*] *Per se: by reason of their essence, not accidentally*. For not only may a good habit be accidentally the cause of good actions which do not spring from itself as such, but vice also may *accidentally* be the cause of good actions though

not as vice, *καθ' αὐτάς*.

21. *ὅχι ὁμοίως αἱ πράξεις*] *Actions which result from habit are no longer equally in our power, as they were previous to the formation of the habit, but approach rather to the nature of the involuntary and natural, for custom is second nature*. The habit from which they spring is beyond our control, nor however desirous, can we be rid of it otherwise than indirectly: as it was formed by degrees so must it be

power than
the habits.

τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους
κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων
δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἢ πρόσθεσις οὐ
γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι
ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρῆσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο
ἐκούσιοι.

CHAP. VI.

Application of the definition to several particulars.

FEAR—COURAGE—FOOLHARDINESS.

PAIN.
Courage
defined.

ΑΝΑΛΑΒΟΝΤΕΣ δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης, εἶπωμεν
τινες εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται
δηλον καὶ πόσαι εἰσὶν. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβου καὶ θάρρη, 10

corrected. And thus it is that the
ἄρχῃ only of habits, that is the single
acts which lead to their formation and
not the entire habits themselves, are in
our power. This argument appears to
have been intended against the Plato-
nists, though I do not remember to
have seen it explicitly stated in any
of Plato's dialogues. Plotinus how-
ever has endeavoured to show that,
while the habits of bad men are invo-
luntary, single acts are however volun-
tary. De Providentiā, ii. 10.

CHAP. VI.

Upon the first perusal of the
Ethics the reader should omit what
follows of this Book, together with the
fourth and fifth, proceeding imme-
diately to the sixth. Afterwards read-
ing the omitted books in connexion,
having first read the sixth chapter of

the second Book. Generally upon
this and the succeeding chapters the
reader will do well to consult the
second Book of Aristotle's Rhetoric,
and the Characters of Theophrastus.

9. *πρῶτον αὖτε ἀνδρείας*] Non ut
vult Eustratius, ideo a fortitudine in-
cipit, quod sit longe difficillima et
præstantissima omnium virtutum sed
quia mirabili iudicio Aristoteles virtutes,
quippe cum sint appetitus ad rationem
directi, eo ordine persequitur quo in
hominis natura a vicioribus ad excel-
lentiora progrediente appetitus unus ex
altero pendet; ita ut potius a virtuti-
bus, minus præstantibus, i. e. for-
titudine et temperantia circa dolores
et voluptates versantibus, profectus,
postremo ad præstantissimam nempe
sapientiam libro vi. perveniat quæ in
summo cognoscendi appetitu posita est.
MICH.

ἤδη καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, φοβούμεθα δὲ δηλονότι PAIN.
 τὰ φοβερὰ, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν Courage.
 κακὰ· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν
 κακοῦ. Φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακὰ, Its object-
 5 οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' matter dis-
 οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρείος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ tinguished
 καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχροῦ, and defined.
 οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικῆς 1. What
 καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυτος. evils are not
 10 λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινῶν ἀνδρείος κατὰ μεταφορὰν properly its
 ἔχει γάρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις object-mat-
 καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος. πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι ter.
 οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ
 δι' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρείος.
 15 λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἔνιοι γὰρ
 ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευ-
 θέριοι εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρ-
 σῶς ἔχουσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας
 καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων,
 20 δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι,
 ἀνδρείος. Περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρείος; 2. What
 ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος are.
 τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας
 γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὐτ' ἀγαθὸν

1. *πρότερον*] See ii. 6.

3. *ὀρίζονται*] Plato in Protagora, p. 358. *προσδοκίαν* σινὰ λίγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δῖας καλίπτει. Laches, p. 198. MICH.

4. *πάντα τὰ κακὰ*] See the Rhet. ii. 5. Tractat autem in prima de objecto fortitudinis materiaque ejusdem. Omnis enim habitus habet objectum

quoddam circa quod versatur. Procedimus enim in cognitione nostra ex objectis ad actus, et ab actibus ad potentias, et a potentiis ad essentias; a notioribus ad ea quæ nobis sunt minus nota. Acciaj.

23. *πέρας γάρ*] "Mors ultima linea rerum." Hor.

PAIN.
Courage.

οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον
τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος εἶναι, οἷον εἰ ἐν θαλάττῃ
ἢ ἐν νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις;
τοιούτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ
καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμολογοὶ δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ δ
αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρ-
χοις. κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρείος ὁ περὶ τὸν
καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεῆς, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει
ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλε-
μον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις 10
ἀδεῆς ὁ ἀνδρείος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι·
οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασιν τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν
θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλ-
πιδές εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρι-
ζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν 15
ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐθέτερον ὑπάρχει.

Courage
and its
extremes
compared.

Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν 10
δέ τι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ
φοβερὸν τῷ γε νοῦν ἔχοντι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄνθρωπον
διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον· ὁμοίως 20
δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀνδρείος ἀνέκπληκτος

9. δαίγμα ὄντα] σλησίον τι φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ σίερον. Eud. Eth. iii. 1. Compare the Rhet. ii. 5. οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κατὰ φοβεῖσθαι, οἷον ἰ ἴσται ἄλιος ἢ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ἴσα λύσας μεγάλας ἢ φθορὰς δύναται, καὶ ταῦτ' ἰὰν μὴ σίερον ἀλλὰ σύνιγγυς φαίνεται ὅσοι μίλλων. τὰ γὰρ σίερον σφῆρα οὐ φοβεῖσθαι.

16. οὐσίτερον] A most unusual orthography, in which Bekker is by no means consistent, sometimes writing οὐσίον and οὐσίον, sometimes μησίον or μησίον. Goettling thinks that this form was not introduced till after the battle of

Leuctra. See his note on Arist. Polit. i. 1. p. 278. The same writer has appended the following note upon this subject to Trendelenburg's edition of Arist. de Anima, p. 202. ὁ ἐν θ mutatum esse in οὐσίον et οὐσίτερον non videtur; potius a Bœotia Ἐολensibus, quorum οὐσίον fuisse proprium dicitur (V. Eustat. p. 1814.) pro spiritu aspero θ ascitum esse ut in θαμέ et ἄμα, in θάλασσα et ἄλας atque hoc post pugnam Leuctricam ad reliquos etiam transiisse Græcos, ut multa alia, ad fidem propius esse videtur.

ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, PAIN.
ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ, τοῦ καλοῦ ^{Courage.}
ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ
μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ
5 μὴ φοβερὰ ὡς τοιαῦτα φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν
ἀμαρτιῶν ἢ μὲν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ἢ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ,
ἢ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ καὶ οὐ
ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ
10 ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρείος· κατ' ἀξίαν
γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ
ἀνδρείος. τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ
τὴν ἕξιν. καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν.
τοιούτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον
15 τῷ τέλει. καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομένει
καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν. Τῶν δ' ὑπερ- <sup>The ex-
tremes con-
sidered.</sup>
βαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται
δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστὶν ἀνώ-
20 νυμα), εἴη δ' ἂν τις μαινύμενος ἢ ἀνάληγτος,
καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς. Ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν <sup>1. The Fool-
hardy.</sup>
ὑπερβάλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ
καὶ ἀλαζῶν εἶναι ὁ θρασύς καὶ προσποιητικὸς
ἀνδρείας. ὡς οὖν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει,
25 οὕτως οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι ἐν οἷς οὖν

12. εἰς δὲ] If the habit be honourable the end must also be honourable. For every energy produced by a virtuous habit is for the sake of virtue. The brave man will therefore do and endure, as a brave man, and for the sake of virtue. Each

action also appears from the end to be either honourable or disgraceful. But courage is honourable, therefore the end of courage, for which sake courage is exercised, is also honourable.

18. ἀνώνυμος] See p. 71, 14.

PAIN.
Courage.

2. The fear-
ful.

And com-
pared with
the mean.

Recapitu-
lation of the
subject, and
the distinc-
tion of cou-
rage from
five impro-
per kinds
of it.

1. Political.

δύναται, μιμείται. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν
θρασύδειλοι· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι τὰ
φοβερά οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. Ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι
ὑπερβάλλον δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἂ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ
δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. ἐλλεί-
πει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν· ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερ-
βάλλον μᾶλλον καταφανής ἐστίν. δύσελπις δὴ
τις ὁ δειλός· πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος
ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ θαρρεῖν εὐέλπιδος. Περὶ ταῦτα
μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ τε δειλὸς καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ὁ
ἀνδρείος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς αὐτά· οἱ μὲν
γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ μέσως
ἔχει καὶ ὡς δεῖ· καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς,
καὶ βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ'
ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ' ἀνδρείοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς,¹⁰
πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.

Καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ
περὶ θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερά, ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ
ὅτι καλὸν αἰρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχροὺς
τὸ μῆ. τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ
ἔρωτα ἢ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα, καὶ
οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν.

ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι. Λέγονται

10. *δουλός*] Cf. Theophrasti Cha-
racteres, xxv. *περὶ δουλίας*. Descri-
buntur enim ab Aristotelis discipulo,
hoc ipsum magistri opus nimirum re-
spiciente, singuli naturales appetitus,
quemadmodum toto animo potiti et ad
extremum proveci vitiosam singu-
lorum hominum indolem perficiunt.

MICH.

16. *πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι*] Compare
Polonius' advice to Laertes.

Beware

Of entrance to a quarrel: but,
being in,

Bear it, that the opposer may beware
of thee. Hamlet, i. 3.

δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους, πρῶτον· μὲν ἢ ^{PAIN.} ^{Courage.}
 πολιτική· μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν· δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπο-
 μένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν
 νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ἀνεῖδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμὰς.
 5 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρείοτατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ'
 οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι. τοιού-
 τους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἶον τὸν Διομήδην
 καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα.

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει·

10 καὶ Διομήδης,

Ἐκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσι ἀγορεύων,
 Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο.

ὁμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένη,
 ὅτι δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται· δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ
 15 καλοῦ ὄρεξιν (τιμῆς γάρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδούς,
 αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. τάξαι δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ
 τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκαζομένους εἰς ταυτό· χεῖρους
 δ', ὅσφ' οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον αὐτὸ δρῶσι,
 καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχροὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν·
 20 ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἑκτωρ

ὃν δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πῶσσοντα νοήσω,
 οὗ οἱ ἄρκιον ἔσσειται φυγέειν κύννας.

καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, κἂν ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες

2. *πολιτική*] Such particularly was the courage of the Romans.

7. *Ὅμηρος*] See Iliad xxii. 100. and viii. 148. sq.

20. *Ἐκτωρ*] Agamemnon hos versus (Iliad. ii. 391 et 393.) pronuntiat, ut est etiam apud ipsum Aristotelem,

Polit. iii. 14. Hector tamen simillima profert Iliad. xv. 348—351. Nec mirum, quod in utroque loco Aristotelis hi versus paulo aliter scribantur, quam nunc apud Homerum legimus, cum memoriter eos philosophus auditoribus haud dubie recitaverit. MICH.

PAIN.
Courage.

2. Expe-
rience.

τὸ αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην ἀνδρείον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι· ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ῥήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὗτοι· φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρείοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. εἴτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὅποια ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὀπλισμένοι μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρειότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μάλιστα ἰσχύοντες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύγουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ καπὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ φεύγειν

6. Σωκράτης] See the Laches, p. 195, and the Protagoras, p. 360.

22. τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ] Ἑρμαῖος ἐν Κερωνίᾳ τῆς Βιωτίας τόπος· οὕτως λεγόμενος ἰστί· πειδίδος ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνωμάλων ὄντων. ἐν ᾧ παρατεταγμένοι ποτὶ Κερωνίᾳ ἐν τοῖς βοηθήσασιν αὐτοῖς στρατιώταις, ἐκ τοῦ μιστὰ τοῖχου μιστὰ τῶν Βιωταρχῶν, ὅτι τὴν σέλιον πατίλαβον, καὶ τὴν ἀπέσπολιν εἶχον ὄφ'

ἰαυτῷ Ὀνίμαρχος ὁ Φωκίδος προδοθεὶς αὐτῷ, αὐτοὶ μὲν μίαντας ἀπέθανον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ τὸν Ὀνίμαρχον ἀποκλεισάντες τὰς πόλεις ἵνα αὐτοῖς μὴδὲ βουλομένοις ἔξῃ φυγεῖν καὶ καταλασθεῖν τὴν σπαρτίδα. οἱ δὲ τῶν Βιωτῶν βοηθήσαντες αὐτοῖς στρατιῶται ἐκ τοῦ μιστὰ τοῖχου ἴθυσον εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς μάχης, αἰσθόμενοι ἵνα τιθάναι τῶν Βιωταρχῶν Χάριτα. Schol.

καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἰρετώτερος^{PAIN.}
οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευον ὡς κρείττους ὄντες,^{Courage.}
γνόντες δὲ φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ
αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι· ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος οὐ τοιοῦτος.

5 Καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιφέρουσιν^{3. Anger.}
ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ὥσπερ
τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενοι, ὅτι καὶ
οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς· ἰητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος “σθένος
10 ἔμβαλε θυμῷ” καὶ “μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε” καὶ
“δριμὺν δ' ἀνὰ ρίνας μένος” καὶ “ἔξεσεν αἷμα”
πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ
θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὀρμὴν. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι
διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ
15 αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ
πληγῆναι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ εἰάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ
ἐν ἔλει ἦ, οὐ προσέρχονται. Οὐ δὴ ἐστίν^{4. Insensibility.}
ἀνδρεία διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνης καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελα-
νόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὀρμᾶν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν
20 προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι
εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται
τῆς νομῆς· καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν
τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. οὐ δὴ ἐστίν ἀνδρεία τὰ
δι' ἀλγηδόνης ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν
25 κίνδυνον. φυσικωτάτη δ' εἰκεν ἢ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν
εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ
ἔνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργι-

5. τὸν θυμὸν] Aristotle probably alludes to Plato's *Repub.* p. 442.

9. Ὅμηρος] See *Iliad* II. 529. E. 510. *Odyss.* Ω. 317, 318.

11. Ἰζις] Theocritus xx. 15.

14. διὰ τὸ καλόν] See note, p. 113, 12.

20. ὄνοι] *Respicere videtur notum locum de Ajaxis fortitudine apud Homer. Iliad. A. 558. adnotanti Camerario quoque et Giphanio. ZELL,*

PAIN.
Courage.

ζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγοῦσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδονταί· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀνδρείοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ καλὸν οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πάθος· παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσί τι.

4. Sanguine
hope.

Οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀνδρείοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλὰκίς καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέσαι θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις. παρόμοιοι δέ, ὅτι ἄμφω θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἶσθαι κρείττους εἶναι καὶ μηθὲν ἀντιπαθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ 10 μεθυσκόμενοι· εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῆ τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερά ἀνθρώπων ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μῆ. δὴ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίαις 15 φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδηλοῖς· ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ ὅτι ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. Ἀνδρείοι δὲ φαίνονται 20

5. Ignorance of the
danger.

καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ εἰσιν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ' ὅσῳ ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα χρόνον· οἱ δ' ἠπατημένοι, ἐὰν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν· ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον περι- 25 πεσόντες τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. οἱ τε δὴ ἀνδρείοι εἰρηναῖοι ποιοῖ τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρείοι.

Courage
more con-
versant
with φοβερά
than θάρρη-
λια.

Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἢ ἀνδρεία οὐσα οὐχ 12

25. Οἱ Ἀργεῖοι] See Xenophon's Hellenics iv. 10.

ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ PAIN.
φοβερά· ὁ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' Courage.
ὡς δεῖ ἔχων ἀνδρείος μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρ-
ραλέα. τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται,
5 ἀνδρείοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ ἀνδρεία, καὶ
δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ
ὑπομένειν ἢ τῶν ἡδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ The end
δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, pleasant,
ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλω δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, οἷον κὰν τοῖς but the
10 γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται· τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν means pain-
τέλος ἡδύ, οὐ ἔνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί, τὸ
δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπη-
ρόν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτ'
εἶναι, μικρὸν ὄν τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται
15 ἔχειν. εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀν-
δρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ
τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται, ὑπομένει δὲ αὐτά,
ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μῆ. καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν
μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχη πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέ-
20 στερος ἢ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπηθήσεται·
τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος
μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστερεῖται εἰδώς· λυπηρὸν
δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀνδρείος, ἴσως δὲ
καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ καλὸν αὐτ'
25 ἐκείνων αἰρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς
τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ
τέλους ἐφάπτεται. στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως
κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιοῦτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ

9. *κύκλω*] Things which stand between us and the end.
around it; things which intervene be-

PAIN.
Courage.

τοὺς ἦττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας· ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

CHAP. VII.

INTEMPERANCE—TEMPERANCE—ANON.

PLEA-
SURE.

The object-
matter of
Temperance
and Intem-
perance.

Pleasures
divided into
1. Mental.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν 13
δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ
ἀρεταί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονᾶς ἢ
σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν· ἦττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ 10
ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ
καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν
ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. Δηρῆσθωσαν δὲ αἱ
ψυχικαὶ καὶ αἱ σωματικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία, φιλο-
μάθεια· ἐκάτερος γὰρ τούτων χαίρει, οὐ φιλητικός 15
ἐστίν, οὐθὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μάλ-
λον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς
οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. ὁμοίως
δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαὶ
εἰσιν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικούς καὶ 20
περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας
ἀδολέσχας, ἀκόλαστους δ' οὐ λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς

These habits are more clearly defined in the Seventh book, to which the reader is referred for further information.

22. ἀδολέσχας] See Theophrast. Charact. iii. περὶ ἀδολεσχίας. vii. περὶ λαλιᾶς. viii. περὶ λογοποιίας.

λυπουμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. Περὶ δὲ τὰς PLEA-
 σωματικὰς εἶη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ SURE.
 ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον i. But of
 χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σῶφρονες these, nei-
 5 οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι ther the
 καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν pleasures of
 καὶ ἔλλειψιν. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ii. Nor
 ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένους χαίροντας μέλε- hearing,
 σιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεὶς ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ τοὺς
 10 ὡς δεῖ σῶφρονας. Οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὄσμήν, iii. Nor
 πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μή- smell,
 λων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμαμάτων ὀσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν
 ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων καὶ ὄψων·
 χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τούτων
 15 ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν. ἴδοι δ'
 ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινώσι, χαίροντας
 ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὀσμαῖς. τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαί-
 ρειν ἀκολάστου· τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμητὰ ταῦτα. οὐκ
 ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς
 20 αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ταῖς ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγωῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν, ἀλλὰ
 τῇ βρώσει· τὴν δ' αἰσθησιν ἡ ὄσμη ἐποίησεν. οὐδ'
 ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοός, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι
 δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἦσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν
 25 δὴ ταύτη φαίνεται. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἢ εὐρὼν
 ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. Περὶ
 τὰς τοιαύτας δὴ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ ἀκο-

3. οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες] See vii. c. 4.

11. κατὰ συμβεβηκός] The Intemperate delight in the smell of viands and unguents, but only accidentally,

from association.

25. ἰδὼν ἔλαφον] Respezisse videtur. Iliad. Γ. 23. ZELL.

iv. But of touch, or more properly taste, are the chief object-matter of temperance and intemperance.

PLEA-
SURE.
Tempor-
ance.

λασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀφή καὶ γεύσις. φαίνονται δὴ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως ἐστὶν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς 5 οἴνους δοκιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ οἱ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομέ- νοις. διὸ καὶ ἠῤῥατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὧν τὸν φάρυγγα 10 αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἠδόμενος τῇ ἀφῆ. κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία· καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονειδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἢ ἄνθρωποι ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ'

In which to
delight to
excess is
brutish-
ness.

ἢ ζῶα. Τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα 15 ἀγαπᾶν θηριώδες. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἠδονῶν ἀφήρηται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γίνο- μεναι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ τοῦ ἀκόλαστου ἀφή, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινὰ μέρη. Τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἰ 20

Desires are
of two
kinds:
1. Common.

μὲν κοινὰ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσική· πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὅτε δ' ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων τὸ δὲ τοιαῦδε ἢ τοιαῦδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν 25 αὐτῶν. διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. οὐ μὲν ἀλλ'

12. κοινοτάτη] κοινοτάτη γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ ἀφῆ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσειν· ἰσὺ καὶ ἀφῆ ἐνὶ πᾶσαις οἱ αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνονται. Paraph. See also De Part. Animal. ii. 8.

20. ἐπιθυμιῶν] Having thus explained the object-matter of temper-

ance and intemperance, he now explains how the temperate, intemperate, and insensible, use or abuse them. How their desires are regulated in reference to pleasure.

24. Ὅμηρος] See Iliad Ω. 129.

ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν· ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν PLEASURE.
 ἡδέα, καὶ ἕνια πᾶσιν ἡδίω τῶν τυχόντων. ἐν μὲν TEMPERANCE.
 οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἀμαρτάνουσι
 καὶ ἐφ' ἔν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον· τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ
 5 τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῆ, ὑπερβάλλειν
 ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις
 γὰρ τῆς ἐνδεΐας ἢ φυσικῆ ἐπιθυμίας. διὸ λέγονται
 οὗτοι γαστριμαργοί, ὡς παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες
 αὐτήν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν ἀνδραποδάδεις.
 10 Περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ καὶ πολλα- 2. Particular.
 χῶς ἀμαρτάνουσιν· τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιούτων λεγομέ-
 κων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ ὡς
 οἱ πολλοί, ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκό-
 λαστοὶ ὑπερβάλλουσιν· καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις
 15 οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ γάρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν
 τῶν τοιούτων, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ
 χαίρουσιν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερ- How far,
 βολῆ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς and in what
 λύπας οὐχ ὡς περ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας τῷ ὑπομένειν sense, pain
 20 λέγεται σώφρων ἀκόλαστος δὲ τῷ μὴ, ἀλλ' ὁ is the ob-
 μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι ject-matter
 τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ of these
 αὐτῷ ἢ ἡδονῇ), ὁ δὲ σώφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι habits.
 τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος. Ὁ μὲν The ex-
 25 οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ τῶν tremes con-
 μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ sidered.
 τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται 1. The ex-
 καὶ ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ cessive or
 ἢ ἐπιθυμίας· ἀτόπῳ δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖ- intempe-
rate.

5. ἀναπλήρωσις] A definition derived from the Pythagoreans, and adopted by Plato. See the Philebus, p. 35. n. Stallb. and x. 2.

PLEASURE.
TEMPERANCE.

2. The defective, which is nameless.

And compared with the mean.

Intemperance contrasted with cowardice in three points.

σθαι. Ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἦττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δέ τῳ μῆθὲν ἐστὶν ἡδὺ μῆδὲς διαφέρει ἕτερον ἐτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι. Ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως περὶ ταυτ' ἔχει· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δυσχεραίνει, οὔθ' ὅλως οἷς 10 μὴ δεῖ οὔτε σφόδρα τοιούτῳ οὐδενί, οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμῆι, ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν· ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστὶν ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέζεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ 15 τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

20

Ἐκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς 15 δειλίας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν αἰρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν. καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δ' ἐκού- 20 σιον· διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστότερον. καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾶον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλι. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκούσιον ἢ

3. ἀναισθησία] See Theophrast. Charact. xiv. σπερὶ ἀναισθησίας.

29. ἐκούσιον] Vult demonstrare Aristoteles singulas actiones ignavas minus

δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον· αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ PLEA-SURE.
 ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε καὶ Temper-
ance.
 τὰ ὄπλα ρίπτειν καὶ τᾶλλα ἀσχημονεῖν· διὸ καὶ
 δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι. τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ
 5 μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐκούσια, ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ
 ὀρεγομένῳ, τὸ δ' ὅλον ἦττον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμῆ
 ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. Τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας Of the ap-
plication of
the term
 καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἀμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι Intemper-
ance, to
boyish
faults.
 γὰρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου κα-
 10 λείτται, οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον δ' ὅτι
 τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου. οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε
 μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχροῶν
 ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὔξησιν ἔχον, τοιοῦτον
 δὲ μάλιστα ἢ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν
 15 γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδιά, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις
 ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθεὶς καὶ
 ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἤξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἢ
 τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ
 ἢ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὔξει τὸ συγγενές, καὶ
 20 μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὤσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκ-
 κρούουσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας,
 καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μηθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον
 εὐπειθεὶς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον· ὥσπερ γὰρ

spontaneas esse habitu ignaviæ (δοκῶ
 βίαια εἶναι). Itaque quod probaturus
 est, forsan non jam initio ut concessum
 asseveravit. Sensus est: "Ignaviam
 minus fugimus quam actiones ignavas,
 quia non ipsa affert dolores, sed acti-
 ones secundum eam factæ; quod au-
 tem dolore nos afficit est violentum;
 itaque actiones ignavæ, violentæ vi-
 dentur, ignavia vero ipsa spontanea."

MICH.

11. τοῦ προτέρου] καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν και-
 δικῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀκολα-
 σίαν τὸ ὄνομα μετανεχθῆναι. Paraph.

19. συγγενίς] ἢ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν εἰ μὴ
 ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου κολάζουτο, ἐπὶ πολλὴν ἤξει·
 καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιθυμιῶν
 αὔξαντο καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσι
 πολλάκις. Paraph.

PLEA-
SURE.
Temper-
ance.

τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ
ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν
τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπι-
θυμειὶ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτως
δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω
περὶ σωφροσύνης.

1. *πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ*] See by Aristotle on this subject, p. 46,
a somewhat similar comparison used 31.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK IV.



IN this Book Aristotle continues to apply his general definition of virtue to the particular species of it. In the previous Book he had explained two of the eleven virtues, of which he has given a brief sketch in Book ii. 6, namely, Courage and Temperance. In this, he now proceeds to the consideration of the remaining eight. Of which two, Liberality and Magnificence, have money for their object-matter. Two, Magnanimity and Modesty, honour. The next, Clemency, anger. The three last have regard to the daily intercourse of social life, Sincerity, Wit, and Politeness. And in the last Chapter, he examines whether Modesty is to be classed among the virtues or not.

The latter part of the preceding and the whole of the present Book is frequently illustrated by Theophrastus, the disciple of Aristotle, in his Characters.

ARISTOTELIS
ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. IV.

CHAP. I.

Of the Habits employed on the giving and taking of Money.

PRODIGALITY—LIBERALITY—ILLIBERALITY.

ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝ δ' ἐξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος, δοκεῖ MONEY.
δ' εἶναι ἡ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ Giving and taking.
ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς Liberality.
ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ The object-
ὁ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ matter of
their habits.

2. ἢ *περὶ χρήματα*] Quælibet virtus mediocritas esse videtur circa eam materiam et objecta, circa quæ cum bene se habet laudatur, at liberalitas laudatur cum bene se habet circa pecunias, ergo ipsa est mediocritas circa pecunias tanquam circa suam materiam, et non circa res bellicas, aut circa ea quæ afferunt voluptates. Et declarat philosophus quid intelligit per pecunias; sc. non solum nummos, sed omnia etiam quæ pretio et nummis æstimari et mensurari possunt.

Notandum quod objectum sive materia cujuslibet virtutis est duplex, propinquum et remotum. Nam forti-

tudo versatur circa timores et fiducias tanquam circa materiam propinquam: circa pericula bellica et mortem, tanquam circa remotum. Idem est de temperantia, cujus materia propinqua sunt voluptates cupiditates et hujusmodi: remota vero sunt illa quæ afferunt cupiditates et efficiunt voluptatem, ut cibus potus et res veneræ. Liberalitatis est etiam duplex materia; propinqua est cupiditas pecuniarum, remota vero sunt ipsæ pecuniæ: et hoc dicitur quia virtutes non solum circa actus versari videntur, sed etiam circa affectus quos moderantur.—Actiaj.

MONEY. *δόσει.*
Giving and
taking.

Liberality.

νόμισματι μετρεῖται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν αἰετοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι, 5 τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν. διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· πολλὰς γὰρ ἅμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται· βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος 10 εἶναι ὁ ἔν τι κακὸν ἔχων, τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δι' αὐτὸν ἀπολλύμενος, δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. οὕτω δὲ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα. ὣν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία, ἔστι τού- 15 τοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς· ὁ πλούτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων· ἐκάστῳ δ' ἄριστα χρῆται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετὴν· καὶ πλούτῳ δὲ χρῆσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἀρετὴν. οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος. Χρήσις δ' εἶναι 20 δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἡ δὲ λήψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτήσις μᾶλλον. διὸ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου τὸ δίδοναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, 25 καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχροῦ μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ μὲν δόσει ἔπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, τῇ δὲ λήψει

The actions
of the
liberal.

1. ἄξια] See v. c. 7.

10. οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται] οὐδὲ οἰ-

κείως προσαγορεύονται ἐν ἀνομασίαις μίαν
κακίαν δηλοῦναι. Paraph.

τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις ^{MONEY.}
 τῷ δίδοντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι, καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος ^{Giving and}
 δὲ μᾶλλον. καὶ ῥᾶον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· ^{taking.}
 τὸ γὰρ οἰκείον ἦττον προίενται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ
 5 λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ ἐλευθέριοι δὲ
 λέγονται οἱ δίδοντες· οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ
 εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἦττον
 εἰς δικαιοσύνην· οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦν-
 ται πάνυ. φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευ-
 10 θέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιμοι γάρ, τοῦτο.
 2 δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. Αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ ^{And the}
 καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει ^{modes and}
 τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα ^{conditions}
 καὶ ὅτε, καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα ἔπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. ^{he will ob-}
 15 καὶ ταῦτα ἠδέως ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν ^{serve in}
 ἠδὲ ἢ ἄλυπον, ἠκιστα δὲ λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ διδοὺς ^{them.}
 οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ διὰ τιν'
 ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις
 ῥηθήσεται. οὐδ' ὁ λυπηρῶς· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔλοιτ'
 20 ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ
 ἐλευθερίου. οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ· οὐδὲ
 γὰρ ἔστι τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα ἢ τοιαύτη
 λήψις. οὐκ ἂν εἶη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γὰρ
 ἔστι τοῦ εὖ ποιοῦντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι. ὅθεν
 25 δὲ δεῖ, λήψεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων,
 οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχη
 δίδοναι. οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν ἰδίων, βουλόμενός γε
 διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι
 δώσει, ἵνα ἔχη δίδοναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὐ

10. τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς] Sc. τῶν σπου-
 δαίων. See the Rhetoric, i. 9.

11. κατ' ἀρετὴν] See p. 113, 115.

MONEY. *καλόν.* ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερ-
 Giving and *βάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ*
 taking.
 Liberty. *ἐλάττω· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθε-*
 ρίου. *κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται·*
οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ὁ
ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἕξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν
 Certain pe- *οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. Οὐθέν δὲ κωλύει ἐλευθεριώτερον*
 cularities *εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα, εἰάν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων*
 respecting *διδῶ. ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ*
 him. *κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπει-*
ροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι
μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ
ποιηταί. πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον,
μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικόν, προετικόν
δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἵς
ἕνεκα τῆς δόσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ
ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν.
συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε
χρήματ' ἔχειν μὲ ἐπιμελούμενον ὅπως ἔχη, ὥσπερ
οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ 20
οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ
ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς
ταῦτα ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν.
ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθερίος ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν
οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων 25
ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους·
 Recapitula- *τὸ γὰρ πλήθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥάδιον εἶναι*
 tion. *ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. Τῆς*

4. *κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν*] Liberty has
 no fixed or definite measure, but must
 depend upon the fortunes and station

of the individual. See p. 40. n.

11. *πάσης ἀγαπᾶμε*] See Plato's
 Repub. p. 330.

ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ μεσότητος οὔσης περὶ χρημά- MONEY.
 των δόσιν καὶ λήψιν, ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ δώσει Giving and
 καὶ δαπανήσει εἰς ἅ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν taking.
 μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἠδέως· καὶ λήψε- Liberality.
 5 ται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ
 περὶ ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφοτέρα
 ὡς δεῖ· ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικείᾳ δώσει ἢ τοιαύτη
 λήψις, ἢ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν
 οὖν ἐπόμενα γίνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ'
 10 ἐναντία δῆλον ὡς οὐ. εἰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ
 τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίνει αὐτῷ ἀναλίσκειν, λυπή-
 σεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ
 καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς
 δεῖ. καὶ εὐκοινωνήτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς
 15 χρήματα· δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε
 τὰ χρήματα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον
 μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπούμενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσε,
 καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. ὁ δ' ἄσωτος
 3 καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδέεται ἐφ'
 20 οἷς δεῖ οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ οὔτε λυπεῖται· ἔσται δὲ
 προϋοῦσι φανερώτερον· Εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ὅτι The ex-
 ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἢ ἀσωτία καὶ ἢ tremes,
 ἀνελευθερία, καὶ ἐν δυσίν, ἐν δώσει καὶ λήψει· prodigality
 καὶ τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. ἢ and illibe-
 25 μὲν οὖν ἀσωτία τῷ δίδοναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν rality, com-
 ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει, ἢ δ' pared and
 ἀνελευθερία τῷ δίδοναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν defined.
 δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. τὰ μὲν οὖν

18. Σιμωνίδῃ] See the Rhet. iii. 2.

28. πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς] Liberales lar-

gietur ut debet non aliter in parvis
quam in magnis; avarus tamen superat

MONEY. τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον
 Giving and taking. μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι· ταχέως γὰρ
 Liberality. ἐπιλείπει ἢ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ
 καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἀσωτοὶ εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ὁ γε τοιοῦτος
 δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῶ βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευ- 5
 θέρου. εὐιάτος τε γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας
 καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται
 ἔλθειν. ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου· καὶ γὰρ
 δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς δεῖ οὐδ'
 εὔ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθεῖν ἢ πῶς ἄλλως μεταβάλαι, 10
 εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ
 λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι
 φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς
 τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα,
 ἡλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀσωτος πολὺ 15
 δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι διὰ τε τὰ
 εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλούς, ὁ δὲ
 οὐθένα, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτόν. Ἄλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ
 Peculiarities of prodigality. τῶν ἀσώτων, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν
 ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. 20
 ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀνα-
 λίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι·
 ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγ-
 κάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν πορίζειν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ
 τὸ μῆθὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ 25

accipiendi modum in parvis tantum, quippe cum in magnis esset spoliator, non avarus. Lambinus male vertit πλὴν πρᾶτεργματ, quasi sensus esset in parvis. Eustratius aperte pro nobis facit: πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς οὕτω ἐκποιδιστοῖ εἶσθ, οἷς καὶ οἱ μικροεπίσταται καλοῦ-

μενοι· οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τὰ μεγάλα λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλουσιν· οἷοί εἰσι καὶ οἱ τύραννοι ἀπληροῦ καὶ ἐπισοίκαται καὶ ἄδικοι καὶ ἀσιβῆς, οὐκ ἀπλιθύθησι καλοῦνται. MICH.

1. συνδυάζεται.] Michelet and others read συναίχεται.

πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· δίδοναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, MONEY.
Giving and
taking.
 τὸ δὲ πῶς ἢ πόθεν οὐθὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. διόπερ
 οὐδ' ἐλευθέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ
 καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ
 5 ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὐς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουσίους
 ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη οὐδὲν ἄν
 δοῖεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορί-
 ζουσι πολλά. διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσιν οἱ
 πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς
 10 ἀκολασίας δαπανηροί εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς
 τὸ καλὸν ζῆν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν· ὁ
 μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος εἰς
 ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν δ' ἐπιμελείας εἰς τὸ
 μέσον καὶ τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἄν. Ἡ δ' ἀνελευ- Of Illibe-
rality.
 15 θερία ἀνιάτος ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ
 πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν. καὶ συμ-
 φνέστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ
 πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. καὶ
 διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πολυειδὲς ἐστίν· πολλοί
 20 γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν
 δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως καὶ
 τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὀλόκληρος
 παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ οἱ μὲν
 τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλεί-
 25 πουσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίας
 οἶον φειδωλοί, γλίσχροι, κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει
 ἐλλείπουσιν, τῶν δ' ἄλλοτριῶν οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ
 βούλονται λαμβάνειν, οἱ μὲν διὰ τινα ἐπιείκειαν

14. ἀνελευθερία] See the Charact.
of Theophrast. xxii. περὶ ἀνελευθερίας.

26. φειδωλό] Compare Aristoph.
Plutus, 236.

MONEY.
Giving and
taking.

Liberality.

καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχροῶν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι
ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν, ἵνα μὴ ποτ'
ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχρόν τι πρᾶξαι. τούτων δὲ καὶ
ὁ κυμνοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος ὠνόμασται
δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηθενὶ ἂν δοῦναι. οἱ δ'
δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὡς
οὐ ρᾶδιον τὸ αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἑτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ
δ' αὐτοῦ ἑτέρους μὴ ἄρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μῆτε
λαμβάνειν μῆτε δίδοναι. οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν
ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν,¹⁰
οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι,
πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ
κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῷ. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὅθεν
οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὅποσον οὐ δεῖ. κοινὸν δ'
ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἢ αἰσχροκέρδεια φαίνεται· πάντες γὰρ¹⁵
ἔνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνειδῆ ὑπομέ-
νουσιν. τοὺς γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ λαμ-
βάνοντας, μηδὲ ἂν δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους,
οἷον τοὺς τυράννους πόλεις πορνοῦντας καὶ ἱερὰ
συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς²⁰
καὶ ἀδίκους. ὁ μέντοι κυβευτῆς καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης
καὶ ὁ ληστῆς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσὶν αἰσχροκερ-
δεῖς γάρ. κέρδους γὰρ ἔνεκεν ἀμφότεροι πραγ-
ματεύονται καὶ ὀνειδῆ ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν
κινδύνους τοὺς μεγίστους ἔνεκα τοῦ λήμματος,²⁵
οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερδαίνουσιν, αἷς δεῖ δίδοναι.
ἀμφότεροι δὲ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι
αἰσχροκερδεῖς, καὶ πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται λήψεις
ἀνελεύθεροι. εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθερίῳτι ἀνε-

4. κυμνοπρίστης] See the Com-
mentators on Aristophan. Vesp. 1311.

13. κατὰ μικρὸν] Lending small
sums upon great interest.

λευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται· μείζον τε γὰρ ἐστὶ MONEY. Giving and taking.
κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀμαρ-
τάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν. περὶ Liberty.
μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων
δ κακιῶν τοσαυτ' εἰρήσθω.

CHAP. II.

Of the Habits employed upon the expending of Money with
sumptuousness.

VULGAR PROFUSION—MAGNIFICENCE—MEANNESS.

4 ΔΟΞΕΙΕ δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ MONEY. Sumptuous spending.
μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν· δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ
χρήματά τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι. οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευ- Magnificence.
θεριότης διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι
10 πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν matter of these habits.
τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος μεγέθει.
καθάπερ γὰρ τοῦνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, ἐν μεγέ-
θει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς
τι. οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ
15 ἀρχιθεωρῷ. τὸ πρέπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ
καὶ περὶ ᾧ. ὁ δ' ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ'
ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπῆς, οἷον
τὸ “πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτη” ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις
οὕτως, ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἐλευθέριος, ὁ δ'
20 ἐλευθέριος οὐθὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπῆς· τῆς τοι-
αύτης δ' ἕξω ἢ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια

18. αλλὰ] See Homer's *Odys.*
P. 420.

20. οὐθὲν μᾶλλον] οὐδὲν. *Is not*
the more.

MONEY. καλεῖται, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία
 Sumptuous καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει
 spending. περι ἅ δει, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ
 Magnif- λαμπρυνόμεναι· ὕστερον δὲ περι αὐτῶν ἐρούμεν.
 cence. Ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν· τὸ 5
 The pecu- πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι
 liarities of the magni- μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶπομεν,
 ficient. ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν.
 αἱ δὴ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ
 πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ 10
 ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε
 τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν
 δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἢ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπα-
 νήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπῆς τοῦ καλοῦ
 ἔνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι 15
 ἠδέως καὶ προετικῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μικρο-
 πρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον,
 σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου.
 ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ
 εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἅ δει καὶ 20
 ὡς δεῖ. ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς,
 οἷον μέγεθος, περι ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος
 οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον
 ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἢ αὐτῇ
 ἀρετῇ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου· κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ 25
 πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός, ἔργον

3. περι ἅ δει] Supra diximus ad p. 72. in universum hujus virtutis mediocritatem esse proportionem quandam. Jam nunc triplicem hujus proportionis rationem profert, cum decorum hujus virtutis exstat, si proportio servetur:

spectatur autem decorum I. et personæ quæ impendit, II. et rei in quam impendit, III. et pecuniæ quæ impenditur, qua partitione ipse in describendo magnifico infra utetur. MICH.

7. ἢ ἐλαχίστῃ] See p. 55.

δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν. τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ **MONEY.**
 θεωρία θαυμαστή, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμα- **Sumptuous**
 στόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετῆ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν **spending.**
 μεγέθει. Ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων, οἷα λέγομεν **Magnif-**
 5 τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεοῦς ἀναθήματα καὶ **cence.**
 κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ **Both in**
 πάντων τὸ δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφι- **public,**
 λοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν **(which are**
 λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν. **more espe-**
 10 ἐν ἅπασιν ὃ ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν πράτ- **cially his**
 τοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων· **object),**
 ἄξια γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ **And in pri-**
 ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ποιῶντι πρέπειν. διὸ πένης **vate acts.**
 15 ὢν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν **And in pri-**
 ἡλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον, κατ' **vate acts.**
 ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. πρέπει δὲ καὶ οἷς τὰ τοιαῦτα **And in pri-**
 προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ διὰ τῶν προγόνων ἢ ὢν **vate acts.**
 αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδό-
 20 ξοῖς καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος **And in pri-**
 ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ **vate acts.**
 μεγαλοπρεπής, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δαπανήμασιν **And in pri-**
 ἢ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ **vate acts.**
 καὶ ἐντιμότερα. Τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ **And in pri-**
 25 γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ εἰ **vate acts.**
 περὶ τι πᾶσα ἢ πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι,
 καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολάς, καὶ

2. θεωρία] *θεῖραι* dicebantur qui-
 cumque ad conventus sacrorum aut
 solennia sacrificia aut etiam oracula
 ablegabantur. Quorum scilicet prin-

ceps erat *ἀρχιθεῖραιος*. Dixere autem
 et *θεῖραιαν* hanc ipsam administratio-
 nem. CAM.

MONEY. δωρεάς καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανη-
Sumptuous
spending. ρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά, τὰ δὲ

Magnific-
ence.

δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. μεγαλοπρε-
 ποῦς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως
 τῷ πλούτῳ· κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ οὗτος. καὶ περὶ ὧ
 ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν
 ἔργων· κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα. καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τὸ
 πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώ-
 ποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανη-
 μάτων ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλο- 10
 πρεπέστατον μὲν τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα
 δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα. καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ
 ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι· σφαῖρα μὲν
 γὰρ ἢ λήκυθος ἢ καλλίστη ἔχει μεγαλοπρέπειαν
 παιδικῷ δώρον, ἢ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ 15
 ἀνελεύθερον. διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς,
 ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῆ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν· τὸ
 γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐνυέρβλητον, καὶ ἔχον κατ'
 ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ ὅ
 μεγαλοπρεπῆς, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον καὶ βάνουσος 20
 τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει, ὥσπερ
 εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων
 πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος,
 οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἐστιῶν, καὶ κωμφοδοῖς
 χορηγῶν ἐν τῷ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, 25
 ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει
 οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικ-

Vulgar
Profuse-ness.

20. βάνουσι] οἱ ἰθαῖοι νιχιῦται καὶ
 παρὰ βάνου· ἢ ἴσοι καμίον· τὶ ἔργον
 διατιθίμενοι. οἱ δὲ βάνουσι ἐπὶ ἀπάσθου-
 σον καὶ ὑπερέφασον. ἴσιν δὲ βανούσου

χίμερι τῆς ὀβρισιτιπῆς ἢ τιχιναῖς. Schol.
 upon Plato's Theæt. in Bekker. Com.
 Cr. ii. 363. See Heindorf's note on
 Theæt. p. 176. §. 85.

νύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, MONEY. Sumptuous spending.
 καὶ οὐ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλώσει, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν,
 οὐ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλά. Ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπῆς περὶ Magnificence.
 πάντα ἐλλείψει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ Meanness.
 τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ, καὶ ὅ τι ἂν ποιῆ μέλλων, καὶ
 σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσει, καὶ ταῦτ'
 ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ
 δεῖ. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις αὐται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν
 ὀνειδίη γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ
 10 πέλους εἶναι μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.

CHAP. III.

Habits employed upon the desire of Honour, or ambition of being distinguished.

THE VAIN-GLORIOUS—NOBLE-MINDED—MEAN-MINDED.

7 Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μέγала μὲν καὶ ἐκ HONOR. Ambition of receiving.
 τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ
 πρῶτον λάβωμεν. διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ Noble-mindedness.
 τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλό-
 15 ψυχος εἶναι ὁ μέγλων αὐτὸν ἀξίων ἄξιος ὢν.
 ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ
 κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἡλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. μεγα-
 λόψυχος, μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν
 ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξίων ἑαυτὸν σῶφρων, μεγα-
 20 λόψυχος δ' οὐ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἢ μεγαλοψυχία,
 ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μέγλω σώματι, οἱ

11. ἢ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία] Quod hanc virtutem Aristoteles nostro loco tam copiose et accurate præ multis et alijs describit, haud dubie eo pertinet, quia

eadem veterum Atheniensium imprimis propria habebatur. ZELL.

22. τὸ κάλλος] Compare the Rhetoric i. 5.

HONOR. μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ.
Ambition of receiving. ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος·

Noble-mindedness. ὁ δὲ μείζωνων ἢ ἀξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος. ὁ δ' ἐλατ-
τόνων ἢ ἀξιος μικρόψυχος, εἴαν τε μεγάλων εἴαν
τε μετρίων, εἴαν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἀξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλατ-5
τόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοί. καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δόξειεν ὁ
μεγάλων ἀξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ
τοσοῦτων ἦν ἀξιος; ἔστι δὲ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ
μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ
γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸν ἀξιοί. οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι 10
καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. εἰ δὲ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοί
ἀξιος ὢν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἐν
μάλιστα ἂν εἴη. ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς
ἀγαθά. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς
ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώ- 15
ματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἄθλον, τοιοῦτον
δ' ἡ τιμὴ· μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς
ἀγαθῶν. περὶ τιμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλό-
ψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ. καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται
οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ 20
μάλισθ' οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς, κατ' ἀξίαν
δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ
χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τόν
γε μεγαλόψυχον. Ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ 25
τῶν μεγίστων ἀξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· μείζονος
γὰρ αἰεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἀξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος.
τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν
εἶναι. καὶ δόξειε δ' ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν

Peculiarities of the noble-minded.

13. τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά] See the Rhetoric i. 5.

19. ἄνευ δὲ λόγου] Without argument. Is self-evident.

ἐκάστη ἀρετῇ μέγα, οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγα- HONOR.
 λοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος Ambition
 γὰρ ἔνεκα πράξει αἰσχρά, ᾧ οὐθὲν μέγα; καθ' of receiving.
 ἑκάστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ'
 5 ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὢν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν
 οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος ὢν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ
 ἄθλον ἢ τιμῇ, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. ἔοικε
 μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι
 τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ
 10 γίνεταί ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀλη-
 θείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷον τε ἄνευ
 καλοκάγαθίας. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμὰς καὶ His actions.

2. παρασείσαντι] sc. χείρας.

11. ἂν καλοκάγαθίας] Without philosophy. The great attention paid by Socrates to the lovely as well as the virtuous (τὸ καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν), and the intimate connection between the two, is familiar to the reader of Plato's Dialogues. From habituating the mind to love that which is beautiful to the senses, Socrates wished to lead his disciples gradually to the contemplation of that which was really and unchangingly beautiful, until the love of that which is supremely good and supremely beautiful ended in one and the same thing. (See *Repub.* 401—2. *Sympos.* 210.) τοῦτο γὰρ δή τις ἐπὶ ἐβῆς ἐστὶ τὰ ἱερτικὰ ἵσαι ἢ ὅσ' ἄλλου ἀγνοῦναι ἀρχόμενοι ἀπὸ τῶνδ' τῶν καλῶν ἐκίνοιο ἵσαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ ἱσανίαι, ἄσπερ ἱσαναβαθμοῖς χρώμενοι, ἀπὸ ἰνῶς ἐστὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ δυῖν ἐστὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐστὶ τὰ καλὰ ἱστικηδύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἱστικηδύματων ἐστὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, ἴσ' ἂν ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἴσ' ἐκίνοιο τὸ μάθημα τιλιωτήρη, ἢ ἴσ' οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκίνοιο

τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, καὶ γῆ αὐτὸ τιλιωτῶν ἢ ἴσ' καλόν. *Symp.* 211. c. With Socrates then and his disciples the enquiry after the beautiful and the virtuous was never separated, and hence they called those who sought for moral beauty, and consequently the virtuous and good, καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί. In subsequent times, however, though this term retained its meaning, the inquiry after beauty and virtue was disunited, as is well expressed by a modern writer. "Sed vis et natura τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ deinde apparuit maxime, postquam id Cynici tandemque Stoici a pulcro et decoro exemplo ipsi suo, vivendi philosophandique ratione disjuxerunt. Nam apud germanos Socraticos sic illa conjuncta fuerant, ut nec pulcrum aestimarent nisi quod bonum, nec bonum nisi quod idem pulcrum esset. Unde virtutem vocare amabant καλοκάγαθίας. Sed Aristippus et Cyrenaici τὸ καλόν, Antisthenes et Cynici, e quorum secta Stoici exiterunt, τὸ ἀγαθόν unice, certe maxime prosecuti sunt. Heusde *Init. Phil. Plat.* ii. 1. 49.

HONOR. ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς
Ambition
of receiving. μεγάλας καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθή-

Noblemind-
edness. σεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων
ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμῆ·
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεται γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοῦς 5
μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν. τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων
καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγορήσει· οὐ γὰρ τού-
των ἀξίος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται
δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν,
ὡσπερ εἶρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ 10
μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ
πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως ἔξει, ὅπως
ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὐτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρῆς ἔσται
οὐτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμῆν
οὕτως ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι 15
καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετά· οἱ
γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται.
ᾧ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τᾶλλα.
Success
contributes
to noble-
minded-
ness. διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ 8
τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. 20
οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύ-
οντες ἢ οἱ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ'
ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. διὸ καὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ
ὑπὸ τινῶν. κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μένος 25
τιμητέος· ᾧ δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται
τιμῆς. οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες

See also De Geer's Diat. in Polit. Platon. principia, p. 93.

In common use, however, this term was employed to denote those who had enjoyed the honours of

the state in opposition to the undistinguished populace (τῆ ἡμέρῃ). See Stallb. Introd. to the Meno of Plato, p. xii. Ed. 1827.

οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς HONOR. Ambition of receiving.
 μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντε-
 λούς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. ὑπεράπτται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ Noblemind- edness.
 καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίνονται. ἄνευ
 5 γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥάδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχή-
 ματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν
 ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν,
 αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται
 γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο
 10 δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν
 οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. ὁ
 δὲ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ
 ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ His conduct in reference to,
 μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα 1. Forti- tude.
 15 τιμᾶν, μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ,
 ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν πάντως ζῆν.
 Καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται· 2. Libe- rality.
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. καὶ
 ἀντενεργητικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γὰρ προσοφλήσει
 20 ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονηθὼς. δοκοῦσι δὲ
 καὶ μνημονεύειν οὓς ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ' ἂν
 πάθωσιν οὐ· ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιή-
 σαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἠδέως
 ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν
 25 τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Δίῳ· οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς

20. Διοῦσι.] See Thucyd. ii. 40.

24. Θίεισ.] See Homer's Il. I. 503.

25. οἱ Λάκωνες] τὸ ἢ σιγῇ Λακωναίους καὶ οὐκ ἴστωσι Καλλιπιδίους ἐν τῷ ἀρχαίῳ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἵτι Θεβαίων ἐν τῷ Λακωνικῷ ἱμβαλλόντων Ἰσχυφάν Λακωναίους πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους συμ- μαχίας διέμενοι· λέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τῶν

Ἀθηναίων, ἴσα μὲν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ Λακωναίους πιστεύουσι εὖ, τοῦτων ἱσχυφάνους ἰσχύειν, δ' ἄν αὐτοὶ χρηστὰ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἱσχυφάνους, τοῦτων ἱμῖναι. ὡς διὰ τοῦτων αὐτοὺς ἱσχυφάνους πρὸς τὴν συμμαχίαν μᾶλλον. Schol. See however Xenophon's Hist. Gr. vi. 5. §. 33.

HONOR. *τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθησαν εὖ. Μεγα-*
 Ambition
 of receiving. *λοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηθενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγισ,*
 Noblemind-
 edness. *ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν*
 In his man-
 ners, con-
 duct, and
 outward
 circum-
 stances. *ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς*
μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν δ
καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν
σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς
φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι.
καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὐ πρωτεύουσιν
ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητήν ἀλλ' ἢ¹⁰
ᾧπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακ-
τικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ
καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον· τὸ γὰρ
λανθάνειν φοβουμένου. καὶ μέλει τῆς ἀληθείας
μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης, καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν¹⁵
φανερῶς· παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν.
διὸ καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλην ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν·
εἴρωνα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον
μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον· δουλικὸν
γάρ, διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ²⁰
ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐθέν γὰρ
μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ μνησικάκος· οὐ γὰρ με-
γαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε
γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἐτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ²⁵
ἵνα ἐπαινῆται μέλει αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι
ψέγωνται, οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστίν· διόπερ οὐδὲ

16. *ἀὰ ἐν καταφρονεῖν*] Compare the same use of this word in Thucydides, ii. 62.

24. *ἀνθρωπολόγος*] Not given to talking about other people and their

affairs. Which is much more in reality the case with the truly magnanimous, the philosopher, as Plato observes. See Theæt. p. 173.

κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. HONOR. Ambition of receiving.
καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἤκιστα ὀλοφυρ-
κὸς καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν Noblemind- edness.
περὶ ταῦτα. καὶ οἶος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ
5 καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ἀφελίμων· αὐτάρ-
κους γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ
μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ
λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικός ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα
σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μὴτὲν μέγα οἰόμενος·
10 ἢ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτῆς διὰ τούτων. Τοι- The ex-
οὔτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων sidered.
9 μικρόψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ 1. The Mean-
μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι· οὐ γὰρ κα-
κοποιοὶ εἰσιν· ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρό-
15 ψυχος ἄξιος ὧν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὧν
ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ
ἄξιου ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτὸν·
ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ὧν ἄξιος ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων.
οὐ μὴν ἡλίθιοί γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,
20 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκνηροί. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ
καὶ χείρους ποιεῖν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται τῶν κατ'
ἄξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν
καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. Οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἡλίθιοι 2. The
Vain-glo-
rious.
25 καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς· ὡς
γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἴτα

5. ἀκαρπια] See Aristotle's Rhetoric, i. 9.

20. ἐπιτηδεῖ] Præteritum lectionem veteri sunt potius intelligentes, i. e. ut Eustratius interpretatur, "acres nimis et considerabundi (ἀκριεῖς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύοντες).

nos)." MICH. Were such a reading adopted, these characters would much resemble that of Shakspeare's Hamlet. See also Herod. vii. 50.

24. χαῦνοι] See Theophrast. Character. xxiv. περι ὑπερηφανίας.

HONOR. ἐξελέγονται· καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχή-
 Ambition of receiving. ματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυ-
 Noble-mindedness. χήματα φανερὰ εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ λέγουσι περὶ
 αὐτῶν ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι. ἀντιτίθεται
 δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχία ἢ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς⁵
 χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χειρόν
 ἐστίν. ἢ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμῆν ἐστὶ
 μεγάλην, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

CHAP. IV.

Habits employed upon the desire of Honor in small things.

AMBITIOUS—NAMELESS—UNAMBITIOUS.

HONOR in small things. ΕΟΙΚΕ δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετή τις,¹⁰
 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἢ δόξειεν ἂν¹⁰
 The object-matter of these habits. παραπλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ
 καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν.
 ἄμφω γὰρ αὐταὶ τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ
 δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς
 δεῖ. ὥσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει καὶ δόσει χρημάτων¹⁵
 μεσότης ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις, οὕτω
 καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον,
 καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τόν τε γὰρ φιλότιμον
 ψέγομεν ὡς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ
 τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον, τόν τε ἀφιλότιμον ὡς οὐδ'²⁰

CHAP. IV.

These habits bear the same relation to those in the last Chapter, as Liberality and its extremes to Magnificence and its extremes. Liberality being concerned with the spending of

small, Magnificence of great sums. So noble-mindedness is concerned with great, these habits with small honors.

10. πρώταις] See p. 72.

16. ἀσεβελή] See Theoph. Charact. xxi. περὶ μικροφιλονικίας.

ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. Ἔστι HONOR
 δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ in small
 φιλόκαλον, τὸν δὲ ἀφιλότιμον ὡς μέτριον καὶ things.
 σόφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἶπομεν. The ex-
 5 δῆλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτιοῦτου λεγο- tremes of
 μένου οὐκ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ φέρομεν τὸν φιλότιμον, this Habit
 ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, assume
 ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. ἀωνύμου δ' sometimes
 οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβη- the appear-
 10 τεῖν τὰ ἄκρα· ἐν οἷς δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ance of the
 ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον. ὀρέγονται δὲ τιμῆς καὶ mean.
 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἦττον, ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ ὡς δεῖ
 ἐπαινεῖται γοῦν ἢ ἕξις αὕτη, μεσότης οὔσα περὶ
 15 τιμὴν ἀωνύμος. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλο-
 τιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν
 φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφότερα δὲ ἀμφότερά πως.
 ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς.
 ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθ' οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ
 μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

CHAP. V.

THE CHOLERIC—THE MERCIFUL—ANON.

11 ΠΡΑΟΤΗΣ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς, ΠΑΘΟΣ.
 ἀωνύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ The object-
 matter of
 these
 habits.

9. ἐρήμης] See p. 75. 6.

14. ἀωνύμος] We have no terms to express these habits or the relation they bear to the previous, or the extremes of the Liberal to those of

the Magnificent. Those which I have used must therefore be understood in a sense restricted by the matter, upon which they are said to be employed.

ΠΑΘΟΣ. τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸν μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρο-

μεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνώνυμον
οὔσαν. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιότης τις λέγεται ἄν. τὸ
μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή, τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα

πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖς

καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ
ὅτε καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται· πρᾶος δὲ οὗτος
ἄν εἴη, εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινεῖται. βούλεται γὰρ
ὁ πρᾶος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ
πάθους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ 10
τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν.

ἀμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν·
οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον συγ-
γνωμονικός. Ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία τίς
ἐστὶν εἴθ' ὅ τι δὴ ποτε, ψέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργι- 15
ζόμενοι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ ἡλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ
μὴ ὡς δεῖ μηδ' ὅτε μηδ' οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ
αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε
οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός. τὸ δὲ προπηλακιζόμενον
ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραπο- 20

δῶδες. Ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται

καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον
ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θάπτον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον· οὐ μὴν
ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ'
εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, κἂν 25
ὀλόκληρον ἢ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν οὖν
ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ
καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται

The ex-
tremes con-
sidered.
1. The de-
fective.

2. The cho-
leric.

8. βούλειται γὰρ] Ut supra βούλειται
γὰρ ἢ ἕκαστος εἶναι. Id est, eo est animo
mansuetus. CAM.

21. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολή] See the Rhetoric,
i. 2.

δὲ ταχέως· ὁ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. συμβαίνει ΠΑΘΩΣ,
 δ' αὐτοῖς τούτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ' Mercifal-
 ἀνταποδιδόασιν ἢ φανεροί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, ness,
 εἴτ' ἀποπαύονται. Ὑπερβολῇ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρό- Three spe-
 5 χολοὶ ὀξείσιν καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· cies of this
 ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα. Οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι, excess.
 καὶ πολλὸν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν 1. ἀπέχο-
 θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῶ· ἢ λαί.
 γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς 2. πικροί.
 10 λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα. τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ 3. χαλεπαί.
 βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ This ex-
 συμπεῖθει αὐτοὺς οὐδεὶς, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν treme fur-
 ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀκλη- ther from
 15 ρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. Χαλεποὺς δὲ the mean
 λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ than the
 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλα- other.
 τομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως. Τῇ πραότητι This ex-
 δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ γὰρ treme fur-
 μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖ- ther from
the mean
than the
other.

4. ὑπερβολῇ] Aristotle enumerates three species of anger and angry persons. *οἱ ἀπέχουσι—οἱ πικροί—οἱ χαλεπαί.* The I. (whom we in our language generally term *hasty*) are such as are easily provoked, which is their principal fault, nevertheless they retain their anger but for a short time. The II. the bitter and implacable, are guilty of three faults: first because they retain their anger long and are not satisfied till they have had their revenge; secondly, because they hide their feelings in their own breast, and do not allow the persons who have offended them the means of reconciliation; and thirdly, because they are morose even to their

best friends and companions. The III. the violent and savage, which like the former admit of no reconciliation till they have been revenged, who are likewise guilty of two faults besides, first in being angry more than they ought, and secondly in retaining that anger longer than they ought. But they differ from the former, inasmuch as they do not conceal their feelings.

12. πέψαι] Cf. Homer's *Il. A.* 81—3.

ἴσατε γὰρ τι χόλον γι καὶ αὐτῆμαρ
 παρσάψῃ

ἀλλά γι καὶ μινότησθι ἴχμ κίτσι
 ὄφρα τελίσῃ.

ἰσ στήσσι κίτσι.

ΠΛΘΟΣ. σθαι. καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιωῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χείρους.

Merciful-
ness.

A slight
transgression
of the mean not
blamed.

ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἶρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν
λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον διορίσαι τὸ
πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον
ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις ἢ
ἢ ἀμαρτάνει. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων
οὐ ψέγεται, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον·
ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ
πράους φαμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις
ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὲ πόσον καὶ πῶς 10
παρεκβαίνων ψεκτός, οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀπο-
δοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει
ἢ κρίσις. ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον δῆλον, ὅτι ἢ μὲν
μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετή, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα
καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, 15
αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί, καὶ ἐπὶ
μικρὸν μὲν γινόμεναι ἡρέμα, ἐπὶ πλεόν δὲ μᾶλλον,
ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης
ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον. αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν
ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν. 20

CHAP. VI.

THE OFFICIOUS—THE POLITE—THE CONTENTIOUS.

SOCIAL-
ITY.

Politeness.
The object-
matter of
these ha-
bits. And

EN δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων 12
καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦ-
σιν εἶναι, οἱ πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ

2. πρότερον] See ii. 6.
6. μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων] Compare
p. 79. 5.

particularly appropriate to the Athe-
nians. See Thuc. ii. 137. sq.

22. ἄρεσκοι] See Theophrast. Cha-
ract. v. σιγῆ ἀρεσιμίας.

CHAP. VI.

The discussion of these virtues is

οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι SOCIAL-
ITY.
τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας τού-
τοισι πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν Politeness.
οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες that they
are distin-
guished by
the different
ends which
they have
in view.
καλοῦνται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέται ἕξεις ψεκταί
εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετή,
καθ' ἣν ἀποδέχεται ἅ δει καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ δυσχερανεῖ. ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ
τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλία· τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ
10 κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν οἶον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν
ἐπιεικῆ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει
δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέρ-
γειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν
ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι.
15 ὁμοίως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνή-
θεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν
ἐκάστοις ὡς ἀρμόζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει
συνήθων καὶ ὀθνεῖων φροντίζειν, οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν.
Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει, Of Polite-
ness.
20 ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον
στοχάσεται τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν. ἔοικε
μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς
ὁμιλίαις γινομένας, τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ
μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ
25 προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν. κἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχη-
μοσύνην φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικρὰν, ἢ βλάβην,
ἢ δ' ἐναντίωσις μικρὰν λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέχεται
ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. διαφερόντως δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς

11. Διαφέρει] Præstat hic habitus amicitias, quæ quidem non ipsa virtus inter instrumenta tantum virtutis nu-

meratur, quum amore ductus, non ratione, amicus recte agat. MICH.

SOCIAL-
ITY.

Politeness.

The ex-
tremes.

ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἦπτον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς, ἐκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν αἰρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, εἰάν ἢ μείζω, ὁ συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαυθις μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει. Ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δέ, τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι ἄρεσκος, ὁ δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γίγνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων, κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. ἀντικείμεθα δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἐαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

15

CHAP. VII.

THE VAIN-GLORIOUS—THE SINCERE—THE SELF-
DETRACTOR.SOCIAL-
ITY.Sincerity.
The object-
matter of
these
habits.

ΠΕΡΙ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδὸν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλα-13
ζονείας μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. οὐ χειρὸν
δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν· μᾶλλον τε γὰρ ἂν
εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες,
καὶ μεσότητος εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύοισαμεν ἂν, 20
ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνηδύνοντες. ἐν δὲ τῷ
συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες

CHAP. VII.

Aristotle now proceeds to discuss another class of habits, which are concerned with the conversation and intercourse of daily life. To express the mean of these habits, the Greek

possesses no appropriate term, although we may very well define it by the words *sincerity* or *candour*. Being that virtue which neither exaggerates nor extenuates its own merits.

εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθεύοντων τε καὶ ψευδο- SOCIAL-
ITY.
 μένων εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι καὶ Sincerity.
 τῷ προσποιήματι. δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζῶν προσ-
 ποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ
 5 μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖ-
 σθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ μέσος
 αὐθέκαστος τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ
 λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτόν,
 καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἐλάττω. ἔστι δὲ τούτων
 10 ἕκαστα καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ μηθένος. ἕκαστος
 δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει καὶ οὕτω
 ζῆ, εἰ μὴ τινος ἕνεκα πράττη. καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ
 μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ' ἀληθές
 καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευ-
 15 τικὸς μέσος ὢν ἐπαινετός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφο-
 τεροι μὲν ψεκτοί, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ ἀλαζῶν. Περὶ The sincere
described.
 ἑκατέρου δ' εἴπωμεν, πρότερον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀλη-
 θευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις
 ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιο-
 20 σύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταυτ' ἀρετῆς),
 ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηθένος τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν
 λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιοῦτος
 εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπιεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ
 γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων,
 25 ἀληθεύσει καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει ἔτι μᾶλλον· ὡς γὰρ

5. *εἴρων*] *Recessit paulo longius in hoc vitio describendo Theophrastus a magistro. Non enim apud eum εἴρωνία cap. i. tam lenis est dissimulatio, qualis ille Socraticus lusus, quem eundem et Aristoteles hoc loco intelligit, sed potius aliquanto robustior acquitia simulan-*

tis quidvis et dissimulantis, nec per jocum nec satis modeste, sed ut alteri incommodet. Copiosus in hoc discrimine explicando est Casaubonus. ZELL.

7. *αἰτίαντες*] See Zell's note upon this passage.

SOCIAL-ITY. αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦδος εὐλαβήσεται, ὃ γε καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ἠύλαβεῖτο· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἐπαινετός. ἐπὶ τὸ Sincerity. ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀποκλίνει· ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι. 'Ο δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων εἰς προσποιούμενος μηθενὸς ἔνεκα φαύλω μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε τῷ ψεύδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μᾶλλον ἢ κακός. εἰ δ' ἔνεκά τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν ψεκτός, ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών, ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, ἀσχημονέστερος. 10 οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει· κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους. οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονεύομενοι 15 τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιούνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός, οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς πέλας καὶ ἅ διαλαθεῖν ἐστὶ μὴ ὄντα, οἶον μάντιν σοφὸν ἢ ἱατρόν. διὰ τοῦτο οἱ πλείστοι προσποιούνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται· ἐστὶ 20 The self-de-tractor. γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. Οἱ δ' εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἦθη φαίνονται· οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἔνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ

5. ἰ ἢ μείζω] See Theophrast. Charact. xxiii. περί ἀλαζονίας.

11. ἐν τῇ δυνάμει—προαιρέσει] Arrogance consists in the principle and determination, and not in the power of boasting. Just as the liar. For a liar is not he who can but who will tell a lie. And, equally as the arrogant, he is guilty of this fault either because he delights in a lie, or for the sake of glory or gain. For the

sake of glory he pretends to the goods of nature or chance, as beauty, riches, and the like; for sake of gain to those things which bring pleasure to others, the reality of which is not easily detected. The first are foolish rather than vicious, or rather are both foolish, and, in some degree, vicious. The latter still worse, not indeed as far as this habit is concerned, but because they are also unjust.

φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ SOCIAL-
ITY.
 ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. Sincerity.
 οἱ δὲ καὶ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ τὰ φανερὰ προσποιού-
 μνοι βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρόνη-
 5 τοὶ εἰσιν. καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεῖα φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ
 τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ
 λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν. οἱ δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι
 τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδῶν καὶ
 φανερὰ εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται. ἀντι-
 10 κείσθαι δ' ὁ ἀλαζῶν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χεί-
 ρων γάρ.

CHAP. VIII.

THE BUFFOON—THE WIT—THE ASCETICAL.

14 ΟΥΣΗΣ δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ SOCIAL-
ITY.
 ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα Wit.
 εἶναι ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ The object-
matter of
these habits.
 15 ὧς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν. διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν
 τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν. δῆλον δ' ὡς
 καὶ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ τε καὶ ἔλλειψις

2. Σωκράτης] The *ειρωνία* of Socrates appears to be the ironical manner in which he always extenuates his abilities when arguing with the Sophists. This might readily be confirmed by numerous passages, but the subject cannot be easily discussed within the compass of a note.

On self-detraction, or self-blame, Lord Chesterfield has some very good remarks.

4. Βαυκοπανοῦργοι] Βαυκοπανοῦρ-

γοις φησὶ, ὡς ἐν ἀπ' ἰδὸς εἰσὶν, τοὺς εἰμωσανοῦργοις. βαῦνοι γὰρ ἴλιγοι οἱ σκαλιῶ τῶν τρυφῆν· μετνηχθῆαι δ' ἴσται τὸ ἵστωμα ἀπὸ τῶν βαυκῶν δ' ἴσται ἰδὸς ἐκδημάτων Ἴωνικῶν. Ασπας.

6. Λακώνων] οἱ Λάκωνες ἰσθίνας ἔχον ἰσηκούσας μῖνον ἄχρι γούνατον καὶ ἀγκῶνας. τοῦτο δὲ ἴστωλον, ὡς ἴσται, ἰσηκούσιαν ἴσται καὶ μετρήσθησαν ἰσθίμωμοι. διὰ δὲ τῆν σφῆδρα ἐντίλιμον ἐν τῆν ἀλαζονείας δέξαν οὐ διασιφιδόγασαι. Schol. Par. quoted by ZELL.

SOCIAL-
ITY.

Wit.

The mean
and ex-
tremes ge-
nerally con-
sidered.Buffoonery
and wit
often con-
founded.The mean
particularly
described.

τοῦ μέσου. Οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλ-
 λοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί,
 γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στο-
 χαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν
 εὐσχήμονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἷς
 δὲ μήτ' αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μῆδὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε
 λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες ἄγριοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦ-
 σιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι
 προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὐτροποὶ τοῦ γὰρ ἦθους
 αἰ τοιαῦτα δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ
 σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ
 ἦθη. Ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν
 πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν
 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι
 προσαγορεύονται ὡς χαριέντες. ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσι,
 καὶ οὐ μικρόν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον. Τῇ
 μέσῃ δ' ἕξει οἰκίῳν καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ
 δ' ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα

2. βωμολόχῃ] Cur Græcis dicantur
 Scurræ βωμολόχοι, varia redditur ratio.
 Scholiastes Græcus βωμολόχους prop-
 rie ait esse aves, quæ cibi avidissimæ
 soleant etiam *λοχίῳ τοῖς βωμοῖς*, cap-
 tantes si quid ex hostiis in iis reli-
 quiarum remanserit, et hinc dictos et
 Scurras hoc nomine, quasi ut aves
 illæ uadique cibum, ita et Scurræ
 uadique captent risum. Ex Suida
 hanc verbi rationem et originem elicio:
 βωμολόχους proprie esse, qui dum vic-
 timæ immolentur iis astant emendi-
 cantes particulam aut dolo captantes,
 qui, quia de plebe et viles fere fuerint,
 hinc factum ut omnes viliores et aul-
 lins rei homines dicantur βωμολόχοι,
 qui rursus mendici hostiarum, quia

blandis verbis, et risum sacrificanti
 moventibus uterentur, ut facilius quid
 impetrarent. Hinc factum ut qui-
 cumque ridiculis uterentur dicerentur
 βωμολόχοι. GIPH.

5. οἱ δὲ μήτ']

Now by two-headed Janus,
 Nature hath framed strange-fellows
 in her time :

Some that will evermore peep through
 their eyes,

And laugh like parrots at a bagpiper;
 And others of such vinegar aspect,
 That they'll not show their teeth in
 way of smile

Though Nestor swear the jest be
 laughable.

Mereb. of Venice, I. 1.

τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμόττει· ἔστι γὰρ τινὰ SOCIAL-
ITY.
 πρέποντα τῷ τοιοῦτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾷς μέρει καὶ Wit
 ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς
 τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου
 5 καὶ ἀπαιδευτοῦ. ἴδιοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμω-
 διῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν
 γελοῖον ἢ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια·
 διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην.
 πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὀριστέον τῷ λέγειν
 10 ἢ πρέπει ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα,
 ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόριστον;
 ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ
 καὶ ἀκούσεται· ἢ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα
 καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει· τὸ γὰρ
 15 σκῶμμα λοιδορήμᾳ τί ἐστίν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια
 λοιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν. ὁ
 δὴ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἔξει, οἷον νόμος ὧν
 ἑαυτῷ. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ' ἐπι-
 20 δέξιός ἐστ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται. Ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος The ex-
tremes com-
pared.
 ἦπτων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν
 ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσει, καὶ τοιαῦτα
 λέγων ὧν οὐθὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ'
 ἂν ἀκούσαι. ὁ δ' ἄγριος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας
 ἀχρεῖος· οὐθὲν γὰρ συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχε-
 25 ραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ
 βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν
 τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν
 καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν

5. τῶν κωμωδιῶν] See Hor. Ars Poet. 281. sq. The reader may compare the annals of dramatic poetry in

our own country, in the times of Charles II. and George I.

25. ἀνάπαυσις] Compare x. 4.

SOCIAL-ITŪ. — Wit. *περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἢ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίαις.*

CHAP. IX.

BASHFULNESS.

Bashfulness not a habit.

ΠΕΡΙ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὡς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει ¹⁵ λέγειν· πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἔξει. ὀρίζεται γοῦν φόβος τις ἀδοξίας, ἀποτελεῖται δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον· ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυρόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχρῶσιν. σωματικὰ δὲ φαίνεται πως εἶναι ἀμφοτέρα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεως εἶναι. οὐ ¹⁰ πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ· οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι. καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρεσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαι- ¹⁵ νέσειεν ὅτι αἰσχυνηλός· οὐθὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίγνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις· οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ

4. *περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς*] In hoc capite agitur de verecundia seu pudore, utrum etiam sit in numero moralium virtutum recensenda. Cicero quidem in Partitione. Oratoris post enumerationem aliarum virtutum, eam postremo loco recenset, et non virtutem nominat, sed eam dicit esse custodem omnium virtutum, quæ dedecus fugit et laudem

sequitur. Plutarchus pudorem non virtutem, sed calcar et stimulum ad omnem virtutem esse dicit. Plato in Protagora inquit, deum hominibus donasse pudorem et justitiam ut essent civitatum ornamenta et vincula et altrices amicitia. MAG.

6. *ἀδοξίας*] See the Rhetoric, ii. 6.

τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχροῦ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν,
οὐθὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα, ὥστ' οὐκ
αἰσχυντέον. φαύλου δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιούτων οἶον
πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσchrῶν. τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ'
5 εἰ πράξειέ τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ
τοῦτ' οἶεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔκου-
σίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδώς, ἐκῶν δὲ ὁ ἐπιεικῆς οὐδέποτε
πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδώς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
ἐπιεικές· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν· οὐκ ἔστι
10 δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία
φαῦλον καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχροῦ πράττειν,
οὐθὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι
ἐπιεικές. οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ
τις μικτή· δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστε-
15 ρον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν.

11. ἀναισχυντία] See Theophrast. Charact. ix. περὶ ἀναισχυντίας.

14. ὕστερον] In the seventh Book.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK V.



As in order to arrive at a knowledge of the species, we must first consider individuals^a, in other words, to know the abstract we must first consider the concrete, so to discover the nature of *Justice* (δικαιοσύνη), we must first consider that of *just actions* (δικαία); and if we learn what these are, we shall learn what are *unjust actions* (ἀδίκαια), and consequently what is *Injustice* (ἀδικία); for the same science is of contraries, though the same habit (ἔξις) is not^b.

If then the concrete (δικαία) be used in more senses than one, so will the abstract (δικαιοσύνη), and so will their opposites ἀδίκαια and ἀδικία: and if the latter so also the former. The terms ἀδίκαια or ἀδίκος are used in more senses than one, for they imply one who transgresses the laws (παράνομος), and also one who in the distribution of this world's goods gives less and takes more than he ought (ἀνισός). Gives less, not that he always absolutely gives less, for when evils are to be shared he gives the greater evil to his neighbour; nevertheless as the greater evil is the less good, he may be said always to give less good.

^a αὐτὸ δ' ἐστὶ πᾶς ἕκαστος καθόλου οὐ γὰρ τοῦ ἐφαλαμῆ λίγου τὸ ὄντιον ἰδαντοί, ἀλλ' ἢ παντὶ ἢ ἰδίῳ ἀφορισίαι. βῆσόν τι τὸ καθόλου ἰρίσασθαι ἢ τὸ καθόλου. διὸ δι' ἀπὸ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου μεταβαίνων. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἰσονομίαι λαμβάνουσι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς καθόλου ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαφορίαι. Analyt.

Post. ii. 12, 23. The whole chapter deserves the most attentive perusal by those who wish to be acquainted with the admirable method by which Aristotle proceeds to investigate his definitions.

^b See note, p. 170, 6.

Since then the *ἀδικος* is he who is *παράνομος* and *ἀνισος*, Injustice will be, an *ἕξις παράνομος* and an *ἕξις πλεονεκτική*. Consequently Justice will be an *ἕξις νομιμῆς*, (observant of the laws), and an *ἕξις ἐν ἰσότητι* or *ἴση*, (observant of equality).

But since the laws inculcate the practice of universal Virtue, and forbid all Vice, an *ἕξις νομιμῆς* is that which is observant of universal Virtue: and therefore this Justice, which is termed *universal*, will not differ from Virtue, except in being relative, Virtue having regard only to one's self, but Justice having reference to others as well as to one's self. And therefore all further discussion of this division is needless, having been already included in the consideration of Virtue.

It remains then for us to discuss the other division of Justice, which is a part of the former, bearing the same relation to it as a species to a genus, or a part to a whole, and therefore called *particular justice* (*μερική δικαιοσύνη*.)

Now the class of actions upon which this is employed, is the distribution and division of this world's good, for when a man is just or unjust with respect to other actions, that kind of Justice or Injustice is expressed by a word specifying the particular act. Thus if a man commits adultery he is called an adulterer, but if he is guilty of this crime to obtain money by it, he is rather called *πλεονέκτης*, sc. *ἀδικος*. It is clear, therefore, that the *μερική ἀδικία*, and *μερική δικαιοσύνη* are used in a different sense from the *ἄλη ἀδικία* &c. the one, namely the former, being on all actions, the latter upon those only which regard this world's goods.

Now since men stand in two relations in this life, one in relation to the state, the other, in relation to each other as individuals, there will likewise be two kinds of Justice, one belonging to the former, the other to the latter. The first of these is distinguished by the name of *Distributive Justice*, the latter of *Corrective Justice*. The former regulating the rewards or punishments issued by the State, the latter the voluntary or

involuntary dealings of one man, in his private relation, with another.

Now since in the distribution of the State-rewards regard must be had to the merits of Individuals to be rewarded, (and that merit is measured by their *αξία*, according to the degree in which they contribute to the object of the state,) this Justice must observe two ratios; a ratio of the persons to be rewarded, and a ratio of the rewards to be distributed. That is, if the persons be unequal they shall receive unequal rewards, and if equal, equal; and so on. But that proportion which consists of two ratios is Geometrical Proportion; consequently the *Distributive Justice* must be according to Geometrical Proportion, and the rules which apply to one, will apply to the other. Thus let A, B, be two persons, *a*, *b*, the rewards they are respectively to receive. Then

$$A : B :: a : b$$

$$A : a :: B : b$$


$$A + a : a :: B + b : b$$

$$\text{or } A + a : A :: B + b : B.$$

That is, A rewarded is to his original state as B rewarded is to his original state.

But in the case of *Corrective Justice*, no regard is had to the persons of the Individuals who have done or received the wrong, for in this case all in the eye of the law are equal. When injustice therefore has been committed in the private dealings of men, and one man has more and the other less than he ought, their original ratio is lost, and this the law strives to correct, by reducing the injured and injuring party to their original state, or to a similar ratio as before. It merely therefore considers one ratio, that of the things, and consequently acts according to Arithmetical Proportion; by how much the greater exceeds the middle term, taking from it and adding to the less. For by how much the less falls short, the greater exceeds the middle.

The following Analysis will more clearly show the divisions of these habits.



The following passage from Plato will shew how much in the treatment of this subject Aristotle was indebted to his suggestion. ἡ μὲν αἵρεσις οὕτω γιγνομένη μέσον ἂν ἔχοι μοναρχικῆς καὶ δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας, ἧς αἰεὶ δεῖ μεσεύειν τὴν πολιτείαν· δοῦλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ δεσπόται οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο φίλοι, οὐδὲ ἐν ἴσαις τιμαῖς διαγορευόμενοι φαῦλοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι. τοῖς γὰρ ἀνίσοις τὰ ἴσα ἀνισα γίγνοιτο ἂν, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου. διὰ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρωτα ταῦτα στάσεων αἱ πολιτεῖαι πληροῦνται. παλαιὸς γὰρ λόγος ἀληθὴς ὢν, ὡς ἰσότης φιλότῃτα ἀπεργάζεται, μάλα μὲν ὀρθῶς εἴρηται καὶ ἐμμελῶς, ἢ τις δ' ἐστὶ ποτε ἰσότης ἢ τοῦτο αὐτὸ δυναμένη, διὰ τὸ μὴ σφόδρα σαφὴς εἶναι σφόδρα ἡμᾶς διαταράττει. δυοῖν γὰρ ἰσοτήτων οὖσαι, ὁμανύμοι μὲν, ἔργω δὲ εἰς πολλὰ σχεδὸν ἐναντίαιν, τὴν μὲν ἐτέραν εἰς τὰς τιμὰς πᾶσα πόλις ἱκανὴ παραγαγεῖν καὶ πᾶς νομοθέτης, τὴν μέτρῳ ἴσῃν καὶ σταθμῶ καὶ ἀριθμῶ^a, κλήρω ἀπευθύνων εἰς τὰς διανομὰς αὐτῆν· τὴν δὲ ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα οὐκέτι ῥᾶδιον παντὶ ἰδεῖν^b. Διὸς γὰρ δὴ κρίσις ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰεὶ σμικρὰ μὲν ἐπαρκεῖ, πᾶν δὲ ὅσον ἂν ἐπαρκέσῃ πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώταις, πάντ' ἀγαθὰ ἀπεργάζεται· τῶ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείω, τῶ δὲ ἐλάττονι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια δίδουσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἐκατέρω, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζουσι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν αἰεὶ μείζουσι, τοῖς δὲ τούναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρότερον ἐκα-

^a Arithmetical Proportion.

^b Geometrical Proportion.

τέροις ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον. ἔστι γὰρ δὴ που καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἡμῖν αἰετὸ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον ὃ.


The rest of this book is then employed in the discussion of certain questions relative to the definition, and explaining the difference between the actions done from habit and not from habit, which will be better understood by consulting the following table.

RELATIVE HABITS.

Particular Justice and Injustice.

Extreme on the side of excess.	Mean.	Extreme on the side of defect.
τὸ πλίον. ἀδικία, the habit. ἰσόν. ἄδικος. ἀδικημα, the act. ἀδικεῖν—must always suppose an ἀδικούμενος.	τὸ μέσον ἢ ἴσον. δικαιοσύνη, the habit. ἰσόν. δίκαιος. δικαιοσθέντα, the act. δικαιοσθέντων.	τὸ ἕλαττον. No habit. ἄδικον. ἀδικούμενος. ἀδικεῖν τι ἢ ὅπως. ἀδικεῖσθαι—must always suppose an ἄδικον.
No habit. μὴ ἐν προαιρέσει. ἄδικός τις.	No habit. μὴ ἐν προαιρέσει. δίκαιός τις, more correctly δικαιοσύνης, reduced to justice or equality.	No habit. μὴ ἐν προαιρέσει. ἀδικοῦνός τις, more correctly, βλαστόμενος.
ἀδικεῖν τι, ἢ ὅπως, ἢ βλαβή, the act. ἀδικεῖ ὅπως, ἢ ἄδικα πρῶτον κατὰ συμβεβηκός.	δικαίωμα ἢ δίκαιόν τι, the act. δίκαια πρῶτον ὅπως ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.	ἀδικεῖν τι ἢ βλαβή, the sufferance. ἄδικα ἀσχεῖ ὅπως ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

But
κατὰ συμβεβηκός is.



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ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. V.

CHAP. I.

Of Justice and Injustice. That there is a universal and a particular Justice and Injustice.

ΠΕΡΙ δὲ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας σκεπτέον, The meaning of the terms applied to these habits and their acts, examined and defined.
περὶ ποίας τε τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι πράξεις, καὶ ποία μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τίνων μέσον. ἡ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἔστω κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις. ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας τὴν τοιαύτην ἔξιν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην, ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶ καὶ ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας,

CHAP. I.

The thirty-third Chapter of the first Book of the *Magna Moralia*, contains a very clear and intelligible analysis of the important parts of this book.

8. ἀφ' ἧς δικαιοπραγοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ δίκαια] *From which they do just acts, and have the will to do them.* Aristotle adds the *will*, in order to sepa-

rate them from the *intellectual* habits, into which the will does not enter as a component part. He who possesses the science of medicine, whether he will exercise it or whether he will forbear, still possesses the intellectual habit, the science; but he only possesses the moral habits of justice or temperance, not who *can* but who has the *will* to exercise them.

ἀφ' ἧς ἀδικοῦσι καὶ βούλονται τὰ ἄδικα. διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν πρῶτον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξεων. δύναμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτῇ εἶναι, ἔξις δ' ἢ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων οὐ, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας οὐ πράττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ μόνον· λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων. Πολλάκις μὲν οὖν γνωρίζεται ἢ ἐναντία ἔξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας, πολλάκις δὲ αἱ ἔξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων· εἴαν τε γὰρ ἢ εὐεξία ἢ φανερά, καὶ ἢ καχεξία φανερά γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν ἢ εὐεξία καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὰ εὐεκτικά. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ εὐεξία πυκνότης σαρκός, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι μανότητα σαρκὸς καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικὸν τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί. ἀκολουθεῖ δ' ὡς

That the nature of one habit may be discovered from its contrary habit, and both from their subjects.

4. ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων] δύναμις λίγισι ἐπὶ δὲ ἀλλεστεικῶν καὶ ἰατρικῶν. ἐπιστήμη δὲ μουσικῶν καὶ ἰατρικῶν. Schol. Ἐπιστήμη is not here used in the strict sense to which Aristotle afterwards confines it.

6. ἔξις δ' ἢ ἐναντία] He who possesses the science of physic knows and can administer whatever is conducive to health or to disease, for his science takes cognizance of both, of opposites, and is employed upon both. But the same habit is not employed upon contraries, cannot produce contrary *ἔργα*. Healthy acts can only proceed from a healthy habit, unhealthy acts from an unhealthy habit. He only who has the habit of justice can perform just acts, and he only who has the habit of injustice perform unjust acts, neither *quoad* the habit

can the just man perform acts of injustice, nor the unjust man acts of justice. Consequently just acts must be performed by a just man, and if we know one, we may from it discover the other, and *vice versa*. A very learned dissertation upon the word *δύναμις*, and its particular use in Aristotle, will be found in Trendelenburg's Edition of Arist. De Anima, p. 295.

11. ἀπὸ τῶν ὑποκειμένων] Ab iis rebus quæ pariunt eos et quæ sunt tamquam fundamenta strataque florum. Victor.

17. ὡς ἐστὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ ἐναντία ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναντίας γνωρίζεται. "εὐὶ γὰρ φιλοῦν, ὡς ἐν τοσκαίσι εἶσι, πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον, τὸ μισεῖν πολλαχῶς οὐ λέγεται. ὁμοίως ἐστὶ τούτου, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἰατρικοῦ ἰατρικῶν γνω-

ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἐὰν θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ
 2 θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, οἷον εἰ τὸ δίκαιον,
 καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔοικε δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἢ
 δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἢ ἀδικία, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς
 εἶναι τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν αὐτῶν λανθάνει καὶ οὐχ
 ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω δήλη μᾶλλον· ἢ γὰρ δια-
 φορὰ πολλὴ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν, οἷον ὅτι καλεῖται
 κλείς ὁμωνύμως ἢ τε ὑπὸ τὸν αὐχένα τῶν ζῶων
 καὶ ἢ τὰς θύρας κλείουσιν. Εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ

10 ἄδικος ποσαχῶς λέγεται. δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ τε παράνομος ^{That *δικαιος*}
 ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ὁ ἄνιστος, ὥστε ^{implies}
 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἔσται ὁ τε νόμιμος καὶ ^{1. *σαφέ-*}
 ὁ ἴσος. τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ^{νομος.}
 ἴσον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνιστον. ^{2. *πλεονέ-*}

16 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος, περὶ τὰγαθὰ
 ἔσται, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ
 ἀτυχία, ἃ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς αἰεὶ ἀγαθὰ, τινὶ δ'

μισθίσταται. Schol. See the Topics, i. 13. which furnishes the best comment upon this passage.

4. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς] But on account of the close affinity of the things themselves, the equivocation in their names is not so clearly seen, as it is in things which are very remote in their natures from each other. Thus the equivocation in the term *key*, (to suit the illustration to our own language,) meaning either the key of a book, or the key of a lock, as the things themselves to which the term is applied are so widely and specifically different, is instantly perceived; but the equivocation in the term *justice*, applying either to a particular justice, or to justice universally, the things themselves being closely allied and differ-

ing from each other, only as a part from a whole, is not so easily seen. The word *ἐμόνομα* corresponds to our term *equivocal*, (Aristotle not recognizing the division into *Analogous*,) as *ἐνωτόμα* corresponds to *univocal*. See *Categ.* c. i.

17. ἀπλῶς αἰεὶ ἀγαθὰ] Those things are said to be simply good which are so considered in themselves, and without any reference to the effects which they may produce. Thus health, riches, beauty, &c. are simply or absolutely good, though very frequently, relatively speaking, positive evils. Thus too, poverty is an absolute evil, though in many instances a relative good. In those persons, for instance, upon whom it acts as a task-master, and brings them from vice to virtue, &c.

οὐκ αἰεί. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὐχονται καὶ διώ-
κουσιν· δεῖ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαι μὲν τὰ ἀπλῶς
ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ
αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ. ὁ δ' ἄδικος οὐκ αἰεί τὸ πλεόν
αἰρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἕλαττον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶς ὅ
κακῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ μείον κακὸν ἀγαθόν
πως εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ πλεονεξία, διὰ
τοῦτο δοκεῖ πλεονέκτης εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἄνισος·
τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν.

CHAP. II.

That Universal Justice is a habit of perfect obedience to the laws;
and consequently as the laws demand the practice of every Virtue,
and abstinence from every Vice, Universal Justice is Universal
Virtue, and differs from it only in being relative.

That τὰ
νόμιμα are
δίκαια.

ΕΠΕΙ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος ὅ
δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως
δίκαια· τὰ τε γὰρ ὠρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς
νόμιμά ἐστί, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι
φαμέν. οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων,
στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῆ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ¹⁵
τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις, κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ'

8. ἴσος ὁ ἄνισος] That is to say, the
notion of more and less is included in
the word ἄνισος. The unjust man is
called παράνομος and ἀδικός or ἄ-
νισος. If we make use of the term ἄνισος
which includes the notion of more or
less, then we must suppose that the
unjust man takes more of his share of
good, and less of his share of evil; but
if ἀδικός, more of his share of good.

11. ἴσος τῶν δίκαια] πρέσβυνται τὸ

ὡς δίκαιος, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ τὴν δίκην
λογησίνην δικαιοσύνην πάντα τὰ νόμιμα
δίκαια, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς. κατ'
ἴσον γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἀδικησίνης τις ταῦτα
συνεῖ δίκαιος ἴσος, καὶ ἀπὸ δίκαια. ἀπὸ
δὲ κατ' ἀπὸ τὴν ἀνδρεία ἢ σωφροσύνη ἴσος,
ἢ ἐξ ἴσας ἢ εἰς ἀρετῆς. Schol.

15. στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῆ συμ-
φέροντος] See the discussion concerning
justice prefixed by Plato to his dia-
logue, De Republica.

ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον ὥστε ἓνα μὲν τρόπον
 δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ τῆς
 εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ
 κοινωνίᾳ. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀν-
 5 δρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν
 μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ρίπτειν τὰ ὄπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ
 σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδ' ὑβρίζειν, καὶ
 τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθη-
 10 ρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς
 μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασ-
 μένος. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν
 ἐστὶ τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον.
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν

That the habit, of which these actions are the object-

12. ἀρετὴ μὲν ἴστι τελεία] The expression *τελεία ἀρετή* (*perfect virtue*) is used in three senses. I. The moral habit of fortitude is called *τελεία ἀρετή* in contradistinction to *natural fortitude*. II. A union of all the moral habits is called *τελεία ἀρετή*, and this only, correctly speaking, is perfect virtue. And, lastly, that habit is called perfect virtue which is *κατὰ τὸν νομιμότητα*, engaged in rendering perfect obedience to the laws. This is indeed very similar to the second, including under it every other moral habit, and differing from it only in this; the second is considered merely in reference to its being a habit of the soul (*ἔστι ψυχῆς*), but this in reference to the laws, in being relative. So that perfect virtue and universal justice are in their subject and essence (*τῷ ὁμοιωμένῳ καὶ τῷ οὐσίῳ*) the same, and differ only in the way of considering them. If considered as a habit of the soul, then it is universal justice, if as

preservative of social happiness, then it is called justice. The latter however is more perfect than the former, inasmuch as he who possesses it uses perfect virtue not to himself only, but also to others.

12. ἀρετὴ ἴστι τελεία] Compare Theages de Virtutibus: ἵνα τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀρετὴ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ δὲ κείρον ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄγεται εἰς ἴσθηται, ἀμφοτέρω δὲ συνιδεῖσθαι καὶ συνολογῆσαι ἀλλήλους, τίνα δὲ γίνονται ἀρετὰ καὶ παναγαθία περὶ ἴλων τὸν ψυχῆν. καὶ ἵνα μὲν τὸ ἰσομοιωμένον ἴσθηται μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ λογιστικῷ γίνονται σωφροσύνη: ἵνα δὲ τὸ ὁμοιωμένον, ἀνδρείου: ἵνα δὲ τὰ μέρη πάντα δικαιοσύνης αὐτὰ γὰρ ἴσθι ἢ διέργουσα τὰς τι κακίας πάσας τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. καὶ ἴσθι ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐταγματὴ τι τῆς ἀρετῆς τῶν μερίων τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἀρετὰ τελεία καὶ πανωσιετάτα. πάντα γὰρ ἐν ταῦτα.
 Frag. Pythag. Ed. Gale, p. 31.

matter, is perfect virtue, but relative.

εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὐθ' ἑφῶς οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμαζόμενοι φάμεν “ ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετῇ ἐνι.” καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετῇ, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστίν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτήν⁵ καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτόν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι ἀρχὴ ἀνδρα δείξει·¹⁰ πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν· ἄλλῃ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ. κάκιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ¹⁵ πρὸς αὐτόν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτόν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετῇ ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἡ ἐναντία ἀδικία μέρος²⁰ κακίας ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. Τί δὲ διαφέρει ἡ ἀρετῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὕτη, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ'

That this habit differs from perfect virtue, *κατὰ τὸ εἶναι*.

3. *ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη*] Theognis v. 147.

12. *ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν*] He glances at the words of the Sophist Thrasy-machus in Plato's *Repub.* p. 343. *ἀγορεύς δει ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη τι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τι καὶ ἄρχοντος συμφέρον, οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ τοῦ κειμένου τι καὶ ὑπερταύτωνος βλάβη.* See also the *Gorgias*, generally.

23. *ἴσσι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὕτη*] It is the same habit, differing only according to

our mode of considering it; the *subjectum formale*, or *formal part of the essence* is not the same. If we consider it as a habit of the soul, then it is *universal virtue*; if we consider it in reference to our social condition, then it is *universal justice*. The same expression occurs again and in the same sense in vi. 6.

When Aristotle expresses the whole essence, he uses the term *κατὰ τὸ εἶναι*.

ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ἡ δὲ τοιάδε ἔξις,
ἀπλῶς ἀρετή.

CHAP. III.

That besides the Universal Justice, there is a Particular Justice.

What it is.

4 ΖΗΤΟΥΜΕΝ δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς That there
δικαιοσύνην· ἔστι γάρ τις, ὡς φαμέν. ὁμοίως is a parti-
5 δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. σημεῖον δ' cular injustice
called ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας μοχθηρίας σλι-
ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ σι-
ρίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν σι-
διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνε-
10 λευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλακίς κατ'
οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ

CHAP. III.

After Aristotle has shown that *νομίμη δικαιοσύνη* is an aggregate of all the moral virtues, he now proceeds to show that there is another justice, which is a species of virtue distinct from the other virtues, as one species from another, and from the universal or *νομίμη δικαιοσύνη* as a part from a whole. For this habit concurs with the other moral habits in forming universal justice, and is a constituent part of it.

This assertion he then proceeds to prove by a consideration of the opposite habit, in conformity with his own observation at p. 170, 10. (*πολλάκις μὲν γνωρίζεται ἡ ἰσωνία ἔξις ἀπὸ τῆς ἰσωνίας*). If there is a particular injustice which is a part of universal vice, then there will be a particular justice which is a part of universal virtue. The rest of the Chapter is taken up

with proving the minor, that there is such a particular injustice, and that this vice is the taking more of relative good than is fair (sc. *σλισηξία*). For he who acts viciously from the influence of avarice, timidity, and such evil habits is not said to be *σλισηστος*, consequently he who acts from *σλισηξία*, acts under the influence of a vicious habit, or particular injustice, different from the above-mentioned vicious habits, and consequently from universal vice, or universal injustice, of which they are the constituent parts. That is, he acts from a particular injustice, different from the universal injustice, and consequently there is such a particular injustice so differing, which is called *σλισηξία*. 2dly. The object of *σλισηξία* is different from every other vice, therefore *σλισηξία* itself is different.

πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινά (ψέγομεν γάρ) καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρα γε ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἀδικόν τι ἐν μέρει 2. τοῦ ὅλου ἀδικου τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. Ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἔνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ προσ-5 λαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἀδικος, ἀκόλαστος 3. δ' οὐ· δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν. Ἔτι περὶ μὲν τᾶλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίνεται ἢ 10 ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπὶ τινι μοχθηρίαν αἰεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ' ὀργήν· εἰ δ' ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία 15 παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη ἐν μέρει, συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὀρισμὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένοι· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν περὶ τιμὴν ἢ χρήματα ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τιμι ἔχοιμεν ἐνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι' 20 ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, ἢ δὲ περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.

10. *περὶ μὲν τᾶλλα*] If all vicious acts, besides their common name of *injustice*, are referable each to their own peculiar vices, as an act of adultery to intemperance, of desertion to cowardice, and so on, but every act of undue gain is referred to injustice, it is plain that there is an injustice corresponding to intemperance, cowardice, and so on,

bearing the same relation to universal injustice, as these do; that is, as parts to a whole. Consequently there is an injustice differing from universal injustice as a part from a whole. Of both the term *injustice* is predicated univocally (*συνωνύμως*) because the definition of their genus is the same; both of them being relative habits.

CHAP. IV.

After some observations as to the relation of the Particular to Universal Justice, the consideration of the Universal is dismissed, and Particular Justice is divided into Distributive and Corrective.

5 ΟΤΙ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ^{That the particular}
 ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ἑτέρα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν, ^{injustice}
 δῆλον· τίς δὲ καὶ ὅποια τις, ληπτέον. διώριστα ^{bears the}
 δὴ τὸ ἄδικον τό τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον, ^{same rela-}
 5 τὸ δὲ δίκαιον τό τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον. κατὰ ^{tion to the}
 μὲν οὖν τὸ παράνομον ἢ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία ^{Universal}
 ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ πλεόν οὐ ταυτόν ^{as the more}
 ἀλλ' ἕτερον ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ^{to; the un-}
 πλεόν ἅπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δ' ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλεόν), ^{equal.}
 10 καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταυτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα
 ἐκείνων, τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρη τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα· μέρος
 γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἀδικία τῆς ὅλης ἀδικίας, ὁμοίως δὲ
 καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ὥστε καὶ περὶ
 τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει
 15 ἀδικίας λεκτέον, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου
 ὡσαύτως. Ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν ^{The consi-}
 τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία, ἡ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ^{deration of}
 ἀρετῆς οὕσα χρήσις πρὸς ἄλλον, ἡ δὲ τῆς κακίας, ^{the Univer-}
 ἀφείσθω. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ κατὰ ^{sial Justice}
^{dismissed.}

6. ἡ ἐπίτερον — ἀδικία] That is, the universal injustice.

7. ἐν ἄνισον καὶ ἐν ὅλῳ] The same ratio which the more (ἐν ὅλῳ) has to the unequal (ἐν ἄνισον), particular justice has to universal justice: for both are contained as parts in a whole, particular in universal justice, the more in the un-

equal. For as the more is contained under the unequal as a species under a genus, and is therefore not the same as the unequal, so is the particular injustice included under the universal injustice, and differs from it as a species from a genus, as a part from a whole.

ταύτας φανερόν ὡς διοριστέον· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς πραττόμενά ἐστίν· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν προστάττει ζῆν καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος. τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς 5 ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα νενομοθέτηται περὶ παιδείαν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. περὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἕκαστον παιδείας, καθ' ἣν ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐστὶ, πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἢ ἐτέρας, ὕστερον διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταυτόν ἀνδρὶ 10 τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτη παντί. Τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἐν μὲν ἐστὶν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινω- νοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ 15 ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἐτέρου), ἐν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν. τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκού- σιά ἐστὶ τὰ δ' ἀκούσια, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιαύδε οἷον πρᾶσις, ὠνή, δανεισμός, ἐγγύη, χρῆσις, παρα- 20 καταθήκη, μίσθωσις· ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούσιος. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπὴ, μοιχεία, φαρμακεία, προαγωγεία, δουλαπατία, δολοφονία, ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία, δεσμός, 25 θάνατος, ἀρπαγὴ, πῆρωσις, κακηγορία, προπη- λακισμός.

Particular Justice divided into
1. Distribu-
tive.
2. Correc-
tive.

10. οὐ γὰρ ἴσως ταυτόν] See the Politics iii. 4. This is indeed one of the principal objects in Aristotle's Politics, to examine how a state shall be so governed, that the final end of the ac-

tions of each individual shall harmonize with and promote the final end of the state. See the note to the last chapter of the Tenth Book of the Ethics.

CHAP. V.

Of Distributive Justice. That it is according to Geometrical Proportion.

6 ΕΠΕΙ Δ' Ο Τ' ΑΔΙΚΟΣ ΑΝΙΣΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΑΔΙΚΟΝ That the just act (τὸ δίκαιον) is a mean (μέσον τι).
 ἄνισον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τί ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀνίσου.
 τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποῖα γὰρ πράξει
 ἐστὶ τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἴσον.
 5 εἰ οὖν τὸ ἀδικον ἀνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ
 καὶ ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον
 μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν εἴη. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ That as far as it is a mean it must be between two things at least; as far as it is just between two persons.
 ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ
 δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι [καὶ πρὸς τι]
 10 καὶ τισίν, καὶ ἢ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ'
 ἐστὶ πλείον καὶ ἔλαττον), ἢ δ' ἴσον ἐστὶ, δυοῖν,
 ἢ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἐν
 ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον
 15 δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς·
 ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει·

CHAP. V.

9. καὶ πρὸς τι] These words Dr. Cardwell has omitted in his edition, and Bekker included in brackets. Aristotle wishes to prove that the distributive justice must be according to Geometrical proportion. He says, therefore, that every just act inasmuch as it is ἴσον or μέσον, (ἴσως τὸ ἴσον μέσον) must be between two things, for there can be no ἴσον where there is not more and less, no μέσον where

there are not two extremes. Likewise as every act of justice is relative (πρὸς τι) that is, εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἴσον, (to use the words of the Mag. Mor. p. 37.) and must presuppose an act of injustice, and consequently the injurer and the injured, the ἀδικος and ἀδικούμενος, every act of distributive justice must presuppose two persons as well as two things, and must therefore be in four terms at the least.

εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἔξουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἢ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμονται. ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δειν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ' εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετὴν. Ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἀνάλογόν τι. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ 10 μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ· ἢ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. ἢ μὲν οὖν διηρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι, δῆλον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἢ συνεχῆς· τῷ γὰρ ἐνὶ ὡς δυσὶ χρῆται καὶ δις λέγει, οἷον ὡς ἢ τοῦ Α πρὸς τὴν 15 τοῦ Β, οὕτως καὶ ἢ τοῦ Β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Γ. δις οὖν ἢ τοῦ Β εἴρηται· ὥστ' ἐὰν ἢ τοῦ Β τεθῆ δις, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός· διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως, οἷς τε καὶ ἄ. ἔσται ἄρα 20 ὡς ὁ Α ὄρος πρὸς τὸν Β, οὕτως ὁ Γ πρὸς τὸν Δ, καὶ ἐναλλάξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ Α πρὸς τὸν Γ, ὁ Β πρὸς τὸν Δ. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ὅπερ ἢ νομῆ συνδύαζει· κἂν οὕτως συντεθῆ, δικαίως συνδύαζει. ἢ ἄρα τοῦ Α ὄρου τῷ Γ καὶ 7

This justice is therefore in Geometrical disjunctive proportion.

11. μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ] Of numbers which consist of units. Such as we use in Arithmetical calculations.

13. διηρημένη—συνεχῆς] Disjunctive—continuous.

15. ἢ τοῦ Α] Sc. γεγραμῆ. For

instance,

α —
β —
β —
γ —

21. ὡς ἢ Α ἔρος] See the Introduction to this Book. p. 165.

ἡ τοῦ Β τῷ Δ σύζευξις τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιόν
 ἐστι, καὶ μέσον τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῦ παρὰ
 τὸ ἀνάλογον· τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον, τὸ δὲ
 δίκαιον ἀνάλογον. καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀνα-
 5 λογίαν γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί· ἐν γὰρ τῇ
 γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον
 ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον. Ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχῆς ^{Why such}
 αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται εἰς ἀριθμῶ ὄρος, ^{proportion}
 φ καὶ ὄ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον τοῦτο τὸ ἀνάλογον, ^{must not be}
 10 τὸ δ' ἀδίκον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. γίνεται ἄρα ^{continuous.}
 τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἔργων συμβαίνει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλεόν ἔχει,
 ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ
 τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται
 15 τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μείζον κακόν· ἔστι
 γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακὸν μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν τοῦ μεί-
 ζονος, τὸ δ' αἰρετὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον μείζον.
 τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν.

CHAP. VI.

Of Corrective Justice. That it is according to Arithmetical
 Proportion.

ΤΟ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίνεται ἐν ^{The nature}
 20 τοῖς συναλλάγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ^{of the Dis-}
^{tributive}
^{Justice}
^{briefly re-}
^{stated.}

2. τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῦ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον] *Justice is a mean of that which violates proportion; that is, of the unjust. Compare, τὸ δ' ἀδίκον τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. line 10.*

8. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται] *For one numerical term can not designate at once a person (φ), and a thing (δ). As it*

would do in continuous proportion.

As thus,

Achilles : Ajax :: 12 : 6 } Disjunctive.
 α : β :: γ : δ }
 α : β :: β : γ } Continu-
 νuous.

Where β stands for Ajax and the number 12.

ἀκουσίους. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ προτέρου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν ἐὰν γίγνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν δ' αὐτὸν ὄνπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. Τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ 10 κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν. οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικῆς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῆ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικῆς ἢ φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει ὁ νόμος, καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ' ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ἔβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται. ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον ὃν ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διήρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πράξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ ζημίᾳ 20 ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. Λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κὰν εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκειὸν ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία τὸ δὲ κέρδος. 25 ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον

Corrective Justice regards merely one ratio since it considers only the act and not the persons, and is consequently according to Arithmetical Proportion.

The excess (τὸ πλεόν) of the injurer, and deficiency (τὸ ἔλαττον) of the injured, respectively expressed by the terms

9. ἴσον τι] That is, an equality; but different from that of distributive justice.

11. κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν] Arithmetical proportion consists merely in one ratio. Thus the numbers 2 : 4 : 6 are in arithmetical proportion; their

ratio is the number 2.

13. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβου διαφορὰν— εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ] ἴσους εἶναι τὴν ἀδικίαν καὶ βλάβον ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης λίγου· πᾶν οἱ Πλάτωνος ἀδικεῖσθαι μὲν λίγουσι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν κακούμενον, βλάπτεσθαι δὲ τὸν εἰς σῶμα ἢ χρῆματα. Scholiast.

μέσον, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλεόν ^{κέρδος and ζημία: of} τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλεόν ^{which Corrective Justice seeks} τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία ^{the mean.}
 ὧν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον·
 5 ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον
 ζημίας καὶ κέρδους. διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν,
 ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν
 δικαστὴν ἰέναι ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ
 δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμφυχον·
 10 καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι
 μεσιδίους, ὡς ἂν τοῦ μέσου τύχωσι, τοῦ δικαίου
 τευξόμενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἶπερ καὶ
 ὁ δικαστὴς. Ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ ^{How the mean is}
 ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τέτμημένης, ᾧ τὸ ^{discovered.}
 15 μείζον τμήμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ' ἀφείλε
 καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν δὲ
 δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον, τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὰ
 αὐτῶν, ὅταν λάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον
 ἐστὶ τῆς μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος κατὰ τὴν ἀριθ-

5. ἐν ἰσανοῦσι] Since considered in reference to their dealings with each other, the law contemplates all the citizens of the state as equal; when an act of injustice has been committed, the only object of the law is to bring the parties, the injurer and the injured, to their original equality. Their original state then is the μέσον and ἴσον to which they are required to be brought: for at present they are in extremes; one on the side of excess the other of defect. As much therefore as the injurer, that is the gainer, exceeds the mean, or his original state, so much does the Judge take from him and add to the loser, the injured.

In many instances, this is impossible, as in murder: and then the judge reduces the injurer to the state of the injured. But in Greece, as in the earlier ages of our own and other nations, when reparation for offences and ill-deeds, even of blood, could be made by money, justice could take place according to the very letter of these rules to a much greater degree of perfection, than in civilized countries, where, as Thucydides expresses it, men have continually gone on adding to punishment, with a hope to deter offenders, until the most have ended in death, the furthest limit of it. ἐς τὸν θάνατον αἱ πολλὰ ἀνήκουσι. iii. 45.

The etymological meaning of the word, *δίαισις*.

μητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι δίχα ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι δίχαιον, καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς διχαστὴς. ἐπὶ γὰρ δύο ἴσων ἀφαιρεθῆ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θατέρον δὲ προστεθῆ, δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον· εἰ γὰρ ἀφηρέθη μὲν, μὴ προστεθῆ δέ, ἐνὶ ἂν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. τοῦ μέσου ἄρα ἐνί, καὶ τὸ μέσον, ἀφ' οὗ ἀφηρέθη, ἐνί. τούτῳ ἄρα γνωριούμεν τι τε ἀφελεῖν δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλεόν ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι· ᾧ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τούτο προσθεῖναι δεῖ τῷ ἔλαττον ἔχοντι, ᾧ δ' ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου. ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν ΑΑ ΒΒ· ΓΓ ἀλλήλαις ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΑ ἀφηρήσθω τὸ ΑΕ, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ ΓΓ τὸ ἐφ' ὧν ΓΔ, ὥστε ὅλη ἢ ΔΓΓ τῆς ΕΑ ὑπερέχει τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ· τῆς ἄρα ΒΒ τῷ ΓΔ.

The same proportion in the arts.

*Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τούτο· ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τούτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. Ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἧ τε ζῆμία καὶ τὸ κέρδος, ἐκ τῆς

The origin of the terms *ζῆμία* and *κέρδος*.

13. [*ἴσαι αἱ*] This will be better understood by the following lines.

A ——— E A
B ——— ——— B
Γ ——— Ζ ——— Γ Δ.

The dotted line ΕΑ is the same as the line ΓΔ.

17. [*Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν*] And this takes place likewise in the arts and commerce. For they would be destroyed (as no one would care to exercise them), unless the production of the agent, that is, the seller, was of a certain quantity and quality, and the

loss or equivalent given by the patient, that is, the buyer, was likewise of a corresponding quantity or quality. The word *τεχνῶν* appears to me to mean in this place, rather the production of the arts, and when used by Aristotle in a strict sense implies production as well as the mere arts themselves. But here Aristotle expresses two ideas. That the exchange of the production of the arts is according to these rules, otherwise the arts themselves would be destroyed, and consequently their productions.

έκουσίου ἀλλαγῆς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεόν ἔχειν ἢ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ κερδαίνειν λέγεται, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζημιούσθαι, οἷον ἐν τῷ ὠνεῖσθαι καὶ πωλεῖν καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος. ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλεόν μήτ' ἔλαττον ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται, τὰ αὐτῶν φασὶν ἔχειν καὶ οὔτε ζημιούσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν· ὥστε κέρδους τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑκούσιον, τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

CHAP. VII.

That simple retaliation is not Justice: neither can it exist in States.

8 ΔΟΚΕΙ δέ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς εἶναι Simple retaliation is not Justice. ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν· ὠρίζοντο γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς ἄλλω. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονηθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν· καίτοι βούλονται γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ 'Ραδαμάνθους δίκαιον'

εἰ κε πάθοι τά κ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἴσῃα γένοιτο.

πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ οἷον εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἀρχόντα 20 ἐπάταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. ἔτι τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολὺ. 'Ἄλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις Retaliation according to

9. *εὖ ἴσον ἔχειν*] *The having what is just and equal, the same afterwards as before.* After the act of correction as before.

proportion
necessary
for states.

ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητά τῳ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἢ πόλις. ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσῃ· ἢ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται, τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένουσιν. διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδῶν ποιούνται, ἵν' ἀνταπόδοσις ᾗ· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος· ἀνθυπηρητῆσαί τε γὰρ δεῖ τῳ χαρισμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαριζόμενον. Ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις, οἷον οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ᾧ A,

The rule
and method
of it.


2. κατ' ἀναλογίαν] ἴσως δὲ καὶ Πλάτων ἐπὶ ἀναλογίᾳ ταύτῃ τοῦ δικαίου χρησθῆσαι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ. &c. Mag. Mor. p. 37.

3. ἐπὶ ἀντιποιεῖν] Compare the Politics, ii. 1. (p. 29. ed. Goet.)

4. ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν] For either men when they have received an injury seek to retaliate, otherwise they consider themselves in a worse condition than slaves, or when they have conferred a favour expect a return; otherwise there would be no interchange of good offices, and society could not hold together. For this reason the Temple of Gratitude, that is, of the Graces, was built in the most frequented parts of the City, that all might constantly be reminded, that if they have received good they ought to return it. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τριῶν οὐσῶν ἐν τῳ κατὰ χάριτος, ἢ μίση ὅσα τῳ ἕκαστος ἔμασται ἰσχυροῦται πρὸς τὸν χαρισάμενον καὶ διξιοῦται καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐπιστρέφειν πρὸς τὸν εἰς σπουδαία ἢ σύμβολον ὑπηρετίας. τὸ δὲ διξιοῦσθαι τοῦ ἀλλοῦ αὐτὸν ἀρχὴν ποιῆσαι τοῦ ἀντιποιεῖν. Schol. See also Seneca

de Beneficiis, i. 3. (p. 316. Ed. Vogel.)

11. ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις] This will be better understood by the following figure.



Suppose A = Builder, B = Shoemaker, C = House, D = pair of Shoes.

Since then the Builder A, is to receive from the Shoemaker B, a certain quantity of his production D, for which he is to give an equivalent of his own work C, if C equals D, then the exchange (ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις) at once takes place: if not, their respective productions, C, D, must be equalized. The production then of each artificer must be commensurable.

But since C is so totally different from D and both from the many productions of the various classes of society all of whom are desirous of

σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ᾧ Β, οἰκία ἐφ' ᾧ Γ, ὑπόδημα
ἐφ' ᾧ Δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκοδόμον παρὰ
τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τοῦ ἐκείνου ἔργου, καὶ αὐτὸν
ἐκείνῳ μεταδιδόναι τὸ αὐτοῦ. εἰάν οὖν πρῶτον ἢ
5 τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, εἶτα τὸ ἀντιπε-
πονθὸς γένηται, ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ δὲ μὴ,
οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμμένει· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖτ-
τον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου, δεῖ
οὖν ταῦτα ἰσασθῆναι. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ
10 τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ
ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον
ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. οὐ γὰρ
ἐκ δύο ἰατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἰατροῦ
καὶ γεωργοῦ, καὶ ὅλως ἐτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων· ἀλλὰ
15 τούτους δεῖ ἰσασθῆναι. διὸ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ
πως εἶναι, ὧν ἐστὶν ἀλλαγὴ. ἐφ' ᾧ τὸ νόμισμ'
ἐλήλυθε, καὶ γίνεται πως μέσον· πάντα γὰρ
μετρῆι, ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν,
πόσα ἄττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκία ἢ τροφή.
20 δεῖ τοίνυν ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τσο-
αδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ
μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοινωνία. τοῦτο
δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται. Δεῖ ἄρα ἐνί
τινι πάντα μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον.
25 τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ ἢ χρεία, ἢ πάντα

Need the common measure of produce, the exchange of which money is the symbol.

interchanging one with another, the question arises, what common measure can be found by which we may ascertain the different values of these various productions. That common measure, says Aristotle, is *need*; of which money is the symbol. See the

Politics, i. 3. See note p. 188.

14. καὶ οὐκ ἴσον] That is, not equal in reference to their different productions. This must be carefully borne in mind, or the passage which follows is wholly unintelligible.

συνέχει· εἰ γὰρ μηθὲν δέονται ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως, ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή. οἶον δ' ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε κατὰ συνθήκην· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμφ' ἐστί, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον. ἔσται δὲ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσασθῆ, ὥστε ὅπερ γεωργὸς πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ. εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας οὐ δεῖ

9. εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας] We must not bring them into the figure of proportion when they exchange. Suppose A = Builder, B = Cobbler, 500 = House, 2 = pair of Shoes. This then is the original state of the parties ;

$$A : 500 :: B : 2 ; \text{ or } \frac{A}{500} = \frac{B}{2} .$$

But the result we wish to arrive at is,

$$\text{that } \frac{A}{2} = \frac{B}{500} ; \text{ in other words, that}$$

the following ratios should be equivalent ;

$$A : 500 :: B : 2$$

$$A : 2 :: B : 500$$

which can never be according to the rules of Geometrical proportion. And is that very error of which Aristotle says, ἀμφοτέρως ἔτι τὰς δαιμοναὶς τὸ ἴσιον ἀκρον. sc. B. and 500. This then appears to be the meaning of the whole chapter.

Simple retaliation is not justice, neither can it take place in the dealings of man with man. For states do not consist of one class merely whose productions are all alike ; not of physicians, for instance, who might exchange one bottle of physic for another of equal value, and thus simple

retaliation take place, but of various classes, all of whose productions are different. If these then are to make exchanges with each other, it cannot be according to simple retaliation. Yet one must exchange his production with the other, or society could not hold together ; the husbandman with the shoemaker, and so on ; that is, the husbandman with his corn is to make an exchange with the shoemaker with his shoes, so that the parties shall be, the husbandman with the shoes and the shoemaker with the corn, (ἢ παρὰ διὰ μισθον ἀξίως.) p. 186. n. But as the corn is of superior value to the shoes, the shoes must be equalized to the value of the corn. The shoemaker must give either as many shoes, or the symbol of the value of as many shoes, as is the value of the corn, and thus both objects of exchange being equalized, the exchange takes place. But this exchange is not according to the rules of Geometrical proportion : neither can it be. For though in their original state the parties may be in the same ratio as their productions, yet when their productions are equalized that proportion is destroyed. The parties are to be linked together according to what

ἄγειν, ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀμφοτέρας
 ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον. ἀλλ' ὅταν
 ἔχωσι τὰ αὐτῶν, οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινωνοί, ὅτι
 αὕτη ἢ ἰσότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γε-
 5 ωργὸς Α, τροφή Γ, σκυτοτόμος Β, τὸ ἔργον
 αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον Δ. εἰ δ' οὕτω μὴ ἦν ἀντι-
 πεπονθέναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινωνία. Ὅτι δ' ἢ <sup>Of need
and money.</sup>
 χρεία συνέχει ὥσπερ ἔν τι ὄν, δηλοῖ ὅτι ὅταν
 μὴ ἐν χρεία ὣσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ ἀμφοτέροι ἢ ἄτερος,
 10 οὐκ ἀλλάττονται, ὥσπερ ὅταν οὐ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί
 τις, οἶον οἴνου, διδόντες σίτου ἐξαγωγῆς. δεῖ
 ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς μελλούσης
 ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ νῦν μηδὲν δεῖται, ὅτι ἔσται ἐὰν
 δεθῆ, τὸ νόμισμα οἶον ἐγγυητῆς ἐσθ' ἡμῖν· δεῖ
 15 γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι εἶναι λαβεῖν. πάσχει μὲν οὖν
 καὶ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἴσον δύναται·
 ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ πάντα
 τετιμῆσθαι· οὕτω γὰρ αἰεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγή, εἰ δὲ
 20 σύμμετρα ποιῆσαν ἰσάζει· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης
 ἀλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, οὔτ' ἀλλαγὴ ἰσότητος μὴ
 οὔσης, οὔτ' ἰσότης μὴ οὔσης συμμετρίας. τῇ μὲν

would be diametrical conjunction in Geometrical proportion, but not to exchange according to the rules of Geometrical proportion.

Husbandman A

B Shoemaker



Food

Γ

Δ + (Γ - Δ) Shoes equalized to Γ.

$$\text{That is, } \frac{A}{\Gamma} = \frac{A}{\Delta + (\Gamma - \Delta)}$$

That is, A is in the same proportion after his exchange as before.

7. ὅτι δ' ἢ χρεία] The best comment on this subject is the Politics i. 3.

οὐν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐνδέχεται ἰκανῶς. ἐν δὴ τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα· μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι. οἰκίας Α, μναῖ δέκα Β, κλίνη Γ. τὸ δὴ Α τοῦ Β ἡμισυ, εἰ πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἢ οἰκία, ἢ ἴσον· ἢ δὲ κλίνη δέκατον μέρος τὸ Γ τοῦ Β· δῆλον τοίνυν πόσαι κλῖναι ἴσον οἰκία, ὅτι πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἢ ἀλλαγὴ ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, δῆλον· δια-10 φέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ κλῖναι πέντε ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ ὅσου αἰ πέντε κλῖναι.

Conclusion
of the sub-
ject.

Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, 9 εἴρηται. διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ δικαιοπραγία μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδι-15 κείσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐστίν. Ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης ἐστὶν οὐ τὸν

In what
sense Jus-
tice is ἕξις

13. τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον] In the concluding part of this chapter Aristotle explains some ambiguities connected with his definition of Justice. He has already shown that the just thing (τὸ δίκαιον) is a mean between more and less; he now shows how justice itself is a habit in a mean, (ἕξις ἐν μεσότητι), first showing that its acts (δικαιοπραγία) are a mean be-

tween inflicting and suffering injustice, (μίσειν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι.)

17. ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη μεσότης] Justice is a habit ἐν μεσότητι, not because it stands in the mean between two vicious habits, but because its actions (δικαιοπραγία) are in a mean between committing and suffering injustice, between too much and too little. Thus,

The habit.

ἀδικία.

ἀδικεῖν, or
τὸ πλέον.

The act.

The habit.

δικαιοσύνη.

δικαιοπραγεῖν,
or τὸ μέσον

The act.

No habit.

ἀδικεῖσθαι,
or τὸ ἔλαττον.

Thus, because δικαιοπραγεῖν is a mean between the more and the less, δικαιοσύνη is said to be a habit ἐν μεσότητι,

and not because it is in a mean between two other habits, as is the case with the other moral virtues.

αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρότερον ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ^{ἢ μείζοντι,}
 μέσου ἐστίν· ἢ δ' ἀδικία τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ ἡ μὲν ^{and its de-}
 δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ὁ δίκαιος λέγεται πρακ- ^{fnition.}
 τικὸς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ διανε-
 5 μητικὸς καὶ αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον καὶ ἐτέρῳ πρὸς
 ἕτερον, οὐχ οὕτως ὥστε τοῦ μὲν αἰρετοῦ πλέον
 αὐτῷ ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ βλαβεροῦ δ'
 ἀνάπαλιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλῳ πρὸς ἄλλον. Ἡ δ' ἀδικία ^{Definition}
 10 τούναντίον τοῦ ἀδίκου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή ^{of Injustice.}
 καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ ὠφελίμου ἢ βλαβεροῦ παρὰ τὸ
 ἀνάλογον. διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἢ ἀδικία,
 ὅτι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως ἐστίν, ἐφ' αὐτοῦ
 μὲν ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἀπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλεί-
 15 ψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ
 μὲν ὅλον ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὅπο-
 τέρως ἔτυχεν. τοῦ δὲ ἀδικήματος τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον
 τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ μείζον τὸ ἀδικεῖν. περὶ
 μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς ἐκατέρας
 20 ἐστὶν ἢ φύσις, εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου.

15. *ἢ μὲν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων*] The unjust man always acts contrary to proportion. Taking either too much of what is good, or too little of what is evil; and this rule he always observes in respect to himself. And in the case of others, in short, he adopts the same;

but is not always consistent in awarding that which is disproportionate to the same persons, for at one time he gives the more to one, at another time to another. And the man whom he has favored to-day, he will injure to-morrow.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Social or Political Justice, and its two parts: the Natural and Arbitrary.

That an unjust act is not necessarily an act of injustice.

ΕΠΕΙ δ' ἔστιν ἀδικοῦντα μήπω ἄδικον εἶναι, 10
 ὁ ποῖα ἀδικήματα ἀδικῶν ἤδη ἄδικός ἐστιν ἐκά-
 στην ἀδικίαν, οἷον κλέπτῃς ἢ μοιχὸς ἢ ληστῆς;
 ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν συγγένοιτο
 γυναικὶ εἰδὼς τὸ ἦ, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ὁ
 ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος, ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἄδικος
 δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. οἷον οὐδὲ κλέπτῃς, ἔκλεψε δέ, οὐδὲ
 μοιχός, ἐμοίχευσε δέ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων. Πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς
 πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται πρότερον· δεῖ δὲ μὴ 10

10. διὸ δὲ μὴ λαθάνω] Having completed his definition, Aristotle proceeds to examine certain divisions of Justice, both proper and improper, common in his time. As, the political (πολιτική), the œconomic (οἰκονομική), the magisterial (δυσσοδική), and the like. The question then is, under what head are we to class that Justice of which we have been speaking? To which he answers, under the Social (πολιτική); which is the only division absolutely and properly (ἀπλῶς, not κατὰ μεταφοράν. see p. 210.) δίκαιον. This he divides into two, Natural and Arbitrary; which are included under the Social as species under a genus. For Social Justice is the bond and union, the order and arrangement of the social condition of mankind; (πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις, Pol. i. p. 5.) which was considered by Aristotle as his natural state, (ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον Pol. i. 1. p. 4.); the Social being the only condition in

which his natural tendencies are developed, and in which he answers the final ends of his being. οἷον γὰρ ἑκαστὸν ἔστι τῆς γενέσεως τελειότητις ταύτης φασὶν ἐν φύσει εἶναι ἑκάστου Pol. ib. p. 3. See also Cic. Acad. i. 5.

The existence of the moral sense or natural justice (φυσικὴ δικαιοσύνη) is not therefore to be sought (as often has been done) in savages, in creatures, who, as far as the purposes of their being are concerned, are not men, much less the Arbitrary, but in those who are in a social and civilized condition. And hence it is that Social Justice is of much wider extent than the other divisions of Justice, including Natural Justice, since the Social is the only natural condition of man; and the Arbitrary since certain enactments are necessary for the very condition of the existence of society. For all society is formed with a view to mutual defence and sufficiency immediately, for hap-

λανθάνειν ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον καὶ το πολιτικὸν δίκαιον. τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὥστε ὅσοις μὴ ἐστι τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα. ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον, οἷς καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτούς· νόμος δ', ἐν οἷς ἀδικία· ἢ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου. ἐν οἷς δ' ἀδικία, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀδικία· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον αὐτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. διὸ οὐκ ἐῴμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ἑαυτῷ ἰσὺ τοῦτο ποιεῖ καὶ γίνεται τύραννος. ἔστι δ' ὁ ἄρχων

piness prospectively, (αὐτὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν; or, as he expresses it in the Pol. p. 3. γινομένη ἐν τοῦ ζῆν ἴσῳ, οὕτω δὲ τοῦ εἶναι ζῆν. See also ibid. iii. 4. and 5. p. 81. 85. Plato's Repub. 359. 372.) and all κοινωνία implies an absolute or relative equality, (ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμὸν, an ἰσότης τοῦ ἀρχῶν καὶ ἄρχισθαι. Compare Pol. ib.) If, therefore, Social Justice cannot exist elsewhere than with men in a social condition, it is clear that where there is no equality, there can be no justice. But there can be no equality in unity, consequently, as there can be no equality between a man and his wife, or his child, or his servant, all being part of himself, it is equally clear that the conjugal, or œconomic Justice are different from the Social, and are only called divisions of Justice metaphorically and not properly. In the same

way as a man is said to be just to himself. See p. 210, 15.

1. τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον] ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου καὶ ἀληθῶς δίκαιον. Schol. See the Politics iii. 5. (p. 86, 7. ed. Goetl.)

2. τοῦτο δὲ ἴσῳ] Compare the Politics I. 1. (p. 3.) ἢ δ' ἐκ πλείων καμῶν κοινωνία τίλλεις, πόλις, ἢ δὲ πᾶσης ἰχουσα πῖρας τῆς αὐταρκειᾶς—ἢ δὲ μὴ δυναίμενος κοινωνεῖν ἢ μηδὲν διόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος πόλιος.

4. καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν] See the Politics iii. 4. p. 82.

9. δίκη κρίσις] The same definition occurs again in the Politics i. 1. p. 6.

14. ἀλλὰ τὸν λόγον] But reason or the law, which is not subject to be warped by human passions. Compare the Politics: ἀλλ' ἴσως φαίη τις ἂν τὸ κύριον ἕλως ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον. φαῦλον, ἴχοντά γι τὰ συμβαίοντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχάν. iii. 6. p. 89. See also cap. xi. p. 107.

φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου, εἰ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ τοῦ ἴσου. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθὲν αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἶπερ δίκαιος· οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἐτέρῳ ποιεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον εἶναι φασιν ἀγαθὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας· ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι. Τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταῦτόν τούτοις ἀλλ' ὅμοιον· 10 οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ἡ πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χωρισθῆ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸν δ' οὐθεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν. οὐδ' ἄρα ἀδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν· 15 κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος· οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν οἷς ὑπάρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστὶ δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον· ἕτερον δὲ καὶ 20 τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ. Τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ νομικόν, φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν, καὶ οὐ τῷ δοκεῖν ἢ μῆ, νομικὸν δὲ ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐθὲν διαφέρει οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, δια- 25 φέρει, οἷον τὸ μνᾶς λυτροῦσθαι, ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα, ἔτι ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ'

The *despotikόν* and *patrikόν* different from the *πολιτικόν* δίκαιον.

Social Justice divided into
1. Natural.
2. Arbitrary.

5. διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλότριον] See p. 174, 12. note. Justice is the good of another, and not of him who dispenses it, otherwise rewards would not be given him for dispensing it.

12. κτῆμα] His slave. See the Politics i. 2. p. 6.

13. μέρος αὐτοῦ] See the Politics ib. p. 11.

ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἶον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδα,
καὶ τὰ ψηφισματώδη. Δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι The opinion that there is no such thing as Natural Justice re-
πάντα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ
πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ
5 πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσiais καίει, τὰ δὲ
δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσιν. τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν

4. *θεοὶ ἐν πῦρ*] Compare Cic. de Repub. iii. "Jus enim de quo quærimur, civile est aliquod naturale nullum; nam si esset, ut calida et frigida ut amare et dulcia, sic essent justa et injusta eadem omnibus." This was the opinion of the Pyrrhonists and was afterwards supported by Carneades, the founder of the New Academy. The examination and refutation of it occupies the third book of this Dialogue of Cicero.

The opinions of the Sophists, who were the great supporters of this doctrine, is thus stated by Plato, de Legibus p. 889. θεοὶ οἶμαι πρῶτον φασιν οὔσαι εἴχνη, οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ εἰσι νόμοι καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλαι, Ἰση Ἰασσῶ λαυταῖσι νομομολόγησαν νομοθετούμεναι· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσει μὲν ἄλλα οἶμαι, νόμος δὲ ἴσῃ· τὰ δὲ δὴ δίκαια οὐδ' οἶμαι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ' ἠμφισβητούντας διατελιῖν ἀλλήλους καὶ μετατιθεμένους ἐπὶ ταῦτα. ἀ δ' ἂν μετέβληται καὶ ἴσαν, τότε νόμιμα ἴασσῶ οἶμαι, γυγόμενα εἴχνη καὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἀλλ' οὐ δὴ εἰσι φύσει. See particularly the Gorgias, p. 482. sq. comparing with it the Repub. 338. sq. Protag. p. 337. Theæt. p. 172.

5. *ἐν Πίεραις*] The same simile is used in the Platonic Dialogue, Minos, p. 316, which is partly devoted to the consideration of this subject.

6. *τοῦτο δ' οὐκ*] De hac autem quæstione, an jus aliquod sit natura (quod tamen negabat Archelaus præ-

ceptor Socratis, teste Laertio: [ii. 16. Menag. ibid.] et Callicles Sophista apud Platonem in Gorgia, p. 482. et posterius Epicurei omnes) videatur Plato in Gorgia et Minos et libro primo et decimo de Legibus. Cicero, lib. i. de Legibus. Alexander Aphrodisiensis pulcherrime in Lib. ii. de Anima, apud quæstionem hanc, an jus aliquod sit natura. Et Simplicius in præfatione Physicæ ἀπεδείκνυται. GIPH. See Cudworth's Im. Mor. p. 2. and Plato there quoted.

— *τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἴσται οὔτως ἔχειν*] It is not true absolutely, that all justice is variable. For among those who are in a natural state who are not perverted or depraved, it ever has the same immutability; not every where absolutely, but every where among those who are in a state of nature. Thus that which is naturally pleasant, is so, notwithstanding there may be some to whose appetites as being depraved, as being unnatural, it is not so. And thus naturally the right hand is better than the left, though there are some who are left-handed, and naturally men have five fingers on each hand; and if some are not so born, it does not follow that the being born with five fingers on each hand is not natural. And thus, if we can conceive that Justice exists among the gods, as Plato thinks, Justice would be altogether the same and every where invariable amongst them, as being in

οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὡς. καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς· παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἐστὶ μὲν τι καὶ φύσει, κινητὸν μέντοι πᾶν. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν φύσει τὸ δ' οὐ φύσει. ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὐ ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκη, εἴπερ ἄμφω κινητὰ ὁμοίως, δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει διορισμός· φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων, καίτοι ἐνδέχεται τινὰς ἀμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῶν δικαίων ὁμοία ἐστὶ 10 τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα τὰ οἰνηρὰ καὶ σιτηρὰ μέτρα, ἀλλ' οὐ μὲν ὠνοῦνται, μείζω, οὐ δὲ πωλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια οὐ ταῦτ' ἀπανταχοῦ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ 15 κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρίστη.

Τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ'

Difference of *δίκαιον* from *ἀδίκημα*, *δίκαιον* from *δικαίωμα*.

the perfect state of nature. Wherefore we are not to form our opinions as to the non-existence of Natural Justice from considering those who are in an unnatural and corrupt state; any more than seeing some men are left-handed, ought we to say that the being right-handed is not natural. But among men, although this Natural Justice exists, fainter or stronger according to their condition, it is every where mutable; for all men are more or less depraved. Just as men may by employing the left hand more than the right, become eventually left-handed, all of them if they will.

1. *καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς*] τὸ δὲ καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς οὐδαμῶς ἴσως ἔχον. πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος δόξαν ἀπειδὴν εἶπε. λίγοντας εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς δίκαιον καὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ τὴν αὐτο-

δικαιοσύνην. Schol. See x. 6.

4. *καίτοι δὲ φύσει*] It may be asked then, since all justice is variable, the natural as well as the arbitrary or juridical, how shall we distinguish the one from the other? This is easily done, says Aristotle, who illustrates this observation by an example. For as the right hand is generally stronger than the left, and few men only are left-handed, so in determining what is naturally just and what is not so, we must consider whether it exists the same among the generality of nations; and if so, it is natural. But that which is not generally the same, but varies daily and in almost all places, such as measures of food, liquids, &c. this is merely juridical and arbitrary.

17. *ὡς τὰ καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα*] The *δίκαιον* bears the same

ἕκαστα ἔχει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενα πολλά,
 ἐκείνων δ' ἕκαστον ἔν· καθόλου γάρ. διαφέρει
 δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ
 τὸ δίκαιον· ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῆ φύσει ἢ
 5 τάξει· τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῆ, ἀδίκημά
 ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὐπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον.
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα. καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον
 δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπανόρ-
 θωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος. καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν,
 10 ποῖά τε εἶδη καὶ πόσα καὶ περὶ ποῖα τυγχάνει
 ὄντα, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. ὄντων δὲ τῶν The ques-
 tion started
 at the be-
 ginning of
 this chapter
 discussed.
 δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀδικεῖ μὲν
 καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ, ὅταν ἐκὼν τις αὐτὰ πράττη·
 ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ ἀλλ'
 15 ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷς γὰρ συμβέβηκε δικαίοις
 εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκους, πράττουσιν. ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ
 δικαιοπράγημα ὠριστα τῷ ἐκούσιῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ·
 ὅταν γὰρ ἐκούσιον ἦ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδίκημα
 τότε ἐστίν· ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν, ἀδίκημα
 20 δ' οὐπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσῆ. λέγω δ'
 ἐκούσιον μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἂν
 τις τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων εἰδὼς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν
 πράττη μῆτε ὄν μῆτε φ' μῆτε οὐ ἔνεκα, οἷον
 25 ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός μηδὲ βία, ὥσπερ

relation to ἀδίκημα as a common noun to a particular. The precept of the law is general, "Thou shalt not steal," the particular instances of transgressions of the law are innumerable.

11. ὄντων δὲ τῶν δικαίων] The conclusion of this chapter, in which Aristotle distinguishes between acts which

are and are not done from habit, and distributes them under their different heads, will be better understood by consulting the Table in the Introduction to this Book, p. 167.

21. πρότερον] See the earlier chapters of the Third Book.

εἴ τις λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ τύπτει ἕτερον, οὐχ ἐκῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι, τὸν δ' ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατὴρ ἄγνοεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πράξιν ὅλην. τὸ δὲ ἄγνοούμενον, ἢ μὴ ἄγνοούμενον μὲν μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν, ἢ βία, ἀκούσιον· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων εἰδότες καὶ πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθέν οὔθ' ἐκούσιον οὔτ' ἀκού- 10 σίον ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν. ἐστὶ δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀποδοίη τις ἄκων καὶ διὰ φόβον, ὃν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον ἀλλ' 15 ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ ἄκοντα τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδίδοντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πράττειν. τῶν δὲ ἐκούσιων τὰ μὲν προε- 20 λόμενοι πράττομεν τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι, προε- λόμενοι μὲν ὅσα προβουλεύσαμενοι, ἀπροαίρετα δὲ ὅσα ἀπροβούλευτα. τριῶν δὲ οὐσῶν βλαβῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις, τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἀμαρτή- ματά ἐστίν, ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ οὐ βαλεῖν ἢ 25 οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα φήθη, ἀλλὰ συνέβη οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα φήθη, οἷον οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὄν, ἢ οὐχ ὥς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἢ βλάβη γένηται,

22. τριῶν δέ] See the Introduction to this Book, p. 167.

23. ἀμαρτήματα] See the Rhetoric i. 13.

ἀτύχημα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας,
 ἀμάρτημα· ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ
 ἢ τῆς αἰτίας, ἀτυχεῖ δ' ὅταν ἐξῶθεν. ὅταν δὲ εἰδὼς
 μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε
 5 διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικά,
 συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες
 καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μὲν, καὶ ἀδικήματά
 ἐστίν, οὐ μέντοι πῶ ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ
 πονηροί· οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἢ βλάβη· ὅταν
 10 δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ
 καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται·
 οὐ γὰρ ἄρχει ὁ θυμῷ ποιῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίσας.
 ἐτι δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβη-
 τεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου· ἐπὶ φαινομένη
 15 γὰρ ἀδικία ἢ ὀργή ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς
 συναλλάγμασι περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀμφισβητοῦσιν,
 ὧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ
 διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ
 τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τοῦ ποτέρως δίκαιον ἀμ-
 20 φισβητοῦσιν. ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἄγνοεῖ,
 ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἶεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ. ἂν δ' ἐκ
 προαιρέσεως βλάβῃ, ἀδικεῖ. Καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' Recapitulation.
 ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν ἄδικος, ὅταν παρὰ
 τὸ ἀνάλογον ἢ ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἴσον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 25 δίκαιος, ὅταν προελόμενος δικαιοπραγῇ. δικαιο-
 πραγεῖ δέ, ἂν μόνον ἐκὼν πράττη. τῶν δ' ἀκού-
 σίων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγγνωμονικὰ τὰ δ' οὐ συγ-

5. ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικά] εἰσι δὲ πάθη
 φυσικά, ἔρωσι, λύπαι, φόβος ἀναγκαῖα
 δέ, σίτις, δίψα. Schol.

15. ἀδικία ἢ ὀργή] On which account
 Plato placed anger midway between the

rational and appetitive parts of the
 soul: οὕτω καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ κρίνεται τοῦτ'
 ἐστι τὸ θυμοῦδός, ἐπιβουλεύει δὲ τῷ λογισ-
 τικῷ φύσει ἵαν μὴ ὑπὲρ κακῆς τροφῆς
 διαφθαῖ. *Repub.* p. 440.

γνωμονικά· ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες
ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἀγνοίαν ἀμαρτάνουσι, συγγνωμονικά,
ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' ἀγνοίαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν διὰ
πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ
συγγνωμονικά.

5

CHAP. IX.

Several questions considered in reference to committing and suffering acts of Injustice and of Injury.

i. Question considered.

ΑΠΟΡΗΣΕΙΕ ὃ ἂν τις, εἰ ἰκανῶς διώρισται ἢ
περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ
ἔστιν ὡσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἶρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως

μητέρα κατέκτα τὴν ἐμήν, βραχὺς λόγος,
ἐκὼν ἐκούσαν, ἢ θέλουσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν.

10

ii. Question.

πότερον γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔστιν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι,
ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν
πᾶν ἐκούσιον. Καὶ ἄρα πᾶν οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως,

2. δ' ἄγνοια] See p. 92, 12.

CHAP. IX.

Having observed in the previous chapter, that he who inflicts and he who suffers injustice is respectively voluntary and involuntary, he is now led to examine the accuracy of this sentiment of Euripides, which is opposed to the above assertion: and which gives rise to the examination of five questions.

I. Whether a person can suffer an act of injustice, and be at the same time a voluntary patient?

II. Whether every suffering of in-

justice must not be involuntary as the inflicting of it is voluntary?

III. Whether every one who suffers from an unjust act suffers from an act of injustice?

IV. Whether the person who gives or he who receives more than he ought commits an act of injustice?

V. Whether any one can do injustice to himself?

8. Εὐριπίδης] See Euripides, vol. ii. p. 980. Ed. Oxon. 1833. Michaelis Epheusius and a Scholiast quoted by Zell, attribute these lines to the Belerophon, but it is much more probable that they are derived from the Alcmæon. See Euripid. ib. p. 849.

ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι τὸ γὰρ δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον, ὥστ' εὐλογον ἀντικεῖσθαι ὁμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον ὅτ' ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ δικαιοῦσθαι ἢ ἐκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι. ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἐκούσιον· ἔνιοι γὰρ δικαιοῦνται οὐχ ἐκόντες. Ἐπεὶ καὶ τότε διαπο-^{iii. Question.}
 ρήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερον ὁ τὸ ἄδικον πεπονθὼς
 10 ἀδικεῖται πᾶς ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνειν τῶν δικαίων. ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων οὐ γὰρ ταῦτ' ὁ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν τῷ ἀδικεῖν
 15 οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικα πάσχειν τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι μὴ ἀδικούντος ἢ δικαιοῦσθαι μὴ δικαιοπραγούντος. Εἰ δ' ἐστίν ^{No one can do an act of injustice to himself.}
 ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα τινά, τὸ
 20 δ' ἐκόντα εἰδόντα καὶ ὄν καὶ φ' καὶ ὡς, ὁ δ' ἀκρατῆς ἐκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτόν, ἐκὼν τ' ἂν ἀδικοῖτο καὶ ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἓν τι τῶν ἀπορουμένων, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν. ἔτι ἐκὼν ἂν τις δι'
 25 ἀκρασίαν ὑπ' ἄλλου βλαῖπτοιτο ἐκόντος, ὥστ'

19. τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα] *If injustice consists merely in voluntarily injuring another: then what Euripides says is correct; but if this definition is not correct, but we must add to it another particular, viz. that the patient must be involuntary, then it*

is not possible to do an act of injustice (ἀδικεῖν) to one's self: though it is possible to do injury to one's self (βλάπτειν). This will be more clearly understood by referring to the Table in the Introduction. Compare p. 199, 21. ἂν δ' ἐκὼν ἀδικεῖται ἀδικεῖν.

εἴη ἂν ἐκόντ' ἀδικεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμός, ἀλλὰ προσθετόν τῳ βλάπτειν εἰδότεα καὶ ὄν καὶ φῶ καὶ ὡς τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν; βλάπτεται μὲν οὖν τις ἐκὼν καὶ τὰδικα πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς ἐκὼν οὐθεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐθεὶς ὃ μὴ οἶεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον, ὃ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἂ οἶεται δεῖν πράττειν πράττει. ὁ δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησι δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῳ Διομήδει¹⁰ " χρύσεια χαλκείων, ἐκατόμβοι' ἐνεαβοίων," οὐκ ἀδικεῖται· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ δίδοναι, τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἐκούσιον, δῆλον.

15

iv. and v.
Questions
considered.

Ἔτι δ' ὧν προειλόμεθα δὴ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, πότε-¹² ρόν ποτ' ἀδικεῖ ὁ νεῖμας παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὸ πλεῖον ἢ ὃ ἔχων, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν· εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον λεχθὲν καὶ ὁ διανεμῶν ἀδικεῖ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὃ ἔχων τὸ πλεόν, εἴ τις²⁰ πλεόν ἐτέρῳ ἢ αὐτῷ νέμει εἰδὼς καὶ ἐκὼν, οὗτος αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ. ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικὴς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστίν. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν; ἐτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἐπλεονέκτει, οἷον δόξης ἢ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ. ἔτι²⁵

10. Ὅμηρος] Hom. II. 2. 235.

23. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν] It is never absolutely the case, says Aristotle, that any man who distributes, *does* distribute less to himself than he ought. He may give less of that which he is distributing to himself than he has a

right to take, but in so doing he takes something else as an equivalent to it, either the gratification of his own benevolent feelings, or the friendship of him to whom he surrenders his right, or reputation, or such like.

λύεται καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν· οὐθὲν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πάσχει βούλησιν, ὥστε οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διὰ γε τοῦτο, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον. Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ διανέμων ἀδικεῖ, That the distributor, and not the receiver, is unjust, (σλευσία-της.)
 5 ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ τὸ πλεόν ἔχων αἰεὶ· οὐ γὰρ ᾧ τὸ ἀδικὸν ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ᾧ τὸ ἐκόντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ' ὅθεν ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως, ἢ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ διανέμοντι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἔτι ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται, καὶ ἐστὶν
 10 ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει καὶ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα. ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν, οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον οὐδ' ἄδικος ἢ κρίσις ἐστίν, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἄδικος· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον καὶ
 15 τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως, πλε-

9. [ἴτι ἰσὺ πολλοχῶς] ὁ ἄρα διανέμων τὸ πλεόν ἀδικεῖ κατ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ διχομένοσ· οὐ γὰρ ἰσὺ αὐτῷ ἴσῃ ἢ ἀρχή, καθὼς ἴσῃται. οὐ γὰρ ὁ ποιῶν τὰ ἄδικα ἀδικεῖν λίγεται, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥσπερ λίγεται καὶ ἡ χεὶρ φοιτοῖν ἢ μάχαιρα ἢ λίθος, παρ' οἷς οὐκ ἴσῃται ἀρχὴ τῶν φόνου οὐδὲ ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν πρᾶτ-τουςσ' ἄδικα μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν, ἀδικεῖν δὲ οὐδαμῶς. Paraphr.

12. ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν.] He who distributes, acts either wittingly or unwittingly. If the latter, it is from ignorance of Natural or of Positive Justice, or of both. If from an ignorance of both, though he may have done an unjust act, he has not done an act of injustice. Neither if he has made a wrong distribution, knowing the Positive but ignorant of the Natural Justice: for in so doing he has acted according to the Laws. Neither if he has made a wrong distribution,

following Natural but ignorant of Positive Justice; for then he obeys the Moral Law. But he who makes an unjust distribution contrary to the dictates of both, knowing both, or of one or the other knowing one or the other, commits an act of injustice.

15. τὸ πρῶτον.] Natural Justice.

— εἰ δὲ γινώσκων.] But if, knowing both species of Justice, a person hath made an unfair decision from motives of popularity or revenge, he is unjust, taking more than his due in the shape of popularity or revenge. Just the same then as if a person were a partner in an unjust act, so he by giving an undue decision from such motives has more than his due, and is partner in an unjust act, although he may have no share, or less than he ought, in that which he distributes. As in other instances, he who adjudges a field to a man who has no right to it is a partaker in the in-

ονεκτεῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ χάριτος ἢ τιμωρίας. ὥσπερ οὖν κὰν εἴ τις μερίσαιο τοῦ ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ διὰ ταῦτα κρίνας ἀδίκως πλέον ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων ὁ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας οὐκ ἀγρὸν ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν. Οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς 13 οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν, διὸ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ῥάδιον. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ῥάδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντας ταῦτα ποιεῖν οὔτε 10 ii. ῥάδιον οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ γνῶναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ ὧν οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν οὐ

Three vulgar errors touching justice and injustice stated ;

justice, though he has not the field but money to bias his judgment. And so, not he that receives more than he ought, but he who distributes to another more than he ought from improper motives, if the receiver have no part in bribing the distributors, is unjust.

5. *οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι*] Aristotle here refutes those vulgar errors originating in men's incorrect notions of justice and injustice.

I. That any one can at any time do an *act of injustice*, and consequently an *act of justice*, and therefore be a just man.

II. That any one can determine whether an act be one of *justice* or *injustice*.

III. That a just man can do an *act of injustice*.

To which it is sufficient to answer, that as all actions both of justice and injustice can only result from habit, and habits can neither be acquired speedily nor lost directly, so neither

can he who has not the habit of justice perform an act of justice when he will, nor he who has not the habit of injustice the act of injustice. The just man cannot have at the same time within him the habit of justice and injustice, and consequently cannot perform an act of injustice. Neither is it easy to determine whether an act be one of justice or injustice, though it be done according or contrary to the strict letter of the law. A man may obey the law from fraudulent motives or transgress accidentally, but the first is not necessarily an act of justice, or the second of injustice. And in all judgment concerning acts of this kind, many circumstances must be considered to determine the quality of the act, which is not easy nor in the power of every one, and requires not only a knowledge of positive but moral justice; which brings us to the subject of the next chapter. What is Equity?

χαλεπὸν ξυιέναι. ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια
 ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ πῶς πραττόμενα
 καὶ πῶς νεμόμενα δίκαια· τοῦτο δὲ πλεόν ἔργον
 ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι, ἐπεὶ κάκεῖ μέλι καὶ οἶνον καὶ
 5 ἐλλέβορον καὶ καῦσιν καὶ τομῆν εἰδέναι ῥάδιον,
 ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ τίνι καὶ
 πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι. Δι' iii.
 αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ δικαίου οἴονται εἶναι οὐθὲν
 ἦττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ὅτι οὐθὲν ἦττον ὁ δίκαιος ἀλλὰ
 10 καὶ μᾶλλον δύναται ἂν ἕκαστον πρᾶξαι τούτων·
 καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι γυναικὶ καὶ πατάξαι, καὶ
 ὁ ἀνδρεῖος τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι καὶ στραφεῖς ἐφ'
 ὀποτεραοῦν τρέχειν. Ἄλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ and refuted.
 τὸ ἀδικεῖν οὐ τὸ ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστὶ, πλὴν
 15 κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδὶ ἔχοντα ταῦτα
 ποιεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν
 οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ
 φαρμακεύειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠδί. ἔστι δὲ τὰ
 δίκαια ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν,
 20 ἔχουσι δ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἔλλειψιν·
 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν, οἷον
 ἴσως τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ' οὐθὲν μόριον ὠφέλιμον,
 τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βλάπτει, τοῖς
 δὲ μέχρι τοῦ· διὰ τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν.

4. τὸ ἀδικεῖν] So asserted the Sophists.

19. ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν] See p. 171, 17.

CHAP. X.

Of Equity.

Justice and
Equity not
opposed.

ΠΕΡΙ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει 14
ἢ μὲν ἐπιεικεία πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς
πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ
ὡς ταῦτὸν ἀπλῶς οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται
σκοποῦμενοις, καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν 5
καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα
ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἐπιει-
κὲς ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες· ὅτε δὲ τῷ λόγῳ
ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ
τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὄν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον 10
οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ ἄλλο·
ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταῦτόν ἐστιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν
ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιει-
κὲς, ἔχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐθὲν
ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιου 15

CHAP. X.

On the subject of this chapter, see also the Rhetoric i. 13.

6. ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ] So that we transfer the term from its original meaning to other acts besides those of equity; instead of using the term good, using that of equitable, when desirous to use a higher term of praise to a thing: indicating thereby that equity is better.

— ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα] To the acts of the other virtues.

7. τὸ ἐπιεικὲς] τὸ ἐπιεικότερον Bekker. If this reading be retained the sense will be, shewing that when a thing is more equitable it is better. For

instance, if we say, temperance is more equitable (*ἐπιεικότερον*) than courage, we indicate thereby that it is better.

9. εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς] Since equity is commendable, nothing which is contrary to equity is commendable; justice is contrary to equity; therefore justice is not commendable. The fallacy in this syllogism is in the word justice, used in a partial sense in the premise, distributively in the conclusion. Some justice is contrary to equity, viz. that of which equity is the correction, and that particular justice is not commendable.

τινὸς ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο
 τι γένος ὃν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. ταῦτόν ἄρα
 δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαίοις ὄντων
 κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικές. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι
 5 τὸ ἐπιεικές δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον
 δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου. αἴτιον δ'
 ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ
 οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. Ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη In what
cases
 μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς Equity is
better than
Justice.
 10 ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ
 ἁμαρτανόμενον. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἦττον ὀρθῶς· τὸ
 γὰρ ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομο-
 θέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν·
 εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἢ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν.
 15 ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῆ δ'
 ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει,
 ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ ἤμαρτεν ἀπλῶς
 εἰπὼν, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ κἂν ὁ νομο-
 θέτης αὐτὸς οὕτως ἂν εἶποι ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ
 20 ἦδει, ἐνομοθέτησεν ἄν. διὸ δίκαιον μὲν ἐστίν, καὶ
 βέλτιόν τις δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ
 τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἁμαρτήματος. Καὶ ἔστιν Equity de-
fined.
 αὕτη ἢ φύσις ἢ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου,
 ἢ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον
 25 καὶ τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ
 ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι νόμον, ὥστε ψηφίσματος
 δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀόριστου ἀόριστος καὶ ὁ κανὼν
 ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς ὁ μολί-
 βδινος κανὼν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου

14. ἄλη] See p. 7.

28. μολίβδινος κανὼν] Compare the

expression in the Rhetoric i. 1. p.
2, 2. (Ed. Bekk.)

μετακινεῖται καὶ οὐ μένει ὁ κανὼν, καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον, καὶ τίνος βέλτιον δικαίου, δῆλον. φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτου καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικῆς τίς ἐστίν· ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαι-
 5
 ρητικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χειρόν ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικὸς, καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, ἐπιεικῆς ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὐτῆ ἐπιείκεια, δικαιοσύνη τις οὐσα καὶ οὐχ ἕτερα τις ἕξις.

10

CHAP. XI.

A person cannot commit against himself an act of Universal injustice.

ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ δ' ἐνδέχεται ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν ἢ οὐ, 15
 φανερόν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστὶ τῶν

6. μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος] For according to the proverb: *Summum jus summa injuria*.

CHAP. XI.

Aristotle resumes the consideration of the question proposed in the previous chapter; *whether a man can do an act of injustice to himself*; which question is copiously discussed in the *Gorgias* of Plato.

12. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἴσται] Aristotle repeats the distinction already stated in the early part of this Book, between acts done contrary to universal and particular justice: and infers that consequently all acts of injustice suffered, must be those contrary to one or the other justice. Aristotle shows, that a man can inflict neither the one

nor the other class of actions upon himself.

A case is supposed. "When a man commits deliberately an injury, not from a spirit of retaliation, which act is forbidden by the law, does he not commit an act of injustice?" We grant it. "He then who commits suicide, commits such an act of injustice: does he not?" This we grant. "And upon himself." This Aristotle denies: affirming that he injures the state of which he is a member. And this is evident, for the state shows its sense of such an injustice by punishing the person who has committed it. Thus a person cannot commit an act contrary to universal justice upon himself. Suicide is said to be an act contrary to universal justice, since a man who commits it disregards all

δικαίων τὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου
 τεταγμένα, οἷον οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτινύναι ἑαυτὸν
 ὁ νόμος, ἅ δὲ μὴ κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει· ἔτι ὅταν
 παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάβη μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων, ἐκὼν,
 5 ἀδικεῖ, ἐκὼν δὲ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὄν καὶ φ. ὁ δὲ δι'
 ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν σφάττων ἐκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ
 τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃ οὐκ ἔᾶ ὁ νόμος· ἀδικεῖ ἄρα.
 ἀλλὰ τίνα; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, αὐτὸν δ' οὐ; ἐκὼν
 γὰρ πάσχει, ἀδικεῖται δ' οὐθεὶς ἐκὼν. διὸ καὶ
 10 ἡ πόλις ζημοῖ, καὶ τις ἀτιμία πρόσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν
 διαφθειραντι ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικούντι. Ἔτι or Particu-
 καθ' ὃ ἄδικος ὁ μόνον ἀδικῶν καὶ μὴ ὄλως φαῦλος, lar Injus-
 οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικῆσαι ἑαυτόν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο tice.
 ἐκείνου. ἔστι γὰρ πως ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρὸς
 15 ὥσπερ ὁ δειλός, οὐχ ὡς ὄλην ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν,
 ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ
 αὐτῷ εἶη ἀφηρησθαι καὶ προσκεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτό
 τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἀνάγκη
 εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔτι δὲ ἐκούσιόν
 20 τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ πρότερον. ὁ γὰρ
 διότι ἔπαθε, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποῶν οὐ δοκεῖ
 ἀδικεῖν· αὐτὸς δ' ἑαυτόν, τὰ αὐτὰ ἅμα καὶ πάσχει
 καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι εἶη ἂν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. πρὸς
 δὲ τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων
 25 οὐθεὶς ἀδικεῖ, μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲ
 τοιχωρυχεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοίχον οὐδὲ κλέπτει τὰ
 ἑαυτοῦ. ὄλως δὲ λύεται τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν κατὰ
 τὸν διορισμὸν τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἐκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι.

positive duties, (προσάσσει ὁ νόμος τὰ
 τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιῆν—καὶ τὰ τοῦ
 σώφρονος—ἡμῶν δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας

ἀρετάς. p. 77, 10.). All of which, of
 course, by such an act he neglects.
 He is, in fact, a traitor to his country.

To do is worse than to suffer injustice.

Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττον τὸ δὲ πλεόν ἔχειν ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὡσπερ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ. ἀλλ' ὅμως χεῖρον τὸ ἀδικεῖν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν, καὶ κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ ἐκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας), τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ἄνευ κακίας καὶ ἀδικίας. καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἦττον φαῦλον, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ' οὐθέν κωλύει μείζον εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῆ τέχνη, ἀλλὰ πλευρίτιν λέγει μείζω νόσον προσπταίσματος· καίτοι γένοιτ' ἄν ποτε θάτερον κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ προσπταίσαντα διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν συμβαίη ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι καὶ ἀπο-

Metaphorically a man may do an act of justice and injustice to himself.

θανεῖν. Κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ καὶ ὁμοιότητά ἐστὶν οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις διέστηκε τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον. εἰς ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ἔστι πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὡσπερ οὖν ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ τούτοις. περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν διωρίσθω τὰν τρόπον ταῦτον.

5. *χῆρον ἐπὶ ἀδικεῖν*] Of this one would have thought there never could have been any question. Yet so it was. See Plato's Gorgias, p. 469. 473. sq. Plat. Rep. 579. Apolog. 30. Leg. 728.

16. *κατὰ μεταφορὰν*] Breviter copio-

sam Platonis disputationem attingit qui lib. iv. de Repub. in fin. duo facit justitiæ genera, interioris et exterioris. GIPH.

24. *ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ*] See the Pol. i. 2. p. 7, 8.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK VI.

ARISTOTLE now proceeds to complete the analysis of his definition of Moral Virtue, and at the same time to discuss the Intellectual Virtues, the division of which was spoken of at the close of the First Book, p. 48.

Now Aristotle had defined Moral Virtue to be *ἄξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὐσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν* (p. 69.); in which definition three things remain yet to be explained :

1. What is *λόγος* ?
2. Who is *φρόνιμος* ?
3. What is *προαίρεσις* ? the consideration of which was left unfinished in iii. 3. p. 100. see n.


The nature of these then we now proceed to examine. And our enquiry is ; What is that *λόγος* which always directs us to the *true* mean in all Moral Actions, since there are many kinds of *λόγοι* : and what is that Virtue of the *φρόνιμος* by which he is enabled exactly to discover this true mean ? But to ascertain these, we must examine in what part of the soul they exist, and what *λόγοι* or Virtues there are whose object is truth. If then there be two parts of the soul, as there would appear to be from there being two kinds of matter only, Contingent and Necessary, upon which the soul can operate, one of these will take cognizance of the Truth in Moral, the other in Scientific Matter. The first of these then will be the Deliberative, the other the Scientific part of the soul. And in whichever of these the *λόγος* is employed in finding and determining the truth in moral subjects, that will be *λόγος*, and that the virtue

of the *φρονιμος* which we are endeavouring to discover. Now since necessary matter is that upon which the Scientific part operates, it cannot take cognizance of Moral Truth which is not Scientific, consequently cannot be that *λόγος* and that Virtue which directs the Moral Habits to the truth. If, therefore, we can discover how many Habits there are in both parts of the soul which take cognizance of Truth, we shall discover which direct our Moral Habits, and what are our Intellectual Virtues. Now the matter upon which they can operate are two; necessary and contingent: the ends which they can have in view are only three; truth purely, moral truth, truth in production, consequently these habits can be only,

- (1.) One which has Moral Truth for its object (*φρόνησις*).
- (2.) The other which has Truth in production (*τεχνή*).
- (3.) Which has Scientific Truth.

But the matter of the latter subdivides itself into either pure demonstration, or the principles of demonstration. And consequently there will be, following the same analogy, a distinct habit for each, the first being science (*ἐπιστήμη*), the other apprehension (*νοῦς*), or the union of both which is wisdom (*σοφία*).


Accordingly we obtain five divisions of Habits, all having Truth for their object.



The examination therefore of these five Habits, *ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, νόϋς, φρόνησις, and σοφία*, occupies the following book; together with a consideration of their utility for promoting the happiness of man.

Aristotle then has not thought it necessary in this Book to investigate all the Intellectual Habits, reserving the consideration of them for another treatise^a. His principal attention is directed to those which form the intermediate link between the rational and irrational soul, and which have unmixed truth either theoretical or practical for their object (*ἔργον*)^b; and hence the consideration of *σοφία* bears but a small proportion to that of *φρόνησις*, and one of them (*νόϋς*) is left so obscure, that, without recurring to his other writings, it is by no means easy to understand several portions of the ensuing chapters. It may be therefore useful to consider briefly such of the intellectual faculties of the soul as are not explicitly defined in the following Book.

The faculties of the soul may be divided then as follows :



Of these, as has been already shown, Aristotle divides

^a The third book of the Treatise De Anima.

^b See p. 47. and the note.

the purely rational according to their object-matter, confining *ἐπιστήμη* to necessary matter with demonstration, and *φρόνησις* to contingent matter. See the division, p. 212. Of such faculties then as are concerned with knowledge (*γνωστικαί*), the lowest is *αἴσθησις*, that of the five senses. These when employed, each upon its peculiar object-matter, seldom err ^c. But they have a common object-matter upon which they frequently are at fault ^d, such as motion, rest, number, figure, and magnitude, (*κίνησις, ἡρεμία, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος* ^e). But besides this *αἴσθησις* which Aristotle designates by the name of *ἴδια αἴσθησις*, there is another which is called *κοινή αἴσθησις*, of which he speaks in the 6th chapter of this Book, p. 240. For as every sense is confined to its own peculiar object-matter, there must be some other sense which compares the differences of things sensible with each other. Not *νοῦς*, although somewhat resembling it ^f, for *νοῦς* cannot judge of things sensible. Not that *νοῦς* is ignorant of their differences, but it uses this organ for the discovery of those differences; for without sense it is impossible to judge (*γνώναι*) of things sensible; and which, because it judges of all the energies of the senses, is called common (*κοινή*). Contrary to the other senses this faculty is both incorporeal (*ἀσώματος*), and acts at any time (*ἀχρόνως*). For it does not at one time know that a thing is bitter and another time white, but at the same time (*ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νῦν*) that it is both bitter and white ^g.

^c ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις εἰς ἴδιον αἰεὶ ἀληθής. De Anima, iii. 3. §. 3. Compare also ii. 6. §. 2. and iii. 3. §. 12.

^d See De Anima, iii. 3. §. 12.

^e These are called the common matter of the senses, not because they are common to all the senses at once, but because they are subject to more than one; for instance, sight and touch can both judge of magnitude. See De An. ii. 6.

^f See Chap. ix.

^g Compare De Anima, iii. 2. §. 10. ἰσάσθη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὁνομαζομένου αἰσθητοῦ ἰστί, ὁράσθησιν ἰσ τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἢ αἰσθητῆρι, καὶ κρῖναι τὰς εὐὸ ὁνομαζομένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφορὰς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψει, γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν ἡγεῖται. ἰμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἰσ τῶν ἄλλων. ἰστί δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ ἰσασται εὐὸ αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἰσασται κρῖνεται, σίνι καὶ αἰσθητόματα ἴσσι διαφορῆ; ἀνάγκη δὲ αἰσθητοῦ αἰσθητὰ γὰρ ἴσσαι. ἢ καὶ ἄλλοι ἴσσι ἢ

Neither of these faculties are concerned with action (*πραξις*^h) except accidentally.

The next in order is imagination (*φαντασία*), the power of presenting visions to the mind^l, a motion proceeding indeed from the senses, not of the senses but of the soul, being necessary to *διάνοια*, and itself requiring *αἴσθησις*, yet differing from both. Differing from sense (*αἴσθησις*), because sense cannot energize without the presence of the sensible object, and we have power over our senses but not of our imagination^k. Differing from *ἐπιστήμη* and *νοῦς*, because they are always of the truth (*ἀληθευτικαί*), whereas imagination is more frequently false. Differing from opinion, because upon opinion follows belief or persuasion (*πίστις*^l), but not upon *φαντασία*; our feelings and affections also immediately sympathize with *δόξα* but not with *φαντασία*^m. And, further, *δόξα* does not exist in brutes, but *φαντασία* does; the former is a rational the other an irrational faculty. By *φαντασία* they are guided in their actions either who have not reason, or whose reason is clouded by passion or diseaseⁿ.

The next of these faculties is *δόξα*, which is employed either upon conclusions in contingent or in scientific matter, but without knowing the process by which such conclusions were deduced. And in this respect also it differs from science (*ἐπιστήμη*), for science knows both the conclusions and the process by which it arrived at

σὰρξ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἔρχασθαι αἰσθητικῶν ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ ἀπεύρομαι αὐτοῦ κρῖναι τὸ κρῖνον. οὔτε δὲ κίχουρμινοῖς ἰδιόχρηται κρῖναι ἔτι ἴσκειν τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λιποῦ, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐπὶ τῆν ἄμφω δῆλα εἶπαι. π. ε. λ.

^h See Chap. l. p. 220.

^l *περὶ ἡμετέων γὰρ ἔστι ποιήσασθαι.*
De Anima, iii. 3. §. 4.

^k O, who can hold a fire in his hand
By thinking on the frosty Caucasus?
Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite,
By bare imagination of a feast?
Or wallow naked in December's
snow

By thinking on phantastic summer's
heat?

Richard II. Act i. Sc. 3.

^l *δόξῃ μὲν ἴσκειται αἴσθησις, οὐκ ἰδιόχρηται γὰρ δεξιόχρηται εἰς δουρὶ μὴ πικροῦσθαι.*
De Anima iii. 3. §. 8.

^m *ἴσκει μὲν δεξιόχρηται διότι τὸ ἢ φοβερόν, ἰδίως συμνάσχηται, ἰστίως δὲ πάνθ' ἰσχυρόν κινεῖ τὸ ἐν φαντασίᾳ ἀσπίτως ἔχουσι ἄσπερ εἰ εἰσάμειν ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δυνάτ' ἢ θαρραλία.* De Anima iii. 3. §. 4.

ⁿ *καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡμετέων καὶ ἰστίως εἶπαι ταῖς αἰσθητικῶν, πάλιν κατ' αὐτὰς πλάττει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχου*

such conclusion^o. To use the expression of Aristotle (see p. 11, 11.) it knows the *ὄτι*, but is ignorant of the *διότι*, in which it resembles the *αἴσθησις* of the irrational soul^p. They, therefore, who have not science may yet act superior to irrational animals, by holding the conclusions derived by others, and by being guided by their opinions.

The last faculty then of which it is necessary to speak is *νοῦς*, which differs from *αἴσθησις* in operating alike on all object-matter, from *φαντασία* in always being true, and for the same reason from *δόξα*. From *ἐπιστήμη* and *διάνοια*, because it apprehends by intuition without having need of a process of reasoning^q. This faculty is possessed to a degree by all mankind, for the first principles of morals and science exist to a degree in all mankind, otherwise they would be unable to comprehend the self-evident truths of the one, the axioms and definitions of the other. But as it is the most noble faculty of the soul, so it is possessed in an eminent degree by few; growing to perfection only by experience^r, in those who keep their appetites and passions in subjection. It is that faculty which in morals does at once what is right, without the process of an argument, not because it is any wise allied to shrewdness or conjecture, but because it is the eye of the soul disciplined and accustomed to the contemplation of the truth, which by its very nature recoils from falsehood.

The following are the remarks of Philoponus upon this faculty in his Commentary on Aristotle's Treatise de Anima: τοῦ δὲ νοῦ ἔργον τὸ ἀπλαῖς προσβολαῖς καὶ κρεῖττον ἢ κατὰ ἀπόδειξιν ἐπιβάλλειν τοῖς πράγμασιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις προσβάλλουσα τυχὸν τῶν λευκῶν, ἢ τῶδε τῶν σχήματι, κρεῖττον ἢ κατὰ ἀπόδειξιν αὐτοῦ τὴν γνώσιν ἔσχειν· οὐ γὰρ δεῖται πρὸς ταῦτα συλλογισμοῦ, ὅτι τῶδε ἐστὶ λευκόν, ἀλλὰ ἀπλῆ ἐπιβολῇ τοῦτο γινώσκει· οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀπλῆ ἐπιβολῇ γινώσκει τὰ νοητὰ κρεῖττον ἢ κατὰ ἀπόδειξιν. ἢ δέ γε τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ἐκείνοις μόνοις

νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θερία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἰσχυρὰ
λύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἴσους αἴθου ἢ ἴσους
ἢ ἔπιση, οἷον αἱ ἀνθρώπων. De Anima
iii. 3. §. 15.

^o See p. 227.

^p See Metaph. i. 1. p. 3.

^q See p. 239.

^r See p. 249.

παραγίνεται, οἷς εἰς ἄκρον καθαρῆς καὶ ἐπιστήμης γέγονεν ἀφικέσθαι, καὶ διὰ τῶν καθαρτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἀφαντάστως καὶ δίχρα αἰσθήσεως ἐνεργεῖν συνειθισμένοις. ἔστι γὰρ ὁ νοῦς οἷον ἕξις τῆς ψυχῆς τελειοτάτη.—τούτου τοίνυν τοῦ νοῦ εἰ καὶ μὴ μετέχομεν οἱ πολλοί, ἀλλ' ἴχνη τινὰ καὶ ἰνδάλματα διαβέβηκεν εἰς ἡμᾶς. ταῦτα δὲ ἔστιν αἱ κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, αἷς ἀναποδείκτως, μᾶλλον δὲ κρεῖττον ἢ κατὰ ἀπόδειξιν, πάντες γινώσκομεν. οἷον ὅτι τὰ τῶ αὐτῶ ἴσα καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἴσα, ὅτι ἐὰν ἀπὸ ἴσων ἴσα ἀφαιρεθῇ τὰ καταλειπόμενα ἴσα γίνεται, ὅτι ἐπὶ παντὸς ἡ ἢ κατάφασις ἡ ἢ ἀπόφασις, ὅτι πάντα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐφίεται, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τούτων πίστιν κατασκευῆς οὐ δεόμεθα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πρώτην ἐπιβολὴν κρεῖττον ἢ κατὰ ἀπόδειξιν ταῦτα γινώσκομεν. αὐταὶ οὖν ὡς εἶπομεν αἱ κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι διὰ πάντων χωροῦσαι ἰνδάλματα τοῦ νοῦ εἰσιν ἐναργῶς. διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης τὸν νοῦν καλοῦσιν¹, φησὶν τὰ νοήτα γινώσκομεν. περὶ τούτου καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀποδεικτικοῖς² ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης πρὸς τοὺς νομίζοντας μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ἔλεγεν, ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι λέγομεν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης, ἢ τοὺς ὄρους γινώσκομεν, ὄρους λέγων ἦτοι τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας, καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς ὄρους, δεῖ γὰρ πάντα συλλογισμὸν ἀπὸ κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν ἔχειν τὴν ἀρχήν, αἵτινες ὡς εἶπομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ [καὶ] πρὸς ἡμᾶς φοιτῶσιν. ἀναποδείκτως γὰρ ἴσμεν ὅτι τότε τι ἀνθρώπος ἔστιν, ἢ ψυχὴ, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. ἢ τὰ νοητὰ ὄρους φησι, ὡς πέρατα τῶν ὄντων, ὄρος γὰρ ἔστιν, ὡς φησὶν ὁ γεωμέτρης, ὃ τινός ἐστι πέρας: ἀρχὴν οὖν ἐπιστήμης φησι τὸν νοῦν εἶναι, δι' αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἔχομεν τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας, ὅθεν ἡ διάνοια ὡς ἀπὸ ἀρχῶν τὰς ἐπιστημονικὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιεῖται³.

¹ See p. 234.

² Perhaps for ἀναλυτικοῖς. See note p. 232.

³ This writer also, in another passage of his commentary, gives the following account of the different cognoscent faculties.

The *gnostic energy* (γνώσις) is employed either upon external objects and causes sensation (*αἰσθησις*), or upon internal and causes perception, in the more general use of the term (*καυστήριον εἶπειν*). I say more general, because imagination (*φαντασία*) also

operates on things internal, and is called *νοῦς παθητικός*. But an operation on things internal is either upon the Universal or Particular. If upon the Particular it causes Imagination, if upon the Universal it causes *νοῦς*, in the proper use of that term (*τὸν κυρίως νοῦν*). But this knowledge of the Universal is either above and without, or with the use of the syllogism; in the former instance producing the theoretical *νοῦς*, (see p. 239. n.) both as to the habit and the energy, (*τὸν θεωρητικὸν νοῦν τὸν καθ' ἑἑν καὶ ἐνεργετικόν*);

in the latter, *διάνους* properly, (*καρίως διάνους καὶ κωινότης ἀπέληψις*^a). For *ἀπέληψις* is applied both to *διάνους* and to *δέξα*. (See p. 230, 11.) But if it energize in the inferior way or according to syllogism, (*εἰ δὲ χυρήνως ἢ κατὰ συλλογισμὸν ἐνεργήσῃ*) it produces *δέξα* and *ἀπέληψις καρίως*. The *διάνους* which is employed on theoretical or scientific matter (*θεωρησιακά*), produces science; but when

employed upon contingent matter (*πρακτικά*), if they require deliberation, *φρόνησις*, for *φρόνησις* requires deliberation. But if this contingent matter do not require deliberation, it produces the arts. For the artist or artizan does not deliberate as far as he is an artist, but as far as he is a man. Philopon. in Arist. de An. P. iii. b.

^a *διάνους* and *ἀπέληψις* seem frequently used in common both by Aristotle and his commentators, (see De Anima iii. 3. §. 4. and 4. §. 3); but they differ, in that *διάνους* is the progression of the mind in the discovery of truth, *ἀπέληψις* is the determination or supposition of that truth, or what is supposed to be true, in the mind. The one is in motion, the other at rest.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. VI.

CHAP. I.

The connection of the Intellectual with the Moral Virtues. The object of the Intellectual Virtues generally investigated.

ΕΠΕΙ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες ὅτι Introduction to the subject of this book.
δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν
μηδὲ τὴν ἑλλειψιν, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστὶν ὡς ὁ
λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει, τοῦτο διέλωμεν. ἐν πάσαις
5 γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεσι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων, ἐστὶ τις σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ἀποβλέπων ὁ
τὸν λόγον ἔχων ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν, καὶ τις
ἐστὶν ὄρος τῶν μεσοτήτων, ἃς μεταξύ φαμεν
εἶναι τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, οὔσας
10 κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν
οὔτως ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές· καὶ γὰρ ἐν
ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὅσας ἐπι-
στήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείω
οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν οὐδὲ ραθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ
15 μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος· τοῦτο δὲ μόνου

2. τὸ μέσον] See ii. 2.

5. καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων] ἵτι οὐ
μόνοι τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχουσιν τὰς

ὑπερβολὰς καὶ ἐλλείψεις ἐκπέποιθον,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν. Schol.

ἔχων ἂν τις οὐθὲν ἂν εἰδείη πλέον, οἶον ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, εἴ τις εἴπειεν ὅτι ὅσα ἢ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεις μὴ μόνον ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διωρισμέ-5 νον τίς τ' ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος καὶ τούτου τίς ὄρος.

The subject commenced.

Τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι τὰς μὲν 2 εἶναι τοῦ ἥθους ἔφαμεν τὰς δὲ τῆς διανοίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἠθικῶν διεληλύθαμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, περὶ ψυχῆς πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγωμεν 10 οὕτως. Πρότερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη δὴ εἶναι

The rational part of the soul divided according to its object-matter. Into,

μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, τό τε λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον· νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαιρετέον. καὶ ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ἐν μὲν ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν 15 ὄντων ὅσων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐν δὲ ᾧ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα· πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων ἕτερον τῷ γένει τὸ πρὸς ἐκάτερον πεφυκός, εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοι-

11. *πρότερον*] See p. 48.

17. *τῷ γένει ἕτερον*] If the object-matters upon which the soul may be employed be specifically different, it is probable that there will be different faculties of the soul corresponding to the differences of this matter, which will be employed upon it. And this may be inferred generally from analogy.

For as colour differs from flavour, and noise from smell, so are there different senses which are respectively employed upon them. We distinguish noise by hearing, flavour by taste, colour by sight, and so on in all other

instances.¹ Since, therefore, the object-matter of the soul is different, it is probable that there are corresponding parts of the soul to energize upon the different matters.

But the object-matter of the soul is either necessary or contingent, and therefore we may conceive a division of the soul generally into two parts, corresponding to them. The first of which will be deliberative, *λογιστικόν* or *βουλευτικόν*, or *δραστικόν*, see p. 231. (for deliberation is only employed upon contingent matter,) over which we have control, (see iii. 3.); the other into scientific (*πιστευτικόν*.)

ὅτι τὰ τινα καὶ οἰκειότῃα ἢ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς.
 Λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ δὲ ^{1. The Deliberative or contingent.}
 λογιστικόν· τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ^{2. The Scientific or Necessary.}
 ταυτὸν, οὐθεὶς δὲ βουλευέται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδε-
 5 ⁵χομένων ἄλλως ἔχει. ὥστε τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστὶν
 ἓν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. Ληπτέον ἄρ' ^{The virtue of each in-}
 ἐκατέρου τούτων τίς ἢ βελτίστη ἔξις· αὕτη γὰρ ^{vestigated,}
 ἀρετὴ ἐκατέρου, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ ^{by examin-}
 οἰκεῖον. τρία δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια ^{ing the ἔργον}
 10 ^{of each.} πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις.

3. λογιστικόν] Compare de Anima, iii. 9. §. 3. Ἴσ τι τῶ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἢ βούλησις γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἢ ἰαθυμία καὶ ἰθυμία.

6. λήπτειν] The genus of every art, science, habit, &c. is discovered by considering the matter upon which they are respectively employed; and this was termed by the Schoolmen, the *subjectum materiale*, (ὄλη). The *differentia* is found, by considering the end and object which each has in view; which they also called the *subjectum formale*. Now truth is the *subjectum formale* of the virtues or habits both of the deliberative and intellectual parts of the soul; but of the former, the *subjectum materiale* is necessary-matter; of the other, contingent. The definition, then, of the respective habits of the soul will be, of the one, those habits which have the aptitude of discovering the truth (ἀληθείου) in necessary matter; of the other, those habits which have an aptitude at arriving at the truth in moral and contingent. Aristotle then proceeds to investigate the difference between these two kinds of truths, by first explaining what is meant by truth in morals.

Now though Aristotle has said that truth is the *ἔργον* of the intellectual virtues, he has given no direct proof of it; for this is nearly self-evident. For if beasts cannot share in *σφᾶξις* much less can they in truth. These, therefore, action (*σφᾶξις*) and truth, are peculiar to man, and must consequently be peculiar to that part of him by which he is distinguished from brutes. The *ἔργον* therefore of the intellectual part of man must be either *σφᾶξις*, or ἀλήθεια, or ἀλήθεια μετὰ σφᾶξις.

9. τρία δ' ἴσσει] Since the best habits of the soul are to be discovered by its operations (*ἔργον*), Aristotle therefore proceeds to examine the principles and first causes of all operations, and thence to show what is the peculiar operation (*οἰκεῖον ἔργον*) of each part of the rational soul.

10. νοῦς ὄρεξις] ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινήτικα κατὰ τόσον, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις. νοῦς δὲ ἰστικῶν τοῦ λογιστικῶν καὶ ἰστικῶν· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικῶ τῷ τίλει. καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἰστικῶν τοῦ πάσων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὐτὴ ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικῶ καὶ νοῦ· τὸ δὲ ἰστικῶν ἀρχὴ τῆς σφᾶξις· ὅστις εὐλόγως ταῦτα δύο φαίνονται τὰ κινήτικα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακ-

τούτων δ' ἡ αἰσθησις οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πρᾶξεως·
 δῆλον δὲ τῷ τὰ θηρία αἰσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν, πρᾶ-
 ξεως δὲ μὴ κοινωνεῖν. Ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ
 κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει διώξις
 καὶ φυγή· ὥστ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαι-
 ρητικὴ, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ὄρεξις βουλευτικὴ, δεῖ
 διὰ ταῦτα τὸν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν
 ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία, καὶ
 τὰ αὐτὰ τὸν μὲν φάναι τὴν δὲ διώκειν. αὕτη
 μὲν οὖν ἡ διανοία καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια πρακτικὴ. 10

The *ἔργον*
 of the Deli-
 berative
 part of the
 soul.

Of the Sci-
 entific part.

Τῆς δὲ θεωρητικῆς διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρακτικῆς

τιᾶς. τὸ *ἔργον* γὰρ κινῶ· καὶ διὰ
 τοῦτο ἡ *διάνοια* κινῶ. *ἵτι* ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς
 ἵστι τὸ *ἔργον*. De Anim. iii. 10.

Compare generally the whole of the
 third book of this treatise, and also
 De Anim. Motione, with the sixth and
 seventh books of the Ethics.

1. οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πρᾶξεως] The
 reason of this he himself explains in
 his treatise De Anim. Motione, cap.
 vi. *ἔργον* μὲν δὲ καὶ τὰ κινῶντα τὸ
 ζῶον, *διάνοια* [καὶ αἰσθησις] καὶ φαντα-
 σίας καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν καὶ
 θυμὸν καὶ ἰσθυμίαν· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα
 ἀνάγκη εἰς νοῦν καὶ ἔριξιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ
 φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις ἐνὶ αὐτῇ τῷ
 τῷ χόρῳ ἴχουσι· κινῶντα γὰρ πάντα
 διαφέρουσι δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἰσχυμίας ἐν
 ἄλλοις διαφοραῖς. (See De Anim. iii.
 3. sq.) βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἰσ-
 θυμία πάντα ἔριξιν· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις
 κινῶν διανοίας καὶ ἔριξιν ὄρεξις καὶ τὸ
 προαιρετικόν. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ *διανοητικόν*,
προαιρετικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πρακτικῶν
 τίλος. Compare also De Anim. iii. 7.
 §. 2.

— πρᾶξεως] For all πρᾶξις is the
 subject of deliberation. ἡ γὰρ πρᾶξις ἐν
 οἷς τὸ βουλευτικὸν καὶ οἷον τὸ αἰρετικὸν
 συμπεριλαμβάνεται. Schol.

10. ἀλήθεια πρᾶξεως] The deli-
 berative part of the soul is employed
 upon contingent matter, and the scien-
 tific upon necessary matter; it follows
 therefore that action (*πρᾶξις*) is the
ἔργον of the deliberative part of the
 soul. For all deliberation is for action
 and in contingent matter; but all
πρᾶξις depends upon προαίρεσις, all
πρᾶξις is νοῦν καὶ ἔριξιν, conse-
 quently νοῦν καὶ ἔριξιν are the prin-
 ciples of all moral action. But all
 good moral action, (for we are seeking
 the peculiar excellence (ἐν οἷς) of this
 part of the soul, in order to discover
 its ἀρετή), is not without correct rea-
 son (λόγος ἀληθής), and correct ἔριξιν.
 That is, the reason must call good
 that which is really good, and ἔριξιν
 pursue it, according to the dictates
 of reason. The pursuit or avoidance
 of the ἔριξιν must harmonize and cor-
 respond with the affirmation or nega-
 tion of the reason. For if either
 reason call good evil or evil good,
 and the ἔριξιν act accordingly; or if
 the reason be correct, but the ἔριξιν
 be rebellious, no good moral action
 can be produced.

11. οἷς δὲ θεωρητικῆς] Compare

αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἄρχει· ἔνεκα γάρ του ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν, καὶ οὐ τέλος ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ τινὸς τὸ ποιητόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτόν· ἢ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἢ δ' ὄρεξις τούτου· διὸ ἢ ὄρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική, καὶ ἢ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἄνθρωπος. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐθέν γεγονός, οἷον οὐθεὶς προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ δὲ γεγονός οὐκ¹⁰ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγαθῶν

μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,
ἀγένητα ποιεῖν ἄσσο' ἂν ἢ πεπραγμένα.

ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ

ulterior. But the end of the practical *διάνοια* (τὸ πρακτόν), is some thing complete and absolute, for *εὐπραξία* is the end, which is the object of *ἔριξις*. See p. 230, 3.

5. διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν] Since *ἔριξις* is the motive principle of *προαίρεσις*, and *ἔριξις* must be directed and governed by the practical *διάνοια*, *προαίρεσις* may be called either *ἡμετέρας νοῦς* or *ἔριξις διανοητική*. And such a principle is man; for beasts cannot possess intellect, nor perfect beings be swayed by appetite and deliberation.

The following is the paraphrase, generally attributed to Andronicus, upon the whole of this obscure passage.

Καθὸ δὲ θεωρητικὴ ἡ διάνοια οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἀρχή, οὐδὲν γὰρ κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ μόνον καθὸ πρακτικὴ τῶν ἰερημίων ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τῆς τι ἐρίξιος καὶ τῆς προαίρεσις καὶ τῆς ἀράξιος. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἀρχὴ ἔστιν ἡ πρακτικὴ αὕτη διάνοια,

διαφίξει γὰρ θεωρητικὴ πρακτικῆς· ἢ μὴ γὰρ πρακτικὴ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τέλος ἔχει αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς πρᾶττιν τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ μίχρη τούτου σκοπῷ, ὅσως εἰς ἀράξην τὰ τῆ ἐρίξου δοκῶντα ἢ δὲ θεωρητικὴ αὐτὸ ἔστιν τὸ πρᾶττιν εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τέλος ἔχει τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἰσθμιασίου. καὶ τὸ μὴ τέλος τῆς πρακτικῆς καθ' αὐτὸ ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς θεωρητικῆς ἀπὸς τι. καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπου διαφίεται. τῆς γὰρ ἀφίλειαι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ζῆτι. ἔτι τοῖσι ἄλλοις ἔχει τέλος ἡ πρακτικὴ διάνοια καὶ οὐ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία, τὴν πρᾶξιν λίγων τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦτο ἀρχὴν ἔχει τοῦ ἴλιου τέλους ἡ θεωρητικὴ· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀγαθῆς ἀράξιος ἡ ἀνθρωπίνην ἰσθμιασίου· διὰ τοῦτο καὶ αὐτῆς ἀρχὴ λίγιται. ἔτι δὲ ἀρχὴ ἔστιν ἡ διάνοια τῆς ἐρίξιος, ἢ δὲ ἔριξις τῆς προαίρεσις. εἴη ἂν ἡ προαίρεσις ἡ ἡμετέρας νοῦς ἢ ἔριξις διανοητικὴ. ταῦτα ὅ ἂν εἴη ἐν μόνῳ τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ, δε ἔστιν ἀνθρώπος.

ἔργον. καθ' ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἔξεις ἀληθεύσει
ἐκάτερον, αὐται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

CHAP. II.

Of Science.

3 ΑΡΞΑΜΕΝΟΙ οὖν ἄνωθεν περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν The intel-
lectual ha-
bits are
five.
λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ
5 καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν· ταῦτα
δ' ἐστὶ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς·
ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξῃ ἐνδέχεται διαψεύδεσθαι.
ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὖν τί ἐστίν, ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν,
εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς
10 ὁμοιότησιν. Πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὅ The object-
matter of
science.
ἐπιστάμεθα, μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν· τὰ δ'
ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται,
λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶ
τὸ ἐπιστητόν. αἰδίου ἄρα· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης
15 ὄντα ἀπλῶς πάντα αἰδία, τὰ δ' αἰδία ἀγένητα

5. καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι] In affir-
mative or negative propositions: περι-
γὰρ σύνθεσις καὶ διαίρεσις ἴσται τὸ ψευδὲς
τι καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. De Interp. cap. 1.
See also de Anim. iii. 6.

10. ὁμοιότησιν] Tangit proculdubio
Platonem in Theæteto ubi imprimis
ejusmodi similitudinibus scientiæ ratio
explicatur, p. 197. ZELL.

11. τὰ δ' ἰδιόχρῆστα] Compare the
Topics v. 3. (p. 186. ed. Tauch.)
ἄσται γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἔξω γινόμενοι τῆς
αἰσθήσεως ἀδελφοὶ γίνονται, ἀφανὲς γὰρ
ἴσται εἰ ἴσται ὑπάρχει, διὰ τὸ τῆ αἰσθήσε-
ως γινόμενον. See also Analyt.
Prior. ii. 23. p. 134. and Post. i. 33.

p. 199.

15. ἀπλῶς] Aristotle divides neces-
sity (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον or ἐξ ἀνάγκης) into
two kinds, ἀπλῶς and ἐξ ὑποθέσεως.
The first is that which is simply and
in its own nature, eternal and immu-
table; the second, only conditionally
so; as, for instance, to use the illus-
tration of Eustratius, a man is of neces-
sity sitting whilst he is sitting, (οἷον
τὸ καθῆσθαι τινὰ ἴσται ἂν καθῆσθαι ἢ καθῆ-
μινος ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι λίγουμεν τὸ καθῆ-
σθαι αὐτόν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἀπλῶς.) Under
this head may be reduced the divisions
of Necessity enumerated in Metaph.
iv. 5. p. 92. In his treatise De Part.

The origin
and cause
of it.

καὶ ἄφθαρτα. Ἐτι διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη
δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν. ἐκ προ-
γινωσκομένων δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ
ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν (ἢ μὲν γὰρ δι'
ἐπαγωγῆς, ἢ δὲ συλλογισμῶ. ἢ μὲν δὴ ἐπαγωγῆς
ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς
ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλ-
λογισμὸς, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι συλλογισμὸς ἐπαγωγῆς

Anim. i. 1. p. 10, Aristotle thus briefly describes the two: ἡ δ' ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ μὴ σημαίνει, ἔτι εἰ ταῦτα ἴσται τὸ οὐ ἴσται ταῦτα ἀνάγκη ἴσται ἔχειν, ἐπὶ δὲ, ἔτι ἴσται οὐδὲν ἔχοντα καὶ σφικνύσθαι. See also p. 3. Anal. Post. ii. 10. §. 9. And for a more philosophical dissertation on this intricate subject, Phys. Ausc. ii. 9, with the commentary of Simplicius.

1. ἔτι διδακτὴ] ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ διδασκαλικὴ γὰρ ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν θεωρητικῶν μάλλον. οὐτοι γὰρ διδάσκουσιν οἱ εἰς αἰτίας λόγουσι περι ἴσαστον. Metaph. i. 3. p. 5.

— διδακτὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη] All science is teachable, but all teaching must proceed either by induction or syllogism, (μαθητῶν μὴ ἢ ἐπαγωγῆς ἢ ἀποδείξεως.) Induction is one principle of science, viz. of the universal, (ἀρχὴ ἴσται καὶ τοῦ καθόλου, — ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρεῖσθαι εἰ μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς), inferring the truth of the universal from the truth of each particular, inferring the whole from the whole parts contained, (δικιόντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δήλου ἴσται τὸ καθόλου.) The universals, so arrived at, are the ἀρχαὶ of the syllogism. For both, therefore, there must be a certain prognosis; for induction, of the particulars which are known by αἰσθησις, (ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἰσθησις ἀδύνατον); for the syllogism, of

the premises which are arrived at by induction; and consequently all science must proceed from a certain prognosis; consequently there are certain principles of science, of which science itself cannot take cognizance. See the Analyt. Post. i. 18. p. 177.

4. ἀναλυτικοῖς] Analyt. Post. i. cap. 1—6.

5. ἐπαγωγῆς ἀρχὴ] Compare Anal. ib. p. 145. πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσων γίνονται γνώσεως.— ἰμοίσι δὲ καὶ περι τοὺς λόγους, εἴ τι διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων σημαίνονται τὴν διδασκαλίαν οἱ μὲν (the Syllogism) λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ζηνόντων, οἱ δὲ (the Induction) δικιόντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δήλου ἴσται τὸ καθόλου. For the difference of the Syllogism and the Induction, see Analyt. Prior. ii. 25, and an excellent paper in the Edinburgh Review, Vol. lvii.

7. ἀρχαὶ—συλλογισμῶ] Such are axioms, postulates, definitions in mathematics, first principles, self-evident truisms in other sciences. Compare Anal. Post. ii. 3. §. 9. αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ἰσομοί. οὐ ἔστι οὐκ ἴσται ἀποδείξεις δίδωται πρότερον, ἢ ἴσται αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀποδεικταὶ καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀρχαί, καὶ τῶν εἰς ἄσπερον βαδιύσται.

ἄρα.) Ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἕξις ἀπο- Its defini-
δεικτική, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορίζομεθα ἐν τοῖς tion.
ἀναλυτικοῖς· ὅταν γὰρ πως πιστεύῃ καὶ γνώριμοι
αὐτῷ ὧσιν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐπίσταται· εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον
6 τοῦ συμπεράσματος, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἕξει τὴν
ἐπιστήμην. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης διωρίσθω
τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

CHAP. III.

Of Art.

- 4 Τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν ἔστι τι καὶ The object-
ποιητὸν καὶ πρακτόν, ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ Art.
10 πρᾶξις· πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξω-
τερικοῖς λόγοις. ὥστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἕξις
πρακτικὴ ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς
ἐξεως διὸ οὐδὲ περιέχονται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων· οὔτε
γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις ποίησις, οὔτε ποίησις πρᾶξις ἐστίν.
15 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστι, καὶ ὅπερ Art defined
ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆ, καὶ οὐδεμία οὔτε by one of
τέχνη ἐστὶν ἧτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆ ἕξις its species,
and gene-
rally.

4. ἀρχαί] ἐπίστασθαι δὲ σημαίνει ἵνα-
σθαι ἀπλῶς—ἵνα τὴν εἰς αἰτίαν οἰόμεθα
γνωσκῶν δι' ἢ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἴσθαι, ἵνα
ἴκνῃ αἰτία ἴσθαι, καὶ μὴ ἰδιόχῃσθαι
τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἴχθαι. Analyt. Post. i. 2.
p. 147.

5. κατὰ συμβεβηκός] In other words,
he will possess merely opinion (δόξα).
τῆς γὰρ διανοίας συλλογισαμένης ἵνα
ἀθάνατος ἢ ψυχὴ, λαβεῖσθαι ἢ δόξα τὸ
συμπίρασμα τοῦτο μόνον οἶδεν ἵνα ἀθάνα-
τος. See Philopon. in Arist. de An.
ad initium.

CHAP. III.

The affinity of Art to Science
(see p. 228, 4. note) is perhaps the
reason why Aristotle treats of it next
to Science.

13. περιέχονται] That is, they are
not included one in the other as
species under genus; they differ from
each other as species from species.

16. οἰδημία] Aristotle here exem-
plifies his own rules: converting his
definition with the thing defined, in
order to ascertain its correctness.

ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη ἢ οὐ τέχνη, ταῦτόν ἂν εἴη
τέχνη καὶ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικῆ.

How art is
employed
on its own
matter.

Ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν, καὶ τὸ τεχνά-
ζειν, καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηται τι τῶν ἐνδε-
χομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ δ
ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ· οὔτε
γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων ἢ γινομένων ἢ τέχνη
ἐστίν, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν· ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι
ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτε-
ρον, ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως ἀλλ' οὐ πρᾶ- 10

An affinity
between act
and chance.

ξως εἶναι. Καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶν
ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων φησὶ
“τέχνη τύχην ἕστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.” Ἡ μὲν

4. θεωρεῖν] Art is employed in three things, in generating (περὶ γίνεσιν), in inventing (τεχνάζειν), and in contemplating (θεωρεῖν). In their natural order these operations are inverted. For the artist is first employed in contemplating the thing he wishes to produce, considering not merely whether the matter, proposed to be operated on, is contingent, but also whether the principle of operation is within himself.

— θεωρεῖν] For art deals with universals equally as science. Science also equally as art is derived from experience. The one differing from the other in this, that art is about generation (γένεσις), science about essence (ὄν). And this perhaps is the reason, why Aristotle, instead of considering τοῦς, has placed the consideration of Art next to Science. Compare Post. Analyt. ii. 15. ἐν δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἡμεψαντος τοῦ καθύλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. τοῦ ἰσθὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ, δ' ἂν ἐν ἀσπασιν ἐν ἐσθ' ἐκείνους τὸ αὐτὸ, τίχνης

ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη· ἰσθὸς μὲν περὶ γίνεσιν, τίχνης· ἰσθὸς δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.

12. τύχη] γίνεσιν δ' ἐκ τῆς μήτης ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. αἱ γὰρ πολλὰ μῆται τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μῆς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτιλοῦσι, καὶ δοκῶ σχιδοὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ τίχνη ὁμοιοὶ εἶναι ἐμπειρία. ἀποβαίοντι δ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ τίχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τίχνης ἐπιστήμη, δε φησι Πᾶλος ἰσθὸς λόγον, ἢ δ' ἐμπειρία τίχνης. γίνεσιν δ' ἐπίχνη, ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐπισημάτων καθύλου μία γίνεσιν περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπισημάτων. Metaphys. i. 1. p. 2. Compare also the Post. Anal. ii. cap. 15. p. 231. (Ed. Tauch.)

— τίχνη] A certain degree of affinity exists between art and chance, because both of them operate as it were upon the same matter, and both are causes external to their matter. See Phys. Aus. ii. 5.

13. τίχνη τύχνη] See the Schol. on Plat. Gorg. p. 338. Bekk. and Pflugk in Eurip. Med. p. xxiv.

οὖν τέχνη, ὡσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ^{Definition of Art.}
 ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ ἐστίν, ἢ δ' ἀτεχνία τούναντίον
 μετὰ λόγου ψευδοῦς ποιητικὴ ἕξις, περὶ τὸ ἐνδε-
 χόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

CHAP. IV.

Of Prudence or φρόνησις.

5 ΠΕΡΙ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεω- ^{The object-}
 ρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς φρονίμους. δοκεῖ ^{matter of}
 δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευ- ^{φρόνησις.}
 σασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα,
 οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ ἰσχύν,
 10 ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. σημείον δ' ὅτι καὶ
 τοὺς περὶ τι φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος
 τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη.
 ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός.
 βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως
 15 ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πράξαι·
 ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως, ὧν δ'
 αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μὴ ἐστὶν
 ἀπόδειξις, πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν,
 καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 20 ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ
 τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν
 ἄλλως ἔχειν, τέχνη δ' ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πρά-

CHAP. IV.

14. βουλιόσται] See iii. 3.

16. ὡστ' εἴπερ] The apodosis is at
 οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ φρόνησις.17. τούτων μὴ ἴσασιν] For if the pre-
 mises be contingent, the conclusions

must be contingent likewise; *πάντα*
γὰρ ἰσχύουσι καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, for all
the conclusions drawn from such premises
are contingent likewise; but the con-
clusions of demonstration are neces-
sary. See chap. ii.

Its definition.

ξέως καὶ ποιήσεως. Λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι ἔξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος. Διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ

Confirmed by general opinion.

τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν· εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἠγούμεθα τοὺς οικονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς. Ἐνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σῶζουσιν τὴν φρόνησιν. σῶζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην

And a nominal definition.

2. τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθὰ] Compare Archytas de viro bono: *σρατηύματος μὴ γὰρ ἀγίεται σρατηγία. πλωτῆρον δὲ κυβερνήτης, τῷ δὲ νόμος θύς, τῆς ψυχῆς δὲ νόμος. τῆς δὲ στεί ἐν βίῳ ἰδαιμοσύνας φροσύνης. οἶδιν γὰρ ἄτις ἴσσι φροσύνης, εἰ μὴ ἰσιστάμα τῆς στεί ἐν βίῳ ἰδαιμοσύνας, ἢ ἰσιστάμα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθῶν.* Frag. Pythag. p. 18.

3. ἴσιστον ἐν εἰλας] Production differs from action: for the end of production is different from the act of production, but the end of action (*πραξία*) is not different from action, being action (*εὐπραξία*).

11. σῶζουσιν ἐν φροσύνη] This etymology is derived from Plato's *Cratylus*, 411. E.

— σῶζει] It preserves a right apprehension of moral good and evil: for pleasure and pain do not pervert our apprehension on all subjects; for instance, of mathematical truths; for the drunkard or debauched has frequently as clear an apprehension of those as the temperate and sober. Pleasure and pain pervert our right apprehension of *moral* truths, when from pleasure we choose the evil, or

from pain avoid the good. In other words, vice prevents us from seeing and pursuing the end and the good which we ought to pursue, and this end is the principle of moral actions, (*αἱ μὴ γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ εὖ ἴσικα τὰ σρατηγία*), and consequently pleasure and pain pervert our apprehension of the right principles of moral action, (*ἢ κακία φρασην ἀρχῆς*).

In the vicious man, therefore, the light of nature and revelation has become darkness; he calls evil good, and good evil, and acts accordingly.

Since then *φροσύνη* must select the *right* means to a *good* end, (*πρὸς εἰλας σὶ σπουδαίῳ εὖ λογιζομαι*), it must possess not only what we call prudence, but also a correct apprehension of what is a *good* end, must possess a certain degree of moral virtue, for moral vice is destructive of this apprehension.

The terms *εἰλας*. *εὖ ἴσικα*, and *ἀρχῆς*, are synonymous throughout this passage.

11. ἐν τοιαύτῳ ὑπόληψιν] *As preserving such a ὑπόληψιν as φροσύνη*, that is, the faculty of judging correctly of our own good and evil, and acting accordingly, (*πρακτικῶς στεί τὰ ἀν-*

ὑπόληψιν· οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει
 οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν, οἷον
 ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει ἢ οὐκ
 ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ
 5 ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα τὰ πρακτά·
 τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθύς
 οὐ φαίνεται ἡ ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἔνεκεν
 οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν·
 ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς· ὥστ' ἀνάγκη
 10 τὴν φρόνησιν ἔξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ, περὶ τὰ
 ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικὴν. Ἄλλὰ μὴν τέχνης Art differ-
ent from
φρόνησις.
 μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· καὶ
 ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος, περὶ
 δὲ φρόνησιν ἦττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς.
 15 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετὴ τίς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τέχνη.
 δυοῖν δ' ὄντων μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον
 ἔχοντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετὴ, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ·
 ἢ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν
 καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔξισ μετὰ λόγου
 20 μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης
 ἕξεώς ἐστὶ, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

ἡρώσῃ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά.) The term
 ὑπόληψις is variously applied, as Aris-
 totle teaches us in his own words: *εἰσι*
δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφεραί,
πιστοτήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ φρόνησις καὶ
τάλαντία τούτων. De Anima iii. 3.
 §. 5. It is already in this place ap-
 plied to two very different faculties,
πιστοτήμη and *φρόνησις*. See the Intro-
 duction to this Book, p. 218.

12. ἀρετή] τῆς μὲν τέχνης ἐστὶ καὶ

κακία καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ δυνατόν καὶ
 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τεχνίτην καὶ σοφόν. φρο-
 νήσιος δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν κακία ἐστὶν, ἀδύνατον γὰρ
 φρονημῶν εἶναι φαῦλον εἶναι. οὐκ ἀρετή.
 αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρετή· ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀρετῆς
 οὐκ ἐστὶν, οὐ γὰρ μισότης μισότητος.
 Paraph.

13. αἰρετωτέρας] See p. 62.

18. δόξα] See vi. 1. p. 220.

20. λήθη] See i. 8. p. 38.

CHAP. V.

Of Apprehension, or νοῦς.

The object-
matter of
νοῦς.

ΕΠΕΙ Δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν ὀ
 ὑπόληψις καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, εἰσὶ δ'
 ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης (μετὰ
 λόγου γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη), τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ ἐπι-
 στητοῦ οὐτ' ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε
 φρόνησις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν ἀποδεικτόν, αἱ
 δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως
 ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ
 σοφοῦ περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξιν ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ
 οἷς ἀληθεύομεν καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα περὶ
 τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν,
 ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία καὶ νοῦς,
 τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηθὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι (λέγω
 δὲ τρία, φρόνησιν ἐπιστήμην σοφίαν), λείπεται
 νοῦν εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν.

15

CHAP. V.

Concerning this habit, see the Introduction to this book, p. 216. and p. 234, and p. 239. Aristotle in this chapter describes merely one office of νοῦς.

1. ἡ ἐπιστήμη] ἰσὺ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχειν αἰς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν αὖ ἀληθεῖς εἰσὶν αἱ δι' ἰσυχονταὶ ἐν ψεύδει, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθῆ δ' αὖ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γίνεσθαι ἢ νοῦς. αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώταται,

ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπαντα μετὰ λόγου ἰστί, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη. ἰσὺ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθιέστερον ἰσυχονταὶ εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦς, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν· ἵνα τι τούτων εἰσαυτοῦ καὶ ἵνα ἀσυνδίξιος ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀσύνδιξιος, ἄρα οὐδ' ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν ἄλλο παρὰ ἐπιστήμην ἔχουσι γίνεσθαι ἀληθεῖς, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή. Analyt. Post. ii. 15, p. 232.

4. λόγου] See chap. ii.

9. περὶ ἐνίων] See p. 234, 5.

CHAP. VI.

Of Wisdom, or σοφία, how it differs from φρόνησις; and of the several kinds of φρόνησις.

7 ΤΗΝ ΔΕ ΣΟΦΙΑΝ ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκρι-
 βεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, οἷον Φειδίαν
 λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντο-
 ποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες
 τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δέ
 τινὰς σοφοὺς οἴομεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος οὐδ'

The proper and improper use of the word σοφία.

CHAP. VI.

The following passage from *Metaph.* i. 1. p. 2—3, clears up many difficulties connected with these habits. ἡ μὲν ἱμμερία τῶν καθήκοντά ἐστι γνώσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθήκον· αἱ δὲ ἀεζῆσι καὶ αἱ γνώσεις πάνσαι περὶ τὸ καθήκοντόν εἰσιν.—ἰὰν οὖν ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἱμμερίας ἔχη τις τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸ καθήκον μὴ γνωρίζῃ. τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ καθήκοντον ἀγνοῇ, πολλὰκις διαμαρτυρήσεται.—ἄλλ' ἔμοις τί γε εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἰσαίνειν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς ἱμμερίας ὑπάρχειν οἴομεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἱμμερίων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὡς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πάνσι. τοῦτο δέ, ἵτι οἱ μὴ τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν, οἱ δ' οὐ. οἱ μὴ γὰρ ἱμμερίαι τὸ ἵτι μὴ ἴσασιν διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν, οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσι. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιστίχτους περὶ ἴσαστον τιμωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν, καὶ σοφωτέρους ἵτι εἰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν.

On the use of the term σοφία, as applied in its translation *sapientia* exclusively to the knowledge and study of causation, “*divinarum humanarumque rerum tum initiorum caussarumque cujusque rei cognitio*,” see *Cic. Tusc.*

Disp. v. 3. and *Arist. Met. i. 1. p. 3, 4.*

5. εἶναι δὲ τινὰς] *We conceive some are wise absolutely, universally and not partially, not wise in one particular subject and upon nothing else.*

Aristotle explains the particular use of the term wisdom (σοφία) when applied to the arts, and then infers the nature of it generally (σοφία ὅλος); assuming that there is such a general wisdom from the opinions of mankind, and the quotation respecting Margites. By wisdom in any particular art, he says, we understand the perfection of that art, and those are called wise, who are most exact in their art: consequently wisdom must be the most excellent of the sciences; of the sciences, because none other habits than science admit of exactness and perfection.

But he who is entirely wise must of course know the principles and axioms of science as well as the deductions from them, and consequently wisdom is composed of simple apprehension and science (νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη); or, in other words, an ἐπιστήμη with νοῦς for its head.

ἄλλο τι σοφούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ “ τὸν δ' οὐτ' ἄρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὐτ' ἀροτῆρα οὐτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.” ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία. Δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμωτάτων. Ἄτοπον γὰρ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν σπουδαιοτάτην οἶεται εἶναι, εἰ 10

Its component parts.

Its difference from φρόνησις.

3. σοφόν] On the earlier and various uses of this word, see Diog. Laertius in V. P. proem. §. 12, and the notes of Menage, *ibid.* Some remarks upon it will also be found in Clemens Alex. Strom. i. §. 25, and a more complete dissertation in the notes of Muretus on this passage.

8. *ἄσπερ κεφαλὴν*] *A science of things the most honorable, as possessing a head (νοῦς); being complete and perfect. ὁ μὲν νοῦς τὴν γῶσιν ἔχει τῆς ἀληθείας τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη χορηγούμενας αὐτὰς λαμβάνουσα ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ ἀποδείκνυσι τὰ οἰκία προβλήματα. ἄσπερ ἰσὺ ἡ σοφία καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχει ὡς ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν ὡς ἡ ἐπιστήμη, εἴη ἂν νοῦς ἄμα καὶ ἐπιστήμη. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κεφαλῆς λέγεται ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ἰσὺ, ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμωτάτων ἰσὺ, τιμωτάται δὲ αἱ ἀρχαί.—ἡ δὲ σοφία ἰσὺ ἀνομιλῆς καὶ ἔξ ἰσότητος ἔχει τὰς ἀρχὰς διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται μετὰ κεφαλῆς, ὡς ἔχουσα κεφαλὴν, ἥτις ἰσὺ αἱ ἀρχαί.* Schol. See a somewhat similar use of the word *κεφαλαιος* by Plato in the Philebus, p. 48. Gorgias, p. 505. D. and the passages cited in both places by Stallbaum.

9. *τιμωτάτων*] *Of things eternal and immutable: τῶν ὄντων τὰ τιμώ-*

ταια. See p. 43. 10. and particularly the Metaph. x. 1. p. 211, sq. See the Index s. v. *τίμιμα*.

Aristotle has purposely left the discussion of this and the previous habit incomplete, as pertaining rather to other subjects than Ethics.

10. *φρόνησις*] Aristotle is very careful in distinguishing *φρόνησις* from *σοφία*, for many philosophers, and among the rest Xenocrates the Chalcedonian, evidently confounded them. *ἰσὺ καὶ Πεισοκράτους ἐν τῷ σιελ φρονήσιος τὴν σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην τῶν ἀρχῶν αἰτίων καὶ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας ἰσὺ φρονησὶν τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγούμηνος διττῆς, τὴν μὲν πρακτικὴν τὴν δὲ θεωρητικὴν ἢ δὲ σοφίαν ὡς ἀρχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην. διότι ἡ μὲν σοφία φρόνησις, ἐδὲ μὴ πᾶσα φρόνησις σοφία.* Clem. Alex. Strom. ii. 5. §. 24. p. 441. ed. Potter. See Wyzperse de X. C. p. 181. This tenet he apparently derived from Socrates and Plato; from the former, who thought all the virtues were sciences, (see vi. 10. ad fin. and vii. 2.); from the latter, who asserted that *φρόνησις* was the soul's contemplation of the eternal ideas: *ἴσται δὲ γὰρ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀθάνατος ἐσοσῆ, ἰσὺ οἰχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τι καὶ ἀει ὄν.—καὶ ὡς συγγατῆς οἶσα αὐτοῦ ἀει μετ' ἰσίου τι γίνονται—καὶ αἰσωνοαί τε*

μη τὸ ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀνθρώπος ἐστίν.
 εἰ δὴ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις
 καὶ ἰχθύσι, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθὺ ταῦτὸν αἰεί,
 καὶ τὸ σοφὸν ταῦτὸν πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρόνιμον
 5 δὲ ἕτερον· τὸ γὰρ περὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστα εὖ θεωροῦν
 φαῖεν ἂν εἶναι φρόνιμον, καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψειαν
 αὐτά. διὸ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἕνια φρόνιμά φασιν
 εἶναι, ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται
 δύναμιν προνοητικὴν. Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ
 10 ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ
 τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦσι σοφίαν,
 πολλαὶ ἔσονται σοφίαι· οὐ γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ
 ἀπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζώων, ἀλλ' ἑτέρα περὶ
 ἕκαστον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ πάντων τῶν
 15 ὄντων. εἰ δ' ὅτι βέλτιστον ἀνθρώπος τῶν ἄλλων
 ζώων, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ἄλλα
 πολὺ βειότερα τὴν φύσιν, οἷον φανερώτατά γε
 ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. Ἐκ δὴ τῶν
 εἰρημένων δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη
 20 καὶ νοῦς τῶν τιμιωτάτων τῇ φύσει. διὸ Ἀνα-
 ξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους σοφοὺς
 μὲν, φρονίμους δ' οὐ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν

And from
the political
φρόνησις.

Confirmed
by the gene-
ral opinion
of mankind.

τοῦ πλάτους, καὶ εἰς τὴν αἰῶνα ἀπὸ κατὰ
 ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἴχθυ, ἀπὸ τοιοῦτων
 ἰσαστομίση.— καὶ τοῦτο ἀνεῖς τὸ
 εἶδημα φρόνησις κίληται. Phædo,
 p. 79. D. See also the dialogue of
 Lysis and the Philebus, p. 59. While
 these three exalted φρόνησις into σοφία,
 the earlier philosophers, such as De-
 mocritus and Empedocles, degraded it
 into mere αἰσθησις, (see Metaph. iii. 5.
 p. 76. sq. De Anima, iii. 2. p. 64.);
 and in this they were followed by
 many of the sophists. With Aristotle

φρόνησις holds, as it were, a middle
 station, being the connecting link be-
 tween the irrational and purely scien-
 tific parts of the soul. See note p. 47.

15. βέλτιστος] Wisdom is superior
 to φρόνησις, because its object-matter is
 superior to the other, and the habit
 operating upon the better matter is al-
 ways the better.

22. φρονίμους δ' οὐ] See Plato's
 Gorg. p. 486. C. and Aristot. Pol. i.
 4. p. 21. ed. Goetling.

ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέρονθ' ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν. Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις 8
 περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἔστι βουλευέ-
 σασθαι· τοῦ γὰρ φρονίμου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον
 εἶναί φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλευέσθαι, βουλευέται
 δ' οὐθείς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν,
 οὐδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τί ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο πρακτὸν
 ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ἀπλῶς εὐβουλος ὁ τοῦ ἀρίστου 10
 ἀνθρώπου τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν

By considering the difference of the object-matter.


5. *βουλίσασθαι* | See p. 229. Aristotle here recapitulates what he had said concerning *φρόνησις*, in order more clearly to distinguish it from *σοφία*. They differ, he says, in their object-matter, they also differ in the ends which they have in view, practical good being the end of *φρόνησις*, contemplation or *θεωρία* the end of *σοφία*. If we appeal to the sense of mankind, so far are they from considering practical good as the end of *σοφία*, that they have derided philosophers (*οἱ σοφοί*) for despising it.

2dly. Wisdom is always employed on universals (*τὰ καθόλου*); whereas *φρόνησις* being practical, must be employed upon particulars. For all moral action turns upon particulars. For in all moral action, we do in fact go through, however imperceptibly, a syllogistic process; of which the principle is the universal, the application to practice the particular premise. Thus, to use the illustration here employed by Aristotle, he who is truly *φρόνιμος*, and would apply his *φρόνησις* to practice, must know not only that all light meats are easy of digestion

(which is the universal premise), but also the particular fact, that this or that meat, such as bird's flesh, is of this description, and this is gained by experience. Without this particular premise, there is no acting at all. For he who knows the general principle, that all light flesh is easy of digestion, and yet knows not the particulars under that universal when presented to his senses, cannot act at all; and consequently, he who knows the particular fact, that all birds' flesh is easy of digestion, and yet knows not the principle upon which it rests, viz. because it is light food, and all light food is easy of digestion, appears rather to possess *φρόνησις*, than he who knows the principle only. (In the same sense, indeed, as the sagacious animals who appear to exercise in some degree this sense in providing for their own good, are said to possess *φρόνησις*). The relation which the former bears to the latter, may be compared to that of a master workman and his man, the former giving the rules and directions, the latter applying them to practice.

λογισμὸν. Οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου φρόνησις of the particular as well as of the universals.
 μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν.
 πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.
 διὸ καὶ ἔνιοι οὐκ εἰδότες ἐτέρων εἰδότες πρακ-
 5 τικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ ἔμπειροι· εἰ
 γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὐπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά,
 ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ'
 ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινὰ ποιή-
 σει μᾶλλον. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτικὴ ὥστε δεῖ
 10 ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἡ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ' ἂν τις
 καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ The three different kinds of φρόνησις.
 πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἕξις, τὸ
 μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταῦτὸν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ περὶ πόλιν
 ἡ μὲν ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις νομοθετικὴ, ἡ
 15 δὲ ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα
 πολιτικὴ· αὕτη δὲ πρακτικὴ καὶ βουλευτικὴ· τὸ
 γὰρ ψήφισμα πρακτὸν ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον· διὸ πολι-
 τεύεσθαι τούτους μόνους λέγουσιν, μόνοι γὰρ
 πράττουσιν οὗτοι ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχνη. δοκεῖ

11. καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ] This will be more clearly understood by the following scheme.



The οἰκονομική may easily be filled up in the same way.

13. ἴσως] See note on p. 174, 23.

17. ἴσχυατος] See note p. 239, 11.

δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστα εἶναι ἢ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ
 εἶνα, καὶ ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα φρόνησις.
 ἐκείνων δὲ ἢ μὲν οἰκονομία, ἢ δὲ νομοθεσία, ἢ
 δὲ πολιτική, καὶ ταύτης ἢ μὲν βουλευτική ἢ δὲ

Individual
 φρόνησις
 cannot exist
 isolated
 from the
 rest.

δικαστική. Εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως 9
 τὸ αὐτῷ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν
 καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν εἰδὼς καὶ διατρίβων
 φρόνιμος εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ πολυπράγμονες
 διὸ Εὐριπίδης

πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοῖν, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνας
 ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖσι ἠριθμημένῳ στρατοῦ
 ἴσον μετασχεῖν;
 τοὺς γὰρ περισσοὺς καὶ τι πρᾶσσοντας πλέον . . .

10

ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο
 δεῖν πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε 15
 τὸ τούτους φρονίμους εἶναι· καίτοι ἴσως οὐκ
 ἔστι τὸ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἄνευ οἰκονομίας οὐδ' ἄνευ πολι-
 τείας. ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διοικεῖν, ἄδηλον
 καὶ σκεπτέον. Σημεῖον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου
 καὶ διότι γεωμετρικοὶ μὲν νέοι καὶ μαθηματικοὶ 20
 γίνονται καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φρόνιμος δ' οὐ
 δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά
 ἐστὶν ἢ φρόνησις, ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας,
 νέος δ' ἐμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν· πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου

Conse-
 quently as
 φρόνησις de-
 pends so
 much on
 experience,
 young men
 cannot pos-
 sess it.

5. γνώσις] Some books read φρο-
 νήσις, which is evidently a gloss. And
 some translate ἴχου διαφορὰν πολλήν, by
 the words "sed multum in re discrimi-
 nis est." Whereas I rather think
 we should understand them as used
 p. 8, 3. τὰ καλὰ σοφόντων ἴχου διαφορὰν
 καὶ πλάτην. And as Aristotle after-

wards subjoins, τὰ αὐτοῦ πῶς δεῖ διο-
 κεῖν ἄδηλον. After ἀποῖν supply ἄγχα-
 ρον.

9. Εὐριπίδης] See Euripides, vol. ii.
 p. 962. ed. Oxon. 1833.

21. σοφοί] That is σοφοί on the sub-
 jects here mentioned, not σοφοί in the
 proper and restricted use of the term.

ποιεῖ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄν τις σκέψαιτο, διὰ τί δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἄν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ φυσικὸς οὐ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν, τῶν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐξ ἐμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύουσιν οἱ νέοι ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν, τῶν δὲ τὸ τί ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄδηλον. ἔτι ἡ ἀμαρτία ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου ἐν τῷ βουλευέσασθαι ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα, ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ βαρύσταθμον. "Ὅτι ^{The difference of φρέ-} 10 δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ^{νησις from} ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν ^{ἐπιστήμη and νοῦς.}

3. σοφὸς ἢ φυσικὸς] In metaphysics and physics.

9. ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις] Aristotle proceeds to state the difference between φρόνησις and ἐπιστήμη, and φρόνησις and νοῦς. Science (ἐπιστήμη) is employed merely about universals, φρόνησις upon particulars as well as universals.

Φρόνησις differs from νοῦς, because their object-matter is different. Both, indeed, are upon extremes, but opposite extremes; φρόνησις of extremes below, νοῦς of extremes beyond the reach of science; φρόνησις of particulars, of which αἴσθησις takes cognizance; νοῦς of the first terms (πρῶτοι ὄροι), the definitions and axioms of science. Φρόνησις, consequently, is of the extremes which are the first to us, the last to nature; νοῦς of extremes the first to nature, the last to us.

The real sense of νοῦς must be carefully borne in mind, and distinguished from that division of it of which he treats in chap. ix. For Aristotle divides νοῦς into two, the *theoretical*, that employed upon the principles of science, and the *practical*, that employed

upon the particulars of human actions: διττὸς ὁ νοῦς, ὁ μὲν περὶ τὰ καθόλου καταργιόμενος, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα. καὶ ὁ μὲν περὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔστι καθ' ὅτι αἱ ἐπιστήμαι ἡμῖν παραργίζονται, οἱ καὶ θεωρητικὸς ἰσομάχεται, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ πρακτά, οἱ καὶ πρακτικὸς λίγεται. Eustrat. f. 109, b. The former is used here.

11. ἐσχάτου] This term Aristotle himself explains in chap. ix. ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρῶτων ὄρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων.—ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὄρων καὶ πρῶτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἰνδιχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐπίσης προτάσεως (the minor premise.) If we proceed from particulars and sensible objects, we arrive at the universal, (the *inductive* method): if we commence with universals we end with particulars, (the *deductive* or *sylogistic* method): the result is in both instances expressed by the term ἐν ἐσχάτου. So that this term may express, a *universal* or a *particular*, in *necessary* or *contingent* matter.

τοιούτου. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῶ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὄρων ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου οὐ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ' αἰσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἐσχάτον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κάκεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον αἰσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.

2. *Ἐν οὖν ἔστι λόγος*] *Of which there is no demonstration.*

3. *αἰσθησις*] *I do not mean that αἰσθησις which is any of the five senses, but that by which a mathematician perceives that a triangle is the last and the simplest of all rectilinear figures; (for there he rests, and seeks no further). This faculty is however rather αἰσθησις than φρόνησις, but yet a different species from that, because φρόνησις is a rational, αἰσθησις an irrational faculty.*

Aristotle distinguishes *αἰσθησις* into two kinds: the mere external sense which is conversant only with external objects, and an internal one which operates without them, and independently of sensible objects; to which he compares this *φρόνησις*. For not only on particulars *φρόνησις* is exercised, which are cognizable by the senses; but also in weighing and scrutinizing particulars, and examining and comparing them, and in this resembles a faculty, which is called *common sense* (*κοινή αἰσθησις*). See the Introduction to this book, p. 214.

5. *στίθεται γὰρ*] Compare Phys. Aus. vii. 3. *τὸ γὰρ ἡμιῶσι καὶ στίθαι τὴν διένειαν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ φρονεῖν λεγόμεθα.*

6. *ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον*] *ἴσθι περι*

τῶν πρῶτων καὶ βουλευτῶν εἰρηαι, καὶ ταῦτα ἴσαι καθίστασθαι καὶ αἰσθητά, καὶ περι ταῦτα τὴν φρόνησιν καταγιγνώσκει, ὡς εἶναι τὸ λογιζόμενον προσεχῶς αὐτῶν ἰφασσόμενον, ὥστε σύγκριον ποιῶνται τοῦ μετὰ φρονήσεως αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ καθίστασθαι, καὶ τοῦ ἀπλῶς, ἥτοι κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν αἰσθησιν· τὸ γὰρ, οἷα αἰσθάνεσθαι, τοῦτο δηλοῖ ἥτοι τῇ κοινῇ αἰσθησὶ καὶ ἢ ἡμῖν προεργίται τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἥτοι μία τί ἔστι καὶ κοινὴ πρὸς πάντα ἰσχυρῶσα τὰ αἰσθητά. ἡ γὰρ εἰς εἶναι διαιρέσει κατὰ τὰ αἰσθητά γίνεται, ὅν δι' τῇ κοινῇ αἰσθησὶ. ἴν' ὡς ἰσχυρῶς χρωμίση αὐτοῖς τοῖς διαφόροις κατὰ γίνεσι προσβάλλη δι' αὐτῶν αἰσθησῶν. ἰσῆσι δὲ μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔστι, καὶ ὥστε ποιότητα τινὰ ταυτὴν τὴν κοινότητα τῇ ἀπλῶς προσεργίται αἰσθησὶ. οὐ λόγισμον, φησὶ, αἰσθησὶν τὴν τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθησῶν, τῇ ἢ τῇ, ἢ δι' αἰσθητηρίου τινὸς ἰσχυρῶνται. ἀλλὰ τοιαύτην λόγισμον ἰσῆσι αἰσθησὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ κοινῶς αἰσθάνεσθαι. φησὶ δὲ ταύτην μᾶλλον ἴσαι αἰσθησὶν τὴν μετὰ φρονήσεως. ἴσαι οὖν λόγῳ καὶ ἰσῆσι αἰσθησῶν, ἰσῆσι δὲ ἀλογίς τι καὶ ἀπιστάτατος. ἴσαι οὖν τὸ μετὰ λόγου κριῖται τοῦ ἔστιν λόγου, ταυτῶν κριῖται αἰσθησῶν ἢ φρονήσεως τῆς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἰδίας αἰσθησῶν. διὰ καὶ ἄλλο ἴσαι ἰσῆσι ἢ αἰσθησῶν ταύτης τῆς αἰσθησῶν, ὡς καὶ τὸ λογιζέσθαι τοῦ ἀλόγου ἴσαι. Eustrat.

CHAP. VII.

Of Good Counsel, or *εὐβουλία*.

- 10 ΤΟ ζητεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ βουλευέσθαι διαφέρει· ^{What *εὐβου-*}
 τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι ζητεῖν τι ἐστίν. δεῖ δὲ ^{*λία* is not.}
 λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ εὐβουλίας τί ἐστι, πότερον ἐπι-
 στήμη τις ἢ δόξα ἢ εὐστοχία ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος.
 5 ἐπιστήμη μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι περὶ
 ὧν ἴσασι, ἢ δ' εὐβουλία βουλή τις, ὁ δὲ βου-
 λεύομενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ'
 εὐστοχία· ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου καὶ ταχύ τι ἢ
 εὐστοχία, βουλευόνται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ
 10 φασὶ πράττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχὺ τὰ βουλευθέντα,
 βουλευέσθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι ἢ ἀγχίνοια ἕτερον
 καὶ ἢ εὐβουλία· ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἢ ἀγχίνοια.

CHAP. VII.

Having thus far investigated the nature of those habits which have truth for their object, (*οἷς ἀληθεία ἢ ψυχὴ τῆ παραφάνει ἢ ἀποφάνει*. vi. 1.) Aristotle now proceeds to consider certain others which are intimately connected with *φρόνησις*, and which naturally arise from the remarks which have been made upon that habit. For respecting *φρόνησις* it was said, that it required and indeed partly consisted of good deliberation, (*τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευέσθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῆ ἀγαθὰ*, p. 229, 7; and again, *τοῦ φρονήσου μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον ἰσχυρῶς, τὸ εὖ βουλευέσθαι*, p. 236, 5.) ; there immediately then starts forth a question, what is *εὐβουλία*, does it consist in the fitness of the means proposed for the end, and may that end be any end; or does it

consist of the two united, good means and good ends? For we have already seen that a degree of moral virtue must reside in *φρόνησις*, p. 230, 11. sq. These doubts Aristotle now proceeds to resolve, by considering at greater length the nature of *εὐβουλία*, and subsequently proceeding to explain how far judgment and candour are connected with *φρόνησις*.

12. *εὐστοχία τις ἢ ἀγχίνοια*] Compare Anal. Post. i. 34. p. 201. ἢ δ' ἀγχίνοια ἵσταν εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀπείσθη χρόνῳ τοῦ μέσου. οἷον εἰ τις ἰδὼν ἔτι ἢ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν αἰὲ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχὺ ἰστιάσει διὰ τί τοῦτο, ἔτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἢ διαλεγόμενοι πλουσίῳ ἔργον δέει δαμιέσθαι· ἢ δέει φίλοι ἔτι ἰχθῆροι τοῦ αὐτοῦ. πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια τὰ μέσα, ὁ ἰδὼν τὰ ἄκρα, ἰστιάσει. Therefore *ἀγχίνοια*

εὐβουλία is not an *ἐπιπέτης* either of science or opinion.

οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἢ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος ἀμαρτάνει, ὁ δ' εὖ ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται, δηλον ὅτι ὀρθότης τις ἢ εὐβουλία ἐστίν, οὗτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὔτε δόξης· ἐπιστήμης μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρθότης (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμαρτία), δόξης δ' ὀρθότης ἀλήθεια· ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὠρισταί ἤδη πᾶν οὐ δόξα ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἢ εὐβουλία. διανοίας ἄρα λείπεται· αὕτη γὰρ οὐπω φάσις· καὶ γὰρ ἢ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἤδη, ὁ δὲ βουλευόμενος, εἴαν τε εὖ εἴαν τε κακῶς βουλεύηται, ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται. Ἄλλ' ὀρθότης τίς ἐστίν ἢ εὐβουλία βουλήσ· διὸ ἢ βουλὴ ζη-

In what *ἐπιπέτης* it consists;

is an unpremeditated assumption of the middle term, that is, of the cause why the major term is predicated of the minor term in the conclusion: in this, therefore, it differs from *εὐβουλία*, which does nothing without time and meditation.

6. *ἄριστοι ἦδη*] See p. 94, 24. sq.

8. *διανοίας—λείπειναι*] *εὐβουλία* is a species of correctness (*ἐπιπέτης*), but not a correctness either of science or of opinion. Not of science, because correctly speaking there is no correctness of science, since there is no incorrectness of it; not of opinion, because the correctness of opinion is mere truth without action, (see p. 95); and further, opinion is not *σέση* but *ἀσέση*, (*φάσις*, the generic term of the negative and affirmative judgment of the Logicians); whereas *εὐβουλία* has not yet arrived at this state, (*αὕτη γὰρ οὐπω φάσις*), but searches and deliberates. But yet, though *εὐβουλία* is neither science nor opinion, it must still belong, somehow to the *διάνοια*, because it is not without reason, (*ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ'*

ἄνευ λόγου ἢ εὐβουλία, διανοίας ἄρα λείπειναι). It cannot be excluded from it (*διάνοια*), as it must be if we followed Plato's division of the soul. *What ἐπιπέτης then is it? an ἐπιπέτης βουλήσ: and before we can discover what εὐβουλία is, we must examine into the meaning of the term ἐπιπέτης, that of βουλή having been already determined.* See p. 96. Such appears to me to be the meaning of this intricate and involved passage; many other interpretations have been suggested, for which the reader must consult the different commentators.

But Aristotle may mean to say, that *εὐβουλία* is a species of *διάνοια*, since *διάνοια* is that exercise of the mind which has not yet arrived at decision (*φάσις*), but is in a state of progression to it. Compare Philoponus in *Arist. de Anima: διάνοια δὲ ἔστι, τὸ εἶναι ἀνέτινα διανοίῳ μεταβαίνουσαν ἀπὸ προτάσεων ἐπὶ συμπιεράματα. ἔξ οὗ καὶ τὸ κληῖσιν ἔλκεται*. This I think the more probable interpretation.

τητέα πρώτον τί καὶ περὶ τί. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὀρθότης ^{1. Good end.}
 πλεοναχῶς, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα· ὁ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς
 καὶ ὁ φαῦλος ὁ προτίθεται ἰδεῖν ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ
 τεύξεται, ὥστε ὀρθῶς ἔσται βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν
 δὲ μέγα εἰληφῶς. δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι τὸ
 εὔβεβουλευσθαι· ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλήs
 εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική. Ἄλλ' ἔστι καὶ ^{2. Good means.}
 τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῶ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὁ μὲν
 δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὗ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ
 10 τὸν μέσον ὄρον εἶναι· ὥστ' οὐδ' αὐτῆ πω εὐβου-
 λία, καθ' ἣν οὐ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι'
 οὗ ἔδει. Ἔτι ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμε- ^{3. Sufficient time.}
 νον τυχεῖν τὸν δὲ ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω
 εὐβουλία, ἀλλ' ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἀφέλιμον, καὶ
 15 οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι ἔστι καὶ ἀπλῶς εὔβε-
 βουλευσθαι καὶ πρὸς τι τέλος. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἀπλῶς
 ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, ἡ δὲ
 τις ἡ πρὸς τι τέλος. Εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὔ ^{Complete definition of εὐβουλίας.}
 βεβουλευσθαι, ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ
 20 τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τι τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς
 ὑπόληψις ἐστίν.

17. τὸ τέλος] τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς
 Happiness; πρὸς τι τέλος means tend-
 ing to Happiness. When εὐβουλία
 aims at the first, then εὐβουλία is
 absolutely perfect, when it aims at
 any of the others only partially, upon
 one particular object.

19. ἐφ' ἧς ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον]
 A correctness as to the means to an end,
 of which end φρόνησις forms the right
 conception. It has been already stated

that a good end is necessary for
 εὐβουλία, but of this εὐβουλία itself can-
 not take cognizance, because it does
 not commence till the end is fixed
 and proposed, and then only delibe-
 rates upon the means to that end.
 See p. 94, 18. The forming of a right
 conception then of the end must be
 the part of some other habit, and
 that is φρόνησις. See p. 230, 10. and
 the note.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Judgment, or *σύνεσις*; and Candor, or *γνώμη*.

Of Judgment and its object-matter.

ΕΣΤΙ δὲ καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ ἀσυνεσία, καθ' ἧς λέγομεν συνετοὺς καὶ ἀσυνέτους, οὐθ' ὅλως τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξη (πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν συνετοί) οὔτε τις μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν ἢ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέθους· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ ὄντων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἡ σύνεσις ἐστίν οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὄτουοῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις καὶ βουλευσάιτο. Διὸ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν τῆ

Difference of Judgment from *φρόνησις*.

φρονήσει ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ταῦτὸν σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστίν· τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ μή, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον· ταῦτὸν γὰρ σύνεσις καὶ εὐσυνεσία καὶ συνετοὶ καὶ εὐσύνετοι. Ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν 15

Judgment defined.

CHAP. VIII.

1. *σύνεσις*] Both *σύνεσις* and *γνώμη* mean judgment. But *σύνεσις* is a mere judgment as to measures: *γνώμη* to persons. In the first there is no moral virtue, there is in the second.

15. *οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν*] *τὸ γὰρ λαμβάνειν φρόνησιν. ἔστι τὸ μαθάνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ φράσιμος γνώσκου.* Paraph. *σύνεσις* and *φρόνησις* have the same object-matter, but differ in species. The latter seeks and discovers what ought to be done, and gives directions for it, but the former merely forms an opinion concerning these operations of

φρόνησις. Consequently they are also distinguished in point of time, *σύνεσις* being subsequent to *φρόνησις*. It follows therefore, that *σύνεσις* cannot be the same as the possessing or acquiring *φρόνησις* (*οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν*). In order to point out more clearly the difference between them, Aristotle introduces the illustration of a master and his pupil. For as the pupil apprehends and forms a correct judgment of the precepts of his master, so does *σύνεσις* of the dictates and directions of *φρόνησις*.

ἡ σύνεσις· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μανθάνειν λέγεται
 ξυνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ, οὕτως ἐν
 τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τούτων
 περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησις ἐστίν, ἄλλου λέγοντος, καὶ
 5 κρίνειν καλῶς· τὸ γὰρ εὖ τῷ καλῶς ταυτόν.
 καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τοῦνομα ἡ σύνεσις, καθ'
 ἣν εὐσύνητοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν· λέγομεν
 γὰρ τὸ μανθάνειν συνιέναι πολλάκις.

Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη γνώμη, καθ' ἣν εὐγνώμονας ^{Οἱ γνώμα.}
 10 καὶ ἔχειν φαμέν γνώμην, ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶ
 κρίσις ὀρθή. σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστα
 φαμεν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν, καὶ ἐπιεικῆς τὸ ἔχειν
 περὶ ἕνα συγγνώμην. ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη γνώμη
 ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή. ὀρθὴ δ' ἡ τοῦ
 15 ἀληθοῦς.

CHAP. IX.

Some general remarks upon the foregoing habits.

12 Εἰσι δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἔξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταῦτο ^{σύνοιαι. γνώ-}
 τείνουσαι· λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην καὶ σύνεσιν ^{μα. φρόνησις,} and τοῦς,

9. γνώμη] Etiamsi prior illa facultas
 ἡ σύνεσις perspicientia, etiam sit facultas
 judicandi de rebus, tamen non est
 eadem cum presenti facultate. Nam
 σύνεσις ita simpliciter de rebus judicat
 et pronuntiat, quales sua sunt natura;
 si sunt bonæ vel malæ, tales quoque
 pronuntiat: γνώμη autem in judicando
 adhibet æquitatem et moderationem,
 et mavult in benigniorem quam in
 deteriore partem quandam accipere.
 Habet ergo γνώμη se ad σύνεσιν, quem-

admodum se habet æquitas ad justi-
 tiam. MAGIRUS.

CHAP. IX.

In this Chapter Aristotle proceeds to
 explain the affinity of the three last-
 mentioned habits with φρόνησις, to which
 they are so inseparably united that it
 cannot be perfect without them. That
 affinity consists in three things; I. all
 are in the same subject-matter, the de-
 liberative part of the soul; II. all are

are all upon
the same
object-
matter,
human ac-
tions.

φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἤδη καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετούς· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐται τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετὸς δὲ καὶ εὐγνώμων ἢ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων

employed upon the same object-matter, human actions; III. and all are produced by the same efficient cause. For although some men appear naturally to possess a greater degree of *αἰσῆσις* and *γνώμη* than others, yet these faculties can only be perfected by use and habit.

They differ from *φρόνησις* in the following respects. *φρόνησις* first exerts the proper means and aim, at the ends proposed. Upon these proceedings of *φρόνησις* is *αἰσῆσις* or *γνώμη* exerted accordingly as the occasion requires. The first perceives and apprehends those things which *φρόνησις* commands and passes a correct judgment upon them: the second, also judges of the commands of *φρόνησις*, chiefly considering the persons, their opportunities, wishes, times, and such like; correcting, when need may be, any error, which may arise from following strictly a general law or precept, and when a fault would be committed were the commands of *φρόνησις*, (using *φρόνησις* in a loose sense,) in that particular instance obeyed.

1. νοῦν - ἔχων] νοῦν δὲ λίγου ἰσταῖνα εἰς πρακτικῆν ἢ γὰρ περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα τοῦ ἢ πρακτικῆς ἰστίαι. δε καὶ λογισμὸς λίγεται. ὡς λογίζων καὶ μισθῶν τῶν πρακτικῶν ἰστίαι. ἢ γοῦν φρόνιμος ὡς διακτικῶν καὶ ἀντιδύων πρὸς τὰ τίλας ἀπὸ φρόνιμος λίγεται, ὡς δὲ κρίνειν ἔτι

καλῶς ἀντιδύειν. καὶ ὡς ἴδι τοῦ τίλου ἰστίαιτο σπαστὸς καὶ ἰστίαιτο ἰσμάξι-
ται, ὡς δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀρμάτιον τοῦ ἰσμά-
τιου πρὸς τὸν καὶ πρᾶγμασι. αἰτίαι
τι καὶ τρέσειν τὰς κρίσεις ποιήσεις
ἰσγνώμων ἰστίαιται. διὰ τοῦτο τὸν αἰτίαι
καὶ φρόνησιν ἔχων ἔχει τοῦν πρακτικῶν
καὶ αἰσῆσιν καὶ γνώμην λίγεται, ὡς παρ'
αὐτὰς ἰσγνώμων περὶ τὰ πρακτικῶν.
Schol.

2. νοῦν ἤδη] τὸ δὲ ἤδη πρὸς τὴν τῶν
νοῦν ἔχων, τοῦν ἔχων ἤδη ἰστίαι, δηλοῖται
μετὰ τὴν τῶν πρᾶγματων σπουδαίαι
ἢ περὶ τὰ πρακτικῶν τοῦν τῶν ψυχῆς σπει-
γίται, καὶ ἤδη τοῦν ἔχων λίγεται ἢ
πολλὰ ἴδων καὶ καθὼν καὶ διὰ μακροῦ
χρόνου τοῦτον δεξιότατος. Schol.

6. συγγνώμων] ἰσγνώμων, συγγνώ-
μων, and ἰστίαιται, are here used
synonymously; as are ἰστίαιται and
γνώμη

— τὰ γὰρ ἰστίαιται] κατὰ ἢ ἰστίαιται,
καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῆς ἰστίαιται κρίνειται
πᾶσι ἰστίαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῆς παρὰ τοῦ
φρονίμου κατακρίνειται. πρὸς ἄλλοι τοῦ
ἰστίαιται τῶν ἰστίαιται ἰστίαιται ἰστίαι-
ται. ἢ γὰρ ἰστίαιται ἰστίαιται κατα-
κρίνει τῶν ἰστίαιται κρίνει ἰστίαιται
χρᾶται καὶ συγγνώμων τὰ γὰρ ἀπὸ
ἰστίαιται ἰστίαιται, ὡς πρὸς τὴν, τῶν
φρονίμου καὶ ἰστίαιται ἄλλ' ἢ μὲν φρό-
νιμος ὡς αὐτὰ ἰστίαιται καὶ κατακρίνει ἔχων
πρὸς αὐτὰ, ἢ δὲ ἰστίαιται ὡς ἄλλοι ἰστίαι-
τάται αὐτὰς κρίνει μετὰ γνώμης τὴν
καὶ συγγνώμων. Schol.

πάντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ
 γνώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ
 τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα. Καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν
 ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων
 ὄρων καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ λόγος,
 καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὄρων
 καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ' ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου

The object-
 matter of
 nous more
 fully ex-
 plained.

3. ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων] Since nous, as it has been already observed, (see p. 232. n.) is of two kinds, both active and speculative, the one employed upon particulars, the other upon universals, by which science is acquired, and since there are certain principles of human actions, the knowledge of which is of the utmost importance for the proper understanding and performing of the actions themselves, Aristotle here proceeds to explain at greater length what faculty it is which apprehends those principles, and how the apprehension of them is effected. These principles he calls by other terms, extremes and particulars (τῶν καὶ ἰσχυρὰ καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων). For commencing with universals, and progressing from these, we arrive at particulars, which are therefore called extremes, because we are able to proceed no farther. But nous is not merely of these extremes, but also of extremes both ways (τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα), of speculative as well as active principles: for since those things which are by nature prior, are in the knowledge of man posterior, and, on the other hand, those things which are prior to us are in nature posterior (see p. 11), it must of course happen, that if we commence with those things which are prior to us, we shall arrive at last at what is prior to nature, at universals, the principles of sci-

ence, (the extremes in one way); but if we commence with those things which are prior to nature, we shall arrive at length at what is prior to us, at particulars, the principles of actions, (the extremes the other way). So that nous is consequently of those things which are both first and last (ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἰσχυρὰ), to nature and to us, and the same things are at once both principles and extremes.

5. καὶ οὐ λόγος] And not reasoning or syllogism. Here λόγος corresponds to λογισμὸς as used in the second chapter of this book. And by this remark, Aristotle still further distinguishes the nature of apprehension (nous), from science.

Although apprehension is divided into two, it is not actually so divided, but only in reference to its energies. It is the same faculty, whether employed upon the first principles of science or of morals. nous δι' ἑσθὲν ἐν ἀνδρὶ μὴ ἐν οὐσίᾳ, ἴσται δὲ καὶ ἴσται ἐν τῇ ἐπιτησίᾳ. ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς ἰαυτὸν μὴ θεωρεῖ καὶ τὰ κατ' αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ κείμενα θεωρητικῶς ἴσται, τὰ δ' αὐτῆς ἐπιτηρητέμια καὶ χεῖρα μίσην διδοὺς καὶ ἰσχυρίζεται καὶ ἀνάσσει πρακτικῶς ἴσται καὶ ἐνομαζέσται. ἰαυτὸς μὴ οὐτὸν τὰς ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιτήσσει. οὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ καταγίνεται. πάντως μὴ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀνυπέστησι, ἀλλ' ὁ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καταθεῖ. Schol.

καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προτάσεως· ἀρχαί γὰρ τοῦ οὗ ἔνεκα αὐται· ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γὰρ τὸ καθόλου. τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθησιν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς. Διὸ καὶ φυσικὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει σοφὸς μὲν οὐδεὶς, γνῶμην δ' ἔχειν καὶ σὺννεσιν καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις οἴομεθα ἀκολουθεῖν, καὶ ἦδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ γνῶμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης. διὸ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἰ

These habits acquired only by experience.

1. *ἰτίαις σεράσεισι*] Minor premiss or particular proposition. See vii. 3.

— *ἀρχαὶ γὰρ*] οἱ μὲν ἄριστοι² λόγου τῇ φύσει πρῶτοι, ἰσχυροὶ δὲ ἡμῖν. τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα πρῶτα μὲν ἡμῖν, ἰσχυρὰ δὲ τῇ φύσει· ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἰσχυρὰ τῇ φύσει ἀρχαὶ εἰσι καὶ αἰτία τοῦ εἶλουσ τῷ σερασεῖ· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ αἰσθησὶ καθ' ἕκαστα διδασκόμενοι σεράσσειν τὰ συμφέροντα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ δὲ δὴ πρὸς τὸ ζητούμενον ἀφ' ἑξῆς εἶλος· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων τῶν μαινῶν καθολικῶς εἰσις συνάγουσιν λόγους φρόνημα γινόμενα πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῇ βίῃ σεράσεις. διὰ τούτων δὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν γινώσκον ἔχον τῶν μαινῶν· ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ γινώσκῃ ἄριστος γινόμενος τοῖς ἰσοῖς γὰρ ἰστίαις ἢ γινώσκῃ τῶν ἁρίστων καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν. Paragraph.

3. *αἰσθησι—νοῦς*] The knowledge which is derived from particulars may in one sense be termed *αἰσθησις*, and also *νοῦς*. Sense (*αἰσθησις*) inasmuch as by means of this faculty we take cognizance of particulars; apprehension (*νοῦς*), inasmuch as we refer those particulars so acquired from *αἰσθησις* (see p. 214.) to certain general heads, by which we deduce rules for our

guidance upon other and similar occasions, clearing and strengthening this eye of the soul. Sense and apprehension have this in common; both energize without the use of middle terms, without syllogizing, the one upon the objects of apprehension, the other upon objects of sense. In this they also have a similarity: all demonstration proceeds upon principles and universals first gained by apprehension. In actions, on the contrary, setting out with the principles derived from the senses, we refer each particular to the *νοῦς σερασεῖς*, and thence form certain deductions. Consequently, he who has had the greatest experience, will have this faculty in the greatest perfection.

4. *φυσικὰ δεξιῶν*] For since these habits turn chiefly upon particular acts, which can only be known by experience, and experience is only gained by age, and nature is the cause of age, therefore nature may in some sense be said to be the cause and author of these habits.

9. *ἀρχὴ καὶ εἶλος*] ἡ γὰρ τοῦς, καθὼς εἴρηται, καὶ θεωρητικῶς ἰστίαι καὶ σερασεῖς, καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ εἶλος. ἀρχὴ

² Propositions not obtained by the use of a middle term, not the conclusions of previous syllogisms. Such of course are all *summa genera*.

ἀποδείξεις καὶ περὶ τούτων. ὥστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδείκτοις φάσεσι καὶ δόξαις οὐχ ἥττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας δῶμα ὀρῶσιν ὀρθῶς. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις καὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ περὶ τίνα ἑκατέρα τυγχάνει οὐσα, καὶ ὅτι ἄλλου τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετῆ ἑκατέρα, εἴρηται.

CHAP. X.

Of the utility of σοφία and φρόνησις, and which is superior to the other.

13 ΔΙΑΠΟΡΗΣΕΙΕ Δ' ἂν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τί ^{First and} ^{Second Ob-} ^{jection.}
10 χρήσιμοί εἰσιν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ.

μὴ καὶ ἴσιν τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν ἴσιν γνώσεσι καὶ θεωρητικῆς λήγισται, ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἴσιν ἀποδείξεως τίλος δὲ καὶ ἴσιν γνώσεσι ἴσιν τῶν καὶ ἴσιν καὶ ἐκ αἰσθήσεως καὶ πρακτικῆς λήγισται. ἀρετὴ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις, καὶ ταῦτά ἴσιν τὰ ἀποδεικνύει καὶ ἴσιν ταῦτα εἰλη- ταῖον ἢ ἀποδεικνύει λήγισται ἀπὸ τῶν καὶ ἴσιν καταβαίειν. Paraph.

But wisdom theorizes upon nothing which is generated, (*οὐδὲ μῶς ἴσιν γνώσεως*. See also p. 235.); and consequently contributes nothing to happiness.

The 2nd objection, that φρόνησις contributes nothing to happiness.

If φρόνησις be useful and necessary, it is so either to him who has acquired virtue, or to him who has not yet acquired it.

CHAP. X.

Aristotle having explained the nature of wisdom and φρόνησις, now proceeds to consider two objections which he supposes may be raised; I, as to the utility of these habits, and II, as to their comparative dignity.

The 1st objection, that wisdom contributes nothing to happiness, may be stated in the following form.

The happiness of man is the good of man, which is both contingent and generated,

It is not useful either to one or the other, and therefore φρόνησις is not useful to happiness.

The minor of this syllogism is thus proved.

First, It is not useful to him who has virtue; because virtue is of itself an active habit, and will produce acts accordingly. For so he who has a healthy habit of body will perform his energies accordingly, to which the mere knowledge of what is healthy contributes nothing: so likewise the

Neither wisdom nor φρόνησις contributes to happiness, and are consequently useless.

ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαιμόνων ἄνθρωπος, οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ ἔστι γενέσεως. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τίνος ἕνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς, εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἔστιν ἢ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπων, ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἀνδρὸς 5 πρᾶττειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναί αὐτὰ ἔσμεν, εἴπερ ἕξεις αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ οὐδὲ τὰ εὐεκτικά, ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι λέγεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμνα-10 στικὴν ἔσμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον θετέον ἀλλὰ τοῦ γίνεσθαι, τοῖς οὐσι σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος, ἔτι δ' οὐδὲ τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν· οὐθὲν γὰρ διοίσει αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἄλλοις ἔχουσι πείθεσθαι, ἰκανῶς τ' ἔχει ἂν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ 15 καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν ὁμῶς οὐ μαθαίνομεν ἰατρικὴν. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὐσα κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται· ἡ γὰρ ποιούσα ἄρχει καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον. περὶ δὲ τού-20 των λεκτέον· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι καθ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἰρετὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀρετὰς γ' οὐσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου, καὶ εἰ μὴ

Objection as to the relative dignity of wisdom and φρόνησις.

1. Reply. They are eligible for their own sakes.

mere knowledge (φρόνησις) of what is good, just, and temperate, tends nothing to the production of such acts.

Secondly, It is not useful to him who has not yet acquired virtue. For if he who has not yet acquired virtuous habits, is desirous of performing virtuous acts, he has only to imitate the actions of the good man. For, to

continue the illustration above, he who wishes to acquire a healthy habit, and perform the energies accordingly, would never think of learning the science of medicine for that purpose, but would be satisfied with following the directions of him who did possess it, of his physician.

ποιούσι μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. Ἐπειτα καὶ 2. They are
 ποιούσι μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ' ὡς eligible as
 ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν· μέρος γὰρ parts of
 οὐσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς τῷ ἔχασθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ happiness.
 5 ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαιμόνα. Ἐτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται 3. φρόνησις
 κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἡ indispensable
 μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ able to
 φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον. (τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου virtuous
 μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ actions.
 10 θρησκευτοῦ· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πράττειν ἢ μὴ
 πράττειν). Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρακ- φρόνησις in-
 separable from moral
 virtue.

2. *ὡς ἰατρικῆς*] Not as efficient causes, as the objector has supposed, but as parts of happiness.

5. *ἔτι τὸ ἔργον*] Aristotle here refutes the proofs of the minor of the second objection. He observes, that φρόνησις is useful for happiness, because moral virtue cannot operate without it. For to every virtuous action a good end as well as good means are required. But moral virtue only forms and directs the appetite, which being irrational cannot reason upon the end, but only fix upon it when presented to it, and further also requires φρόνησις to discover the proper and sufficient means for the attainment of that end. φρόνησις then selects and orders the right means for the attainment of that end which moral virtue has sought out and selected; and consequently φρόνησις is indispensable to virtuous actions and to happiness.

11. *σπεῖ δὲ τοῦ*] Aristotle here refutes the allegation of the objector, that a person can perform the energies of virtue, without possessing φρόνησις, merely by imitating the actions of

others and following their directions, as the sick man can attain to health without learning the art of medicine. To this Aristotle replies, by saying, that imitation alone is not sufficient for the performance of virtuous actions, for which four properties are required as already has been stated, ii. c. 3. First, that the agent should know what he does; secondly, that he should act from deliberate choice (*ἡ προαιρέσις*); thirdly, that he should act from the love of virtue itself; and fourthly, with consistency and perseverance. Moral virtue then makes the προαιρέσις correct, causes it to fix upon the good and to avoid the bad. This however is not sufficient, but the means for attaining that end when so found ought to be good likewise; but the discovery and determination of the means which are to be put in action for obtaining the object of our choice (*ἡα ἡαίσις ἵκανα σίφους πράττειν*) belong not to moral virtue, but to some other faculty. What that faculty is, Aristotle now proceeds to examine.

τικωτέρους διὰ τὴν φρόνησιν τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων, μικρὸν ἄνωθεν ἀρκτέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας οὐπω δικαίους εἶναι, οἷον τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιοῦντας ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ δι' ἄγνοϊαν ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά (καίτοι πράττουσί γε ἅ δει καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον), οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστι τὸ πῶς ἔχοντα πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν, λέγω δ' οἷον διὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα τῶν πραττόμενων. 10 τὴν μὲν οὖν προαίρεσιν ὀρθὴν ποιῆ ἢ ἀρετὴ, τὸ δ' ὅσα ἐκείνης ἔνεκα πέφυκε πράττεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως. Λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὴ 15 τις δύναμις ἣν καλοῦσι δεινότητα· αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ τοιαύτη ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ἦ καλός,

(δυνάτης, the same as φρόνησις stripped of moral virtue).

3. δίκαια λέγομεν] See p. 197.

15. δεινότητα] A technical word applied to this particular use even by the Pythagoreans. Compare Clinias: *ἴσθι μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἐν νομοῖσιν καὶ γνωστοῖσιν μέρος αὐτῶν* [sc. ἀρετῶν], *δεινοὶ εἰ καὶ συνιστοὶ ἰσχυρίζονται. ἴσθι δὲ τὸ ἠθικὸν εἰ καὶ πραγματικόν, χρησιμὸν εἰ καὶ ἰσχυρῆς*. Frag. Pyth. Ed. Gale, p. 29.

18. σκοπός] Every one who wishes to act fixes upon some end, but requires a certain aptitude or faculty, by which he may fix upon and perform those things which tend to the end proposed. This faculty, as given us by nature, is called δυνάτης, but is not sufficient of itself to constitute a

virtuous action, otherwise all who possessed it would be virtuous, which is not the case. Something else then is required. Then only is it virtuous, when the end it has in view is good and praiseworthy. But the faculty which determines and fixes on the good end is correct *ἔριξις*, that is, moral virtue, therefore to constitute perfect δυνάτης moral virtue must be united with it, but δυνάτης so united is the same as φρόνησις, which always has a good end (see p. 230, 11. n.) therefore φρόνησις is not without moral virtue. *τοῦτο γὰρ διαφέρει δυνάτης φρονησιως. ἴσθι ἢ μὲν τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀπλῶς σκοπὸν συντελούντων ἰφαιμερῆσιν ἴσθι δύναμις, ἢ δὲ φρόνησις τῶν πρὸς τὸν ὀρθῶν σκοπόν, καὶ ἴσθι ἢ μὲν φρόνησις ἴσθι ἐν*

ἐπαινετή ἐστίν, ἂν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία· διὸ
καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους δεινοὺς καὶ πανούργους φαιμέν
εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δεινότης, ἀλλ'
οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ' ἕξις τῷ
5 ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς,
ὡς εἴρηται τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· οἱ γὰρ συλλο-
γισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ
τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὅτιδῆποτε ὄν'
ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν. τοῦτο δ' εἰ
10 μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ
μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεται ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακ-
τικὰς ἀρχάς. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἀδύνατον φρό-
νιμον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθόν. Σκεπτέον δὴ
πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παρα-
15 πλησιῶς ἔχει ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα

And moral
virtue is in-
separable
from φρό-
νησις.
(Natural
virtue bear-

σπουδαίως προσγινομένη τῇ ψυχῇ, δι-
ταὶ δὲ τῆς δεινότητος, δυνάμεως οὐσης καὶ
ἐφ' ἧς, καὶ ἐν φύσει προσούσης τῶν
ἐν ἡμῖν λόγῳ. ἴ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἰσχυρίζεται.
Schol.

4. ἡ δ' ἕξις] *This habit (φρόνησις)*
is generated in this eye of the soul,
(that is, τοῦς σπουδαίως. See p. 239,
9. n. 246, 1. n. and 247, 3. n.
not without moral virtue). τῷ ὄμματι
τούτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς. ἔστι τῷ εἰρημίῳ καὶ
παραδοκίμῳ ἀπὸ μικροῦ, ὃ ἔστιν ἡ
σπουδαίως τοῦς. Schol.

7. ἰσχυρὸν τοῖσδε] Docet prudentiam
(φρόνησιν) absque virtute esse non posse
hunc in modum. Dictum est supra
syllogismos partim esse theoreticos,
partim practicos, utrique notum est
sua esse principia. Practici princi-
pium finis est, non secus atque theo-
retici hypothesis, inquit Aristot. vii. 8.
Finis igitur nisi viro bono bonus con-

stitui non potest. Vir improbus malum
semper et improbum finem sibi deligit:
nam hæc improbitatis est vis, ut in
scopo et fine deligendo aberrare non
faciat. Virtus, inquit Aristoteles, sco-
pum et finem tuetur, vitium perdit
et corrumpit. vi. 4. quod rectum
solus vir bonus recte iudicat, improbus
non item ut supra dictum iii. 4. de
voluntate. Jam vero quia prudentis
potissimum est syllogismum practicum
concludere, ut cujus est proprium
ratiocinari quid agendum quid non
agendum sit, hinc efficitur ut si recte
concludere velit, quia principia ad hoc
recta sint oportet, id est finis quod
absque virtute fieri non posse diximus,
virum quoque bonum esse debere ut
rectum prius constituat finem. Ad
summum virtus et prudentia mutuum
tradunt operam. GIPH.

10. διαστρέφει γὰρ] See p. 231.

ing the same
relation to
moral vir-
tue, as
δεινότης to
φρόνησις).

οὐ ταῦτον μὲν, ὁμοιον δέ' οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ
ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα
τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι
καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι καὶ τᾶλλα ἔχομεν
εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι
τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον
ὑπάρχειν· καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ
ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαί-
νονται οὔσαι. πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὀραῖσθαι, ὅτι
ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῶ ἄνευ ὄψεως κινουμένῳ¹⁰
συμβαίνει σφάλλῃσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν
ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν
τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει. ἡ δ' ἕξις ὁμοία οὔσα τὸτ'
ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετὴ. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ
δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις,¹⁵
οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ
φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ

1. ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ] Virtus autem
hæc naturæ Aristoteli nihil est aliud,
quam ἐρημὴ seu appetitio (sic vertitur a
Cicerone) et impetus quidam ratione
vacans seu ἄλογος ut ibidem Aristo-
teles in Mag. Mor. i. cap. ult. Quare
et hoc loco eam in pueris et beluis
reperiri ait. Diximus et supra iii. c. 5.
p. 108. de εὐφροσύνη seu naturæ bonitate,
ubi dictum alios ad alia natura esse
aptiores: cujus εὐφροσύνης pars quædam
est hæc virtus natura insita, nam et
hic infra εὐφροσύνησις dicitur, de vir-
tutibus natura insitis agens. GIPH.

3. φρόνησις] As a certain natural
aptitude which we call δεινότης pre-
exists and predisposes the mind to the
reception of φρόνησις, so a certain nat-
ural virtue precedes and renders it
fit and apt for the acquisition of vir-

tue properly so called (κυρία ἀρετή.)
The same relation which δεινότης
bears to φρόνησις, does natural to ac-
quired virtue. φρόνησις is a habit, δει-
νότης is not: φρόνησις contributes the
means only to those ends which are
recommended by moral virtue, δεινότης
to any end. So acquired virtue is a
habit, the natural is not. Acquired
virtue, fixing on the good end, only
admits those means which φρόνησις has
determined; natural virtue regards not
the character of any of the means to
the end it proposes. φρόνησις and
moral virtue are inseparable; he who
possesses one must possess both, he who
loses one must lose both. If moral
virtue be added to δεινότης, then it be-
comes φρόνησις: if φρόνησις be added to
natural virtue, it becomes moral virtue.

γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως. Διόπερ τινές φασι ^{Whence some infer-}
 πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης ^{red that}
 τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐξήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν ^{virtue was}
 γὰρ φρονήσεις ^{φρέσει.} ἔφετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς,
 ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς

2. Σωκράτης] See Xenophon's Mem. iii. 9. §. 4. and Plato's Charmides and Laches. See the Introduction to the Seventh book of the Ethics.

5. ἔπει φρονησεως] To constitute a good action, a good end and good means are requisite. But to constitute good means, they must not only be sufficient for effecting their purpose, but likewise morally good, and consequently require moral virtue in the person who is to choose them. But it is not sufficient merely for moral virtue to fix upon a good end, but it must cause good means for attainment of that end, good actions to be put in motion. Therefore neither can φρέσεις be acquired without moral virtue, nor moral virtue without φρέσεις. This seems like arguing in a circle; to explain which Aristotle says, we are possessed by nature of two faculties corresponding to moral virtue and φρέσεις, without the moral goodness and perfection of either. Natural virtue and cleverness (φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ δυνότης). Natural virtue fixes upon a good end generally, δυνότης generally chooses the right means to that end: and the exercise of these natural faculties causes them to ripen into the perfect virtue and perfect δυνότης. that is, φρέσεις. The one reciprocally operating on the other, and both ripening and reaching their perfection in the soul at once. But though such is Aristotle's account of the progress of man to moral perfection, he does not appear to think that

to such a perfection, though mankind may almost infinitely approximate, they can ever reach. It is a perfection of his being not reserved for him here.

For if moral virtue cannot be formed without φρέσεις, certainly it cannot be by δυνότης; and if φρέσεις cannot be formed without moral virtue, then it cannot be formed by natural virtue; neither does it appear therefore how the two together, δυνότης and natural virtue, should ever ripen into φρέσεις and moral virtue, which are perfect and unerring habits, although they may infinitely approximate towards them. For let it be supposed that such a perfection is attainable by man, he could never be a sinning or an erring creature; moral virtue would ever guard him from fixing on or even wishing a bad end, from the possibility of any germination of evil habits from inward acts, and his φρέσεις would entirely preclude him from any error as to the means, from the influence of bad external acts. φρέσεις would ever keep him alive to the calls of moral virtue, moral virtue would always enforce upon him the right impressions as to φρέσεις. Such a man could never have the wish or morally the power to do wrong. Suppose either one or the other, then at once he loses both these habits. So that Aristotle, in reference to these habits, only considers man transcendently not what he ever is or can be in this world, but what he supposed he might be, virtue

ἔλεγεν. σημείον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὀρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασι τὴν ἕξιν, εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἅ ἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. εἰκόασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαι πως ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν. ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησις ἐστὶν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς 10 ᾗετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας), ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτῃ λύοιτ' ἂν, ᾧ διαλεχθείη 15 τις ἂν ὅτι χωρίζονται ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρεταί· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφύεστατος πρὸς ἀπάσας, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ' οὐπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται· τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὰς φυσικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐνδέχεται, καθ' ἃς δὲ ἀπλῶς λέγεται ἀγαθός, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα 20 γὰρ τῇ φρονήσει μιᾷ οὔσῃ πᾶσαι ὑπάρξουσιν. δῆλον δέ, καὶ εἰ μὴ πρακτικὴ ἦν, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν

Conclusion of the subject; and the inference to be drawn from it.

itself and his capacities for it having an unlimited tendency to perfection. But a perfection never to be developed in this world. To such a perfect state, we may apply the words which Aristotle uses on another occasion: ἰδὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀδρασίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀδρασίη ἐστιν οὕτω βιώσιμος, ἀλλ' ἡ βίη τι ἐν αὐτῇ ὑπάρχει. x. 5. Can we suppose that a man holding such language did not

believe in a future state?

10. λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς] See the Introduction to Book vii.

21. μιᾷ οὔσῃ] Sic Stoici quoque omnes virtutes unam esse putaverunt, quippe qui, ut Socrates, rationalem tantum in virtute partem reliquerunt. Cf. Diog. Laert. vii. §. 125. τὰς δὲ ἀρετὰς λίγουσι ἀνακαλοῦσθαι ἀλλήλαις, καὶ ἐν μίᾳ ἴχοντα πάσας ἴχου. MICH.

αὐτῆς διὰ τὸ τοῦ μορίου ἀρετὴν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ ἄνευ φρονήσεως οὐδ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τέλος, ἡ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ πράττειν. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ^{σοφία is superior to} οὐδὲ κυρία γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτιόνος ^{φρόνησις.} μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγείας ἡ ἰατρική· οὐ γὰρ χρήται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ ὅπως γένηται· ἐκείνης οὖν ἕνεκα ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνη. ἔτι ὁμοιον καὶ εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, 10 ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει.

3. ἡ μὲν—ἡ δὲ] Virtue—φρόνησις.


INTRODUCTION TO BOOK VII.

ARISTOTLE having discussed the Moral and Intellectual Virtues, now proceeds to consider those which are employed on a particular class of pleasures, namely, such as are connected with those pleasures which admit of excess, the pleasures of Touch and Taste. He has not included the consideration of these in that of the previous Moral Habits, because some of them, such as *ἀρχαία* and *ἐυχράτεια*, are not perfect Habits, and consequently the former cannot be properly considered in the light of perfect Vice, nor the latter in that of perfect Virtue. In the perfect Virtues there is a perfect and willing obedience of the appetitive to the rational part of the soul; thus the *σάφρων* has his appetite perfectly subservient to his reason, and has a pleasure in the very exercise of that obedience. But the continent man has not yet arrived at such a state, much less the *καρτερικός*. The former obeys his reason, but that obedience is attended with pain, which, as we have seen in the Second Book, p. 59. indicates that the Habit is imperfect.

Further, as there is a Virtue which approaches to divine (*τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴν, ἡρωϊκὴν τινα καὶ θεϊαν*), and a Vice which approaches to brutality (*θηριότης*), one above, the other below human nature, these could not properly be included in the consideration of the Moral Habits of man as man, and are therefore reserved to this opportunity.

The principal part of this Book, then, is occupied in considering those Habits which have for their object-

matter the pleasures of Touch and Taste, which will be better understood by the following Table :



The earlier chapters also are devoted to the consideration of a very important question in the theory of Morals; Whether he who is incontinent does act contrary to knowledge, or not; or whether, as Socrates supposed ^a, there can be no such thing as Incontinence.

^a Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ἔλωι ἰμάχιστο πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὡς οὐκ εἴησι ἀκρασίας· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν

παρὰ τὸ βίλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιας. p. 266.

The peculiarities of his views of moral philosophy, and his desire, the very reverse one of his age, a phenomenon not unusual in the history of philosophy, of exalting the theory of Morals to the certainty and precision of unerring mathematical science, has been briefly noticed in the Introduction to the Third Book of this Treatise. The following one may be looked upon as a resumption of that argument, which it may be worth while briefly to consider.

According to Socrates^b, all men possessed a natural tendency towards goodness, and consequently it was the chief object of his philosophy to further this tendency by rendering man as much like the gods as possible, that is, to real and pure goodness^c. But God was not the type merely of goodness but of pure reason, and consequently the study of goodness and pure reason, that is to say of virtue and wisdom, ἀρετή and σοφία, are the same^d, and consequently whatever is not of that character is worthless. And in this consists the intimate relationship of the Moral and Scientific energies, both being directed to and ending in the same object. From this view of the *general* tendency of man's nature, he considered that the man who fixed upon and pursued evil was an involuntary or an ignorant agent: for that it was impossible, if he knew what was really Good, not to prefer that Good. And consequently he who acted wickedly did so from an ignorance not merely of his own particular, but likewise of the Universal and Supreme Good, for the one is necessarily united to and involved in the other. It might indeed be said, as

^b See Xen. Mem. iv. 3. §. 14. See the passages quoted in this treatise, p. 81, 82.

^c πρώτος μὲν δὲ πρὸς θεοὺς ἰσχυρῶς σφόδρα καὶ τὰς ἀνθρώπους. Xen. Mem. iv. 3. §. 2.

Ἰσχυρῶς, ὃ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίας οἰκίαν τρυφῆν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι, ἔγωγε δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδὲν διέσθαι

θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἰσχυρῶς, ἰσχυρῶς τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κρατίστων, τὸ δὲ ἰσχυρῶς τοῦ θεοῦ ἰσχυρῶς τοῦ κρατίστων. Id. i. 6. §. 10.

^d Σωκράτης—ἕνός ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ γινώσκων τὴν ἀρετήν. Arist. Eud. Eth. i. 5. Ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πάντων ἀρετῶν σοφίαν εἶναι. Xen. Mem. iii. 9. §. 5.

Aristotle intimates, p. 266, that facts were contrary to his assertions. But if, as some have thought*, Socrates took a transcendental view of human nature, on the outside of sensible representation, his doctrine would not be affected by mere experience and the observation of facts. We must take into consideration what he considered human agency and human choice *properly*, separating from the varied phenomena we observe in the conduct of men those which are his as a *rational* being, and those which he shares in common with brutes.

But by knowledge, also, Socrates understood another kind than what we term knowledge. According to him, true knowledge, which is the same as moral action, is a knowledge unknown to mortals, the perfect knowledge of the Good. And as, in his doctrine, the Scientific and the Moral are coextensive and reciprocal, the will must have a tendency to knowledge, for no one is ignorant of his own will; and knowledge, in its turn, must have a tendency to Good, for no one does wrong with his own option. The foundation of his doctrine upon this subject consists in considering the knowledge of the Good, not as a knowledge simply general, but as a knowledge which embraces at the same time the general and the particular. He thought that one could not know the Good without knowing his own particular good and his own interest, in the particular moments of his life; and that with this pure view of the real Good he could not act contrary to his interests, by the same reason that by the possession of it he would possess universal Virtue.

* See Ritter's Hist. of Philosophy in the account of the Socratic School.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. VII.

CHAP. I.

Of Intemperance—Incontinence—Brutality. And their opposites, Temperance—Continnence—Heroism. The notions of mankind respecting them.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους Of the three vices considered in this book, and their opposites. ἀρχήν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἥθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἶδη, κακία, ἀκρασία, θηριότης. τὰ δ' ἐναντία τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ δῆλα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν τὸ δ' ἐγκράτειαν καλοῦμεν· πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἂν ἀρμόττοι λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴν, ἡρωϊκὴν τινα καὶ θείαν, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος περὶ Ἐκτορος πεποίηκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον ὅτι σφόδρα ἦν ἀγαθός, “ οὐδὲ ἐφκει ἀνδρὸς γε 10 θνητοῦ πάϊς ἔμμεναι ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.” ὥστ' εἰ, καθάπερ φασίν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ δι' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν, τοιαύτη τις ἂν εἴη δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τῆ θηριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἔξις· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία οὐδ' ἀρετὴ, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ, 15 ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν τιμώτερον ἀρετῆς, ἡ δ' ἕτερόν τι

γένος κακίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του (σειὸς ἀνὴρ φασιν), οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος. μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστίν, γίνεται δ' 5 ἔνια καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις· καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλοντας οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως ὕστερον ποιητέον τινὰ μείαν, περὶ δὲ κακίας εἴρηται πρότερον· περὶ δὲ ἀκρασίας καὶ 10 μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ καρτερίας· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ ἐκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον γένος. Δεῖ δ', ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα 15 καὶ πρῶτον διαπορήσαντας οὕτω δεικνύναι μάλιστα μὲν πάντα τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κυριώτατα· ἐὰν γὰρ λύηται τε τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα, δεδαιγμένον ἂν εἴη ἰκανῶς. 20

The principal phenomena of them ought to be considered.

Those phenomena stated.

Δοκεῖ δὴ ἢ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία τῶν 2 σπουδαίων καὶ τῶν ἐπαινετῶν εἶναι, ἢ δ' ἀκρασία 2. τε καὶ μαλακία τῶν φαύλων τε καὶ ψεκτῶν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατῆς καὶ ἐμμενετικὸς τῷ λογισμῷ, 3. καὶ ἀκρατῆς καὶ ἐκστατικὸς τοῦ λογισμοῦ. Καὶ 25 ὁ μὲν ἀκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλα πράττει διὰ πάθος, ὁ δ' ἐγκρατῆς εἰδὼς ὅτι φαῦλαι αἱ ἐπι- 4. θυμῖαι οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ διὰ τὸν λόγον. Καὶ τὸν

9. ὕστερον] See chap. v. and vi.

11. μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς] These

words are used to denote one and the same habit. See chap. vii. p. 287, 2.

σώφρονα μὲν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ καρτερικόν, τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον οἱ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα οἱ δ' οὐ, καὶ 5 τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ ἀκόλαστον συγκεχυμένως, οἱ δ' ἐτέρους εἶναι φασιν. Τὸν 6 δὲ φρόνιμον ὅτε μὲν οὐ φασιν ἐνδέχασθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῆ, ὅτε δ' ἐνίους φρονίμους ὄντας καὶ δεινοὺς ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι. Ἐπι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ 7 καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

CHAP. II.

The Questions stated in the last Chapter briefly examined.

3 ΑΠΟΡΗΣΕΙΕ δ' ἂν τις πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεται τις. ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὐ φασί τινες οἶόν τε εἶναι δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ

The 3rd notion considered; whether the incontinent acts contrary to knowledge; which Socrates denied.

6. φρονίμους—ἀκρατεῖς] As Callicles in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 491. E. sq.

13. Σωκράτης] Compare Mag. Mor. p. 57. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ἰσχυροῦς ἀγῆου ἔλας καὶ οὐκ ἴση ἀκρασίαν εἶναι, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ εἶδὸς ἐὰν κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ εἶσιν ἴδων ἂν ἰδὲ ἀκρατεῖς δευτέρως ὅτι φαυλά εἶσιν αἰριῶσθαι ἡμῶς, ἀγίμους ὅπερ τοῦ πάσης διὰ δὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον οὐκ ἔπεισο εἶναι ἀκρασίαν, οὐκ ἔβη. See also Xenophon's Mem. Soc. iii. 9, 4. Socrates thought that it was impossible, that a man who either knew or thought that to abstain from vicious pleasures was the best, should act contrary to what is best, and pursue vicious pleasures; but that if he did so,

he must do it by reason of his ignorance. The argument, as given in the Protagoras, (p. 354. sq.) may be reduced to this syllogistic form.

He who pursues vicious pleasures pursues pain.

No man knowingly (*ἰσιστάμενος*) pursues pain.

No man *knowingly* pursues vicious pleasures.

To this it is replied, that the assertion of the minor is at variance with the fact, for we see many pursuing vicious pleasures, knowing them to be such. Yet nothing is stronger than *ἰσιστήμην*, for nothing could ever persuade a mathematician that 2×2 makes 3. In order therefore to remove the diffi-

περιέλκειν αὐτὸν ὡσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἐναργῶς, καὶ δέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος, εἰ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ τρόπος γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας. ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶταί γε ὁ ἀκρατευόμενος πρὶν ἐν τῷ πάθει γενέσθαι, φανερόν. Εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ τὰ μὲν

Or whether as others thought (in order to get clear of this difficulty) contrary to opinion. The absurdity which must follow such a supposition.

συγχωροῦσι τὰ δ' οὐ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης¹⁰ μὴθὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον ὁμολογοῦσιν, τὸ δὲ μὴθὲνα πράττειν παρὰ τὸ δόξαν βέλτιον οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν ἀκρατῆ φασὶν οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἔχοντα κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ δόξαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶγε δόξα καὶ μὴ¹⁵ ἐπιστήμη, μὴδ' ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις ἢ ἀντιτείνουσα

culty, and to reconcile truth with this assertion, they said that the incontinent man does not act contrary to knowledge, but *δέξα*. If it be so, then this *δέξα* must be either strong or weak; if strong and confirmed, a man cannot act contrary to this any more than *πιστήμη*, for with many *δέξα* is as strong as *πιστήμη*. (See p. 270, 19.) And if it be a weak opinion, then a person would not be subject to great censure for pursuing pleasures which he was not certain were vicious; whereas a man is condemned for incontinence, and therefore the incontinent does not act contrary to a *weak* opinion.

If, then, the incontinent man does not act contrary to *πιστήμη*, nor *δέξα*, strong or weak, does he act contrary to his *φρόνησις*? This supposition is still more absurd than the others, for

it supposes that the same person may at once be *ἀκρατής* and *φρόνιμος*, which is impossible. For even the *ἡγεμονίας*, inasmuch as he has strong and violent desires, has not yet attained to the perfect *ἔξις* of *σωφροσύνη*, and therefore does not, like the *φρόνιμος*, possess *σωφροσύνη*; and in this not only does the temperate man differ from the continent, but it is also clear that the incontinent cannot be *φρόνιμος*. See p. 220, 9.

1. *περίλευσις*] See note p. 275, 12.

7. *οὐκ εἰσται*] For it is evident that before he is within the influence of temptation, he thinks he ought not to give way. It is strange that this simple and common expression should have been so much misunderstood. See p. 270, 19. Michelet translates the words, "Non opinione distrahitur:" he does not think, he is not distracted in opinion.

- ἀλλ' ἡρεμαία, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διατάζουσι, συγ-
 γνώμη τῷ μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας
 ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ οὐ συγγνώμη, οὐδὲ
 τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν. Φρονήσεως Or, (which
 5 ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης· αὕτη γὰρ ἰσχυρότατον. ἀλλ' is the 6th
 ἄτοπον· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἅμα φρόνιμος καὶ contrary to
 ἀκρατής, φήσειε δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἰς φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ φρέσσει.
 πράττειν ἐκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Which in-
 δέδεικται πρότερον ὅτι πρακτικός γε ὁ φρόνιμος· volves a
 10 τῶν γὰρ ἐσχάτων τις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἔχων ἀρετάς. still greater
 Ἔτι εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυρὰς καὶ The fourth
 φαύλας ὁ ἐγκρατής, οὐκ ἔσται ὁ σώφρων ἐγκρατής, Whether
 οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατής σώφρων· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἄγαν temperance
 σώφρονος οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ and conti-
 15 γε· εἰ μὲν γὰρ χρῆσται αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἢ nence are
 κωλύουσα ἕξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὥσθ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια the same.
 οὐ πᾶσα σπουδαία· εἰ δ' ἀσθενεῖς καὶ μὴ φαῦλαι,
 οὐθὲν σεμνόν, οὐδ' εἰ φαῦλαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, οὐθὲν
 μέγα. Ἔτι εἰ πάσῃ δόξῃ ἐμμενετικὸν ποιεῖ ἡ The second
 20 ἐγκράτεια, φαύλη, οἷον εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ· καὶ εἰ notion,
 πάσῃ δόξῃ ἡ ἀκρασία ἐκστατικόν, ἔσται τις Whether
 σπουδαία ἀκρασία, οἷον ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτό- the conti-
 λεμος ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ· ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ οὐκ abso-
 ἐμμένων οἷς ἐπέισθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως διὰ τὸ lutely
 25 λυπεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος. ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος abides by
 his resolu-
 tion, and
 the inconti-
 nent the
 reverse.

14. δι' ἧς] The continent man must have strong and bad desires; for if they be bad and not strong, there is no merit in resisting them; and if they were strong and not bad, it would be vicious to resist them.

25. σοφιστικὸς λόγος ψευδέμενος] The

sophistical syllogism called *mentiens occasions a difficulty*. Est autem ψευδέμενος, sermo, cui quicquid respondeas, falsum reperietur. Habuit nomen a *mentiente*, quoniam exempli causa sumitur is qui mentitur. Hoc modo: an mentitur is qui mentiri se dicit?

ψευδόμενος ἀπορία· διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα βού-
 λεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα δεινοὶ ᾧσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν,
 ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται· δέδεται
 γὰρ ἡ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὲν μὴ βούληται διὰ
 τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπερανθέν, προϊέναι δὲ μὴ
 δύνηται διὰ τὸ λῦσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον. συμ-
 βαίνει δ' ἕκ τινος λόγου ἡ ἀφροσύνη μετὰ ἀκρα-
 σίας ἀρετῆ· τάναντία γὰρ πράττει ὧν ὑπολαμβάνει
 διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν, ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ τὰγαθὰ κακὰ
 εἶναι καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν, ὥστε τὰγαθὰ καὶ οὐ¹⁰
 τὰ κακὰ πράξει.

And whether it will not then follow, that the ἀπίστος is more curable than the ἀκρασίας.

Ἔτι ὁ τῷ πεπεῖσθαι πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἡδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν τοῦ μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν εὐϊατότερος γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἂν. ὁ δ'

Cui si respondeas mentiri, colligitur statim non mentiri, quod vere dixerit se mentiri. Menag. in Diog. Laert. ii. §. 108. See Cicero's Acad. ii. 29. The author of this fallacy, which occasioned much controversy, and upon which Theophrastus is said to have written three books (Diog. L. v. 49.), and Chrysippus twelve (Diog. L. vii. 196), was Eubulides of Miletus, one of the Megaric school, who was also the inventor of several other captious questions of the same kind. See Ferd. Deycks de Megaricorum doctrina Bonnæ. 1827. p. 52. Hottinger ad Cic. de Divinat. ii. 4. p. 174. sq. Diog. Laert. ii. 108.

Ἀσπείρια, entangles us in a toil from which we have no means of escaping, can neither advance nor recede: διδεται ἡ διάνοια προϊέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται. corresponding to the words of Cicero, "inexplicabilia esse dicitis." Acad. ii. 29.

To explain then the argument. Aristotle is proving that continence cannot be the absolute adhering to any and every opinion. For the person who grants the premises in this sophistical syllogism, thinks that he grants what is true; but when the conclusion is drawn, he finds them to be false: if then he obstinately abides by his former opinion, he is guilty of a vice in so doing, and he is a more consistent and honest man who will change his former concessions and opinion. But by so doing he incurs the charge of incontinence, if continence be an absolute abiding to an opinion once formed, and his incontinence in forsaking a conclusion which he knows to be false, occasioned by a folly in granting the premises, is a virtue; that is, two vices constitute a virtue, which is absurd.

14. εὐϊατότερος.] Hanc de incontinentia doctrinam, a sua mente plane abhorrentem, e Platonis Hippia de-

ἀκρατῆς ἔνοχος τῇ παροιμίᾳ ἐν ἣ φημὲν “ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγη, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;” εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἐπέπειστο ἂ πράττει, μεταπεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ πεπεισμένος οὐδὲν ἤττον ἄλλα βπράττει.

Ἔτι εἰ περὶ πάντα ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατῆς; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἀπάσας ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας, φημὲν δ' εἶναι τινὰς ἀπλῶς.

Seventh notion, Whether incontinence and continence are on every object-matter.

CHAP. III.

In what way, and against what knowledge, the Incontinent acts.

4 Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἀπορίαι τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ τὰ δὲ κατα-

Three questions proposed.

duxisse videtur Aristoteles; atque ita ipsum videas docentem in *Metaph.* iv. 29. *CARDWELL.*

Although this opinion, that the ἀπέλαστος is more easily curable than the ἀκρατῆς is not here directly refuted, yet it is so, in the further discussion of the subject.

The ἀπέλαστος is one who has lost the faculty of distinguishing right from wrong, the light that is in him has become darkness; and he has lost all feeling, all perception of goodness, (p. 285, 15.) consequently he is incurable. Whereas the ἀκρατῆς has not yet arrived at this deplorable state, and is therefore curable, (p. 288, 12.) The supposition that if you could dissuade the ἀπέλαστος from his vicious course, he would more readily reform than the incontinent, may be true if you grant the hypothesis; but then it is true that he cannot be dissuaded. And this is a fearful warning when it is remembered, that equally as the ἰγνατῆς may become σώφρων, so may

the ἀκρατῆς become ἀπέλαστος, each by continuance in their several courses. This question is fully discussed in *Chap.* viii.

2. τὸ ὕδωρ] This passage is generally translated thus. “If water choke a man, why should he drink more?” The application of which to this argument is not very clear, nor does ἰσιπίειν, as I conceive, warrant such an interpretation: ἰσιπίειν means to “drink next,” or “to drink afterwards.” “If water chokes a man, what is he to drink then?” or as we should say, “If water chokes a man, what is he to drink?” He has the simplest beverage, and yet chokes at it; you can do no more; his case is hopeless. Just so the incontinent man. He knows what vice is, he knows he is doing wrong; he has all the advantages he possibly can have for obtaining virtue, and yet does not; what more can you do for him? what is to be done? you cannot improve his state; his case is hopeless.

Two as to the knowledge, and the third as to the object-matter, of continence and incontinence.

λιπεῖν· ἡ γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας εὕρεσίς ἐστιν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον πότερον εἰδότες ἢ οὐ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότες, εἶτα περὶ ποῖα τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ θετέον, λέγω δὲ πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ἢ περὶ τινὰς ἀφωρισμένας, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατῆ καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερός ἐστιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συγγενῆ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατῆς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατῆς εἰσι τῷ περὶ ἃ ἢ τῷ πῶς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφορὰν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῷ περὶ ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατῆς ὁ ἀκρατῆς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὐ· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατῆς, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῷ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπλῶς ἔχειν (ταῦτον γὰρ ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ), ἀλλὰ τῷ ὡδὶ ἔχειν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων αἰεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἢδὲ διώκει· ὁ δ' οὐκ οἶεται μὲν, διώκει δέ. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δόξαν ἀληθῆ ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων, οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναί. εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἡρέμα

The incontinent does not act contrary to mere opinion, but to knowledge.

2. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν] The six questions proposed in the above Chapters are here reduced to the three, the consideration of which will embrace the whole subject.

I. Whether the ἀκρατῆς acts contrary to knowledge or not, and if contrary to knowledge, what kind of knowledge that is.

II. Upon what pleasures the ἀκρατῆς is employed.

III. Whether it differs from the other habits, of a similar nature, and from ἀκρασία in its object-matter, or the manner in which it is employed upon that matter, or in both, τῷ περὶ ἃ, ἢ τῷ πῶς, ἢ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. Upon this chapter see De Animal. Mot. c. vii.

πιστεύειν οἱ δοξάζοντες μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων
 παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὐθὲν διοίσει
 ἐπιστήμη δόξης· ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν
 ἦττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται·
 βδηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέ- In what
 γομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ way he acts
 χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται contrary to
 ἐπίστασθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα *ἐπιστήμη.*
 δὲ ἂ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα· 1. By pos-
 10 τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν. sessed
 Ἔτι ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων, ἔχοντα μὲν 2. By the
 disuse or

5. Ἡράκλειτος] This is another instance in which the Mag. Moral. is inconsistent with Aristotle, and furnishes an additional presumption that it was written some considerable time after the period of this treatise. See Mag. Mor. ii. 6.

— ἀλλ' ἐπὶ διχῶς] A man who acts contrary to knowledge must act contrary either to *ἐπιστήμη* or *δόξα*. (See Plato's *Repub.* V. sub fin.) He does not act contrary to *δόξα*, (see p. 266, 9. and p. 270.) therefore he must act contrary to *ἐπιστήμη*.

If then he acts contrary to *ἐπιστήμη*, in what way is it, and what kind of *ἐπιστήμη*?

9. ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα] Having knowledge, and not using it.

10. δεῖ δεινόν] "For this appears a strange thing, if we suppose a man possessing science and using it acts contrary to its dictates, but not if we suppose a man possessing science and not using it."

11. δύο πρόσω] Of the two premises one is universal the other particular; if therefore a man knows the universal

he must either *actually* or *virtually* know the particular, since that is included in the universal. Now it is possible for a man having both these premises to err. In the first place then he may know the universal *actually*, and only the particular *virtually*, and as the particular is that upon which the entire action turns, he consequently falls into error when he comes to act. Thus if a person knows the universal premise, "All hellebore is deadly," but is ignorant of the particular, that this or that particular herb is hellebore, he may very easily fall into error: and this is the *ἐν καθύλῳ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος*. But if the universal depend upon himself (*ἐν καθύλῳ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ*), then of necessity he must *actually* know the particular. For instance, if he knows that "all dry food is good for man," he cannot help knowing the particular proposition, "I am a man," therefore it is good for me.

Aristotle has illustrated his argument by two syllogisms on the same subject.

actual ignorance of the minor.

ἀμφοτέρας οὐθὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπι-
στήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ
τῇ κατὰ μέρος· πρακτὰ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.
διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ καθόλου τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ'
ἑαυτοῦ τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· οἷον ὅτι
παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρά, καὶ ὅτι οὗτος
ἄνθρωπος, ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἀλλ' εἰ τὸδε
τοιόνδε, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. κατὰ τε δὴ
τούτους διοίσει τοὺς τρόπους ἀμήχανον ὅσον, ὥστε
δοκεῖν οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι μὴθὲν ἄτοπον, ἄλλως δὲ
θαυμαστόν.

3. In possessing science, but being carried out of himself by violent desires.

Ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην
ἄλλον τρόπον τῶν νῦν ῥηθέντων ὑπάρχει τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ἔχειν μὲν μὴ χρῆσθαι
δὲ διαφέρουσιν ὀρώμεν τὴν ἔξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν
πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν, οἷον τὸν καθεύδοντα καὶ μαινό-
μενον καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται
οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυ-
μῖαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιδήλως
καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας
ποιούσιν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχειν λεκτέον

The first is the ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. sc.

All dry food is good for man ;

I am a man, &c.

Where we can scarcely go wrong.

The second, ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματός, sc.

All dry food is good for man ;

This is dry food, &c.

In which it is not strange that a man should go wrong. See *Metaph.* i. 1. p. 2.

11. ἔτι τὸ ἔχειν) Though not apparently, this argument is really distinct from the first. In the first instance the man has knowledge, but *purposefully* omits to use it ; in this he has knowledge, but

unintentionally omits to use it, being carried away from himself and overcome by some masterless passion. These produce the same effect upon the mind as violent commotions on the body. For as a man in great agony fixes his eyes upon various objects yet sees none of them, so great affections of the body may operate on the mental vision, producing the same effect. Though the visual faculty remains, its energies are rendered ineffectual. He undergoes a change as from waking to sleeping ; his habits remain, but their energies are locked up.

τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτοις. τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν σημεῖον· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις ὄντες ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μα-
 5 θόντες συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὐπω· δεῖ γὰρ συμφῦναι, τούτῳ δὲ χρόνου δεῖ ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους, οὕτως ὑπο-
 ληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατευομένους. Ἔτι 4. By desire
 καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἂν τις ἐπιβλέψειε τὴν αἰτίαν. pervverting the proper application of the minor to the major.
 10 ἢ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἢ δ' ἐτέρα περὶ τῶν
 καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν, ὧν αἰσθησις ἤδη κυρία·

8. *ἴτι καὶ δεῖ*] Aristotle proceeds to show in a fourth way how the incontinent may be said to act contrary to knowledge. In all actions a syllogistic process first takes place in the mind, however sudden and imperceptible. The principle upon which we act is the major premiss or the universal, the particular application of it forms the minor (*ἡ τελευταία πρότασις*), the last proposition, the final step in the process, before we proceed to act. This particular proposition, in all active syllogisms, is a judgment exercised upon some particular object of sense, and the chief cause of action, for without it no action would take place at all. But there is not the same need of the major and universal, for we can act, though not rationally without it, as brutes who have no knowledge of the universal, but only of the particular, of which they retain a certain *φαντασία* and memory. As the monkey who has burnt its mouth by drinking brandy remembers again when it sees brandy that it has so burnt its mouth, though it forms no universal conclusion, has no knowledge of the principle, that all brandy burns.

To examine then how the incontinent man acts in this particular case contrary to knowledge. Let us suppose, then, that he is aware of this universal principle, that *no sweet thing ought to be tasted*, and also of another, that *every sweet thing is pleasant*, to whichever of these the particular premiss, *this is a sweet thing*, be applied, it will produce a different course of action. But desire or appetite shutting his eyes to the former, applies the particular only to the second of the two, so that he is led away by his knowledge of the universal, in a certain sense, and by this particular: and thus acts both knowingly and contrary to knowledge.

9. *φυσικῶς*] Hoc loco physice Platonis sententiam refutat. Physice inquam: nam animum hominis hoc loco pertractat penitus, ejusque partes, ratio et cupiditas, quemadmodum in impotente configant luculenter ostendit. Sic accipiendum puto verbum *φυσικῶς*, quæ confirmat verbum infra in fin. cap. *τὸν φυσικὸν λόγον*, quicquid dicant alii. GIPH.

11. *δὲ αἰσθησις*] Compare Metaph. p. 3. *ἴτι δὲ τῶν αἰσθησιῶν οὐδεμίαν*

ὅταν δὲ μία γένηται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπερανθὲν εἶναι μὲν φάναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιητικαῖς πράττειν εὐθύς· οἶον, εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύεσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ὡς ἐν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλύομενον ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν ἡ μὲν καθόλου ἐνῆ κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι, ἡ δέ, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γλυκὺ ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ (αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ), τύχη δ' ἐπιθυμία ἐνοῦσα, ἡ μὲν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμία ἄγει· κινεῖν γὰρ ἕκαστον δύναται τῶν μορίων· ὥστε συμβαίνει ὑπὸ λόγου πως καὶ δόξης ἀκρατεύεσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ δόξα, τῷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ· ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τῶν καθόλου ὑπόληψιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην. Πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπιστήμων ὁ ἀκρατής,

But how this happens is the

ἠγαθήματα εἶναι σοφίαν καίτοι κομώμεται γὰρ εἶπεν αὐτὰς τῶν παθίωστων γνώσεις, ἀλλ' οὐ λέγουσι ἐν δὴ τὴν οὐδὲν εἶπεν διὰ τὴν ἡμεῖς ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ μόνον ἐν τῷ θεμῶν. See also of this treatise, p. 222. 1.

11. ὅταν λόγου πως] εἶπεν δὲ τὸ πᾶν ἴσα διέξῃ, ἵτις οὐκ ἀμείωτος ἀκρατεύεται ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παθίωστος καὶ τῆς μεριστικῆς δόξης, ἀλλὰ διὰ μίσην τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἰστανία καὶ τὴν δόξαν τὴν παθίωστος καὶ τὴν μεριστικῆν. εἶπεν ἰστανία δὲ ἵσταν καὶ αὐτὸ ἢ δόξα ἢ μεριστικὴ ἢ λίγιστος, ἵτις τῷ γλυκῷ ἵσταν, τῷ λόγῳ τῷ παθίωστος τῷ λίγιστος, οὐδὲν γλυκίως ἀπογινώσκουσι δὴ. ποῖα γὰρ ἰστανιότητα ἵσταν, γίνονται δὲ ἰστανία κατὰ συμβεβηκός. δίδου γὰρ συμβεβηκῆς τῷ ἵσταν

θεμῶν συνελθὼν τῷ μεριστικῇ δόξῃ καὶ παθίωστος τὴν γίνουσι γνώσεσθαι τοῦτο τοῦ γλυκίως, τοῦτο χῆρην εἶπεν ἰστανία ἢ δόξα ἢ μεριστικὴ καὶ ἢ παθίωστος. ἢ γὰρ ἰστανία ἵσταν ἢ παθίωστος καὶ ἰστανία. Schol.

17. λύεται ἢ ἄγνοια] Aristotle does not pretend to inquire, how it is that this ignorance is dispersed and the man regains knowledge, which is rather an enquiry for the physiologist than the moral philosopher. Yet that such is the fact is clear from the following instance. For as the musician so long as the vapors of wine affect his brain is unable to exercise his art, but after the dispersion of them enervates according to it; so is it with the

ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἰνωμένου καὶ καθεύδοντος enquiry of another science.
καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους, ὃν δεῖ παρὰ
τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία The sum of the whole : and how we are to interpret the opinion of Socrates on this subject.
πρότασις δόξα τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ κυρία τῶν πρά-
5 ξεων, ταύτην ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ὁ ἐν τῷ πάθει ὢν, ἢ
οὕτως ἔχει ὡς οὐκ ἦν τὸ ἔχειν ἐπίστασθαι ἀλλὰ
λέγειν ὥσπερ ὁ οἰνωμένος τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους, καὶ
διὰ τὸ μὴ καθόλου μηδ' ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως
εἶναι δοκεῖν τῷ καθόλου τὸν ἔσχατον ὄρον. καὶ
10 ἔοικεν ὁ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμβαίνειν' οὐ γὰρ
τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης εἶναι δοκούσης παρουσίας
γίνεται τὸ πάθος, οὐδ' αὐτὴ περιέλεται διὰ τὸ
πάθος, ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ

incontinent man. He knows that adultery is a vice, but being overcome by violent desires, his intellect is stupified, and he loses the use of his knowledge for the time, and does not regain it until his desires have subsided. But since the particular proposition (ἡ τελευταία πρότασις) is a knowledge of the object of sense, or of the individual (in the Logical use of the word), and this is the ἀρχὴ of actions, and is not scientific, (for individuals are not the subjects of science,) it is not surprising that the incontinent person should transgress by wanting or misusing the knowledge of the minor. For since science is of universals, and not of particulars, whereas actions turn upon particulars and not universals, the ἀκρατής does not act contrary to knowledge, properly so called. And in this sense Socrates was correct in saying, that a man cannot act contrary to ἐπιστήμη. And when he acts contrary to ἐπιστήμη, it is not ἐπιστήμη in the cor-

rect but the vulgar use of the term ; namely, the knowledge of the particular, or that which has sensible things for its object.

9. ἐν ἔσχαστον ἔρον] *The particular proposition: ἡ τελευταία πρότασις.*

10. Σωκράτης] See Introd. p. 261. and Plato's Protagoras, p. 352. B. sq. and the whole argument, which deserves to be well considered.

11. τῆς κυρίως ἐπιστήμης] Here Aristotle briefly sums up the argument. If Plato meant to say that the ἀκρατής cannot act contrary to knowledge, *actually energising*, then he is correct. And so also, when he says that the ἀκρατής cannot act contrary to knowledge, properly so called. But he may act contrary to knowledge, *not actually energising*, and contrary to ἐπιστήμη on practical subjects.

12. σιμύλειται] ἀτιχῶς διατιοῦμαι πρὸς τῆς ἐπιστήμης. ὡσαύτως πρὸς ἀνδραπόδου, σιμύλειται ὁπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. Plato's Protag. ib.

εἰδότα καὶ μή, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα ἐνδέχεται ἀκρα-
τεύεσθαι, τσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.

CHAP. IV.

That the proper object-matter of Intemperance and Incontinence are the pleasures of Touch and Taste.

The second
question
considered.
See p. 270,
3.

ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ δ' ἐστὶ τις ἀπλῶς ἀκρατῆς ἢ ὅ
πάντες κατὰ μέρος, καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποῖά ἐστι,
λεκτέον ἐφεξῆς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ
λύπας εἰσὶν οἱ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ καὶ
οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ μαλακοί, φανερόν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ
τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιούντων ἡδονήν, τὰ δ'
αἰρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολήν, ἀν-
αγκαῖα μὲν τὰ σωματικά. λέγω δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὰ
περὶ τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων
χρεία, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν περὶ τὴν
ἀκολασίαν ἔθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην.
τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐ, αἰρετὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτά.
λέγω δ' οἶον νίκη, τιμὴν, πλοῦτον, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων. Τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα
παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν
αὐτοῖς ἀπλῶς μὲν οὐ λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προστι-
θέντες δὲ τὸ χρημάτων ἀκρατεῖς καὶ κέρδους καὶ
τιμῆς καὶ θυμοῦ, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, ὡς ἐτέρους καὶ
καθ' ὁμοιότητα λεγομένους, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ὁ
τὰ Ὀλύμπια νενικηκώς· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ὁ κοινὸς λόγος

Those who
are excee-
sive in other
than these
corporeal
pleasures,
are called
ἀκρατεῖς
only from
analogy.

22. ἡ κοινὸς λόγος] The common de-
finition, or common noun, man. As
the man who conquered at Olympia

is distinguished from the common noun
man by the addition of this epithet, so
he who is incontinent on any other

τοῦ ἰδίου μικρῶ διέφερον, ἀλλ' ὁμως ἕτερος ἦν. σημεῖον δέ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται οὐχ ὡς ἁμαρτία μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις, ἡ ἀπλῶς οὐσα ἢ κατὰ τι μέρος, τούτων δ' οὐθείς.

5 τῶν δὲ περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἃς That the incontinent is he who pursues the excess of pleasures, but not from principle. The intemperate from principle. λέγομεν τὸν σῶφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον, ὁ μὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι τῶν τε ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ ἀφῆν
 10 καὶ γεύσιν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατῆς λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι περὶ τάδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς μόνον. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται περὶ ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ' οὐδεμίαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ'
 15 εἰς ταυτόν τὸν ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκόλαστον τίθεμεν καὶ ἐγκρατῆ καὶ σῶφρονα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι· οἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν περὶ ταῦτά, ἀλλ'

pleasure is distinguished from the general term incontinent, by the addition of the particular thing in which he is incontinent. See p. 279. 12.

9. *περὶ ἀφῆν καὶ γεύσιν*] These habits are conversant with the pleasures of touch more than the pleasures of taste, properly so called, as far as taste is concerned in the distinguishing of flavours. (See iii. 7.) And the fact that intemperance is thus engaged with the pleasures of that sense which is the most common of all others in man, with brutes, is the reason why this vice is of all others the most brutal and degrading. The touch, like the rest of the senses, is given to man and animals for self-preservation; but they

contribute much more than this, if it can be said to contribute at all, to the intellectual capacities of man. See *Aristot. de Anima* iii. 12. §. 6. de *Sensu* cap. i. *Ἐσθρησι καὶ ἀποῇ καὶ δίψῃ πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς ἴχοσι, σωτηρίας ἵνακα ὑπάρχουσι, ἵνακα δὲ ἀποῇ τε ἀσθενήματα τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ φαρτικά φεύγουσι· τοῖς δὲ καὶ φροσύνης ευχαρίουσι, τοῦ εἶ ἵνακα, πολλὰς γὰρ εἰσαγγίλλουσι διαφορὰς ἐξ ἃν ἢ τι τῶν κτηνῶν ἰγγίται φροσύνης καὶ ἢ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. αὐτῶν δὲ τοῖτων σπερὶ μὲν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα κρείσσον ἢ εἶψι καὶ κατ' αὐτήν, σπερὶ δὲ νῦν καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἢ ἀποῇ.*

13. *ἀκόλαστοι*] *μαλακοί*. Cardwell and Bekker.

οὐχ ὡσαύτως εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν προαιροῦνται οἱ δ' οὐ προαιροῦνται. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἂν εἴπομεν, ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας, ἢ τοῦτον ὅστις διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμῶν σφόδρα· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ προσγένετο ἐπιθυμία νεανικὴ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά; Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι τῷ γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων· (τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἰρετά, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον, οἷον χρήματα καὶ κέρδος καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ)· πρὸς ἅπαντα δὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ μεταξύ οὐ τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ φιλεῖν ψέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ πως ὑπερβάλλειν. διὸ ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ἢ κρατοῦνται ἢ διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, οἷον οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες ἢ περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς· (καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ

They who pursue moderately pleasures, which are either naturally good or indifferent, are not blamed; but they who pursue them immoderately; for even in such pleasures there is a faulty excess.

3. ἢ ἐρίμα] For if he pursues vicious pleasures, when those pleasures are but slight, or slight to him, then it is a clear proof that he pursues them not because he is overcome by temptation, but purely from vicious principle. Thus according to the principle which he lays down in his Rhetoric, i. 14: ἀδίκημα δὲ μίζον, ὅσῳ ἂν ἐπὶ μίζονος ἢ ἀδίκιας· διὸ καὶ τὰ ἰλάχιστα μίγιστα. Little things, or rather things in themselves of less value, show more distinctly the operation of the principle, the pure love of doing wrong. But when a person has stolen that which is considerable in value, it is impossible to tell whether he has done so from

vicious principle, or from being overcome by the force of temptation; whether, in short, he is ἀκόλαστος, or only ἀμαρτίς. See also p. 286. 6.

13. δῆ] ἢ Bekk. et ferri potest ἢ in apodosis. MICH.

15. διὸ ὅσοι] Aspasius subaudit ψέγονται. Alii Muretum secuti, non audacius quam verius, hanc enuntiationem, quum apodosis careat, per anacoluthiam cum §. 8. conjungunt, ita ut apodosis a μεχτήρια μὲν οὐδὲ incipiat. Abit in hanc sententiam Paraphrastes, qui verbis transpositis ex his duabus enuntiationibus unam confecit. MICH.

ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες)· ἀλλ' ὁμοῦς ἔστι τις ὑπερ-
 βολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, εἴ τις ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη μά-
 χοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἢ ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ
 φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος περὶ τὸν πατέρα· λίαν
 5 γὰρ ἐδόκει μωραίνειν. Μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν Though not
vice pro-
perly so
called, and
conse-
quently not
inconti-
nence: but
when this
term is used
to denote
such excess,
it has the
name of the
kind of ex-
cess added
to it.
 οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἔστι διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι
 φύσει τῶν αἰρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὐτό, φαῦ-
 λαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί.
 ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀκρασία· ἡ γὰρ ἀκρασία οὐ μόνον
 10 φευκτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ψεκτῶν ἐστίν. δι' ὁμοιό-
 τητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους προσεπιτιθέντες τὴν ἀκρα-
 σίαν περὶ ἐκάστου λέγουσιν, οἷον κακὸν ἰατρὸν
 καὶ κακὸν ὑποκριτήν, ὃν ἀπλῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν
 κακόν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν
 15 εἶναι ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὁμοίαν,
 οὕτω δῆλον ὅτι κακεῖ ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρα-
 σίαν καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι ἧτις ἔστι περὶ ταῦτα
 τῇ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ, περὶ δὲ θυμὸν
 καθ' ὁμοιότητα λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες
 20 ἀκρατῆ θυμοῦ ὥσπερ τιμῆς καὶ κέρδους φαμέν.

CHAP. V.

That brutal or unnatural pleasures are only the object-matter of Incontinence in the metaphorical use of that term.

9 ΕΠΕΙ δ' ἔστιν ἕνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει, καὶ τού- Desire
of unnatural
pleasures
 των τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη καὶ ζῶων

CHAP. V.

Having explained in the last chapter the object-matter of incontinence, in


the absolute use of the term (*ἀκρασία ἀπλῶς*), and in its metaphorical or analogous use (*ἀκρασία πρὸς*), Aristotle

and its
causes.

καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν
διὰ πηρώσεις τὰ δὲ δι' ἔθη γίνεται, τὰ δὲ διὰ
μοχθηρὰς φύσεις, ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων ἕκαστα
παραπλησίας ἰδεῖν ἔξεις. λέγω δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις,
οἷον τὴν ἀνθρώπων ἢν λέγουσι τὰς κούσας ἀνα-
σχίζουσαν τὰ παῖδια κατεσθίειν, ἣ οἷοις χαίρειν
φασὶν ἐνίους τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον,
τοὺς μὲν ὁμοίως τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς
δὲ τὰ παῖδια δανείζειν ἀλλήλοις εἰς εὐωχίαν, ἣ
τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον. αὗται μὲν θηριώδεις. 10
αἱ δὲ διὰ τε νόσους γίνονται καὶ μανίαν ἐνίους,
ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγῶν,
καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου τὸ ἦπαρ. αἱ δὲ νοσημα-

now proceeds to show, that the latter is applicable to other pleasures besides those already mentioned. To this end he more distinctly considers the division of pleasures (mentioned in the last chapter) into natural and unnatural: under the unnatural fall the brutal, the object-matter of that habit (*θηριώδεις*) mentioned in the beginning of this book, which Aristotle now, for the first time, identifies with the present investigation. Of this there are three causes, natural depravity (*μοχθηρία φύσις*)

φύσις), habit (*ἔθος*), disease or mutilation. In the pursuit of these pleasures there is no vice, and consequently no incontinence, inasmuch as he who pursues them is not a voluntary agent, and violates not his deliberate conviction, any more than a madman, or he who shakes under the influence of a palsy. Yet these habits are called incontinent, incontinent therefore from analogy, and under this division they are to be included. See the Table in the Introduction, p. 260.



1. τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν] sc. ἡδία φύσις.

τώδεις ἢ ἐξ ἔθους, οἷον τριχῶν τίλσεις καὶ ὀνύχων
 τρώξεις, ἔτι δ' ἀνθράκων καὶ γῆς, πρὸς δὲ τού-
 τοις ἢ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν· τοῖς μὲν
 γὰρ φύσει τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν, οἷον
 5 τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ παίδων. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν
 φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρα-
 τεῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπιύουσιν
 ἀλλ' ὀπιύονται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς νοσηματωδῶς
 ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων But these
 10 ἔξω τῶν ὄρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ can be the
 θηριότης· τὸ δ' ἔχοντα κρατεῖν ἢ κρατεῖσθαι οὐχ object-mat-
 ἢ ἀπλῆ ἀκρασία ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ὁμοιότητα, καθάπερ ter only of
 καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς θυμοὺς ἔχοντα τούτον τὸν inconti-
 τρόπον τοῦ πάθους, ἀκρατῆ δ' οὐ λεκτέον. πᾶσα nence
 15 γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ (ως).
 ἀκολασία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ
 νοσηματώδεις εἰσὶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος
 οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, κἂν ψοφήσῃ μῦς, θηριώδη
 δειλίαν δειλός, ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδεδίει διὰ νόσον·
 20 καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι
 καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες θηριώδεις, ὥσπερ
 ἕνια γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων, οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους,
 οἷον τὰς ἐπιληπτικὰς, ἢ μανίας νοσηματώδεις.
 τούτων δ' ἔστι μὲν ἔχειν τινὰ ἐνίοτε μόνον, μὴ
 25 κρατεῖσθαι δέ, λέγω δὲ οἷον εἰ Φάλαρις κατεῖχεν
 ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων
 ἄτοπον ἠδονήν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον

5. τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις] See p. 283, 6.

25. λέγω δι' οὖν] I mean, for instance, if Phalaris had repressed his desire for devouring his child or for extravagant pleasure from venery. φαγεῖν (the eat-

ing of his child) is the accusative corresponding to ἠδονήν κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν φαγεῖν—κατεῖχεν ἐπιθυμῶν ἠδονήν. Unless it be considered a genitive after ἠδονήν in both places.

ἔχειν. ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ μοχθηρία ἢ μὲν κατ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπλῶς λέγεται μοχθηρία, ἢ δὲ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, ὅτι θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀκρασία ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν θηριώδης ἢ δὲ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀκολασίαν μόνη.

CHAP. VI.

A comparison of Incontinence with Incontinence of anger.

Inconti-
nence of
desire worse
than inconti-
nence of
anger; for
anger
listens to
reason,
though neg-
ligently,
desire not
at all.

 ΟΤΙ μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι μόνον 7
 περὶ ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι περὶ
 τὰ ἄλλα ἐστὶν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, λεγόμενον
 κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, δῆλον· ὅτι δὲ 10
 καὶ ἦττον αἰσχροὶ ἀκρασία ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἢ τῶν
 ἐπιθυμιῶν, θεωρήσωμεν. ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς
 ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δέ, καθά-
 περ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων, οἱ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι
 πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν, εἶτα ἀμαρτάνουσι 15
 τῆς προστάξεως, καὶ οἱ κύνες, πρὶν σκέψασθαι
 εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλακτοῦσιν· οὕτως
 ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτήτα τῆς φύσεως
 ἀκούσας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὁρμᾷ
 πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἢ φαν- 20
 τασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὁ δ' ὥσπερ
 συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν
 χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, εἰ μόνον

CHAP. VI.

12. θυμὸς ἀκούει] See Plato's Re-

public, p. 440. See also p. 199, 10.

εἶπη ὅτι ἡδὺ ὁ λόγος ἢ ἡ αἰσθησις, ὁρμῆ πρὸς
 τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ
 λόγῳ πως, ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. αἰσχιῶν οὖν ὁ
 μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατῆς τοῦ λόγου πως
 5 ἡττᾶται, ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.
 "Ἐτι ταῖς φυσικαῖς μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκολουθεῖν Anger is
 more natu-
 ral than
 desire.
 ὀρέξεσιν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας ταῖς τοιαύταις μάλ-
 λον ὄσαι κοιναὶ πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί· ὁ δὲ
 θυμὸς φυσικώτερον καὶ ἢ χαλεπότης τῶν ἐπι-
 10 θυμῶν τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων,
 ὥσπερ ὁ ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα τύπτοι.
 "καὶ γὰρ οὗτος" ἔφη "τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κάκεινος τὸν
 ἄνωθεν," καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας "καὶ οὗτος ἐμέ"
 ἔφη, "ὅταν ἀνὴρ γένηται· συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν."
 15 καὶ ὁ ἐλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε
 πρὸς ταῖς θύραις· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλκύσαι τὸν
 πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα. "Ἐτι ἀδικώτεροι οἱ Is not insi-
 dious as is
 desire.
 ἐπιβουλότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμῶδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος,
 οὐδ' ὁ θυμὸς, ἀλλὰ φανερός· ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία,
 20 καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασί· "δολοπλόκου
 γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς" καὶ τὸν κροσσὸν ἱμάντα Ὀμηρος·
 "πάρφασις, ἣ τ' ἐκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρο-
 νέοντος." ὥστ' εἶπερ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ αἰσχιῶν ἢ
 ἀκρασία αὕτη τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ
 25 ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία πως. "Ἐτι οὐδεὶς Desire is
 contume-
 lious, anger
 is not.

1. ἰ λόγος] See note p. 273, 8.

19. ἢ Ἐπιθυμία] *Eni desire is insi-
 dious. Compare Plato de Legibus,
 p. 863. καὶ μὴ ἰδοῖν γι οὐ ταῦτὸν
 τῷ θυμῷ προσαγορεύομεν. ἔξ ἰσταντίας δὲ
 αὐτῇ φαινὸν ῥάμης δυναστυύουσα αὐτοῖ
 μιτὰ ἀπάτης βελίου κρόσσου ἢ τί πτε
 δὲ αὐτῆς ἢ βούλησις ἰθιλόση.*

21. Ὀμηρος] *Iliad* π. 214. 217.

25. κακία πως] *προσέθηκε δὲ τὸ πως,
 ἵνα δείξῃ ὅτι ἴσον πρὸς τὴν ἀκρασίαν τὴν
 πτερὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἴσται τίς ἀκρασία τῆς ἐπι-
 θυμίας ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία καὶ κακία καὶ
 αἰσχιότητα καὶ ἀδικοτητα ὡσαύτουσα.
 ἴσον δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀπλῶς ἀκρασίαν καὶ
 κακίαν συγκαταμίνομεν ἢ πτερὶ τὴν ἰσθυ-*

ὕβριζει λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς ποιεῖ λυπούμενος, ὁ δ' ὕβριζων μεθ' ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα, καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. ὡς μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχίων ἢ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμόν, καὶ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία περὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς σωματικὰς, δηλόν. Αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, αἱ μὲν ἀνθρωπικαὶ εἰσι καὶ φυσικαί, 10 καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει, αἱ δὲ θηριώδεις, αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσήματα. τούτων δὲ περὶ τὰς πρώτας σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία μόνον ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σώφρονα οὔτ' ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ μεταφορὰν καὶ εἴ τιτι ὅλως 15 ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζῴων ὕβρι καὶ σιναμωρία καὶ τῷ παμφάλον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ λογισμόν, ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἔλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον δέ· οὐ 20 γὰρ διέφθαρται τὸ βέλτιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει. ὅμοιον οὖν ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κάκιον· ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἢ φαυλότης ἀεὶ ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ 25 συμβάλλειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ἀδικόν· ἐστι γὰρ ὡς ἐκάτερον κάκιον· μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἄνθρωπος κακὸς θηρίου.

The difference of the intemperance from incontinence.

μία ἀκρασία μερικὴ ἢ καὶ καθ' ἑμῶς
σησα λιγομίση οὐδὲ ἀπλῶς κακία ἢ.

1. ὕβριζι] ἦτοι μεχίυι. Schol. See

however the Rhetoric, ii. 2.

25. ἀρχή] See p. 232, 248, 9.

CHAP. VII.

Of the difference of Intemperance, Incontinence, Effeminacy,
Temperance, Continence, Patience.

8 ΠΕΡΙ δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γέυσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ Of the dif-
λύπας καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγὰς, περὶ ἃς ἡ τε ference of
ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον, these sever-
ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστε ἡττᾶσθαι καὶ ὧν οἱ ral disposi-
5 πολλοὶ κρείττους, ἔστι δὲ κρατεῖν καὶ ὧν οἱ tions from
πολλοὶ ἡττους· τούτων δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ ἡδονὰς each other.
ἀκρατῆς ὁ δ' ἐγκρατῆς, ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς
ὁ δὲ καρτερικὸς. μεταξὺ δ' ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις,
καὶν εἰ ρέπουσι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς χεῖρους. Ἐπεὶ The Intem-
10 δ' ἔναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν αἱ δ' οὐ καὶ perate ;
μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὐ, οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλεί-
ψεις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ λύπας,
ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διώκων τῶν ἡδέων ἢ καθ'
ὑπερβολὰς ἢ διὰ προαίρεσιν, δι' αὐτὰς καὶ μηδὲν
15 δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον, ἀκόλαστος· ἀνάγκη γὰρ
τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν, ὥστ' ἀνίατος· ὁ
γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος. ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ὁ
ἀντικείμενος, ὁ δὲ μέσος σῶφρων. ὁμοίως δὲ

- CHAP. VII.

1. περὶ δὲ τὰς] See the table in the Introduction to this Book.

7. περὶ λύπας μαλακίης] Aristotle says that effeminacy rather has pain for its object-matter, not because continence and incontinence are not em-

ployed upon the same, but because their nature and effect is more clearly seen in reference to pleasure. Compare Theages de Virtutibus ; μαλακία μὲν ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πένους, ἀκρατία δ' ἐν τῇ κηρῶσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν ἡδίων. p. 31. Frag. Pythag.

καὶ ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας μὴ δι' ἦταν
 ἀλλὰ διὰ προαίρεσιν. Τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρου-
 μένων ὁ μὲν ἄγεται διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, ὁ δὲ διὰ
 τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας,
 ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε⁵
 χείρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα πράττοι
 τι αἰσχρόν, ἢ εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ
 ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ἢ εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τί γὰρ ἂν
 ἐποίει ἐν πάθει ὦν; διὸ ὁ ἀκόλαστος χείρων
 τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς. τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων τὸ μὲν μαλακίας¹⁰
 εἶδος μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἀκρατής. Ἀντίκειται δὲ
 τῷ μὲν ἀκρατεῖ ὁ ἐγκρατής, τῷ δὲ μαλακῷ ὁ
 καρτερικός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ
 ἀντέχειν, ἢ δ' ἐγκράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν, ἕτερον
 δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ κρατεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ¹⁵
 ἠτᾶσθαι τοῦ νικᾶν· διὸ καὶ αἰρετώτερον ἐγκρά-
 τεια καρτερίας ἐστίν. Ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ

That he is
 worse than
 the inconti-
 nent or
 effeminate.

The differ-
 ence of the
 continent
 from the
 patient.

The effemi-
 nate.

1. ὁ φεύγων] *He who avoids bodily pains not by reason of his being too weak to overcome them, but from deliberate choice, is intemperate.*

2. μὴ προαιρουμένων] *ἀπροαιρέτως ἢ διὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς φερόμενον.* Paraph. ὁ μὲν δὲ ἐν ἡδονῇ. sc. the incontinent (ἀκρατής). ὁ δὲ διὰ τῆς λύπης the effeminate (μαλακός).

6. μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα] See p. 278, 3. n.

11. ἀκρατής] ἀκόλαστος Bekk. I have not hesitated to adopt in this place the reading of the Paraph. and Aspasius, authorities quite equal to many of Bekker's MSS. It is a great deficiency in Bekker's new edition of Aristotle, that he should have entirely omitted the readings of the early com-

mentators and early printed copies of Aristotle.

13. ἐν τῷ ἀντίχειν] Compare Meto-
 pus de Virtute: *ἴσασιν μὲν τὸ λογιστικὸν
 μίξαι τὰς ψυχᾶς ἡγετανῆ τῷ ἀλόγῳ
 γίνεσθαι καρτερία καὶ ἡγερέτεια, ἴσασιν δὲ
 ἐν μὲν ἡγήται τὸ ἴσταναι καὶ ἀμφότερα
 συμφωνεῖ ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῆσιν αὐτῶν ἀρεταῖς.
 ἃ μὲν δὲν καρτερία καὶ ἡγερέτεια γίνονται
 μετὰ λύπης· ἀλλ' ἃ μὲν καρτερία ἐν τῷ
 ἀντίχειν τίσι. ἃ δ' ἡγερέτεια ἐν τῷ
 ἀντίχειν ἡδονῆς. ἃ δ' ἀκρατία καὶ μαλα-
 κία ἐν τῷ μὴ ἀντίχειν μηδὲ κρατεῖν· καὶ
 διὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει φεύγειν ἐκ τῆσιν τοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις διὰ λύπης, ἀσφαλῆ δ' αὐτὰ
 διὰ ἡδονῆς.* Frag. Pythag. Ed. Gale,
 p. 27. Compare also Theages de
 Virtutibus, p. 30. *ibid.*

πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνουσι καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μα-
 λακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφή μαλακία
 τις ἐστίν· ὃς ἔλκει τὸ ἱμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ ποιήσῃ
 τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἶρειν λύπην, καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν
 5 κάμνοντα οὐκ οἶεται ἄθλιος εἶναι, ἄθλιψ ὅμοιος
 ὢν. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρα-
 σίαν· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν
 ἡδονῶν ἠττάται ἢ λυπῶν, θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ συγ-
 γνωμονικόν, εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ὥσπερ ὁ Θεοδέκτου
 10 Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγμένος ἢ ὁ
 Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκύων, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ
 κατέχειν πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα ἀθρόον ἐκκαγ-
 χάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ, ἀλλ' εἴ τις
 πρὸς ἅς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων
 15 ἠττάται καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν
 τοῦ γένους ἢ διὰ νόσον, οἷον ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν
 βασιλεῦσιν ἡ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος, καὶ ὡς τὸ
 θῆλυ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ
 παιδιώδης ἀκόλαστος εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ μαλακός· ἡ
 20 γὰρ παιδιὰ ἀνεσίς ἐστίν, εἶπερ ἀνάπαυσις· τῶν
 δὲ πρὸς ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ παιδιώδης ἐστίν.
 Ἀκρασίας δὲ τὸ μὲν προπέτεια τὸ δ' ἀσθένεια·
 οἱ μὲν γὰρ βουλευσάμενοι οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οἷς
 ἐβουλεύσαντο διὰ τὸ πάθος, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ
 25 βουλεύσασθαι ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἔνιοι
 γάρ, ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται,
 οὕτω καὶ προαισθόμενοι καὶ προϊδόντες καὶ προε-

3. ἵνα μὴ ποιήσῃ] That he may not be troubled with the pain of holding it up. The collocation of the words in this passage is remarkable.

7. ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν] See p. 87, 11.

17. μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος] See Herod. i. 106.

γείραντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν οὐχ ἠτῶνται
 ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, οὔτ' ἂν ἠδὺ ἢ οὔτ' ἂν λυπηρόν.
 μάλιστα δ' οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῆ
 ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν
 ταχυτήτα, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀνα-
 μένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι
 τῇ φαντασίᾳ.

CHAP. VIII.

The difference of the Intemperate and Incontinent more explicitly stated.

The intemperate is incurable, the incontinent is not.

ΕΣΤΙ δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐδ' ἔστι
 μεταμελητικός· ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει· ὁ δ'
 ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικός πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἠπο-
 ρήσαμεν, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀνίατος, ὁ
 δ' ἰατός· ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία τῶν νοση-
 μάτων οἶον ὑδέρω καὶ φθίσει, ἡ δ' ἀκρασία τοῖς
 ἐπιληπτικοῖς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ συνεχῆς, ἡ δ' οὐ συνεχῆς
 πονηρία. καὶ ὅλως δ' ἕτερον τὸ γένος ἀκρασίας
 καὶ κακίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει, ἡ δ'
 ἀκρασία οὐ λανθάνει. Αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελ-
 τίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μὲν,
 μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ' ἐλάττους γὰρ πάθους

Of the incontinent, the hasty are less blameable.

CHAP. VIII.

16. ἡ μὲν κακία] For vice is hid from the view of the vicious, but incontinence is not. The completely vicious has lived so long in an evil course, and neglected so long the voice of conscience, that it ceases to offer opposition, and he has no light within him to discover whether he is acting right

or wrong. But not so the incontinent, who feels and acknowledges that he is doing wrong, and has not yet arrived at the same state of depravity with the former.

17. ἀνοῶν δὲ τούτων] Sc. the incontinent.

18. ἱεραταί] The hasty or precipitate.

ἡττώνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἄτεροι·
 ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρατής ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομέ-
 νοις καὶ ὑπ' ὀλίγου οἴνου καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ
 πολλοί. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κακία ἢ ἀκρασία οὐκ
 5 ἔστι, φανερόν. ἀλλὰ πῆ ἴσως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ
 προαίρεσιν τὸ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐστίν. οὐ μὴν
 ἀλλ' ὁμοίον γε κατὰ τὰς πράξεις ὥσπερ τὸ
 Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους "Μιλησιοὶ ἀξύνετοι
 μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσι δ' οἵαπερ οἱ ἀξύνετοι." καὶ
 10 οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἄδικοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, ἀδικουσι δέ.
 Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἶος μὴ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι
 διώκειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
 λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ πέπεισται διὰ τὸ
 τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἶος διώκειν αὐτάς, ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν
 15 εὐμετάπειστος, ὁ δ' οὐ· ἢ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἢ μοχ-
 θηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ μὲν φθείρει ἢ δὲ σώζει, ἐν δὲ
 ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς
 μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος
 διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ
 20 ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν.

13. ἰ δὲ] sc. The intemperate.

15. ἢ γὰρ ἀρετή] The intemperate having lost all moral and natural virtue, has with them also lost the power of presenting to himself a good end as the object of pursuit. For as the mathematician does not undertake to prove the first and necessary axioms of his science, and to one who cannot intuitively perceive them, all attempts of proving them would be fruitless and inconsistent; so the incontinent man, who has lost this first principle of morals, can never be recovered by

human means. No one can restore to him this moral vision which he has destroyed by his folly and depravity, or enable him to enter into a new course of life, by representing to him (who cannot understand the very first principles of such reasoning) the vice and folly of his conduct.

— μοχθηρία] See p. 231, 5.

18. αἱ θεολογίαι] The axioms and postulates.

20. ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστὴ] See p. 254, 15.

Recapitulation.

σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. Ἔστι δέ τις διὰ πάθος ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ὃν ὥστε μὲν μὴ πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος, ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πεπεῖσθαι διώκειν ἀνέδην δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὐ κρατεῖ· οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἀπλῶς· σῴζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἢ ἀρχή. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος, ὁ ἐμμενετικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικὸς διὰ γε τὸ πάθος. φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ μὲν σπου- 10
δαία ἔξις, ἡ δὲ φαύλη.

CHAP. IX.

Whether the Continent is the same as he who adheres to his opinion.

Three ways of viewing this question.

ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ οὖν ἐγκρατῆς ἐστὶν ὁ ὀποιουῦν 10
λόγῳ καὶ ὀποιουῦν προαιρέσει ἐμμένων ἢ ὁ τῆ

CHAP. IX.

Aristotle proceeds to discuss the second question proposed, p. 264, 24. whether the incontinent is the same as he who perseveres in his purpose, and the incontinent the same as he who departs from it.

This question he observes may be considered in three ways :

I. Whether you consider the continent to be one who adheres to his purpose whether good or bad, and the incontinent who forsakes it whether good or bad :

II. Whether you consider the continent to be one who persists in a good purpose, and the incontinent to be one who departs from a bad purpose : and

III. Whether the absolutely continent be he who persists in a good purpose, the accidentally, he who persists in any ; and the incontinent the reverse.

From the first two views of the question an absurdity must obviously result ; for if the forsaking of a bad purpose be a virtue, as it evidently is, then from these it would follow that incontinence would in some instances be a virtue, which is ridiculous. According to the third way no such absurdity results ; and we infer from it another distinction respecting continence and incontinence, which has not yet been noticed, that there are two kinds of it ; one proper the absolute persisting, the other improper the

ὀρθῇ, καὶ ἀκρατῆς δὲ ὁ ὀποιοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων
 προαιρέσει καὶ ὀποιοῦν λόγῳ ἢ ὁ τῷ ψευδεῖ
 λόγῳ καὶ τῇ προαίρεσει τῇ μὴ ὀρθῇ, ὥσπερ ἠπο-
 ρήθη πρότερον; ἢ κατὰ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ὀποιοῦν,
 5 καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ὀρθῇ προαι-
 ρέσει ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γὰρ τις
 τοδὶ διὰ τοδὶ αἰρεῖται ἢ διώκει, καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν
 τοῦτο διώκει καὶ αἰρεῖται, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ
 πρότερον. ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτό, ὥστε
 10 ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὀποιοῦν δόξῃ ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει ὁ δ'
 ἐξίσταται, ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ τῇ ἀληθεί. Εἰσὶ δὲ
 τινες καὶ ἐμμεντικοὶ τῇ δόξῃ, οὓς καλοῦσιν ἰσχυ-
 ρογνώμονας, οἷον δύσπιστοι καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάπει-
 στοί· οἱ ὅμοιον μὲν τι ἔχουσι τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ, ὥσπερ
 15 ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ καὶ ὁ θρασύς τῷ θαρρα-
 λέῳ, εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ
 πάθος καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν οὐ μεταβάλλει, ὁ ἐγκρατής,
 ἐπεὶ εὐπειστος, ὅταν τύχῃ, ἔσται ὁ ἐγκρατής· ὁ δὲ
 οὐχ ὑπὸ λόγου, ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμβάνουσι,
 20 καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ
 ἰσχυρογνώμονες οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς
 καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι, οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες δι' ἡδονὴν καὶ
 λύπην· χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες, εἰ μὴ μεταπαί-
 θωνται, καὶ λυποῦνται, εἰ μὴ ἄκυρα τὰ αὐτῶν ἢ

The obsti-
 nate bear
 greater re-
 semblance
 to the incon-
 tinent than
 the conti-
 nent, both
 acting
 under the
 influence of
 pleasure.

accidentally persisting, in a good purpose: the first acting from principle, the second from accidental circumstances. The Paraph. has some judicious remarks upon this subject: ὁ μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀγαθῇ δόξῃ ἐμμένει καὶ τῇ ἐξῆς προαιρέσει αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἰρεῖται διότι ἀγαθὸν ἔστι καὶ αὐτὸ ἰσχυρατῆς ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ ἐμμένει τῇ μὴ ἐξῆς προαιρέσει καὶ

τῇ ψευδῇ δόξῃ, ἐμμένει διὰ τὸ νομίζου ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν ὁ αἰρεῖται· νομίζου δέ, ὅτι ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐν ἀμυδρῶν ἰσχυρῶν. δι' ὅ ἰσχυρατῆς τῆς μὴ ἐξῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ τῆς ψευδοῦς δόξης ὡς ἐξῆς καὶ ἀληθοῦς. ἰσχυρῶν οὖν οὐ δι' ἑαυτὰ αἰρεῖται ἢ αἰρεῖται καὶ οἷς ἐμμένει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐ καὶ αὐτὸ ἰσχυρατῆς ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ συμβεβηκός.

ὥσπερ ψηφίσματα· ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ εἰ-
 κασιν ἢ τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ. Εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ τοῖς
 δόξασιν οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν οὐ δι' ἀκρασίαν, οἷον ἐν
 τῷ Φιλοκτήτῃ τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεοπτόλεμος.
 καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλὴν· τὸ
 γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν ἦν, ἐπέισθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ
 Ὀδυσσεως ψεύδεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονὴν τι
 πράττων οὐτ' ἀκόλαστος οὔτε φαῦλος οὐτ' ἀκρα-
 τής, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχροῦ.

They who
do not abide
by a bad
resolution
are neither
incontinent
nor vicious.

CHAP. X.

Some concluding remarks for the better understanding of their
Habits.

Of the
nameless
extreme of
continence
on the side
of defect.

ΕΠΕΙ δ' ἐστὶ τις καὶ τοιοῦτος οἶος ἦττον ἢ δεῖ 11
 τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρων, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ λόγῳ
 ἢ τοιοῦτος, τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς μέσος ὁ
 ἐγκρατής· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατής οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ
 λόγῳ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι, οὗτος δὲ διὰ τὸ ἦττόν τι·
 ὁ δ' ἐγκρατής ἐμμένει καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μετα- 15
 βάλλει. δεῖ δέ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον,
 ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ἐναντίας ἕξεις φαύλας εἶναι, ὥσπερ
 καὶ φαίνονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἐτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις
 καὶ ὀλιγάκις εἶναι φανεράν, ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη
 τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ 20
 ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ ἀκρασίᾳ. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ὁμοί-
 οτητα πολλὰ λέγεται, καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἢ τοῦ σώ-

The relation
of conti-
nence to tem-
per-

CHAP. X.

10. ἦττον ἢ δεῖ] See p. 124, 1.

15. οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον] Neither from one
or the other. Neither from being in-

fluenced too much by pleasure as the
incontinent, nor too little as the one in
the defective habit.

- φρονος καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἠκολούθηκεν· ὁ τε γὰρ ance, and
inconti-
nence to in-
temper-
ance.
ἐγκρατῆς οἶος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς
σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σόφρων, ἀλλ' ὁ
μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ
5 μὲν τοιοῦτος οἶος μὴ ἡδεσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον,
ὁ δ' οἶος ἡδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι. ὅμοιοι δὲ καὶ
ὁ ἀκρατῆς καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτεροι μὲν ὄντες,
ἀμφοτέροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν, ἀλλ'
ὁ μὲν καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὁ δ' οὐκ οἰόμενος.
- 10 Οὐδ' ἅμα φρόνιμον καὶ ἀκρατῆ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι That he who
is inconti-
nent cannot
possibly be
φρόνιμος.
Because the
φρόνιμος is
given to act
(πρακτικῆς)
according
to his
knowledge.
Not so the
incontinent.
τὸν αὐτόν· ἅμα γὰρ φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος τὸ
ἦθος δέδεικται ἄν. ἔτι οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρό-
νιμος ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ' ἀκρατῆς οὐ
πρακτικός. τὸν δὲ δεινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἀκρατῆ
15 εἶναι· διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναι
τινες ἀκρατεῖς δέ, διὰ τὸ τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν
τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς
πρώτοις λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς
εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. οὐδὲ
20 δὴ ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ θεωρῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων
ἢ οἰνωμένος. καὶ ἐκὼν μὲν (τρόπον γὰρ τινα
εἰδὼς καὶ ὁ ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα), πονηρὸς δ' οὐ
ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις ἐπιεικῆς· ὥσθ' ἡμιπόνηρος. καὶ

11. φρόνιμος καὶ σπουδαῖος] See p. 251, 11.

16. διαφέρειν τῆς φρονήσεως] See p. 252, 13.

19. τὸν λόγον] *As to their definition.* Both are habits employed upon means to an end. But in the φρόνιμος the προαίρεσις is always good, proposing only those means which tend to a good end, but in the δεινός indifferently.

24. ἡμισύνηρος] As has already been stated, p. 288. n. Incontinence and continence differ from intemperance and temperance, as imperfect from perfect habits; this will be seen by inspecting the table prefixed to this book. The following passage from the fragments of the Pythagoreans furnishes an excellent comment upon this subject. τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ ἦθους ἢ προαίρεσις σημαίνει.

οὐκ ἄδικος· οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐμμενετικός οἷς ἂν βουλευέσθαι, ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικός οὐδὲ βουλευτικός ὄλως. καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατὴς πόλει ἢ ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης ἔσκωψεν

ἢ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ἢ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει·

ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς χρωμένη μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ χρωμένη. ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτεια περὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ἕξεως· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον ὁ δ' ἦττον τῆς τῶν πλείστων δυνάμεως. Εὐΐατοτέρα δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἣν οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ ἀκρατεύονται, τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ ἐμμενόντων δέ, καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμού ἀκρατεῖς τῶν φυσικῶν· ῥᾶον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινήσαι φύσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπόν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐῆνος λέγει

Φημί πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δὴ ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτῶσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια καὶ τί ἀκρασία καὶ 20

διὸ καὶ μετὰ τῆς βίας μὴ ἰσικρατίας ἡ λογισμὸς θυμῷ καὶ ἰσθυμίας ἰσικρατίας καὶ παρτερίας ἰσχυαῖ. μετὰ βίας δὲ πάλιν ἰσθυμίας αὐτὴς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἀκρατίας καὶ μαλακίας. αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται διαθεσεῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμιτελεῖς μὴ ἀρτὰ ἡμιτελεῖς δὲ κακίαι συγχάνονται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λογισμὸς ὀρθοῖται, τὰ δ' ἄλογα μίξεις τῆς ψυχῆς νοσῶσι. καὶ καθὼ μὴ ἀρτῆται καὶ ἄρτῆται ἡ θυμὸς καὶ ἰσθυμίας ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντες μίξεις τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ ἰσικρατία καὶ ἢ παρτερία ἀρτῆται συ-

χάνονται. καθὼ δὲ μετὰ βίας ἀλλ' οὐκ ἰσικρατίας τοῦτο πρᾶσσονται, κακίαι συγχάνονται. διὸ γὰρ τὰ ἀρτῆται μὴ μετὰ λύπης ἀλλὰ μετὰ ἡδονῆς τὰ δέοντα πρᾶσσονται. πάλιν δὲ καθὼ μὴ ἰσικρατίας ἡ θυμὸς καὶ ἰσθυμίας τῷ λογισμῷ μαλακίαι καὶ ἀκρατίας ἰσικρατία, κακίαι τῆς συγχάνονται. καθὼ δὲ μετὰ λύπης παρτερίας τῆς πάλιν, ἰδίους δὲ ἀσπλαγίσονται, τῷ ὄντι ἡμῶν τὸ ἅμα τῆς ψυχῆς, ταῦτα δὲ οὐ κακίαι. Theages de Virtut. in Fragm. Pythag. p. 33.

Some species of incontinence more curable than others.

τί καρτερία καὶ τί μαλακία, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ
ἕξεις αὐταὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται.

CHAP. XI.

The different opinions concerning Pleasure, and the grounds upon
which they were founded, briefly stated.

- 12 ΠΕΡΙ δὲ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης θεωρῆσαι τοῦ τὴν Reasons why the consideration of pleasure is necessary.
πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος· οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ τέλους
ἄρχιτέκτων, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες ἕκαστον τὸ μὲν
κακὸν τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ἀπλῶς λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ
τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν· τὴν
τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν περὶ
λύπας καὶ ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν, καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἱ
10 πλείστοι μεθ' ἡδονῆς εἶναι φασιν, διὸ καὶ τὸν
μακάριον ὠνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν. Τοῖς Three opinions concerning it.
μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε
καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι
ταῦτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔναι μὲν 2.
15 εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. Ἔτι δὲ τούτων 3.
τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχασθαι
εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. Ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ Reasons in support of the 1st opinion.
ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν

CHAP. XI.

5. ἀρχιτέκτων] Compare p. 6, 7.

9. λύπας καὶ ἀπορίας] Compare p. 59, 7.

18. εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητός] In his Rhetoric (i. 11.) Aristotle has explained this at greater length: ὁποῖοίσεσθε ὃ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὸν ἄλλον αἰσθητός τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πατάσασιν ἄλλοι καὶ αἰσθη-

τὸν εἰς τὴν ἀνάγκησιν φύσιν. That is, a rapid (ἀέριον) and sensible (αἰσθητός) transition into a state of nature. Rapid, since otherwise there is no sensible exercise of sensation. Which is the reason why starving people eat greedily, and those benumbed with cold thrust their fingers into the fire; feeling no pleasure if they be fed or warmed

- αἰσθητή, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενῆς τοῖς τέλε-
 2. σιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκία. Ἔτι ὁ
 3. σώφρων φεύγει τὰς ἡδονάς. Ἔτι ὁ φρόνιμος
 4. τὸ ἄλυπον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ. Ἔτι ἐμπόδιον
 τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ὄσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, ὅ
 μᾶλλον, οἷον τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων· οὐδένα γὰρ
 5. ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαί τι ἐν αὐτῇ. Ἔτι τέχνη
 οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον.

slowly and by slight degrees. For the same reason there is no pleasure if the transit be too rapid to be sensible. This definition was apparently derived from the *Timæus* of Plato, p. 64. ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύσης ὁδῷ διὰ διαδοχῆς. ἐν μὲν σαφῶς φέρον καὶ βίαιον γιγνώσκοντες ἀλλήλων σαφῶς ἡμῖν πάθος ἀλλοτριόν, τὸ δ' εἰς φέρον ἄσπετον πάλιν ἀλλήλων ἡδύ, ἐν δὲ ἡδέϊα καὶ παρὰ σμικρὸν ἀναίσθητον.

1. οὐδεμία γένεσις] This statement of the argument of those who endeavoured to prove that pleasure was not a good because it is a generation, and no generation is congenious with its end, is somewhat different from that given in the latter part of this treatise, where the subject is more philosophically considered. There it is shown that pleasure is not a good because it is a generation, and every generation is imperfect; here, on the contrary, the reasoning is that all goods are ends, no pleasure is an end but a generation to an end, and therefore no pleasure is a good. See x. 2.

The best comment on this passage is the summary of Plato's reasoning upon this subject given by Olympiodorus in his *Scholia* to the *Philebus*: ed. Stallbaum, p. 278. ὅτι συλλογίζεται μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν αὐτῆς. ἢ ἡδονῆς, γένεσις· ἢ γένεσις, ἵκανά

του· τὸ ἵκανά του, ἵκανον τοῦ οὐδ' ἵκανα. ἐν οὐ ἵκανα, ἀγαθόν· ἢ ἡδονῆς ἄρα ἵκανον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

That this doctrine though generally attributed to Plato did not originate with him, seems to be indicated by himself in these words: ἄρα σιελὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀπηπάμην ὡς αἱ γένεσις ἵκανον, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἵκανον ἐν ἀσφατάσει ἡδονῆς; κομψοὶ γὰρ δὲ τινος αὐτῶν ἐν λόγῳ ἱσχυροῦσι μνησθῆναι ἡμῖν, οἷς δὲ χάρις ἔχουσιν. *Philebus*, p. 63. Now by the term κομψοὶ Plato means not only philosophers, as Stallbaum has observed, but also what has not been noticed, the Pythagoreans. (See *Gorg.* p. 493. with the notes of Heindorf and Buttmann.) At all events, it is certain that the notion that pleasure is an ἀπασπάρων, from which the other was derived, (see x. 2.) originated with the Pythagoreans. Compare *Jamblichus* in *Vita Pythag.* §. 205. σιελὶ δὲ τῆς ἰσομετρείης ἰσχυροῦσι τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἵστανται τοὺς ἀνδρας ἱκανούς, τὴν μὲν ἰσχυροῦσαν ἰσχυροῦσαν εἶναι οὕτως ψυχῆς καὶ ἰσχυρῆς καὶ ἡρεῖται, ἵκανον ἀπασπάρων τῆς ἡδονῆς ἢ ἀπασπάρων αἰσθητικῆς. γίνεσθαι δὲ τῶν ἱκανῶν ἰσχυροῦσαν ἢ ἰσχυροῦσαν τὴν αὐτῆς καὶ ἀπασπάρων καὶ τοῦ μὴ αἰσθητικῆς τῶν. See Stallbaum's note on the *Philebus*, p. 34—101.

Ἔτι παιδία καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς. Τοῦ In support of the second.
 δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας, ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ αἰσχυραὶ καὶ ὀνειδιζόμεναι, καὶ ἔτι βλαβεραὶ νοσώδη γὰρ
 ἔνια τῶν ἡδέων. Ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄριστον ἢ ἡδονή, In support of the third.
 ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα
 σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

CHAP. XII.

The inconclusiveness of the arguments, upon which these opinions were founded, exposed.

13 ὍΤΙ δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν 1. Argument in refutation of the first opinion.
 μηδὲ τὸ ἄριστον, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. πρῶτον μὲν, That goods are both absolute and relative.
 ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ
 10 τινί), καὶ αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἕξεις ἀκολουθήσουσιν, are both absolute and relative.
 ὥστε καὶ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις, καὶ αἱ
 φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς φαῦλαι τινί
 δ' οὐ ἀλλ' αἰρεταὶ τῷδε, ἔνια δ' οὐδὲ τῷδε ἀλλὰ
 ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον, αἰρεταὶ δ' οὐ· αἱ δ' οὐδ'
 15 ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, ὅσαι μετὰ λύπης καὶ
 ἰατρείας ἕνεκεν, οἷον αἱ τῶν καμνόντων. Ἔτι 2. Argument. That

CHAP. XII.

Aristotle now proceeds to refute the first and third opinions stated in the previous chapter, as well as the arguments used in defence of the second, though not the opinion itself, which he himself adopted, as will be seen hereafter. x. 3.

9. τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς] Aristotle now proceeds to refute the arguments of those who said that pleasure is not a good, because it is a motion and a generation. For as good, he observes,

is of two kinds, absolute and relative, so are habits and generations either absolutely and relatively good, or absolutely and relatively evil. So that if generation be an absolute evil, it follows not that it is not a good, for it may be a relative good; or if it be a relative it follows not that it may not be an absolute good. Therefore the argument that pleasure is not a good, because it is a generation, is inconclusive.

pleasures
arising from
repletion
are only ac-
cidentally
pleasant.

ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια τὸ δ' ἔξις, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθιστᾶσαι εἰς τὴν φυσικὴν ἔξιν ἡδεΐαι εἰσιν. ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοίπου ἔξεως καὶ φύσεως, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύτης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ δ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι, τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς οὔσης. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ χαίρουσιν ἡδεῖ ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας, ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις· καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι¹⁰ καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν, ὧν οὐδὲν οὔτε φύσει ἡδὺ οὔθ' ἀπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί· ὡς γὰρ τὰ

1. [ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] Good is either a habit or an energy: as in virtue or the energies of virtue. Which latter are only good accidentally, and accidentally pleasant as filling up a natural defect, not at all times. For unless pain or defect has preceded them, or when that pain is removed, they are no longer pleasant. Further there are many energies which cause pleasure, and yet cause no repletion, nor are consequent upon any deficiency, such as those of contemplation (αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι). Consequently all pleasures are not generations; and therefore as far as this argument is concerned, it does not follow that pleasure is not a good.

Eadem partitione usus est infra, x. 2. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἰδιῶν εἶναι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀποπῆ ἀναπληρώσειν. ταῦτα δὲ σωματικὰ ἵσθαι σάτη, . . . ἢ δόξα δ' αὐτῆ δευτὴ γίγνεται ἐκ τῶν αἰσθῶν ἐπὶ τρεφῆν λουπῶν καὶ ἀποπῆ· ἰδιῶς γὰρ γνωμένους καὶ προληπτικότητας ἡδίστα· ἐπὶ ἀναπληρώσει. οὗτο δ' οὐ αἰσθῶν κάσας συμβαίνει εἰς ἡδονάς. ἄλλοτε γὰρ εἰσὶν αἱ τε μαθημα-

τικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθητικῶν καὶ δὲ τῆς ἐνφροσύνης καὶ ἀπεράματα δὲ καὶ ἡδέματα· ἀλλὰ δὲ καὶ μαθηματικὰ καὶ ἰσθίσις. Is autem locus, cujus causa hæc attulimus, aperto contra locum aliquem in Philebo dirigitur, ut omnino in tota hac disputatione auctor noster Platoniam rationem refutare sibi proposuit. Plato enim eo loco alterum voluptatum genus perfectum et absolutum, nulla molestia mixtum, agnoscere non videtur, sed voluptatum nomen tantum iis assignat, quæ ex imperfecto et quasi mutilato ab plenum integrum et perfectum habitum nos perducunt. Hæc ejus sunt ipsa verba (Phileb. p. 42.) vel potius Socratis quem loquentem inducit: ἕρται σὺ τελλᾶσι, εἰ τῆς φύσεως ἰσθῶν διαφθειρόμενης μὲν συγκρίσεις καὶ διακρίσεις καὶ ἀληθέσεις καὶ κρισίσεις, καὶ νισσῶν αἰσθῶν καὶ φθίσεις, λύσει τε καὶ ἀλλαγῆς καὶ ἀδυναί καὶ ἀσθῶν ἰσθῶν τῶν αὐτῶν ἰσθῶν ἔχου συμβαίνει γιγνώσκου . . . εἰ δὲ γι τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἴσθαι καθίσταται, ταύτην αὐτὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἡδονὴν ἀποδείξειται κατὰ ἡμῶν ἀποπῆν. ZELL.

ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλληλα συνέστηκεν, οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων. Ἐπι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι That it does not follow

2. οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἵταίροι ἐι.] This is a refutation of the argument which has been explained at length, p. 296, 1. that the end is different from and better than the generation to it: that good is an end, and pleasure a generation, and therefore pleasure is not a good. Now in many instances the end is the same as the operation (see p. 5, 8.); and secondly, pleasure is an end as well as an operation.

Nunc refutat eam sententiam jam supra propositam, qua voluptates generationes, ortus (*γενήσεις*) et quasi transitiones in perfectum habitum, adeoque ipsæ imperfectæ et summi boni expertes perhibebantur. Id autem, ut jam significatum est, Platonis erat decretum, quem etsi non nominatum h. l. Aristoteles impugnat. Quapropter non alienum erit, priusquam Aristotelem refellentem audiamus, Platonis de hoc re sententiam cognoscere quam tradidit in Philebo, p. 54. unde potiora transcribam: τὸ μὲν ἴσιακά σου τῶν ὄντων ἴσος· αἱ δὲ δ' οὐ χᾶρις ἰσάσονται τὸ τίς τις ἴσια γιγνόμενον αὐ γίγνεται... δύο δὲ καὶ ἴτρα λάβωμεν... Ἰσὸν μὲν ἐν γένεσιν πάντων, τῆν δὲ οὐσίαν (quod vocabulum respondet Aristotelico ἔξι), ἴσους ἴσ... αἰσθητῶν οὖν τούτων ἴσια ποιεῖται; τὰς γένεσιν οὐσίαν ἴσια φῶμεν. ἢ τῆν οὐσίαν ἴσια γένεσις ἴσια;—φημι δὲ, . . . ἰσάσονται γένεσιν ἄλλαν ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἰσάσους ἴσια γίγνεσθαι, ζόμεσθαι δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίαν ἴσια γίγνεσθαι ζόμεσθαι.—οὐκ οὖν ἄδονα γι. ἴσως γένεσις ἴσως, ἴσια τινὸς οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι ἄδονα—τό γε μὴν οὐ ἴσια τὸ ἴσια σου γιγνόμενον αὐ γίγνεσθαι ἄδονα τῆ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μέρος ἰσῶν ἴσως· τὸ δὲ τίς τις ἴσια γιγνόμενον ἐξ ἄλλαν μέρος ἰσῶν ἴσως.—ἄδονα οὖν ἄδονα γι ἴσως γένεσις ἴσως, ἐξ ἄλ-

λαν ἢ τῆν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μέρος αὐτὴν ἴσως, ἰσῶν ἴσως;—οὐκ οὖν τῆ μὴ ἴσως τῆς ἴσως αἰσθητῶν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι μὲν, οὐσίαν δὲ μὴ ἴσως οὐσίαν ἴσως, χᾶρις δι' ἴσως. ὁ δὲ γὰρ οὐτι οὐτῶν τῶν φασκόντων ἴσως ἄγαθῶν ἴσως καταγιγνῆθαι. Cf. etiam imprimis eundem Dialogum, p. 31. Eandem opinionem refutat Aristoteles etiam in Mag. Mor. ii. 7. hunc in modum, ut primum, quod nostro quoque loco fecit, ostendat, esse etiam tales voluptates, in quibus nulla sit ἴσως ἀναπλήρωσις, nullaque antecedens molestia, unde ad meliorem perfectumque habitum fiat transitio, adeoque non esse easdem ἀνάγκης et γένεσις, ut voluptates e rebus cognoscendis (ἐκ τοῦ θεωρητῶν): deinde aliud novum argumentum addit, quo demonstret, ne illas quidem voluptates, quæ implendis cupiditatibus contineantur et præcedentes habeant molestias, vere γένεσις dici posse. Hoc autem alterum argumentum his verbis tradit: τὸ δ' ὅλον οὐκ ἴσως οὐδὲμία ἴσως γένεσις. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ φασκῶν καὶ αὐτῶν ἴσως οὐκ ἴσως γένεσις; ἀλλὰ διαμαρτάνουσι εἰ τούτων φασκῶν τὰς ἴσως εἶναι γένεσις. οὐκ οὖν γὰρ ἰσῶν τῆς προσφασκῆς γιγνόμενης γίγνεσθαι ἴσως, διὰ τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἴσως ἴσως δ' οὐ. ἰσῶν γὰρ ἴσως τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν μέρος ἢ ἴσως ἀμα τῆ προσφασκῆς ἄδονα ἴσως, τοῦτο μέρος τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴσως καὶ αὐτῶν ἢ δὲ αἰσθητῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἴσως ἴσως ἴσως ἴσως διὰ δὲ τὸ ἀμα τῆ προσφασκῆς ἴσως τὸ μέρος τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴσως, ἢ διὰ τῆν αὐτοῦ ἴσως, οὐκ οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἴσως τῆν ἴσως, τῆ τῶν προσφασκῶν ἴσως ἴσως, τὸ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος ἴσως. ἴσως οὖν αὐτῶν τῶν ἴσως οὐκ οὖν ἴσως ἴσως. ἴσως οὖν αὐτῶν τῶν ἴσως οὐκ οὖν ἴσως ἴσως. ΖΕΛΛ.

that pleasure is not an end.

εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. δοκεῖ δὲ γένεσις τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν· 10 τὴν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν γένεσιν οἴονται εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ἕτερον.

Refutation of the 2d opinion. From the accidental evils of pleasure, it does not follow that pleasure is in itself an evil.

Τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας ὅτι νοσώδη ἔνια ἡδέα, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἔνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν. ταύτη οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω, ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατὰ γε τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ποτὲ 15 βλάπτει πρὸς ὑγίειαν, ἐμποδίζει δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει οὔθ' ἔξει οὐδεμιᾶ ἢ ἀφ' ἐκάστης ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ' αἰ ἀλλότριαι, ἐπεὶ αἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν μᾶλλον ποιήσουσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν.

Refutation of the 5th argument for the first opinion.

Τὸ δὲ τέχνης μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονὴν μηδεμίαν εὐλόγως 20

5. τῶν εἰς τὴν εὐλείωσιν] Because their end is the production of a state different from what existed before. Thus medicine produces in the diseased or defective a state of soundness and health which existed not before, and which is distinct from the operation which produces it.

10. κυρίως ἀγαθόν] γίνεσις δὲ ἰατρικῆς τισι εἶναι ἢ ἡδονή, ἵτις φασὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθόν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, τὸ δὲ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι, ἐνέργειαν δὲ καὶ γίνεσιν μὴδὲ ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν. εὐ δὲ εὐχ' οὕτως ἔχει· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν ἐστι γίνεσις ἐνέργειᾶ· γίνεσις μὲν γὰρ

ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι τῆς ἕξεως· ἐνέργειαν δὲ ἵτις ἐστὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ἢ μετὰ τὴν ἀνάληψιν τῆς ἕξεως, κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν εὐλείωσιν ἔστι ἐνέργειαν. Paraph. 17. αἰ ἀλλότριαι] See x.

19. τὸ δὲ τέχνης] The reason of this objection is given by Aristotle at the very commencement of this treatise. καὶ μὴ οὐδὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἔργον τέχνης εὐδαιμονίας διὰ τοῦτο φαῦλον· οὕτω γὰρ εἰς πάντα ἐνέργειαν φαῦλον εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν γὰρ ἐνέργειαν τέχνης ἐστὶν ἀποτέλεσμα· ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν δόξαν ἢ τέχνην, ἢ δὲ δόξαν ἀεὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ τὴν ἀναρτητικὴν τέχνην αἰτίας

συμβέβηκεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ἐνεργείας οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ δοκεῖ ἡδονῆς εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ τὸν σῶφρονα φεύγειν καὶ τὸν
 5 φρόνιμον διώκειν τὸν ἄλυπον βίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ 6. argu-
 παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διώκειν, τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται ments used
 πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ in support
 πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰς τοιαύτας of the same
 τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διώκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων opinion.
 10 ἄλυπίαν ὁ φρόνιμος, τὰς μετ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπης
 καὶ τὰς σωματικὰς (τοιαῦται γὰρ αὗται) καὶ τὰς
 τούτων ὑπερβολάς, καθ' ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκό-
 λαστος. διὸ ὁ σῶφρων φεύγει ταύτας, ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν
 ἡδοναὶ καὶ σῶφρονος.

CHAP. XIII.

Whether some Pleasure may not be the Chief Good.

14 ΑΛΛΑ μὲν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, That plea-
 καὶ φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ good is a
 πῆ ἐμποδιστικὴ. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ being oppos-
 φευκτόν τε καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ed to pain.
 ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος

ἔστι τοῦ δύνασθαι κυβερᾶν· ἐδὲ δὲ δύνασ-
 θαι κυβερᾶν αἰεὶν ἔστι εἴς κατὰ τὴν
 κυβερητικὴν ἐνεργείας. Schol. See vi. 3.

5. ἐν ἄλυποι βίον]. See Plato's
 Philebus, p. 55.

CHAP. XIII.

17. [ἐμποδιστικὴ] Since happiness,
 as has been shown, is an exercise of

the virtuous energies, whatever im-
 pedes those energies must be an evil,
 and whatever removes that impedi-
 ment must be so far a good. If plea-
 sure then is the opposite of pain and
 removes it, and pain is an hindrance
 to our energies, pleasure is in this
 sense a good.

19. Σπειώσιππος] See x. 2. n.

That since it is an unimpeded energy, it may be the best of all energies: consequently, Happiness.

ἔλυνεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἢ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μείζον τῷ ἐλάττωι καὶ τῷ ἴσφ' ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. Ἄριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔναι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων ὀυσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἐκάστης ἕξέως εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἢ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἢ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ἢ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἰρετωτάτην εἶναι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονή τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων ὀυσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἀπλῶς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἴονται βίον εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία τῶν

where this passage is explained at length. Compare Gellius, N. A. ix. 5. Spuissippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala dicunt esse opposita inter sese, bonum tamen esse quod utriusque medium foret.

5. *ἰσιστήμην ἐπιστήμην*] ὡςτις οἰδὶν πολλοὺς εἶναι τινὰ ἐπιστήμην ἀρίστην ἢ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ἰσὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσιστήμης φαῦλαι. ἰσιστήμης ἰσαῦθα καταχρηστικῶς εἰς βαναύσους ἔλαβεν. Schol.

7. *ἢ πασῶν ἐνέργειαι*] If happiness be an unimpeded energy of the soul according to every virtue or the best of them, and if pleasure be an unimpeded energy (*ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιστος*), (as we have shown where it was said that for the term *αἰσθητὴ* we ought to use *ἀνεμπόδιστος*, and for *γίνεσθαι*, *ἐνέργειαι*, p. 300, 6.) then it follows that some pleasure must be happiness.

Aristotle, however, distinguishes plea-

sure from happiness, though the greatest pleasure must of necessity follow it. (See x. 3.) But here he seems to take the objector on his own ground, after having corrected his terms, arguing as though pleasure was an unimpeded energy. Whereas in fact, as he afterwards states, it differs from the energy, being necessarily consequent upon it, as the bloom upon the ripeness of the plum. *οἰκνύεται δὲ ταῖς ἰσιστήμης αἰ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναῖς τῶν ἀρίστων· αἰ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναι ἐπὶ καὶ ταῖς χερούς καὶ τῆ φόδου. αἰ δὲ σύνεργαι ταῖς ἰσιστήμης καὶ ἀδύναται οὕτως ἀπ' ἔχουσιν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἰσιστήμης τῆ ἡδονῆς. οὐ μὲν ἰσὶ γὰρ ἢ ἡδονὴ διάστωμα εἶναι οὐδ' αἰσθητῆς· ἀποσσοὺ γὰρ· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται τισι ταῦτόν. x. 3.*

This difference does not however materially affect the argument.

τελείων' διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, εἰάν ἦ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τύχης δοκεῖ τισὶ ταῦτὸν εἶναι ἢ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ οὔσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν
 01 καλεῖν δίκαιον· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὄρος αὐτῆς. Καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία That the fact of plea-

3. ἐμποδίζηται] See p. 39, 22. note.

— τὸν τροχιζόμενον] Falluntur mag-nopere qui putant hæc Aristotelem dixisse contra Stoicos qui ætate Aristotelis nondum erant; peccarunt igitur inscitia temporum; semina sane extabant earum opinionum quas postea amplexi sunt illi, eruta e variis dis-sentientibusque inter se disputationibus Socratis. Sæpe autem miratus sum quod M. Cicero dixit in Tuscul. V. §. 9. de Theophrasto: "Vexatur autem ab omnibus, primum in eo libro quem scripsit de Vita beata, in quo multa disputat, quamobrem is qui tor-queatur, qui crucietur, beatus esse non possit. In eo etiam putatur dicere, in rotam beatam vitam non escendere." Plane igitur hinc cognoscitur M. Tul-lium non valde versatum fuisse in lectione horum de Moribus librorum; neque enim oportuisse purgare Theo-phrastum, quod iudicium auctoritatem-que sui doctoris et in sententiis ipsis et in verbis secutus esset. VICT.

11. καὶ τὸ διώκειν] See x. 2. n.

— καὶ τὸ διώκειν] Aristotle here ob-serves, that the fact of all animals, both rational and irrational, pursuing

pleasure, is to a certain extent an in-dication of pleasure being the greatest good. That some indeed, from a de-praved nature and vicious habits, pur-sue improper pleasures argues nothing against this inference, nothing against the presumption that abstractedly plea-sure is a good. It only shows that such persons follow the wrong means to the attainment of this end. The right per-ception of pleasure is infinitely influ-enced by the moral habits, and as these do not exist the same or to the same perfection in all, the perception of pleasure and consequently the pur-suit of it will infinitely vary. Some will pursue virtuous some vicious plea-sure, but both pursue it as a good, neither as an evil. And this desire for pleasure is divinely implanted in us, and consequently with an intent to be gratified. As much as the organ sight was given us to be exercised. Not that it is intended that we should gratify ourselves in every particular instance, any more than that eyes were given us to be exercised alike on every object to which they can be extended, to such indeed as are destructive of

sure being
universally
pursued,
proves it, in
some de-
gree, to be
the Chief
Good.

καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημεῖον τι τοῦ εἶναι
πῶς τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν.

φῆμη δ' οὐ τί γε πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἦν τινα λαοὶ
πολλοί . . .

ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθ' ἕξις ἡ δ
ἀρίστη οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διώ-
κουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες.
ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἢν οἴονται οὐδ' ἢν
ἂν φαίεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει
ἔχει τι θεῖον. Ἄλλ' εἰλήφασιν τὴν τοῦ ὀνό-10

That if
pleasure be
not a good,
then pain is
not an evil,
and conse-
quently the
happy man
might live a
life of pain,
which is
absurd.

ματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ
πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας
μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους
εἶναι ταύτας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι. φανερόν δὲ
καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ 15
ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα· τίνας γὰρ ἔνεκα
δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπη-
ρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν; οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν
ἢ λύπη, εἴπερ μὴδ' ἡδονή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι;
οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδίων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ 20
αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ.

them. Since, therefore, in the pursuit
of pleasure we follow a divine impulse,
pleasure is a good. Compare Butler's
Analogy, i. 2.

3. φῆμη] Hesiod. Op. 761.

9. πάντα γὰρ φύσι] In eandem
sententiam omnibus naturalibus divini
quiddam inesse, luculentus locus est
Aristotelis alius de Partib. Animal. i.
§. 5. p. 481. C. ἰσ πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς
φυσικοῖς ἵκαστί τι θαυμαστόν· καὶ παλά-
στιε Ἡράκλειτος λίγισται πρὸς τοὺς
ξίτους εἰπῶν, τοὺς βουλομένους αὐτῶ

ἰσχυρῶν, εἰ ἰσχυρὰ προσέτις εἶδεν αὐτὸν
θερμῶς πρὸς τῆ ἴστω ἴστωσαν ἐκίλισται
γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰσίναι θεροῦστας· εἶναι γὰρ
καὶ ἰσχυρὰ θεοῦ· οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν
ζήτησιν πρὸς ἰσχύου τῶν ζῶων προσέτις
δι' μὴ δυνασώμενοι, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὄντος
φυσικοῦ καὶ παλοῦ. ZELL.

21. αἱ ἐνέργειαι] Either pleasure, be-
ing an energy, must be good, or the
life of the happy man is not pleasant;
the latter is false, therefore the former
is true.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Bodily Pleasures.

ΠΕΡΙ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπισκεπ- Objection, and its answer.
 τέον τοῖς λέγουσιν ὅτι ἔνιαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ
 σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ καλαί, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαὶ
 καὶ περὶ ἃς ὁ ἀκόλαστος. διὰ τί οὖν αἱ ἐναντία
 δ' λῦπαι μοχθηραί; κακῶ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον. ἢ
 οὕτως ἀγαθαὶ αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ κακὸν
 ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν; ἢ μέχρι τοῦ ἀγαθαί; τῶν μὲν

CHAP. XIV.

After having examined and refuted objections respecting pleasure, and shewn in what way it may be considered the chief good, as necessarily emanating from the activity of the noblest energies, he now proceeds to speak concerning bodily pleasures, determining four questions about them.

I. Whether and how far the pleasures of the body may be said to be good.

II. Why the pleasures of the body are more generally desired than those of the mind.

III. Why the pleasures of the mind are superior to those of the body.

IV. Why the same pleasures do not always delight us.

In the beginning of this chapter he meets the following objection. If, as you assert, says the objector, some pleasures are good and eligible, such as those derived from the virtuous energies; but some are bad, such as excessive bodily pleasures, and those in which the intemperate delight; why are the pains, which are contrary

to these pleasures, evil and to be avoided, for good is opposed to evil? If therefore, the pleasures of the body are an evil, it follows that those which are contrary to them, bodily pains, are a good.

To this Aristotle replies, that bodily pleasures are not evil, nor yet absolutely good, but good in so far as they are not evil and are necessary.

2dly, That they are good to a certain degree as far as mediocrity is observed in them. As in the case of the habits. Of those habits of which there can be no excess on the side of the good, (as in the case of the intellectual habits,) there can be no excess of the pleasures resulting from the exercise of those habits. The excess only of pleasure, therefore, is censurable; that is, these pleasures are only accidentally censurable and to be avoided. But it is not so with pain; for all pain is an evil and to be avoided, whether it be more or less. That is, pain is not accidentally and in certain circumstances, but absolutely, an evil.

γὰρ ἔξεων καὶ κινήσεων ὅσων μὴ ἐστὶ τοῦ βελ-
 τίονος ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς· ὅσων δ' ἐστὶ,
 καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστίν. τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν
 ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φαῦλος τῷ διώκει τὴν
 ὑπερβολὴν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαίας· πάντες ὅ
 γὰρ χαίρουσί πως καὶ ὄψοις καὶ οἴνοις καὶ ἀφρο-
 δισίοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ. ἐναντίως δ' ἐπὶ τῆς
 λύπης· οὐ γὰρ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως·
 οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ἐναντία ἀλλ' ἡ
 τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν. 10

The error in
 the objec-
 tion more
 fully ex-
 amined.

Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἀλλὰ 15
 καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ψεύδους· τοῦτο γὰρ συμβάλ-
 λεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν· ὅταν γὰρ εὐλογον φανῇ τὸ
 διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθὲς οὐκ ὄν ἀληθές, πιστεύειν
 ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον· ὥστε λεκτέον διὰ τί 15
 φαίνονται αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδوناὶ αἰρετώτεραι. πρῶ-
 τον μὲν οὖν δὴ ὅτι ἐκκρούει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ
 τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔσης ἰατρείας,
 τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν καὶ
 ὅλως τὴν σωματικὴν. σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται αἱ 20
 ἰατροίαι, διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναν-
 τίον φαίνεσθαι. Καὶ οὐ σπουδαῖον δὴ δοκεῖ

ii. Question.
 That such
 pleasures
 are not
 good, as
 having a
 necessary

ἡ ἡδονὴ διὰ δύο ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὅτι αἱ
 μὲν φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις, ἡ ἐκ γενετῆς,
 ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἡ δὲ ἔθος, οἷον αἱ τῶν φαύλων 25

4. καὶ ὁ φαῦλος] Compare p. 60.

20. σφοδραί] Because the opposition to
 the previous state of pain is greater and
 more sensible. See the note p. 295, 18.

21. Ἐπεὶ τὸ ἰσχυρόν] Præpositio
 ἠεὶ hic valet *juxta, ad*, in compara-
 tione, hoc sensu: voluptates medicinæ

dolorum eo vehementius appetuntur,
 quia non solæ nec per se sentiuntur,
 sed compositæ cum ipsis doloribus sibi
 contrariis, quo fit, ut eo clarius appa-
 reant animosque vehementius move-
 ant. ZELL.

23. ἴσχυται] See p. 280.

ἀνθρώπων. αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι, ὅτι ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ἔχειν admixture
 βέλτιον ἢ γίνεσθαι. αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελευ- of pain.
 μένων· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν σπουδαῖαι. ἔτι The more
 διώκονται διὰ τὸ σφοδραὶ εἶναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλαις violent the
 δ μὴ δυναμένων χαίρειν· αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς δίψας pain, the
 τινας παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, more extra-
 ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον· οὔτε vagant is
 γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα ἐφ' οἷς χαίρουσιν, τό τε the pleasure
 μηδέτερον πολλοῖς λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν· αἰὲ which is
 10 γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ ζῶον, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσικοὶ λόγοι sought to
 μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὄραν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες remedy it.
 εἶναι λυπηρόν· ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμέν, ὡς φασίν.
 ὁμοίως δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν
 ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται, καὶ ἡδὺ ἢ νεότης·
 15 οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν φύσιν αἰὲ δέονται ἰατρείας·
 καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ διὰ τὴν
 κρᾶσιν, καὶ αἰὲ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾷ εἰσίν. ἐξελαύνει
 δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην ἢ τ' ἐναντία καὶ ἡ τυχοῦσα,
 εἴαν ἢ ἰσχυρά· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι

1. ἔχειν βέλτιον] *It is better to have than to acquire*: it is better never to be hungry nor to want, than to be satisfied and filled.

8. ὅτι ἐπιτίμητον] *The state of neutrality.*

13. αὔξησιν] *The αὔξησις of youth produces in them a natural ἰδέα, which, besides their natural predisposition that way, makes them more intent on gratification. As the drunkard, the more he drinks the more he thirsts, the more does he lose the natural advantage of resisting drinking, nature cooperating, by producing an ἰδέα, with his predilection, in causing*

him to drink more; the natural punishment of all self-indulgence.

18. τυχοῦσα] Thus our old proverb; "exceeding sorrow is exceeding dry." Men in great grief drown their sorrows by drinking, although drinking is not the opposite of their sorrow. And thus in other instances, anger or revenge is mitigated in their breasts, though they do not meet with the peculiar pleasure which they seek, but with the gratification of some other passion, such as malice, or the like. See the exquisite chapter in the Rhetoric, ii. 3.

Pleasures without pain do not admit of excess, and such are the natural pleasures, as those of contemplation.

γίνονται. Αἱ δ' ἄνευ λυπῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν. αὐταὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν φύσει ἡδέων καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. λέγω δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἡδέα τὰ ἱατρύοντα· ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἱατρύεσθαι τοῦ ὑπομένουτος ὑγιούς πράττοντός τι, διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺς δοκεῖ εἶναι· φύσει δ' ἡδέα, ἃ ποιεῖ πρᾶξιν τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως. οὐκ αἰεὶ δ' οὐθέν ἡδὺ τὸ αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλήν ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναι τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ φθαρτά, ὥστε ἄν, τι θάτερον πράττη, τοῦτο τῇ ἑτέρα φύσει παρὰ τὴν φύσιν, ὅταν δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ οὔθ' ἡδὺ τὸ πραττόμενον· ἐπεὶ εἴ του ἢ φύσις ἀπλή εἴη, αἰεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. διὸ ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ μίαν καὶ ἀπλήν χαίρει ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον

4. τῷ ἀσμενίστοις ὁμοῖς] Non sine fructu medicus fuerat Aristoteles, cum dicat in ægro quidquid sanum atque integrum subest operari ut valetudo redeat; et moritur animal, si sanæ parti non satis virium est, ut ægritudinem atque adeo medicamentum superet. MICH.

8. ἀσπλῆ] The energies of man are as various as there are different habits of the soul and of the body. But upon the exercise of these habits follows its own peculiar pleasure. Consequently our nature not being simple and uniform (ἀσπλῆ, simplex dumtaxat et unum), neither can our pleasures be. And further, as the nature of the soul is so very different from that of the body, that which is naturally pleasant to the one will not be so to the other. But when equality takes place (see p. 222.) so that an undue influence be not given to either, then the energy of the soul (τὸ πρᾶσ-

σόμενον) is neither pleasant nor painful to the body. Not pleasant, as not being sensible, not painful because the equality before mentioned is observed. ἰσάζειν δὲ διὰ τῆς σιγῆς ἐνὸς ἀρετῆς καὶ ἑτέρας τῆ ψυχῆ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀπολυτῶσθαι, ἐπισημαῖνα εἰς ἐνεργεῖσθαι ἡδίστη ἢ ψυχῆ οὐχ ἡδίστη μὲν τὸ εἶμα παθῆσθαι οὐκ εἰσὶν αἰσθητά, οὐκ ἀλογαῖ δὲ. Paraph.

13. εἰς—ἀσπλῆ] God having a single and uniform nature, has only a single and uniform energy, consequently a single and uniform pleasure. Not that God is in motion, or requires motion for his energies; ("Behold, I sit upon my throne, creating all things new"); for it is wrong to suppose there can be no energy without motion. (See Phys. Ausc. iii. 1. sq.) For there is energy without motion, for motion requires both time and space. And further, every energy proceeding from the perfect habit, and especially from the most perfect habits; (see x.

κινήσεώς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκινήσιās, καὶ ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ δὲ πάντων γλυκύτεατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀπλή οὐδ' ἐπιεικής.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας καὶ ἀκρασίας καὶ περὶ Conclusion.
ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης εἶρηται, καὶ τί ἕκαστον καὶ πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ κακὰ· λοιπὸν δὲ
10 καὶ περὶ φιλίας ἐροῦμεν.

3.) more resemble rest than motion, and so consequently will the pleasure resulting from them. But it may be said, if change is the sweetest of all things, and God changes not, how can he enjoy the greatest pleasure? To which Aristotle replies, that change is only accidentally the most pleasant of all things, only inasmuch as we are imperfect beings.

3. *παντήν*] Euripid. Orest. 234.

5. ἡ φύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς] Compare the Rhetoric i. 11. καὶ ἐν μεταβάλλειν ἢ δὲ εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίνεσθαι μεταβάλλειν· τί γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀλλ' ὀπιθεβολὴν πῶς τῆς καθυστάσεως ἕως. ἴδον εἶρηται, μεταβολὰ πάντων γλυκῆ.

A state of excess is a state contrary to nature; for nature aims at the mean, the state of perfection, the natural being the perfect state. (See p. 68, 8.) But a continuance in the same thing produces an excess of it, and consequently a change from it, diminishing that excess, restores us to a state of nature; and therefore, change is pleasant.

I cannot help observing by the way, that if Aristotle's theory be correct, (*εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός*), and there can be no doubt that it is, this observa-

tion furnishes another solution, which I do not remember to have been observed, why the wicked man is upon inferior ground, *ceteris paribus*, with the good man, even for the mere acquisition of wisdom and literary eminence. This proneness to change in the immoral man is not merely the result of an uneasy conscience, but also of a physical deterioration produced by his evil habits; for over and above the natural uneasiness and restlessness of guilt, (see ix. 4.) it would seem that immorality itself, besides its influence on the moral feelings, not only increased our natural deficiencies, but produced certain deteriorating effects upon our other faculties not directly moral, of which (from experience) we clearly perceive the effect, but cannot trace the cause. As Eve's moral guilt produced a physical change in the universe.

So saying, her rash hand in evil hour
Forth reaching to the fruit, she
plucked, she eat!

Earth felt the wound; and Nature
from her seat,

Sighing through all her works, gave
signs of woe.

Paradise Lost, ix.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK VIII.

IN the fourth chapter of the Tenth Book, Aristotle distinguishes the whole of this treatise into four principal divisions. First, into Happiness, which is the end of all Moral Philosophy; secondly, Virtue, which is the efficient cause of Happiness; thirdly, into Pleasure, which is inseparably united with it; fourthly, into Friendship, which, although not a virtue itself, is closely allied to Virtue, and is especially necessary to a life of Happiness. The first book is devoted to the consideration of the first division; the second, third, fourth, and fifth, to the investigation of Moral, as the sixth to that of Intellectual Virtue; the seventh to that of Pleasure. This, then, and the ninth book, are reserved for the discussion of the fourth division; and in pursuing this subject, Aristotle follows the same method which he has observed throughout this treatise; first, investigating the definition of Friendship, then dividing it into its separate species; thirdly, comparing those species with each other, and examining what are their peculiarities, and what are natural to different forms of government; and, lastly, the causes of its decay and destruction.

To us, indeed, who are not accustomed to regard Friendship as of so much weight in a system of Morals, Aristotle may seem to have given an undue importance to this part of his subject. Not so to the Greeks. They had been accustomed to see the friendships of individuals, and the *εταίρειαι* which existed in different forms among them, as the organs not only of great political changes and revulsions in the state, but as influencing the minds and morals of the people to an almost inconceivable

extent. The same influence which the press exerts among us, did these political and individual unions amongst them. To make them therefore serviceable to the state, and to promote its objects, seems early to have attracted the attention not only of politicians, but also of philosophers. Hence discussions upon this subject form a very prominent part in the Socratic dialogues and in the political investigations of Plato. We see Socrates eminently trusting to such an instrument for furthering those moral views of which he was the strenuous advocate; drawing around himself as a centre those congenial tempers, whose minds were framed not only for receiving the precepts he wished to convey, but also for uniting with himself and each other in the firmest bonds of friendship, and thus carrying his principles out into action with greater efficiency.

The political character of all moral philosophy among the Greeks, the subserviency of individual to public good, the direction of their energies to the one great end of the state, the desire of promoting this to the greatest extent by making the end of each identical with the end of all, the necessity of individual esteem to furnish motives for virtue and goodness which a diviner teaching supplies to us, indicate the reason, why so great a political engine as Friendship, arising, no doubt, originally from the defective education of the female classes amongst the Greeks, and supplying the deficiencies of domestic sympathies and domestic friendships, occupies so much the attention of philosophers.

Indeed, though so considerable a portion of this work is devoted to this subject, the reader must still have recourse to the Politics to see it entirely developed and applied in all its bearings.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. VII.

CHAP. I.

Of Friendship—its use both publicly and privately—and why the consideration of it is proper for a Moral Philosopher.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ φιλίας ἔποιτ' ἂν διελθεῖν· The connexion of Friendship with Virtue, and its necessity to different states and ages.
ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετὴ τις ἣ μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαιό-
τατον εἰς τὸν βίον· ἄνευ γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἔλοιτ'
ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντα· καὶ γὰρ
ἔπλουτοῦσι καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δυναστείας κεκτημένοις
δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστ' εἶναι χρεῖα· τί γὰρ ὄφελος
τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας,
ἣ γίγνεται μάλιστα καὶ ἐπαινετωτάτη πρὸς φίλους;
ἣ πῶς ἂν τηρηθεῖη καὶ σώζοιτ' ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσῳ
10 γὰρ πλείων, τοσοῦτ' ἐπισφαλεστέρα. ἐν πενίᾳ
τε καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυχίαις μόνημ οἴονται
καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους. καὶ νέοις δὲ πρὸς
τὸ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ πρεσβυτέροις πρὸς θεραπείαν

2. ἀρετὴ τις] Amicitia autem est quædam virtus, in quantum scilicet est habitus electionis ut infra dicitur, et reducitur ad genus justitiæ in quantum

exhibet proportionale ut infra dicitur; vel saltem est cum virtute in quantum scilicet virtus est causa veræ amicitie. Aquin.

καὶ τὸ ἐλλείπον τῆς πράξεως δι' ἀσθένειαν βοηθεῖ, τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ πρὸς τὰς καλὰς πράξεις· “σύν τε δὴ ἔρχομένω” καὶ γὰρ νοῆσαι καὶ πράξαι

That it is to a degree implanted in us by nature.

δυνατώτεροι. Φύσει τ' ἐννύπαρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννημένον τῷ γεννήσαντι καὶ πρὸς τὸ 5 γεννήσαν τῷ γεννηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνισι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζῴων, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοεθνεσὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὡς 10 οἰκεῖον ἅπασ ἀνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον.

Preserving states, and

ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἢ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθέται μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ἢ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὁμοίον τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστα ἐφίενται 15 καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἐχθραν οὔσαν μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν.

doing away with the necessity of justice, and being otherwise commendable.

Καὶ φίλων μὲν ὄντων οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης, δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες προσδέονται φιλίας, καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ. οὐ μόνον δ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστίν ἀλλὰ καὶ καλόν· 20 τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπαινοῦμεν, ἢ τε πολυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἐν τι εἶναι, καὶ ἔνιοι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ φίλους.

2. ἐν τι δέ'] See Homer's II. E. 224.

12. ἴσως δὲ καί] See Polit. ii. 1.

— σίλους συνέχων] Compare Plato's Gorgias, p. 507. E. φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὃ Καλλίστατος, καὶ εὐρανοὶ καὶ γῆ καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἀνθρώποις τὴν κοινότητα συνί-

χων καὶ φίλων καὶ κοινότητα καὶ εὐφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη.

19. ἐν μάλιστα] The highest of the *δικαία* appear to belong to friendship. See chap. vi. p. 327. sq.

23. ἀγαθοὺς καὶ φίλους] See ix. 4.

CHAP. II.

Some doubts stated respecting its nature and its origin.

- 2 ΔΙΑΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΕΓΤΑΙ δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ That some think it to be a similarity, others not.
 ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὁμοιότητά τινα τιθέασιν
 αὐτὴν καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους, ὅθεν τὸν ὁμοίον
 φασιν ὡς τὸν ὁμοιον, καὶ κολοῖον ποτὶ κολοῖον,
 5 καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κεραμῆς
 πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλήλοις φασιν εἶναι.
 Καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι Some again sought for the reason of it in nature.
 καὶ φυσικώτερον, Εὐριπίδης μὲν φάσκων ἐρᾶν
 μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν ξηρανθεῖσαν, ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν
 10 οὐρανὸν πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν,
 καὶ Ἡράκλειτος τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ
 τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμονίαν καὶ πάντα
 κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι· ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τούτοις ἄλλοι
 τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου
 15 ἐφέισθαι. Τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικὰ τῶν ἀπορημά- But such a consideration is dismissed, as not being proper to this treatise.
 των ἀφείσθω (οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία τῆς παρούσης
 σκέψεως)· ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ καὶ ἀνήκει
 εἰς τὰ ἦθη καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα,
 οἶον πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία ἢ οὐχ οἶον
 20 τε μοχθηροὺς ὄντας φίλους εἶναι, καὶ πότερον

CHAP. II.

2. οἱ μὲν γὰρ] Platonem intelligere videtur in Lyside ita statuentem. Vid. *ibid.* §. 25. p. 30. ed. Heind. ZELL.

4. ἐν ὁμοίον] Cf. Hom. *Odys.* P. 218.

ὡς αἰὶ ἐν ὁμοίον ἄγουσιν ὡς ἐν ἴμοιον.

5. κεραμῆς] See the *Rhetoric*, ii. 4.

8. Εὐριπίδης] See *Euripides*, vol. ii. p. 972. Ed. Oxon. 1833.

11. Ἡράκλειτος] *Diog. Laert.* ix. 7. Menag. See *Plato's Sympos.* p. 187.

ἐν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν ἡ πλείω. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν οἴομενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὐχ ἰκανῶ πεπιστεύκασι σημεῖα· δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον καὶ τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. εἴρηται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν. 6

CHAP. III.

The definition of Friendship investigated generally.

The object of friendship investigated, which is threefold ;

ΤΑΧΑ δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερὸν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον. δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ 10 ἂν εἴη τὰ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. πότερον οὖν τὰ ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν ; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίστε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτῶ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος,

2. In οἴομεν] Some considered it a sufficient proof that friendship was not equivocal from its admitting of more and less ; for things which admit of more and less, are under the same genus and univoocal. Aristotle replies that this proof is not valid ; for things which differ in species admit of more and less ; as substance (*οὐσία*) and accident (*συμβεβησός*), differing in species, admit of more and less ; for accident is less substantial (*ὄντα*) than substance. That is to say, some persons imagined that because friendship differed in quantity, as, for instance, the friendship of the bad is less than

that of the good, that friendship therefore could not differ in quality or species : whereas Aristotle shows that difference in quantity will constitute different species, as in the instance above given.

4. τὰ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει] Things different in species.

5. ἔμπροσθεν] εἴρηται δὲ φησι περὶ αὐτῶν ἔμπροσθεν. ἵσται δὲ εἰρησθαι ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστηταικῆσι τῶν Νικομαχείων. Schol.

CHAP. III.

12. τὰ ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν] See iii. 4.

14. ἰδί] See p. 308.

καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἐκάστω
 δὲ τὸ ἐκάστω. φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὄν αὐτῷ
 ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον. διοίσει δ' οὐδέν·
 ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητόν φαινόμενον. Τριῶν δ' whence it is
 inferred,
 that there
 are three
 kinds of
 friendship.
 5 ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων
 φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀντι-
 φίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνων ἀγαθοῦ· γελοῖον
 γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ· ἀλλ' εἴπερ,
 σώζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα αὐτὸς ἔχη. τῷ
 10 δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου
 ἕνεκα. τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τὰγαθὰ εὖνους
 λέγουσιν, ἐὰν μὴ ταῦτ' οὐ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου γίγνηται·
 εὖνοια γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι φιλίαν εἶναι. ἡ
 προσθετόν μὴ λανθάνουσαν· πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσιν
 15 εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἐωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιει-
 κῆς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτόν κ' ἐκείνων
 τις πάθει πρὸς τοῦτον. εὖνοι μὲν οὖν
 οὗτοι φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἂν τις
 εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα
 20 εὖνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ μὴ λαν-
 θάνοντας δι' ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.

6. ἀντιφίλησις] For which reason the notion of there being a friendship on the part of man towards the gods, is repudiated in the Mag. Mor.

— ἀντιφίλησις] Compare the Rhe-

toric, ii. 4. φίλος ὁ ἴσθις ὁ φίλος καὶ ἀντιφιλούμενος. εἰσεται δὲ φίλος εἶναι οἱ οὗτος ἔχει οἰόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

11. εὖνους] See ix. 5.

CHAP. IV.

Of the three species of Friendship.

And these three differ in species.

ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἶδει· καὶ αἱ 3
φιλήσεις ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὴ τὰ τῆς
φιλίας εἶδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκα-
στον γὰρ ἔστιν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθάνουσα. οἱ
δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τάγαθὰ ἀλ-

But friend-
ships
formed for
the sake of
gain or
pleasure,
are only ac-
cidental ;

λήλοις ταύτη ἢ φιλοῦσιν. Οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ
τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς
φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ γίνεταί τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλ-
λήλων ἀγαθόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν· οὐ
γὰρ τῷ ποιούσ τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτρα-10
πέλους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὐτοῖς. οἱ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ
χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέρ-
γουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ
οὐχ ἢ ὁ φιλούμενός ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ χρήσιμος ἢ
ἡδύς. κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὐταῖ 15
εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἔστιν ὅσπερ ἔστιν ὁ φιλούμενος,
ταύτη φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ἢ πορίζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν
τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν. Εὐδιάλυτοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦται εἰσι,

and as such
are easily
destroyed.

μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι
ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ᾖσι, παύονται φιλοῦντες. τὸ 20

CHAP. IV.

1. ταῦτα] sc. εὐ φιλητά.
2. φιλήσεις—φιλίαι] Aristotle himself distinguishes these words afterwards, (see chap. vi. p. 325, 14.) the first being passions, the other habits.

15. κατὰ συμβεβηκός] Friendships

which are formed for the sake of gain or pleasure are merely accidental, for the parties love each other merely accidentally, as far as they possess those accidentia of wealth or fortune, which are the objects desired.

δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίγνεται. ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὃ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς οὐσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. Μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἡ ^{Of these, that for the useful is most cultivated by old men.} 5 τοιαύτη δοκεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικούτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι μετ' ἀλλήλων· ἐνίστε γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὴ 10 προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, εἰ μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ὦσιν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γὰρ εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς ἐφ' ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν τιθέασιν. Ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία ^{That for pleasure, by young men.} δι' ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι 15 ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἡ φιλία μεταπίπτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἡ μεταβολή. 20 καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ δ' οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ συζῆν οὗτοι βούλονται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ φιλίαν 25 οὕτως.

4 Τελεῖα δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ^{That for the sake of good or virtue} ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τὰγαθὰ ὁμοίως βού-

5. οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ] Compare the Rhetoric ii. 13.

11. ἡδεῖς—ἐλαττωσ] And that of course is very little, as they are not

given to hope.

14. κατὰ πάθος γὰρ] Compare the Rhetoric, ii. 12.

(which is the only real friendship) is cultivated by the good. And possesses essentially in itself all that is desirable in the others.

λονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἀγαθοί· ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς φίλους ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· δι' αὐτούς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ᾖσιν, ἡ δ' ὅσῃ ἀρετῇ μόνιμον. καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάτερος ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῶ φιλῶ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀφελίμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἐκάστῃ γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκείαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ 10 τοιαῦται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἐστίν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθ' ὅσα τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν ἢ δι' ἡδονὴν, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ τῶ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθ' 16 ὁμοιότητά τινα· ταύτῃ δὲ πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ' αὐτούς· ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπά,

4. κατὰ συμβεβηκός] The friendship of the good only is perfect, for it possesses every thing which is included in the definition of friendship. And the good love each other, and wish good to each other as far as they are in themselves good. Others indeed wish good for their friends, but not for the sake of their friends but their own sakes. Others also love each other, not as far as they are lovely in themselves, but merely accidentally. For not even as far as a person is pleasant or rich is he loved, but as far only as his pleasantness and riches are pleasant or useful to the person by whom he is beloved. These friendships are therefore merely accidental, and consequently differ essentially from the

friendship of the good, as much as accident differs from essence.

10. αἱ οἰκείαι πράξεις] See p. 316, 12.

11. αἱ αὐταὶ] Michelet reads τῶν κατὰ τοὺς φίλους. Cum omnium bonorum actiones sint tales (certæ cujusdam, i. e. ejusdem naturæ) aut omnium maxime similes inter se (τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἢ ὁμοίων) unicuique autem actiones sue similes aut pares sint jucundæ (ἐκάστῃ γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκείαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τῶν αὐτῶν): bonis bonorum actiones sunt jucundæ (αἱ ἀγαθοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις).

17. ταύτῃ γὰρ] For the other friendships resemble this, and the absolutely good is also absolutely pleasant. Resemble merely, are not friendships in the proper sense of the term.

τό τε ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς ἐστίν. μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά, καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. Σπανίας δ' εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. But such friendship is rare and requires time.
 5 ἔτι δὲ προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας συναναλωσαι· οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδ' εἶναι φίλους, πρὶν ἂν ἐκάτερος ἐκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ.
 10 οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιούντες βούλονται μὲν φίλοι εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσασιν· βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δ' οὐ.

CHAP. V.

Of their resemblance to each other, and which only can be considered as real Friendship.

5 ΑΥΤΗ μὲν οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον καὶ κατὰ The points of resemblance between the friendships formed for pleasure or interest with real friendship.
 15 τὰ λοιπὰ τελεία ἐστί, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα γίνεται καὶ ὅμοια ἐκατέρῳ παρ' ἐκατέρου, ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπάρχειν· ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ὁμοίωμα ταύτης ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ γὰρ τοιού-
 20 τοι ἀλλήλοις οἱ ἀγαθοί. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τού-

7. *ἄλας*] Verumque illud est quod dicitur multos modios salis simul edendos esse ut amicitiae munus expletum sit. Cic in Læl. c. 19. See Eth. Eud. vii. 2.

10. *τὰ φιλητά*] The interchange of friendly offices is not sufficient to con-

stitute friendship. Which being a habit requires time and a corresponding disposition in both parties.

15. *καὶ κατὰ πάντα*] And in all respects, the same and similar favours and kindnesses are reciprocated from one to the other.

τοῖς αἰ φιλῖαι διαμένουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γίγνηται παρ' ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡδονή, καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῇ καὶ ἐρωμένῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονται οὗτοι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ὄρων ἐκείνου, ὁ δὲ θεραπεύμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ὥρας ἐνίστε καὶ ἡ φιλία λήγει· τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδεῖα ἡ ὄψις, τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία. πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμένουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἥθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοῦθεις ὄντες. 10 οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι ἀλλὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ εἰσὶν ἡττον φίλοι καὶ διαμένουσιν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ὄντες φίλοι ἅμα τῷ συμφέροντι διαλύονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν φίλοι ἀλλὰ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς. Δι' 15 ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς φαύλοις καὶ μηδέτερον ὅποιον, δι' αὐτοὺς δὲ δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς· οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ μὴ τις ὠφέλεια γίγνοιτο. 20 καὶ μόνη δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία ἀδιάβλητος ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι περὶ τοῦ

In what points the friendship of the good differs from those above mentioned.

3. ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ] From the same kind of pleasure.

9. θαμίνοισιν] Sc. ἥττον.

18. μηδέτερον] φιλιῶ γὰρ καὶ φαῦλος φαῦλος διὰ ταῦτα, καὶ φαῦλος ἰσικῆ, καὶ ἰσικῆς φαῦλος, καὶ μίσης τις ἰσικῆς αὐτῶν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τῇ ἰσικῆ τῷ φαύλου χρεία πολλὰς δυνατὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀρχὴν τινὰ ἀγαθὴν ἢ στρατηγὸν ἄριστον μὴ· παντὶ τοῖς τρέστοις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἂν χρεῖαν ἔχουσιν τὸν σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν κωλύει. καὶ ἡδίστου δὲ σπουδαῖον φαύλους

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδύνατον· εἰσι γὰρ οἱ τοὺς μὲν τρέστοις ἀσφῶναι· θαμινοῖσι δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφῶντες καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ τινος εἶναι. τῆς ἀληθείας καταστοχαζόμενοι καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῖς σπουδαῖοις ἡδύς γίνονται· οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτω φιλοῦμενοι οὐ δι' ἰσικῆς φιλοῦνται, ἀλλὰ ἢ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον. Paraph.

22. οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον] For they cannot readily credit the report of any one against a friend, who has been long tried and approved by them.

ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑπ' αὐτῶν δεδοκιμασμένου. καὶ τὸ πιστεύειν ἐν τούτοις, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε ἂν ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλία ἀξιοῦται. ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἐτέραις οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰ βιοταῦτα γίνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως
 10 λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἶδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω, καὶ πρώτως μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ ἀγαθοί, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ ὅμοιον, ταύτῃ φίλοι· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθὸν τοῖς φιλη-
 15 δέσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὐταὶ συνάπτουσιν, οὐδὲ γίνονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

5. ἐπὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι] According to Giphanius Aristotle alludes to Plato's Clitopho, p. 409. See also Eud. Eth. vii. 2.

8. ἵνα τοῦ συμφέροντος] See the Rhetoric, i. 3.

15. οὐ πάνυ δ' αὐταὶ] But these are not frequently united, nor do the same persons become friends both for the useful and agreeable, for things which are accidental are not generally united. The friendship formed for pleasure is not generally united with that which is formed for interest, for accidents do

not unite. δέξι δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀληθῆς, ἡ γὰρ αὐτὸς εἶη ἂν καὶ λευκὸς καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ἀμφότερα κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἀλλ' ἵασι οὐ τὰ ταῦτα λίγισ, ἀλλ' ἴταν πρώτως μὲν τι λίγηται καὶ κυρίως, ἂν ἵασι δὲ ἄλλα. πρώτως μὲν ἡ ἄθροιστος ἰατρικὴ, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ τὸ ἐργασιὸν καὶ τὸ φάρμακον. οὐ γὰρ συνδυάζονται τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν συμβεβηκόντων. καὶ ἵναῦθα φίλοι μὲν κυρίως οἱ ἀγαθοί, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ καὶ ἂν τῆς πρώτης φιλίας αἱ λοιπαί. ὅθεν οὐ βραδύς ἐνίαπτουται. Schol.

CHAP. VI.

That Friendship is a habit, and, as such, cannot exist long without the exertion of its proper energies of different kinds of Friendship.

Of the necessity of conversation (*σασίση*) to friendship.

ΕΙΣ ταῦτα δὲ τὰ εἶδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμημένης 6
οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ
χρήσιμον, ταύτῃ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ δι'
αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοί. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν
ἀπλῶς φίλοι, ἐκείνοι δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ 5
τῷ ὁμοιωθῆναι τούτοις. ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν
οἱ μὲν καθ' ἕξιν οἱ δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀγαθοὶ
λέγονται, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
συζῶντες χαίρουσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ πορίζουσι τὰ-
γαθὰ, οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες ἢ κεχωρισμένοι τοῖς 10
τόποις οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μὲν, οὕτω δ' ἔχουσιν ὥστ'
ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς· οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ διαλύουσι τὴν
φιλίαν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος
ἢ ἀπουσία γίνηται, καὶ τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην
ποιεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται “ πολλὰς δὴ φιλίας ἀπροσ- 15
ηγορία διέλυσεν.” Οὐ φαίνονται δ' οὐθ' οἱ
πρεσβῦται οὐθ' οἱ στρυφνοὶ φιλικοὶ εἶναι· βραχὺ
γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς, οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται
συνημερεύειν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ μά-

But this is not possible without mutual pleasure.

3. *καὶ τῇ ὁμοίᾳ ὄντι*] Although men may be in themselves dissimilar, nothing prevents them from forming a degree of friendship, so long as an accidental similarity exist between them; for as far as they mutually contribute to each other's pleasure or advantage, so far do they bear a similarity, and so far and so long does

their friendship exist.

14. *δοκῆ*] εἰ δὲ προσέτιθεν ἰσαῖδα τὸ δοκεῖν. ἰσαὶ γὰρ οἱ δι' ἡδονῆς φίλοι, ἢ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, λήθην λαμβάνουσι τῆς φιλίας, ἂν χρόνιος ἢ ἀπουσία γίγηται, δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς τοούτων ἢ φιλία εἶναι ἰδιόλυτοι καὶ ἀμαυροῦμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπουσίας. ἴσται χρόνιος ἢ. οὐ μὲν ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τσαύση. Schol.

λιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαίνεται τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν
 φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος. οἱ δ' ἀποδεχό-
 μενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δέ, εὖνοις εἰκόασι
 μᾶλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ φίλων
 ὥς τὸ συζῆν' ὠφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐνδεεῖς ὀρέ-
 γονται, συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ οἱ μακάριοι· μονώταις
 μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτοις ἤκιστα προσήκει. συνδιάγειν
 δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας μηδὲ
 χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἐταιρικὴ δοκεῖ
 10 ἔχειν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν,
 καθάπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται· δοκεῖ γὰρ φιλητὸν
 μὲν καὶ αἰρετὸν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ, ἐκάστω
 δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ τοιοῦτον· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ δι'
 ἄμφω ταῦτα. Ἔοικε δ' ἡ μὲν φίλησις πάθει, The differ-
ence of φί-
λησις from
φιλία.
 15 ἡ δὲ φιλία ἔξει· ἡ γὰρ φίλησις οὐχ ἦττον πρὸς
 τὰ ἄψυχά ἐστιν, ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ μετὰ προαιρέσεως,
 ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀφ' ἔξεως. καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται
 τοῖς φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος
 ἀλλὰ καθ' ἔξιν. καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον τὸ
 20 αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος
 γινόμενος ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ᾧ φίλος. ἐκάτερος οὖν
 φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδί-

15. ἡ δὲ φιλία ἔξει] Cum supra, ii. 4.
 p. 64. φιλίας inter πάθη numeraverit,
 et iv. 6. p. 153. virtutem mediam inter
 ἀρεσκούς et δυσσεύλους nominatam φιλίαν
 ab amicitia ita distinxerit, ut sit ἄνευ
 πάθους καὶ οὐ στήργειν αἰς ἑμμελί: hoc
 loco amicitiam ducit habitum cum
 affectu conjunctum; nam etsi amicitia
 affectu non definiatur, tamen sine af-
 fectu (πάθος) et amore (στήργειν) et
 amatione (φίλησις) esse nullo modo

potest. Propter hanc duplicem amicitiae
 naturam Zellius etiam ἴσως dictum
 putat. Præclare Aspasius: "Amicitia
 in animæ parte rationis partici-
 pe, et in ea quæ caret ratione existit; cum enim
 judicavit quispiam et elegerit amicum
 aliquem sibi conciliare, quod est ra-
 tionis, erga ipsum afficitur, quod irra-
 tionalis partis est. Atque ita habitus
 in utrisque animæ partibus consistit."
 MICH.

δωσι τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῷ ἡδεῖ λέγεται γὰρ φιλότης ἢ ἰσότης. μάλιστα δὴ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταυθ' ὑπάρχει. ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἤττον γίνεται ἢ φιλία, ὅσφ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι καὶ ἤττον ταῖς ὁμιλίαις χαίρουσιν· ταῦτα⁵ γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστ' εἶναι φιλικὰ καὶ ποιητικὰ φιλίας. διὸ νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχύ, πρεσβῦται δ' οὐ· οὐ γὰρ γίνονται φίλοι οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυφνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι εὐνοὶ μὲν εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις· βούλονται γὰρ¹⁰ τάγαθὰ καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας· φίλοι δ' οὐ πάνυ εἰσὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεῦειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, ἃ δὴ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικὰ.

That the friendship of the good is generally single. Not so that of others.

Πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα· ἔοικε¹⁵ γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ ράδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχάλεπον. διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδύ²⁰ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι.

Of the others, the friendship formed for pleasure has a greater similarity to true friendship.

Τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε φιλία ἢ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ὅταν ταῦτα ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν γίγνηται καὶ χαίρωσιν ἀλλήλοις ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οἷαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ φιλίαι· μᾶλλον²⁵ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον. ἢ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἀγοραίων. καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δέονται, ἡδέων δὲ συζῆν μὲν γὰρ

16. εἴφυκε] It is not natural for one person to be superlatively eminent in many things.

22. ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ] In contradistinction to that of the good.

βούλονται τισι, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον
φέρουσιν, συνεχῶς δ' οὐθεὶς ἂν ὑπομείναι, οὐδ'
αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῷ εἴη· διὸ τοὺς
φίλους ἡδεῖς ζητοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς
5 τοιοῦτους ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει
αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις. Οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξου-
σίαις διηρημένοι φαίνονται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις· ^{Of the friendships}
ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ χρήσιμοι καὶ ἕτεροι ἡδεῖς, ^{formed by men in power.}
ἄμφω δ' οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐ πάνυ· οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεῖς μετ'
10 ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν οὔτε χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλά,
ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν εὐτραπέλους τοῦ ἡδέος ἐφιέμενοι,
τοὺς δὲ δεινοὺς πράξαι τὸ ἐπιταχθέν· ταῦτα δ'
οὐ πάνυ γίνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ. ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρή-
σιμος ἅμα εἶρηται ὅτι ὁ σπουδαῖος· ἀλλ' ὑπερέ-
15 χοντι οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος, ἂν μὴ καὶ
τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἰσάζει ἀνά-
λογον ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πάνυ δ' εἰώθασι τοιοῦτοι
γίνεσθαι.

8 Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέται φιλῖαι ἐν ἰσότητι· τὰ ^{That these friendships}
20 γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνονται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν καὶ βούλονται ^{are in equality.}
ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἕτερον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου ἀντικαταλλάτ-
τονται, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας. ὅτι δ' ἦττον
εἰσὶν αὐταὶ αἱ φιλῖαι καὶ μένουσιν, εἶρηται.
δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ δι' ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα
25 ταύτου εἶναι τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι φιλῖαι· καθ' ὁμοιό-
τητα γὰρ τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν φαίνονται φιλῖαι (ἢ

1. τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν] Friendship formed for the sake of pleasure more resembles the friendship of the good, than that formed from motives of interest, be- cause the good whose energies consist

in the exercise of virtue do not require the latter, but they do the former. For even the good is intolerable, at least for a continuance, unless with some admixture of pleasure.

μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει ἢ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον, ταῦτα
 δ' ὑπάρχει κάκεινη), τῷ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀδιάβλητον
 καὶ μόνιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ ταχέως μεταπίπτειν
 ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς, οὐ φαίνονται φιλία
 δι' ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης. Ἔτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας 5

From which there is a different kind of friendship; and ὅπως πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς νεώτερον, ἀνδρὶ τε πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον. διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ καὶ ἀλλήλων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους, 10

εἶδος τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν, οἷον πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν
 πρὸς γυναικα καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον.
 πρὸς γυναικα καὶ παντὶ ἄρχοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον.
 διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ καὶ ἀλλήλων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ
 γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἄρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους, 10
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς πατέρα,
 οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα.
 ἕτερα γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τούτων ἀρετὴ καὶ τὸ ἔργον,
 ἕτερα δὲ καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν· ἕτεραι οὖν καὶ αἱ
 φιλήσεις καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. Ταῦτὰ μὲν δὴ οὕτε 15

And how an equality is to be observed between them.

γίγνεται ἐκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου οὔτε δεῖ ζητεῖν

2. ἀδιάβλητον] See p. 322.

13. ἰτίρα γὰρ—ἀρετή] οὐ φασὶ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀρετὴν εἶναι πατρὸς καὶ ἄλλου υἱοῦ, οὐδὲ ἄλλου ἀνδρός, γυναικὸς δὲ ἰτίραν. Ἐξαρκῆ δὲ ἰσ' ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἕξιτάσαι ἐνὶ λόγῳ· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς πατρὸς ἡτίον καὶ υἱοῦ. ἰστωῦσι δὲ τὸν τρίτον τοῦτον, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Σουκρατικοί. (See Plato's Republic, particularly the 5th book.) Ἐξαρκῆ τὸν μὲν ἄνδρα χεῖρ δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ γυναῖκα ἄλλοις, οὐ δὴτα. τί δὲ; τὸν μὲν ἄνδρα σὺφρονα, τὸν δὲ γυναῖκα ἀπάλαστον· οὐδὲ τοῦτο. οὐσα δὲ καθ' ἑκάστην ἰσότητος ἀρετὴν καὶ λαμβάνουσι, ἵτι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα ἴχου ἐὰς ἀρετὰς πάσαις, συμπαινεῖνται ἵτι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀρετὴ. τί οὖν ἡτίον πρὸς τὰ ταυῦτα; ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου; εἰ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀρχοντος

ἀρετὴ ἐν τῷ ἀρχῆν καλῶς, τοῦ δὲ ἀρχομένου ἐν τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καλῶς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀρχομένου ἀρετὴ. καὶ γὰρ παρὰ μὲν ἀρχομένου ἂν τὰ τοῦ ἀρχοντος τρέπτη, παρὰ δὲ ἀρχοντος ἂν τὰ τοῦ ἀρχομένου. ὡς καὶ κυβερνήτου μὲν ἀρετὴ ἂν τὰ τοῦ κυβερνήτου σωφί, καὶ ἀρχοντος τῶν ναυτῶν, ναυτῶν δὲ ἂν ἀρχοντος ὡς τοῦ κυβερνήτου. εἰ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ἰσότητος τὸ ἀρχῆν καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἰσωδὸν τῷ λόγῳ. τάχα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἰσωδὴ ἂν τις, ὡς ἰκανοῦ τινος ἰσωδὸν ἀρχομένῳ, μὴ πάντως δὲ ἀρχῆν. εἰ γὰρ εἰσισμῆται ὑπεροχὴ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀρχομένῳ μὲν ἂν δύναιτο καθ' ἴσους, ἀρχῆν δὲ οὐκ ἴσους. εἰ δὲ καὶ δοθείη, τὸν αὐτὸν ἰσιστάσθαι ἄμφω, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ἀρχῆν ἀλλὰ ἀρετῆ, ἢ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ ἰτίρα. Schol. See also Aristot. Pol. i. 5.

ὅταν δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ ἃ δεῖ τοῖς γεννήσασι, γονεῖς δὲ υἰέσιν ἃ δεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις, μόνιμος ἢ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπικεικῆς ἔσται φιλία. ἀνάλογον δ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὐσαις φιλίαις καὶ τὴν φιλίῃσιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν, καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως· ὅταν γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν ἢ φιλίῃσιν γίγνηται, τότε γίγνεται πως ἰσότης, ἧ δὲ τῆς φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.

CHAP. VII.

Of the chief requisites for Friendship.

9 ΟΥΧ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν τε τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ φαίνεται ἔχειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρῶτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ

As friendship is generally and properly between

8. κατ' ἀξίαν] A species of geometrical proportion is to be observed in friendships of this kind. For the inferior is to compensate to the superior for the greater benefits which he receives from him, a return not in kind, but in proportion of love and respect, κατ' ἀξίαν. (See p. 180.) Differing, however, from the proportion observed in distributive justice in certain points, which he now proceeds to state.

According to the Scholiast, another question is also raised as to this class of friendships, whether they ought to be included in any of the previous species, or form a distinct one by themselves. Eudæmus and Theophrastus distributed them among the previous ones. For both father and son, husband and wife, and so on,

may be virtuous, and consequently the highest degree of friendship exist between them. But if not, then the motives of their friendship must be sought in that of interest or pleasure, and consequently such friendships be included in the other species.

10. οὐχ ὁμοίως] In justice, geometrical proportion, or rather the dignity of the different persons, is primarily considered; in friendship, an equal compensation (κατ' ἀξίαν) between equals. For friendship correctly and properly speaking is among equals. Which is plain from the fact, that when a great distance exists between the relative state of the parties, friendship can scarcely ever take place between them.

equals, Arithmetical is more observed than Geometrical proportion between them.

κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως, ἐν δὲ τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρώτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν δευτέρως. δῆλον δ', εἰς πολὺ διάστημα γίγνηται ἄρετῆς ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἢ τινος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιούσιν. ἐμφανεστάτων δὲ τούτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν· πλείστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιούσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ

Whence is a question, whether one friend can wish so great a good to another, so as entirely to destroy this equality, and consequently their friendship.

σοφωτάτοις οἱ μηδενὸς ἀξιοί. Ἀκριβῆς μὲν 10 οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρισμὸς, ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον 15 θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθὰ· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθὰ. εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, μένειν ἂν δέοι οἷός ποτ' ἔστιν ἐκείνος· ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ὄντι βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα 20 ἀγαθὰ. ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα· αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ. Οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ

That more desire to be loved than to love, (and why.)

δοκοῦσι διὰ φιλοτιμίαν βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν, διὸ φιλοκόλακες οἱ πολλοί· ὑπερέχοντος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος 25 εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι. τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οὐ δὴ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται. οὐ δὲ αὐτὸ δ' εἰκόσιν αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν τιμὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· χαίρουσι γὰρ οἱ

μὲν πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι
 διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα· οἴονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ'
 αὐτῶν, ἅν του δέωνται· ὡς δὴ σημείω τῆς εὐπα-
 θείας χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ. οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεικῶν
 5 καὶ εἰδότην ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς βεβαιῶσαι τὴν
 οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὐτῶν· χαίρουσι δὴ
 ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοί, πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων
 κρίσει. τῷ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ χαίρουσιν·
 διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ
 10 ἢ φιλία καθ' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ εἶναι. Δοκεῖ δ' But yet
friendship
consists
more in the
latter than
the former.
 ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι εἶναι.
 σημεῖον δ' αἱ μητέρες τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι· εἶναι
 γὰρ διδῶσι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι
 μὲν εἰδυῖαι, ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, ἐὰν
 15 ἀμφοτέρα μὴ ἐνδέχῃται, ἀλλ' ἰκανὸν αὐταῖς ἔοικεν
 εἶναι, ἐὰν ὀρῶσιν εὖ πράττοντας, καὶ αὐταὶ φι-
 λουῦσιν αὐτούς, κἂν ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν ὦν μητρὶ προσ-
 10 ἦκει ἀπονέμωσι διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν. Μᾶλλον Three re-
quisites for
lasting
friendship.
 δὲ τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν
 20 φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων, φίλων ἀρετῇ τὸ φιλεῖν
 ἔοικεν, ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν,
 οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἢ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω
 δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄνισοι μάλιστα εἶεν φίλοι· ἰσάζονται
 γὰρ ἅν. ἢ δ' ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης φιλότης, καὶ
 25 μάλιστα μὲν ἢ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοιότης· μόνιμοι
 γὰρ ὄντες καθ' αὐτούς καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μένουσι,
 καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων οὔθ' ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα,

3. τῆς εὐπαθείας] Compare the Rhetoric, i. 5.

4. ὁπὸ τῶν ἰσημικῶν] But they who are desirous of being honored (ἡγεμό-

μοι τιμᾶσθαι) by the good and prudent, aim at honor in order to have a confirmation of their own self-opinion. Compare p.13. See also the Rhet. i. 9.

ἀλλ' ὡς εἶπεν καὶ διακαλύουσιν· τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ μήτ' αὐτοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. οἱ δὲ μοχθηροὶ τὸ μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς διαμένουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίνονται φίλοι, 5 χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ· οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλείον διαμένουσιν· ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις. Ἐξ

The friend-ship of persons in opposite stations, formed generally from motives of interest.

ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἢ διὰ τὸ χρησίμον γίνεσθαι φιλία, οἷον πένης πλουσίῳ, ἀμαθῆς 10 εἰδότι· οὐ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεὴς ὢν, τούτου ἐφιέμενος ἀντιδωρεῖται ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα δ' ἂν τις ἔλκοι καὶ ἐραστήν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν. διὸ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε, ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν· ὁμοίως 15 δὴ φιλητοὺς ὄντας ἴσως ἀξιωτέον, μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας γελοῖον. ἴσως δὲ οὐδ' ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἢ δ' ὄρεξις τοῦ μέσου ἐστίν· τούτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν, οἷον τῷ ξηρῷ οὐχ ὑγρῷ γενέσθαι 20 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν, καὶ τῷ θερμῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀλλοτριώτερα.

4. ἀνάτῃ διαμένουσιν] Compare the advice of Polonius to Laertes :

To thine own self be true ;
And it must follow as the night the day ;
Thou can'st not then be false to any man. Hamlet, Act i. 3.

See particularly Plato's Republic, Book ix. near the beginning.

20. ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὑγρῷ] Alluding to the words of Euripides. See above, p. 315.

CHAP. VIII.

That there are different Friendships according to the different communities.

11 ΕΟΙΚΕ δέ, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶρηται, περι
 ταῦτά καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἢ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ ^{That there}
 δίκαιον· ἐν ἀπάσῃ γὰρ κοινωνία δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον ^{is a friend-}
 εἶναι, καὶ φιλία δέ· προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν ὡς ^{ship pecu-}
 5 φίλους τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς συστρατιώτας, ^{liar to every}
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωνίαις. καθ' ^{community.}
 ὅσον δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτόν ἐστι φιλία· καὶ
 γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία “κοινὰ τὰ φίλων,”
 ὀρθῶς· ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς
 10 μὲν καὶ ἐταίροις πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἀφω-
 ρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείω τοῖς δ' ἐλάττω· καὶ
 γὰρ τῶν φιλιῶν αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον αἱ δ' ἦττον. δια-
 φέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ δίκαια· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά γονεῦσι
 πρὸς τέκνα καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐδ'
 15 ἐταίροις καὶ πολίταις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλ-
 λων φιλιῶν. ἕτερα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἄδικα πρὸς ἐκάστους
 τούτων, καὶ αὐξήσιν λαμβάνει τῷ μᾶλλον πρὸς
 φίλους εἶναι, οἷον χρήματα ἀποστερηῆσαι ἐταῖρον
 δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην, καὶ μὴ βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῷ ἢ
 20 ὀθνεῖῳ, καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα ἢ ὄντιν οὖν ἄλλον.

CHAP. VIII.

In this Chapter Aristotle proceeds to show, that all friendship consists in society, all society is part of that chief society which is called the political,

and consequently there will be as many kinds of friendships as of political communions.

8. κοινὰ τὰ φίλων] Erasm. Adag. i. 1. 1.

αὔξεσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα.

That all communi-
ties are part
of the Poli-
tical.

Αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι μορίοις εἰκόασι τῆς πολι-
τικῆς· συμπορεύονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ
ποριζόμενοί τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ
κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμένειν· τούτου γὰρ καὶ οἱ
νομοθέται στοχάζονται, καὶ δίκαιόν φασιν εἶναι
τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι
κατὰ μέρη τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται, οἷον πλω-
10 τῆρες μὲν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς ἐργασίαν
χρημάτων ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, συστρατιῶται δὲ τοῦ
κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων εἴτε νίκης ἢ
πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ φυλέται καὶ
δημόται. ἔναι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν δι' ἡδονὴν δοκοῦσι
15 γίνεσθαι, θιασωτῶν καὶ ἑρανιστῶν· αὐται γὰρ
θυσίας ἔνεκα καὶ συνουσίας. πᾶσαι δ' αὐται ὑπὸ
τὴν πολιτικὴν εἰκόασιν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος
συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα
τὸν βίον, θυσίας τε ποιῶντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας
20 συνόδους, τιμὰς ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς
ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς. αἱ γὰρ ἀρ-
χαῖαι θυσῖαι καὶ σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ
τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς οἷον ἀπαρχαί· μά-

6. *συμφέροντος*] Compare the Politics, iii. 4. φύσει μὲν ἴσων ἀνεμοσσι βῆσιν πολιτικὴν διὰ καὶ μηδὲν διόμενοι τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας οὐκ ἴλαστον ἐβίβονται τοῦ συζῆν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν κοινῇ συμφίεσι συνάγει, καὶ ἴσων ἰσιβέλλει μίγρον ἰκασσῶν τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. See also note p. 192.

16. *θιασωτῶν*] *θίασος* est sodalitas

eorum qui statis diebus in honorem alicujus dei congregati peracto sacrificio una epulantur et genio indulgent. Cf. præter alios locos Xenophon. Mem. ii. 1. §. 31. Plutarch. iii. p. 204. Ed. Hutten. Casaubon ad Theophrast. Charact. xv. p. 168. Ed. Fischer. ZELL.

λιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον τοῖς καιροῖς. πᾶσαι δὲ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι· ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται φιλίας ταῖς τοιαύταις κοινωνίας.

CHAP. IX.

Of the three forms of Political Communities, and their perversions.

- 12 ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ δ' ἐστὶν εἶδη τρία, ἴσαι δὲ καὶ That there are three forms of political communities; παρεκβάσεις, οἷον φθοραὶ τούτων. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν 1. Kingdom, and its perversion, πολιτεῖαι βασιλεία τε καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, τρίτη δ' ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ' αὐτὴν εἰώθασιν οἱ πλείστοι Tyranny.
- 10 καλεῖν. Τούτων δὲ βελτίστη μὲν ἡ βασιλεία, χειρίστη δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία. παρέκβασις δὲ βασιλείας μὲν τυραννίς· ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι δὲ πλείστον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τύραννος τὸ ἑαυτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ, ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν
- 15 ἀρχομένων. οὐ γάρ ἐστι βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδεὶς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὐτῷ μὲν οὐκ ἂν σκοποῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀρχομένοις· ὁ γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος κληρωτὸς ἂν τις εἴη βασιλεὺς. ἡ δὲ

CHAP. IX.

On this Chapter see the third and fourth Books of the Politics, and the last four Books of Plato's Republic, and Sir Walter Raleigh's Maxims of State.

6. *παρεκβάσεις*] See Goettling's Pref. to the Politics, p. xviii.

13. *τὸ ἑαυτῷ συμφέρον*] See the state

of the ancient tyrannies as described by Thucydides, i. c. 17. See the Rhet. i. 8.

19. *κληρωτός*] A king merely by good luck or chance. Aristotle appears to have had in view the method of choosing magistrates in Athens. The reader will remember the caustic jest of Socrates on this subject.

τυραννὶς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτης· τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερότερον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ βελτίστῳ. μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα· φαυλότης γὰρ ἐστὶ μοναρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος· ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασι-⁵

2. Aristocracy, and its perversion, Oligarchy.

λεὺς τύραννος γίνεται. Ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κακία τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ νέμουσι τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλου-¹⁰ τεῖν· ὀλίγοι δὲ ἄρχουσι καὶ μοχθηροὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων. Ἐκ δὲ δὴ τιμοκρατίας εἰς

3. Timocracy, and its perversion, Democracy.

δημοκρατίαν· σύνοροι γὰρ εἰσιν αὐταί· πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ τιμήματι. ἤκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν¹⁵ ἐστὶν ἡ δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ πολιτεῖαι· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ῥᾶστα μεταβαίνουσιν. Ὁμοιώματα δ'

That the types of them are found in the domestic relationships;

αὐτῶν καὶ οἷον παραδείγματα λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ²⁰ ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱεῖς κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα· τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει· πατρικὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. ἐν Πέρσαις δ' ἡ τοῦ²⁵ πατρὸς τυραννικὴ· χρῶνται γὰρ ὡς δούλοις τοῖς υἱεῖσιν.

As that of father and son to the first;

Τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ δεσπότου πρὸς δούλους· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον ἐν αὐτῇ

13. *τιμοκρατίας*] This in the Rhetoric is called by the more vague and,

popular term *ὀλιγαρχία*. Rhet. i. 8.
24. *πατρικῆ*] See the Politics, i. 5.

πράττεται. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ὀρθὴ φαίνεται, ἡ Περ-
 σικὴ δ' ἡμαρτημένη· τῶν διαφερόντων γὰρ αἱ
 ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. Ἄνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς ἀρι-
 στοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ Of hus-
band and
wife to the
second.
 ἄρχει, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ
 γυναικὶ ἀρμόζει, ἐκείνη ἀποδίδωσιν. ἀπάντων δὲ
 κυριεύων ὁ ἀνὴρ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν μεθίστησιν· παρὰ
 τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἧ ἀμείνων.
 ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπὶ κληροῖ οὖσαι·
 10 οὐ δὴ γίνονται κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ
 πλοῦτον καὶ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις.
 Τιμοκρατικῇ δ' ἔοικεν ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν· ἴσοι γάρ, Of brethren
to the third.
 πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν·
 διόπερ ἂν πολὺ ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι
 15 ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φιλία. δημοκρατία δὲ μά-
 λιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπότοις τῶν οἰκίσεων
 (ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου), καὶ ἐν αἰς ἀσθενῆς
 ὁ ἄρχων καὶ ἐκάστῳ ἐξουσία.

CHAP. X.

Of the peculiar Friendships in peculiar forms of Government.

13 ΚΑΘ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνε- Of friend-
ships which
are accord-
ing to
kingly go-
vernments.
 20 ται, ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς
 τοὺς βασιλευομένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ
 γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευομένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς
 ὦν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὖ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ

CHAP. X.

After having distinguished the several forms of political communities, Aristotle now divides the several

species of friendship in the same manner, showing what relation each bears to each.

νομεὺς προβάτων ὄθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρική, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἴτιος γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας· καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται· φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱὼν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐγγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασιλευμένων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὐται, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταῦτ' ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ 10

To Aristocracy.

φιλία. Καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ· κατ' ἀρετὴν γάρ, καὶ τῷ ἀμείνوني πλέον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀρμόζον ἐκάστω· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. Ἡ δὲ τῶν

To Timocracy.

ἀδελφῶν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ἔοικεν· ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιωταί, οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ' ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοήθειες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἔοικε δὴ ταύτῃ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τιμοκρατικὴν· ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι· ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐξ ἴσου· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς 20

In their perversions friendship is seldom found: and not at all in a tyranny, equally as there is no justice.

παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐστὶ, καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν τῇ χειρίστῃ· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· ἀλλ' 25

3. διαφέρει δὲ] But excels the kingly (sc. φιλίας) in the magnitude of its benefactions.

6. ταῦτα] ἢτοι συγκαχόμενα παρ' ἡμῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ διὰ μίσην τῶν πατέρων. ἢ καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις

ταῦτα ἀποτίμονται παρὰ τῶν πατέρων ἡμῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸ εἶναι. Schol.

9. τιμῶνται] According to the rule before given, p. 328.

25. οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον] See p. 193.

οἶον τεχνίτη πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς δούλον· ὠφελείται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς βῆππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δούλον ἢ δούλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δούλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἄψυχος δούλος. ἢ μὲν οὖν δούλος, οὐκ ἔστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φιλίας δὴ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐπὶ πλείστον· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἴσοις οὖσιν:

CHAP. XI.

Of Friendship formed by communities and by nature.

14 EN κοινωνία μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, καθά- Friendships
περ εἴρηται· ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις τὴν τε συγγενικὴν formed by
communi-

2. διασότη πρὸς δούλον] See Pol. p. 6. and Eth. p. 194.

6. ἔμψυχον ὄργανον] Compare Pol. i. 2. τῶν δ' ἐργάνων, τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δ' ἔμψυχα· οἷον τῶ κυβερνήτη ἢ μὲν οἷα ἔμψυχον ἢ δὲ σφαιρῶν ἔμψυχον· ἢ γὰρ ἀσφαιρῶν ἐν ἐργάνῳ ἴδου ταῖς εἰχναῖς ἴσται. οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτήμα ἔργων πρὸς ζῶον ἴσται καὶ ἢ κτήσις ἀλλήθες ἐργάνων ἴσται, καὶ ἢ δούλος κτήματι ἔμψυχον, καὶ ὅσων ἔργων πρὸς ἐργάνῳ πᾶσι ἢ ἀσφαιρῶν.

CHAP. XI.

In this chapter, Aristotle considers two divisions of friendship generally, derived from a consideration of their efficient causes, society and nature, (κοινωνία, φύσις.) Not but what all friendship depends upon society, but some entirely, others not so. These he again subdivides; the first into πολιτικαί (used in its strict sense), φιλικαί, συμπαλαιαί, and the like; these depend upon certain conditions

ties divided
from those
formed by
nature.

καὶ τὴν ἐταιρικήν. αἱ δὲ πολιτικαὶ καὶ φυλετικαὶ
καὶ συμπλοικαί, καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται, κοινωνικαῖς
εὐοίκασι μᾶλλον· οἶον γὰρ καθ' ὁμολογίαν τινὰ
φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἂν τις καὶ

Those form-
ed by nature
of various
kinds.

1. Of pa-
rents and
children.

τὴν ξενικήν. Καὶ ἡ συγγενική δὲ φαίνεται
πολυειδῆς εἶναι, ἠρηγῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρι-
κῆς· οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα ὡς
ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα, τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοὺς γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ'
ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. μᾶλλον δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ
ἐξ αὐτῶν ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα ὅτι ἐκ τούτων, καὶ 10
μᾶλλον συνφκείωται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῷ γεννηθέντι ἢ
τὸ γενόμενον τῷ ποιήσαντι· τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ
οἰκείον τῷ ἀφ' οὗ, οἶον ὁδοὺς ἢ θριξὶ ἢ ὀτιοῦν
τῷ ἔχοντι· ἐκείνῳ δ' οὐθέν τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἦττον.
καὶ τῷ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθύς 15
γενόμενα στέργουσιν, τὰ δὲ προελθόντα τοῖς χρό-
νοις τοὺς γονεῖς, σύννεσιν ἢ αἰσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ
τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ
μητέρες. Γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν ὡς ἑαυ-
τούς (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν οἶον ἕτεροι αὐτοῖ τῷ 20
κεχωρίσθαι), τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων
πεφυκότα, ἀδελφοὶ δ' ἀλλήλους τῷ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν

2. Of bro-
thers.

entered into by the communicating parties, and for which such communities are formed. But in natural friendships no such conditions are made; nature herself is the tacit organ, engendering them in the minds of both parties, who in the formation of these friendships are as it were guided by a natural instinct. These are of two kinds; one arising from the ties of blood (*συγγενικαί*), of which there are four kinds, I. parents and

children; II. brothers; III. cousins and kindred; IV. husband and wife; or from the ties of companionship (*ἰσχυρικαί*.)

13. *εἰκείων*] *Proprium, proper* to. Aristotle seems to use this word in the same way as in the argument at the commencement of the Politics; that the part is proper to the whole, belongs to the whole, not the whole to the part.

19. *μητέρας*] See ix. 7.

πεφυκέναι· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης ἀλλήλοις ταυτοποιεῖ ὅθεν φασὶ ταυτόν αἶμα καὶ ρίζαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰσὶ δὴ ταυτό πως καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις.

Μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ ^{3. Of companions.}

5 καθ' ἡλικίαν· ἤλιξ γὰρ ἡλικά, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῇ ἑταιρικῇ ὁμοιοῦται.

Ἄνεψιοι δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς ἐκ τούτων ^{4. Of kith and kin.}

γίνονται δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι οἱ δ' ἀλλοτριώτεροι

10 τῷ σύνεγγυς ἢ πόρρω τὸν ἀρχηγὸν εἶναι. Ἔστι ^{The peculiarities in the friendship of parents ;}

δ' ἢ μὲν πρὸς γονεῖς φιλία τέκνοις, καὶ ἀνθρώποις πρὸς θεοῦς, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον· εὐ

γὰρ πεποιήκασιν τὰ μέγιστα· τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αἴτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις τοῦ παιδευθῆναι.

15 ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τοιαύτη φιλία μᾶλλον τῶν ὀθνείων, ὅσφ καὶ κοινότερος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ^{Of brothers;}

ἀδελφικῇ ἄπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑταιρικῇ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, ὅσφ

20 οἰκειότεροι καὶ ἐκ γενετῆς ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσφ ὁμοθηέστεροι οἱ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευθέντες ὁμοίως· καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία πλείστη καὶ βεβαιο

25 γενῶν τὰ φιλικά. Ἄνδρι δὲ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία ^{Of husband and wife.}

δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, ὅσφ πρότερον καὶ ἀναγκαϊότερον οἰκία πόλεως, καὶ

5. ἡλξ] See the Rhetoric, i. 11. See note. also p. 315.

28. περίερον] Compare the Polit.

12. πρὸς θεοῖς] See p. 317. and i. 1.

τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοῖς ζῴοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἀνθρώποι οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικῶσι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· εὐθύς γὰρ διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός· 5 ἐπαρκούσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ δι' ἀρετῆν, εἰ ἐπιεικέις εἶεν· ἔστι γὰρ ἑκατέρου ἀρετή, καὶ χαίροιν ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ. σύνδεσμος δὲ τὰ 10 τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι· διὸ θάπτουσι οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται· τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν, συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν. τὸ δὲ πῶς συμβιωτέον ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον, οὐδὲν ἕτερον φαίνεται ζητεῖσθαι ἢ πῶς δίκαιον· 15 οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν φαίνεται τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον καὶ τὸν ἐταῖρον καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.

CHAP. XII.

Of offences which arise in Friendship between equals, and how they are to be avoided.

Rule for requiting friends.

ΤΡΙΤΤΩΝ δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ 15 εἴρηται, καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην. τῶν μὲν ἐν ἰσότητι 20

1. *τεκνοποιία*] See the first and second chapters of the Politics, first Book.

the causes of the corruption of friendship, which subject is continued into the next Book, first premising a general rule for avoiding offences, which cause the dissolution of friendship. Towards those who are equal

CHAP. XII.

Aristotle now proceeds to speak of

φίλων ὄντων τῶν δὲ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν (καὶ γὰρ
 ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται καὶ ἀμείνων χεῖροσι,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς, καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἰσάζοντες
 ταῖς ὠφελείαις καὶ διαφέροντες), τοὺς ἴσους μὲν
 5 κατ' ἰσότητά δει τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς
 ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τῷ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπερ-
 οχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι. Γίνεται δὲ τὰ ἐγκλήματα Complaints
 καὶ αἱ μέμψεις ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίᾳ are almost
 ἢ μόνῃ ἢ μάλιστα εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἀρετὴν entirely
 10 φίλοι ὄντες εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται confined to
 τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας. πρὸς τοῦτο δ' friendships
 ἀμλλωμένων οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα οὐδὲ μάχαι formed from
 τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ ποιῶντα οὐδεὶς δυσχε- interested
 ραίνει, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἧ χαρίεις, ἀμύνεται εὖ δρῶν. motives.
 15 ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, τυγχάνων οὐ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν
 ἐγκαλοῖ τῷ φίλῳ· ἐκάτερος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
 ἐφίεται. οὐ πάνυ δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἡδονὴν ἅμα
 γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὐ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιαγείν
 χαίρουσιν. γελοῖος δ' ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν
 20 τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἐξὸν μὴ συνδημερεύειν. ἡ δὲ
 διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐγκληματικὴ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ
 χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις αἰεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ
 ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμ-
 φονται ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται τοσοῦτων τυγχάνου-
 25 σιν ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ δ' εὖ ποιῶντες οὐ δύνανται
 ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα ὅσων οἱ πάσχοντες δέονται.
 Ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν, τὸ On what
 μὲν ἄγραφον τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ account
such com-
plaints
arise.

the Arithmetical ratio of return is to not, the Geometrical proportion.
 be observed, towards those who are 26. [ἄγραφον] See the Rhetoric, i. 13.

τὸ χρήσιμον φιλίας ἢ μὲν ἠθικὴ ἢ δὲ νομικὴ εἶναι. γίγνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ' ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συναλλάξωσι καὶ διαλύωνται. ἔστι δὴ νομικὴ μὲν ἢ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἢ μὲν πάμπαν ἀγοραία ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα, ἢ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντὶ τίνος. δῆλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα κοῦκ ἀμφίλογον, φιλικὸν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει· διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων δίκαι, ἀλλ' οἴονται δεῖν στέργειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας. ἢ δ' ἠθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ δωρεῖται ἢ ὅτιδῆποτε ἄλλο. κομίζεσθαι δὲ ἀξιοῖ τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλεόν, ὡς οὐ δεδωκὼς ἀλλὰ χρήσας. οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ συναλλάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος ἐγκαλέσει. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν πάντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους τὰ καλά, προαιρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ ὀφέλιμα. καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθῃ, ὀφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι. Δυναμένῳ δὴ ἀναποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὣν ἔπαθεν, καὶ ἐκόντι ἄκουτα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον. ὡς δὴ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ ἔδει· οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρώντος· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα διαλυτέον. καὶ ὁμολογήσαι δ' ἂν δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν· ἀδυνατοῦντα δ' οὐδ' ὁ δούς ἠξίωσεν ἄν' ὥστ' εἰς δυνατός, ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτέον ὑφ'

How such complaints may be avoided.

20. ἄποια γὰρ] The Paraphrast appears to me to have correctly interpreted this passage, although much diversity of opinion exists concerning it. οὐ γὰρ ἔλαβον δι' ἐμὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλίαν μὴ βουλομένους, ἀλλὰ δουλοκρατεῖν

ἵτι ἔλαβον εὖ παθόντες ὑφ' οὗ οὐκ ἔδει, ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, καὶ ζητούντων ἵσως ἐκόντες ἀποδίδονται τὰς ἀισχυρὰς εὐεργετίας, ἃς ἄποιας ἰδίως αὐτῶν ἀγνοῦν τὸν εὐεργετοῦντα.

οὐ εὐεργετῆται καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι, ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις
 ὑπομένη ἢ μή. Ἀμφισβήτησιν δ' ἔχει πότερα Who is to
 fix the value
 of the be-
 nefits.
 δεῖ τῇ τοῦ παθόντος ὠφελεία μετρεῖν καὶ πρὸς
 ταύτην ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ
 5 δράσαντος εὐεργεσία. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοι-
 αῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἅ μικρὰ
 ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ' ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατα-
 σμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν
 παρ' αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἅ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν
 10 κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρεῖαις. ἀρ' οὖν διὰ μὲν
 τὸ χρήσιμον τῆς φιλίας οὔσης ἢ τοῦ παθόντος
 ὠφέλεια μέτρον ἐστίν; οὗτος γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος,
 καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομμούμενος τὴν ἴσην·
 τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται ἢ ἐπικουρία ὅσον οὗτος
 15 ὠφέληται, καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὴ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρατο,
 ἢ καὶ πλέον· κάλλιον γάρ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν
 ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δ' ἔοικεν ἢ τοῦ
 δράσαντος προαίρεσις· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ
 ἡθους ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει τὸ κύριον.

CHAP. XIII.

Of offences which arise in Friendships, where one party is superior to the other.

16 ΔΙΑΦΕΡΟΝΤΑΙ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν How and
 what equal-
 ity of return
 φιλίαις· ἀξιοὶ γὰρ ἑκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν, ὅταν

20. *καθ' ὑπεροχὴν*] This particular friendship is more subject to complaints and dissensions than any others being generally formed, as has been already stated for the sake of mutual interests, and such are generally full

of recriminations. (See p. 343.) And because the good man very rarely contracts friendship with one in a more exalted station than himself, on account of the difficulty of making an adequate return of favours.

is to be observed where one party greatly exceeds the other.

δὲ τοῦτο γίγνηται, διαλύεται ἡ φιλία. οἶεται γὰρ ὁ τε βελτίων προσήκειν αὐτῷ πλέον ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλέον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀφελιμώτερος· ἀχρείων γὰρ ὄντα οὐ φασι δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας· οἴονται γάρ, καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλείον λαμβάνουσιν οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλείον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ. ὁ δ' ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων ἀνάπαλιν· φίλον γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι 10 τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδέεσιν· τί γάρ, φασίν, ὄφελος σπουδαίῳ ἢ δυνάστη φίλον εἶναι, μηθέν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν; ἔοικε δὲ ἐκάτερος ὀρθῶς ἀξιούν, καὶ δεῖν ἐκατέρῳ πλέον νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δέ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι τιμῆς, 16 τῷ δ' ἐνδεεὶ κέρδους· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας, τῆς δ' ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία τὸ κέρδος. Οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ πορίζων· τὸ κοινὸν 20 γὰρ δίδεται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἡ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα χρηματίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τιμᾶσθαι· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει. τῷ δὲ περὶ χρήματα ἐλαττωμένῳ τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι καὶ τῷ δωροδόκῳ χρή- 25 ματα· τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὁμιλητέον, καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ἀφελουμένῳ ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον, ἀνταποδι-

Which is also observed in the distribution of state rewards.

The inferior therefore is to make a return to the best of his

24. ἀπαμίει] No man can endure to have less than he ought on all occasions.

δόντα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. τὸ δυνατόν γὰρ ἢ φιλία ability; and though it be not an equivalent, it should be received as such, as the father receives the duty of a
 ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν
 πασι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς
 καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ποτε τὴν ἀξίαν
 5 ἀποδοίη, εἰς δύναμιν δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων ἐπιεικῆς
 εἶναι δοκεῖ. διὸ κὰν δόξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα
 ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ δ' υἱόν· ὀφείλοντα γὰρ ἀπο-
 δοτέον, οὐθὲν δὲ ποιήσας ἄξιον τῶν ὑπηργμένων
 δέδρακεν, ὥστ' αἰεὶ ὀφείλει. οἷς δ' ὀφείλεται,
 10 ἐξουσία ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δὴ. ἅμα δ' ἴσως
 οὐδεὶς ποτ' ἂν ἀποστήναι δοκεῖ μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος
 μοχθηρία· χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν
 ἐπικουρίαν ἀνθρωπικὸν μὴ διωθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ
 φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπουδαστὸν τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, μοχθηρῷ
 15 ὄντι· εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται, τὸ
 δὲ ποιεῖν φεύγουσιν ὡς ἀλυσιτελέες. περὶ μὲν
 οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK IX.

IN the concluding part of the last Book, Aristotle has shown what are the causes which lead to the dissolution of Friendship, and the means of preventing such effects, which brought him to the consideration of the offices of Friendship, and the returns which ought to be made by friends, more particularly when the parties are unequal. The same subject is also pursued in this book, in which, after showing that in dissimilar Friendship, of all others, dissensions are likely to arise, and that in Friendship, which is a kind of Justice, where the parties are unequal a geometrical proportion must be observed, he proceeds to determine the point who should estimate the value of the benefit, the giver or receiver, in order to the making of a just return. This point being determined, he then lays down some general precepts for the guidance of our conduct in the returning of favors, examining whether every kind of return is justifiable or not, and how far, and in what kinds; and whether, when from alteration of circumstances or changes in individuals one of the essentials of Friendship is lost, so that no adequate return can be made, the dissolution of Friendship is justifiable; and thus concludes that part of his subject.

But the examination of this last question naturally engages him in the consideration of another springing out of it; What is the origin, and what are the essentials for the existence of Friendship? Considering it then in its most simple and primitive state, the love of a man towards himself, (for a friend is a second self, and how can he love another as a second self who loves not his own

self?) Aristotle is led to a consideration of self-love, and whether it is possible for one to love another who loves not himself. And if this be not possible, and the love of one's self must be the first of all friendships, and the good man only can love himself, and the good man is the canon of all moral truth, we must seek for the essentials of friendship in the love of the good man towards himself: but this consists of three things; benevolence (*εὐνοία*), unanimity (*ὁμόνοια*), and beneficence (*εὐεργεσία*). To each of these then he devotes a separate chapter, and concludes the book with a consideration of certain questions arising out of this subject.

As to the need of friends, their number, and society.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. IX.

CHAP. I.

Of the causes of quarrels in Friendship—and of the right estimate of benefits in order to preserve Friendship.

EN πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἰσάζει καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ, καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐδὲν πεπόρισται κοινὸν μέτρον τὸ νόμισμα, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται, καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖται· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστῆς

The dissimilar friendship may be preserved, if a proportionately return of benefits be observed.

1. ἀνομοιοειδῆσι] *Of different species.* That is, when friendship is formed between two or more, but each person has a different motive. As the poor loves the rich for the sake of money or reward; the rich the poor for the sake of his services or respect, and so on. In such friendships, of course, a return in kind is indeed no return, since it is not a return of the object for which the connexion was formed. As has been already shown in the case of commutative justice. (See p. 187.

sq. Compare also p. 344.) If one party, therefore, has received a certain gratification in the particular object which he had in view, he must make a return in proportion of the particular object which the other party had in view. But in friendships formed from motives of virtue, of course a return in kind is equivalent, since the object of both parties is the same.

3. οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ] See v. 7.

6. κοινὸν μέτρον] See p. 187, 23. sq.

ἐγκαλεῖ ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐθὲν ἔχων φιλητόν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, πολλάκις δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλλόμενος πάντα νῦν οὐθὲν ἐπιτελεῖ. συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν δι' ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλῆ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον τὸν ἐραστήν, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχη· διὰ ταῦτα γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὐσης διάλυσις γίνεται, ἐπειδὴν μὴ γίνηται ὧν ἕνεκα ἐφίλουν· οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔστεργον ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα· διὸ τοιαῦτα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν καθ' αὐτὴν οὐσα μένει, καθάπερ εἴρηται. διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἕτερα γίνηται αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ ὧν ὀρέγονται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τῷ μὴθὲν γίνεσθαι, ὅταν οὐ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνη, οἶον καὶ τῷ κιθαρωδῷ ὁ ἐπαγγελλλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμεινον ἄσειεν, τοσοῦτῳ πλείω· εἰς ἕω δ' ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέαι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο, ἰκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν· εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν τέρψιν ὁ δὲ κέρδος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει ὁ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς· ὧν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κακείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει. Τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ποτέρου τάξαι ἐστί, τοῦ προἰεμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προἰεμένος ἔοικ' ἐπι-

In whose power the determination of the value of the return ought to be.

10. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν] But virtuous friendship —.

24. ἀρχοῦμενος] He who commences with conferring a favour upon another, seems to leave to the person upon whom the favour is conferred the fixing the estimate of the return. As Protagoras who conferred the favour first, by teaching his disciples, and left

them to fix his reward. And in such cases, the person who confers the services ought to be satisfied with the reward which is given him. And although by the persons gratified an equivalent return is not always made, yet such persons escape censure because they violate no stipulation. But when a stipulation is made, and

τρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν·
 ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα
 ἐκέλευεν ὅσου δοκεῖ ἄξια ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ ἐλάμβανε
 τοσοῦτον. ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ
 5 “μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρί.” οἱ δὲ προλαβόντες τὸ ἀργύ-
 ριον, εἶτα μῆθὲν ποιούντες ὧν ἔφασαν, διὰ τὰς
 ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλή-
 μασι γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἂ ὠμολόγησαν.
 τοῦτο δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ σοφισταὶ ἀναγκάζονται
 10 διὰ τὸ μῆθένα ἂν δοῦναι ἀργύριον ὧν ἐπίστανται.
 οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὧν ἔλαβον τὸν μισθόν, μὴ ποιούντες
 εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασιν εἰσιν. Ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ In cases of
pure friend-
ship. γίνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑπουργίας, οἱ μὲν δι'
 αὐτοὺς προἰέμενοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἀνέγκλητοι· τοι-
 15 αὐτή γὰρ ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν φιλία. τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τε
 ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν· αὐτὴ γὰρ τοῦ
 φιλου καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. οὕτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς
 φιλοσοφίας κοινωνήσασιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρήμαθ'
 ἢ ἄξια μετρεῖται, τιμὴ τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο,
 20 ἀλλ' ἴσως ἰκανόν, καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ
 πρὸς γονεῖς, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον. Μὴ τοιαύτης In cases
where
friendship is
formed from
motives of
mutual in-
terest or
pleasure.
 δ' οὔσης τῆς δόσεως ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινι, μάλιστα μὲν
 ἴσως δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι δοκοῦσαν
 ἀμφοῖν κατ' ἀξίαν εἶναι, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμ-
 25 βαίνοι, οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον δόξειεν ἂν τὸν προέ-

he who has received a benefit upon
 certain conditions makes no equiva-
 lent return, and breaks his promise, as
 was the case with the Sophists, he is
 exposed to very great censure.

1. Πρωταγόρας] Of Protagoras, see
 Diog. Laert. ix. §. 52. and Menag. ib. See
 also Geel's Hist. Sophist. in v. Protag.

5. μισθός] Compare Hesiod. Op.
 et Dier. v. 368. μισθός δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλου
 σινημένιος ἄξιος ἴστω.

22. ἐπὶ τινι] Sc. ἢ διὰ χρεῖμασιν ἢ διὰ
 ἡδονῆς.

25. ἀνάγκη] This word seems to
 be used as equivalent to ἀναγκάσθαι.
 See line 5.

χοντα τάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον· ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶλετ' ἄν, τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν ἔξει τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον, ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι τῶν ἔκουσίων συμβολαίων⁵ δίκας μὴ εἶναι ὡς δέον, ᾧ ἐπίστευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον καθάπερ ἐκοινώνησεν. ᾧ γὰρ ἐπε-
 τράφη, τοῦτον οἶεται δικαιοτέρον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ βουλούμενοι λαβεῖν· τὰ¹⁰
 γὰρ οἰκεία καὶ ἃ διδῶσιν ἐκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἀξία. ἀλλ' ὁμως ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν οἱ λαβόντες. δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσοῦτου τιμᾶν ὅσου ἔχοντι φαίνεται ἀξίον, ἀλλ' ὅσου πρὶν ἔχειν ἐτίμα.

15

4. ἐν τοῖς ὠνίοις] ἡ γὰρ ἀνούμιος εἴσται ἐν τιμῇ καὶ μετρίᾳ τῇ ἰσοτιμῇ ὠφελείᾳ ἢ τῇ ἡδονῇ. καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀξίον εἶναι λέγει ἐν ζητούμενοις δῖον. Paraph.

12. ἡ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται] Ex iis omnibus patet quod is debet statuere remunerationem qui accepit beneficia non is qui contulit. Et hoc videtur probasse philosophus supra per totum tam in amicitias et societatibus quæ fiunt cum pactatione quam in iis quæ sponte fiunt. Sin vero acciderit ut animus conferen-

tis responderet iudicio recipientis tunc remuneratio esset utrisque accommodata, et id est quod dicit philosophus, oportet forsitan remunerationem fieri iudicio utrorumque; sed si id non accidat ut concurrant in iudicia et convenient, tunc ex parte recipientis repensio statuenda videtur qui novit et animadvertere debet quanti sit beneficium susceptum et quantum sibi profuerit et quanti æstimabat antequam susciperet. Acciaj. See p. 345.

CHAP. II.

Of the offices and return which ought to be made to friends.

2 ΑΠΟΡΙΑΝ δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιαύδε, οἷον πότερα Three ques-
tions pro-
posed
touching
the return
of benefits.
δεῖ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι, ἢ
κάμνοντα μὲν ἰατρῷ πειστέον, στρατηγὸν δὲ
χειροτονητέον τὸν πολεμικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ φίλῳ
5 μᾶλλον ἢ σπουδαίῳ ὑπηρετητέον, καὶ εὐεργέτῃ
ἀνταποδοτέον χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ δοτέον, ἐὰν
ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται. ἀρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα
ἀκριβῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ράδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ
καὶ παντοίας ἔχει διαφορὰς καὶ μεγέθει καὶ
10 μικρότητι καὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ. Ὅτι General so-
lution of the
questions.
δ' οὐ πάντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποδοτέον, οὐκ ἄδηλον.
καὶ τὰς μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἀνταποδοτέον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χαριστέον ἐταίροις, καὶ ὥσπερ
δάνειον, ᾧ ὀφείλει ἀποδοτέον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐταίρῳ
15 δοτέον. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ τοῦτ' αἰεὶ, οἷον τῷ λυτρω-
θέντι παρὰ ληστῶν πότερον τὸν λυσάμενον ἀντι-
λυτρωτέον, κἂν ὅστισούν ἦ, ἢ καὶ μὴ ἐαλωκότι

CHAP. II.

In the first part of this chapter, Aristotle proposes three questions touching the return of benefits. First, whether obedience is to be yielded by a son to his father in all things; secondly, whether is our duty, to assist a good man or our friend when both are not possible; and lastly, whether if both be not in our power, are we to return a favour to him who has conferred one upon us, or upon our companion.

To these he replies, that exact rules cannot be given for our conduct on these occasions. But as a general maxim, favours conferred ought to be returned, but not every kind to our benefactors in all cases, but we ought to be guided by what is suitable to each person: *ἀπαντι ἀντιπερισσὸν τὸ εὐεργετικὸν ἀποδοτέον, καὶ ἐπιπέφασκεν τὰ ἐκείνοις ἀνάλογα κατ' εὐκρίτητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χεῖρον.*

ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ ἀποδοτέον, ἢ τὸν πατέρα λυτρω-
 τέον; δόξειε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον τὸν
 πατέρα. Ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθόλου μὲν τὸ
 ὀφείλημα ἀποδοτέον, εἰάν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἢ δόσις
 τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀποκλιτέον· 5
 ἐνίστε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἴσον τὸ τὴν προὔπαρχὴν
 ἀμείψασθαι, ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν σπουδαῖον εἰδὼς εὖ
 ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἢ ἀνταπόδοσις γίγνηται, ὃν οἶεται
 μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι ἐνίστε
 ἀντιδανειστέον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἴομενος κομείσθαι 10
 ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομεί-
 σθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως
 ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως
 οἴονται δέ, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν. ὅπερ
 οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, οἱ περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς 15
 πράξεις λόγοι ὁμοίως ἔχουσι τὸ ὠρισμένον τοῖς
 περὶ ἃ εἰσιν. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταῦτ' ἀπαντα
 ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ
 τῷ Διὶ θύεται, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι
 καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ ἐταίροις καὶ ἐνεργέταις, ἐκάστοις 20
 τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα ἀπονεμητέον· οὕτω
 δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται· εἰς γάμους μὲν γὰρ

More parti-
 cular solu-
 tion of the
 second and
 third ques-
 tions.

More parti-
 cular solu-
 tion of the
 first ques-
 tion.

13. *ὅτι ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα*] *The character of the good and bad are not equal. Consequently if the good man make the same return of favour to the bad as he receives from him, he breaks that rule of proportion which friendship ought to observe.*

15. *πολλάκις εἴρηται*] See particularly p. 7, 6.

19. *τῷ Διὶ θύεται*] *ἴσον γὰρ ἔστιν ἃ οὐ θιμῶν ἰδίῳ τοῖς Ἕλλησι θύειν τῷ*

Διὶ. πῶς γὰρ καὶ ὄφει καὶ ἄλλ' ἕτερα πολλά ἐνίστιν ἰδίῳ θυσίαν προσφέρειν τῷ Διὶ πατρὶ κατ' Ἑλληνίας ὄντι ἀνθρώποις ἐν θύῃσι. οὕτως οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντως ἀποδοτέον. Schol.

21. *οὕτω δὲ καὶ*] Aristotle illustrates his argument, that what is fitting ought to be returned to each, by the conduct of men to their different relatives. We invite our relatives to marriage feasts, &c. we think this a befitting return

καλοῦσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς· τούτοις γὰρ κοινὸν τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις· καὶ εἰς τὰ κήδη δὲ μάλιστ' οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς ἀπαντᾶν διὰ ταῦτό. δόξειε δ' ἂν τροφῆς μὲν 5 γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὄν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτ' ἐπαρκεῖν. καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι καθάπερ θεοῖς, οὐ πᾶσαν δέ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί· οὐδ' αὖ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ τοῦ στρατη- 10 γοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὴν πατρικὴν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν μητρικὴν. καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν τὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. πρὸς ἐταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελ- 15 φούς παρρησίαν καὶ ἀπάντων κοινότητα. καὶ συγγενεῖσι δὴ καὶ φυλέταις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν αἰεὶ πειρατέον τὸ οἰκείον ἀπονέ- μιν, καὶ συγκρίνειν τὰ ἐκάστοις ὑπάρχοντα κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ ἀρετὴν ἢ χρῆσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν ῥάων ἢ κρίσις, τῶν δὲ διαφερόντων

to those having a common interest with us. But to our parents we do more than this, as being greater debtors to them, not only inviting them to feasts, but providing them with sustenance, a return particularly appropriate to those from whom we have received it.

2. εὐὰ κήδη] Miror Argyropyllum Græcum hominem et illum quidem valde doctum non vidisse quid hic valeret εἰς εὐὰ κήδη. Reddidit enim, ut ad sponsalia; secutus autem ille in eo est Eustratium, quod non debebat, non magnæ auctoritatis interpretem. Aretinus tamen in hoc lapsus non est.

Nam præterquam quod non est dubium, quin κήδος quoque valeat bustium et obitum: (unde ἰπικῆδαιος θρῆνος vocatus est fletus, lamentatioque qua propinqui lugent fato functum quempiam ipsorum; nam Staius quoque carmen funebre Græco hoc nomine indicavit,) admonere ipsos debuit, morem esse institutumque mortalium non minus quam in nuptiis, hoc tempore adesse propinquos, ac pio hoc officio fungi, atque illos quidem non invitatos, ab ostendere etiam videtur philosophus, qui ait eos solere ἀπαντᾶν ad hoc munus obeundum. VICTOR.

ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διὰ γε τοῦτο ἀποστατέον,
ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχεται, οὕτω διοριστέον.

CHAP. III.

Upon what occasions Friendships may be dissolved, and what conduct ought to be observed in such cases.

A question as to the dissolution of friendship formed for interest or pleasure, where one party is changed.

ΕΧΕΙ δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς 3
φιλίας ἢ μὴ πρὸς τοὺς μὴ διαμένοντας. ἢ πρὸς
μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ φίλους ὄντας, 5
ὅταν μηκετι ταῦτ' ἔχωσι, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον διαλύ-
εσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ὧν ἀπολιπόντων
εὐλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν. ἐγκαλέσειε δ' ἂν τις, εἰ διὰ
τὸ χρήσιμον ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαπῶν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ
τὸ ἦθος· ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν, πλείισται 10
διαφοραὶ γίνονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως
οἴωνται καὶ ὧσι φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ

CHAP. III.

Having discussed in the preceding chapters what returns of kind offices ought to be observed towards friends, and the offences which cause the dissolution of friendship, Aristotle now proceeds to consider upon what grounds friendship may be justly dissolved. In such cases where the intimacy has been formed for the sake of pleasure or utility, the object ceasing with either party, it is reasonable that the friendship between them should cease likewise. But in such cases where friendship has been formed from virtuous motives, if one party prove vicious, or so far, in course of time, excel the other in virtue as to leave an extreme disparity between

them, then it is likewise reasonable that their friendship should be destroyed, since no similarity exists between them, (εὐ ἴμοιον τῷ ἰμοίῳ φίλον), and no congeniality of sentiment: πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι μὴτ' ἀριστάμοινοι τοῖς ἀνότοις μήτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι; εὐδὲ γὰρ σπερὶ ἀλλήλους τοῦτ' ἐστέξει ἀνότοις, ἄνοι δὲ τοσούτων οὐκ ἔστι φίλοις ἴσαι.

3. σπερὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι] As to the dissolution or non-dissolution of friendship with those who do not continue the same.

11. ἴσαν μὲ ἰμοίως] When they may not be friends for the same motives as they were thought to be. Or according to some interpreters: "quando non eadem pacto, ut ipsi expectaverint, illi fuerint amici."

τις καὶ ὑπολάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηθὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου πράττοντος, ἑαυτὸν αἰτιῶντ' ἂν ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ, δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ ἀπατήσαντι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ 5 τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδηλεύουσιν, ὅσφ' ἀποδέχεται ὡς ἀγαθόν, γένηται δὲ μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ, ἅρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατὸν, εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν ἀλλὰ τὰγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον πονηρὸν οὔτε 10 δεῖ φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιωσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἅρ' οὖν εὐθύς διαλυτέον; ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν; ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς τὸ ἦθος 15 ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅσφ' βέλτιον καὶ τῆς φιλίας οἰκειότερον. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ διαλυόμενος οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ποιεῖν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιούτῳ φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι ἀφίσταται. εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν διαμένει ὁ δ' ἐπιεικέστερος γένοιτο καὶ πολὺ διαλ- 20 λάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἄρα χρηστέον φίλῳ, ἢ οὐκ

As to the dissolution of it, under the same or similar circumstances when formed from virtuous motives.

11. τὸ ἦθος] See p. 341, 5. n.

13. τοῖς ἀνιάτοις—ἰσχυροῖσι δ' ἔχουσι] This is a truly Christian principle, though frequently neglected by those who have been led to see the folly of their conduct, who not only desert their previous companions, but even regard them with a degree of acrimony, when by no means utterly reprobate; ἀνίατοι κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν. "Quid ergo, inquit Aristoteles, amicitia itane dissolvetur funditus ut nullum prorsus vestigium superesse debeat? et eo loco vetus ille amicus sit habendus, quo quisvis extraneus aut

alienus? minime. Nam quemadmodum plus amicis quam alienis ita et huic propter pristinae memoriam amicitiae aliquid erit tribuendum, quibusdam in rebus interdum gratificandum, exceptis illis plane perditis et profigatis seu insigniter improbis. Qua de re extat et elegans locus in Laelio Ciceronis: cap. 21. Quamobrem primum danda opera est, nequa amicorum dissidia fiant: sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut extinctae potius amicitiae, quam oppressae esse videantur." GIPH.

18. ἀνασῶσαι] To save and recover.

ἐνδέχεται ; ἐν μεγάλη δὲ διαστάσει μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται, οἷον ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένει τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος, πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι μὴτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς μῆτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι ; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι· συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἄρ' οὖν οὐθὲν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκτέον ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγονεί φίλος μηδέποτε ; ἢ δεῖ μνείαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης¹⁰ συνηθείας, καὶ καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνείοις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι διὰ τὴν προγεγενημένην φιλίαν, ὅταν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας ἢ διάλυσις γένηται.

15

CHAP. IV.

Of the offices of Friendship and their origin—that no one can be a friend to another unless he be a friend.

What are the affections and offices of friendship.

ΤΑ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ οἷς⁴ αἱ φιλῖαι ὀρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν

5. οὐδὲ γὰρ] For neither will these feelings exist in them with respect to each other.

8. εἴρηται] See viii. c. 6.

CHAP. IV.

Aristotle now proceeds to show, that the offices which are to be observed towards friends, derive their origin from the feelings and conduct which men

observe towards themselves. For a friend is a second self. Not indeed, that we are to judge of these offices from the conduct of any one, but in this, as in all other instances involving our moral nature, the good man is to be the rule and measure, by which to guide our actions and affections.

The notions then of mankind concerning friendship and its offices may be brought under three heads ; bene-

ἐληλυθέναι. τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ
 πράττοντα τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἔνεκα,
 ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ
 χάριν· ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι,
 5 καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκρουκότες. οἱ δὲ τὸν
 συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταῦτ' αἰρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλ-
 γοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ· μάλιστα δὲ
 καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. τούτων δέ
 τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὀρίζονται. Πρὸς ἑαυτὸν How the
 good man
 observes
 these to-
 wards him-
 self.
 10 δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ
 λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι. ἔοικε
 γάρ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἐκάστῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ
 ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι. οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ,
 καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν,
 15 καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα

ficence (τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τὰγαθὰ), benevolence (τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον), and concord (συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ). The good man only entertains these feelings, for the vicious cannot as far as he is vicious, towards himself, and consequently can only feel them towards others. The good man therefore only can feel real friendship.

Upon this subject, the reader may consult a similar passage in the Republic of Plato, and Butler's Analogy, i. 3. See above p. 332.

In this beautiful chapter, Aristotle seems to have been carried away, though not beyond the limits of strict philosophical language, by the eloquence of his feelings, so as fully to justify what Cicero says of him.

1. τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα]

sc. τῷ φίλῳ, quod jam Paraphrastes addidit. Quæ hic exponuntur in universum amicitiae officia, suum singula nanciscuntur caput in hoc secundo libri ix. tractatu: Benevolentia (c. 5), beneficentia (c. 7), concordia (c. 6). MICH.

5. οἱ προσκεκρουκότες] *Who have fallen out, or clashed.* It is a proof that a friend wishes another friend to live and that for his own sake, because even those who have quarrelled and expect no advantage from each other, still entertain such wishes.

12. μέτρον—ὁ σπουδαῖος] See p. 102, 2. n.

13. ὁμογνωμονεῖ] For he alone acts reasonably, his appetite is in complete subjection to his reason. Not distracted as the incontinent, at one time guided by reason, another time by appetite.

καὶ πράττει (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τὰγαθὸν διαπονεῖν)
καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἔνεκα· τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν,
ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ. καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται
ἑαυτὸν καὶ σώζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο φ̄ φρονεῖ
ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. ἕκαστος δ' ὅ
ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τὰγαθά, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς
αἰρεῖται πάντ' ἔχειν ἐκείνο τὸ γενόμενον· ἔχει
γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τὰγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὧν ὅ τι ποτ'

2. καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἴσως] Compare the Rhetoric, i. 11. ἰσὺ δὲ ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ ἐν συγγένει ἀδὲ ἰσότη ἄπαν, μάλιστα δ' αὐτὸς σφίς ἰσότην ἐαυτοῦ πίστευσι, ἀνάγκη πάντας φιλοπόνησι εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἕτερον πάντα γὰρ ἐὰν ταυτὰ ἀνάγκη πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλιστα. ἰσὺ δὲ φίλοντα πάντας, καὶ ἐὰν αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη ἄδια εἶναι πάντων, οὐκ ἔργα καὶ λόγους.

5. τὸ εἶναι] Compare ix. 4. and x. 3.

6. γινόμενος δ' ἄλλος] The great man is something divine (θεῖον εἶναι), since man is properly the intellectual soul, and that which is properly and peculiarly adapted to his nature, is for him the greatest happiness, and consequently a life of intelligence, (καὶ τῷ ἀσφράσῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, ἴσως τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. x. 5. ad fin.) If then, as it has been stated, each one wishes good for himself (see iii. 4.), and he only, properly speaking, is a man who is a good man, (for he only lives according to the dictates of this divine principle within him), the good man only can wish for himself what is really good. For he who desires wealth, or pleasure, or luxury, only wishes what is good for the irrational, and not the real part of himself, whose desires and wants are ever varying, tormenting and racking him, and like an imperious and wrong-headed master driving him to various tasks.

at one and the same moment. Thus wasting his time and labour in subservience to his animal passions, man becomes transformed from a rational to an irrational being. Transformed then into another species (γινόμενος δ' ἄλλος), how can he any longer desire the good of that essence which he has lost, since every thing desires that which is good to itself? Consequently the good man only can wish that which is good to himself, and therefore he only can be a true friend. ὁ δὲ σπουδαῖος βούλεται ἑαυτῷ ζῆν. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. τῆν γὰρ θεωρητικὴν διώκει ζωὴν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ νοῦ ἢ ἰσάσσει οὐσία συνίσταται, ἢ ἐν ταύτῃ μάλιστα. ἴς δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ βούλεται τὸ εἶναι καὶ εὐχέσθαι, καὶ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται, τὰ ἀγαθὰ τοῦ εἰκείου εἶναι παραστραφέντι, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τὰ ἀγαθά. ἀλλ' ἑαυτῷ εἰς ὁ μεταβλήθη καὶ ἴσαστος δὲ ἑαυτῷ βούλεται γινέσθαι τὰ ἀγαθά, οἰόμενος μόνον ἴσως ἑαυτῷ· εἰ δὲ συνίδει ἑαυτὸν ἄλλον γινόμενος, οὐκ ἂν ἴσαστο πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἔχειν ἑαυτῷ τὸ γινόμενος, οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφθεῖ ἄλλῳ ἐνὶ βούλεισθαι τὰ ἀγαθά, ἢ ἑαυτῷ μεταβλήσθαι. Paraph. 8. ἀλλ' ὧν ὅ τι ποτ' ἑαυτῷ] But οὐτε by being what he is. sc. ἦται ὁ θεὸς εἶναι. εἰ δ' ἄλλο εἰ γίνετο ἐν τῆς φύσεως ἦ ἑαυτῷ, οὐκ ἔξει ἴσως ἔχειν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἰ καὶ δόξαι εἶναι ἔχειν, οὐχ ὡς ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ παραίεσθαι. Schol.

ἐστίν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἢ
 μάλιστα. συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βού-
 λεται· ἠδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγ-
 μένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνήμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων
 5 ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί· αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἠδεῖαι. καὶ θεωρη-
 μάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ, συναλγεῖ τε καὶ
 συνῆδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ
 αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἠδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο·
 ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν
 10 μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς
 δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν (ἔστι
 γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων
 εἶναι τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταυθ' ὑπάρχει. πρὸς
 αὐτὸν δὲ πότερόν ἐστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι φιλία, ἀφεί-
 15 σθω ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος· δόξειε δ' ἂν ταύτη εἶναι
 φιλία, ἣ ἐστὶ δύο ἢ πλείω ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων,
 καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς φιλίας τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν
 ὁμοιοῦται. Φαίνεται δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς
 πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὔσι φαύλοισ. ἄρ' οὖν
 20 ἢ ἀρέσκουσιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιει-
 κεῖς εἶναι, ταύτη μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; ἐπεὶ τῶν
 γε κομιδῆ φαύλων καὶ ἀνοσιουργῶν οὔθενι ταυθ'
 ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φαίνεται. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ
 τοῖς φαύλοισ· διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ἑτέρων
 25 μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ

The bad
cannot pos-
sess these
feelings.

1. τὸ νοῦν] See x. c. 5. ad fin.

11. ἴσται γὰρ ὁ φίλος] For a friend is another self. A friend is another self; consequently what feelings we entertain towards ourselves, we must entertain towards others. But the good man only is a friend to himself, enter-

taining towards himself the feelings of benevolence, beneficence, and concord, other men only as far as they are good, consequently the good only can be friends.

25. βούλονται] See p. 201. and p. 213. n. Aristotle appears from

ἀκρατεῖς· αἰροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων
 ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερά ὄντα·
 οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν ἀφίστανται τοῦ
 πράττειν ἃ οἴονται ἑαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι· οἷς
 δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν,⁵
 μισοῦσί τε καὶ φεύγουσι τὸ ζῆν καὶ ἀναιροῦσιν
 ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσί τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν συνδιη-
 μερέουσιν, ἑαυτούς δὲ φεύγουσιν· ἀναμμη-
 σκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν, καὶ τοιαῦθ'
 ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ' ἑαυτούς ὄντες, μεθ' ἐτέρων¹⁰
 δ' ὄντες ἐπιλανθάνονται. οὐθέν τε φιλητὸν ἔχοντες
 οὐθέν φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ
 συγκαίρουσιν οὐδὲ συναλοῦσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυ-
 τοῖς· στασιάξει γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ μὲν
 διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεί ἀπεχόμενον τινῶν, τὸ δ'¹⁵
 ἡδέεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκείσε ἔλκει
 ὥσπερ διασπῶντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα λυπεῖ-
 σθαι καὶ ἡδεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρὸν γε λυπεῖται
 ὅτι ἦσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέ-
 σθαι αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν.²⁰
 οὐ δὴ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος οὐδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλι-
 κῶς διακεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλητὸν. εἰ
 δὴ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον, φευκτέον
 τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ
 εἶναι· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν φιλικῶς ἂν²⁵
 ἔχοι καὶ ἐτέρῳ φίλος γένοιτο.

this passage to have made the same good or evil.

distinction as Socrates, that the will 20. μεταμελείας] Compare p. 363,
 can be only of good, the desire of 9. See also p. 309.

CHAP. V.

Of Benevolence (*εὐνοια*), and what relation it bears to Friendship.

5 Η δ' εὐνοια φιλία μὲν ἔοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἐστὶ γε ^{εὐνοια differs} φιλία· γίνεταί γὰρ εὐνοια καὶ πρὸς ἀγνώστας καὶ ^{from φιλία,} λαυθάουσα, φιλία δ' οὐ. καὶ πρότερον δὲ ταῦτ' ^{and φίλους.} εἴρηται. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ φίλησις ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει
 5 διάτασιν οὐδ' ὄρεξιν, τῇ φιλήσει δὲ ταῦτ' ἀκο-
 λουθεῖ. καὶ ἡ μὲν φίλησις μετὰ συνηθείας, ἡ
 δ' εὐνοια καὶ ἐκ προσπαίου, οἷον καὶ περὶ τοὺς
 ἀγωνιστὰς συμβαίνει· εὐνοιοὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνονται
 καὶ συνθέλουσιν, συμπράξαιεν δ' ἂν οὐθέν· ὅπερ
 10 γὰρ εἶπομεν, προσπαίως εὐνοιοὶ γίνονται καὶ ἐπι-
 πολαίως στέργουσιν. *Ἔοικε δὲ ἀρχὴ φιλίας ^{But is the}
 εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἢ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἡδονῆ· ^{ἀρχὴ of} friendship.
 μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῇ ιδέα οὐθεὶς ἐρᾶ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων
 τῷ εἶδει οὐθέν μᾶλλον ἐρᾶ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα
 15 ποθῆ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῆ. οὕτω δὲ καὶ
 φίλους οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι μὴ εὐνοιοὺς γενομένους,
 οἱ δ' εὐνοιοὶ οὐθέν μᾶλλον φιλοῦσιν· βούλονται
 γὰρ μόνον τάγαθὰ οἷς εἰσὶν εὐνοιοὶ, συμπράξαιεν

3. ἀρόσιον] See viii. c. 3. p. 317.

5. διάτασιν] διάτασις non est intensio multoquin minus quod Lambinus putat, contentio, sed continuatio quædam ac tractus temporis. Hæc Muretus. Nos autem cum Paraph. vet., Eustrat., Giphani, Lambino, aliis, animi intentionem interpretamur; ipse enim Arist. adverbium διασεταμίνους (ix. 4. et x. 2.) hoc sensu usurpat. Optime vocab.

aperit Demosth. 275, 8. ἰσηράμαι καὶ διασετάμην οὕτω σφοδρῶς. ZELL.

But Muretus evidently followed the interpretation of Eustratius, who thus observes upon this word: οὐ γὰρ ἔχει διάτασιν, αὐτὸν ἴσται τῷ. οὐ γὰρ ἴσται ἴκτασι καὶ ἴδης σθένος, ὡς ἡ λυσιπαισις.

10. προσπαίως] Suddenly.

17. οὐδὲν μᾶλλον] Are not the more friends. See p. 137.

δ' ἂν οὐθέν, οὐδ' ὀχληθείην ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. διὸ μεταφέρων φαίη τις ἂν αὐτὴν ἀργὴν εἶναι φιλίαν, χρονιζομένην δὲ καὶ εἰς συνήθειαν ἀφικνουμένην γίνεσθαι φιλίαν, οὐ τὴν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον οὐδὲ τὴν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ· οὐδὲ γὰρ εὖνοια ἐπὶ τούτοις γίνεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐεργετηθεὶς ἀνθ' ὧν πέπονθεν ἀπονέμει τὴν εὖνοιαν, τὰ δίκαια δρῶν· ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ' εὖνους ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑαυτῷ, καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει 10 αὐτὸν διὰ τινα χρῆσιν. ὅπως δ' ἡ εὖνοια δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἐπιείκειάν τινα γίνεται, ὅταν τῷ φανῇ καλός τις ἢ ἀνδρείος ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἶπομεν.

CHAP. VI.

Of Concord.

The object-matter of *ἰμῖνια*.

ΦΙΛΙΚΟΝ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁμόνοια φαίνεται· διόπερ 6 οὐκ ἔστιν ὁμοδοξία· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν ἂν. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὄτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων (οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων ὁμονοεῖν), ἀλλὰ τὰς πόλεις ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν 20 περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ὁμογνωμονῶσι καὶ ταῦτα

2. *μεταφέρων*] That is to say; as benevolence (*εὖνοια*) may be termed an isoperative friendship, so friendship may be termed an operative benevolence, using the rule for metaphor mentioned in the Rhetoric, iii. 10.

11. *εὖνοια δι' ἀρετήν*] See above p. 317, 18. and the Rhetoric, ii. 1.

16. *οὐκ ἔστιν ἰμοδοξία*] For *ἰμῖνια*, as he afterwards shows, is confined to things practical (*πρακτικά*); but *ἔξις* is speculative. See p. 95.

προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα.
περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, καὶ τούτων περὶ
τὰ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχειν
ἢ πᾶσιν, οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς
5 ἀρχὰς αἰρετὰς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις,
ἢ ἄρχειν Πιπτακόν, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν. ὅταν
δ' ἐκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς
Φοινίσσαις, στασιάζουσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστ' ὁμονοεῖν
τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐννοεῖν ὀδήποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν
10 τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς
τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίγνεται
οὐ ἐφίενται. πολιτικὴ δὲ φιλία φαίνεται ἢ ὁμό-
νοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται· περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα
γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνήκοντα. Ἔστι In whom
15 δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικεῖσιν· οὗτοι only ἁμόνοια
γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ἐπὶ τῶν is to be
αὐτῶν ὄντες ὡς εἰπεῖν· τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ μένει found.
τὰ βουλήματα καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ ὥσπερ Εὐριππος,

6. Πιπτακός] Pittacus communi reipublicæ consensu, et suo (nam et hoc requiritur ad plenam concordiam) princeps in patria constitutus fuit ad decennium, quo elapso, cum amplius eum imperare vellet civitas recusavit, quo allusit Aristoteles his verbis *ἦτοι καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν*. GIPH. See Diog. L. i. §. 75.

8. Φοινίσσαις] Aristotle alludes to the quarrel of Eteocles and Polynices as represented in the Phœniassæ of Euripides. To constitute concord, it is not sufficient that two should agree in wishing the same thing (*εὖ ἀνὰ ἑκάτερον ἰσοῦν θέσσειν*) as Eteocles and Polynices, who both wished to

reign alone, but they must also agree as to the same person (*ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ*).

9. *ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ*] *τοιοῦτοι περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*. Schol.

18. *οὐ μεταρρεῖ*] *Is not subject to ebb and flow as a Euripus*. Vocare solitos Græcos hoc nomine loca quædam maris in quibus fierent hujuscemodi contrarii inter se motus fluctuum, et ut inferioris ætatis ipsos vocant, fluxus et refluxus, notum est. VICTOR. Isaiah uses a somewhat similar illustration. "The wicked are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt." cap. lvii. 20. Compare with this the fourth chapter, p. 364.

βούλονται τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται. τοὺς δὲ φαύλους οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμοιοεῖν πλὴν ἐπὶ μικρόν, καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι, πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ὠφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλεί-⁵ποντας· ἐαυτῷ δ' ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει· μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινὸν ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν, ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.

10

CHAP. VII.

Of Beneficence.

The reasons stated why it was supposed that there is more love in the benefactor than the benefited.

Οἱ δ' εὐεργέται τοὺς εὐεργετηθέντας δοκοῦσι⁷ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ οἱ εὐπαθόντες τοὺς δράσαντας, καὶ ὡς παρὰ λόγον γινόμενον ἐπιζητεῖται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν δανείων¹⁵ οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμέλονται τῆς τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς

9. ἐπαναγκάζοντας] sc. τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.

11. οἱ δ' εὐεργέται] Compare Thucyd. ii. 40. καὶ τὰ ἐς ἀρετὴν ἠπαντιώμεθα τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ ἀσχετοὶ εἰς ἄλλα δρώντες κτάνεθα τοὺς φίλους. βιβαιοτέρως δὲ ἰδράσας τὴν χάριν, ὅστις ἰφικλομένη δι' εὐνοίας ἢ δίδωκε σώζειν· ἰδ'

ἀποφίλων ἀμβλύότερος. εἰδὼς οὐκ ἐς χάριν ἀλλ' ἐς ἰφικλομένην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδώσειν. There can be little doubt but that Aristotle tacitly alludes to this passage.

13. ἐπιζητεῖται] And the reason of this is required, as though it were something strange and paradoxical.

- κοινομένους τὰς χάριτας, τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπι-
 μελὲς τὸ ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν Which reason-
 ing is
 objected to
 by Epi-
 charmus.
 Neverthe-
 less it is
 true that
 benefactors
 love more
 than they
 do who are
 benefited.
 But not for
 the reasons
 stated.
- 5 οἱ πολλοί, καὶ μᾶλλον εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν
 ἐφίενται. δόξειε δ' ἂν φυσικώτερον εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον,
 καὶ οὐχ ὁμοιον τῷ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας· οὐ
 γὰρ ἐστὶ φιλῆσις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώ-
 ζεσθαι βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δ' εὖ The reasons
 for this in-
 vestigated.
- 10 πεποιηκότες φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπον-
 θότας, κἂν μηθὲν ὧσι χρήσιμοι μηδ' εἰς ὕστερον
 γένοιτ' ἂν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμ-
 βέβηκεν· πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκείον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ μᾶλλον
 ἢ ἀγαπηθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου ἐμψύχου γενομένου.
- 15 μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμ-
 βαίνει· ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεία ποιή-
 ματα, στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. τοιοῦτῳ δὴ ἔοικε
 καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐεργετῶν· τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς ἔργον
 ἐστὶν αὐτῶν· τοῦτο δὴ ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ
 20 ἔργον τὸν ποιήσαντα. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ
 εἶναι πᾶσιν αἰρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν, ἐσμὲν δ' ἐνεργ-
 γεία· τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν. ἐνεργεία δὴ ὁ

2. Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν] Epicharmus would, perhaps, say, that this view of the question was derived merely from considering an insufficient portion of mankind, from vitiated specimens, and not from a correct view of them. But, indeed, this appears to be the fault of man generally, a natural infirmity not confined merely to the worst and defective part of them.

22. ἐνεργεία δὴ ἡ αἰσῆσις] For the producer is in a sense (αἰσῆσις) his own

work in energy (ἐνεργεία, that is, actually, not virtually δυνάμει) as previous to production. The argument appears to be this.

Existence is desirable (αἰρετὸν καὶ φιλητόν) by all. 'But we can properly be said to exist, only when we are in energy; (for life is not the capacity of living, but the actually living), and we are in energy when we live and act. But he who acts is actually (ἐνεργεία ἰστίῳ) in his work

ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἐστὶ πως· στέργει δὴ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν· ὁ γάρ

(ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ). For the art of building, which is the method of constructing a house (ὁ λόγος τῆς οἰκοδομίας), is actually (ἐνεργεῖα) in the house, or the house would not have been built. And the house itself, therefore, is part of the builder, or the builder actually (ἐνεργεῖα), as far as his art is concerned, his art being actually in the building. Consequently every production is part actually (ἐνεργεῖα) of a man's self: or, in the words of Aristotle, every producer is in a sense his own work in energy. But every one loves himself, and consequently his own work as part of himself, and therefore every benefactor loves the person whom he has benefited, standing in the same relation to him as the artist to his ἔργον.

The following is the comment of Eustratius on this passage :

τοῦ φυσικοῦ φιλοῦν φησὶ ἵκασται ἐν οἰκίῳ ἔργον αἰτίον ἵσται, ἵτι καὶ αἰρεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ἵσται ἐν οἴκῳ καὶ ζῆν. ἵσται δὲ οὐ τῷ δύνασθαι γινώσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἴδῃ ἐνεργεῖα εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ οὐ λίγωμεν ἴσταια τὸ βεῖφος, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴχοντα τῆς εἰχῆς καὶ δυνάμειοι ἐνεργεῖν, καὶ ἀνδράποτα οὐ τὸν ἀπλῶς χαλκόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἱσχηματισμένον τῷ τοῦ ἀδριάντος σχήματι, οἷον καὶ ἴσ. ἴσται ἄθροιστοι ὄντα ἢ λίοντα ὄντα ἢ ἴσται ὄντα λίγωμεν, οὐ τὸν μήσω ὄντα δυνάμειοι δι γινώσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴδῃ ὄντα καὶ ζῶντα καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ δυνάμειοι ἐνεργεῖν. εἰσὼν δὲ, ἵσται δὴ ἐνεργεῖα, σαφηνίζων εἶ ἵσται ἐν ἐνεργεῖα, ἵσται γὰρ, τῷ ζῆν καὶ πράττειν, δυνάμειοι ὄντα λίγωμεν, ἵτι ὄντα ζῆ καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἢ δυνάμειοι ἐνεργεῖν. καὶ ἵσται ἢ συλλογισμὸς ταιούτος. ὄντα λίγωμεν ἄθροιστοι τὸν ζῶντα καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἢ ἐνεργεῖν δυνάμειοι, ἢ ζῶν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἐνεργεῖα

ἵσται. ὡς ἄρα ἐνεργεῖα ἵσται. εἰ δὲ καὶ αἰρεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ἐν οἴκῳ ἐνεργεῖα. ἵσται δὲ φησὶ εἰσὼν ἐν τοῦ Σωκράτους ἔργον οὐδὲ ἄλλο ἢ ἐνεργεῖα αὐτὸς ὁ Σωκράτης, φιλεῖν δὲ ἄρα τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν ἔργῳ αὐτοῦ. ἵτι ἐν οἴκῳ τῷ καθεστῶτος Σωκράτους αὐτὸ ἵσται ἐν τῷ καθεστῶ αὐτοῦ. ἵτι δὲ ἐν ἔργῳ αὐτοῦ ἵσται ἢ ἐνεργεῖα καθεστῶ οὐ πάντῃ ἀπλόῳ ἵσται. ἢ γὰρ εἰσὼν αὐτῇ ἐνεργεῖα ἵσται ὁ ζωγράφος· ἢ γὰρ εἰχῆ δυνάμειοι ἵσται ἐν τειχαστά. ἢ γὰρ οἰκοδομὴ οὐδὲ ἄλλο ἵσται ἢ οἰκία μετὰ λίθου, καὶ ἴσται ἄρα ἢ οἰκία ἢ οἰκοδομητὴ ἵσται μετὰ λίθου, καὶ ἵσται ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ οἰκίῳ ἢ οἰκοδομητῇ. ἴσται ὁ οἰκοδόμος ἢ οἰκοδόμος, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ ἄθροιστοι. εἰ οὖν οἰκοδομητὴ οἰκία ἵσται μετὰ λίθου, ἢ δὲ οἰκοδομητὴ ἢ καὶ οἰκοδόμος ταυτὸν, ἢ οἰκία ἄρα καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος ταυτὸν, καὶ ἵσται ἢ οἰκία ἄρα ἐνεργεῖα αὐτὸς ὁ οἰκοδόμος. Compare also the Paraph.

1. ἐν ἔργῳ ἵσται πως] ἐν ἔργῳ ἵσται πως. Bekk. The reading of the text was first adopted by Michelet, with this explanation. ἐν ἔργῳ est nominativus et sensus alius esse non potest nisi quem expressit Argyropylius secutus Eustratium, Paraphrastane Thom. Aquinatem: Qui igitur facit, est actu suum quodammodo opus; quod et sequentia confirmant; ὁ γὰρ ἵσται δυνάμειοι, ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖα ἐν ἔργῳ μαρτύει. Eodem modo ut Aristoteles dixit Hegelius, Rechts-philosophie, §. 124. Was das Subject ist, ist die Reihe seiner Handlungen. Et convenit inter utrumque philosophum, operationem et actum demum esse veram rerum substantiam.

2. ὁ γὰρ ἵσται δυνάμειοι] For of that which existed merely potentially before, the ἔργον shows the actual existence. The house shows the actual existence of

ἔστι δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργεία τὸ ἔργον μνηύει.

Ἄμα δὲ καὶ τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτῃ καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ^{That a}
 πρᾶξιν, ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ παθόντι ^{good deed}
 οὐθὲν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, συμ- ^{is honorable}
 φέρον' τοῦτο δ' ἦττον ἢ δὲ καὶ φιλητόν. ^{to him who}
 Ἡδεῖα ^{confers it.}

δ' ἔστι τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἢ ἐνέργεια, τοῦ δὲ ^{The actual}
 μέλλοντος ἢ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἢ μνήμη. ^{is more}
 ἦδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητόν ^{pleasant}
 ἢ ^{than hope}
 ἢ ^{or memory.}

that which existed only potentially before. For when the art exists its productions exist potentially, but actually only by production. As Eustratius expresses in the above quotation :
 ἢ γὰρ εἴχθη δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὰ τεχνιασά.

2. τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν] *At the same time to the benefactor his action (τὸ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν sc. id quod egit) is beautiful. He who has conferred a favour upon another has performed a beautiful action, and this beautiful work or action is, as was shown above, the person who has been benefited as far as he has received the benefit, and he is a standing memorial of the ἔργον of his benefactor. But in the benefactor there is no beautiful ἔργον which has been produced by the benefited, in which he can take pleasure, contemplating it as his own work. But if there be any thing in the contemplation of his benefactor in which he can take pleasure, it must be the contemplation of his own advantage and profit (τὸ συμφέρον). But this is less pleasant to him, as being merely the means to an end, than is his own work to the benefactor; for that which is useful is as a mean to some end, whereas the ἔργον of the benefactor is that end already produced. As therefore the ends are more desirable than the means, and*

the means desirable only in relation to the end; it follows, that in reference to benefits, the pleasure of the benefactor is great, whilst that of the benefited is inconsiderable.

ἴτι δὲ καὶ ἐστὶ ἡ μὲν εὐεργεσίας ἰσότης γίνεται βελτίων εὐεργετούν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ ἐστὶ τὸ εὐεργετοῦν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χαίρει τῷ εὐ εὐεργετοῦν, ἐστὶ ἐν αὐτῇ θεωρεῖ τὸ ἰσότητος ἀγαθόν. ἡ δὲ εὐ εὐεργετοῦν οὐ γίνεται βελτίων ἰσότητος τῷ πάσχοντι, οὐδὲ ἐν τῷ εὐεργετῇ ἔχει τι ἀγαθόν, βελτίων γὰρ ἐστὶ δύναται γίνεσθαι ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ, ἐν τῷ εὐεργετοῦν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. ὥστε ἐν τοῖς ἔμπεστον ἔρεται. διὰ τοῦτο εἰ ἐστὶ ἰσότης ἢ δὲ τῷ εὐ εὐεργετοῦν ἀπὸ τῷ εὐεργετῇ, οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστὶ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ συμφέρον τὸ διὰ συμφέρον οὐκ οὕτως ἢ δὲ καὶ φιλητόν ἐστὶν ὡς τὸ ἀγαθόν. τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθόν εἶδος ἐστὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον φιλητόν ἐστὶ καὶ ἢ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔρα φιλεῖ ἡ εὐεργεσίας ἐν εὐ εὐεργετοῦν ἢ δὲ ἐν ἰσότητος φιλεῖται. Paraph.

5. ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ] Compare the Rhetoric, i. 11.

8. τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν] *But that which is in act, or which actually is, is most pleasant. All pleasure is consequent upon the exercise of some energy, but all energies are of the past, the present, or the future. But of*

ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι μένει τὸ ἔργον (τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἢ τε μνήμη τῶν μὲν καλῶν

these, the energy of the present, that is the actual energy, is more vivid and more real than either of the others, and consequently the pleasure attending upon such energies is greater than that upon the others. For the pleasures arising from memory or hope, proceed from imagination picturing as present what is past or future, and consequently must be less pleasant than that which is actually present.

But to him who has conferred a favor, his work is ever present in the person of him upon whom he has conferred the favor, and consequently his energies are actual. Whereas in the case of the person benefited, it is merely the expectation of the future, or memory of the past, which brings pleasure.

To this it may be urged, that the expectation is often more pleasant than the reality; that in the words of Pope,

“ Hope springs eternal in the human breast,

Man never is, but always to be blest.”

But this is only a seeming objection; for the good, when really present, is not the same good which our hope pictured. Whether he who has received only a slight favour, but expects a very great one from his benefactor, may not receive more pleasure than his benefactor does from him, may reasonably be doubted. But this is another question.

3. ἢ τε μνήμη] There are two ways of considering this passage, either as a further explanation of the previous sentence, or as an answer to an objec-

tor. If the first, then Aristotle says; the memory of past καλὰ is more pleasant than that of past χρήσιμα; but, on the contrary, the hope of future χρήσιμα is more pleasant than that of future καλὰ. For since the καλὰ are ends but the χρήσιμα means, and the end cannot exist without the means, the ends as being more distant less affect our minds, and are to us less desirable than the means, as happiness than money. But where the end has already happened, the eligibility of the means, and the reason for which only they are desirable, has passed away, and consequently cannot afford us the same pleasure as the end, if any at all. This is one way of considering the passage.

Or it may be an answer to an objection. “ How can the benefactor who has conferred a favour be said actually to energize, since when he has conferred the favor his energy has ceased? Let it be granted. Nevertheless the benefactor feels more love than the benefited. For if the memory of the καλὰ is more pleasant than that of the χρήσιμα, and the benefactor has conferred the χρήσιμα from which follow the καλὰ, and if he remembers the καλὰ, and so much the more vividly as having them before his eyes, but the debtor only the χρήσιμα, and that but feebly since they are passed away, therefore the benefactor has more pleasure than the benefited, and therefore naturally loves more than the benefited.

Michelet gives a different interpretation: Pulchre facta, antequam acta

ἡδεΐα, τῶν δὲ χρησίμων οὐ πάνυ ἡ ἦτρον ἢ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. Καὶ ἡ ^{And in conferring be-} μὲν φίλησις ποιήσῃ ἔοικεν, τὸ φιλεῖσθαι δὲ τῶ ^{nefits there is an} πάσχειν. τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὴ περὶ τὴν πράξιν ^{ὑπερεχέ.} ἔπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά. Ἔτι δὲ τὰ ^{As also} ἐπιπόνως γεγόμενα πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν, ^{greater labor.} οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτησάμενοι τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὴ τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν ἐργώδες. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ ¹⁰μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι· ἐπιπονωτέρα γὰρ ἢ γέννησις, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασις ὅτι αὐτῶν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκείον εἶναι.

sint plus laboris habere quam jucunditatis videntur, externa autem bona sive utilia quæ speramus majorem expectationem movent, quam possunt explere, cum non sint vere bonum; unde patet ante beneficium collatum eum, qui accepturus est, daturum majore amplecti amore, post autem contra.

4. τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι] But to those who excel in any action, there follows a delight upon that action. Thus, as he says in the Rhetoric i. 11. τὸ καὶν ἰδόν, οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοτιμοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φαντασίᾳ ὑπερεχέσθαι γίγνεται, οὐ πάντες ἔχουσι ἰσοθυμίαν ἢ ἡρέμα ἢ μᾶλλον. And again in the same chapter, in reference to the particular subject before us: καὶ τὸ εἰ παῖς καὶ τὸ εἰ πάσχειν τῶν ἰδίων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰ πάσχειν εὐχαίᾳ ἴσθαι ὡς ἰσοθυμοῦσι, τὸ δὲ εἰ παῖς ἔχειν καὶ ὑπερέχειν, ὡς ἀφοσιῶν ἰφίπτεται.

The feeling of superiority is pleasant to us, because it is the contemplation of an actual good which we possess, the love of superiority being a natural feeling, as Aristotle appears to consider it in his Rhetoric; or because, to

reduce it to a primary principle, in the possession of superiority we possess a greater degree of power over our energies; the greater our superiority, the less are our energies impeded. The reverse of superiority must therefore, as far as this is concerned, be painful. Since therefore he who confers a favor exercises a superiority, but he who receives is placed in a degree of inferiority, the benefactor, as far as he excels, is not a natural object of delight to him whom he has benefited. Whilst the reverse holds good with the benefactor.

6. ἰσοθυμίας γινόμενα] See the Rhetoric i. 7.

7. οἱ κτησάμενοι] Compare Plato's Repub. p. 330. οὐ τοῖς ἴσους ἡρέμα, ἢ ὅ γὰρ, ἴσθαι μὲν ἴσους οὐ σφάρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. τοῦτο δὲ παῖς ὡς τὸ καλὸν εἰ μὴ αὐτὸν κτήσονται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διατλήῃ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὡς πρὸς γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ αὐτῶν παιχνήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπᾶσι, ταύτην σὲ δὲ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι πρὸς τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἰαντῶν.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Self-love.

Reasons for
and against
self-love
stated.

ΑΠΟΡΕΙΤΑΙ δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν 8
 μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά· ἐπιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦς
 μάλιστα ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχυρῷ φιλαύτους
 ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν
 πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ἦ, 5
 τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον· ἐγκαλοῦσι δὲ αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐθὲν
 ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπικηὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν,
 καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ἦ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν,
 καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα· τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρήσιν. τοῖς
 λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. 10
 φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον,
 φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται
 τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηθεὶς εἴσεται.
 ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν, καὶ
 τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθ' οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται· εἴρηται 15
 γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς
 τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι
 ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ “μία ψυχὴ” καὶ “κοινὰ
 τὰ φίλων” καὶ “ισότης φιλότης” καὶ “γόνυ
 κνήμης ἕγγιον” πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτὸν 20
 μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὐτῷ, καὶ

6. *ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ*] Does nothing of himself: *mero motu*: without self-interested motives. *ἰσχυρῶς* διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν ἰδίων κλίον ἰσχυροῦ, ἀλλ' ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα ποιεῖ. Paraph.

14. *αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν*] See chap. 4. p. 361.

15. *εἴρηται γὰρ*] See above, p. 363.

21. *μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος*] If to love one's self be reprehensible, then to love

φιλητέον δὴ μάλισθ' ἑαυτόν. Ἀπορεῖται δ' That self-love is of two kinds; rational and irrational. But from the latter being most common, the notion that all self-love is censurable.
 εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεῶν ἔπεισθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντων
 τὸ πιστόν. ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιοῦτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων
 διαιρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον ἐκάτεροι καὶ πῆ
 5 ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς
 ἐκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον. οἱ μὲν
 οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι
 τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι
 καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων
 10 γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασιν περὶ
 αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν.
 οἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς
 ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ
 τῆς ψυχῆς. τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ
 15 ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου
 ὄντος. δικαίως δὲ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται.
 ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασιν
 λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον· εἰ γάρ
 τις αἰεὶ σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μά-
 20 λιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὅποιαοῦν ἄλλα
 τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως αἰεὶ τὸ καλὸν
 ἑαυτῷ περιποιεῖτο, οὐθεὶς ἐρεῖ τούτον φίλαυτον
 οὐδὲ ψέξει. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον Whereas the former appears in
 εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα

one's friend as another self is also reprehensible. And conversely, if to love one's friend as one's self be praiseworthy, then the loving one's self must also be so. Such is the force of the proverbs which Aristotle cites, all resting on the principle that we must first love ourselves before we can love another. Self-love being the inmost

circle, proceeding next to those who are part of ourselves, thence to those further removed. This is most truly and beautifully illustrated in the Epistles of St. John.

23. *ἴξιν δ' ἄρ]* Compare the argument generally in Plato's *Gorgias*, p. 509. sq.

reality rather to be self-love, since it reserves the greatest good for itself. But each self-love can only exist with virtue. And must therefore be commendable.

καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαντος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ δ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατῆς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατῆς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μὴ, ὡς τούτου ἐκάστου ὄντος· καὶ πεπραγένοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοῖ καὶ ἐκούσῳ τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι 10 ὁ ἐπιεικῆς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ φίλαντος μάλιστα ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς 15 καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμειλιμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ 20 ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαντον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει· τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν ἐπόμενος. τῷ 25 μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἂ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ

2. *δοτικὴ δὲ καὶ*] And just as that which has the chief sway in a city appears par excellence to be the city, and that which has the chief sway in any system, the system, so is it with man. After *σύστημα* and *ἄνθρωπος* re-

spectively the words *εὖ κυριώτατον μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ* ought to be supplied.

7. *ὡς τοῦτο ἐκάστου*] See above, p. 363, 1.

ἂ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπεικῆς, ἂ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει·
 πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ'
 ἐπεικῆς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. Ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ
 τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα πολλὰ
 5 πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέη ὑπεραποθνή-
 σκειν· προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς
 καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθὰ, περιποιούμενος
 ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι
 σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἔλοιτ' ἂν ἢ πολὺν ἡρέμα, καὶ
 10 βιώσαι καλῶς ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη τυχόντως,
 καὶ μίαν πράξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἢ πολλὰς
 καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως
 συμβαίνει· αἰροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ
 χρήματα προοῖντ' ἂν ἐφ' ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ
 15 φίλοι· γίνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα, αὐτῷ
 δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὴ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει.
 καὶ περὶ τιμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος·
 πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται· καλὸν
 γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ
 20 σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἰρούμενος τὸ καλόν.
 ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προῖεσθαι, καὶ
 εἶναι κάλλιον τοῦ αὐτὸν πράξαι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ
 φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ὁ

2. αἴς γὰρ νοῦς] See above, p. 362, 6. n.

3. ἀληθῆς δ' εἰς] Besides showing in this place in what way the good man displays his self-love, Aristotle indirectly gives direction as to the offices of virtuous friendship.

8. ὀλίγοι γὰρ χρόνοι] Aristotle seems to refer to Homer's *Il. A.* 418. See the note of the Schol. on that passage.

23. ἐν αἴσι δὲ] In tota hac disputatione Platonis sententiam scriptor noster respexisse videtur amorem sui non accuratius distinguentis, sed universe damnantis. De Legib. V. p. 731.

πάντοι δὲ μέγιστος κακὸς ἀνθρώπου τῆς πολλῆς ἰμφοῦ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἴσσει· οὗ αἴς ἑαυτοῦ συγγνώμη ἔχειν ἀποφυγῆν οὐδέμιν μηχανῆσαι. τοῦτο δ' ἴσσει δ' ἴσσει ὡς φίλος αὐτῷ αἴς ἀνθρώπου

σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων.
οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαντον εἶναι δεῖ, καθάπερ εἶρηται·
ὡς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή.

CHAP. IX.

Whether Friendship is necessary to Happiness or not.

That the happy, being all-sufficient in themselves, are not likely to require the aid of friends.

But yet it seems absurd if we suppose that he who possesses all good should not possess the greatest. Especially if friendship consists in conferring rather than in receiving favors; and it is more honorable to bestow them on friends than strangers.

ΑΜΦΙΣΒΗΤΕΙΤΑΙ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, 9
εἰ δεήσεται φίλων ἢ μὴ. οὐθὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν 5
φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν
γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰγαθὰ· αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς
προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα,
ποριζεῖν ἅ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ ὅθεν τὸ “ὅταν
ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῶ, τί δεῖ φίλων;” Ἔοικε δ' 10
ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντ' ἀπονέμοντας τὰγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι
φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν
μέγιστον εἶναι. εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ
ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς
ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους 15
ὀθνεῖων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος.
διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον
δεῖ φίλων ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις, ὡς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος
δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησούντων καὶ τῶν εὐτυχοῦντων

φίλοι εἰσὶν, καὶ ἑβδὸς ἔχει τὸ δεῖν εἶναι
εἰσὺς &c. in fine his verbis additis :
δὲ πάντα ἀπέρωσεν χρεὶ φίλων τὸ
σφδρα φίλων αὐτῶν· ἐν δ' ἑαυτοῦ βιλ-
τω δάκρυον δέ. ZELL.

CHAP. IX.

Upon this Chapter, as for some

other points of this Book, see Diog.
Laert. vii. §. 23. §. 123. sq. viii.
§. 10.

9. Ἔστι δ' αὖ δαίμων] Euripid. Orestes,
v. 667.

13. ἐν εὖ ποιῶν] See the seventh
Chapter of this Book.

- οὐς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. Ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ Or that the
μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἔλοιτ' happy man
ἂν καθ' αὐτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ· πολιτικὸν can be a
γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. καὶ τῷ being.
5 εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει Besides,
ἀγαθὰ ἔχει. δῆλον δ' ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιει- that it is
κῶν κρείττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων better to
συνημερεύειν· δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. Τί That the
οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῆ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ negative of
10 ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι; this ques-
τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐθὲν δεῖσεται ὁ μακάριος, tion came
ἐπειδὴ τὰγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ. οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ to be as-
τὸ ἡδύ, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν· ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὧν οὐθὲν sserted from
δεῖται ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς. οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν the good
15 τοιούτων φίλων οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων. Τὸ Nevertheless they
require vir-

1. Ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως] The supposition that a man can be happy without friends contravenes not only the general notions of mankind, but likewise the undoubted truth that man is a social animal, and can only be happy in a state of society, that being the state for which nature intended him, and for which she has endowed him with capacities and desires. As elsewhere he expresses it: *ἰ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κινουμένων ἢ μηδὲν διόμενος δι' ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν μίξας φύλας· ἄσπερ ἢ θηρίον ἢ βίος*. he is either above or below human nature. (Pol. i. l. p. 4.) If, therefore, the happy man were a solitary being, he would be cut off from the exercise of his noblest energies, and consequently of the greatest part of his happiness, and a solitary he must be if he have not a friend. For how can he with pleasure spend his life with those who are totally dissimilar to himself?

— ἴσως] This term appears to me to be used only to qualify the harshness of the word preceding it, although the Scholiast thinks that Aristotle uses it in reference to the subject of the tenth Book, where he shows that the life of the happy man consists chiefly in contemplation (*θεωρία*).

2. *μειώσης*] See p. 22. and p. 31, 16.

3. *πολιτικὸν γὰρ*] See p. 192. n.

14. *ἐπεισάκτου ἡδονῆς*] Of adventitious pleasure. Compare p. 30. *ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἰ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς.—οὐδὲν δὲ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς ἡδονῆς ἰ βίος αὐτῶν ἄσπερ ἀνθρώπων τινός.*

15. *εὖ δ' οὐκ ἴσως*] Having shown that people inferred erroneously that because the happy man did not require friends either for pleasure or for profit, therefore he did not require them at all, Aristotle now proceeds to show, that though he does not stand in need of these which are but accidental friendships, he does of that which is

tuous friends, since in them they contemplate two things which are the sources of the greatest pleasure.

δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές· ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὡς περ κτήματι· εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐνέργεια σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα καθ' αὐτήν, καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον τῶν ἡδέων, θεωρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς πέλας δυνάμεθα ἢ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις ἢ τὰς οἰκειάς, αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὲ πράξεις φίλων ὄντων ἡδεῖαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· ἄμφω γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα. ὁ μακάριος δὲ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται, εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπιεικῆς καὶ οἰκειάς· τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλου ὄντος.

And friends are necessary to him not only for the full de-

Οἶονταί τε δεῖν ἡδέως ζῆν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· μονώτῃ μὲν οὖν χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος· οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον καθ' αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν

real friendship, the friendship of the good. And this argument will be more intelligible if it be simplified as Muretus has simplified it, by commencing with the concluding syllogism.

Happiness is an energy, but the energies of happiness consist not only in action but contemplation, and consequently in a contemplation of those things which are pleasant. But these things the happy man must contemplate either in himself or in others. But in himself he cannot contemplate them so well as in others. He must, therefore, contemplate them in his friends or in strangers. If in strangers, though they be virtuous they will not be *εικῆαι*. But if in others they will possess both these qualities, (*ἄμφω ἔχουσι εὐὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα*); they will be *εικῆαι* since a friend is a second self;

virtuous (*ἰσχυροῖς*) since he is a good man.

The friend therefore of the good man, is the mirror in which he sees himself and his own actions reflected. The same simile is beautifully applied in Shakespeare's Julius Cæsar, in the celebrated dialogue of Brutus and Cassius. Act i. sc. 2.

1. *ἐν ἀρχῇ*] See p. 26, 1.

3. *ἴσως γίνεται*] εἰ δὲ ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως εἰ καὶ ὑφιστηκός, ὡς οἰκία ἢ ἰμάσιον ἢ ἰγὰ ἢ εὐ, ἀλλὰ γίνεται ὡς περ καὶ ἡ κίνησις. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις ἔστιν ἰμοῦ ζυμαῖον, ἀλλὰ ἐν μὲν αὐτοῖς γίγνεται, ἐν δὲ ἑστί, ἐν δὲ μίλλῃ γινώσθαι· οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἴσως εἰ. Schol. See also i. 7.

6. *ἐν ἀρχῇ*] See note above, p. 30, and p. 363.

7. *εὐὰ οἰκῆαι*] That which is appropriate to, or part of one's self, is pleasant.

συνεχῶς, μεθ' ἐτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους ῥᾶον. ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια συνεχεστέρα, ἡδεῖα οὕσα καθ' αὐτήν, ὃ δεῖ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ἢ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει, καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἡδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησις τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆναι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θεογνίς φησιν. Φυσικώτερον δ' ἔπισκοποῦσιν ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος τῷ σπουδαίῳ τῇ φύσει αἰρετὸς εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν εἴρηται ὅτι τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι καθ' αὐτό. τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις.

velopment but also pleasurable exercise of his energies.

Which is further proved from the perception of life generally being pleasant and natural to us.

9. *Θέλωμι*] The verses to which Aristotle here refers are quoted at length with some others of the same writer by Plato, *Meno*, p. 95. D.

καὶ σαφὲς τοῖσιν τίτι καὶ ἴσθι, καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν

Ἦς, καὶ ἄδαναι τοῖς ἄν' μεγάλη δύναμις. ἰσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄτ' ἰσθλὰ δὲδέξαι· ἢ δὲ πακοῖσιν

συμμελοῦσιν ἀπολλύει καὶ ἐνὶ λότῳ ἴσον.

— *φυσικώτερον*] The previous arguments were derived from the nature of the happy man, as far as he is happy, which is not a consideration derived from his natural state, because virtue is the efficient cause of happiness, and this is not given us by nature (see ii. 1.) But the following view of the subject is derived from the consideration of life generally, not such as is peculiar to the happy man, but such as nature gives to all; and hence Aristotle uses the term *φυσικώτερον* in application to it. *συνεψύμωθα γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων προσηύδατο τῷ εὐδαίμονι ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῆ ἀπῶσι.* Paph.

12. *εἴρηται*] See p. 30, 14.

13. *εὐδὲ ζῆν*] Aristotle commences his argument drawn from a consideration of the natural life, by first defining what life is. That of plants consists in vegetation and reproduction; that of animals in vegetation, reproduction, and sensation; that of man in vegetation, reproduction, sensation, and perception (*εἴρηται*). Not in the mere power of vegetation &c. but in the actual vegetating (*ἐνεργεῖν*), for it is the actual employment not the dormant possession merely of their differentia which distinguishes man from animal, and animal from plant. For the energy is the perfection (*εὐδὲ κέρειον*) of the power, and the power is always referred to the energy; therefore, the life of man should be defined by the actual, rather than the power of feeling and perceiving. Having premised thus much, he then proceeds to the main argument, which appears involved from his mixing up with it the proofs of the different propositions. To make it therefore more clear, we shall omit the

δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως, ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνεργεῖαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἔοικε δὴ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῆν τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων (ὠρισμένον γάρ, 5 τὸ δ' ὠρισμένον τῆς ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως) τὸ δὲ

prosyllogisms, as they are termed, representing merely the principal argument.

Since that which is absolutely and naturally good is pleasant to the good man, and life is such a good; (1) then,

Life is pleasant to the good man;

But life is feeling and perception; therefore,

Feeling and perception is pleasant to the good man.

But he who feels, feels that he feels, and he who perceives, perceives that he perceives; therefore,

The feeling that he feels, and the perceiving that he perceives is pleasant to the good man.

But the feeling that a man feels and the perceiving that he perceives is nothing else than the perceiving that he lives, or the perceiving of a good in one's self, (for life is such a good),

And the perceiving of a good in one's self is pleasant; therefore,

The feeling that he lives is pleasant to a good man.

But as a good man feels to himself, so does he towards his friend; therefore,

The feeling and perceiving the life of his friend is pleasant to a good man.

But these are not possible without a friend and without his presence; therefore,

A friend and his presence (συζῆν) is pleasant and good to the good man.

2. ἡ δὲ δύναμις] τὴν δύναμιν ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ γὰρ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ· λέγουσι δὲ κυρίως τὸ τέλος, καὶ τὸ εὖ ἵνα καὶ τῆς γὰρ ἐνεργείας ἵνα καὶ ἡ φύσις τὰς δυνάμεις ἡμῖν ἰσίσταται, καὶ ταύτης ἵνα περιέσται καὶ ἀσπαζόμεθα ταύτας. Paraph.

4. τὸ δὲ ζῆν] See x. 3. ad fin.

5. ὠρισμένον γὰρ] See the *σοφιστικὰ* of the Pythagoreans, p. 17. See also x.

2. ἴσμεν δὲ ὅτι οἱ Πυθαγορεῖοι δύο συνείχευσι ἰσίσταν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἴσταντο ὑπὸ τῆν μίαν, τὰ δὲ κακὰ ὑπὸ τῆν λοιπῆν καὶ ἰσάλλου ἐν ἡ. ὑπῆγον τὰ κακὰ ὠρισμένην. ἐν ἡ δὲ τὰ κακὰ ἀρίστην, καὶ ἀντιστρέφουσιν ἴλιγον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ὠρισμένα.—ἰσόμενος καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἀρίστα.—ὅτι δὲ τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὠρισμένον ἐν πολλοῖς τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Πλάτωνα διδύκνται. ἰ μὲν γὰρ Φαῦλος διὰ τὰς ἀλόγους ἰερίους αἰετῆς ἵστανται καὶ τὴν ἀπείρατον ἰσχυρίαν τῶν φαύλων ἡδονῶν ἀρίστην ζῆν. παντοῖος γὰρ γνώμωνος μῆτιν ὡν ἀρέσται ἀριστοτέμεινος, καὶ διὰ τούτου ἀπὸ ἄλλων ἰσ' ἄλλα μετασπῶν, ἐν οὐδὲμῃ ὄρα ἰπὶ τινος τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἰστάμεινος.—ἰ δὲ σπουδαῖος. βλίωμι γὰρ ἰσθῆ, τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ καὶ ὄντως ἴδια δύνανται καὶ ἀρέσταν αὐταῖς ἴσμεν. Schol.

6. ὠρισμένον] This passage, as the next, *διότι τινος ἴσμεν*—, is used to prove the minor of the second syllogism, (1) that life is naturally good.

τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ· διόπερ ἔοικε
 πᾶσιν ἡδὺ εἶναι. (οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν
 ζῶην καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις· ἀόριστος
 γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν
 5 τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώ-
 τερον)· εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ (ἔοικε
 δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μά-
 λιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτοις γὰρ
 ὁ βίος αἰρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη
 10 ζῶη)· ὁ δ' ὁρῶν ὅτι ὀρᾷ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ ἀκούων
 ὅτι ἀκούει καὶ ὁ βαδίζων ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ
 τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι
 ἐνεργούμεν, ὥστε αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι αἰσθανό-
 15 μεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν ὅτι νοοῦμεν, τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανό-
 μεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν· (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἢ
 αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν)· τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῆν,
 τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὐτό· (φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζῶη,
 τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡδύ)·
 αἰρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅτι

2. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν] Aristotle here meets an objection, that we must except a life of vice and depravity, of course, from the natural goods, as not falling under the genus of ἀρεταίαι.

4. καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα] *Just as the things which belong to it; the vices which attend it.* As the vices and pains of a profligate life are multifarious and innumerable, so is the profligate life itself.

“Cur autem vita finita sit hæc est ratio, quia est *ἰσχύριον* seu actio quædam; nam ut potestas (*δύναμις*) est interminata et quæ ad multa deduci et explicari potest, ita *ἰσχύριον* est ter-

minata: exemplo sint materia et forma.” GIPH. Of the word *ὀρέγεσθαι*, see above p. 28. 3.

5. τοῖς ἐχομένοις] The Scholiast refers to the discussion concerning pleasure in the next Book.

7. πάντας ἐρέγεσθαι] See x. 3.

— μάλιστα τοῖς ἰσχυρίοις] See above, p. 362, 5.

13. αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι αἰσθάνομεθα] Explicatur a Physicis initio libri tertii de Anima. GIPH.

14. τὸ δ' ὅτι] *But the fact of our feeling and perceiving is a fact that we exist.*

15. ἦν] *Was said to be.* In p. 382, 4.

τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ· (συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἡδονται)· ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· (ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν)· καθάπερ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸν εἶναι αἰρετόν ἐστιν ἐκάστω, 5 οὕτω καὶ τὸ τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως. τὸ δ' εἶναι ἢν αἰρετόν διὰ τὸ αισθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος. ἢ δὲ τοιαύτη αἴσθησις ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν. συναισθάνεσθαι ἄρα δεῖ καὶ τοῦ φίλου ὅτι ἐστίν, τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν 10 λόγων καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρετόν ἐστι καθ' αὐτό, ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὄν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ 15 καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρετῶν ἂν εἴη. ὁ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἰρετόν, τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτη ἐνδεὴς ἔσται. δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων.

CHAP. X.

Of the number of Friends.

The question resolved in reference first to friendships of interest.

AP' οὖν ὡς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ 10 καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρησθαι δοκεῖ “ μῆτε πολύξεινος μῆτ' ἄξεινος,” καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἀρμόσει μῆτ' ἄφιλον εἶναι μῆτ' αὐ πολύ-

10. ἢ τῷ συζῆν] See above viii. 5.

— ὡς κλίσιονες] See viii. 6.

20. ὡς κλίσιονες] See what Diog. Laert. says of the followers of Zeno. vii. 124.

21. εἰρησθαι] By Hesiod. Oper. et D. v. 713.

φιλον καθ' ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρήσιν
καὶ πάνν δόξειεν ἂν ἀρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς
γὰρ ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος
αὐτοῖς τοῦτο πράττειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς
5 τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶς περιέργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι
πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν. καὶ
οἱ πρὸς ἡδονήν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν
τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἡδυσμα. Τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους In virtuous
friendships.
πότερον πλείστους κατ' ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον
10 καὶ φιλικῶν πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ
ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὔτ' ἐκ δέκα
μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν
ἴσως ἐν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὀρισμένων.
καὶ φίλων δὴ ἔστι πλήθος ὀρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως
15 οἱ πλείστοι, μεθ' ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν· τοῦτο
γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι, ὅτι δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε
πολλοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν αὐτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλον.
ἔτι δὲ κάκεινους δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ
μέλλουσι πάντες μετ' ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν·
20 τοῦτο δ' ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν
δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλαγεῖν
οἰκειῶς πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμω τῷ
μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν
εὖ ἔχει μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλότατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ

3. οὐκ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος] Quod quidam
hic vertunt *βίος facultates et rem fami-
liarem* errant. Argumento sit quod
ait, *πρὸς οἰκίαν βίον*, et quod hic *βίος* in
magnis dicitur *φύσις*, id est, vitam et
naturam nostram esse imparem ad
omnia amicorum obsequia plurimo-
rum. Exemplum affert elegans Plu-
tarchus in libello de *πολυφιλίᾳ*: "Si

ex multis unus roget ad cœnam, alius
ad funus, alius ut in foro sibi sis advo-
catus, alius ad nuptias, alius ad iter,
alius denique alio, alius pecuniam ro-
get mutuam, alius vestem," &c. omnes
eodem tempore, quis par his omnibus
esse posset? GIPH.

11. δέκα μυριάδων] See Polit. vii.

4.

τοσούτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσι λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπεικῆ· δι' ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὐρεῖν τοιούτους.

15

CHAP. XI.

Whether there is greater need of Friends in adversity or prosperity.

ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ δ' ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον φίλων δεῖ 11

That we require friends both in adversity and prosperity. ἢ ἐν δυστυχίαις; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται· οἳ τὲ γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας, οἳ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες συμβίων καὶ οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν·

3. *ἰσπερὶ γὰρ*] See above p. 326, 16.

8. *ἰσ δμοί*] As Pylades and Orestes, Damon and Pythias, and the like.

10. *πλὴν πολιτικῶς*] Aristotle says it is not possible for a good man to have many friends, for the reason stated above. Nevertheless he may be a friend to many at once in a certain sense, as to his country or his own

party. But this feeling differs from friendship, properly so called, because he does not entertain this affection towards individuals on account of their individual virtue, but as parts of a whole, and with a view to the benefit of that whole; as of happiness to his country or victory to his party.

14. *ἀγαπητός*] It is enough.

βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δρᾶν. ἀναγκαιότερον μὲν δὴ
 ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις, διὸ τῶν χρησίμων ἐνταῦθα δεῖ,
 κάλλιον δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις, διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς
 ζήτουσιν· τούτους γὰρ αἰρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν
 5 καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ παρουσία
 αὐτῆ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις·
 κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι συναλγούντων τῶν
 φίλων. διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειέν τις πότερον ὥσπερ
 βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, ἢ
 10 παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν ἡδεῖα οὖσα καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ
 συναλγεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 διὰ ταῦτα ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται, ἀφείσθω·
 συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν. Ἔοικε
 δ' ἡ παρουσία μκτὴ τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν
 15 γὰρ τὸ ὄρᾶν τοὺς φίλους ἡδύ, ἄλλως τε καὶ
 ἀτυχοῦντι, καὶ γίνεται τις ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ
 λυπεῖσθαι· παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῆ
 ὄψει καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐὰν ἢ ἐπιδέξιός· οἶδε γὰρ
 τὸ ἦθος καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἡδεται καὶ λυπεῖται. τὸ δὲ
 20 λυπούμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἀτυχίαις
 λυπηρόν· πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς
 φίλοις. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἀνδρώδεις τὴν φύσιν εὐλα-
 βοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς, κἂν μὴ
 ὑπερτείνῃ τῆ ἀλυπία, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην
 25 οὐχ ὑπομένει, ὅλως τε συνθρήνους οὐ προσίεται

But the
 pleasure de-
 rived from
 the society
 of friends in
 sorrow is
 mixed with
 pain :
 pleasure
 from the
 mere sight
 of them, but
 pain from
 seeing them
 grieving for
 us.

4. αἰετώτερον ἐνέργειῳ] See above chap. 9.

22. δῖοςτις εἰ μὴ ἀνδρώδεις] Wherefore the brave are cautious of having their friends to condole with them, for unless he (the brave) be very insensible (ὀπιεταίνῃ τῇ ἀλυσίᾳ) he will not endure to see grief coming upon them

(from his own troubles); and secondly, and in short, he does not readily admit commiserators, from himself not being given to weeping and lamentation. Such seems to me to be the simplest and most grammatical way of constructing the passage, though great diversity of opinion exists respecting it.

διὰ τὸ μηδ' αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός· γύναια δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλοῦντας. μιμῆσθαι δ' ἐν ἅπασι δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω. Ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις τῶν φίλων παρουσία τὴν τε εὐδιαγωγὴν ἠδεῖαν ἔχει καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν ὅτι ἡδοντα ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς. διὸ δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμως· εὐεργετητικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν· εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας ὀκνοῦντα· μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν, ὅθεν τὸ “ἄλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν.” μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες μεγάλ' αὐτὸν ὠφελήσειν. ἰέναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἀρμόζει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀτυχοῦντας ἄκλητον καὶ προθύμως (φίλου γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, 15 καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρεῖα καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀξιώσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἡδιον), εἰς δὲ τὰς εὐτυχίας συνεργοῦντα μὲν προθύμως (καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεῖα φίλων), πρὸς εὐπάθειαν δὲ σχολαίως· οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμῆσθαι ὠφελεῖσθαι. δόξαν 20 δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διωθεῖσθαι ἴσως εὐλαβητέον·

But in joy we receive, on the contrary, double pleasure; from their presence, and from seeing them pleased at our own good fortune. Wherefore we should court their society in our prosperity, but not call for them in adversity, except in certain cases. But when they are in prosperity or adversity we should act just the reverse.

2. καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες] sc. and womanish men.

3. μιμῆσθαι—δεῖ] This is said in reference to the words preceding. We ought not, like effeminate persons, to give way to sorrow and be ready to communicate it to our friends, but bear it like the brave.

11. ἄλις ἰγώ] Paraphrastes: ἰ τραγῳδίας φησιν. Interpretes putant locum significari Euripidis in Oreste v. 239:

λίξις τι καινός; καὶ μὴν εὐχάριν φέρις· εἰ δ' ἴς βλάβην τιν'. ἄλις ἴχω τῷ δωσσυχῶν.

Quapropter alius locus indicandus erat, nisi, quod verisimilius videtur,

tragedia unde hic versus desumptus est, perit. Similis autem valde loco huic est veteris tragici, quod ad sententiam facit, locus itemdem Sophoclis e fabula, cujus index est Œdipus Tyrannus (v. 1061.) ita enim loquitur Jocasta, ἄλις τοσοῦτ' ἰγώ. VICTOR and GIPH.

15. ἀκλητον] Aristotle appears to allude in this passage to Homer's description of Menelaus visiting Agamemnon in his troubles. See Iliad B. 408.

αὐτόματος δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι βεβῆν ἀγαθὸς Μινίλαος,
ἦδει γὰρ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀδελφῶν ὡς ἰσοῦστα.

ἐνίοτε γὰρ συμβαίνει. ἡ παρουσία δὴ τῶν φίλων ἐν ἅπασιν αἰρετὴ φαίνεται.

- 12 Ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρώσι τὸ ὄραν ἀγαπη- Some con-
cluding re-
marks, tend-
ing to shew
why the
presence of
friends is
delightful
in all
friendships.
τότατόν ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται ταύτην τὴν
5 αἰσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς, ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μάλιστα
τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς
φίλοις αἰρετώτατόν ἐστι τὸ συζῆν; κοινωνία γὰρ
ἡ φιλία. καὶ ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς
10 αἰρετὴ καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον δὴ. ἡ δ' ἐνέργεια
γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ συζῆν, ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου
ἐφίενται. καὶ ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκάστοις τὸ εἶναι
ἢ οὐ χάριν αἰροῦνται τὸ ζῆν, ἐν τούτῳ μετὰ
τῶν φίλων βούλονται διάγειν· διόπερ οἱ μὲν
15 συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ συγκυβεύουσιν, ἄλλοι δὲ
συγγυμνάζονται καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν ἢ συμφιλοσο-
φοῦσιν, ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες ὃ τί
περ μάλιστα ἀγαπῶσι τῶν ἐν τῇ βίῳ· συζῆν γὰρ
βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων, ταῦτα ποιοῦσι καὶ
20 τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν οἷς οἴονται συζῆν. γίνεται
οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν φαύλων φιλία μοχθηρὰ· κοινωνοῦσι
γὰρ φαύλων ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες, καὶ μοχθηροὶ δὲ
γίνονται ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν
ἐπιεικῆς, συναυξανομένη ταῖς ὁμιλίαις· δοκοῦσι
25 δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ διορ-
θοῦντες ἀλλήλους· ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλ-

6. ἔρωτος ὄντος] See above ix. 5; and compare the Rhetoric, i. 11.

8. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει] Compare p. 384.

9. ἡ αἰσθησις οὗ ἔστιν αἰρετή] See above p. 382.

10. ἐνέργεια—ἐν τῷ συζῆν] Compare p. 384, 10. note.

12. ἐν εἶναι] Compare p. 383.

22. ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες] See p. 364.

26. ἀπομάττονται] πολυχρήστον ἤματι τὸ μάσσειν, ἐξ οὗ κατὰ παραγωγὴν

λήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται, ὅθεν “ ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ
 ἄπ’ ἐσθλά.” περὶ μὲν οὖν φιλίας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
 εἰρήσθω· ἐπόμενον δ’ ἂν εἶη διελθεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς.

ἁμαρτάνει μὲν τὸ ἁπλῆ ἀποσογγί-
 ζειν. ἁμαρτάνει δὲ τὸ εἶναι σκαῖν τοῦτο
 σκεῖν κερταῖν. ἁμαρτάνει δὲ καὶ ἁμαρ-
 τάνει καὶ τὸ ἀποσογγίξει μὲν. μά-
 λιστα δὲ τὸ εἶναι σκαῖν ἀρετῆς ἐπὶ
 ἴστω καὶ ἁμαρτάνει κατὰ τοὺς σκαλαῖς

ἀποσογγί. σφραγίς, εἰσάφ. Eusta-
 thius, p. 1857.

1. ἐσθλῶν μὲν γάρ] These are part of
 the verses of Theognis, quoted above
 ix. 9. p. 381.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOK X.

AT the conclusion of the Seventh Book (p. 295 sq.) Aristotle took occasion to glance from the discussion of Temperance and Intemperance and their kindred habits, to the consideration of their particular object-matter, the more immediate pleasures derived from sensual gratification; and although some of the remarks there introduced apply to the nature of pleasure in general, yet it is easily seen, that they are made more especially with reference to corporeal pleasures. That discussion is left unfinished, Aristotle contenting himself with exposing the weakness of the arguments brought for and against it, not entering very deeply or explicitly into an explanation or refutation of the theories of Eudoxus and Plato, which he reserves for the present Book. Both because such a refutation serves for a natural introduction of his own system, which strikes the midway between the other two, and because the further and more intricate prosecution of this subject is coincident with a more complete and conclusive explanation of the true nature of Happiness. In the same way Plato also, in his dialogue of the Philebus, proceeds from a consideration of the nature of Pleasure to that of the chief and perfect Good.

The opinion that Pleasure is the Chief Good had been much advanced by the efforts of Democritus, the Sophists, Aristippus, and others, and was entertained by many of the contemporaries of Aristotle and Plato. The dialogues of the latter are full of objections to this popular theory: but in none are they refuted with more care and labor than in the Philebus; to which dialogue and its reasonings and representations of the nature of Pleasure particularly, constant reference is made in the following Book.

According to Plato's theory^a, as there set forth, all things are either of the finite (*πέρας*), or infinite (*ἄπειρον*), or formed from the union of these two, the mixed (*τὸ ζυμμισηγόμενον*), and, lastly, the cause of this union which regulates and directs it (*τὸ αἴτιον*). The indefinite is that which admits of more or less, without the destruction of its essence, in which there is a constant vicissitude of qualities (*ποιότητων*), possessing in itself neither beginning, middle, nor end^b. The finite is that which has the power of bounding and restraining the infinite. But since neither of these, separated and disunited, are desirable by

^a ΣΩ. ἀκατάβρωτον ἔσται τῶν τῶν δὲ λόγων. ΠΡΩ. ποῖα; ΣΩ. τὸν θὸν ἰλιγγυμένον σου. τὸ μὴν ἄπειρον διῆσαι τῶν ὄντων. ἐδὲ δὲ σίρας; ΠΡΩ. πάντων μὴν οὖν ΣΩ. τοῦτω δὲ τῶν ἰδῶν τὰ δύο τίθωμεθα, ἐδὲ δὲ τρίτον. Ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτων ἴν τι ζυμμισηγόμενοι. — τίταρτου μοι γίνους αὐτῶν πρῶτον φαινόμενα. ΠΡΩ. λίγος τίσις; ΣΩ. τῆς ζυμμιξίως τούτων πρὸς ἀλλήλα τὴν αἰτίαν ἔρα, καὶ τίθω μοι πρὸς τρίτον ἰκίσις τίταρτος τοῦτο. — Phileb. p. 23. πρῶτον μὲν τοῖσιν ἄπειρος λίγος, δεύτερος δὲ σίρας, ἴσως ἢ καὶ τούτων τρίτον μικτὴν καὶ γιγνημένην οὐσίαν. τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξις αἰτίας καὶ γιγνίσεως τίταρτην λίγος. ib. p. 27.

^b ΣΩ. θερμότητος καὶ ψυχρότητος πῆρι πρῶτον ἔρα, σίρας ἢ ποῖ τι νοήσας, ἢ τὸ μᾶλλον τι καὶ ἦτονος ἢ αὐτοῖς οἰκοῦν τοῖς γίνουσιν, ἴσως ἢ ἰσοκῆτος, τίλος οὐκ ἂν ἰσοτριψαίτην γιγνίσθαι γινομένης γὰρ τελευτῆς καὶ αὐτὰ τετελευτήκατος. — αἰ δὲ γι φαρμὴν ἴν τι τῆ ψυχρότητος καὶ τῆ θερμότητος τὸ μᾶλλον τι καὶ ἦτονος ἴνι. — αἰ τοῖσιν ἢ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαῖνι τούτω μὴ τίλος ἔχουσιν, ἀλλῆ δ' ἔστι δῆστος παντάσῃσιν ἄπειρος γιγνίσθαι. ΠΡΩ. καὶ σφῶρα γι, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. ἀλλ' εἴ γι, ὦ φίλι Πρῶταρχι ὑπελάβεις καὶ κείμενησας, ἴσως καὶ τὸ σφῶρα τοῦτο, ἢ οὐ τῶν ἰφθίχων, καὶ τὸ γι ἡρίμα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχουσιν τῆ μᾶλλον τι καὶ ἦτονος ὅστω γὰρ ἂν

ἰῆτος οὐκ ἴσως αἰται ποῖν ἰκατος ἀλλ' αἰ σφοδρότερος ἰσυχαιότερος καὶ τοῖσιν τίος ἰάσωντας πρᾶξις ἰμασιῶντι τὸ πλίον καὶ τὸ ἰλαττον ἀσπυράξιστον, ἐδὲ δὲ ποῖν ἀφαιρίξιστον. ἢ γὰρ ἰλίχθη τῶν δὲ, μὴ ἀφαιρίσωντι ἐδὲ ποῖν. ἀλλ' ἰάσωντι αὐτὸ τι καὶ τὸ μίτριον ἢ τῆ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦτονος καὶ σφῶρα καὶ ἡρίμα ἰδρα ἰγγυνίσθαι αὐτὰ. ἴσως ταῦτα ἢ τῆς αὐτῶν χώρας ἢ ἢ ἰῆν. οὐ γὰρ ἴνι θερμότητος οὐδὲ ψυχρότητος ἦτονος ἂν λαβόντι τὸ ποῖν. πρῶτον γὰρ καὶ οὐ μίνου τῆ τι θερμότητος αἰ καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερος ὡσαύτως. ἐδὲ δὲ ποῖν ἴσως καὶ πρῶν ἰσαύσωντι. κατὰ δὲ τούτων τὸν λόγον ἄπειρος γιγνίσις ἂν τὸ θερμότερος καὶ τοῖσιν αἰμα. — τῶν μίνου ἄδρα, τῆς τοῦ ἄπειρος φύσις ἢ τούτω δεξίμεθα σημαῖσι; — ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖν δὲ λίγος; ΣΩ. ἰσῶς ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνονται μᾶλλον τι καὶ ἦτονος γιγνίμενα, καὶ τὸ σφῶρα καὶ ἡρίμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ἄπαντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἄπειρος γίνους ὡς εἰς ἢ δι' πάντα ταῦτα τίθεται. — οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τὰ ἰσῶς πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσως καὶ ἰσῶσωντι, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἴσως τὸ δαυλάσωντι, καὶ πάν ἢ τῆ πῆρι ἂν πρὸς ἀρίμων ἀρίμων ἢ μίτριον ἢ πρὸς μίτριον, ταῦτα ζύμπαντα εἰς τὸ σίρας ἀσπυραξίμενα, καλῶς ἂν δοκίμωμεν ἴδρα τοῦτο. Phileb. p. 24.

themselves, and nothing generated (ἡ γογενημένη οὐσία) can be produced, except by operation of the finite upon the infinite, hence arises the necessity of their union (τὸ ζυμμοσιγόμενον), by which the opponent qualities of the infinite are reduced to harmony and concord^c. And by this union all that is excellent in nature or art is produced. (Tim. p. 27. c.) But since the Chief Good is that which is perfect and symmetrical (τὸ μέτριον or τὸ ζύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον), it is evident that if Pleasure be indefinite it cannot be the Chief Good; but that such is Pleasure is evident from the fact admitted by its greatest admirers, that it may be infinitely increased or diminished without its essence being destroyed^d. And such is the nature of the infinite; thus you may add to a heap of earth or subtract from it ad infinitum, and still it remains

^c ΣΩ. θερμότερον ἰφθιγγόμενα οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ τι καὶ ψυχρότερον.—περισσὴ δὲ θερμότερον καὶ ὑγρότερον αὐτοῖς, καὶ πλείον καὶ ἴλαστον, καὶ ἄστρον καὶ βραδύτερον, καὶ μείζον καὶ συμκρότερον, καὶ ὅσῃα ἐν τῷ περισσῷ τῆς ἐν μᾶλλον τι καὶ ἥσσον διαφορῆς ἐπίδημι ἐν φύσει. ΠΡΩ. τῆς τοῦ ἀπειροῦ λόγος; ΣΩ. ναί. ζυμμομένου δὲ γὰρ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐν μετὰ ταῦτα ἐν ἄδ τοῦ ἀπειροῦ γίνεται.—ΠΡΩ. ποῖαν καὶ αὖτε λόγος; ΣΩ. ἐν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διαλασίῳ, καὶ ὁμοίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ ἀλλήλων ἀναστασίᾳ διαφέρει; ἔχοντα, ζύμμετρα δὲ καὶ ζύμμετρα ἰσότητος ἀπὸ ἀπείρου γίνονται. ΠΡΩ. μανθάνω· φαίνομαι γὰρ μοι λόγος, μιν γὰρ ταῦτα γίνονται ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἰσότητος αὐτῶν ζυμμομένον.—ΣΩ. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν ἴσῳ ἢ τούτων ἰσότητος ἀπὸ ἀπείρου τῆς ὑγιείας φύσει ἰσότητος;—ἐν δὲ ἔξω καὶ βαρῆ καὶ ταχυῆ καὶ βραδύ ἀπειροῖς οὖν, ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα ἰσότητος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀπὸ ἀπείρου τῆς ἀπείρου ἀπείρου, καὶ μιν γὰρ ζύμμετρα ἐπιλάττωται ἐπιλάττωται;—καὶ μὴν ἐν γὰρ ζυμμομένου καὶ ἀπείρου ἰσότητος ἐν μὲν ἴσῳ καὶ ἀπείρου ἀπείρου, ἐν δὲ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀπείρου ἀπείρου ἀπείρου;—οὐκ οὐκ ἐν τούτων ἀπὸ τι καὶ ἴσα καλὰ πάντα

ἡμῶν γίνονται, τῶν τι ἀπείρου καὶ τῶν ἀπείρου ἔχοντα ζυμμομένον;—καὶ ἄλλα γὰρ δὲ μιν ἐπιλάττω λόγος, οὐκ ἀπὸ ὑγιείας ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν, καὶ ἐν ψυχραῖς ἀπὸ ἀπείρου ἴσῳ καὶ ἀπείρου. Phil. p. 25. Then a little after, p. 26. he defines this third form of existence (ἐν ζυμμομένον in these words: τῆς φάσις μοι λόγος ἐν τούτῳ ἐπίδημι τὸ τούτων ἰσότητος ἀπείρου, γίνεται εἰς οὐσίαν ἐν τῷ μετὰ τοῦ ἀπειροῦ ἀπείρου ἀπείρου ἀπείρου, a generation into essence, or an essence generated from measures, or things rendered definite (μέτρον) by means of the finite (ἀπείρου). The infinite and chaotic mass is rendered fixed by the finite, and the essence produced by this action is the ἐν ζυμμομένον.

^d ΣΩ. ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ἀπείρου ἔχοντα, ἢ τῶν ἐν μᾶλλον τι καὶ ἥσσον διαφορῆς ἰσότητος; ΦΙ. ναί, τῶν ἐν μᾶλλον, ἢ ἡδονῆς. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδονὴ τῶν ἀπείρου ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἀπείρου ἰσότητος ἀπείρου καὶ ἐκ τῶν καὶ τῶν μᾶλλον. Phil. p. 28. ἡδονὴ ἀπείρου ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ἀπείρου μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ἐπίδημι ἀπὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχοντα, μᾶλλον ἔξῳ τῶν, γίνεται. Ib. p. 31.

a heap of earth : but if you form a foot-measure you can neither add to nor subtract from it without destroying its essence. Pleasure therefore cannot be the Chief Good^e, nor yet desirable at all without the admixture of the finite wisdom (the *φρόνησις* of Aristotle p. 402.) to govern and direct it. And as in the universe the Supreme Intelligence (*νοῦς βασιλεύς*)^f rules over all, directing and uniting the finite and the infinite, so in man it attempers the union of pleasure and wisdom, directing all things according to the *Ideal Good*, which alone can render life completely happy.

In the contemplation therefore of the *Ideal Good*, and not in pleasure, consists the real happiness of man ; but of its full and perfect contemplation none are capable except God, and those who resemble him ; consequently, the great object and happiness of this life is to direct our efforts to the imitation of God, to return to that bright and pure state in which we were placed before our union with the body. In this Aristotle joins issue with Plato, arriving at a similar result, although by a different process. For having shown that the greatest pleasure results from the most perfect energies, and the most perfect energies from the exercise of the noblest faculties on the noblest object-matter, that that noblest faculty is *νοῦς*, and the noblest object-matter the particular object of *νοῦς*, it follows that from its energies we must derive the greatest pleasures. And this is not the only result, but its energies constitute

^e Pleasure absolutely speaking is not a good at all. For unless the harmony naturally produced by the finits united with the infinite be first broken pleasure cannot be produced. So that the very existence of pleasure must presuppose a pain. *λίγω τοίνυν τῆς ἀρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἀμὰ λύσει τῆς φύσεως καὶ γίνεσθαι ἀλγηδέων ἐν τῷ τότε γίνεσθαι χρεῖον.—καὶ ἐν λόγῳ σπῆσαι εἴ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος, ὅς ἐν φῆ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσπίρου καὶ σπῆσαι παρὰ φύσιν ἐμφύχων γιγασιῶν εἶδος, ὅστις ἴλιγον ἐν τῷ σπῆσαι, ἵσται μὲν τοῦτο φθίεσθαι ἐν μὲν φθιεῖν*

λόγου εἶναι, τὸν δ' εἰς τὴν ἀνῶν οὐσίαν ἰδόν, ταύτην δ' αὖ πάλιν ἐν ἀναχώρησι σπῆσαι, ἠδονήν. ib. p. 32.

^f Plato proves that *νοῦς* is that which applies the finite to the infinite (pleasure) from the analogy of the divine mind. For as the divine mind rules and moderates all things in heaven and earth, (*νοῦς ἰστέι βασιλεύς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς* p. 28.) so does the mind of man, which is part of that divine mind, rule the body, which is a compound of the same elements as the universe.

our greatest happiness. For since Happiness is the most perfect energy (*ἐνεργεία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀριστήν*), and the energies of νοῦς most perfect, they also constitute the greatest happiness; so that from the greatest happiness essentially results the greatest pleasures, and the converse. Is it then needful to exhort mankind to cultivate these energies, to live according to νοῦς, to imitate the gods and study to live like them (for they only can exercise the energies of νοῦς), thus at the same time ensuring our own happiness by such a mode of life, and ensuring their favour from most resembling themselves, ὅμοιοι ὡς τὸν ὅμοιον?

But yet since man is a compound being possessing a moral as well as an intellectual nature, to complete his happiness he must possess in perfection the energies and virtues of that inferior nature, as well as of the higher and more divine; and consequently since these energies are for the most part external acts dependent upon external means, he must possess to a certain degree both means and objects for the performance of those acts: which shows not only that this class of energies are essentially inferior to the theoretical as being less independent, and less possessing those qualities which we invariably attach to Happiness, but also that they are less adapted to a perfect state of existence, such as we attribute to immortal beings. Yet at the same time they are not so dependent upon external means as some seem ready to imagine. οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀνευ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐταρκές οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις, δυνατόν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλά· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἂν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν (p. 485.).

Having thus concluded the argument, and reverted to the same position from which we started, we may now substitute in our definition of Happiness what was obscure. We have learnt what virtue is and what are the best virtues. If, then, those virtues be σοφία and φρόνησις (including moral virtue in φρόνησις), the Happiness of man will be the energies resulting from the exercise of those habits.

ARISTOTELIS

ETHICA NICOMACHEA.

LIB. X.

CHAP. I.

The consideration of Pleasure necessary from two causes : from its own intrinsic importance ; from the designed or undesigned errors of those who have treated upon it.

ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἡδονῆς ἴσως ἔπεται The necessity of this consideration shown from the importance of Pleasure in itself.
διελθεῖν· μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ συνφκειῶσθαι τῷ
γένει ἡμῶν· διὸ παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους οἰακίζοντες
ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ
ἡθους ἀρετὴν μέγιστον εἶναι τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ
καὶ μισεῖν ἃ δεῖ· διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς
τοῦ βίου, ῥοπήν ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν

1. *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα*] The connexion of this with the other parts of this Treatise will be seen at p. 295.

— *ἴσως*] The Greek Scholiast thinks that this word has been used by Aristotle not merely as expressive of the diffidence with which he always proposes his opinions, but likewise from this consideration. If pleasure be a part of virtue, as we cannot know the whole without knowing first each of the parts, it is requisite that we should

now consider pleasure ; if, however, it be only *accidental* to virtue it would not be requisite, it would only *perhaps* be requisite to consider it. Only *perhaps*, because as the *accidentia* are never included in the definition, and the definition expresses the whole of a thing, it is plain that we may know the whole without the *accidentia*, consequently we might know what virtue is without knowing what pleasure is.

τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν. Ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἤκιστ' ἂν δόξειε παρετέον εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐχόντων ἀμφισβήτησιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἑναντίας κομιδῇ φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεύειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τούναντίον ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. Μὴ ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι ἡττόν εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων ὅταν οὖν διαφωνῶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καταφρονούμενοι καὶ τάληθές προσαναίρουσιν· ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονὴν, ὀφθεῖς ποτ' ἐφιεμένος, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς τοιαύτην οὖσαν ἅπασαν· τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν. εὐόκασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον· συμφδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις

And from the errors of others concerning it.

i. Of those who called it the Chief Good.

ii. Of those who called it entirely evil.

The evil consequences of such misrepresentations.

4. ἀμφισβήτησιν] After this word Eustratius supplies τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν ἑδδοξῶν.

5. τὰγαθόν] That is, Eudoxus, who said that pleasure was the specific cause and principle of all good. Just in the same way as the Platonists introduced their doctrine of the idea, and affirmed, that the ἀνταγαθόν was the only good, and the specific principle (εἰδικὴ ἀρχή) of all other goods.

8. τῶν φαύλων] Irrational creatures, creatures inferior to man. See

the Politics, i. 1. (p. 4. Ed. Goet.)

12. μή ποτε δὲ οὐ] But surely they do not well, or I question whether they do well in making such an assertion. A gentle way of expressing a negative, and when attended with a subjunctive mood expressing a doubt in the mind of the speaker. Had it been οὐ μή ποτε, it would have implied, they certainly do not, I am positive they do not well, &c.

πιστεύονται, διὸ προτρέπονται τοὺς ξυμμέντας ζῆν
κατ' αὐτοὺς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἄλλης, τὰ δ'
εἰρημένα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.

CHAP. II.

The opinion of Eudoxus and Plato, concerning Pleasure, refuted—
that Pleasure is not the Chief Good—that it is not all to be sought
nor all avoided—that it differs in species, or in those things from
which it is derived.

2 ΕΥΔΟΞΟΣ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθὸν φεῖτ' The argu-
ments of
Eudoxus to
δεῖναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὀρᾶν ἐφιεμένα αὐτῆς, καὶ

4. Εὐδοξός] Of the tenets of Eudoxus on this subject, little else is known than what is here mentioned by Aristotle. He was the son of Æschines and born at Cnidos: and was celebrated for his knowledge of legislation, physic, and geometry, in which latter science he had the celebrated Archytas for his master. At the age of twenty-three, although in great poverty, he was so struck with the fame of Socrates, that he resolved to take a journey to Athens in order to become his hearer: and afterwards studied under Plato, whom he accompanied into Egypt. Although none of his writings remain, he is said to have composed treatises upon various subjects: upon astronomy, geometry, and medicine. He was so ardent an admirer of the first of these sciences, as to have wished that he might share the fate of Phaeton, provided that he might have the opportunity of as closely inspecting the sun, and discovering its form and magnitude. See Diog. Laert. viii. §. 86—91. and Menag. *ibid.* See also Plutarch,

Non posse s. v. secund. Epicurum. Vol. xiv. p. 99. Hutten.

— τὰγαθόν] It was usual among the Platonists to designate what they termed the *specific principle* (εἰδησιαὴ ἀρχή) by the prefix of the letter (τ) or the word αὐτό: meaning thereby to express the very thing itself, the αὐτό τοῦτο, from that which was only *accidentally* such. Thus by the word ταυταγαθόν or τὰγαθόν they meant that which was solely and primarily ἀγαθόν, whereas all other things, such as τοῦς, ψυχά, ἰσοστάμιον &c. were called by them ἀγαθὰ but not τὰγαθά, as partaking only of the *quality* of the τὰγαθόν. And according to Eudoxus, who had been a disciple of Plato, pleasure was not ἀγαθόν but τὰγαθόν.

The Platonists used also these words in a particular sense, αὐτοίς, αὐτοζῶς, αὐτοίς. By the word αὐτοίς they understood the principle or ἀρχή of units, (ἑως) and monades: making a distinction between this and other units. The ἀρχή of all things they termed αὐτοίς αὐταγαθόν or τὰγαθόν. But the αὐτοίς they called the ἀρχή of all

prove that Pleasure is the Chief Good.

1. Because all things aimed at it

ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλλογα· ἐν πᾶσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὴ πάντ'

things, (*πάντων τῶν ὄντων*), which was subsequent to *αὐτοῖς*. For the *αὐτοῖς* was first of all things, then the *αὐτοῖς*, next the *αὐτοζωή*, and finally the *αὐτοζωόν*. (See the Scholiast.)

Now Eudoxus thought that pleasure was the chief good, *εὐγαθόν*, for if that which is aimed at is a good, that which is most aimed at is the greatest good, and pleasure is the most aimed at, and therefore it is the greatest good.

2dly. That which is opposite to the greatest evil, is the greatest good; pleasure is opposed to the greatest evil (pain); and therefore, pleasure is the greatest good.

3dly. Pleasure is sought entirely for its own sake, is ultimate and perfect, and consequently is the chief good.

4thly. That which when added to every other good makes that good more eligible is *εὐγαθόν*.

Pleasure added to any other good makes it more eligible;

Consequently pleasure is *εὐγαθόν*.

Eudoxus confirmed his major premise, by saying that good could only be made more eligible by the addition of its own essence, (*αὐτὸ αὐτῷ*.) That the *ἀρχὴ πρώτη* or *εὐγαθόν* was the only thing which when added to every other good made it more eligible, since that alone could be congenerous with all goods, as being the source from which they derived their essence. But this argument, as Aristotle shows, is not conclusive: for though pleasure added to *φρένησις* makes *φρένησις* more eligible, it is not because the *essence* of *φρένησις* is increased or altered, but because it is the *addition* of one good to another, and two goods are better than one. And by the same argument Plato

overturned the conclusion of Eudoxus: for he says,

If good can only be made greater by the addition of its own essence, the chief good, as embracing the essence of all other goods, cannot be increased; and consequently if *ἡδονὴ* be the *εὐγαθόν* it cannot be improved by the addition of any other good;

But it is increased by the addition of some other good (e. g. pleasure with *φρένησις* is better than pleasure without); and therefore,

Pleasure is not *εὐγαθόν*.

Yet some have doubted, from the inconclusiveness of these arguments of Eudoxus, whether he intended to prove that pleasure is a good or the chief good. But that he rather intended to prove that pleasure was the chief good can scarcely be doubted, both from the first objection of Plato and from the conclusion of this Chapter, more particularly the last lines of it, in which Aristotle thus sums up the argument: *ἵτι μὲν οὖν οὐτε εὐγαθὸν ἢ ἡδονὴ οὐτε πᾶσα αἰρεσιμὴ. δῆλον ἴσως εἶναι, καὶ ἵτι ἐστὶ τινος αἰρεσιμὴ καὶ αὐτάς.* p. 411. Here then are three opinions:

1. That of Eudoxus, that pleasure is the chief good, and essentially good, and that all pleasures are good. In which latter opinion he was supported by the Sophists. Compare the Gorgias of Plato, p. 495. ΣΩ. *πότερον φησὶ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὴ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναι τι τῶν ἡδίων ἢ εἶναι ἴσους ἀγαθόν;* KAA. — *τὸ αὐτὸ φημι εἶναι.*

2. The doctrine of Plato, who denied that any pleasure was a good. This is also questioned by some, whether

- ἐπὶ ταῦτὸ φέρεσθαι μὴνύειν ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἀριστον· ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τροφήν· τὸ δὴ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τὰγαθὸν εἶναι. ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς· διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σῶφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν. Οὐχ ἦττον δ' φετ' εἶναι φανερόν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὴν γὰρ
- 15 λύπην καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὴ τὸνναντίον αἰρετόν. Μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετόν ὃ μὴ δι' ἕτερον μηδ' ἑτέρου χάριν αἰρούμεθα· τοιοῦτον δ' ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν τίνος ἕνεκα ἡδεται, ὡς καθ'
- 16 αὐτὴν οὖσαν αἰρετὴν τὴν ἡδονήν. Προστιθεμένην τε ὄφρουν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον ποιεῖν, οἷον τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν· καὶ αὐξέσθαι δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ. Ἔοικε δὴ οὕτως γε ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν,
- 20 καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἑτέρου· πᾶν γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου

2. Because it is the opposite of the greatest evil.

3. Sought entirely for its own sake.

4. All other goods are essentially improved by it.

Objection to this argument urged by Plato.

Plato did exclude all pleasure from the class of good. But this seems certain: for good is placed by him in the category of *αἰρία*, (whether this term be understood in its logical sense or as implying the *ideal*, will not signify,) pleasure in that of relation (*γίνεσις*). Compare also his own words. ΣΩ. *ἀεὶ οὖν ἡδονὴ γινεῖται γίνεσις ἴσων, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μαῖραν αὐτὴν τίνος ἕνεκα θέομεν*; ΠΡΩ. *ἡδέονα μὲν οὖν*. Philebus, p. 54. See the whole argument. See also p. 226. l. n. of this treatise.

3. The opinion of Aristotle striking

the mid way between the two, that some pleasures are good and some are not. Or perhaps more correctly, that pleasures are essentially good, but some accidentally evil.

— *εὐδὲν δὴ ὡς ἀγαθόν*] Compare p. 4. 1.

11. *μάλιστα δ' εἶναι αἰρετόν*] See Cic. de Fin. i. 12.

18. *αὐτὸ αὐτῷ*] Although the text is undoubtedly correct, and it will amount to the same, nevertheless I think the argument would be clearer if with the Greek Scholiast we were to read *αὐτῷ* for *αὐτῷ*. sc. *ἡδονῆς*.

ἀγαθοῦ αἰρετώτερον ἢ μονούμενον. τοιοῦτο δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναρεῖ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδονὴ τὰγαθόν· αἰρετώτερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ χωρὶς, εἰ δὲ τὸ μικτὸν κρείττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰγαθόν· οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτὸ τὰγαθὸν αἰρετώτερον γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὰγαθὸν ἂν εἴη, ὃ μετὰ τινος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν αἰρετώτερον γίνεται. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦμεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. Οἱ δ' ἐνίστάμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται,

The objection to the first argument of

2. Πλάτων] See the Philebus, p. 21. sq.

— Πλάτων] See the Philebus, p. 60. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπεὶ . . . ἡμῶν ἂν ἔπορευομεθα; ΠΡΩ. ἐν αὐτῷ; ΣΩ. ἐν τὰγαθῷ διαφέρει φόνει τῷ μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων. ΠΡΩ. τί; ΣΩ. ὃ σαφὴς τῶν' αἰ τῶν ζῶν διὰ τίλους πάντας καὶ πάντη, μηδὲν ἴσθαι ποτὶ ἴσιν προσδύσθαι, ἐν δὲ ἰκανῶν τιλιώτατος ἔχων οὐχ οὕτως; ΠΡΩ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἰσαριθμησὶν χωρὶς ἰσαρίων ἰσαρίων θίνης εἰς τὸν βίον ἰσάσται, ἡμῶν μὲν ἡδονὴ φρονήτου, φρόνησις δὲ ἡδονῆς ἰσάσταις μὴδὲ τὸ σμικρότατος ἔχουσαι;—εἰ δὲ γὰρ σαφῆσθαιμὲν τι τότε, οὐν ἰσιστοῦν ἰσικαλαβῶν ἰσιστοῦν ἰσάσται, μῆμῃ καὶ ἰσιστοῦν καὶ φρόνησις καὶ ἀληθῆ δέξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδίας τῆσταις, καὶ σποσῶν εἰ τις ἄνισ τούτων δέξαν' ἂν οἱ καὶ ἰσιστοῦν ἰσάσται ἢ καὶ γίγνησται, μὴ ἴσιν δὲ γὰρ ἡδονῆς, ἰσὶ ὡς πλίσσται ἰσὶ ὡς σφοδρόταται, εἰ μῆτι ἀληθῆ δέξαν χωρὶς, μῆτι σποσῶν γίγνησται εἰ ποτὶ σποσῶν σάσται, μῆτ' αὐ μῆμῃ τῶν σάσταις μῆδ ἰσιστοῦν χροῖον ἔχων. ταῦτὰ λίγισ καὶ σποσῶν φρονήσταις, εἰ τις ἄνισ σάσταις ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάταις δέξαν' ἂν φρονήσταις

ἔχων μᾶλλον ἢ μῆτ' ἴσιν ἡδονῆς, ἢ σάσταις ἡδονῆς χωρὶς φρονήσταις μᾶλλον ἢ μῆτ' φρονήσταις αὐ τῶν.—οὐκοῦν τό γὰρ τίλους καὶ σποσῶν αἰρετῶν καὶ ἐν σποσῶν σποσῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐδῆσταις ἂν τούτων ἴσιν. See also p. 21. of the same dialogue.

8. εἰ οὖν ἰσιστοῦν] εἰ δὲ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τούτων ἀγαθῶν, οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινουοῦμεν; ἰσάσταις ἀγαθῶν ἴσιν αἰ ἔφεται καὶ αἰ ἰσιστοῦν; σποσῶν γὰρ ἔφεται καὶ ἰσιστοῦν μῆδ ἡδονῆς αἰρετῶν τῆς ἀπῶν. ἐν δὲ τούτων γὰρ ἰσιστοῦν, ταῦτῶν ἴσιν τῶν, σποσῶν τῶν τούτων γὰρ ἀγαθῶν ἂν καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινουοῦμεν ἰσιστοῦν ἰσάσταις, εἰ τούτων εἰ ἴσιν ἢ ἡδονῆς, ἂν σποσῶν ἢ ἡδονῆς σποσῶν ἴσιν, ἢ ἀληθῆ. ἢ φρονήσταις, ἢ τις τῶν ἰσιστοῦν. Schol.

10. οἱ δ' ἰσιστοῦν] Eudoxus had asserted, that that which all things aim at is a good, and consequently that pleasure being more aimed at than any thing else is the greatest good. To this reasoning Plato objected, saying, that it did not necessarily follow that that was a good at which all things aimed. For as the tastes of mankind are corrupted, they generally seek after the apparent and not the real good. The

μη οὐθὲν λέγωσιν· ὁ γὰρ πᾶσι δοκεῖ, τοῦτ' εἶναι φαμεν. ὁ δ' ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ὠρέγεται αὐτῶν, ἣν ἄν τι τὸ λεγόμενον, εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα, πῶς λέγοιεν ἄν τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐστὶ τι φυσικὸν ἀγαθὸν κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτά, ὃ ἐφίεται τοῦ οἰκείου ἀγαθοῦ. Οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

Eudoxus, and Aristotle's reply to that objection.

Objection to the second argument of

appetites of animals are without reason and judgment, and therefore can afford no criterion upon this subject. Against these remarks of the Platonists, Aristotle brings two objections. If only bad men and brutes sought pleasure as a good, then, he says, this argument would be of some weight; but as the wise and the good seek it as well as the bad and the foolish, it is not conclusive, it avails nothing to the proof that pleasure is not a good. Nay, even granting the assumption, that only the irrational and brutes seek it, yet as they do it from a natural impulse, it is plain that there is some good in pleasure, for all natural impulses are to good. See p. 303, 11. n. and Butler's Analogy, i. 2.

4. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα] This remark is probably aimed against Plato's doctrine in the Philebus, who considers the life of the wise (εἰ φρόνιμοι) to be a state removed beyond the reach of pleasure or pain; from the influences of which he is exempt as are the Gods, though not in the same degree. ΣΩ. οὐκ οὐκ ἴσως τις κρίνει ἡμῶν ἢ τοιαύτη διάβησις παρὰ τι τὸν τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τὸν τοῦ λυπομένου; ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;—ΣΩ. τῶ ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν ἰλομένη βίῃ οὐδ' ὡς τοῦτον ἐν τέρσει οὐδὲν ἀποπαύσει ζῆν. ΠΡΩ. ἐν τῷ μὴ χαίροντι μὴδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λίγως; ΣΩ. ἰερῆθη

γὰρ σὺ εἶπες ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων μηδὲν εἶναι μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ἢ μᾶλλον χαίροντι τῶ ἐν τῷ τοῦ τοῦ φρονεῖν βίῃ ἰλομένη.—οὐκ οὐκ ἴσως ἄν τις κρίνει γὰρ ἰσοπέδου καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄριστον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἴσως εὐδαιμονίας. Philebus, p. 33. And this was consequent upon his theory of pleasure. For pain and pleasure he considered to be both evil, both extremes, but that the real and natural state was that of quiescence, a middle state equally removed from both. See the exquisite passage in the Republic, p. 585. sq.

6. φρονεῖν ἀγαθόν] Compare p. 304, 9.

7. οὐκ ἴσως] Eudoxus had endeavoured to prove, by the following argument, that pleasure is the greatest good:

Whatever is opposed to the greatest evil is the greatest good;

Pleasure is opposed to the greatest evil (pain); and therefore it is the greatest good.

He endeavoured to prove that pain is the greatest evil by a similar kind of argument, as that by which he proved that pleasure is the greatest good; for if that which is sought for is a good, that which is avoided is an evil, and that which is most avoided is the greatest evil. This argument was afterwards adopted by the Epicureans:

Eudoxus, and Aristotle's reply.

οὐ γὰρ φασιν, εἰ ἡ λύπη κακὸν ἐστὶ, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῶ καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδετέρῳ, λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. ἀμφοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων κακῶν καὶ φευκτὰ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι, τῶν μηδετέρων δὲ μηδέτερον ἢ ὁμοίως· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες ὡς κακὸν, τὴν δ' αἰρούμενοι ὡς ἀγαθόν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀντίκειται.

Plato's first argument against pleasure, refuted.

Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ποιότητων ἐστὶν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαι-

His second, also, that it

μονία. Λέγουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ὀρίσθαι,

see it set forth and refuted in Cic. de Fin. i. 9. sq.

To this syllogism it was objected by Plato, (see *Repub.* ix. in init. and *Philebus*, p. 33. sq.) as well as by Speusippus his successor, (see above p. 301, 19. n.) that the major is not universally true, for evil is opposed to evil as well as to good, as extremes to extremes as well as to the mean; that pleasure is opposed to pain not as a mean to an extreme, but as an extreme to an extreme, and consequently both are evil. To this Aristotle replies, that if this reasoning be true, if both be extremes, then both would be objects of avoidance, whereas pain only is an object of avoidance, pleasure is not; therefore as far as this objection is concerned, the argument of Eudoxus remains in its full force. See p. 301, 15.

9. *συνεχόμενα*] Aristotle now proceeds to examine and refute the arguments of the Platonists and others against pleasure. Their first reason was, that all goods are qualities, but that pleasure was not a quality, and

consequently not a good. To this he replies by denying the major, by showing that there are many goods, such as the energies of virtue, which are good and yet are not qualities. The reason for asserting that all goods are qualities, arose from their placing all good and evil in that category. But whether Plato was the author of this doctrine, it is difficult to determine. But if so, we must separate from this number Plato's *ideal Good*.

12. *ἀγνοεῖν δὲ*] This second argument of the Platonists against pleasure will be more clearly seen by stating it at full length, and in a syllogistic form:

Whatever admits of more and less is indefinite;

Pleasure admits of more and less; therefore

Pleasure is indefinite.

Whatever is indefinite is an evil;

Pleasure therefore is an evil;—is not a good.

For the proof of the major premise of both syllogisms, Plato referred to the *συναρχία* of the Pythagoreans. See p. 17, 7. note, and p. 382, 5.

τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι δέχεται τὸ ^{is indefinite.} μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἡδυσθαι τοῦτο κρίνουσι, καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον τοὺς ποιоὺς ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, ἔσται τὸ αὐτό· δίκαιοι γάρ εἰσι μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνδρείοι, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. Εἰ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, μή². ποτ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ὧσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμυγῆς αἱ δὲ μικταί. τί γὰρ κωλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια ὠρισμένη οὐσα δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μία τις ἀεί, ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει 15 τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ

To both of these Aristotle objects. In the first place, he says, if from seeing men more or less pleased they infer that pleasure admits of more and less, and is consequently indefinite, by the same principle virtue is indefinite, because men are more and less virtuous, and consequently the major proposition of the second syllogism, that whatever is indefinite is an evil, is not true.

2. But if they draw this inference from the consideration of pleasure in itself, then it is by no means universally true that pleasure admits of more and less. It is only the mixed pleasures which differ in degree, and have an admixture of pain, the increase or diminution of which causes a variation in those pleasures. Just as in the case of health: health is something definite and determined, yet is continually varying not only in different but likewise in the same

persons: at one time the body is perfectly free from sickness, at another time not; the health of the body is greater at one time, less at another; and consequently the major premise of the first syllogism is not true.

12. *συμμετρία*] Compare Theages de Virtutibus: *ἰσχυρὰ δὲ τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὰ σκεῖ πάθια, τῶν δὲ παθίων ἡδονὰ καὶ λύπη ἀνίερατα, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ διαξελίσθαι τὰ πάθια τῆς ψυχῆς ἀδονὰ καὶ λύπη δὲ ἀρετὰ σίσταται, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ταῦτα συναρμύσσειναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑγίεια, ἰσχυρὰ εἰς τοῦσα τῶν τοῦ σώματος διαμέμων, ἐν τῷ διαξελίσθαι τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν σίσταται, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ταῦτα συναρμύσσειναι, ἔστι γὰρ οἷον συμμετρία εἰς ταῦτα.* Frag. Pythag. p. 33. See also Plato's Philebus, p. 26. n. Stallb. §. 42. And for the subsequent argument, the Philebus, p. 174. and Stallb. Introd. p. 56.

His third argument, that pleasure is a *κίνησις*, refuted.

τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι. Τέλειόν τε τὰ γα-
θὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις
ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀπο-
φαίνειν πειρῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' εἰκόασι λέγειν
οὐδ' εἶναι κίνησιν· πάσῃ γὰρ οἰκείον εἶναι δοκεῖ εἶ-
τάχος καὶ βραδυτής, καὶ εἰ μὴ καθ' αὐτήν, οἷον
τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτων
οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει· ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως
ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι, ἡδυσθαι δ' οὐ, οὐδὲ πρὸς
ἔτερον, βαδίζειν δὲ καὶ αὐξῆσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ 10

1. τίλειόν τι τὰ γαθόν] This is the third argument of Plato against pleasure :

All motions and generations are imperfect ;

All pleasure is a motion and a generation ; and consequently all pleasure is imperfect, and consequently not the chief good. (See p. 402.)

To this reasoning Aristotle replies by confuting the minor premise. All motion, he says, is attended with quickness or slowness, but neither of them are compatible with pleasure. We may pass from a state of pain to pleasure (*ἡσθῆναι*) either quickly or slowly, but when we are in the state (status or standing) of pleasure (*ἡδυσθαι*) it is absurd to say that we energize as to that state quickly or slowly ; that, in other words, we stand in a state of pleasure quickly or slowly.

2. τὰς δὲ κινήσεις—ἀτελεῖς] The earlier philosophers, who were much puzzled to define motion, included it under the notion of inequality, alteration, nonentity (*εἰς ἀνοσίγητα καὶ ἰταρότητα καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι εὐκταίσι, ἔτι ἀέριστόν τι δοκεῖ ἢ κίνησις*). This they probably derived from the Pythagoreans, in whose *συναρχία* the indefinite (*ἄπειρον*) and the

moving (*κινούμενον*) are placed under the head of evil ; which probably is one reason why Plato was induced to consider motion and pleasure as an evil.

Aristotle also himself acknowledges this difficulty. Compare Phys. Ausc. iii. 2. *ἢτι κινήσεις ἰσόμενα μὲν εἰς ἑαυτὸν, ἀτελεῖς δὲ. αἰτίον δ' ἔστι ἀτελεῖς τὸ δυνατὸν εὐ ἔστιν ἰσόμενα κινήσεις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν εἰ ἔστιν*. See Simplicius, *ibid.*

6. τὰχος καὶ βραδυτής] Compare Phys. Ausc. iv. 14. *φανερὸν ἔστι ἄνωγον μεταβολὴν καὶ ἄνωγον τὸ κινούμενον ἀνόγωμα κινήσθαι ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ γὰρ ἄνωγον καὶ βραδυτέρως κατὰ πᾶσαν ἔστι μεταβολήν*.

— καὶ αὐτήν—σφῆς ἄλλο] *Motus celer est et tardus vel per se et absolute, vel comparate σφῆς ἄλλο*. Per se in rebus quarum non est æquabilis motus, ut in navis cursus nunc est tardior, nunc celerior ; item equi cursus, etc. Compare, quo modo plerumque motus intelligi solet, ut Solis cursus, cum Saturno comparatus est celer, cum Luna tardus, suapte alioqui natura æquabilis. Cælum etiam ipsum cujus rotatio est æquabilis et per se neque celera neque tarda, comparatione tamen aliarum rerum ita dici potest. GIPH.

τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ βραδέως ἔστιν, ἐνεργεῖν δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως, λέγω δ' ἡδεσθαι. Γένεσις His fourth argument, that it is a generation or repletion, refuted.
 τε πῶς ἂν εἴη; δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος εἶναι τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι. καὶ οὗ γένεσις ἢ ἡδονή, τούτου ἢ λύπη φθορά. καὶ λέγουσι δὲ τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν

3. γένεσις τι πῶς] Aristotle now proceeds to refute the doctrine of Plato, that pleasure is a generation or progression (*γένεσις*).

For every generation, he says, there must be that from which generation proceeds, and that in which it ends: and that from which it proceeds must virtually be of the same elements as the thing generated, possessing a power of producing something similar to itself; οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος εἶναι τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι. (Phys. Ausc. i. 4. sq.) 2ndly. Every thing generated is resolvable into that from which it was generated by the operation of a corruption (*φθορά*) opposed to its generation. If therefore pleasure were a generation, it must be a progression or change from something determined into something determinate; but pleasure generates nothing which is resolvable into the same elements from which it was generated.

Further; if it were a generation, some change must take place in some subject-matter which is virtually the same as that into which it changes. But pleasure produces no such effect in the subject-matter, nor is the effect produced by pleasure similar to the subject-matter from which it was produced.

Finally, pleasure is not resolvable into any thing similar to itself, but into

pain which is its opposite.

II. If pleasure were a generation, pain a corruption, then what was generated by pleasure would be corrupted by pain, and the reverse; but this is not the case. For pleasure actually generates nothing.

The reasons here urged against pleasure being a generation, are somewhat different from those in the Seventh Book. See p. 296, 1.

6. γένεσις — φθορά] See Plato's Philebus, p. 55.

7. τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν] This also is another argument, by which it was attempted to be proved that pleasure is not a good. (See also p. 307.)

All pleasure is a repletion (*ἀνωμαλίας*), all repletion is a generation, all generation is imperfect, therefore pleasure is imperfect, and consequently not a good. That pleasure is a repletion, was proved from consideration of its opposite, pain. If pain is a deficiency (*ἰδέια*), then its opposite, pleasure, is a repletion. That pain then is a deficiency, is clear from these considerations: if whilst we feel hunger and thirst we feel pain, then hunger and thirst are pains; but hunger and thirst are deficiencies of the natural habits. For the body when it is in want of its proper moist or dry elements, is disturbed from its natural constitution, and feels in consequence a pain and craving

ἀναπλήρωσιν. ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δὴ ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἐν ᾧ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἡδοίτο· τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ· οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἄρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἡ ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ γινομένης μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως ἡδοίτο· 5

(The origin of these notions).

ἂν τις, καὶ τεμνόμενος λυποῖτο. Ἡ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφήν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γινομένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας ἡδεσθαι τῇ ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς· ἄλυποι 10 γάρ εἰσιν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνήμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες· τίνος οὖν αὗται γενέσεις ἔσονται; οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔνδεια γεγένηται, οὐ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις. 15

That pleasure is nei-

Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονειδίστους τῶν

to have those wants supplied, and in the supplying of them receives pleasure. Therefore pain is a natural deficiency, and pleasure is a natural repletion.

To this Aristotle replies; that if this be true, then this deficiency and repletion are certain affections of the body, and consequently, if pain and pleasure consist in them, then in whatever they take place, that must feel pleasure; consequently the body only would feel pleasure. But this is not the case. For were it so, then every body (*σῶμα*, corpus) would be sensible of pleasure, which is absurd. For the body truly is delighted with repletion, but not with respect to itself, but with regard to the sensitive and nutritive part of the soul. Since therefore the body, as a corporeal substance, does not receive pleasure from repletion, it is plain that pleasure is not a repletion.

That we feel pain from hunger, arises from the energies of the nutritive part of the soul being impeded, and we consequently feel pleasure when that impediment is removed, and this class of energies resume their free and unobstructed exercise.

11. *αἱ τε μαθηματικαί*] According to Plato's own acknowledgment. See the *Philebus*, p. 52. *τούτους προτιῶμεν τὰς πλεῖς τὰ μαθήματα ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δεκτοῦσι ἡμῖν αὗται αἰτίαι μὴ καὶ ἔχουσι τοῦ μαθήσαν. καὶ διὰ μαθημάτων τίνος ἀλγηδόνιας ἔξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομίνας. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλ' οὕτω ξυνοῦσι. ΣΩ. εἰ δέ; μαθημάτων πληρωθῆσιν ἴαν ὕστερον ἀποβελῆαι διὰ τῆς λήθης γίγνεται, παροξὺς σπῆς ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλγηδόνιας; ΠΡΩ. οὐτι φῶσι γι.—ΣΩ. τούτους τίνου τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμίκτους εἰ ἵναί λήθης ἴησιον. See also *Repub.* p. 584.*

16. *πλεῖς δὲ τούτῃ*] This argument,

ἡδονῶν λέγει τις ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταυτὴ ἡδέα· οὐ^{ther en-}
 γὰρ εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἷητέον^{tirely evil,}
 αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις, καθάπερ οὐδὲ^{nor entirely}
^{good.}

though generally supposed to be directed merely against the Platonists, applies equally to those who said pleasure is a chief good, as to those who denied that it was a good at all; between whom Aristotle takes the middle course, in conformity with his observation at p. 29. 10. of this treatise.

Both are wrong in considering pleasure as contained under one species. Thus when the Platonist argued; as are the things which cause delight, so are the pleasures derived from them; but many of those things which cause delight are disgraceful, consequently so are the pleasures derived from them; it does not follow from this argument, that pleasure is not a good, but that there are various species of pleasures, as there are of the things from which they are derived, and consequently as there may be virtuous and vicious pleasures, it follows that pleasure is not entirely (that is, throughout all its species) a good, nor entirely an evil. This however is not the answer which Aristotle *here* makes to this argument of Plato. But he observes, that to judge correctly of pleasure, we are not to form our notions of it from what is pleasant to the vicious, any more than we should form our notions of what is healthy from what appears so to the diseased. If therefore, to those whose moral constitution is depraved, that which is vicious appears pleasant, we are not to conclude absolutely, therefore, that pleasures are vicious: but rather to judge from those things which are pleasant to the good and the virtuous. (See the following chapters.)

2dly. Because some pleasures are

said to be disgraceful, this is not to be so understood of pleasures absolutely and in themselves, but only accidentally, inasmuch as they are derived from actions or things which are disgraceful. For instance, the pleasure which is derived from the eating of food is not absolutely vicious, but accidentally it is; when for instance it is derived from excess, from immoderate eating. Although the intemperate therefore appears to derive pleasure from immoderate food, yet it is not real pleasure, nor should it be considered as such. And thus to use the instances before us, to desire and seek after riches is not dishonourable, though it is so to seek for them by committing treason: and to desire health is not dishonourable, though it would be so could it only be done by cannibalism.

But if we are to follow the general opinion, and term those things pleasures, whatsoever are pleasant to any one, then we must make a distinction, and say that pleasures differ in species. For the pleasures of the good, and those who live according to nature, differ specifically from those of the depraved and intemperate. For in what the virtuous differ from the vicious, so do the pleasures of the one from the other; otherwise the unjust might be delighted with exercising justice, and the temperate with temperance. Otherwise the pleasure derived from the society of a flatterer and a friend would be the same, and equally virtuous or equally vicious. Which is absurd. Whence we infer that pleasures differ in species.

τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν ὑγιεινὰ ἢ γλυκέα ἢ πικρά,
οὐδ' αὖ λευκὰ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμῶσιν:

2. Ἡ οὕτω λέγοιτ' ἄν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ
εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀπὸ γε τούτων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ
πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὐ, καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐδ'
3. μὴν ὅτιοῦν φαγόντι. Ἡ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν
αἱ ἡδοναὶ ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν
ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι τὴν
τοῦ δικαίου μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μου-
σικοῦ μὴ ὄντα μουσικόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 10
ἄλλων. ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος, ἕτερος
ᾧν τοῦ κόλακος, οὐκ οὐσαν ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονὴν
ἢ διαφόρους εἶδει· ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰγαθὸν ὁμι-
λεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδί-
ζεται, τὸν δ' ἐπαινοῦσιν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὁμιλοῦντα. 15
Οὐδεὶς τ' ἂν ἔλοιτο ζῆν παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων
διὰ βίου, ἡδόμενος ἐφ' οἷς τὰ παιδιά ὡς οἷόν
τε μάλιστα, οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων,
μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. περὶ πολλά τε

Nor the
chief good.

5. καὶ εὐδαιμονίῳ] Probably Aristotle had in view that remarkable discussion in the *Repub.* of Plato, p. 406.

6. τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν] Compare Plato: *ἦδιστα μὲν φασιν εἰς ἀεὶ καλοῦσθαι ἀπορῶσαι, ἦδιστα δὲ καὶ εἰς σωφροσύνην ἀντιᾷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν, ἦδιστα δ' αὖ καὶ εἰς ἀνοηταίοντα καὶ ἀνοήτων δαζῶν καὶ ἰσθιδῶν μιστόν, ἦδιστα δ' αὖ καὶ εἰς φροσύνην ἀντιᾷ τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ τούτων τῶν ἰδίων ἰσχυρῶς πᾶσι ἂν τις ὁμοίως ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λίγων, οὐκ ἀνήσθητο φαίνοντο ἰδίως;* Phileb. p. 11.

16. οὐδεὶς ε' ἂν ἔλοιτο] That not all pleasures are good, that pleasure is not the chief good, is evident from

these considerations; that then any life of enjoyment would be good and desirable, even that of children. 2dly. That then we should do nothing but with reference to pleasure. Whereas there are many things we now study and pursue with much toil and labour without any such view. And though it may be said that the practice and pursuit of such things necessarily carries pleasure along with it, yet this does not affect the argument: for we should still pursue them, though we were certain that we should derive no pleasure from them. This subject is more copiously discussed in chap. iv.

σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ' ἂν καὶ εἰ μηδεμίαν ἐπι-
 φέροι ἡδονήν, οἶον ὄραν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι,
 τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔπονται τού-
 τοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἐλοιμέθα γὰρ ἂν
 5 ταῦτα καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἡδονή. "Οτι Conclusion.
 μὲν οὖν οὔτε τὰγαθὸν ἢ ἡδονὴ οὔτε πᾶσα αἰρετή,
 δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες αἰρεταὶ καθ'
 αὐτὰς διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἶδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν. τὰ μὲν
 οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἰκανῶς
 10 εἰρήσθω.

CHAP. III.

The definition of Pleasure investigated.

3 ΤΙ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ^{Pleasure is}
 ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. ^{not a κίνησις.} δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν 1. For time

8. ἢ ἀφ' ὧν] If pleasures differ not in species as to themselves, yet they differ in species accidentally, inasmuch as they are derived from things different in species.

βιβλικός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' εἶναι μὲν εἶναι, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι. ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθαί, ἕως μὴ ἰδιόχισθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν. p. 295, 11.

CHAP. III.

Having thus far examined the opinions of others touching pleasure, Aristotle now proceeds to explain his own, first investigating its essence (*τί ἐστίν*) in order to settle more scientifically the much disputed question respecting its quality (*ποῖόν τι*), and to determine whether it should be considered the chief good, or sometimes good and sometimes or entirely evil. τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκῶ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὐτὴν οὔτε κατὰ συμ-

In this chapter, therefore, he proceeds to its definition by farther narrowing the field of investigation, and showing by a comparison between the essentials of motion and pleasure, that they are specifically different, a mode of proceeding, which necessarily draws out certain qualities of pleasure, and lays down certain data by which we may more easily arrive at the discovery of the real nature, the definition of pleasure.

The reader cannot fail being struck with admiration at the exquisite manner in which Aristotle generally pro-

and place constitute specific differences with respect to *κίνησις*, but not with respect to pleasure.

ὄρασις καθ' ὄντινούν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστίν ἐνδεῆς οὐδενός, ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γενόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος. τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή· ὅλον γάρ τί ἐστι, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις ἐστίν· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τελεία, ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὐ ἐφίεται. ἡ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἡ τούτῳ. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων· ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἕτερα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ραβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως.

2. The parts of motion differ in species.

ceeds to the most difficult of all tasks, the investigation of the several definitions which are to be found in this book; and the similarity of method which may be traced in all of them, is an evident proof that he proceeded in this as in all other parts of his subject, upon fixed and scientific principles.

See his own admirable dissertation upon this subject in Anal. Post. ii. 12.

1. *ὄρασις—εἰλήσις εἶναι*] Vision or the act of seeing is perfect at each indivisible moment of time. The moment we see, we see: nor does the act of sight require any thing for its perfection at a posterior moment, which it possessed not at the moment it was exercised. And as is vision such is pleasure. For pleasure does not consist of an aggregate of many other pleasures: nor does one pleasure succeed to the first, the first remaining, and a third to the second, and so on; nor do the different parts succeed each other in different divisions of time, as

in extension and duration. But pleasure is perfect and complete at each moment of time; wherefore it is not a motion, and for the same reason it is not a generation. Every motion also, and generation, require not only time for their completion, but the attainment of or extension to their end. In this resembling a line, consisting of a point from which it is generated, a point in which it ends, and extension through the intermediate space; neither is the line generated at any moment, its generation and motion is not complete till it has reached its end; consequently generation and motion are not perfect in any time, but only in perfect time. *ἄνω τέρας καὶ κενὸν καὶ χεῖρον ἀνάστασις κίτησις εἶναι*. Phys. Aus. iii. 1. Whereas neither of the latter are required for pleasure.

For the whole argument of this chapter, consult particularly Phys. Ausc. vi. Book.

13. *ραβδώσεως*] Levelling or erecting the column. Or, more correctly, mea-

καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς
 πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον· ἡ δὲ τῆς κρηπίδος καὶ
 τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους γὰρ ἑκατέρα. τῷ
 εἶδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὄψου
 χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἶδει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ,
 ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ
 τῶν λοιπῶν· εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν
 ποῖ, καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατ' εἶδη, πτῆσις βάδισις
 ἄλσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ
 10 καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ οὐ
 ταῦτὸν ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν
 ἑτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν
 γραμμὴν τήνδε κάκεινην· οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν
 διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ οὔσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ
 15 δ' αὐτῇ ἐκείνης. Δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ
 κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι
 χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ
 διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἶδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδο-
 ποιόν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὄψου χρόνῳ τέλειον
 20 τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τ' ἂν εἴεν ἀλλήλων,
 καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. δόξειε δ'
 ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ

3. Place
 constitutes
 specific dif-
 ference in
 motion, not
 in pleasure.

Recapitu-
 lation.

asuring it by a wand to discover whether it is perpendicular. Such is the opinion of the Greek Scholiast, from which Camerarius departs not only without any authority, but also with considerable prejudice to the sense. He translates it, the fluting of the column.

7. ἡ φορὰ] Compare Phys. vii. 3. ἰσὺ δὲ τρεῖς εἰσὶ κινήσεις, ἥ τι κατὰ τόπον, καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, καὶ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ κινούμενα τρεῖς. ἡ

μὲν οὖν κατὰ τόπον, φορὰ· ἡ δὲ κατὰ σῶμα, ἀλλοίωσις· ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν, αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις.

16. ἐν ἄλλοις] See Phys. Ausc. vi—viii. Books.

17. πολλαί] Except circular motions, which are always perfect. See De Cælo, c. 4. According to Eustratus.

21. διξίαι ὅτι] All motion is extension, and is therefore divisible, but pleasure is not divisible, therefore pleasure is not motion.

ἐν χρόνῳ, ἦδεσθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν ὄλον
τί. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι
κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ γὰρ
πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ
μὴ ὄλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὀράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ⁵
στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις
οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὄλον γὰρ τι.

But since
pleasure at-

Αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνερ-

1. τῷ νῦν] ἀποσῶ ἵνας τοῦ νῦν, τοῦ
μὴ ὡς ἀρχῆς καὶ τέλους τοῦ χρόνου, ὃ
ἀπαλογίᾳ τῆς στιγμῆς τῆς ἐν τῇ γραμμῇ.
τοῦ δὲ παρὰ τὸν ἵνασῶτα χρόνον λεγέ-
μηναι, ὡς ἀντιδίδραται πρὸς τὸν παρελα-
λῶτα καὶ τὸν μίλλαντα, ἐπὶ μὴ ὡς
ἀρχῆν καὶ τέλει δὲ καὶ ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι
καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ πρότερον νῦν λέγεσθαι φησι.
Simplicius in Arist. Phys. Aus. vi. 3.
§. 1.

— τῷ νῦν ἔλον τί] See Phys. Aus.
vi. 3.

5. γίνεσις—στιγμῆς] Compare Phys.
Ausc. vi. 10, 4. ἴτι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷδε
φασκεῖν ἴτι οὕτω στιγμῆν ὁδὸν ἄλλο
ἀδιαίρετον οὐδὲν ἰδιόχεται κινῆσθαι.—ἴτι
δ', εἰ ἄσων ἐν χρόνῳ κινῆται, ἐν δὲ τῷ νῦν
μὴ ἐν, ἄσων δὲ χρόνος διαίρετός, εἴη ἄσ-
ων τις χρόνος ἰλάσεται ἰσχυρῶν τῶν κινου-
μένων ἐν τῷ κινῆσθαι ὅσον αὐτῶν· ὅσων μὴ
γὰρ ἴσων ὁ χρόνος ἐν τῷ κινῆσθαι, διὰ τὸ
σῶν ἐν χρόνῳ κινῆσθαι· χρόνος δὲ σῶς
διαίρετός διδύκεται ἀρίτερον. εἰ δὲ ἄρα ἡ
στιγμῆς κινῆται, ἴσων τις χρόνος ἰλάσ-
εται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κινῆσθαι ἄλλ' ἄλλοιαν.

8. αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης] χρῆθ' ἀντὶ τοῦ
δὲ συνδίσταται, τὸν δὲ συνδίσταται γράφειν.
καὶ εἴη ἂν ἐλίγῳ διαίρεται τοιοῦτος. δῆλον
δὲ ἐν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἴτι παρὰ κατ'
ἰσχυρῶν αἰσθήσεως ἀμειωμένης ἰσχυ-
ροῦσιν συνδίσταται τις ἡδονή. καὶ ἴσων
καὶ ἴσων μίρος χρόνου καὶ κατ'
ἴσων νῦν ἢ ἴσων ἔλη καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσων ἴσων,
ἰσῶν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἡδονή, ταῦτα δὲ τρεῖς τινὰ

ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἰσχυρῶν αἰσθήσεως τῆς ἐν
αὐτῇ ἡδονῇ. καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν. εἰ δὲ
ἄσων ἴσων συμβαίνει αὐτῇ, δῆλον ὡς ἐκ
πάσης αἰσθήσεως πρὸς τὸ εἰσῶν αἰσθητὸν
ἰσχυροῦσιν ἴσων εἰσῶν ἡδονῇ. Schol.

8. αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης] Adhuc
docuit voluptatem non esse motum sed
perfectionem: nunc docet quæ volup-
tatis sit et perfectissima seu plenissima et
unde hæc perfectio manet et oriatur.
Qua recognita continuo intelligetur
vera vis et natura voluptatis. (Aris-
toteles rem aliquam volens definire,
primum causam quærit, inventa causa
forma cognoscitur, statim forma cog-
nita res ipsa). Qui locus quia et ver-
borum interjectionibus et iterationibus
est obscurior, et vim omnem fere et
naturam voluptatis complectitur, eum
paulo altius repetito principio, sic ex-
plicemus.

Notum est ex prioribus voluptatem
quicquid tandem sit; esse in animo non
in corpore; (vii. 14. x. 2.) Animi autem
partes tres esse, altricem, sentientem
et intelligentem, notum est ex Phisicis.
Jam vero in altrice nulla est voluptas
(see p. 407, 7. and note.) quia nulla
actio, cujus perpetua comes est vol-
uptas. Reliquum est igitur, ut in his
tantum duobus animi partibus, sen-
tiente et intelligente collocetur: atque
ita omnis voluptas vel est in sensu vel
in mente. Hoc uno jam præmunto

γούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὐ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ tends the
 κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν τοιοῦτον γὰρ exercise of
 μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἢ τελεία ἐνέργεια· (αὐτὴν every
 δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μηθὲν διαφερέτω)· αἰσθησις,
 the most
 5 καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἢ ἐνέργεια τοῦ perfect
 ἄριστα διακειμένου πρὸς τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑφ' pleasure
 αὐτὴν. αὕτη δ' ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη will be de-
 κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἐστὶν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως rived from
 δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἢ τελειο- the most
 10 τάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ἢ τοῦ εὐ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ perfect
 σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑφ' αὐτὴν. Τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν αἰσθησις.
 ἐνέργειαν ἢ ἡδονή. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἧ Pleasure
 then per-
 facts the
 energy, but
 in a differ-

et alterum est cognoscendum, nimirum ad hujus utriusque animi partis perfectionem duo esse necessaria, ipsam animi facultatem sive sensum sive mentem, et rem denique facultati utrique subjectam; hæc, inquam, duo hic spectari debent, facultas et res subjecta. Est et tertius; utriusque facultatis suam esse voluptatem, non quo sit facultatis (nam actionis est comes voluptas) sed quia actio ex facultate manat, cujus actionis propria est voluptas. Sensus igitur voluptates sunt ἀκροάματα aurium, oculorum spectacula &c. Mentis voluptates sunt in artibus et scientiis.

His præmunis nunc videamus de hoc loco. Docet igitur Aristoteles sensum et mentem perfici tribus rebus, facultate ipsa, re subjecta et voluptate. Perfici id dicitur quod ita expletur ut ad summam naturam perductum nihil amplius desideret. His igitur tribus earum facultatum actiones expleri et perfici docet. GIPH.

4. μὴν διαφερίτω] See p. 369, 22. and note.

8. κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησιν] See

the Rhetoric i. 11.

9. διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν] The exercise of the practical and scientific energies. For this use of the term διάνοια, see p. 223, 10. But the Scholiast gives a different, and what appears to be a better interpretation: εἴη δ' ἂν λίγων διάνοιαν εὐν ἰσιστημονικὴν γνώσιν, θεωρίαν δὲ τὴν νεκρὰν ζωὴν καὶ ἐνέργειαν. ἄλλως γὰρ ἐνεργῆσαι ἢ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀφίξις κάτω καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν στραφίς καὶ διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης ἰσιστημονικῆς τοῖς νεκροῖς ἑαυτὸν ἐνδύσασθαι, καὶ ἄλλως ἢ ἔξω βλίσκων, καὶ ἄλλως ἢ ἐν στροφάσει εἰς ἰσιστημονικὴν ἰσιστημονικὴν. ὅσοι καὶ διαφεροῖσι αἱ τοῦτων ἡδοναὶ καὶ οὐχ αἱ αὐτὰ ἴσονται. καὶ ἴσονται ἢ μὴν νεκρὰ ζωὴν τελειοτάτη καὶ ἡδίστη. αἱ δ' ἄλλαι τί- λωσι καὶ ἡδῆαι, ἡδίσται δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

11. τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν] Pleasure perfects the energy. But pleasure perfects the energy not in the same way as the object of sensation (τὸ αἰσθητὸν) and sense perfect the energy. Just as health and the physician are not in the same way the cause of health. See the same illustration above, p. 251. 2.

If pleasure is consequent upon every exercise of αἰσθησις, it will follow that

ent way
from the
faculty or
object-
matter.

τε ἥδονῃ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ἡ
αἴσθησις, σπουδαία ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια

the most perfect pleasure will attend the most perfect αἴσθησις, and consequently by discovering what is the most perfect αἴσθησις, we shall best discover the nature of pleasure. Now to perfect αἴσθησις it is required that not only the organ which energizes, but also the object-matter upon which it energizes, should be perfect; and the more or less this is the case, the more or less will be the pleasure resulting from the energy. Consequently there will be infinite varieties of pleasure, depending not only upon the perfectness of the organ, but also of the object-matter, the exercise of the faculty being more or less free according to the perfection of its object-matter. For as Hooker beautifully expresses it: "Let Phidias have rude and obstinate stuff to carve, though his art do that it should, his work will lack that beauty, which otherwise in fitter matter it might have had. He that striketh an instrument with skill may cause notwithstanding a very unpleasant sound, if the string whereon he striketh chance to be incapable of harmony." (Vol. i. 259. ed. Keble.) And he will from this imperfection in the energy, an imperfection not arising from the faculty but the object-matter, either diminish or wholly destroy the pleasure resulting from it.

ἴσται εἶναι τῆς ἐνεργείας ἡ ἥδονῃ καὶ τελευτήσει τις ἴσται αὐτῆς. τελευτῶν δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἔστι ἐν ἔχοντα ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἄγοντα· (see note p. 372, 2.) ὅσπερ ἐν δυνάμει οἰκωδόμεν ἢ οἰκωδομένη τελευτῶν καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτῆς οἰκωδόμεν, καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτιαὶ εἰσι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ αὐτῆς μὴ οὕσα ἐν τῷ ὑγιαίνειν ἐνεργεῖται,

ὁ δὲ συντηρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει καὶ ἴσται παραμείνη ζῆντι. ἴσται δὲ οὐδ' ὅσπερ ἐν αἰσθητῷ τελευτῶν ἐν αἴσθησι. ἢ ἐν δικαιοσύνην ἐν δίκαιοιαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἥδονῃ τελευτῶν ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ αὐτῶν ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι καὶ ἐν ἀντικειμένους ἀπὸ τοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ προάγονται ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἡ δὲ ἥδονῃ τῆς ἐνεργείᾳ γινώσκουσα συμπεφοικία συντηρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει· τίθηται γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἐστ' αὐτῆς ἥδονῃ, καὶ ἴσται τῆς ἐνεργείᾳ καθάπερ ἐνεργεῖται εἰς ὅσπερ ὅσπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῖς ἐν ἀρετῇ· καὶ ἴσται ἀπὸ τούτων, ἴσται ἂν ἢ ἴσται αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δίκαιοιαν, καὶ αἰσθῆται τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ δίκαιοιαν ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν εἶ καὶ ἀρετῶν ἔχουσι, καὶ αἰσθῆται τὸ ἀρετῶν ἐνεργεῖται. Paraph.

18. τελευτῶν—ἐν αἰσθητῷ] The object of sensation perfects the energy or the αἴσθησις, (for it will amount to the same) by carrying out into act that which only virtually exists before. The energy can only be performed by the object-matter being presented to the sense. And as the energy is the perfection of the faculty (δύναμις) for that is the end and object of all our faculties, they have been given to us that we should employ them, (as has been previously stated), therefore, the object of sense as causing the energy perfects the αἴσθησις. This then exists previously to the sense and the energizer, and is extraneous to either of them. But not so pleasure; it is neither extraneous from nor previous to the energy, but inseparably allied to and consequent upon it, by a simultaneous consequence. (See Rhet. i. 7.) Thus health and the physician are not in the same way the causes of a person being healthy. For the physician is extraneous, and as causing the health of the healthy person, is previous to

- καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. καθ' ἐκάστην δ' αἰσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον (φαμέν γὰρ ὀράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα). δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὴν ἢ τε αἰσθησις
 5 ἢ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῆ. τοιοῦτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, αἰεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. Τελειοὶ δὲ τὴν ἐνεργεῖαν ἢ In what way pleasure perfects the energies. ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς
 10 ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα. ἕως ἂν οὖν τό τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἢ οἷον δεῖ καὶ τὸ κρίνον ἢ θεωροῦν, ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ ἡδονῇ ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πρὸς ἀλληλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ
 15 τοῦ ποιητικοῦ ταῦτό πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. Πῶς Why some are not continually pleased. οὖν οὐδεὶς συνεχῶς ἡδεται; ἢ κάμνει; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀδυνατεῖ συνεχῶς ἐνεργεῖν. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή· ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καινὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ
 20 ὁμοίως διὰ ταῦτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακκληται ἢ διάνοια καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη ἢ ἐνεργεῖα ἀλλὰ παρη-

the healthy person: whereas health is not.

But yet pleasure does not perfect the energy as a habit, as a formal and essential cause. For it arises from the energy when it is already perfect, when its essence is already whole and complete. Pleasure therefore does not perfect the energy, either materially as *ἐν αἰσθησίᾳ*, nor efficiently as *αἰσθησις*,

nor essentially and formally as *ἔξις ἡσυχαστοῦσα*.

11. *οἷον δὲ*] That is, by being perfect.

15. *πῶς οὖν οὐδεὶς*] Why then is it that we are not continually pleased? Is it that men grow tired and so forego energising, and consequently fail to receive pleasure? For nothing human can energise without intermission.

Whether
life be de-
sirable for
pleasure, or
the reverse.

μελημένη διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται. Ὅρέ-
γασθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθείη τις ἂν ἅπαντας,
ὅτε καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται· ἡ δὲ ζῶη
ἐνέργειά τις ἐστὶ, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ
τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἅ καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ
μὲν μουσικὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλο-
μαθῆς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα, οὕτω δὲ
καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἕκαστος. ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς
ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δέ, οὐ ὀρέγονται. εὐλόγως
οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται· τελειοῖ γὰρ ἕκάστῳ
τὸ ζῆν, αἰρετὸν ὄν. πότερον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν
τὸ ζῆν αἰρούμεθα ἢ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονήν,
ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. συνεζυῆχθαι μὲν γὰρ
ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι· ἄνευ
τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε
ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή.

That plea-
sures differ
in species
because
they perfect
the energies
which dif-
fer in
species.

Ἄθην δοκοῦσι καὶ
τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν· τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει ὑφ'
ἐτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι. οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται
καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῶα καὶ
δένδρα καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ οἰκία καὶ
σκεῦος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς δια-
φερούσας τῷ εἶδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦ-
σθαι. διαφέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ
τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος·

15. *πᾶσαν—βίηγμων*] And conse-
quently happiness, and the life of the
happy man: for which purpose this
digression appears to have been intro-
duced.

16. *Μιν δοκοῦσι*] Since the musician
has a peculiar pleasure, and the phi-
losopher a peculiar pleasure, resulting

from their respective energies, for the
musician feels not the pleasure of the
philosopher nor the philosopher of the
musician, as such, it would seem that
the pleasures differ as the energies.
As well because the perfections of
things different in species must them-
selves differ in species.

καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί. Φανείη δ' ἂν Because properties which flow from the essence of things essentially different, must themselves be essentially different.
 τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνφκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκά-
 στην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ. συναύξει γὰρ τὴν
 ἐνεργείαν ἢ οἰκεία ἡδονή· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα
 5 κρῖνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνε-
 γοῦντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες
 τῷ γεωμετρῆν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον
 10 ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ. συναύξουσιν δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί,
 τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεία. τοῖς ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ
 εἶδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει. Ἔτι δὲ Because the pleasure resulting from one energy is not compatible with that resulting from an opposite energy;
 μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη ἐκ τοῦ τὰς ἀφ' ἑτέρων
 ἡδονὰς ἐμποδίουσ ταις ἐνεργείαις εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ
 15 φίλαυλοι ἀδυνατοῦσιν τοῖς λόγοις προσέχειν, εἰάν
 κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦντος, μᾶλλον χαίροντες αὐλη-
 τικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας· ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐλη-
 τικὴν οὖν ἡδονὴ τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνεργείαν
 φθείρει. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 20 συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ· ἢ γὰρ
 ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει, κἂν πολὺ διαφέρει
 κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον, ὥστε μηδ' ἐνεργεῖν
 κατὰ τὴν ἑτέραν. διὸ χαίροντες ὄφρουν σφόδρα
 οὐ πάνυ δρῶμεν ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν ἄλλοις
 25 ἡρέμα ἀρεσκόμενοι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγη-
 ματίζοντες, ὅταν φαῦλοι οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι ᾧσι,

9. ἐπιδιδόασιν] See p. 77.

12. ἴσι δὲ μᾶλλον] Those things which produce effects specifically different, are themselves specifically different. But pleasures produce such effects.

The peculiar pleasure of one energy increases that energy, the pleasure resulting from a different energy, produces the opposite effect, by destroying the previous energy.

Opposite pleasures producing the same effect as peculiar pain.

τότε μάλιστα αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ χρονιωτέρας καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι λυμῶνται, δῆλον ὡς πολὺ διεστᾶσιν· σχεδὸν γὰρ αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ αἱ οἰκείαι λῦπαι· φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ οἰκείαι λῦπαι, οἷον εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ ἐπίλυπον ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ γράφει, ὁ δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρᾶς οὔσης τῆς ἐνεργείας. συμβαίνει δὴ περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τούναντίον ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκείαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν· φθείρουσι γὰρ, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως.

But since pleasures differ as the energies, they must also differ in virtue and viciousness. Consequently in species.

Διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικεία καὶ φαν-
15
λότῃτι, καὶ τῶν μὲν αἰρετῶν οὐσῶν τῶν δὲ
φευκτῶν τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων, ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ
αἱ ἡδοναί· καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἐνέργειαν οἰκεία
ἡδονὴ ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία
ἐπιεικής, ἡ δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ μοχθηρά· καὶ γὰρ αἱ
ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἐπαινεταί, τῶν δ'
20

5. αἱ οἰκείαι λῦπαι] This passage seems to be a fuller explanation of the previous syllogism, particularly of its major premise, that things which produce opposite effects, &c.

εἰ δ' ἐπιθυμῶν ἀφαιρέσειται, ἵνα αἱ οἰκείαι λῦπαι καὶ καὶ πάντως εἰσὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν φθαρτικαί, αἱ δὲ ἡδοναὶ οὐκ αἰ. Schol.

14. οὐχ ὁμοίως] Non similiter ad- junxit philosophus, quia aliena voluptas videtur minuere operationem, dolor vero impedire ne producatur. ACCIAJ.

20. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι] If the

desires are partly good and partly bad, and that in reference to actions, (for desire is no farther blameable than as productive of vicious internal or external acts), much more are the pleasures, because they are more closely united with actions and energies, than are the desires, both in time and by nature. Desire is disunited in time from energy or action; desire being first, action subsequent. In nature, because action is in itself perfect, as including an end within itself, desire not. Whereas pleasure is closely

αισχροῶν ψεκταί. οικειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἡδοναὶ τῶν ὀρέξεων· αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμένοι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ τῇ φύσει, αἱ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς ἐνεργείαις, καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἰ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι οὐδ' αἴσθησις· ἄτοπον γάρ· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι φαίνεται τισι ταῦτόν. ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί.

- 10 Διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὄψις ἀφῆς καθαριότητι, καὶ ἀκοή As also in degrees of purity; as do the energies. καὶ ὄσφρησις γεύσεως· ὁμοίως δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ἑκάτεραι ἀλλήλων. Δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἑκάστῳ As the energies also of different men and other animals are different, their pleasures must also be different. ζῳῷ καὶ ἡδονῇ οικεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ 15 κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανεῖν· ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ καὶ κυνὸς καὶ ἀνθρώπου, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν ὄνον σύρματ' ἂν ἐλέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν· ἡδιδον γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφή ὄνοις. αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν 20 ἐτέρων τῷ εἶδει διαφέρουσιν εἶδει, τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀδιαφόρους εὐλογον εἶναι. διαλλάττουσι

allied to energy as not to be separable or distinct from it. So that we might almost imagine that pleasure was an energy. Yet it is not; for surely pleasure is not an act of the understanding (*διάνοια*) nor of sense (*αἴσθησις*).

10. *καθαριότητι*] διαφέρει γὰρ ὄψις ἀφῆς καθαριότητι, καὶ ὄσον ἢ μὴ τοῦ εἶδους ἀντικαμβάνεται μόνου, ἢ δὲ ἀφῆ τῆ ὄλη μᾶλλον προσάγει, καὶ ἡ ἀκοή ταύτη τῆς ὄσφρησεως καὶ τῆς γιγνώσεως διαφέρει, ὅτι τῆς ὄλης ἀπαιτοῦται μᾶλλον. Paraph. See also p. 279, 9. n.

13. *ἐκάτεραι ἀλλήλων*] *And the pleasures of the intellect differ each from one other.* ἴσκι γὰρ διττὸς ὁ νοῦς, ὃ τι θεωρητικὸς καὶ ὃ πρακτικὸς, καὶ αἱ τούτων ἡδοναὶ διαφέρουσι. Schol.

14. ἢ γὰρ] sc. ἡδονή.

21. *διαλλάττουσι*] See Plato's *Philebus*, p. 45. The observation here made by Aristotle is probably intended as a reply to the reasoning of Plato in the passage above quoted. In that dialogue Plato makes no essential distinction between the pleasures of the good or of the vicious, of the

δ' οὐ μικρὸν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητὰ ἔστι τοῖς δὲ ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει· οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῷ πυρέττοντι καὶ τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι, οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι τῷ ἀσθενεῖ καὶ τῷ εὐεκτικῷ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἐτέρων συμβαίνει. Δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστου μέτρον ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἄγαθός, ἧ τοιούτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἰ. τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς οὗτος χαίρει. τὰ δὲ

In this variety of pleasures arising both from their own and our natures we must be guided by the good man. He is to deter-

healthy and diseased, a necessary consequence of his theory, as he considered pleasure to be an ἀναπλήρωσις, and derived his notions primarily from too exclusive a view of our bodily desires. Thus, in investigating the nature of pleasure, instead of considering what is really and naturally pleasant in itself, and which can only be discovered by examining what is pleasant to him who is a correct and competent judge of these things in the natural and perfect man, he draws his inferences from what is pleasant to the wicked and diseased; a mode of reasoning wholly unphilosophical, and diametrically at variance with his practice on other occasions. (See p. 33. n.) Thus he argues; ΣΩ. ὄνοῦν, εἰ καὶ τὸ εὖ ἡδοῦν ἴσως ἰδὲν ἦεν ἡσυχία καὶ ἰσχυρὸν φῦσιν βουαησίημαν, οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολλοτάτας ἡδονὰς ἀποβλεπείν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἀρετότητας καὶ σφροδερστάτας λιγομίνας; ΠΡΩ. πῶς ἂν σοι ταύτη ἐν γυμνασίῳ ταῦν. ΣΩ. ἀρ' οὐν αἱ ἀρεταίαι γὰρ, αἵτις καὶ μέγισται τῶν ἡδονῶν, δ' ἰσχυροὶς ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἀρεταίαι, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι αὐταί; ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ΣΩ. σίτητον οὐν

καὶ μίζους εἰς καὶ γίγνεται περὶ τοὺς πάμπολλας ἐν ταῖς νόσοις, ἢ περὶ τοὺς ὑγιαίνοντας; — ἀρ' οὐν οἱ ἀρεταίαι καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἰσχυροί μᾶλλον διψῶσι καὶ βίβωσι, καὶ πάντα ὁρῶσι διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἶναι ἀσχετοί, μᾶλλον τ' ἰδίᾳ ἐν γυμνασίῳ, καὶ ἀποσπληροῦνται μίζους ἰδοὺς ἰσχυροί; — τί οὐν; ἡβῶν ἂν φαινομένη λίγοντες, ὡς εἰ τις τὰς μέγιστας ἡδονὰς ἰδὲν βούλωντο, οὐκ εἰς ὄφελος ἀλλ' εἰς νόσον ἰόντας δὲ σκοπεῖν.

7. δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπασιν] If these pleasures differ in species, and some are good and some are bad, how are we to discover what are good pleasures, or rather what are true pleasures?

8. τὸ φαινόμενον] And in all such things, that which appears to the good man, that is the truth and the reality. To him all such things exhibit themselves in their true and native colors. To others not so, being viewed through a false and distorting medium.

11. αἱ ταύτῃ φαινόμεναι] The question therefore which was left undecided, in iii. 4. here receives its real answer.

τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἶ τῷ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμα-
 στὸν· πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων mine for us
 what is true,
 and what is
 not so.
 γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ
 οὕτω διακειμένοις. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμολογουμένως
 5 αἰσχροῦς δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς εἶναι, πλὴν
 τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις· τῶν δ' ἐπικεικῶν εἶναι δοκου-
 σῶν ποίαν ἢ τίνα φατέον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι;
 ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν δῆλον; ταύταις γὰρ ἔπονται
 αἱ ἡδοναί. εἴτ' οὖν μία ἔστιν εἴτε πλείους αἱ τοῦ
 10 τελείου καὶ μακαρίου ἀνδρός, αἱ ταύτας τελειοῦσαι
 ἡδοναὶ κυρίως λέγοντ' ἂν ἀνθρώπου ἡδοναὶ εἶναι,
 αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ δευτέρως καὶ πολλοστῶς, ὥσπερ
 αἱ ἐνέργειαι.

CHAP. IV.

CONCLUSION OF THE TREATISE.

That Happiness is a perfect energy, eligible for its own sake.

6 ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΩΝ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ The defini-
 tion of hap-
 piness set
 15 φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ

CHAP. IV.

Aristotle now proceeds to give a kind of summary and application of the whole book. Having observed at the conclusion of the last chapter that, however multifarious pleasure might be, owing to the very different energies from which it is derived, nevertheless the greatest pleasure is to be derived from the most perfect energies of man as man, (which he has already shown to be happiness by the very manner in which he arrived at his definition), it remains that we should further consider what are the most perfect energies of man. But the most perfect

energies (*ἐπιγνῆσαι κατ' ἀρετὰς ἀρίστους*) are happiness, as we have already seen; our inquiry therefore now respecting pleasure joins issue with that respecting happiness, and become one and the same thing. So that, consequently, when we shall have discovered the most perfect energies, that is, the most perfect happiness, the same result will inform us what are the most perfect pleasures.

Aristotle consequently in this chapter directs our attention to the fact, that pleasure is an energy; which he also substantiates by further arguments.

forth in the first book (p. 23. sq.) resumed. That it is a self-eligible energy.

διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. εἶπομεν δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἂν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ ἄμεινιστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μάλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἶρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεταί, αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτὰς αἰρετῶν 10 τινὰ θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. καθ' αὐτὰς δ' εἰσιν αἰρεταί, ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

But not a sport, though this seems to be an energy of such a nature. And why.

Τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα 15 πράττειν τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν. καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἰροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μάλλον ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν 20 εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς· δέονται δὲ τοιούτων. δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ 25 τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ

3. *ἕξις*] See p. 29.

9. *ἀναγκαῖαι*] Necessaria non sunt hoc loco ea quæ per se necessaria sunt et summe expotenda; sed media et

instrumenta quæ fini alicui subjecta, ad illum finem exsequendum sunt necessaria. MICH.

ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἢ ἀρετῇ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ' ὧν
 αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι
 ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς
 σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας
 5 οἰητέον αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ
 παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται εἶναι.
 εὐλογον δὴ, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα
 φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φάυλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν.
 καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ
 10 ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἐκάστῳ
 δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἕξιν αἰρετωτάτῃ ἐνέργεια,
 καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. οὐκ ἐν
 παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ
 τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ
 15 κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν.
 ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἶπεν ἐτέρου ἕνεκα αἰρούμεθα
 πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη. σπου-
 δάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἡλίθιον φαί-
 νεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν· παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπου-
 20 δάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀνα-
 παύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιᾷ, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ
 συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὲ τέλος
 ἢ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας.
 δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος
 25 δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω
 τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν
 μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου
 καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἢ
 δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα

19. παίζειν] Compare Plato's Philebus, p. 30.

ἤδη. ἀπολαύσειέ τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ ἦττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου· οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τῶν αὐτῶν διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.

CHAP. V.

That perfect energies being of two kinds, happiness is according to the best.—What that best is.

That the energies according to nous are the most perfect, being ;

Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, ἡ εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ

3. ἀνδραπόδῳ] Compare the Politics, iii. 5. (p. 86. ed. Goet.) καὶ γὰρ ἐν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶσι δὲ σκλάβοι· οὐκ εἰσὶν ἴσοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ μετρίχως εὐδαιμονίας μετὰ τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν. Compare Plato's Gorg. p. 491. E.

4. βίου] Compare Mag. Moral. p. 10. ἰσὶ οὖν ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τίλειον ἀγαθόν καὶ τίλος, ἐδὲ τοῦτο δὲ λαμβάνουσιν ἴσοι καὶ ἐν τελείῳ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἐν παιδί, οὐ γὰρ ἔστι κατὰ εὐδαιμονίας, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀνδρὶ, οὗτος γὰρ τίλος. Some refer the words εἰ καὶ βίου to σπουδαίου or εὐδαιμονίας. But Aristotle uses the term βίος simply and absolutely. As he observes in his Politics, the life of the master is not referred to his slave, but the slave to the master ; the slave lives in the master, not the master in the slave ; in the same way as the hand is referred to the man, not the man to his hand. If the hand be cut off or the man die, it is no longer a

hand except equivocally. In the same way the slave lives in the master, and has no life independently as far as he is a slave ; no energies therefore which can be called his own, consequently no happiness. See the introductory chapters upon this subject. See also the Pol. vii. 13.

CHAP. V.

If the theoretical energies possess all the qualities which we attribute to happiness in the greatest degree, then they are the happiness of man.

But they do possess these qualities (for they are κρατίστη, σοφιστάται, ἡδίστα, αὐταρχιστάται, ἐν σχολῇ, τιλιωτάται) beyond all other energies, and consequently they are the happiness of man. Compare with this chapter i. 6.

κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν
 ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὄν καὶ
 αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἢ τούτου
 ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία
 5 εὐδαιμονία. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται. Ὁμο-^{κρατίστη.}
 λογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς
 πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεί. ^{κρατίστη} τε γὰρ αὕτη
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν,
 καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ἃ ὁ νοῦς. Ἔτι δὲ <sup>συχι-
στέται.</sup>
 10 ^{συνεχιστάτη} θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς
 μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν. Οἰόμεθά τε δεῖν ^{ἰδοῦναι.}
 ἡδονὴν παραμεμίχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονία, ἡδίστη δὲ
 τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν
 ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία
 15 ^{θανμαστὰς} ἡδονὰς ἔχειν ^{καθαριότητα} καὶ τῷ
 βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων
 ἡδῖω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι. Ἡ τε ^{λεγομένη} ^{αὐτάρκεια.}
 αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη·
 τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς
 20 καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις
 ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς
 οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

7. ^{κρατίστη τε γὰρ}] ^{νοῦς} is the noblest of all our faculties ; its object-matter is the most perfect of all matters upon which we can operate ; consequently the energies of ^{νοῦς} must be most perfect (see p. 414, 8), and consequently the most pleasant of all our energies.

15. ^{καθαριότητα}] See p. 421, 10.

19. ^{σφός ἐν ζῆν ἀναγκαίων}] The wise man and the just man both require external goods and the necessaries of

life. But the former only accidentally, the latter essentially, as far as their energies are concerned. The just and the liberal, and those whose energies are of the moral nature, require external goods as organs by which they may energize ; and not only external means, but persons upon whom and with whom they may operate. Whereas the contemplative energies require neither the one nor the other, but are sufficient in themselves.

ὁ σόφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος,
ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν,
καὶ ὅσφ' ἂν σοφώτερος ἢ μᾶλλον βέλτιον ὄ
ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὁμως ἀνταρκέστατος.

Sought for
their own
sake.

ἢ σχολῆ.

Δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτῇ μόνῃ δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι⁵
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι,
ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτῶν ἢ πλείον ἢ ἕλαττον περι-
ποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν. Δοκεῖ τε ἡ
εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ
ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην¹⁰
ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς
πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἢ ἐνέργεια· αἱ
δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἀσχολοὶ εἶναι,
αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς· οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖ-
ται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ πα-¹⁵
ρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς
μαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους
ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίνωντο. ἔστι δὲ
καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀσχολος, καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ

3. βέλτιος ὄ ἴσως] This is said in reference to ix. 7.

7. ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτῶν] The moral energies are less perfect than the contemplative, since they are all exercised with a view to some end extraneous and ulterior to themselves. As courage for victory, temperance for tranquillity, and the like. Whereas the contemplative energies are exercised merely for the sake of contemplation.

9. ἢ σχολῆ] Whatever qualities have been attributed to happiness, are only to be found perfectly in the contemplative life. For whether it be considered as that which is eligible

merely for its own sake, or an energy of the soul upon absolute and perfect good, or as some have thought, whose opinions were afterwards adopted by Epicurus and his followers, that happiness consists in a life of ease and freedom from trouble, all these, and especially the last, are only to be found in the life of contemplation. For the political life, whether in war or peace, is continually occupied with troubles; either in war with a view to a peace, or in a peace with a view to the preservation of peace, or in providing for war, or for increase of dominion, or, in short, the happiness of its citizens.

πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένη δυναστείας καὶ τιμὰς ἢ τὴν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις, ἑτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν. Εἰ δὲ τῶν μὲν κατὰ If, then, the energies of τῶν possess in the greatest perfection all those qualities which we attribute to happiness, they constitute consequently our greatest happiness, the peculiar happiness of man: which it is our duty to further.

5 τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν, αὐταὶ δ' ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν, ἣ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικῇ οὖσα, καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς

10 ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν, αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ τὸ αὐταρκες δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα. ἡ τελεία δὲ εὐδαι-

15 μονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστι τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν And such a life, as it is most pecu-

3. *ἐτέραν οὖσαν*] The sense of this passage seems clear enough, although the reading is apparently corrupt. Aristotle is proving, that the theoretical energies are only the true happiness of man, because they only are final, and have their end in themselves. Now the political life, which seems to be the next to the contemplative in dignity, must be engaged either with war or peace: if with war, it cannot be final; for we make war, with some ulterior object, namely to have peace. If with peace, still it is not final; for in peace the statesman still seeks something further, either aggrandizement of territory, honor, or happiness for himself or his citizens, indicating

by this conduct that there is some end or good, that is, a happiness yet ulterior, and consequently different from that which he already possesses; and that happiness, says Aristotle, we are in search of; clearly entertaining the same view as the politician, and proving it also in this chapter, that it must be different from any derived from the political energies, and consequently from the political happiness.

15. *μῆκος βίου*] See p. 26, 3. n.

17. *κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων*] Above the reach of man. Compare the Philebus of Plato, p. 11. *εὐδὲν ἴσον δῖος οὐκ ἴσσι κατ' ἀνθρώπων*. Stallbaum's note and app. *ibid*.

liarily adapted to him as a man, so does it exalt him nearest to the gods, and raises the immortal part within him.

οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἢ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῇ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν. εἰ δὲ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. 5 οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει 10 καὶ τιμότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου. τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ 15 οἰκεῖον ἐκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ. καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

1. *θεῖον τι*] What Cicero has observed respecting this part of the teaching of the Stoics is perfectly just. "Vitæ autem degendæ ratio maxime quidem illis placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum: quæ quia deorum erat vitæ simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima, atque his de rebus et splendida est eorum et

illustris oratio." De Finibus, v. 4.

7. *φρονεῖν*] See Sophocles, frag. 515. p. 392. Ed. Oxon. 1832. and Æschyl. Pers. 807.

14. *ἐν αὐτοῦ βίος*] See p. 362, 6. n.

15. *λεχθέν τι κράτιστος*] See p. 380, 7.

16. *οἰκεῖον*] *σάντων γὰρ τῶν κτημάτων μετὰ θεοῦ ψυχὰ θεϊκώτατος, οἰκεύτατος δὲ.* Plato De Leg. p. 726.

CHAP. VI.

Nevertheless as man consists of body as well as soul, to complete his happiness he must possess in perfection the energies of the inferior part.

8 ΔΕΥΤΕΡΩΣ δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν· That the
αἱ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί· δίκαια derived
γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς from the
πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ happiness
5 χρεῖαις καὶ πράξεις παντοίαις ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι of man
διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστω. ταῦτα δ' εἶναι merely as
φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἕνια δὲ καὶ συμ- far as he is
βαίνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνφ- a human
κειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν ἢ τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετή. being.
10 συνέξενται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἡθους
ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς
φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικὰς εἰσιν ἀρετὰς,
τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν.
συνηρημέναι δ' αὐταὶ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ
15 σύνθετον ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ
ἀνθρωπικαί. καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατ' αὐτὰς καὶ ἡ
εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον
γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω· διακριβῶσαι γὰρ μείζον
τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς And are es-
20 ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι sentially
dependent

10. *συνέξενται*] See p. 251, 11. sq.

11. *αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαί*] The final causes of every action are the *ἀρχαί* of *φρόνησις*, and of *φρόνησις* in the correct use of the term, as has

been already shown, a good end. But the right conception of this end is only to be derived from moral virtue. Moral virtue then points out the right end, *φρόνησις* the right means to that end.

upon external means. Not so the theoretical.

τῆς ἠθικῆς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέροι· πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων ὅσον πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, προσποιῶνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σόφρονι ἐξουσίας· πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης. τὸ δὲ τέλειον δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη. πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖται, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ὦσι καὶ καλλίους, πλείονων. τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρὸς γε τὴν θεωρίαν· ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ καὶ πλείοσι συζῆ, αἰρεῖται τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράττειν· δεήσεται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. Ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητικὴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι πρά-

That the theoretical is the perfect happiness would also appear from its

1. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων] See above, p. 427, 19.

22. ἢ δὲ τελεία] That happiness is θεωρία, is proved from considering in what the happiness of the gods consists.

The gods live, consequently they

energize. But their energies can be only those according to the matter they are employed on, sc. θεωρία, πράξις, or σοφίσις. Their energies cannot be those of the two last, consequently they must be of the former, sc. theoretical.

ξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεῶν αὐτοῖς; πότερα being the happiness of the gods.
 τὰς δικαίας, ἢ γελοῖοι φαίνονται συναλλάττοντες For the happiness of the gods
 καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; cannot consist in
 ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ εὐεξίας.
 5 κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν; ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους;
 τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς
 νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σῶφρονες τί ἂν
 εἶεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι
 φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ'
 10 ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν.
 Ἄλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς But in this view.
 καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ
 τὸν Ἐνδυμῖωνα. τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν
 ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λεί-

2. ἢ γελοῖοι] Some persons have represented it, as if Aristotle differed from Butler, who observes, that though there may be no scope for the exercise of the moral energies in a future state, yet there may be for the temper of mind and disposition which have been previously formed by such energies. (Anal. i. 5. ad fin.) But it is evident that Aristotle is here speaking merely of the energies and moral acts (*εὐεξίας* καὶ *ποίας* *π. ε. λ.*)

But even granting the objection its full weight, unless Aristotle had considered that the Gods had the opportunities of acquiring such habits by the performance of their proper acts, he could not reasonably have taken these dispositions into consideration on this occasion; and by proving that the Gods did not perform moral acts, he sufficiently proved that their happiness could not consist in the disposition springing from such acts.

And it may with some reason be urged against Butler, whether if the moral acts be needful for the generation and preservation of such dispositions, (and such is the fact as far as we can trace) upon the acts ceasing, the disposition would not eventually cease likewise; and consequently as there would be no such acts, and no occasion for them in a future life, so there would be no such disposition. At all events Aristotle to be consistent could take no other view. Of course I speak here merely as far as unassisted human reason is concerned. Not only our moral habits, but even our moral energies may be so sublimated as to be rendered fit for another world; but this is as far above the discovery of human reason as the resurrection and immortality of the body.

9. διεξιούσι] So Cicero; see frag. p. 1094. Ed. Ernesti.

πεται πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη. καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτη συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζῶων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῆ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ' ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὐτὴ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν τιμία. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

1. ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια] The following passage of the *Metaphysics* furnishes an important comment upon this subject. *Ἰσχυρὸν οὖν ὡς δι' εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτὴν ζητούμεν χρεῖαν ἵσταναι, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἀνθρώποις φανερὸν ἐλευθέρως ἢ αὐτοῦ ἵσταναι καὶ μὴ ἄλλου, οὕτως καὶ αὐτὰ μόνη ἐλευθέρως εἶναι ἐπιστημῶν. μόνη γὰρ αὕτη αὐτῆς ἵστανεῖν ἵσται. διὰ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρώποις νομίζοντο αὐτῆς ἢ πεῖσαι. ἀλλὰ καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις δούλη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἵστανεῖν ὅστις κατὰ Σιμωνίδην, οἷος ἂν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχου τὸ γίγασθαι· ἀλλὰ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν μὴ ζητεῖν τὴν κατ'*

*αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην. εἰ δὲ λίγουσί τι οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ σφόδρα φρονεῖν τὸ θεῖον, ἐπὶ τοῦτου συμβῆναι μάλιστα εἰδὸς καὶ δυνατοῦς εἶναι πάντας τοὺς περιττοῦς. ἀλλ' οὕτως τὸ θεῖον φρονεῖν ἰδιόχρηται εἶναι· ἀλλὰ, κατὰ τὴν σαρκομῖαν, ἀλλὰ ψεύδονται ἀκούει οὕτως τῆς τοιαύτης ἄλλην χρὴ νομίζου τιμωτέρων. ἡ γὰρ θεωρία καὶ τιμωτάτη· τοιαύτη δὲ διχῶς ἂν εἴη μόνη. *Metaph. i. 2.* See also *Met. xi. 7. xiv. 8.**

8. ὁμοίωμα] See Stallbaum's *Prol.* in *Platon. Phil.* p. 25, 29.

CHAP. VII.

And for this purpose will require external prosperity.

9 ΔΕΗΣΕΙ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ^{External means ne-}
 ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ^{cessary, and}
 ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφήν καὶ ^{how far.}
 τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν. οὐ μὴν οἰητέον
 5 γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαι-
 μονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς
 ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ
 τὸ αὐτάρκες οὐδ' ἡ πράξις, δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ
 ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλά·
 10 καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἄν τις πράττειν
 κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς·
 οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἥττον δοκοῦσι
 τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. ἰκανὸν
 δὲ τοσαυτ' ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων
 15 τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργούντος. καὶ Σόλων
 δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν
 μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας
 δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς φέτο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρό-
 νως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πράττειν
 20 ἅ δει. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον
 οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν
 ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς

CHAP. VII.

The question which was left undecided, or rather insufficiently explained in i. 8. is here fully and perfectly settled.

19. μέτρια κεκτημένους] See note, p. 39, 22.

22. εἴ τις ἄτοπος] If he (the happy man) should appear a strange out of the way being to the generality of mankind.

πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτός, τούτων
 αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις
 εἰκόασιν αἰ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι. πίστιν μὲν οὖν
 καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς
 πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται· 5
 ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προει-
 ρημένα χρῆ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιφέροντας,
 καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, δια-
 φωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον. Ὁ δὲ κατὰ
 νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τούτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακεί- 10
 μενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔρικεν εἶναι· εἰ
 γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν
 γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐλογον χαίρειν
 τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τούτο
 δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα 15
 τούτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων
 αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς
 πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μά-
 λισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα.
 τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε 20
 καὶ οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

That he who derives his happiness from the theoretical energies, as by so doing he approaches most nearly to the nature of the gods, must be, for that reason, naturally an object of greater love to them.

11. *θεοφιλέστατος*] This proving that the happy man is *θεοφιλέστατος* is neither a useless nor impertinent argument. For Aristotle by so doing showed that his theory agreed with the received opinions of the ancient philosophers; and in this he was supported

by Socrates. See Plato's *Protag.* p. 346. c. ἐπὶ κλίσεων δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί εἰσιν οὗς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλοῦσι. And if *ἄριστοι* then also *εὐδαιμονέστατοι*. See also the magnificent passage in Plato's *Repub.* 613. A.

CHAP. VIII.

INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICS.

10 AP' οὖν εἰ περὶ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς That the scope of this treatise is practical.

CHAP. VIII.

The last chapter concludes the treatise. The following one has nothing at all to do with it as far as an ethical investigation, but merely in relation to the Politics. For if, says Aristotle, the end and scope of all this investigation is not to please the fancy or to amuse a passion for speculation, but for a practical purpose, to make men wiser and better, one grand object of our enquiry must be how such a purpose shall be obtained. Perhaps some few generous tempers might be persuaded to the truth of what has been said, and endeavour to direct their conduct for the attainment of happiness according to the rules here laid down. But what hope is there of convincing and moving the great mass of mankind? How, to say nothing of evil habits already acquired and grown inveterate by time, can they be induced to relinquish their prejudices, and enter upon a course of life, for which they neither have a taste, nor motives strong enough to compel them? More especially since the happiness held out to them demands of them not the mere labor of undoing their old habits, but of acquiring new ones; and the real appreciation of the value and pleasure of virtuous habits, can only be formed by those who have in some measure attained them? The only hope then that this treatise may be of

practical service to mankind, rests upon the ground of its rules being applied in early life, in the education of mankind from their infancy being governed and directed by its precepts. But all education should have two points in view, not merely the advantage of the individual, but likewise that of the state. For it is impossible to know and act for the benefit of a part, without knowing and acting for the benefit of the whole. And it is not only the duty but the interest of every state to have the minds of its citizens so directed, that their own advantages and private ends shall be in unison with the advantages and ends of the state. But for this, it is necessary that education should be under control of the state. Consequently a knowledge of politics is required, not merely because many things in this treatise, particularly in the eighth and ninth books, are necessarily left unfinished and ill explained without them, but also because otherwise it is necessarily deprived of its chief practical bearing, for which purpose only it was written.

περὶ δ' ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρῶν, τῆς τε περὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἡμετέρας, τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἔστι, καὶ πῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶδέναι τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν ταῖς περὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιθεῖν, ἐπιθεῖ γὰρ οἰκία μὴ πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα δ' οἰκίας, τῆς δὲ

τύποις, τέλος ἔχειν οἰητέον τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἣ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γινῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά; οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρα- 5
 τέον, ἣ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα. **Εἰ**
 μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θεόγγιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέ- 10
 ψασθαι μὲν καὶ παρορμηῆσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν, ἡθὸς τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ- 15
 πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχροὺς ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες τὰς οἰκειάς ἠδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν αὐταὶ ἔσονται, φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς 20
 ἠδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι ὄντες. τοὺς

But pre-
 cepts only
 are not suf-
 ficient to
 make men
 virtuous.

τοῦ μίθους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἔλου δι' βλίπτου ἀρετήν, ἀγαθαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλίπτοντας παιδεύειν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, ἵστις τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σωθεῖσαν, καὶ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σωθεῖσιν καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σωθεῖσιν. Polit. i. 5. p. 25. See also i. 1.

9. κατὰ τὸν Θεόγγιν] Significat locum Theognidis, v. 432.

ἢ δ' Ἀσκληπιάδης τοῦτο ἰδοὺς θίς, ἴασθαι κακότητα καὶ ἀσχερὰς φρένας ἀνδρῶν

πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ἴφιστον.

Usus est eodem loco etiam Plato in Menone, p. 96. Cf. denique Euripidis quoque Hippolyt. 916. ZELL.

21. ἄγιωστοι] It is remarkable to observe how little practical benefit the moral philosophers of antiquity seem to have felt would be derived from their writings; what faint motives they could urge to influence the generality of mankind. For how far could the love of virtue in itself urge men to become virtuous who had no taste for virtue? The very fact of loving virtue for vir-

δὴ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσει; οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἦθεσι κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι. ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων, δι' ὧν ἐπιει-
 5 κείς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλάβοιμεν τῆς ἀρετῆς.

Γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθούς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δηλονότι ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος θείας
 10 αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ

λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύη, ἀλλὰ δέη προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὡσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέψουσιν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγου ἀποτρέποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνείη
 15 ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἶόν τε μεταπέισαι; ὅλως τ' οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπέικειν τὸ παθος ἀλλὰ βία. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προϋπάρχειν πῶς οἰκεῖον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν.

Ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέντα νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλῶς τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ νόμοις δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ
 25 λυπηρὰ συνήθη γινόμενα. οὐχ ἰκανὸν δ' ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ

tue's sake, presupposes a proficiency in morals far beyond the general state of mankind. Some other motive was then clearly necessary for men sunk in

vice as the heathen world, a powerful motive which no heathen, no human philosophy, could supply.

καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων,
καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ
ἀνάγκη μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις
ἢ τῷ καλῷ. διόπερ οἴονται τινες τοὺς νομοθε-
τοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ 5
προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὡς ὑπακουσομένων
τῶν ἐπιεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπειθοῦσι
δὲ καὶ ἀφυστέροις οὖσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας
ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν
μὲν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ 10
λόγῳ πειθαρχήσειν, τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρε-
γόμενον λύπη κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διὸ
καὶ φασὶ δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας αἱ
μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς.
εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν 15
τραφήναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἴθ' οὕτως
ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπιεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μὴτ' ἄκουτα
μὴθ' ἐκόντα πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίγνεται
ἂν βιουμένοις κατὰ τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν,
ἔχουσαν ἰσχύν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις 20
οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ
δὴ ὅλως ἢ ἐνὸς ἀνδρός, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἢ
τινος τοιούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει
δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπὸ τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ.
καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιου- 25
μένους ταῖς ὀρμαῖς, κἂν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ
δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθῆς τάττων τὸ ἐπιεικές.
ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίῳ πόλει μετ' ὀλίγων

For the
education
by private
persons is
ineffectual.

9. τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ἐξορίζειν] This was Plato's notion. See De Legibus, Book v.

ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς
 τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν
 πόλεων ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῆ
 ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, Κυκλωπικῶς “θεμιστεύων
 5 παιδῶν ἢ δ’ ἀλόχου.” Κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ ^{Necessity}
 γίνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθὴν καὶ δρᾶν ^{of public}
 αὐτὸ δύνασθαι· κοινῇ δ’ ἐξαμελουμένων ἐκάστῳ ^{education.}
 δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ
 φίλοις εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ἢ προαιρεῖσθαι
 10 γε. μάλιστα δ’ ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν, ἐκ
 τῶν εἰρημένων, νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος· αἱ μὲν
 γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νόμων γίνον-
 ται, ἐπιεικῆς δ’ αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων. γεγραμ-
 μένων δ’ ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν,
 15 οὐδὲ δι’ ὧν εἰς ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ
 οὐδ’ ἐπὶ μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνι-
 σχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἔθνη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις
 οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθνη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον
 20 διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας· προὔπ-
 ἀρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει.
 Ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ’ ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι ^{Compara-}
 τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἰατρικῆς· καθόλου μὲν ^{tive advan-}
 γὰρ τῷ πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, ^{tages of}
 25 τινὶ δ’ ἴσως οὐ, ὃ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι ^{public and}
 τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθησιν. ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὲ ^{private}
 δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἰδίας τῆς ^{education.}
 ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου

4. Κυκλωπικῶς] See *Odyss.* i. 114. See *Arist. Pol.* i. 1.

τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. ἀλλ' ἐπιμεληθείη μὲν ἄριστα
 καθ' ἐν καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ γυμναστῆς καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος
 ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδώς, ὅτι πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε
 τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονταί τε καὶ
 εἰσίν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως⁵
 κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα
 ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ'
 ἐκάστω δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ ἰατροὶ ἔνιοι
 δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἐτέρω οὐδὲν ἂν
 δυνάμενοι ἐπαρκέσαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἦττον ἴσως τῷ γε¹⁰
 βουλομένω τεχνικῶ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῶ ἐπὶ
 τὸ καθόλου βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν, κάκεινο
 γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ
 τούθ' αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι. Τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλο-
 μένω δι' ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς¹⁵
 εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῶ πειρατέον γενέσθαι, εἰ
 διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ' ἂν. ὄντινα γὰρ οὖν
 καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ
 τυχόντος, ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ
 ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὧν ἐστὶν ἐπιμέλειά²⁰
 τις καὶ φρόνησις. ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον
 πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις, ἢ καθάπερ
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν; μῶριον
 γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. Ἡ οὐχ ὁμοιον
 φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπι-²⁵
 στημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τὰς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες

Necessity
 of a know-
 ledge of
 politics to
 be a good
 teacher.

Whether
 politics can
 be taught.

4. τοῦ κοινού] According to the well-known dictum of Plato.

26. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις] For in

the other arts and sciences the same persons are seen to teach the use and faculty of them, as exercise them.

καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἰατροὶ καὶ γρα-
 φεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν
 οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' οἱ
 πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο
 5 πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρία μᾶλλον ἢ διανοία· οὔτε
 γὰρ γράφοντες οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων
 φαίνονται (καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους
 δικανικούς τε καὶ δημηγορικούς), οὐδ' αὖ πολι-
 τικούς πεποικηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους υἱεῖς ἢ τινὰς
 10 ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. εὐλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύ-
 ναυτο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν
 κατέλιπον ἂν, οὔθ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλοιντ'
 ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς
 φιλάτοις. οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἢ ἐμπειρία
 15 συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίγνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς
 πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις
 περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν ἐμπειρίας.
 τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαί-
 νονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ
 20 ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χεῖρω ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ'
 ἂν ᾤοντο ῥάδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγα-
 γόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι
 γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν
 25 οὐσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρίναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον,
 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικῆν· οἱ γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ
 περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι'
 ᾧ ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις

10. εὐλογον δ' ἦν] See Plato's Protag. passim.

συναΐδει τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ διαλαν-
 θάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποιήται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσπερ
 ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις
 εἰκόασιν· πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ'
 ἂν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται⁵
 οὐδ' ἰατρικῶν ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι.
 καίτοι πειρῶνται γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θερα-
 πεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὡς δεῖ
 θεραπεύειν ἐκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἔξεις. ταῦτα
 δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς¹⁰
 δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων
 καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς μὲν δυνα-
 μένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρίναι τί καλῶς ἢ τούναντίον
 καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἀρμόττει, εὐχρηστ' ἂν εἴη· τοῖς
 δ' ἄνευ ἔξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιούσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν¹⁵
 καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον,
 εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο.
 παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ
 περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον
 βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως²⁰
 εἰς δύναμιν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία
 τελειωθῆ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος
 εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειραθῶμεν
 ἐπελθεῖν, εἶτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν
 θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σώζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις²⁵
 καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας
 αἰτίας αἱ μὲν καλῶς αἱ δὲ τούναντίον πολιτεύον-

12. πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαί] Upon work, of which unfortunately a few fragments only remain.

ται· θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον
συνίδοιμεν καὶ ποία πολιτεία ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς
ἐκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρω-
μένῃ. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.

APPENDIX.

BOOK I. CHAP. III.

Concerning Plato's doctrine of the Chief or Ideal Good.

CONSIDERABLE difficulties present themselves in the explanation of this Chapter. Not so much from any intricacy or obscurity in Aristotle's reasoning, as because the theory of Plato respecting the Chief Good, and more than all, the process by which he arrived at his results, are so little known to us.

Nor does Aristotle enter here very fully or very deeply into the refutation of Plato's notions, which he appears to have done in another treatise expressly directed to this subject: unfortunately both the books in which Plato developed this intricate part of his philosophy, and the writings of Aristotle on the same subject, have been lost; and consequently all our knowledge respecting it must be gathered from scattered and indirect notices which occur in the different parts of his writings, and some of his Greek commentators.

Many such passages have been collected both from books and commentaries yet remaining in manuscript by Brandis; and were published by him in an unassuming but excellent little dissertation^a, in which he has thrown considerable light upon this subject. Three years after, another essay appeared upon the same subject by Trendelenburg^b, the

^a Christiani Augusti Brandis Diatribe Academica de perditis Aristotelis libris de ideis et de bono sive philosophia. Bonnæ, apud E. Weber, 1823. 8vo. pp. 69.

^b Platonis de ideis et numeris doctrina ex Aristotele illustrata, scripsit Friderichus Adolphus Trendelenburg. Lipsiæ, 1826. Sumtibus F. C. G. Vogelii. 8vo. pp. 100.

industrious editor of Aristotle's *Treatise De Anima*, and a valuable contributor to the *Rhenish Museum*. By a careful comparison of Plato with Aristotle, in such passages as appeared to bear upon this subject, a consistent and correct view has been endeavoured to be formed of Plato's doctrine of the Ideal Good, although unfortunately much must be still left to conjecture^c.

But the history and origin of this peculiarity in the philosophy of Plato, is not entirely insulated from the systems of his predecessors: in them will be found many of the separate component parts of this doctrine of Ideas. The desire of Plato to reconcile the discordant tenets of his teachers, first directed him to this theory, whilst he amalgamated into a uniform and perfect whole the discordant elements as they passed through the crucible of his mind.

In the earlier part of his life he had associated with Cratylus, and had been a disciple in the school of Heraclitus^d. That philosopher taught him that all things sensible were in

^c Some other foreign writers have also composed treatises upon this subject, but generally only with a slight acquaintance with the writings of Aristotle; and some under that old delusion, that Aristotle, the careful, exact and learned disciple of Plato for twenty years, either would not or could not fairly present to us the tenets of his master; that he who has so carefully preserved and explained the doctrines of the earlier philosophers, has not shown the same fairness and ability in regard to Plato. To this objection Trendelenburg most justly replies: "quod si nescivisset Aristoteles tanti ingenii vir, per tot annos Platonis familiaris,—quis tandem sciret? Noliisse vero, si sibi suadeant, qui iis, quæ hic illic apud seriores scriptores de dissidio inter Platonem et Aristotelem et de quadam Aristotelis in præceptorem superbia leguntur, fidem habere malunt, quam magno et sincero Aristotelis ingenio, quale in scriptis ubique cernitur,

et iis ipsis ex Platone apud Aristotelem exemplis, quæ cum Platone collata optime conspirant. Sed fuerint dissidia, de quibus minime satis constat. Num ex his consequens est Aristotelem Platonis philosophiam in pejus detorsisse? Veteres Aristotelis obtrectatores, quodcumque invidia finxit, in eum congerere non verentur. In Platonem ingratum fuisse criminantur; nec tamen ullum hoc ausum esse scio, Aristotelem Platonis sententias falso interpretatum esse. Quare quidquid fabularum est de Aristotelis aut impia malignitate aut sordida æmulatione (quo enim quis major, eo magis multitudinis infra se positæ obtrectationibus objectus), impedimento esse nequit, quominus Aristoteles Platonis sententias exponens locuples testes habeatur." Platonis de Ideis, &c. p. 3.

^d See *Aristot. Met. i. 6.* from whom this account of Plato's progression in philosophy is derived.

a constant flux, and of such consequently there could be no certain science (ὡς πάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἰεὶ ρεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης κατὰ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὕσης). By his master Socrates, on the contrary, whose enquiries were confined exclusively to ethics, his attention was turned in a Logical direction; he was taught to disregard particulars, and to look to universals and general notions.

In unison, therefore, with his master Socrates, and perhaps the Megaric philosophers before him, Plato saw that all knowledge of the truth must be destroyed, unless it could be proved in opposition to Heraclitus, that continued motion is not the essence of things; and secondly, that truth and real essence is not throughout so entirely identical as to have no diversity, (as the Eleatic School asserted,) but embraced within itself many particular ideas, each of which in its own way is expressive of the eternal essence of things.

The method in which he or his predecessors proceeded to prove that there were such things as *Ideas* entirely and essentially distinct, and having a separate and independent existence from things sensible, was in the following way^c.

If every science always performs its *ἔργον*, keeping in view some one and the same thing (πρὸς ἓν τι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπαναφέγουσα), and not regarding particulars or individuals, there must be something else in every science beyond and beside things sensible, which is eternal, and a type of all those things which are produced according to each science; and this is the *Idea*. Farther, those things must exist of which there is any science. But all sciences are of something beyond individuals or particulars, (for these are infinite and indefinite, whereas the sciences are finite and definite); there is then something in every science beyond the particulars (τὰ κατ' ἕκαστα) of science, and this is the *Idea*. Further, if the science of medicine is not a science of any particular or individual health, (τῆσδε τῆς ὑγιείας,) but of health absolutely, there is a certain absolute health (αὐτου-

^c See the MS. commentary of Alexander on the *Metaph.* quoted by Brandis l. c. p. 16.

γῆρα); and if Geometry is not a science merely of this or that particular equal or commensurate quantity, but of the equal and commensurate absolutely there must be some absolute equal and commensurate (τὸ αὐτοῖσιν καὶ αὐτοσύμμετρον), and these are the Ideas. 2dly, If every one of the multitude of men is a man, and of animals an animal, and so on, and there is no individual of them of which the absolute, sole and very man can be predicated, (καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἑκάστου αὐτῶν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ τι κατηγορούμενον), but there is something which is predicated of all of them, yet not identical with any one of them, there must be this something besides these particulars, separate and distinct from them; which also must be eternal, for it is always and equally predicated of all things differing in number. But that single thing which may be predicated of the many (ἐν ἐπι πολλοῖς), but yet distinct and separate from the many, and eternal, is the *Idea*.

3dly, When we take into our minds the notion of man or animal, we do not consider any particular living man or animal. For if every individual man or animal were destroyed, the notion itself of them would still remain. It is clear, therefore, that there is something besides and beyond particulars, of which, whether they exist or whether they do not exist, we have a conception, which itself must have an existence, (for we cannot have a conception of that which has no existence, or of a non-entity); this then is the *Idea*†.

† In this Plato differed from his master, (see *Metaph.* xii. 4.), for Socrates separated not definitions from the things themselves (τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωρίσματα ἰσχυῖ), as did the authors of the doctrine of Ideas, (οἱ δ' ἰχώριον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδίας προσηγήσαντες), and according to these, all things received their appellations, (καὶ παντὰ ταῦτα λήγεσθαι πάντα). For things sensible are of the same name but not of the same essence with the Ideas. In this point Plato differed from Pythagoras. παντὰ μίθεξιν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἰδέοντα τοῖς ἰδίοις τὸν δὲ μίθεξιν τοῦτομα μόνον μετι-

βαλεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Πυθαγόρειοι μίμησιν τὰ ὄντα φασὶ εἶναι τῶν ἁριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μίθεξιν. (*Arist. Met.* i. 6.) Plato differed from Pythagoras, as it appears to me, only in a different view of the subject; Plato said that things sensible were the same as the *Idea*, only homonymously, the same in name, but not in essence, Pythagoras that they were the same by imitation; which amounts to the same thing. For as a painted horse imitates a real horse, so is it homonymous with a real horse. So that whether we say that a painted horse is a horse, because it is the representation of a horse (μίμησις, according

Having thus determined the existence of the Ideas, which are in themselves immutable, and the vestiges of which exist in our own minds^ε, Plato proceeded to investigate their nature and principles. But since he was not competent to investigate these eternal forms in the nature of the things themselves, he turned his attention to those impressions of them only, which he was convinced were to be found in his own and in the minds of every one. These he supposed that he had found in numbers, because they alone might be learnt without the assistance of any other science, and were likewise the elements of all knowledge^η.

For since the Ideas are the causes to all other things of their existence, the elements of the Ideas must be the elements of all things^ι. ^κ But since number exists previous to all other things, (for the boundaries of lines are points, and points are only units in position, and previous to lines there can be neither surfaces nor solids), therefore number, and consequently the principles of numbers, must be the principles of all things. But the first of all numbers is the duad, and the principles of the duad are unity, the great and the little. For the duad includes in itself both many and few; as far as it is a double, many; as far it is a half, few; consequently it includes in itself, excess and defect, the great and the small. But inasmuch as each of its parts is a unit, and itself a species of unit, as being the duad and a single number (τὸ δυαδικόν); for this reason it was conceived that

to the Pythagorean view), or whether we say that a painted horse is a horse homonymously (*μυθίζου* having the name and not the essence), we express much the same thing though in a somewhat different way. This seems to me to be the meaning of the passage; unless more be implied in reference to the particular views of each philosopher; the one looking more to numbers, the other to the abstract terms of Logic. Plato, at all events, appears to use the terms *μίμησις* and *μίμωξις* synonymously.

^ε For the *εἶδη* have neither substance nor place, and consequently exist in the mind, not derived from sensible objects, but prior to them. See Arist. Phys. iii. 4. iv. 2. Trend. p. 45.

^η Brandis, p. 61.

^ι ἰσὼ δ' αἰτία τὰ εἶδη τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ κινήτων στοιχεῖα ἀπείκων ἥθη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα· ὡς μὲν οὖν ἕλην τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ μικρὸν εἶναι ἀρχαίς, ὡς δ' οὐσίας τὰ ἴσ' ἐξ ἰσίων γὰρ κατὰ μέγεθος τοῦ ἴσος τὰ εἶδη εἶναι τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς. Arist. Met. i. 6.

^κ Brandis 38.

unity, great and small, are the principles or elements of the duad. Since then numbers are the principles of all other things, and exist independently of them, the Ideas must be identical with numbers, and consequently the principles of the one will be the principles of the others. The matter¹ of the Ideas then is the great and small, or the indefinite duad, and their form is unity. Not that these numbers are to be confounded with mathematical numbers. For these ideal numbers (*ἀριθμοὶ εἰδητικοί*), which are the elements of all things, differ from the mathematical. For the mathematical numbers admit of union, and are combinable (*συμβλητοί*), but the ideal are not. The ideal numbers differ from each other not only in number, but also in their elements, each ideal number consisting of different elements².

It may be questioned then, how it is that Aristotle affirms, that they who introduced this doctrine did not form an IDEA of numbers, inasmuch as they made no ideas of those things in which they predicated priority and posteriority (*οὐκ ἐποίησαν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον· διότι οὐδε τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύασαν*)¹. But this question receives its answer, if we bear in mind the distinction of numbers already stated. For posteriority and priority are the conditions of the existence of mathematical numbers, for the existence of a posterior number depends upon the previous existence of a prior number. And consequently there can be no common idea of this species of numbers².

¹ The matter or ἕλη of Plato was nothing else than that which has a capacity of receiving quality and quantity, or more correctly, *form* (*δεξιμότης τῶν ἰδῶν*).

² This distinction of numbers was afterwards abandoned by the disciples of Plato. Perhaps he was induced to this distinction from the fear lest the diversity of notions, which it was one of his main objects to defend, should be extinguished by referring all things to numbers, which are homogeneous, (*ἰσοειδῆς, συμβλητοί*.) Brandis 45. See Trend. 75.

² The passage in the Metaphysics, xiii.

6, as it now stands, seems to be directly contrary not only to this in the Ethics, but to all that we yet know of this doctrine of Ideas. *εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρως φασὶν εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τῆς ἰδέας, τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν παρὰ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά καὶ χωριστῶς ἀμφοτέρως τῶν αἰσθητῶν. εἰ δὲ τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὸν πρότερον τῶν ὄντων πεχωρημένον τῶν αἰσθητῶν.* Unless we read τὸν μὲν μὴ ἔχοντα, as Trendelenburg suggests, p. 82, it is not easy to see how the two passages are reconcilable.

° Not to enter then further into the consideration of this abstract subject than may serve to illustrate the chapter before us, it may be observed, in conclusion, that Plato referred the Chief Good to the highest unity^p. But he distinguished this supreme entity from the unity of mathematical numbers (as we have already stated), but how all other things depended upon this Idea of the Good, he has no where precisely stated^q.

It is also extremely difficult to determine the several relations of the ideal numbers, the Ideas, and the things sensible. For Plato did not hold with the Pythagoreans, that numbers are the things themselves, (that is, that the essence of things is to be found on them). And whether he considered them as the rule and type, according to which ideas were formed by the chief principle of all things, as things sensible were formed from the *Ideas*, or whether certain powers which gave birth to the genera or ideas of all things according to certain numerical combinations, remains uncertain.

° Brandis 65.

^p See the Seventh Book of the Republic.

^q Neque igitur dubium est, quin Plato inter eos fuerit de quibus Aristoteles: τῶν δὲ τὰς ἀκρίτους οὐσίας εἶναι λεγόντων οἱ μὲν φάσιν αὐτὰ εἶναι τὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐσίας μίτου εἶναι αὐτοῦ ὅτι εἶναι μάλιστα (Metaph. xiv. 4.). Qua in re ab eo dissensit unus ex discipulis, isque Speusippus. Ad Aristotelis enim verba l. 1. p. 247. δῖοσιε ἰ μὲν ἴφωγι εἶ ἀγα-

θὸν προσάπτειν τῶν ἰὸν ὡς ἰουατίον ὅν, ἰουαθὴ ἰξ ἰουατίον ἢ γίνεσι, εἶ κακὸν εἶναι τοῦ σληθεῦς φάσιν εἶναι· οἱ δὲ λέγουσι εἶ ἄνωσον εἶναι τοῦ κακοῦ φάσιν· συμβαίνει δὲ πάντα τὰ ὄντα μετρίχων τοῦ κακοῦ, ἴξω ἰὸν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἰὸν π. ε. λ. quæ ad verba igitur Pseudo-Alexander: ἰ στωικατικῶς Σαυῶ- σικκος, λέγω δὲ τὸ, εἶ τὸ ἰ ἀγαθόν, ἀνάγκη εἶναι μὴ ἰ εἶναι τὸ ὄντων κακὸν εἶναι. ἀπίφωγι καὶ προσάπτειν οὐκ ἠβήλησι εἶ ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἰὸν. Cf. Stob. Ecl. Phys. i. p. 58. ed. Heeren. Brandis 66.

CORRIGENDA.

Page 35. chap. viii. *for* internal *read* external

**360. chap. iv. l. 17. *for* unless he be a friend *read* unless he be a
friend to himself**

362. n. 6. line 1. *for* the great man *read* the good man

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 been used by the Peripatetics gene-
 rally in a technical sense to denote
 things abstracted from sense, and con-
 sequently the faculties employed upon
 such things. Thus compare Philo-
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*ἅπαι τιμῆμα δυνάμειος τῶν δυνάμειος οὐ-
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