

Chile 1973: The Tragedy of Frontist Politics

REPRINTS OF ARTICLES FROM THE CLASS STRUGGLE



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In a month of blood and terror, the military dictatorship in Chile has completely destroyed the complex of organizations built by the Chilean labor movement in the course of a half-century through its struggles and its patient efforts in the background of a relatively democratic bourgeois regime.

Dissolved the great working-class parties and unions, dissolved the various economic, political and cultural organizations of the workers, dissolved the mutual aid societies. Dissolved the poor peasants' associations which even though newcomers on the social and political scene had considerably grown during the past years. Dissolved the slumdwellers' committees, the supplies committees and all the organizations through which the poorest strata of the Chilean society could express at least their immediate claims.

These organizations have not been dissolved simply through legal and revocable measures, but through bloodshed and through ferocious and methodical repression, aimed at the physical elimination of the men who once played a part in the organized working-class movement, and designed to terrorize the others.

Not only have the tanks laid in the dust the whole organized labor movement; at the same time, they have swept away the parliamentary regime in which the workers' organizations had developed and to which they had adapted. We are left with a desolate scenery; that of the ruins of parliamentary democracy; the smashed roofs of the Monada, bombed by General Leigh's aircraft, and the House of Parliament, closed down after his normal occupants had been thrown out, and now guarded by machine-guns. Once the democratic facade has been burnt down, the state apparatus appears in its naked self, that is as gangs of armed men.

These gangs of armed men do not need the help of anyone: not even of those center or rightwing politicians who once called out for them so strongly. The Christian Democrats who had expected the army would "save" the society, only met with its iron-grip. Before being discharged because they were obviously useless to the army, the Christian-Democrat leaders went as far as declaring derisively that, in the event of the army intending to keep in power by a dictatorship, it would find them on the barricades.

"The 11th September coup is a classical 'pronunciamento' which lowers Chile to the level of the Latino-American nations, which are time and again ruled by centuries"- such was the comment of the newspaper Le Monde.

It seems that the bourgeois-liberals find some kind of comfort in discovering that Chile, a model of democracy in a continent where political life is reduced to the sound of marching boots, is only falling back to the level of its neighbours. For them, the past has in some way taken over the present. The Latin America of latifundia and pronunciamentos has taken over a too fragile democracy.

But, in fact the military dictatorship as it has come into power in Chile, is not an old-fashioned and narrow type of political regime but on the contrary the most universal answer of the ruling classes, the sinister domination of the bayonets. It is not merely the failure of a democratic attempt in a society which was not quite ready for it, but the failure of bourgeois democracy itself.

As it is, the military coup d'Etat in Chile is not a classical pronunciamento through which, for lack of parliamentary democratic institutions, the dominating strata try to solve their internal problems. The coup d'Etat has taken place after a long period of parliamentary democracy, because it had become clear that such a regime, and particularly the development of the organized labor movement it allowed, was jeopardizing the course of capitalist exploitation in critical periods. It is quite different from a mere political fight within the dominant strata; it is, in fact, a deadly war between the army which is the instrument of the

bourgeois domination, and the labor movement; a war which, though directed against the labor movement has relentlessly destroyed in that war everything in its way including innocent "civilians" and the structures set up by the bourgeoisie for periods of relative social peace.

The facts are there: the military gangs have fought an overwhelming war against one of the most powerful and organized labor movements in Latin America, and its victory is overwhelming. This victory would not have been so complete nor probably would the solution have been so radical-if some people had not prepared the way for the triumphant march to power of the army.

No bourgeoisie readily chooses to take the risk of letting loose without their muzzles, its private pack of watch-dogs and letting them deal with the crisis of the society in their own "radical" way. The most reactionary regime first tries to achieve compromises with some part of the labor movement. It is risky to suppress all intermediaries between the bourgeois state and the working class; when the bourgeoisie comes to choose such a solution, it has not only to fight the battle but win it, which is not that easy. But of course it may happen that, under the pressure of given circumstances, the bourgeoisie has to choose this extreme solution for which it is always preparing.

This coup was not only from a chronological point of view the last of a long list of political attempts to solve the sociological and economic crisis of the Chilean society on a capitalist basis. Every step in the recent history of Chilean society has been both an attempt to solve the crisis and a time of preparation for the next step: first the slow decay of parliamentary democracy through the failure of the different liberal parties, then the Popular Unity, and finally the unchallenged reign of the military dictatorship. And this process has gone through to the ultimate step, an open and complete dictatorship.

The bourgeoisie was not particularly keen on its armed gangs stepping into power over Allende's corpse and over the ruins of parliamentarism; but it had seen to it that both Allende and the army were ripe for this eventuality while the army prepared its weapons; Allende, giving free rein to these military preparations, covered the clacking of the weapons by speeches.

Because of the collapse of all the attempted solutions, everything was leading up to the decisive and ultimate struggle between the army and the working class. Everyone knew this, even if some supporters of other solutions have tried, until the last moment, to enforce another issue on the situation.

THE LAST MOMENTS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY REGIME

What happened in Chile could happen in all those countries where the social crisis has become serious enough to give the army a chance of imposing its own solution of it. However the concrete unfolding of the Chilean crisis was the result of the concrete situation of Chile, an underdeveloped country with a backward society, where capitalist structures were grafted by imperialism.

Chile is an underdeveloped country; the growth of its industry started with the exploitation of its main natural resources: first saltpetre, and then, more importantly, copper; the exploitation of both these resources was carried out by foreign companies: English for saltpetre, American for copper. Even today, Chile is still a single-production country; it remains a semi-colonial country bearing the stamp of its dependence upon imperialism.

In the first place, this dependence is born out by the fact that the whole of Chile's economy relies on its sale of copper on the world market. Thus its economic balance necessarily varies with the world copper rate. Making things worse is the fact that foreign companies have a complete control over this national wealth which yields 70% of the country's income. This basic dependence has led to further

dependence ties, for even in those cases when the foreign companies have not sent all their profits back home, their local investments in the light industries, have merely led to the control of Chile's light industry by American firms.

On the other hand, the Chilean bourgeoisie, which had developed in the few branches untouched by imperialism, had no influence on the main sectors of the nation's economy, and was moreover severely hindered in its development by the limitations of the home-market. The latter was restricted both by the very low incomes of the people in the cities (more particularly of the proletariat), and the underdeveloped state of the agriculture controlled by the latifundia owners.

Thus the Chilean bourgeoisie and its politicians have long been confronted with a number of vital questions such as: how could profits be shared more equitably and foreign companies be challenged without upsetting the capitalist economic system? How could the latifundia system be changed without shattering the nation's fragile agrarian capitalism? What support could one find in order to get rid of foreign control over the nation's economy, not forgetting the presence of a fairly numerous working class, with a long fighting tradition and deep-rooted organizations?

To sum up then, Pinochet's coming into power through the destruction of the working-class movement and of parliamentarism could be foretold from the very narrow maneuvering space that was left for the bourgeoisie, confronted as it was with those unanswerable questions.

After the electoral tidal wave which brought the Christian-Democrat Eduardo Frei to the presidency in 1964 and returned his party with an unprecedented majority of seats in 1967, the bourgeoisie tried to find a solution for the two vital problems of the country within the parliamentary framework: the nationalization (or as they said at the time, "Chileanization") of the copper mines, and land reform.

This moderate and cautious attempt, designed to preserve the frail social system, was to be a failure. As he did not feel strong enough to challenge the huge US companies, Frei offered to indemnify them. But the colossal amounts that the companies demanded in partial repayments of their shares led the Chilean state to run into more debts abroad, Chile ranks second in the world in this respect, just after Israel, which does not have to face the same problems. So the printing of money was resorted to and rising inflation was the price the working classes had to pay for the compensations offered to U.S. capitalism.

A social crisis developed along with the economic crisis. The workers' claims grew louder. The number of strikes suddenly increased. The working class started to move, as it was certainly not willing to give its life in return for the economic independence of the bourgeoisie.

The same thing was true of the peasantry. The partial measures presented by Frei as an agrarian reform did not at all give satisfaction to the poor peasantry. In fact, Frei's cowardice exasperated them. In order to tame the peasants, the Christian-Democrats then began organizing the peasants who, in turn, took advantage of the new possibilities offered them by the regime to build up their own cooperatives and unions.

The interaction of social forces that was to smash Allende was already on its way. Nothing was missing; not even the threat that the army might step in and act its part for its own benefit (although this still remained unclear). In the fights of the workers and the poor peasants against the Chilean bourgeoisie, the army will always back the latter and its official political representatives. Frei called upon its help several times. But the part played by the army becomes much more subtle in a struggle between the Chilean bourgeoisie and U.S. imperialism. Moreover, the generals do not necessarily analyze the situation in the same way as bourgeois politicians.

For we will come back to this later on—even if the army is the instrument of the bourgeoisie and of the ruling classes against those they exploit, it does not acknowledge the Chilean bourgeoisie as its sole master. The Chilean army is generously subsidized and armed by U.S. imperialism (Chile is one of the countries that have benefited most from America's military aid). Its generals, its small cast of officers have multiple ties with U.S. imperialism. Those ties are both financial and personal: American and Chilean officers have often been trained in the same manner, in some cases even in the same places and by the same instructors. They have been taught the same deep-rooted hatred for communism, and the same conviction that America is the ultimate defender of the bourgeois rule.

The tragedy of the underdeveloped Chilean bourgeoisie is that it was not even capable of mastering its own state apparatus, which had a policy of its own (such is the concrete form taken by all its weaknesses). This fact is neither limited to Chile, nor new to it. Thus at the end of the 19th century, President Balmaceda had tried to wrest Chile from the grip of imperialism (at the time mainly British), and was finally defeated by the same rebellious navy which was to stir up the whole army against Allende almost a century later.

The army, allegedly apolitical, had certainly not waited for Allende's coming to power to consider as most suspicious not only the growing social unrest, but also the politicians who let it develop and more generally the democratic framework within which agitation could develop and the oppressed classes get organized.

For a while, the army kept silent in public even if it had difficulty concealing its reserves regarding the timid attempts of the Christian Democrats. But the rebellion of the Tacna regiment was a sign, protected as it was by the officers, and openly backed by them. This was a black cloud hovering over the heads of the workers and over Parliamentarianism: it was only waiting for the right moment to burst, little did it matter whether the man in power was on the left-wing or the right-wing.

So the parliamentary system was crumbling under the pressure of conflicting social forces. The failure of the government (which was also that of the whole system) came out on the electoral plane. The electoral influence of the Christian Democrats shrunk though one of its leaders had declared after a sweeping success in the general elections that they would stay in power for thirty years. Their complete failure during the presidential election was no more than the logical outcome of a trend that had already become obvious during the previous municipal elections.

TWO SOLUTIONS TO SOLVE THE CRISIS OF THE BOURGEOISIE: POPULAR FRONT OR MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

The bourgeoisie finally accepted Allende's Popular Unity solution, only because of the failure of the Christian Democrats' candidate Radomiro Tomic at the presidential elections—for this failure revealed the decline of the Christian Democrats.

The Chilean bourgeoisie was not astonished by Allende's coming to power, nor was it a victim of its own constitution or electoral system, and nor was it unprepared for a Popular Unity majority. We know that this majority, though beyond dispute, had not been large enough for Allende to automatically become president.

After the failure of the Christian Democrats and even before, for this failure was predictable—several solutions had been considered, but they were rejected at once as being impracticable. First, there was the failure of the attempts to give a new look to the Christian Democrats by pushing forward its "left-wing". Then there was an attempt to turn Alessandri, a right-wing politician, into a

kind of Bonaparte, who would have had no connections with political parties; but in spite of his father being a former president, in spite of the role he had played at the head of the state for a few years, in spite of a noisy campaign, it was a failure. In fact, one cannot turn into a Bonaparte so easily. Alessandri appeared for what he was in reality; a senile old man, lacking ability, and above all, lacking popularity; so the attempt failed as he got only 34.9% thus running second to Allende.

Nobody could claim to have an electoral majority. In Parliament, the left was in the minority. From a mathematical point of view, it would have been possible to build a majority for Alessandri. But then, the time for so obvious an artifice, was over. It was even too late for another artifice which Alessandri himself proposed: once elected by Parliament, he would have resigned so that new elections would have taken place and then a united right would have undoubtedly elected such a man as Frei. But the point was no longer to use behind the scene parliamentary schemes; the issue was clear: either domesticate or defeat the working class.

The bourgeois politicians, right-wing included, had made up their mind to try Allende.

To accept that a man like Allende should be elected president in the name of all left-wing parties including the CP, not only implied to accept a man but to accept a particular policy; a bourgeois policy of course, but not just any old bourgeois policy. This policy consisted in defending the capitalist interests with the help of the labor movement domesticated by the reformist, social-democrat and Stalinist organizations and requiring the total absorption of the organized labor movement into the state apparatus.

This policy paved the way for two possible solutions: either the Left, thanks to its prestige and to the devotion of the rank-and-file leaders of the labor movement, succeeded in making the workers and the poor peasants accept the needed sacrifices—and in that case, the bourgeoisie could have used the domesticated masses to get more independence from American imperialism; or the Left fell into discredit and demoralized the working class by undermining its vigilance and its ability to resist, and by demonstrating to the other strata of society, that the labor movement was unable to solve the social crisis.

Faced with a deep social crisis, the bourgeoisie is left with only two possibilities: either the Popular Front, that is domestication of the labor movement, or destruction of the labor movement. Insofar as any other solution was obviously unsatisfactory the bourgeoisie accepted the Popular Front and, in the meantime, allowed its army and its extreme-right wing to prepare for the destruction of the labor movement.

THE POPULAR FRONT PREPARES THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

In fact, the army and the extreme-right never ceased to prepare for this solution. They had done so in Frei's time; they carried on in Allende's. But even though the Chiefs of Staff had let Allende take charge and had let the Left and the parliamentary regime fall more and more into discredit, they were well aware that they had a fundamental political role to play. They knew that if this last experience revealed once more that capitalist exploitation cannot work efficiently when an organized labor movement exists, their task would be to destroy the latter once & for all. The bourgeoisie had shown its way to the army and had provided the means to achieve this task. The Chiefs of Staff had only to choose the right moment.

Everyone knew that battle was imminent, even Allende. But the two opponents who were about to fight—though they did not represent enemy class interests but rather two incompatible solutions did not have equal chances in the battle to come.

The army, and above all the extreme-right, which had less responsibility and greater leeway, could afford to use any kind of weapon; but Allende could not.

All Allende, the responsible bourgeois politician, could do was to try and guard himself against the coming attacks, and try and meet the emergency by merely returning blow for blow without ever being able to deal radically with the army. How could he attack either the army which constituted the framework of the state apparatus, which was his principal support, or the right extremists who were the Chilean bourgeoisie's last resort if the situation ever got any worse?

In fact, the juggler Allende was standing over a volcano. He was trying to do the impossible: namely win acceptance for his politics, which he believed were most in keeping with the interests of the Chilean bourgeoisie, by simply attempting to convince them again and again that his politics were really the only suited to the occasion.

On the crucial subjects of "Chileanization" and agrarian reform, Allende's policy was essentially the same as Frei's. Even though the support of the organized labor movement gave him a basis that his predecessor lacked, his political line was fundamentally characterized by the same cowardice, the cowardice not of a man but of a whole social class, the Chilean bourgeoisie, whose politicians, including the so-called radical ones, shrank from taking measures that could have led to an open conflict with American imperialism.

Of course, the Popular Unity government took the decision to nationalize the copper mines, a decision, it must be added, that was ratified by the whole Parliament including the Christian Democrats and the right wing, and agreed to start taking over other key industrial sectors. However, Allende's conciliatory attitude toward American imperialism—a permanent factor of his behavior during his time in power—compelled him to pay huge compensation to some nationalized American holdings as well as to the expropriated "national" capitalists. The take-over of a number of plants where part of the shares were the property of foreigners was achieved through the mere buying back of these shares. Even in the case of the copper mines which the government had refused to buy back, as it took for granted that they had been long since paid off, Allende's constant attitude was to suggest that this did not constitute a pure and simple seizure of property since the government had agreed to take over the past debts of the holdings as well.

Thus, because they were the result of a compromise with imperialism rather than the conclusion of a victorious clash with it, the nationalizations have cost Chile a trifle billion dollars (of which 735 millions were used to pay off the debts of the Anaconda and the Kennecott copper holdings).

By comparison, the total of all the salaries paid out in the private sector in 1970 was half that sum. This comparison exposes the two faces of the Popular Unity: the one shown to imperialism and the one shown to the workers.

Indeed, the sums that were paid by the national bourgeoisie and its state in order to gain control of the key industries increased the foreign debt and gave a new impetus to inflation. Just like Frei had done, but on an even greater scale, the Popular Unity government set out to make the workers and the petty bourgeoisie pay the bills of its politics.

More generally speaking, inflation was indeed to considerable extent the legacy of the preceding governments. But Allende's economic policy, because of the measures it forced him to adopt, or even to leave out voluntarily, ushered in an incredible inflation. Nationalized industries were indemnified; no measures were taken against bourgeois businessmen who sent their capital abroad; the owners of the

latifundia who had lost their lands after the agrarian reform—that is only that part of their lands over 100 acres—kept their machinery and cattle (the cattle they nimbly sent across the border, thus aggravating the food shortage).

The causes of inflation were all the more reinforced by U.S. pressures on the international money market, which brought about the boycott of Chile's demand for credit and hastened the financial crisis. In any case, prices went up 340 percent between July 1972 and July 1973.

The inflation rate, which helps one appreciate the depth of the government's cowardice toward imperialism and, more basically, the true class character of its economic and financial policy, rapidly became the touchstone of Chilean political life. For inflation is not neutral. It does not affect all the classes and all the strata of a given society in the same way; and demagogy and hollow phrases have little weight when the living conditions of the victims of inflation are rapidly worsening. The petty bourgeoisie, shopkeepers, craftsmen and small businessmen who, at best, were willing to give Allende's experiment a go before condemning the politics of the Popular Unity, soon abandoned their "wait and see" attitude and were infuriated when they saw their cash-boxes become empty and their actual income dwindle and when, to top it all, they started feeling the effects of the harassing measures of the new administration. Frustrated, the petty bourgeoisie turned on the Popular Unity and, even, against the labor movement as a whole since the government was allegedly wielding power and openly attacking the interests of the middle classes in the name of the labor movement. By this time the Left had an entire class rising up against it and the Right had finally found a striking force.

The reaction of the workers, who were also the victims of inflation, was at times one of equal exasperation and violence. But in general, because of the fact that the Popular Unity's policy was carried out in its name, the working class was rather disoriented not to say resigned.

As for Allende, who had to face a host of problems to which he had no solution whatsoever, and who had to cope with a wave of strikes plus the more and more violent interventions of the petty bourgeoisie (who in turn was more and more openly being organized by right extremists), he offered the miserable sight of a desperate man.

The failure of his policy was obvious. He nonetheless continued his desperate efforts to try and convince the bourgeoisie and even the army to whom he truckled and cringed.

From the time of the military's entry in his government up to the time of their significant departure, plus the aborted military coup, the orbit of Allende's policy was clearly on the way down. But did it have to end in a military blood-bath?

It is well known that on the eve of his death, Allende had proposed a referendum. His intention was to open the possibility of a political solution to the crisis (within the limits of the parliamentary system) before the presidential elections which were still a long way off. Had Allende secured a majority in such a referendum, his political authority would have been enhanced and he could have continued to run the country. (It is possible that the army finally intervened to prevent such an outcome). In the event of a negative result in the referendum, Allende could have left the political scene without endangering the parliamentary system.

Why was the bourgeoisie opposed to such a legal outcome of the crisis? Did they feel that the working class was not yet demoralized enough and the Left discredited enough for the inglorious departure of Allende to put an end to the social upheaval and bring back the age of parliamentary coalitions?

Or else, did the army, anxious as it was to get rid of both the organized labor movement and the parliamentary system, once and for all, force the hand of the bourgeoisie in order to impose their own solution of the crisis? In other words, did the sword come to the rescue of the bourgeoisie in exchange for political power, as has so often been the case in history?

The answer to these questions is ultimately of secondary importance. There is no doubt that the army was preparing, even under Frei, to force on the bourgeoisie its own political line and its own solution of the crisis and that this solution implied the methodical destruction of all forms of labor organizations and of all forms of parliamentary democracy. Another thing is sure: even if the coming to power of the Left was not the fundamental cause of the intervention of the military-take Feron who, though he longs for a Mussolini style state, might tomorrow fall a victim of the military if his control over the unions fails to bring the working class to heel-the very presence of the Left at the head of the state created the best possible conditions for the intervention of the army by demoralizing the working class and by making the other social strata of the population come out against them.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BOURGEOIS STATE: A NECESSITY FOR THE WORKERS

Allende paid for his failure with his life. But if he is dead, this representative of bourgeois politics knew the risks of his policies and chose to run them. The illusions which he inspired, the hopes which he raised cost the lives of thousands of workers whose only mistake was to have confidence in him. Thousands of workers have paid with their lives for having believed that it was possible to follow a "peaceful road to socialism"; that it was sufficient to bring men of the left to power through elections...

That particular road not only does not lead to socialism but has every chance of not being a peaceful one. The bourgeoisie prepares itself for the confrontation, even when the workers do not. It engages specialists for the task, competent men trained and organized for repression.

The politicians of the bourgeoisie can be demagogues to the working class when they want to win its confidence, or cowards when the time for a show of strength comes; they are not the ones who count in crucial moments. Ministers or heads of states, they are not the real power but only the facade covering it. The real power is not at the mercy of electoral ups and downs, it is in the hands of those who direct the apparatus of repression which is the state, the Chiefs of Staff, and the officer caste.

It is those that the workers must put out of action, it is that apparatus the working class must destroy, if it wants to open the way to socialism.

"FRONTIST" POLITICS (BOLIVIA, ARGENTINA, CHILE)

AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES

The South American proletariat of Chile, Bolivia, and Argentina, whom some had buried as a revolutionary class since the victory of the Cuban Revolution at the beginning of the 60's, to the benefit of the peasants and the urban petty-bourgeoisie, has shown its combativity once again during the last five years. This combativity, each time, has forced the propertied classes to use politicians who wear labels such as "worker" or "socialist", "communist" or even "revolutionary" - in an attempt to fool the workers, or demobilize them, even to crush them.

And each time the Left has agreed to play along.

It has done so in different ways, but always with a similar policy. This policy which, in Bolivia, took the form of a People's Assembly supporting the "relatively progressive" fraction of the bourgeoisie and the army symbolized by General Torres; in Argentina, that of allegiance by the CGT, the CP and "armed groups of revolutionaries" to Campora and then to Peron; finally in Chile, of the Popular Unity Government, in which the Socialist and Communist Parties, other diverse groups on the Left, and to a lesser degree, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) participated.

This policy is only a re-edition of that of the Popular Fronts, the National Fronts, and the Liberation Fronts which look only to tying the proletariat and the working masses down to the heels of the bourgeoisie and its state.

The conclusions of such a policy are unfortunately quickly drawn as far as the working class is concerned; sometimes its total destruction, but always its demoralization.

On this subject, Trotsky wrote in the Transitional Program:

"The conciliatory policy of 'Popular Fronts' reduces the working class to impotence and prepares the road to fascism.

The 'Popular Fronts' on the one hand, fascism on the other, are the last political resources of imperialism in the struggle against the proletarian revolution."

The employing of the Stalinists, of the Social Democrats and of the nationalist unionists by the bourgeoisie to accomplish its task of strangling the proletariat should not come as a surprise to revolutionary Marxists.

As for the "left-wing" nationalist unionists such as Lechin in Bolivia, or the trade-union leaders in Argentina, it would be wrong to say that they have gone over the side of the bourgeoisie, for, in fact, they have never stopped being on that side of the barricades.

That is why, from that point of view, to claim, as some do, that the majority of the Bolivian People's Assembly, the Argentinian C.G.T. or the Chilean Popular Unity, could have led through blindness, naivety, or reformist illusions, a false policy, in the long run tragic for the workers, is nonsense. Torres, Peron, Allende, and their accomplices, whatever their various political origins, have in common the fact that they consciously practiced an

anti-revolutionary policy. And if they stick the label "reformist" or "social" to their politics, it is only to accomplish better their task of fooling the workers; to protect the bourgeois order and its most faithful guarantor, the state apparatus, against any attempt of a proletarian revolution.

This should be obvious to any militant who claims allegiance to Trotskyism and the bolshevik tradition, to any militant or group who want to be an integral part of the vanguard of the working class, that is to say, of which the task is precisely to preserve the political independence of the proletariat, an indispensable condition for the accomplishment of its historical role.

However, not only are the different international groups who call themselves the Fourth International, incapable of formulating such an analysis for the three countries mentioned, but their different local sections when they have played a given role in events (as in Bolivia and Argentina), have practiced a policy which can be qualified, at best as opportunist, at worst frankly reactionary.

And in Chile where there was practically no Trotskyist group of any significance, the attitude of the most important international regroupings coming from the Fourth International, the United Secretariat, consisted in identifying itself in large measure with centrist groups such as the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (M.I.R.).

And that, indeed, is not surprising. For if all the international Trotskyist groups have, in the past, taken political positions which have not had very much to do with Trotskyism (support of the Chinese Cultural Revolution by the former International Committee, identification by the United Secretariat of the National Liberation Fronts in Algeria, Vietnam, the Gulf of Arabia, etc. as proletarian revolutionary organizations) the pure and simple transition of the United Secretariat to Castroist positions has only magnified the phenomena.

As a matter of fact, in the resolution on Latin America, which was adopted at its Ninth World Congress in 1969, the United Secretariat, theorizing the attitude which it had already taken for several years, stated:

"In fact, in most of these countries, the most likely variation, is that for a rather long period of time, the peasants will have to bear the main burden of the struggle, and the radicalized petty-bourgeoisie will furnish, in a large measure, the cadres of the movement."

This anti-proletarian orientation which, in itself, characterizes the policy of the United Secretariat and the social forces it represents, was the general line along which the South American sections had to follow. They were able to follow this orientation, which led them to complete political failure, all the more easily, as they had themselves been infested for a long time by all sorts of populist and Castroist currents.

Advocates of guerilla warfare and partisans of "prolonged revolutionary war" as the only form of struggle, extolling the rural and intellectual petty-bourgeoisie by attributing to it a role and ability which historically belong only to the proletariat, the sections did not know which way to turn when the proletariat began to move. For this upsurge of the working class was a hypothesis which had not been envisaged either by the theoreticians of the United Secretariat, or the leaders of the South American section of that tendency. Which, for people attaching themselves, at least verbally, to the tradition

of the October Revolution and the Fourth International, is really going a bit to far.

In fact, going through the different political parties defended by the South American groups claiming to be Trotskyist, and which have led them either to the guerilla warfare adventure, or towards the most shameless subordination towards union bureaucrats, the complete collapse of those who claimed to be, and still have claimed recently to be the "international leadership of the Trotskyist movement", has become obvious.

This failure necessitates more than ever the reconstruction of the Fourth International.

THE CHILEAN TRAGEDY AND THE CENTRIST POLITICS OF THE MIR

The overthrow of Allende by a military coup d'etat, and the crushing of the Chilean proletariat by the Pinochet junta, are unfortunately a bloody verification of Trotsky's statement that Popular Fronts open the way for a ferocious repression of the workers.

Even though the responsibility for the defeat of the Chilean proletariat falls on the Stalinists and Social Democrats who left the military armed and untouched, before a disarmed proletariat, one could also question the politics of the movement of the Revolutionary Left (M.I.R.) which made up the extreme-left wing of the Popular Unity, even though the M.I.R. played practically no role in the events which took place.

Of Castroist traditions, the M.I.R., the result of a split of Young Socialists, began from 1968 on to agitate amongst the homeless, the inhabitants of shantytowns, the Indian peasants, and the students.

Before the presidential elections of September 1970; the M.I.R. was convinced that the candidate of the left could not win, and it continued to advocate armed struggle as the only road to socialism.

Therefore Allende's victory was a total surprise to it. And, after short-lived hesitations, it made a complete turnabout and put itself at the disposal of Popular Unity. The support of Salvador Allende became the focal point of its politics. From that moment on, the essential task of the M.I.R. consisted in putting pressure on Popular Unity in the hope of pushing it farther to the left. In order not to hamper Allende or break off the dialogue with him, the M.I.R. checked the squatting on the land by the poor peasants, squattings for which it had, up to that time, been the principal agitator. Furthermore, it placed its para-military groups at the disposal of the President of the Republic, and made up his personal guard, and the General Secretary of the movement, Miguel Enriquez, even became Allende's personal advisor.

The M.I.R. had considered the election of Allende as a great victory of the people which would facilitate the march of the working class toward the socialist revolution. Nelson Gutierrez, M.I.R. militant and president of the students' federation in Concepcion, explained it in a speech given on May 30, 1971 in the presence of Allende:

"Government control, the use of a part of the state apparatus and the

neutralization of the other, give rise to favorable conditions for the mobilization of the masses, and can permit the change of strength relationships in view of the final showdown of both camps."

The M.I.R. was therefore counting on Allende and on the state apparatus that he was supposed to control to engage in the battle against the bourgeoisie. Its role would then consist essentially in convincing Allende of the necessity of finding support in the mobilization of the masses to fulfill his task.

Far from being an axis and a revolutionary leadership for the Chilean workers, the M.I.R. played the role of "socialist revolution advisor" up to the end of the government coalition. Far from denouncing to the workers the politics of class treason by the Chilean Popular Front, the M.I.R. contented itself with being the left-wing cover of that front.

Indeed, its attitude strikingly resembles the one which was adopted in France by Marceau Pivert and the "Revolutionary Left" of the Socialist Party during the Popular Front and the strikes of June 1936. Here too, far from helping the masses not to be taken in by the Popular Front, Pivert, who was at a time a member of the Blum cabinet, urged the latter to rely firmly on the masses and to prepare the revolution.

In Spain, the P.O.U.M. carried out a similar policy, which, there too, allowed the Stalinists, Social Democrats, the anarchists, and the bourgeois republican government to demoralize the workers and to precipitate their defeat.

Commenting on this policy, Trotsky wrote:

"The leaders of the P.O.U.M. plaintively urge the government to take the road of socialist revolution. The leaders of the P.O.U.M. respectfully invite the leaders of the C.N.T. to understand finally the Marxist teachings on the state. The leaders of the P.O.U.M. consider themselves to be 'revolutionary' advisors to the leaders of the Popular Front. We must reveal to the unionist workers and anarchists the treason of these gentlemen, who call themselves anarchists but who are actually plain ordinary liberals. We must pitilessly denounce Stalinism as the most dangerous agent of the bourgeoisie". (Problems of the Spanish Revolution. Is Victory Possible?)

The M.I.R. justified its policy by the necessary "unity of the forces of the Left" toward the Right. It wrote the following in September 1970:

The policy which must prevail on all levels and on all fronts, is that which replies to the necessity of regrouping forces, and of striking the principal enemy. For this reason, the union of all forces destined to confront the enemy was, and remains, fundamental; it relegates to the rear the divergences of the different forces of the Left".

The M.I.R. advocated this union with those who had themselves refused to interfere with the bourgeois state apparatus, the army and the police, but who had voted for a law forbidding workers to carry arms, and supported the Chiefs of Staff in their struggle against loyalist soldiers and sailors. Under these conditions their appeals to the workers to arm themselves and organize for the final showdown were but hollow and misleading words.

From this point of view, the M.I.R. contributed to the defeat of the

Chilean proletariat.

BOLIVIA - TWO "TROTSKYIST" GROUPS,

TWO ERRONEOUS POLICIES.

The strongest Trotskyist organization in Latin America was without a doubt the Bolivian Revolutionary Workers' Party (P.O.R.).

As early as the years 1952-53, the P.O.R., then unified, practiced with the approval of the immense majority of the Trotskyist movement, all tendencies in agreement, a servile policy of coattailing toward the nationalist government of Paz Estensoro, and above all his left wing incarnated by the union leader, Lechin.

With the overthrow of Paz Estensoro in 1964, the army seized power. General Barrientos became the strongman of the country. Upon his death in 1969, a civilian, Salinas, replaced him at the head of the state, but was soon removed by another general, Ovianda Candia. The army then split into different factions. Candia, one year after coming to power, was forced to resign by a military junta led by General Miranda. So that the army would not tear itself to shreds, Candia agreed. But one of his ministers, General Torres, linked to Lechin, seized power on October 12, 1970. To support Torres, and to stop Miranda, the Bolivian Workers' Central whose leader was Lechin, gave the order for a general strike which was very widely followed.

From that moment on, the Bolivian working class began to move, following its vanguard, the proletariat of the mines.

And although the partisans of Ovanda preferred to delay the show of strength with the workers, the sole policy of Torres, of Lechin and their left wing allies was to prevent at all costs the Bolivian workers from challenging the bourgeois state, and to channel the movement into a dead-end. And to bring this effort to a fruitful conclusion, the "Trotskyist" groups lent their humble assistance.

THE P.O.R. (MOSCOSO) AND THE P.O.R. (LORA)

When Torres took power, there were two Bolivian organizations which called themselves Trotskyist and which came out of the postwar P.O.R. which split in 1956: the P.O.R. (Moscoso tendency) which is the Bolivian section of the United Secretariat, and the P.O.R. (Lora tendency) more or less close at the time to the late International Committee.

When the mobilization of the workers took place, the Moscoso group had already and for a long time been completely modelled after the guerillas of the Army of National Liberation created by Che Guevara. Moscoso thinks that the only possible road to socialist revolution is through guerilla warfare. This group had practically no support amongst the working class and did not really try to implant itself in it.

The upsurge of the workers caught it completely unaware. A month after the general strike called by the C.O.B., Moscoso's newspaper, Combate, writes:

"Despite the failures, the national and social liberation must go through

the stage of guerrilla warfare". (November 1970, bi-monthly issue No. 1).

And if, until August 1979, the date of the overthrow of Torres, armed struggle remained its favorite leitmotiv, the Moscoso group was unable to find its way in a situation which it had not foreseen. In fact, the P.O.R. (Moscoso) being foreign to the working class and its struggle and incapable of defining a program of action which would look for support in the most cherished hopes and needs of the working masses, was to remain throughout the events outside of the mass movement.

The attitude of the other Trotskyist group, the P.O.R. (Lora) was completely different but no less erroneous. Fundamentally its policy was to coattail the Stalinists for better or for worse, and to support Lechin, hand in hand with them, whilst the latter gave his unconditional support to Torres.

This alliance between the partisans of Lora, the Stalinists and Lechin was not new. Already, during the "revolution" of 1952-53, the essence of Lora's policy was not to denounce Lechin and the C.O.B. who brought unfailing support to Estensoro, but to ask the Lechinist C.O.B. to take power. According to Lora, that would have transformed the unionist Confederation, ipso facto, into a soviet.

Another variant consisted in establishing a government formed by the P.O.R. and the left-wing nationalists, a government which would then become a workers' and peasants' government. The P.O.R. stated during its Tenth Congress in 1953:

"A coalition government made up of the P.O.R. and the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement would be one way of realizing the formula 'a worker and peasant government' which would in turn constitute the transitory stage to the dictatorship of the proletariat".

THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

In 1970 and 1971 the Lora group led the same politics. Their total dependence on the Stalinists and the nationalists was made especially clear through their activity in the People's Assembly (created in January 1971 after an attempted coup d'etat against Torres). The People's Assembly was created at the top by the respective leaderships of the C.O.B., the C.P., the Revolutionary Party of the National Left and the Lora group, and had for essential function to support Torres' government.

The workers never had any say in its election, its debates or its functioning. And Lora, having immediately baptized it "the first Latin American Soviet" did nothing to leave its framework and to mobilize the working-class masses against Torres and his left-wing allies. It must be said that Lora considered them all as representatives of the progressive bourgeoisie with whom one had to come to terms.

However this did not stop him from bitterly complaining about the workers' lack of interest in such an assembly. He was later to state: "we had to acknowledge the fact that the masses did not get moving and showed sheer negligence in the designation of their delegates".

Nothing was done to arm the working-class masses and to warn them against the ever present danger of being crushed. And in the People's Assembly, al-

though the Lora group boldly raised the question of arming the proletariat, it was only to distribute positions in the Chiefs of Staff with the P.R.I.N., the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking Stalinists and the Revolutionary Left Movement (M.I.R.) in a proletarian army which had yet to see the day.

Though belonging to the same international tendency as Lora, one group was to affirm:

"The People's Assembly became a place for discussion with left-wing nationalism and Stalinism instead of an arena in which... the P.O.R. could openly and audaciously mobilize the masses against Torres and his allies: Lechin and the Stalinists". (Israeli group "Avant-Garde" - International Correspondence, October 1972).

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that general Banzer was able to overthrow Torres without firing a shot and that nowhere did the working class mobilize to any large extent to defend a government which had done everything in its power to demobilize it and which had moreover perfectly succeeded in doing so.

Even though disputes between the two fractions of the P.O.R. during this period had been extremely serious, it did not prevent them from coming to an agreement a few months later about entering together into a "Revolutionary Anti-Facist Front" - a sort of People's Front in exile -, side by side Torres' followers, Lechin's left-wing nationalists, Stalinists, etc... In its manifesto this Front, appealing to the "patriots", called for "the unity of all the revolutionary democratic and progressive forces in the fight" in order to establish "a National Government of the People".

In fact, Lora and Moscoso went from the People's Front to the National Liberation Front, demonstrating a remarkable constancy in their efforts to fit in with all of the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalist movements intent on defending the country. And these are the people supposedly defending Trotskyism and the historical interests of the working class in Bolivia. We can only view such a situation with shame or disgust.

ARGENTINA OR THE COMPROMISES WITH PERONISM

In Argentina, the situation was in some ways similar to that in Bolivia. As in Bolivia, a powerful nationalist movement -Peronism- controlled the Unions, supported in particular by Peron's popularity in the working-class masses.

Of the ten years of Peron's reign (1945-1955) the C.G.T. Union bureaucrats only kept in mind the social advantages granted to the workers by the Justicialist "lider" and which had only been made possible by the extremely favorable situation which Argentina had benefited from at the end of the Second World War. Their propaganda omitted to mention the infringements of the right to strike, of political freedom or the freeze on wages which the regime imposed prior to being overthrown.

Thanks to the favorable situation in which the local bourgeoisie found itself from 1945 to 1949, Peron was able to buy up, heart and soul, a working-class bureaucracy which, for these reasons, remained attached to his per-

son and his cause.

When Peron was overthrown by the army in 1955, the working class did not lift a finger to defeat a man who had however boasted about being the champion of the poor and unclothed.

The various governments then to follow one another were incapable of establishing social peace for any great length of time. For 18 years the country's political life was wrought with instability. Frondizi, Illia, Levingstone were toppled one after the other in 1962, 1966, and 1971. And each time the army attempted unsuccessfully to establish a "stronger" government than the previous one. Despite all the hindrances placed on its trade-union and political activities (outlawing of organizations and of strikes, the imprisonment of militants), the Argentinian working class did not give up the fight.

From 1968 onward, tension was to mount and culminate a few months later in the two movements at Cordoba in May 1969 and March-April 1971. They were veritable workers' uprisings during the course of which the workers controlled the streets despite the army tanks and the police forces dashed to the spot. They erected barricades and transformed certain factories into fortresses. And though the military ultimately got the situation under hand, they were unable to eliminate the considerable recession that those in the Cordoba had made on the workers of the country in general. Other movements of a similar nature, though smaller, got off the ground in Mendoza and Mar de Plata. And during the same period several general strikes of a short length were declared by the C.G.T. Union and were largely successful.

In a parallel way, at the level of the intellectual petty-bourgeoisie, the situation was rapidly deteriorating. Universities were often occupied like the factories and the students joined the workers in the streets. And it was in this milieu at its boiling-point that groups of urban guerillas were created, claiming allegiance either to Peronism (The People's Armed Forces, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Montoneros), to Maoism (Armed Liberation Forces) or even to Trotskyism (Revolutionary Workers' Party - People's Revolutionary Army - P.R.T.-E.R.P.).

Their actions (kidnappings or executions of managing directors or generals, attacks on banks or bank vans, distribution of food and clothing in shantytowns, the disarming of policemen and factory-guards, etc...) was often met with approval in the working population.

Faced with the rising working-class movement, student discontent, and extreme-left terrorist activities, the Argentinian bourgeoisie decided to revive the Peronist myth despite its age and the risks it involved. The first pro-Peronist operation was undertaken under the presidency of General Lanusse. First of all, in order to check the rise in the working class, they had to get Peron's assent and use the old "lider's" prestige to facilitate the election of Campora.

Long negotiations were entered into with the exile in Madrid which were no doubt made all the more painful because the bourgeoisie had to convince a section of the Chiefs of Staff hostile to Peronism to accept this solution. Business circles publicly supported Peron's return and the latter came back to power via Campora.

It had very rapidly become clear that the Peronist solution required the

dictator's return in person.

Campora's candidacy during the presidential elections of March 1973, then Peron's during the September elections after Campora's resignation, led the Peronist guerilla organizations to lay down their arms and to unhesitatingly join forces with the National Justicialist Movement.

But what was the attitude of the Trotskyist organizations during this time?

THE E.R.P.-P.R.T., ARGENTINIAN SECTION OF THE UNITED SECRETARIAT

Unflinching supporters of the "prolonged revolutionary war", the People's Revolutionary Army - Revolutionary Workers' Party (E.R.P.-P.R.T.) fell into the utmost confusion and split when it became obvious that "operation Peron" was going to succeed. One of its fractions called E.R.P.-22 openly joined forces with Campora; the others were left devoid of program or perspective.

The P.R.T. and its newspaper El Combatiente is a petty-bourgeois organization, cut off from the working class, and in complete agreement with the 9th World Congress of the United Secretariat. It entered into urban guerrilla activities and envisaged a "prolonged war as the only path for workers' power in Argentina and all of Latin America to take" (El Combatiente, quoted by Rouge, June 11th, 1969); and to ensure the victory of this prolonged war, envisaged "the unity of the fighting vanguard" that is to say with the other armed Peronist groups. The P.R.T. (El Combatiente) was absolutely incapable of defining a program in keeping with the interests and the level of consciousness of the workers. And in the face of "operation Campora" the P.R.T. (El Combatiente), having totally underestimated the impact of Peronism on the working class, could only think up vague slogans like: "Down with the putsch, down with the elections, up with the Revolution!".

As for the United Secretariat, its attitude toward the P.R.T. (El Combatiente) was very characteristic. At first, it gave full support to the P.R.T.-E.R.P.'s political line. In the April 13th, 1970 issue of Rouge, it declared: "At the present time, actively engaged in an armed struggle, the P.R.T. constitutes one of the most solid sections of the Fourth International." And a year later, Livio Maitan went even further: "lately, as a consequence of its own reinforcement and of the difficulties encountered by the other organizations, the E.R.P. has emerged as the most dynamic force and the one most capable of leading spectacular actions likely to meet with widespread approval." (In Rouge, April 19th, 1971).

But the tone began to change after the total failure of the P.R.T. Soon after Campora's victory, we read in the March 30th issue of Rouge:

"For two years, in keeping with its 'revolutionary war' strategy, the P.R.T. had a precise orientation: the unity of the armed organizations. Our comrades were left completely isolated militarily by the evolution of the armed Peronist organizations.

Likewise, the prestige gained by the daring actions of the P.R.T.-E.R.P. was not really capitalized politically: the favorable reactions of large sectors of the Argentinian masses to our comrades remained scattered and unpolitical and thus did not stand up to the Peronist election-orientated and populist demagogy."

And two months later, the tune was still the same:

"Slogans as general as 'For War and Socialism' or 'Form Commandos in Support of the E.R.P.' cannot give the greater vanguard any concrete prospects as to their reorganization in the present context...

To proclaim that the war against the armed forces will go on may well symbolize a vigorous refusal of submission or surrender, but it in no way opens the road for an uprising of the masses." (Rouge, June 8th, 1973).

Underneath these words is a belated recognition of the total failure of the P.R.T. and its political strategy.

But can one honestly be surprised by such a failure?

A TROTSKYIST-MAOIST ORGANIZATION?

Furthermore, the example of Argentina reveals the United Secretariat's opportunism in organizational matters. Because the P.R.T. which had been officially named the "Argentinian Section of the Fourth International" by the United Secretariat, bears no resemblance to a Trotskyist organization. Not just because its political line like that of the United Secretariat has nothing in common with the Transitional Program and the tradition of Trotsky's Fourth International, but also because its leaders have publicly refused the "Trotskyist" label. In an interview appearing in the magazine Punte Final (August 29th, 1972) two of the P.R.T. leaders declared that:

"The party at the head of the People's Revolutionary Army (E.R.P.) and the Revolutionary Workers' Party (P.R.T.-El Combatiente) defines itself ideologically as Marxist-Leninist and is opened to the contributions of various revolutionaries of different countries, including that of our principal commander, Che Guevara. It takes in the contributions that Trotsky, Kim Il Sung, Mao Tse Tung and General Giap have made to the revolution. We believe that it is insufficient and inappropriate to define this organization ideologically as Trotskyist."

Far be it from us to contradict the militants of the P.R.T. on this last point. They certainly have nothing in common with Trotskyism. Indeed, in a brochure entitled "The sole road to Workers' Power and Socialism", they assign themselves the essential "theoretical" task of "combining the principal contributions of Trotskyism and Maoism into a higher form opening the door to a return to Leninism."

And all this pompous nonsense on the part of the P.R.T., colored here and there with Stalinist-style attacks on the Trotskyist movement which has within its ranks "counter-revolutionary adventurers" (amongst other things), merely proves that the United Secretariat is not very discerning when it comes to affiliating new sections.

THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

The other Argentinian Trotskyist tendency, which in 1969 was considered as one of the United Secretariat's "sympathizing groups" is the one led by Manuel Moreno, former member of the International Committee of the S.L.L. (Socialist Labour League) and the O.C.I. This group which used to be called the P.R.T. (La Verdad tendency) became the Socialist Workers' Party after entering into a coalition with a small centrist organization, the Argentinian Socialist Party, lead by Juan-Carlos Coral.

Against all guerrilla activity, the S.W.P. considers work within the

workers' unions as its main task... It put up a worker candidate against Campora and later Peron, calling for the Argentinians to make a class vote.

Although this orientation is on the whole more apt than that of the P.R.T.-E.R.P., it is nonetheless not free of compromises with Peronism. For example, the S.W.P.'s newspaper Avanzada Socialista published in May 1973 an open letter to Campora. This text was a reply to the new President of the Republic's proposal to the various political groups "to exchange ideas on the proposed project of the National Justicalist Movement for National Reconstruction and Liberation". To quote a few passages from the text:

"Our party has always been in favor of public discussion with the different political forces and this goes for the present time particularly since the invitation comes from a President elected by a clearly majority vote of the working population and who in a few hours time, is going to form a government in which the working class has placed high hopes...

We are in complete agreement with your desire to guarantee and extend the freedom and the rights granted in the National Constitution whilst respecting the rights of minority groups...

A wage increase will enable a strengthening of the domestic market, a key support of the nation's industry which, at the present time, is only turning at 50% of its productive capacity in a number of sectors...

Concerning this last point (the nationalization of trusts) Peronism has already proved its worth...

If Doctor Campora's government follows up and adopts these measures, then this plan to liberate and reconstruct the country will become a reality. In this case, the S.W.P. will support each measure which means striking a blow against imperialism and capitalism."

Though revolutionaries have nothing against this type of open letter a priori, its contents should be no less than an explicit criticism of the leaders in whom the masses have placed their confidence. But the S.W.P., either for tactical reasons or out of opportunism, shares a great deal of its readers' illusions on what Campora really is and whose class interests he is defending.

Moreover, even in its "critical" section about Campora and Peronism, the S.W.P. cannot help bowing down to Peron:

"However, the public support we anticipate giving to the sort of measures we would like to see the new government take, obliges us to make our doubts known to the public as to the process which will be engaged in as of May 25th.

We acknowledge the fact that General Peron's government - particularly in its early stages for both international and national reasons that there is no need to repeat here - was one of the governments most independent of imperialist pressures that the country has ever known...

The elbow-room General Peron had during the early stages of his power has now shrunken...".

The letter does not even recall the anti-worker measures that the Justicalist "lider" did not hesitate to take. And the text concludes thus:

"In order to succeed in the economic and political struggle, we must start by calling for (apart from the measures already stated) a majority participation by the working class in the government by means of a workers' cabinet designated by the C.G.T. Union and for a progressive march towards Socialism by more and more advanced measures...".

In fact, such a political line only serves to spread illusions concerning the nature of the Peronist fraction which the S.W.P. qualifies as "revolutionary". To finish let us remark that the text does not say a word about disarming the army and police in a country where the forces of repression over the past few years have been systematically used against the workers.

RECONSTRUCT THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

The failure of the United Secretariat and of the various pieces of the former International Committee makes the reconstruction of the Fourth International on a proletarian basis a more and more pressing need, and by the same token an International capable of defending the revolutionary Marxist and Bolshevik heritage against all kinds of detractors and charlatans whether they call themselves "Communists", "Socialists", "Revolutionaries", "Castroists", Marxist-Leninists", or even "Trotskyists".

And this reconstruction is the only assurance that the revolutionary militants who have fallen in Latin America, deceived or chloroformed by counter-revolutionary leaderships in the working class or by the inconsistency of centrist groups, and massacred by the bourgeois armies that they had all left intact, will one day be avenged.

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