CHAP. 2. Parliamentary Supremacy 35
Parliament, but contended that the King was the sole judge whether
an emergency justified the exercise of his prerogative power to raise
funds to meet a national danger. A majority of the Court of Ex-
chequer Chamber gave judgment for the King.1 The decision was
reversed by the Long Parliament, and this aspect of the struggle for
supremacy was concluded by the Bill of Rights:
That the levying money for or to the use of the Crown by pretence
of prerogative without grant of Parliament for longer time or in other
manner than the same is or shall be granted is illegal.
The power of the Crown to dispense with the operation of statutes (3) Dispens-
within certain limits seems to have been a necessary one having ™% an(1d.
regard to the form of many ancient statutes and the irregular meet-
ings of Parliament. So long, however, as the limits upon the dispens-
ing power were not clearly defined, there was here a threat to the
legislative supremacy of Parliament. It could be contended that the
dispensing power was one of inseparable prerogatives which could
not be curtailed, but violations of the common law or statutory
enactments of the common law were probably not within the scope
of the royal dispensation. In the leading case of T^wmas v. Sorrell
£1674), Vaughan 330, a distinction was drawn betw^iTHi^
with laws which are not for the particular benefit or safety of third
persons and laws which are for such benefit or for the benefit of the
public as a whole. In Godden v........Haleg^6%6\ 11 St. Tr. 1165;
K. & L. 66, the court upEeld a dispensation from James II. to Sir
Edward Hales excusing him from taking the oaths and fulfilling the
other obligations imposed by the Test Act. It can be argued that the
decision could have been given without impairing the distinction
indicated in Thomas v. Sorrell and by drawing a distinction between
majym prohifytum (by statute) and malum in se from which there can
be no dispensation. The judgment was, however, based on wider
grounds and it was held that it was an inseparable prerogative of the
Kings of England to dispense with penal laws in particular cases and
upon necessary reasons of which the King is sole judge.
Fortified by the favourable decision in the latter case, James IL
proceeded to set aside statutes as he pleased. Hard though it may
be to define the dispensing power, there is no doubt that James over-
stepped all limits of legality in granting a suspension of the penal
laws relating to religion in the Declaration of Indulgence. The
validity of his act only came before the courts in an indirect way at
th$ trial of the Seven BishPp& for seditious libel arising out of their
petitions to James against reading the declaration. The Bill of Rights
abolished the Crown's alleged power of suspending laws.
* For analysis of the arguments of Counsel and the judgment, see "The Case
of Ship Money," by Sir D. L. Keir, 52 L&R. 546.