ENDS AND MEANS
once aroused is evidently much greater than that of most
other animals. When a human baby was brought up with
a baby chimpanzee (see The Ape and the Child, by Professor
and Mrs. Kellogg), it was found that the chimpanzee's
intelligence, at least during the first eighteen months of life,
was more or less equal to the human's. On the contrary,
its power of inhibiting emotion was far lower and it was
consequently unable very often to make use of its intelli-
gence. (For example, when its parents went away, the
baby would cry for a few minutes, then settle down cheer-
fully to play; the ape would be inconsolable for several
hours, during which it was incapable of doing anything
else but grieve.) Animals are almost as heavily handi-
capped by excess of emotionality as by a lack of intelligence.
It is this excess of emotionality which has made it impossible
for all animals except man to pass from emotional to con-
ceptual speech. Beasts can make noises expressive of their
feelings; but they cannot make noises which stand for
objects an$i ideas as such, objects and ideas considered apart
from the desires and emotions they arouse. Conceptual
speech made possible the development of disinterested
thinking, and the capacity to think disinterestedly was
responsible for the1 development of conceptual speech.
No account of the scientific picture of the world and its
history would be complete unless it contained a reminder
of the fact, frequently forgotten by scientists themselves,
that this picture dloes not even claim to be comprehensive.
From the world we actually live in, the world that is given
.by our senses, our intuitions of beauty and goodness, our
emotions and impulses, our moods and sentiments, the man
of science abstracts a simplified private universe of^things
possessing only those qualities which used to be called
6 primary/ Arbitrarily, because it happens to be convenient;
because his methods do not allow him to deal with the
immense complexity of reality, he selects from the whole
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