BELIEFS
la m£me qui invoquent le prindpe de la causalite comme une
loi fondamentale de la raison humaine, ne peuvent y oleir
strictement que s'ils en font usage pour relief de Vunite d'un
iugement deux oljets dont Vexistence leur est prealablement
certijtie. Oest la loi elle-meme qui s9 oppose a ce qu'ils aillent
forger de leur autorite privee le terme qui manque pour la mise
en auvre effective du prindpe: F application transcendentale de
la causalite revient a la petition d'un objet imaginaire* The
question arises: what are the objects which can be legitim-
ately connected by the principle of causality ? Kant involved
himself in extraordinary difficulties by limiting causality to
events in the world of sense. But the only form of causality
with which we have direct acquaintance is our own volun-
tary activity. We know directly that our will is the cause
of our performing a given action in the world of sense. It
is no doubt true, as Brunschvicg says, that we have no right
to apply the principle of causality except to objects of which
we already know, either by direct acquaintance or by infer-
ence, that they exist. Acting on this principle, we may
legitimately postulate a causal connection between one
sense object and another sense object and also between a
sense object and a mental state which is not a sense object.
Whether in fact there can be mental states which do not
belong to individual human beings or animals is another
question. All that we can say in this particular context is
that, if such mental states exist, there seems to- be no
reason why (supposing them to be analogous to our own
mental states) they should not be causally related to events
in the world of sense.
The moral argument for theism may be very briefly
summed up as follows. Moral action aims at the realiza-
tion of the highest good. The highest good cannot be
realized except where there is a virtuous rational will in
persons and a world in which this virtuous rational will is
not thwarted—a world where virtue is united with happi-
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