MIDDLE EAST, 1940

vital parts had been removed. He landed almost without any petrol
at Mersa Matruh; subsequently this gallant little Frenchman and
his crew did good work for us in his Glen Martin till he was miss-
ing from a long reconnaissance over Abyssinia. I wished we could
have had some more of his calibre.

At the beginning of July a cheerful signal from the Air Ministry
gave promise of an early release of a dozen Hurricanes and a
similar number of Blenheims and Lysanders; thereafter I could
expect the same quota monthly. I was also informed that the
possibility of sending direct from U.S.A., American fighters and
bombers off French orders was being investigated; we might
expect to receive some about November. Reference was also made
to the opening and organization of the Trans-African reinforce-
ment route from Takoradi, Gold Coast, through Nigeria to
Khartoum and Cairo; it was hoped it would be functioning by
September.

All this sounded more hopeful but the essential point was that,
when these reinforcements did become available for despatch from
the U.K., there should be a reasonably secure route by which they
could arrive. The Central Mediterranean was definitely insecure
and becoming more so; moreover, there was no doubt that a more
enterprising employment of Italian bombers from I.E.A. could
have troubled the Red Sea convoys considerably. All things con-
sidered I decided that my best policy would be to conserve
resources in the Western Desert until our Army was ready to take
the offensive or more likely become pressed by an Italian advance
over the frontier; meanwhile, to harass the enemy air and
submarine bases on the Red Sea coast.

About this time (July 4th) the Italians occupied Kassala and
Galabat on the Sudan frontier and there was very little besides the
small Sudan Defence Force to stop them. The attitude of the
French at Djibouti was a definite disappointment, they seemed
quite content to preserve as far as possible the status qua, placate
die Italians and fulfil the armistice terms; thus in August we lost
Somaliland and in consequence the Red Sea route looked as if it
might become even more precarious. It was now practically the
sole lifeline for WavelFs army and the Italians could in future use
Berbera airfield.

Two Blenheim squadrons took on the Red Sea convoy escort
work; No. 203 worked from Aden and No. 14 from Port Sudan.
It was known that in addition to the potential air threat there
were some Italian submarines left. Out of the original eight re-

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