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TO SPANISH AMERICA

1583-1594

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
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THE Famous West Indian voyage made
 by the English the fleet of 22 shippes on 1 Barbet
 who first was gotten the Townes of S. JAGO:
 S. DOMINGO, CARTAGENA and
 S. AUGUSTINES the same being begun
 from Plymouth in the Month of September
 1492 and ended at Portes mouth in June
 1496 the whole content the last voyage
 being plainly described by the printed line
 He who come forth



FURTHER ENGLISH VOYAGES
TO SPANISH AMERICA

1583-1594

DOCUMENTS FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE INDIES
AT SEVILLE ILLUSTRATING ENGLISH VOYAGES
TO THE CARIBBEAN, THE SPANISH MAIN,
FLORIDA, AND VIRGINIA

Translated and edited
by

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

THIS volume owes its completion to the sustained assistance extended to the editor by officers of The Hakluyt Society, the former President Sir William Foster, the late Honorary Secretary Dr. Edward Lynam, and his successor, Mr. R. A. Skelton. It owes even more to the encouragement and help of Dr. James A. Williamson, who gave the work the benefit of his wide and deep knowledge of the period within which lie the documents presented. Without the support of the gentlemen mentioned obstacles created by the editor's removal from Seville to Washington and other dislocations would not have been overcome.

Further, to these names should be added that of Sr. D. José Peña who extended the hand of old friendship from the Archives of the Indies; and that of Professor David B. Quinn who generously contributed results of his own investigations, especially in identification of persons whose names as rendered in the Spanish originals no one else could have recognized.

Because the reader will certainly discover errors in the book, it should immediately be added that not all the advice proffered was accepted. Let all others be absolved of faults due to the editor's insistence on maintaining some perhaps dubious translations, identifications, deductions and appraisals.

Finally, in concluding this, undoubtedly my last contribution to the Society's publications, I desire again to invite attention to the wealth of materials as yet unused which in Spanish archives await the consideration of students of English history. Not only is there material for another volume after this one, to carry the story of English seamen in the Caribbean, along the Main, Mexico and Virginia to a more logical terminus at 1603, but also there is much more. There is, for example, an almost inexhaustible body of documents bearing on 'the Spanish War'. Incidentally, whoever undertakes a serious study, based on Spanish documents, of French incursions into this same area in the sixteenth century will upset a great many currently accepted versions of events.

I have appreciated my association with the Society. It has indeed been an honour to work with men wholeheartedly devoted to history, exacting in the standards they insist the Society must maintain, and generously willing to help complete a project when the

expenditure involved of their time and of their knowledge can be repaid only by a few words inadequately expressive of an editor's gratitude. My only regret is that I have not another quarter of a century of life to spend in such good company.

IRENE A. WRIGHT

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

February 1951

FOREWORD

THE present volume, the third of Miss Wright's collection of documents from the Archives of the Indies at Seville* covers the years 1583 to 1594, and, like its predecessors, it was the contemporary Spanish view, from officials and private men, of occurrences in the Caribbean hitherto known only from English accounts. The documents cover the transition to recognised war, the campaign of Drake in 1585-6, and the privateering of the years that followed. They present us with important new material particularly on Drake at Santo Domingo and Cartagena. The Society is indeed fortunate to have been able to produce these three volumes, which together form a collection that rounds off the evidence for a great passage of history and are comparable in value to the English documents edited by Sir Julian Corbett and Sir John Laughton for the Navy Records Society at the end of the last century. In the story of all such voyages as those of the Elizabethan seamen there are two points of view, distinct and complementary, that of the invaders with their minds on themselves, their equipment and their purposes, and that of the defenders, settled in their colonies and regarding the intruders as a disturbance. For the Caribbean area, at least, we now have both aspects for the greater part of the Elizabethan age. Our debt to Miss Wright's research and editing is not easy to express.

J. A. WILLIAMSON

*The two preceding volumes are: *Spanish Documents concerning English Voyages to the Caribbean 1527-1568* (1928); and *Documents concerning English Voyages to the Spanish Main 1569-1580* (1932).

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‘The famous West Indian Voyage made by the English fleete . . . Newlie come forth by Baptista B.’ . . . <i>Frontispiece</i>	<i>Frontispiece</i>
From W. Bigges, <i>A summarie and true discourse of Sir Frances Drakes West Indian Voyage</i> , London, R. Field, 1589. (British Museum, G. 6509.) Reduction $\frac{1}{2}$.	
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The preceding four plans from Bigges, <i>op. cit.</i> Reduction $\frac{1}{2}$.	

*Notes on the Plans from
Bigges’s ‘Summarie and true discourse’, 1589*

The only known copy of Richard Field’s edition (second issue) in which the general chart by ‘Baptista B.’ [Boazio] is found is that of the Grenville Library in the British Museum (G. 6509); and it is now commonly held that the map was not issued with the book. Two copies of the map—the Grenville copy and another now in the John Carter Brown Library—have a printed text pasted along the bottom edge. This is a summary narrative, or ‘log’, of Drake’s voyage of 1585–6. Copies of the text alone, as a broadside, are in the library of the Society of Antiquaries of London and in the New York Public Library.

The four city maps, the engraver of which has been conjectured to be Jodocus Hondius, are found in variant forms, with or without text pasted below, in different editions and translations of Bigges’s narrative. The English text is here reprinted from the Grenville copy (G. 6509) of Field’s edition of 1589.

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INTRODUCTION

HENRY, king of Portugal, the last of the line of Avis, died early in 1580, leaving no immediate male heir to the throne. Philip II of Spain promptly seized the country in the right of his wife, who was a daughter of John III, grandfather of the previous king, Sebastian. If Spain had been formidable before, she appeared doubly formidable now that she held the entire Peninsula, Sicily, Naples, Sardinia and the Duchy of Milan; all the area which has since become Belgium and Holland; the Portuguese settlements in Africa, the whole of the East Indies; and all of the Americas. 'Europe saw herself . . . threatened by a new and living Roman Empire.'¹ As for England, her very existence was menaced by it.

Therefore Elizabeth lent an ear to the entreaties of a Portuguese pretender—Don Antonio, prior of Crato, a natural son of a younger brother of John III—and, if not to seat this pretender upon the throne of Portugal, at least to use him to advance English interests and to divert Philip II, became a leading motive in the policy pursued by Elizabeth and her councillors. The story of the dance they led the prior of Crato during the next few years after Henry's demise, is a tale of sixteenth-century diplomacy which might well have remained entirely outside the scope of a volume dealing, like this, with English expeditions to the Caribbean, the Main and Virginia, had it not been for the part in it that fell to William Hawkins, elder brother of John Hawkins, and, possibly, for the further interesting if unimportant fact that Don Antonio haunted the Spanish Indies in these years—reported to be here, there, and everywhere—as restless and intangible as a ghost.

In England, Drake was just back from his voyage of circumnavigation. It was said that he had left factors in the Moluccas.² In 1582 Edward Fenton led forth an expedition which was intended to establish English trade in those islands but early turned back, a failure. Before it regained England another had sailed which, as the

¹ Sir Julian Corbett, *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, London, 1912, I, pp. 324-5; J. A. Williamson, *Sir John Hawkins*, London, 1927, pp. 397 *et seq.*

² ' . . . Francis Drake [voyage of circumnavigation] . . . the Moluccas, island of Terrenate, loaded spices and left English factors to trade . . . '—p. 8, Account of What Happened to Francisco Vera, *A. de I.*, 70-3-26, Lima 93.

Spanish ambassador informed his master, was planned to take advantage of the general situation created by Philip's seizure of Portugal and to develop English business in the East. On 10 November 1582 Mendoza reported to the king that seven sail had been for some time ready at Plymouth for a distant expedition. He gave their names as the *Primrose* of London, 300 tons, the *Minion*, 180, *Bark Hastings*, 100, two ships of Drake's of 100 tons each, and a pinnace of 80. This, omitting two long boats also mentioned, makes six, not seven.¹ They were bound, he said, for the island of San Thome and the coast of Brazil, and thence would go to the Moluccas. 'The name of the commander is surprising', adds Dr. Williamson,² in dealing with this matter. 'It was none other than William Hawkins, brother of John, a man now over sixty years of age . . . William Hawkins must have sailed not long after the date of Mendoza's report.'

Dr. Williamson does not consider the Spanish ambassador's assertion, that the destination of their expedition was the Moluccas, to constitute conclusive evidence that it was so; nor, indeed, can the supposition be maintained in the face of the 'Draft of a letters patent for Mr. W. Hawkins,'³ found by Dr. Williamson, under the terms of which Hawkins probably put to sea. The purport of this document is that William Hawkins is empowered to make a voyage to the coasts of Africa and America 'for the better discovery of all trade of merchandises in the said coasts.' Further, William Hawkins and his company were to be licensed 'to serve Don Antony, K. of Port., against his enemies.' Given the form of the document, it seems possible that this licence may have been granted as an amendment of the draft in its original shape, or it may have been laid down as a condition. Apparently Hawkins's principal purpose, well in keeping with the policy of his house, was indeed to make a voyage 'for the better discovery of all trade of merchandises . . .' And it was to Africa and America that Hawkins went with Richard Hawkins, John's only son, accompanying him as vice-admiral.

Nevertheless, as he proceeded upon this voyage he visited Santiago in the Cape Verde Islands and there, according to the narrator of a subsequent expedition, the people of the place did him 'great wrong . . . when they did both break their promise, and murdered many of his men . . .'⁴ It will be recalled that Drake too seems, in 1585, to

¹ Cf. Document No. 1, *post*.

² Williamson, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

³ *Ibid*, p. 400.

⁴ W. Bigges, *A Summarie and True Discourse of Sir Francis Drakes West Indian Voyage*, as presented in Hakluyt, *Principal Navigations* (Glasgow, 1903-5), x, p. 109.

have had a special grievance¹ against Santiago to avenge. Something occurred there. Precisely what it was has still to be learned; as it remains to be determined what relation, if any, this occurrence may have borne to the above-mentioned draft licence 'to serve Don Antony, K. of Port.' and to Manuel Cerrada's seizure of the Cape Verde Islands for Don Antonio early in 1583.

For although a Spanish armada had utterly defeated Don Antonio's at St. Michael's in the summer of 1582, the prior nevertheless continued his negotiations for support in foreign courts, evidently with some success, since in January following (1583) a fleet described as thirteen sail 'with 3000 men said to be Portuguese and French'² seized the Cape Verde Islands for Don Antonio, sacked the city of Santiago, and did other damage at Isla de Fuego, after which the expedition may have broken up. One minor unit³ appeared in the Spanish Indies shortly thereafter; and so did William Hawkins's formidable squadron,⁴ which also was accused⁵ of participation in the Cape Verde affair.

Whatever share the English may have had in the hostilities there, Spanish documents (Nos. 1-5, 66) of this present collection, bearing upon Hawkins's conduct after his arrival in the Indies, suggest that if the 1583 voyage was a very lucrative one, as was reported⁶ at the time, the profits were obtained peaceably in the course of cautious barter, since here we discover Hawkins in June 1583 dredging for pearls at La Margarita.⁷ Presumably he had come up from a reconnaissance of the Brazilian coast. Reading between the lines of these Spanish documents, it appears almost certain that he was at the same time disposing profitably of merchandise he carried.

Interest in the pearl fisheries at La Margarita and around Puerto

¹ Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 27. The inference might well be that his two vessels with this Hawkins expedition suffered damage there. Cf. p. xxxiii *post*.

² *A. de I.*, 2-5-1/20, Patronato 265, item 38.

³ *A. de I.*, 53-6-8, Santo Domingo 74, items 136 and 137; 53-4-11, Santo Domingo 51, Lic. Arceo to the Crown, Santo Domingo, May 25, 1583, all concerning a small Portuguese vessel, a prize, which seems to have deserted from the expedition.

⁴ 'I do not know what vessels these can have been, nor is there any information to show whence they sailed', is written in the margin of the report which the Council for the Indies made to His Majesty (Madrid, September 20, 1584) in transmitting the gist of Sarmiento de Villandrando's despatch (Document No. 3, *post*) and recommending that the governor's request for artillery and munitions be granted. This *consulta* is to be found in *A. de I.*, 140-7-34, Indiferente General 740.

⁵ Cf. Documents Nos. 1 (p. 1, note 5), 4 and 5. ⁶ Williamson, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

⁷ Document No. 3 *post*. *The Observations of Sir Richard Hawkins* (London, 1622) in *The Hawkins' Voyages* (Hakluyt Society, Ser. I, No. 57, 1878), p. 314.

Rico was especially keen in these years.¹ Pearls were a large item in the thriving contraband trade which the French were doing all through the Indies, particularly among the islands since the galleys² which now patrolled the Main had somewhat disturbed illicit business conditions along the coasts of the southern continent.

Having departed from La Margarita, Hawkins reappears at Port Vargas on the west coast of Puerto Rico, where he overhauled his ships,³ took in water, obtained information and possibly kept a rendezvous. Certainly other vessels came up promptly, and he was seen to sail away in their company at the end of July 1583. Since Hawkins did not reach Plymouth until late in November,⁴ it seems unlikely that he laid his course direct for England.

Neither did he attack Havana, as some in Puerto Rico thought he might.⁵ That city heard presently of French corsairs, numerous as usual, along the north coast of Hayti, some of whom seem to have bartered slaves to persons residing in Jamaica and around Bayamo, at just this time.⁶ If Hawkins was among them, or with others reported from La Margarita⁷ and the Main, further infor-

¹ *A. de I.*, 53-6-14, Santo Domingo 80, many documents, including Don Pedro Rengifo de Angulo to the Crown, Puerto de Plata, March 13, 1582; *id.* to *id.*, March 28, 1583; Ruy Diaz de Mendoza to the Crown, Santo Domingo, May 16, 1583; 53-6-8, Santo Domingo 74, items 131, -2, -3, the royal officials to the Crown, Santo Domingo, January 16 and May 21, 1583.

² *A. de I.*, 69-2-23, Panama 13, Don Luis Fernandez de Cordoba to the Crown, Nata, April 30, 1580; item 51, the *Audiencia* to the Crown, Panama, April 25, 1583; 54-4-4, Santo Domingo 182, the town council to the Crown, La Margarita, January 20, 1581; 53-6-7, Santo Domingo 73, item 116, the city to the Crown, Santo Domingo, April 8, 1581.

³ Documents Nos. 1, 2, and 4, *post.* Cf. Sir Richard Hawkins, *Observations, op. cit.*, p. 212.

⁴ *Spanish Calendar, 1580-6*, No 362 (pp. 510-11).

⁵ Document No. 2 *post.*

⁶ *A. de I.*, 54-1-15, Santo Domingo 99, Luxan to the Crown, Havana, December 16, 1583.

⁷ '... After I came, which was in August [1583], there were on the coast of this island seven ships, English corsairs, who looted a vessel laden with wine from the Canaries which lay at anchor in this port, and took part of [the cargo of] another ship which had begun to unload. They seized what had not been brought ashore.'—The Licentiate Castro to the Crown, La Margarita, February 2, 1584. The easiest conclusion—that this was Hawkins on his way back—is rendered unsafe by deponent's statement in Document No. 66 that, having cleared from La Margarita, Hawkins 'made no other call here'.

Cf. *A. de I.*, 54-4-7, Santo Domingo 185, depositions concerning the services of Pedro Diaz de Orrego, at La Margarita, especially the mention of 'John of Hamburg'. Evidently there were a number of English corsairs abroad upon the Caribbean at this time.

mation than I now possess must be obtained in order to identify him.¹

Valuable as may have been the coin, jewels, sugar, hides, etc., which Hawkins brought home, it is possible that the information he obtained at first hand and the conclusions at which he arrived were even more so. Indeed, 'the better discovery' of the worth and the strength, or weakness, of the Spanish Indies, rather than 'marchandises', may have been the prime object of his expedition, at least in the minds of some of its promoters.

While Hawkins traded, his lesser vessels reconnoitred² harbours of little immediate interest and demanded news of the inhabitants. The governor of Puerto Rico, who may have known more of the English and their conversation in July of 1583 than he thought it advisable to confess, believed³ that they were selecting a site for a permanent settlement. It would be exceptionally illuminating to know whether or not from Puerto Rico William Hawkins returned to England by way of the Atlantic seaboard of the North American continent, as John Hawkins had in 1565, perhaps as he passed along making a proper reconnaissance of coasts then indefinitely designated as La Florida, Jacan, Norumbega, the New Found Land or Codfisheries (*los Bacalaos*). In any event, the serious attention of the English seems after 1585 to have fixed definitely upon North America, to which various voyages of exploration had already been made.

In 1578 a Portuguese domiciled in England, Simon Fernandez (also known as Fernando or Ferdinando), was master of the *Falcon*, commanded by Walter Raleigh, in Sir Humphrey Gilbert's first expedition, which made for the West Indies in the following May.⁴ In 1580 he sailed from Dartmouth with one small vessel, returning in three or four months.⁵ In Document No. 39 *post* reference is made to one or other of these voyages concerning which little is known. In this document, either intentionally or unintentionally, the Portuguese Ferdinando's reconnaissance is confused with the voyage undertaken in 1584 by Captains Philip Amadas and Barlow.⁶

¹ Cf. *A. de I.*, 87-4-7, Santo Domingo 2681, for mention (in July, 1584) that in 1583 'two vessels were [off the south coast of Cuba] . . . and carried away over ten thousand hides. They left more than a hundred negroes and proceeded to Cape San Anton, where they took in water and departed.'

² Document No. 1 *post*.

³ *Ibid*.

⁴ Quinn, *Gilbert*, I, pp. 198, 211, 236-7.

⁵ Quinn, *Gilbert*, II, pp. 282, 309.

⁶ *The first voyage made to the coasts of America . . . called Virginia*, in *Principal Navigations* (Glasgow, 1904), VIII, pp. 297-310. 'Immediately upon the issue of his charter [1584, for discovery], Raleigh . . . sent out . . . two barks to spy out the new country and prepare the way for a larger enterprise later. Philip Amadas, of that Plymouth

Simon Ferdinando may have approached the North American continent by way of Florida and explored the Carolina-Virginia coast, rather than regions further north as has been generally supposed. Certainly Amadas and Barlow preferred the southerly route. Possibly the Portuguese as their pilot led them on a summer course to what he,¹ like the Indians, considered to be 'the best part of all that coast,' i.e., the general vicinity of Roanoke island and Chesapeake Bay. I do not know that this country furnished either expedition with gold and silver and notable peltry, although Walker, who sailed the year after Ferdinando's reconnaissance, brought home such promising souvenirs of the lands he visited. It may be accepted that the natives slaughtered Ferdinando's men ('. . . the Indians ate 38 Englishmen . . .'), but it was Amadas and Barlow who carried two aborigines away from Jacan, or Virginia. The pair returned² in 1585 with Sir Richard Grenville and Ralph Lane who in that year, for Sir Walter Raleigh, undertook to set up England's first permanent establishment in the New World.³ Both

and Launceston family which was connected with the Hawkinses, and Arthur Barlow, who had served under Raleigh in Ireland, were in command.—A. L. Rowse, *Sir Richard Grenville* (London, 1937), p. 199.

¹ Cf. Document No. 65 *post* for statement that Ferdinando selected the location of the first English establishment in North America. ('. . . induced them to settle there . . .').

² Cf. Document No. 39 *post*, Hakluyt, VIII, pp. 316-7, and Holinshed, II, pp. 1401-2.

³ Under date of June 11, 1585, Don Alvaro de Bazan wrote the House of Trade from Lisbon (*A. de I.*, 41-6-1/36, Contratación 5101) that he had advices to the effect that 'Sir Richard Grenville left England with seven small vessels to settle in Naranbel, which is the region previously mentioned between Florida and the Codfish[eries].' Naranbel would seem to be a version of Norumbega.

'Of their [the English] intentions nothing is known except that they expect more ships and appear to intend to settle. It is presumed that they will go to Florida or to an island 30 leagues long which lies in the Bahama [channel], by which the fleets must sail.'—The governor and royal officials to the Crown, Havana, June 23, 1585, in *A. de I.*, 42-107/12, Contratación 5107.

' . . . Yesterday afternoon a pinnace carrying despatches arrived from the Indies which brought news that . . . there are many English corsairs abroad there. They were seen in Puerto Rico with eighteen ships and eight pinnaces and they took many horned cattle, cows with calf, and yearlings, for breeding purposes. They left a message written on the bole of a tree reporting their arrival to the other ships of the company which were to come there. They said they were not bent on war, but were going to settle an island which His Majesty never cared to settle, which is called Trinidad, and Dominica, where they say they left six ships . . .'—Antonio Orta, 'merchant, burgher of Lisbon', to —, from La Terceira, July 22, 1585, in *A. de I.*, 43-1-1/3, Contratación 5197.

' . . . Where they were going to settle could not be learned then or since; but I have had a letter from the governor of Florida saying that certain Indians saw them pass

Ferdinando and Amadas accompanied this new expedition. Captain Amadas was 'admiral of the country' under Lane. It would not be illogical to suppose that he sailed on board the *Lion*, third largest vessel of the fleet.

The English record of the voyage states that Grenville's ships were early scattered by storm.¹ Document No. 39 of this collection makes it plain that in the vicinity of Jamaica a vessel, of the burden ascribed to the *Lion*, met with experiences less pleasant than usual in those times and in that quarter. Since all on board were starving, twenty of the less useful men, including officers, were set ashore on the unpopulated northern coast of that island, of whom two survived to face the Abbot of Jamaica half a year later. Of these two, I suggest that the Abbot's informant quoted in Document No. 39 *post* was Captain Philip Amadas.² I am not aware whether, beyond the appearance of his name on a list,³ there is any proof that he actually arrived at Roanoke at this time. If he survived Seville as well as Jamaica, he might, however, have proceeded thither with relief in 1587.

Similarly, I should like to see further evidence that the *Lion* rejoined her consorts at Las Boquillas, or Mosquito Bay, on the south side of Puerto Rico, which was evidently the rendezvous fixed before the expedition left England or, indeed rejoined elsewhere at any time.

Grenville anchored in Mosquito Bay on May 10/20 with a squadron which the governor of the island describes⁴ as 'two large vessels', one of them obviously the flagship *Tiger*. She may have been alone except for prizes until nine days later, when the *Elizabeth* came up.⁵ A pinnace was built, possibly to replace one of the two which had

along the coast. Nothing further is certainly known of them.'—Gabriel de Luxan to the Crown, Havana, October 24, 1585, in *A. de I.*, 54-1-15, Santo Domingo 99.

¹ Cf. *The Voyage Made by Sir Richard Grenville for Sir Walter Raleigh to Virginia in . . . 1585*, in *Principal Navigations*, VIII, p. 311 ('. . . a storme in the Bay of Portugall . . .').

² Duarte was a not infrequent Spanish rendering of Edward, but 'Don Arnedes' suggests nothing whatever unless it be the surname Amadas, the title 'don' implying that he was a gentleman. Observe the statement that he claimed to be second in command of Grenville's expedition. This identification is however a 'long shot'.

³ *Principal Navigations*, VIII, p. 317. See *ibid.*, p. 417: this would date Amadas's earthwork building 1587. Lane left Virginia in 1586.

⁴ Document No. 7 *post*.

⁵ Documents Nos. 7 and 9 *post*. Cf. *The Voyage*, and Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 206. The reception given the *Elizabeth* was more than a 'schoolboyish exhibition of good spirits'; storm had badly crippled Grenville's enterprize and the reappearance of this vessel was cause for rejoicing.

been 'adjoynd for speedy service'¹ when the original fleet cleared from Plymouth. At the end of May Grenville's command was said² to be 'three large ships and two pinnaces'. Documents Nos. 7-9, and 11 *post* deal with their stay of about three weeks in Puerto Rico.³

At Mosquito Bay the English fortified themselves in order to build their pinnace in safety. The Spaniards rode down and looked them over. There was some parleying. Evidently the subsistence, etc., which the English wanted was not forthcoming, despite the Spaniards' promise to furnish it. The English then captured two vessels and, apparently as ransom or some part of the ransom which they demanded for them, obtained fowls, hogs, horned cattle, horses and mares. Prisoners taken bought their liberty 'for good round summes.'

By the first of June with five sail including prizes⁴ Grenville was at La Isabela, a port on the north coast of Hispaniola visited by John Hawkins in 1563. There, in the grateful shade of green boughs which roofed the temporary banqueting halls erected for the purpose, Grenville and Lane, dressed in their best, sat down to 'a sumptuous banquet . . . served . . . all in plate, with the sound of trumpets and consort of musicke' to which they had invited 'the governor of La Isabela'. This guest of honour⁵ may have been the warden of the fort at Puerto Plata or one of the two *alcaldes mayores* of La Isabela, both of whom were accused of shameless trafficking with foreigners.⁶ He rode to the banquet accompanied by 'a lusty fryer and twenty other Spaniards, with their servants and negroes,' and after they had dined, the Spaniards for their part entertained the English with an exhibition of riding and bull-fighting. 'In the meane time . . . our English Generall and the Spanish Governour discoursed betwixt them of divers matters, as of the state of the Countrey, the multitude of the Townes and people, and the commodities of the island.' Reading especially Document No. 11 *post* in comparison with Lane's to Sidney,⁷ it is not possible to pass light judgment upon His Catholic Majesty's officers (warden or *alcalde*) who, over the crude banqueting board of June, 1585, contributed their share to the fall

¹ *The Voyage*, p. 310. ² Document No. 7 *post*.

³ Compare throughout with *The Voyage Made by Sir Richard Grenville*, in *Principal Navigations*, viii, pp. 310 *et seq.*

⁴ Cf. Document No. 8 *post* and *The Voyage*, in *Principal Navigations*, viii, pp. 312-3.

⁵ Cf. Documents Nos. 8 and 11 *post*.

⁶ *A. de I.*, 54-3-19, Santo Domingo 168, Francisco Gonzalez to Licentiate Rodriguez Rivero, La Yaguana, December 19, 1582.

⁷ Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 17 and note.

of Santo Domingo city which followed within half a year. Document No. 10 *post* is an account of Grenville's capture, on his way back from Virginia to England, of the *Santa Maria de San Vicente*, 'Cornie's ship'—the prize which 'made' his voyage.¹

What was Santo Domingo like at the beginning of the year 1586—that original seat of Spanish government in the New World, 90 years after its founding? Even then its comparative antiquity and former importance had invested the first capital of Spain's colonial empire with such glamour that it is difficult to visualize it as it was, rather than as it has been depicted in song and story ever since those nights when Francis Drake himself sat long at supper and boasted² how, would the queen aid but a little, he could make her mistress of the wealth and power which, after the middle of the sixteenth century, Santo Domingo represented in men's imagination and memory, rather than in actual fact. Those who remember the place as it was 40 years ago will not, out of the relics of departed greatness still to be discovered, find it easy to reconstruct this 'chief jewel'³ in Philip II's American crown; or, having correctly estimated the city as it was in Drake's day, readily set aside modern standards and realize its relative wealth, strength and importance in comparison to its sister cities in sixteenth-century Europe and America.

'In all this island, Catholic Majesty,' wrote⁴ the acting warden of Santo Domingo's fortress in 1582, 'in all this island, which is indeed large and uninhabited, there are some six or seven thatched villages, and only this city of 500 houses of which most (anyhow, many) have fallen in and are unoccupied. Masters and servants—in villages and on estates, whites, Indian half-breeds and mulattoes—in all, there are scarcely 2000 men, many without weapons, living in an abandonment which cannot be exaggerated. Not only are French corsairs to be feared, but also the negroes, lest they revolt (as some have, who from time to time have done and continue to do great damage).

¹ Cf. Documents Nos. 57, 59 and 65 *post*. The Navarrete Collection of transcripts in Madrid contains authenticated copies of documents bearing upon Grenville's 1585 voyage of which Rowse made good use in his biography, *Sir Richard Grenville of the Revenge*. My best endeavours did not discover at Seville the originals of those accredited to the Archive of the Indies; which is not to say that they are no longer in that great depository where indubitably Navarrete found them. Document No. 10 *post* is that to which Rowse refers on his pp. 217 *et seq.* (Information contributed by Professor Quinn.)

² *Spanish Calendar, 1580-6*, No. 225, p. 206, Mendoza to the Crown, London, March 1, 1582.

³ Cf. Corbett's estimate of the place, *op. cit.*, II, p. 33.

⁴ *A. de I.*, 53-4-11, Santo Domingo 51, Clemente Grajeda de Guzman to the Crown, Santo Domingo, May 25, 1582.

There are in the island more than 25,000 negroes.¹ If these rise and join the outlaws it means general perdition.²

From the sea Santo Domingo looked formidable. As he approached it, in July 1583 Licentiate Cristóbal de Ovalle, incoming president of the *Audiencia*, governor and captain-general—that is, first judicial, civil and military authority of the island—‘saw the fort, old and new, as one of the strongest in Christendom.’³ It hung over the river’s bank and dominated the only entrance, by way of that stream, to the haven which lay inside the bar. Along the river, with streets running parallel to it at right angles to the sea, the city must have straggled then much as it does today.

Close by the fortress, on the same principal plaza, stood the cathedral. The Franciscan monastery rose at some distance, on higher ground. This and the Dominican monastery were rich and important. The Mercedarian monastery was less so. The two nunneries (Santa Clara and Regina Angelorum) were humble indeed. Of the secular buildings, the official residence of the judges of the *Audiencia* and the government warehouse would seem to have been the most imposing. Equally handsome were the best residences of the leading citizens. These were spacious substantial homes of heavy masonry, built on ample plans, and to their furnishing Asia as well as Europe had contributed. Tableware was porcelain as well as plate; linens came from Holland and England; silks from France and the Orient.³

Nominally, the city was walled. In fact it was not so.⁴ Gates it had, but they were flanked with the commencement—the promise only—

¹ ‘There is such a multitude of negroes in this city that during Lent they cannot be sustained except it be with meat . . .’—Ovalle to the Crown, Santo Domingo, June 16, 1584, in *A. de I.*, 53–4–11, Santo Domingo 51.

² *A. de I.*, 54–3–11, Santo Domingo 51, Cristóbal de Ovalle to the Crown, Santo Domingo, October 30, 1583.

³ The statements of this paragraph are based especially upon the memorials and petitions for help formulated in Santo Domingo in the spring and summer of 1586. Compare Bigges, *op. cit.*, and *The discourse and description of the voyage of Sir Francis Drake and Mr. John Frobiser*, etc., B.M., Royal MS., 7.c., xvi, ff. 166 *et seq.*, printed in *Papers relating to the Navy during the Spanish War 1585–7*, ed. J. S. Corbett (N.R.S., 1898), pp. 16–18. This relation is hereafter referred to as ‘the *Primrose log*’, the name which Sir Julian gave to it. See his *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, II, p. 411.

⁴ Muro tienian, pero mal entero
conque la ciudad está cercada,
pues la parte que llaman Matadero
dizen que dél está desamparada . . .—Juan de Castellanos, *Discurso de el Capitan Francisco Draque*, ed. Parra Leon Hermanos (Caracas, 1932), II, p. 307.

Cf. the illustration accompanying Bigges’ *Discourse*, here reproduced, pp. 38–9, where the engraver represents walls where there were none.

of walls, which dwindled into cactus hedges.¹ It was firmly believed that the place could not be attacked by land. The documents here presented (Nos. 12, 13 *et seq.*) stress that conviction. It was not supposed that any landing could be effected upon that coast except, and that not too easily, by way of the River Ozama itself which is the harbour of the city. Therefore, unguarded, unwatched, from 'the great gate' called Lenba, the main road ran westerly through dense thicket toward the Hayna River and the sugar plantations² and cattle ranges, upon the prosperity of which the welfare of the city depended. It was also accepted that Santo Domingo was impregnable from the sea, unless it were against attack by an overwhelming force. Upon assuming office President Ovalle looked first to the fort which defended the approach by water.³ When he came to inspect it more closely he found that 'although it is the strongest and most important in the Indies, in strength comparable to many in Spain, its wardens have lived carelessly . . .' In consideration of his forebears' services as well as in recognition of his own capacity, Don Rodrigo de Bastidas, senior, held the wardenship of the fort⁴ for his son of the same name, then a youth of twenty.⁵ The office was exercised, however, by the elder Bastidas's son-in-law, Clemente de Guzman Grajeda.⁶ 'They kept livestock in the fort,' the recently arrived president continued, 'and the gate was open all day. Portuguese and Castillians, without distinction, have been standing guard. I have ordered the cattle out of the fort and that a sentry be posted at the gate with a halberd . . .'⁷ In fine, Ovalle established what he assured the Crown was a becoming state of military discipline.⁸

¹ Cf. Documents Nos. 12, 42, 56, etc., *post*.

² 'The sugar mills of this island are the principal properties in it.'—Ovalle to the Crown, Santo Domingo, June 16, 1584, in *A. de I.*, 54-4-11, Santo Domingo 51. They were feeling the competition of the Andalusian sugar industry.

³ His despatch of October 30, 1583, previously mentioned. ⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *A. de I.*, 78-3-9, Santo Domingo 900, H 5, f. 43 reverse, *cédula*, San Lorenzo, June 4, 1586. The young man was even then petitioning for possession of his office.

⁶ Or Grajeda de Guzman. There is a carelessness evident in the signatures which suggests that, as a matter of fact, the acting warden could not write and those who signed for him were not particular as to the order of his surnames.

⁷ *A. de I.*, 53-4-11, Santo Domingo 51, Ovalle to the Crown, Santo Domingo, November 4, 1584.

⁸ 'There is in the fort better discipline than ever before—such discipline as is suitable.'—*Ibid.* Yet, in its instructions to its procurator (after its fall to Drake), the city alleges that when the enemy arrived the fort had no artillerymen, no munitions, and that its ordnance was unmounted. Cf. these instructions, *A. de I.*, 53-6-7, Santo Domingo 73.

He inspected what artillery there was and trained it on the water-line of vessels seeking to enter the port. He endeavoured also to supply powder, which was very scarce.¹ In vain had the acting warden been asking for long range artillery, balls and artillerymen.

Most remarkable of all is the fact that this fortress had no regular garrison. Under the terms of a contract between him and the Crown the elder Bastidas was supposed to maintain one there. That he did not do so was part and parcel of the general laxity into which the whole colony had fallen.

Relying utterly upon the accepted opinion that Santo Domingo could not be attacked from any other direction, Ovalle strengthened its defences along the river, built a breastwork, planted a battery therein, and maintained a lookout at Point Caucedo, to advise him of approaching sail.

It should be remarked here that there was no naval force stationed in the Indies at this time, either at Santo Domingo or elsewhere.² Two galleys had arrived in the summer of 1582 to patrol the coast and so to discourage illicit trade, especially on the northern shore of the island. By 1586 the flag-galley had been lost by wreck. The other, the *Santiago*, even earlier declared to be unseaworthy, had recently been recovered from murderous mutineers only by the personal

¹ . . . faltavan salitrosas invensiones

que suelen impeler globos ardicentes . . . —Juan de Castellanos, II, p. 304 —the poetical but not inaccurate *Discurso* previously cited, which from here forward may be profitably compared with corresponding documents.

² Cf. Corbett, *op. cit.*, I, p. 38, note 1. Alvaro Flores de Quiñones commanded the galleons of the guard which cleared from Cadiz on April 19, 1586. Cf. *A. de I.*, 143-3-16, the House of Trade to the Crown, Seville, April 21, 1586. This armada took an unusual course that year, sailing north from Dominica to Puerto Rico, where it arrived on July 11, 1586. Cf. Diego Menéndez de Valdés to the Crown, Puerto Rico, July 11, 1586, in *A. de I.*, 54-3-6, Santo Domingo 155. From Puerto Rico the armada proceeded to Santo Domingo and Cartagena, following in Drake's wake.

The Spaniards in the Indies prayed (cf. Document No. 14 *post*) that it might overtake and give him his deserts. As a matter of fact Alvaro Flores had explicit instructions to 'give Drake no trouble', in that he was expressly forbidden to fight unless in self-defence. He had no punitive mission in the Indies at this time. His very stringent orders were to bring the plate home in safety, i.e., to defeat the real purpose of Drake's raid, which was to interrupt the stream of Philip's incoming wealth. And this Alvaro Flores accomplished. Cf. *A. de I.*, 2-5-2/10, document dated December 28, 1585, marginal note in Philip's own hand, ordering that Alvaro Flores be 'especially told that he is going out to bring back my revenues and those of private persons promptly and safely; and that he is to attend to this task and to no other, not even if the corsair shall have established himself on land, for if this be the case order will be issued from here to seek him out and punish him.'

courage of its commander, Don Diego Osorio. It lay in Santo Domingo harbour.¹

Ovalle held a muster of his available land forces.² There were three companies of foot—500 harquebusiers—‘all handsome effective troops,’ he said. These were the townsmen only. There was another company formed by seamen; and another of landsmen, meaning, evidently, persons who could be assembled from the neighbouring estates—in all, another 200 men. There was still another company of a hundred horse, mostly armed with harquebuses. In fine, 800 territorials, with whom the president was well pleased. To support them he intended to organize the people of the interior, that from the various settlements they might come up under their own officers to support the city in any emergency. Then, too, certain of the negroes might be ‘inspired’ by the promise of liberty to aid in its defence in case of need. Satisfied with his precautionary measures, the president wrote to the Crown that he heard the French were planning to take the island, but he feared no force that could be sent against it—not even ‘all France’.³

About ten o’clock on the morning of December 31/January 10, 1585/6, word came that the night before seventeen vessels had been seen at anchor off Point Caucedo,⁴ that is, six leagues east of the city.⁵ The colony had received no official warning to expect an enemy, although this had been sent.⁶ Unofficial advices there had been, however, concerning a great fleet leaving England. Nevertheless,

¹ *A. de I.*, 53-6-4, Santo Domingo 70, Licentiate Rodrigo de Rivero to the Crown, Santo Domingo, September 10, 1582; 53-4-4, Santo Domingo 51, Ovalle to the Crown, Santo Domingo, October 31, 1583; 53-1-14, Santo Domingo 14, *Información*, Santo Domingo, February 1, 1587. Cf. Document No. 13, *post*, etc.

² His despatch of October 30, 1583, cited.

³ *A. de I.*, 53-4-11, Santo Domingo 51, Ovalle to the Crown, Santo Domingo, November 4, 1584.

⁴ Alcedo, II, p. 28. ⁵ Documents Nos. 19 and 20, *post*.

⁶ Mendoza states that Drake bragged that he took the city despite the fact that it had been warned (*Sp. C.*, 1580-6, pp. 612-3, No. 473). Cf. Documents Nos. 19, 20 and 56 *post* especially. When, in July 1586, the city drew up instructions for its procurator (*A. de I.*, 53-6-7, Santo Domingo 73, Document 130), that it had received no warning was especially stressed, and the blame for its ruin was laid upon the Crown for this very reason, and because its previous appeals for arms, munitions, etc., had been disregarded. Cf. Documents Nos. 28 and 30 *post*, enclosure, for mention that the English took advice-boats, which may have been carrying the warning to Santo Domingo which therefore never arrived.

... las dos tomaron ...

y uno pudo llegar a Cartagena ...—Castellanos, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

... a causa del navio que tomamos

... son inadvertidos.—*Ibid.*, p. 306.

the surprise was complete. Actually, for a moment it was thought that these were Spanish ships; yet, since some suspected that they were not, the call to arms was sounded through the city.¹

In a smaller craft, since the one galley still on the Santo Domingo station was not in condition to go to sea, Captain don Diego Osorio was sent out to reconnoitre. He returned to report that from their lines, heavy armament and other indications, he deduced that these vessels were an English fleet.² So they were, and a formidable fleet, with Francis Drake in command.

It was now a dozen years since Drake had sailed the Caribbean. In 1573, though the flag of Saint George flew high at his mainmast head and he went home rich with gold taken from the packtrain he had robbed near Nombre de Dios³, 'el Capitan Francisco' was at that time 'a private man of mean quality,'⁴ and only one courageous sea-captain among many. Since then a 'large winde' indeed had wafted him forward, around the world and into royal and popular favour, until now off Santo Domingo he stood: Sir Francis Drake, admiral and general, upon the deck of a queen's ship 'with all the budding forces of the coming sea-power [of England] gathered at his back . . . If the influence of sea-power on history is what has been claimed for it, then this moment marks an epoch . . .'⁵

For Drake's appearance off Santo Domingo was Elizabeth's announcement of war on Spain and upon all that Philip II represented, which was dominance in Europe, absolute mastery in America, control of the seas, and Catholicism. The first shot fired here tore away the dissimulation which for 59 years had veiled the activities of the English in the Caribbean. Hitherto they had used subterfuge to mask the advancement of their own interests against Spain—the interest, first, of exploration; then of trade; and next of covert war in commerce destroying. Now, indeed, the Catholic king was boldly challenged openly to fight for his triple (political, religious and commercial) monopoly of the West, in which Elizabeth had never acquiesced even when admitting Philip's claim to it. And behind Drake, as he bore down upon Spain's colonial capital, rode not only the future of Protestantism and of Tudor England, but also the future of North America; for had the outcome of the war which was thus begun been other than that which the defeat of the In-

¹ Compare throughout with Documents Nos. 12 *et seq.*, *post.*

² Documents Nos. 13, 19, and 20 *post.*

³ Wright, I. A., *Documents concerning English Voyages to the Spanish Main* (Hakluyt Society, Series II, no. 71, 1932), p. xlv.

⁴ Corbett, *op. cit.*, I, p. 191. ⁵ *Ibid.*, II, p. 24.

vincible Armada presently foretold, not half but the whole of the western hemisphere must, for better or for worse, forever have borne the stamp of Spanish Catholic culture. Had England not successfully challenged Spain's 'new and living Roman Empire,' it is interesting (though idle) to speculate as to who would have challenged it, and when; and equally idle to imagine what an Hispanic North as well as South America might have meant to the world. Certainly the non-existence of much that figures formidably in its affairs today.

Drake had left England on 14 September, 1585.¹ He had called at Vigo, where his truculence advertised his temper. Thence he steered for the latitude where His Catholic Majesty's fleets might be encountered, apparently with every intention to take any that he might find. Indubitably, to take the fleets was part, if not the major part, of Drake's design.²

Now, the New Spain fleet had set out from San Juan de Ulua on 19 May, 1585, reached Havana safely and there hoped in vain that the Mainland fleet, with its protecting galleons, and the ships from Santo Domingo would come in promptly. Without them, however, on July 21 Don Diego de Alcega,³ commanding 30 vessels out of Mexico, Honduras and Jamaica, sailed from Havana for Spain. Off the Spanish coast Juan Martinez de Recalde with galleons was out to convoy him safe to port, but failed to find him. Instead, at Cape Saint Vincent Alcega met the *adelantado* of Castile⁴ and they were Padilla's 'galleys of Spain' which brought the Mexican fleet safely into San Lucar, in the third week of September.⁵

On October 7 Don Antonio de Osorio reached Terceira with the Mainland fleet. In Spain the greatest anxiety was felt for his

¹ Compare throughout with Bigges's *Discourse* and the *Primrose* log.

² Documents Nos. 28 and 29 *post*. 'I cannot persuade myself that he has not designs upon the fleets from Nombre de Dios and Santo Domingo.'—Don Alvaro de Bazan to the House of Trade, Lisbon, October 13, 1585, in *A. de I.*, 42-1-7/2, Contratación 5107. 'Since the queen did not forget to send the vessels which were at the codfisheries, neither, I think, will she overlook the Indies, the islands, and the ships plying to and from these parts.'—*Id.* to *id.*, Lisbon, October 23, 1585, in *A. de I.*, 41-6-1/36, Contratación 5101. Cf. *Papers relating to the Navy*, p. 69, a plan of the campaign, drawn not by Drake and after he had left Cape Verde for the Indies.

³ Cf. Documents Nos. 8 and 9, *post*.

⁴ Don Martin de Padilla, Conde de Santa Gadea, captain general of the galleys of Spain.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 41-6-1/36, Contratación 5101, Alcega to the House of Trade, Bonanza, September 22, 1585. Cf. *A. de I.*, 42-6-3/7, Contratación 5169, ff. 63 reverse and 64.

safety. Despite the season enemy vessels were extraordinarily numerous along his route.¹ Don Alvaro de Bazan heard that there were forty enemy sail off Finisterre.² Madrid foresaw the possibility of what was there described as 'a great disaster'.

Just as he had failed to find Alcega, so now Recalde and his galleons failed³ to find Osorio and the Mainland argosy. Recalde was shortly thereafter succeeded in command by Alvaro Flores de Quiñones.

Again it was the *adelantado* of Castile with his galleys who on October 16 fell in with Osorio's ships and escorted them into San Lucar. In their holds arrived the greatest treasure ever brought home by a fleet which had not wintered in the Indies.⁴

¹ *A. de I.*, 41-6-1/36, Contratación 5101, Don Alvaro de Bazan to the House of Trade, October 23, 1585, Lisbon; 47-1-7/2, Contratación 5107, Vega de Fonseca to the House of Trade, Madrid, October 18, 1585.

² *A. de I.*, 41-6-1/36, Contratación 5101, Bazan to the House of Trade, Lisbon, October 15, 1585.

³ Much to Don Alvaro's 'great regret and worry.' Cf. his letter to the House of Trade from Lisbon, October 13, 1585, in *A. de I.*, 42-1-7/2, Contratación 5107.

⁴ In *A. de I.*, 42-6-2/6, Contratación 5168, vi, ff. 50 and 50 reverse, are to be found two statements, record copies of communications from the House of Trade to the Crown, dated, respectively, September 29 and October 25, 1585, at Seville. The first shows that according to the manifests Don Diego de Alcega's fleet brought His Majesty revenues which are described as follows:

'On account of the royal treasury, New Spain and Honduras, 197,316,578 maravedis; revenues of the crusade, Mexico and Guatemala, 6,923,150 maravedis; on account of the appropriation for the royal armada for the Indies, 11,984,100 maravedis; proceeds from notarial offices and collectorships, 3,936,650 maravedis; separate account, fines, 10,943,500 maravedis; for the office of the treasurer of the mint of Mexico, sold to Juan Luis de Ribera, 7,937,800 maravedis; on account of the office of assayer, the mint, Mexico, 4,022,650 maravedis; proceeds from sale of a municipal councilman's office, Los Angeles (Puebla), Mexico, 885,800 maravedis; lease made to Francisco de Quintana Dueñas of the office of treasurer, the mint, Mexico, 230,050 maravedis; permit granted to Cristóbal Cuello's ship to cross as second advice-boat of this fleet, 180,600 maravedis; surplus of appropriation allowed for transportation of Your Majesty's bullion to Vera Cruz, 62,350 maravedis. Total brought for Your Majesty as royal revenues on these said accounts from New Spain and Honduras, 244,423,228 maravedis. Further, for Your Majesty, 3 $\frac{3}{4}$ ounces of jewels of all sorts; and . . . for merchants and private individuals, and proceeds from deceased persons' estates, 732,978,214 maravedis . . .'

The second reads: 'Statements of the manifests of ships constituting the fleet which has just arrived from Tierra Firme, General don Antonio Osorio commanding, have been drawn and show that there has been received for Your Majesty on account of royal revenues 532,501,300 maravedis; revenues of the crusade in the New Kingdom of Granada and Los Reyes (Lima) and Quito, 7,747,860 maravedis; fines, New Kingdom of Granada, 774,000 maravedis; procuratorship sold to Pedro de Acevedo, 130,000 maravedis; others sold in the city of Tunja, 355,500 maravedis; an office of notary, *Audiencia* of Panama, 4,092,000 maravedis; offices sold in the city of Lima, 2,242,240 maravedis. Total for Your Majesty on account of royal treasury and these items, 548,427,400 maravedis. For the increase in salary

For once, or rather once again, Drake's 'luck', legendary¹ even then, had failed him. Well might he exclaim: '... it escaped us but twelve hours the whole treasure which the King of Spain had out of the Indies this last year, the cause best known to God; and we had at that instant very foul weather.'²

It is not too much to say that thus, at its outset, was Drake's enterprise frustrated, for unquestionably to seize Philip's treasure and so to weaken³ him while correspondingly strengthening Elizabeth was the very core of his design. For a moment His Catholic Majesty had faced a disaster; but, both fleets safe in harbour, the worst that Drake could do was to humiliate him by despoiling his colonial cities in a raid. That year's golden egg safely deposited in the Spaniard's purse, the Englishman could but pluck the overseas goose that laid it. Given the humour into which his subordinates fell presently, as made evident at Cartagena, it seems possible that neither Drake nor they realized what thin pickings awaited them in Philip's Indies as, having settled old scores at Cape Verde,⁴ they turned their bows to the west. The English watered at Dominica and spent Christmas at Saint Christopher's, where Drake cleansed and aired his ships and somewhat refreshed his men, already beset by sickness.

At Saint Christopher's (apparently in a council of war) it was resolved to attack Santo Domingo. If from Saint Christopher's Drake sent an advanced squadron forward to reconnoitre and to seek communication with disaffected persons⁵ on shore, those

of the members of Your Majesty's royal Council for Indies, 7,201,480 maravedis. Further, for Your Majesty 1012 marks and 1 $\frac{3}{8}$ ounces of pearls of various kinds; 84 grains of pearls classified; and 516 *pesos* and 2 *tomines* weight of emeralds, second class; 403 *pesos* weight of emeralds, third class; a pine of silver which weighs 12 marks from the new mines of Caxatambo. And for merchants and private persons and on account of deceased persons' estates, 1,787,060 maravedis...

Obviously, these statements do not take into account 'unmanifested' bullion and jewels, which were sometimes found to amount to more than that which was manifested as law required. They detail only the 'cash' revenues of the Crown, and 'cash' receipts on account of private persons.

¹ Cf. Documents Nos. 6 and 21, *post*.

² *Papers relating to the Navy*, p. 84. Cf. Documents Nos. 27 (Bravo's deposition) and 28 *post*.

³ 'The principal revenue to which recourse is had for the relief of His Majesty's necessities is that which comes from the Indies.'—Licentiate Hernando de Vega to the House of Trade, Madrid, November, 1585, in *A. de I.*, 42-1-7/12, *Contratación* 5107.

⁴ Cf. pp. xix *ante*, and note 1.

⁵ Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 34. There were no outlaws in Santo Domingo comparable with the 'maroons of the Isthmus'. The negroes at large in the distant mountains of that island were of no such heroic type.

Spaniards who reported upon subsequent events seem to have been uninformed of it, although some renegades¹ were seen in the enemy's company and were accused of having shown the English the way by which they attacked that city.

From a captured pilot the English may have obtained some information concerning its position, but he can hardly have told them much that they did not already know. Drake must have been well aware that the harbour was protected by a difficult bar at the river's mouth and commanded by a castle. The pilot may have furnished news of recent works built for the further defence of the waterfront. As soon, too, as the enemy appeared, Osorio's galley was brought into such position that her artillery could damage any craft seeking to enter, and two or three vessels were 'purposely drowned'² on the bar.

Drake must long have known that the adjacent coast was hazardous, but evidently he refused to admit the Spaniards' universally accepted belief that no landing could be effected except under the castle's guns, in the haven of Santo Domingo itself. Late on the night of that Friday which brought the Spaniards their first news of strange sails off Point Caucedo, certain of his ships (which were seen as they sailed westward past the city) landed a force estimated from 800 to 1400 pikes and muskets. The men were safely piloted through surf at Hayna. By dawn this operation was complete.

These Spanish documents show that no picket was on duty at Hayna, so confidently was it assumed that no landing could possibly be accomplished at that point.³ As a matter of fact, no efficient watch seems to have been kept anywhere along the coast.⁴ If signal fires⁵ were lighted as the English drew near, certainly they conveyed no warning to the threatened city. Having marched from Hayna at eight o'clock, the English forces had been on their way for hours before a scouting party, riding along the coast, discovered them and retired with the news.

So having set ashore at Hayna the troops which under Lieutenant General Christopher Carleill and Captain Anthony Powell approached the city by land from the rear, Drake returned to his ships. Saturday morning dissipated any faint hope the Spaniards may have been entertaining that this fleet would pass Santo Domingo by. Instead, when day brightened, they discovered that

¹ Documents Nos. 14, 16, 37, 55, enclosure 2, etc., *post*.

² Cf. illustration in Bigges's *Discourse*, here reproduced, pp. 38-9, item DD.

³ Documents Nos. 14, 15, 19, 20 *post*.

⁴ Document No. 12 *post*.

⁵ Cf. illustration in Bigges's *Discourse*, here reproduced, pp. 38-9, item A.

large vessels had taken the place of the smaller craft they had watched sail westward the night before; and these smaller vessels reappeared also. They estimated Drake's full strength at thirty to thirty-four vessels, of varying sizes, heavy galleons among them.¹ These now tacked back and forth before the town. When the fort fired upon them its balls fell short, so displaying the weakness of the Spanish artillery, and wasting powder. The English did not consider it necessary to reply.²

Toward mid-morning, however, the enemy ships took up menacing positions; and about noon whatever defence the Spanish within the city may have hoped to offer was shattered by receipt of the dire tidings that in two columns, with 'music playing and standards flying,' a large body of English was resolutely and rapidly advancing by land from the direction of Hayna. Panic ensued. From his ships the enemy watched the exodus.

¹ '... Drake had gathered around him a fleet of twenty-five sail, amongst which were the *Elizabeth Bonadventure*, 600 tons, and the *Aid*, 250 tons, of Her Majesty's. The rest were all private ships. Largest of them was the galleon *Leicester*, of 400 tons, which had been Fenton's flagship in 1582. The London contingent included several of the finest vessels in the subsidized mercantile marine, with the redoubtable *Primrose* at their head. The rest were mainly West-Country vessels. In all, the ships numbered twenty-one and the pinnaces four.' A salt-bark captured off Finisterre was added to these, under the name of *Drake*, thus 'raising the whole force to twenty-six sail ...'

'Drake's flag was hoisted on the *Bonadventure*, and around him was gathered as brilliant an assembly of officers, whether from family connections or services, as a commander could desire. His own flag-captain was Thomas Fenner, one of the most daring and experienced officers of his time. His vice-admiral was Martin Frobisher, who honoured the little *Primrose* with his flag. Francis Knollys, the queen's cousin and Leicester's brother-in-law, was rear-admiral in the galleon *Leicester*. Captain Edward Wynter, son of Sir William, commanded the *Aid*, and Christopher Carleill was lieutenant-general commanding the land forces and the *Tiger*. Thomas Drake, the admiral's youngest brother, had Sir Francis's ship, the *Thomas Drake*. Tom Moone, one of the oldest and most devoted followers of his corsair days, had another, the *Francis*. Amongst others whom he had trained in his voyage around the world were Captain George Fortescue in the bark *Bonner*, Captain John Martyn in the bark *Benjamin*, Edward Careless, also called Wright, whom Hakluyt calls the excellent mathematician and engineer, in the *Hope*, of 200 tons, and Richard Hawkyms with his first command as captain of the galliot *Duck*. Under Carleill was a regular military force with Captain Anthony Powell as "sergeant-major", or chief of the lieutenant-general's staff, and two "corporals of the field", or aides-de-camp. The whole force, including soldiers and sailors, numbered 2,300 men.'—Corbett, in his excellent introduction to *Papers relating to the Navy*, pp. x-xii.

² Cf. Castellanos, *op. cit.*, p. 308. Again, from here forward compare the appended Spanish documents with Bigges's *Discourse*, the *Primrose* log, and Corbett's version of these events presented in his *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, II. See also A. K. Jameson, 'Some New Documents dealing with Drake', in *English Historical Review*, January, 1934.

Some of the more valiant sought to rally foot and horse to oppose Carleill's advance. The English perceived some attempt at defence and approached respectfully,¹ well supported by the ordnance of their ships, which had taken up such stations that their fire swept the field. Against that bombardment and against Carleill's musketry nothing could hold undisciplined civilians. They made for the nearest cover. Those few whose military training or sense of duty sufficed made a last stand at the Lenba gate, where there were three pieces of artillery. They fired at least one shot from one of these. Evidently it was fired when the English were within close range and some were killed.

Nevertheless Carleill came on, at a rapid pace, in solid array. His pikes were levelled against the strongest power in Christendom, in the proudest citadel of the New World. He had no means of knowing that beyond the Lenba gate dereliction and cowardice had already betrayed the city. At first push Spain's 'ancientest' colonial bulwark collapsed, discreditably. By five o'clock that afternoon the banner of Saint George was unfurled above the towers of Santo Domingo and the English ships 'shot off their ordnance for joy having won the town'.² Each leading a column, Carleill and Captain Powell met in the *plaza*, 'a place of very faire spacious square ground', the heart of the city.

The fort held out a little longer, but that night its warden, other officers and what soldiers they had been able to detain inside it, took their unceremonious leave by way of the river. Their departure gave Drake control of the anchorage and of all the shipping in the haven.³ 'Thus the Spaniards gave us the town for a New Year's gift.'⁴ Casualties had been three or four on each side.

¹ See the illustration accompanying Bigges's *Discourse*, reproduced here, pp. 38-9. This very interesting picture of Santo Domingo and the attack corroborates the Spanish documents in the matter. They do not, however, mention any attempt to use cattle to disorganize the English columns (item T), which is not conclusive proof that it was not made.

² *Papers relating to the Navy*, p. 79.

³ Document No. 20 *post* states that the English took five vessels from the harbour, and burned others. Among the latter was the galley (cf. the *Primrose* log, p. 14); evidently President Ovalle's order to burn this, if he issued it, had not been effectively carried out (cf. Document No. 12 *post*). In summarizing the news he had at the beginning of May from the master of a vessel just arrived in San Lucar from Puerto Rico, De Varte wrote to the Crown: '... three ships out of New Spain laden with flour called at Havana and went to Santo Domingo where they must have fallen into the enemy's hands, for they had not been warned; and so also Captain Palanco and his wife who left from La Margarita for Santo Domingo with a ship in which they had more than 30,000 ducats.'—From San Lucar, May 3, 1586, in *A. de I.*, 143-3-16, Indiferente General 1097.

⁴ The *Primrose* log, p. 15.

If in the taking of Santo Domingo no such fierce fighting occurred as his compatriots seem to describe in writing of the matter, nevertheless in the light of these Spanish documents Drake's timeliness, audacity and his ability to command stand forth undiminished. They shine indeed in comparison with the Penn-Venables fiasco of 1655. For not only did Drake take the city unwarned, but also he came suitably supplied, attacked at a favouring season of the year, landed at the right place (thereby accomplishing the impossible), advanced quickly and vigorously, warmly supported his army from his ships, and once in possession of the place, took every precaution against offence.¹

So deeply were all Spaniards involved in this disaster shamed by it that even Latin loquacity was checked: through all the Spanish documents which I have seen concerning the fall of Santo Domingo an unusual reticence² is evident. It is as though, perhaps by actual

¹ ' . . . he fortified himself there and threw up barricades made of lime and brick which he carried along in three vessels . . . the corsair has four great galleons in Port Ocoa and 22 off Santo Domingo and four at Caucedo . . . '—Don Francisco de Varte to the Crown, San Lucar, May 3, 1586, in *A. de I.*, 143-3-16, Indiferente General 1097. Cf. the *Primrose* log, p. 15: ' . . . we had in every street at the outside of the town round about made rampires and planted ordnance and guarded them with men . . . ' Cf. Bigges, *Discourse*, p. 112.

² However, it seems incredible that it could have been possible to enforce silence concerning certain incidents which both Bigges in his *Discourse* and the *Primrose* log (pp. 16-17) describe, i.e., the hanging of two friars, the lancing of Drake's negro servant and the execution of a Spanish officer by the Spaniards themselves at Drake's demand.

In his *Discurso* Castellanos does describe (p. 310) the maltreatment, humiliation and execution of two aged Dominicans whom the English found in their monastery upon taking the city. Citing L. Cabrera de Cordoba's *Felipe Segundo*, III, p. 178, in his edition of the *Discurso* González Palencia gives their names: Fray Juan de Caravia and Fray Juan de Illanes, lay brother. The editor saw no documents at Seville referring to their martyrdom.

The cruel despatch of a negro servant might have passed uncommented upon, but it does seem that had any officer of His Catholic Majesty been executed, a sacrifice to Drake, he must have had relatives to claim consideration from the Crown by reason of so notable a 'service' rendered by him.

At the same time, it is equally incredible that these things should be any sixteenth-century writer's invention. Had the colonial authorities conspired to keep them quiet—highly improbable, since there was no real reason for doing so—there would not have been lacking an enemy to some or all of them to advise the king in his councils of the deceit; or a gossiping commentator to relay, as rumour, the facts from some other colony. Yet I have seen no mention of these particular incidents in any Spanish document.

With respect to another which Corbett recounts (*op. cit.*, II, p. 41, 'Non sufficit orbis') see Document No. 18 *post*, the escutcheon which Drake removed from the *Audiencia* building: ' . . . sério dosel y armas reales . . . ' according to Castellanos, *op. cit.*, and according to Bigges, *op. cit.*, 'very notable marke & Token of the unsatiabie ambition of the Spanish king and his nation.'

agreement, the persons who must lay the facts before Philip in his Council for Indies were determined to offend His Majesty's Catholic eyes and ears with as few 'impious' details as possible.¹

Documents Nos. 12-14 are the earliest accounts of the attack, written from Xagua, whither Licentiate Mercado, Villafañe and Aliaga withdrew. No. 15 is interesting as showing what Spaniards who were not actually in Santo Domingo city at first supposed to have occurred there;² and No. 16 suggests what they thought of it when they learned the truth. It will be remarked that Captain Ovalle³ states that the president led the resistance,⁴ such as it was, which the English met as they approached the Lenba gate, whereas in Document No. 14 (somewhat franker than Nos. 12 and 13) Licentiate Mercado and Villafañe deny that he had any part in these encounters. According to his own version,⁵ President Ovalle

¹ 'The sins of the inhabitants of this, Your Majesty's city of Santo Domingo, multiplied so exceedingly . . . Divine Justice permitted it to be sacked by English enemies of God and of Your Majesty. In despoiling it these bold unbelievers gave free rein to their infidelity and to the remorseless hatred they entertain against the greatness of Your Majesty's royal name as defender of the sacrosanct estate of the church and his holiness' reputation. I will not go into details in order not to offend Your Majesty's pious eyes . . .'—The abbess, Santa Clara nunnery, to the Crown, Santo Domingo, no date, in *A. de I.*, 54-1-12, Santo Domingo 96.

² In a similar letter of the same date addressed presumably to the governor of Cartagena, Ovalle states that Warden Bastidas was killed in defending the fort. Francisco de Viamonte, writing from La Yaguana at the same time, adds the younger Bastidas and Captain Diego de Osorio to the list 'of those supposed to be killed because they were in the fort'. Cf. *A. de I.*, 2-5-2/21, Patronato 266, item 50-4. Certainly Osorio survived. Cf. note 5, p. 19 immediately following.

³ Possibly related to President Ovalle, but probably not.

⁴ Cf. p. 19 *post*, note 1.

⁵ The editor failed to find in the General Archive of the Indies the report to the Crown which President Ovalle must have made upon Drake's seizure of Santo Domingo or the despatch which the royal officials sent forward under date of February 23. Cf. theirs of June 30 in *A. de I.*, 53-6-8, Santo Domingo 74 (192). However, among the appendices to Angel González Palencia's edition (Madrid, 1921) of Castellanos' *Discurso de el Capitan Francisco Draque* is included an 'Account of What Happened in Santo Domingo upon the Arrival of the English, Written by President Ovalle,' printed from a manuscript described as 'a copy of Ovalle's letter', the shelf mark of which is 109, No. 2, of the manuscript collection in the Instituto de Valencia in Madrid. In this relation Ovalle recounts the arrival of the enemy off the island on Friday, the 10th, Osorio's reconnaissance and report that the ships were English and numbered over 30. That night neither he nor any of the judges of the *Audiencia*, whose activity he commends, attempted to sleep. He ordered the fortress to make ready to resist, summoned the foot and horse, and laid three hulks across the bar to close the entrance to the haven. 'That night I had 1500 men', he declares.

He asserts that when the moon rose the English attempted to enter the harbour but were prevented. A party was sent to Guibia to prevent a landing there. This, however, was effected at Hayna, where 1600 men were set ashore, a galleon lost,

rode forth in the direction from which the enemy was approaching, was thrown with his falling horse into mud, returned to his house to clean up and when he set out again met his people in full retreat, with them fell back to the river and there embarked on Ozama with Licentiate Arceo. It was stated that as he went he ordered the galley to be burned. Ovalle says that when he left the enemy was in possession of the city, the English colours raised¹ on government house (i.e., it was four or five o'clock in the afternoon). In Document No. 19 an inclusive 'we' avoids what was doubtless an odious distinction between President Ovalle and Licentiate Arceo who fled by way of the river, and Licentiate Mercado and Villafañe, younger men,² who had at least lingered long enough to see English pikes and muskets near at hand.

Documents Nos. 17, 19, 20 and 42 *post* are official relations. The and a brother of Drake's nearly drowned. But for these mishaps and the fact that the troops lost their way in advancing on the city, says Ovalle, the English would have come down on Santo Domingo by surprise 'and slit all our throats and taken our women and property'.

Ovalle says he sent scouts to Hayna and received contradictory news. Meanwhile, his forces had shrunk from 1500 to 110 foot and horse, 'all together not worth four good fighters'. These 110 breakfasted in his residence after which he set out at their head to take the field. In a narrow muddy street his exhausted horse lay down in a puddle. He then returned to his house to change his clothes, leaving the Licentiate Villafañe in command.

Ovalle says that he arrived at the city gate just in time to see the Spaniards retire. Finding himself abandoned he proceeded to the harbour where he was entreated to embark. The enemy was by that time in the city, his flag flying from Santa Barbara church and the government houses. The enemy ships were bombarding the place. He and Licentiate Arceo therefore embarked at four o'clock and plied up river until seven next morning. He had left his wife and nieces behind. With no change of shirt, he adds, he wandered from estate to estate for eight days.

Cf. *A. de I.*, 53-6-4, Santo Domingo 70, papers in the case against Baltazar Lopez; 53-1-15, Santo Domingo 15, Medrano's *información*. Resenting Licentiate Mercado's manners as he exhibited them under stress, Baltazar Lopez, secretary of the *Audiencia*, refused to recognize Licentiate Mercado and Villafañe, alone, as constituting that court, i.e., as possessing authority to order him about. The quarrel accumulated papers from which it appears that President Ovalle and Licentiate Arceo fled first to Hoçama. Licentiate Mercado and Villafañe had gone to Xagua. They named Nigua as a rendezvous whither what effectives could be assembled were to proceed, to meet them; and presently they moved up to a sugar estate on the Hayna River from where as a base they hoped to annoy the enemy. Cf. *A. de I.*, 2-5-2/21, Patronato 266, item 50-4, p. 2, Mercado and Villafañe to the authorities at La Yaguana, from Xagua, January 14, 1586.

¹ . . . plantaron sus vanderas y estandartes
en las casas excelsas y reales . . . —Castellanos, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

² In very different connection President Ovalle had recently commented upon their youthful impetuosity. He himself died at the end of November, 1586; cf. Document No. 56 *post*.

most interesting paper, possibly, is No. 56 wherein the Spanish official who came into closest contact with him has left us a vivid picture of Francis Drake. Against the background of a blazing, desecrated city, there he stands: rotund and rubicund,¹ cheery and open-handed, a braggart able (obviously!) to make good his boasts; an alert imperious commander, obeyed and feared by his men even at a moment when lawless passions must have been straining at the leash, or loose.

Santo Domingo was subjected to organized pillage. Galley-slaves whom the Spaniards had unchained that they might aid in its defence assisted the English 'lutherans' to ruin the city; and presently departed in their company.² All its holy places,³ which were the abode not only of the Roman religion but also of what beauty, what culture the city knew—what music, what art, what drama, what literature it could boast—all were given over to insult and destruction.⁴ Nothing—neither the king's strongbox nor the city's hospitals—was spared.⁵ The English trumpets sang as rich booty⁶ in coin, plate, jewels and fine raiment was brought forth from the altars of the churches and from the bedchambers of the leading citizens.⁷ In fairness it should be added that by the laws of war, as then prac-

¹ Hes hombre rojo de gracioso gesto,
 menos en estatura que mediano;
 mas en sus proporciones bien compuesto
 y en plática, medido cortesano.
 respuestas vivas, un ingenio presto
 en todas cuantas cosas pone mano,
 en negocios mayormente de guerra
 muy pocas veces o ninguna yerra.—Castellanos, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

² Cf. the *Primrose* log, p. 16; and *A. de I.*, 147-6-5, Santo Domingo 49, Don Diego Osorio to the Crown, Santo Domingo, June 30, 1586. Also *Acts Privy Council*, New Series, xrv, p. 205, mention of Turks, galley-slaves, Drake took to England upon his return. Others remained at large in the island or made off with French corsairs.

³ *A. de I.*, 54-1-10, Santo Domingo 94, *información* on behalf of the cathedral, Santo Domingo, March 18, 1586; 58-1-14, Santo Domingo 14, others on behalf of the Dominican monastery, Santo Domingo, April 17-20, 1586; on behalf of the nunnery, Regina Angelorum, June 6-26, 1586; 54-1-12, Santo Domingo 96, Fr. Francisco Pacheco to the Crown, Santo Domingo, May 24, 1586; Fray Gabriel de Sotomayor, for the Mercedarians, Santo Domingo, June 9, 1586; Fray Manuel de la Cruz, on behalf of the Franciscans (February, 1589); and a communication from the abbess of the Santa Clara nunnery, no date, previously cited.

⁴ Cf. Castellanos, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 53-6-14, Santo Domingo 14, *información* on behalf of San Nicolas hospital, Santo Domingo, June 2, 1586. Cf. Documents Nos. 17 and 42 *post* especially.

⁶ O cuántas variedades de riquezas . . .—Castellanos, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

⁷ *A. de I.*, 53-6-14, Santo Domingo 80, *Probanza de las pérdidas del Licenciado Baltazar de Villafañe*, Santo Domingo, June 6, 1586, a picturesque document.

tised, the English were moderate. The city had not surrendered on summons. It had been taken by assault.

Those of its inhabitants who had not fled or who returned to save what they might, were evidently penned into the cathedral's chapels and held for ransom.¹ For the gutted shell of the city Drake demanded first a million and then 100,000 ducats.² Since these were not forthcoming he began to burn and to demolish. When from the bush, where they had huddled in incredible disorganization,³ the people and their officers saw the flames and smoke arise, they closed a bargain at a quarter of this latter amount.

To raise these 25,000 ducats the people of the city, from the archbishop, Don Alonso Lopez de Avila,⁴ down, laid into the scales their personal treasures—'pearls, gold, jewels, silver, chains and ear-rings',⁵ much of the cathedral plate, the table service of the richer residents. In consideration thereof Drake left standing 300 dwellings, the desecrated cathedral, the shattered, blackened and empty shells of monasteries and nunneries, hospitals and hermitages, the fort, the government house where President Ovalle lived, the wharves and the city hall.⁶ It would almost seem that he spared only what it would have been very difficult to destroy.⁷

Having held Santo Domingo for a month, the English went their way. As Document No. 17 *post* says, they carried with them everything they cared to take, or could transport—galley-slaves, negroes, cannon-balls, artillery, clothing, treasure, subsistence.⁸ Poor as its loss left Santo Domingo, the total and the quality of this booty must have seemed unsatisfactory⁹ to a commander whose preceding

¹ Document No. 17 *post*.

² ' . . . Ducats of five shillings six pence the peece [i.e., *pieza* or "piece" of eight *reales*] . . . Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 114. Cf. p. lvi, note 6, *post*. Documents Nos. 18, 19, 20, and 56 *post*. Cf. *A. de I.*, 53-6-14, Santo Domingo 80, *información*, Ysabel de Andrada, García Fernández de Torquemada's widow, May, 1588.

³ ' . . . 3000 men of the country and negroes had assembled and awaited the armada from Spain to fall upon the enemy.'—Don Francisco de Varte to the Crown, San Lucar, May 3, 1586, in *A. de I.*, 143-3-16, Indiferente General 1097 (recounting latest advices received).

⁴ Cf. Castellanos, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 54-1-10, Santo Domingo 94, the *información* on behalf of the cathedral already cited, especially the testimony of Alvaro Maldonado who was present when these articles were weighed. Cf. Document No. 17 *post*.

⁶ The *información* on behalf of the cathedral, cited, testimony of Juan Caballero Bazan.

⁷ Cf. Bigges, *Discourse*, p. 114. ⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 115-6; the *Primrose* log, p. 17.

⁹ *Sp. C.*, 1580-6, pp. 601-2, No. 467, unsigned advices from London, August 8, 1586; pp. 612-3, No. 473, Mendoza to the Crown, Paris, August 27, 1586; pp. 617-8, No. 479, *id. to id.*, Paris, September 6, 1586.

exploit in the Caribbean had netted him hundredweights of clean bullion. From Santo Domingo, his fleet increased by four or five vessels¹ which he had found in the haven or taken on the coast during his sojourn there, the Englishman now laid his course for Cartagena.

If Drake planned, earlier, to attack La Margarita² certainly he had abandoned the intention. According to Document No. 55 *post*, enclosure No. 2, he was advised³ against calling at Rio de la Hacha, and according to Document No. 49, enclosure, he approached the Main in the vicinity of Santa Marta⁴ and steered thence for Cartagena.

The documents herewith presented concerning Drake at Cartagena are numerous and diversified. Indeed, it would seem that they leave nothing to be desired.⁵ In point of time they lie between February 16, three days before the English appeared off that city, and August 18, when they had been gone little less than four months. They should be compared throughout with Bigges's *Discourse* and the *Primrose* log.

In No. 18 *post* the story of the storming of the city is begun by the dean of its cathedral. In No. 22 it is continued by an unidentified person who says Drake held him as a hostage. Nowhere else does it appear that any hostages were required or given. The story is retold in No. 21 by Tristan de Oribe, who seems to have conducted the

¹ See Documents Nos. 21, 22, 29, 35, 55, enclosure 2, etc., *post* for mention of one good vessel he seized. Cf. Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 38, n. 1; González Palencia, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

Reservaron los miembros del demonio
un grande galleon a maravilla . . .
era nao del gran varón Antonio

Corço, vezino rico de Sevilla . . .—Castellanos, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

² Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 42 and note 1; *Papers relating to the Navy*, p. 70.

³ Cf. Document No. 18 *post*, mention of Drake's generous offer to Maldonado concerning Rio de la Hacha.

⁴ Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 42 and note 2; *Papers relating to the Navy*, p. 71. The editor has discovered no Spanish document bearing upon any call which Drake may have made anywhere—neither at Cabo de la Vela nor at Rio de la Hacha—prior to his arrival at Cartagena. Cf. *Sp. C. 1587-1603*, No. 20, pp. 18 *et seq.* The entry here concerning Rio de la Hacha would suggest that this statement emanated from Drake himself who had good reason to remember conditions there and the treasurer in particular.

⁵ These documents are so numerous that to cite them properly becomes difficult. The following account of Drake's seizure of Cartagena is based solely upon them in comparison with Bigges's *Discourse* and the *Primrose* log, with some reference to Corbett's work in *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, previously cited, II. Castellanos' *Discourse*, *op. cit.*, pp. 321 *et seq.*, is a remarkably accurate account of the events under consideration. Compare it especially with Document No. 27 *post*.

negotiations with Drake for the ransom of the place and to have seen more of the English leader than any other Spaniard there, unless it were Captain Alonso Bravo Hidalgo de Sotomayor. In Nos. 23 and 29 we have Governor don Pedro Fernández de Busto's version of these events, and in No. 28 that put forward by Don Pedro Vique y Manrique, commander of the galleys, on whom blame for the loss of the city fell heavily indeed, largely because he was the one military officer of experience and reputation there and might have been expected to conduct himself creditably.

As soon as the *Audiencia* of Santa Fé heard that the enemy had taken Cartagena that court commissioned¹ his majesty's governor and captain general of Santa Marta, Don Diego Hidalgo Montemayor,² to proceed immediately as special judge to investigate the matter. On April 17 Hidalgo Montemayor presented himself to the municipal authorities of Cartagena who were then at Turbaco. Next day he served notice of his commission upon Governor Fernández de Busto in the Franciscan monastery. The governor recognized his authority, even while protesting that enmity had inspired the appointment. The judge began immediately to assemble evidence from those persons most able, if not always most willing, to tell what occurred. In Document No. 27 we have a handsome series of the depositions he received from participants in the disaster. Surely they tell the story from every possible point of view—from that of the distinguished commander of the king's galleys (who in vain tore his beard and cursed his forebears!) to that of the humble captain of the free blacks who had to be told to run away from the English as his betters were already running 'like sheep'.³ Particularly interesting is the statement furnished by Captain Alonso Bravo, who was Drake's prisoner, to whom 'Captain Francis' must have talked rather freely at meals. Assuredly Special Judge Hidalgo Montemayor possessed complete information, if not an unprejudiced mind and pen. In Document No. 28 we have the relation he made to the Crown.

Documents Nos. 24, 25 and 50 are accounts by individuals who had a share in the catastrophe.

Document No. 30 is the royal official's excellent report to the Crown. No. 31 is the city's. No. 49 is that made by Governor Lodeña, who succeeded Fernández de Busto immediately after the enemy's

¹ For his commission, dated at Santa Fé, March 30, 1587, see records of his proceedings in *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fe 89.

² Brother to Captain Alonso Bravo and therefore, some said, incapacitated to act in respect to matters in which the captain was involved. Cf. Document No. 29 *post.*

³ The *Primrose* log, p. 20.

departure. Its enclosure and No. 57 show what sort of information was supplied to the Spaniards by deserters from Drake's fleet (one an Italian, one an Indian). Document No. 34 shows in what brief terms Philip II was informed of the further humiliation which had been laid upon him in the capture of Cartagena, a stronger place, more important to him in his administration of his American colonies, than was Santo Domingo.

At this date Cartagena was not the marvellously walled city it later became; yet its position was strong. It was defended not only by swamps which made difficult an attack by land from the east but also by the character of the coast upon which it faced, for there was no immediate approach for ships and the prevailing wind might easily carry vessels past the harbour (difficult or impossible to enter in bad weather), it being almost out of the question for them then to beat back. Further, the city was protected by the inaccessibility of its inner haven, entrance to which from the lagoon or outer harbour was by Boqueron channel through which only small vessels could pass, and even these only at high tide.

The only fortification, however, was a blockhouse on the Boqueron channel, some little distance from the town. This single small fort dominated that channel and the bar between the anchorage in the outer harbour, where the galleons of the armada of the guard were wont to lie, and the inner haven with its wharves on the city's edge. At neither entrance to the lagoon, or outer harbour (*mar chica*, little sea), i.e., neither at Boca Grande nor at Boca Chica, further west, did defence of any kind exist at this time.¹

There were two galleys and a tender stationed at Cartagena: the *Santiago*, flag-galley, the *Ocasion* and the *Napolitana*, frigate.² The galleys may have been hardly seaworthy³ but they were well manned

¹ See Bigges's map, here reproduced, pp. 54-5, and the Spanish map of later date, herewith presented (opp. p. xlv) from *A. de I.*, Panama 51, showing harbour defences planned at a later date.

² '... something quite different from the frigate of the next centuries . . . a special kind of galley, with one mast and from eight to twelve oars on a side, sometimes decked and sometimes not . . .'—Corbett, *op. cit.*, I, p. 159, n. 3. ' . . . peculiarly swift and of small draught . . .' *Ibid.*, p. 10. Cf. Juan Bautista Caullo (?) to the Crown, Cartagena, April 28, 1585, in *A. de I.*, 72-5-17, Santa Fé 88, for statement that the *saetia Santa Clara* grounded in Cartagena harbour on March 23, 1585, and was out of commission when the English appeared. Its six pieces of ordnance were lying upon the city quay and its captain, Juan de Castañeda, was acting for Don Pedro Vique in command of the flag-galley. Cf. Documents Nos. 22, 23 and 24 *post.* The English eventually burned the *saetia*, ' . . . or "arrow" . . . , a kind of launch with three lateen sails'—Corbett, *op. cit.*, I, p. 10.

³ *A. de I.*, 140-7-34, Indiferente General 740, *consulta* of March 5, 1583.

and well supplied with munitions and subsistence. Moreover, when the emergency arose additional men from the city were sent on board. Their commander was the veteran Don Pedro Vique. The two captains under him also held royal commissions.¹

The highest authority in Cartagena, however, was the governor and captain general, Don Pedro Fernández de Busto, whom the accompanying documents describe, correctly or not, as a cantankerous old² man, possibly confused by too many unsolicited recommendations³ proffered by self-appointed military advisers. In any event it is clear that he deferred to Don Pedro Vique who was persuaded to leave the immediate command of his galleys to his subordinates and to assume responsibility for the operations on land.⁴

It is made very plain in these documents that there was no garrison or any other disciplined military force in Cartagena when Drake appeared. Here, as at Santo Domingo, the civilian population was expected to constitute the 'main-battle'.

In very early January Governor Fernández de Busto received certain war materials and advices from Spain warning him to expect a formidable English fleet.⁵ Immediately he laid the news before the municipal authorities and the military officers in the city at the time, and it was then or shortly after resolved to convey women, children, monies, merchandise, etc., into safety in the interior;⁶ to warn Nombre de Dios and Panama; to strengthen Cartagena's defences; to call up the Indians, to summon reinforcements from Mompox and Tolu; and to organize both horse and foot—white, red and black men—under their respective officers. Weapons and munitions were assembled and inspected and ordnance, of which there was plenty, was mounted and made ready for use. Earth-works and batteries were planned to protect the several avenues of approach to its beach and the city. On January 24 or 25 came word from La Yaguana⁷ that Santo Domingo had fallen and that Cartagena was Drake's

¹ Document No, 27 *post*, Vique's deposition.

² *Ibid.* ³ *Ibid.*, Cuevas' deposition.

⁴ For Don Pedro Vique's participation in these events see Documents Nos. 25 and 27 *post*, especially his own extraordinary deposition. See also Captain Martín González's deposition in criticism. Cf. Castellanos, *op. cit.*, pp. 322-3.

⁵ Under dates of November 24, 1585, January 4 and 19, February 2 and 8, 1586, despatches were addressed by His Majesty and by the House of Trade to the authorities at Cartagena, copies of which are appended to the depositions which constitute Document No. 27 *post*. Cf. No. 22 *post*.

⁶ Documents Nos. 22, 23 and 27 *post*, Daça's deposition. Cf. Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

⁷ Cf. Documents Nos. 15, 22, 27, 29, 30 enclosure *post*; Castellanos, *op. cit.*, p. 323

next objective. Further councils were held and further effort exerted to strengthen the place.

The suggestion went unheeded that a battery should be planted¹ on Hicacos Point to damage the enemy as he negotiated the narrow entrance to the lagoon by Boca Grande, but artillery was placed in a trench out toward Tesca, Hanged Man's Swamp, in good barricades² at the ends of streets leading into the town from the beach, in convenient locations on the beach itself, and especially in a considerable work—a masonry wall³ with a ditch before it—which was partly built (but not completed) across the Caleta, that narrow spit of land by which the enemy must come if he advanced upon the city from Hicacos. Previous experience had shown that this was indeed the weakest spot in Cartagena's position—almost the only one where an assault might feasibly be attempted.

Now, it had been decided that the galleys should not leave the inner haven, either to meet the enemy on the open sea or even to dispute his entrance into the lagoon. Instead, further to strengthen the Caleta they were to come up, should the enemy appear there, lie bows on to the land, and with artillery and small shot enfilade his attacking party as it faced the trench. It was later claimed that Don Pedro Vique promised to land men from the galleys to help to hold that work.⁴

On February 16 a small vessel came in on board of which was Don Francisco Maldonado. He had been present in Santo Domingo when the English took that city and his story of what occurred there and of Drake's strength and purpose to deal similarly with Cartagena so markedly diminished⁵ the people's confidence in their ability to

¹ Document No. 27 *post*, Martin González' and Cuevas' depositions; Documents Nos. 28 and 50 *post*.

² 'At every streetes end they had raised very fine Barricados of earth-workes, with trenches without them, as well made as ever we saw any worke done . . .'²—Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

³ 'This streight was fortified cleane over with a stone wall and a ditch without it the sayd wall being as orderly built with flanking in every part, as can be set downe . . .'³—*Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁴ Documents Nos. 22, 23, 27, depositions of Captains Martin González and Bravo, 29, etc., *post*.

⁵ The interest, not to say the suspicion, of any close student of Drake's activities at Rio de la Hacha in preceding years must attach to his relations in 1586 with Francisco Maldonado, son-in-law of Miguel de Castellanos, old enemy of the English in their approaches to that place. For in the documents here presented (Nos. 18, 30, 56 *post*) we find Maldonado in Drake's camp negotiating for the ransom of Santo Domingo. We find Drake, whose generosity usually had a purpose, offering to convey Maldonado to Rio de la Hacha, even to spare that town; we learn that Maldonado called at Rio de la Hacha en route to Cartagena with

resist that the governor was obliged to hold a meeting wherein he harangued¹ his troops in an effort to restore their courage and, according to Don Pedro Vique,² to assure them that the galleys were not going out of the haven and that their commander would fight on land. On the morning of Ash Wednesday, February 19, still another advice-boat came in³ with further warning from Spain against Drake but also with assurance that a royal armada was coming to attack him. Hope revived, for it was imagined that this armada might come in even before the enemy should appear.⁴

The English fleet was sighted, however, about noon of that very same day. It seemed to consist of fewer vessels than Maldonado insisted had constituted its full strength at Santo Domingo. It was deduced that some had remained behind to land forces and attack Cartagena from the rear, by way of Hanged Man's Swamp, on a plan similar to that followed at Santo Domingo. Therefore the governor ordered Captain Martin Polo with his company of 120 harquebusiers and 50 Indian bowmen to hold the swamp road at the trench which had been built for the purpose on a convenient height. He sent 40 harquebusiers and 50 Indians to hold the road leading in by a brickyard which he believed to be a possible landing place whence the enemy might advance on the bridge.⁵ He detailed a party of about fifteen to protect San Francisco bridge itself, which was the city's means of communication with the inland country. He sent more than 50 men into the little fort, or blockhouse, at Boqueron. He employed his horse to patrol the beach and to reconnoitre. Indian bowmen were 'placed in coigns of vantage'.⁶ With the rest⁷

warning against Drake, so that there may be something more than ironical error in the confusion which in Document No. 38 *post* makes him a Portuguese vice-admiral in Drake's fleet.

¹ Cf. Castellanos, *op. cit.*, pp. 324-6. ² Document No. 27 *post*, his deposition

³ Document No. 55 *post*, enclosure No. 3.

⁴ Document No. 22 *post*; cf. p. xxix *ante*, note 6. Although it was quite untrue, the authorities at Cartagena were officially informed that Alvaro Flores was coming to engage Drake. Cf. the royal despatch of November 24, 1585, and the other two which were delivered to Governor Fernández de Busto on the morning of Ash Wednesday, those of later date from the House of Trade having arrived earlier.

⁵ Apparently the Anchorage (*el Tenedero*) and the brickyard landing were one and the same place. The men sent thither may have been recalled and posted at the Caleta when, late in the day, it became evident that Don Pedro Vique was not furnishing those the governor had expected from the galleys. Cf. the royal officials' deposition in Document No. 27 *post*.

⁶ Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁷ These were San Miguel's company, the men from Mompox and Tolu, the free blacks and, presently, Bravo's company. See Bartolome Lopez's papers in *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fé 89.

of his forces, being 250 to 300 men (small shot and pikes), the governor made his stand at the Caleta, and it seems that he counted upon Don Pedro Vique to send him at least 150 more from the galleys whenever they should be needed at this point.

As Drake sailed past the city Governor Fernández de Busto and Don Pedro Vique sallied forth¹ upon the beach with all the foot and all the horse in full war panoply, the royal standard and all the company flags unfurled, so 'representing the battle to the enemy'² in accordance with the custom of the time. The Spaniards understood later that, surveying this display, the English considerably over-estimated their strength. It seems at the maximum³ to have been about 1000—'and these not soldiers, but merchants and artisans unaccustomed to war'⁴—nonetheless good fighters, usually.

The ordnance planted along the beach fired upon the nearest enemy ships, evidently doing them little or no damage because of the distance. By four o'clock that afternoon Drake had entered the lagoon by Boca Grande⁴ 'without any resistance of ordinance or other impeachment'. Troops were landed 'in the Evening'.⁵

Now, as has been said, the work across the narrow spit of the Caleta, which separated the inner haven from the sea, was not completed, a matter for which Don Pedro Vique was blamed and he, in turn, blamed the governor. It did not extend to the water's edge on the seaward end. The Caleta measured 150 paces across, and for 65 feet on the north or seaward side there was no protection at

¹ Documents Nos. 18, 21, 22, 23, 27, Francisco de Avila's deposition, etc., etc.

² Cf. Castellanos, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

³ Compare the documents *post*, especially No. 29 wherein the governor enumerates his forces after the debacle, i.e., when he had no reason to exaggerate, with Fernández Duro, *Armada Española* (Madrid, 1896), II, p. 396, who places the number at 1024 men, and with Vique's deposition, Document No. 27, where the Spanish strength appears to have been 989 men, both calculations exclusive of the galleys. Observe that in his deposition Captain Bravo estimates the total available Spanish strength at about 1000 maximum. See also Documents 50, 29, and 30, enclosure, which would make it 1200.

⁴ Compare Bigges's map (pp. 54-5) with the Spanish map of later date reproduced opposite p. xlv. I have not discovered Corbett's authority for his assertion that Drake went in by Boca Chica (*op. cit.*, II, pp. 45-6). Bigges seems to say rather plainly that the English entered by the harbour mouth which 'lay some three miles toward the Westward of the towne', i.e., by Boca Grande. Spanish documents express no 'astonishment' at the manoeuvres. In his deposition Don Pedro Vique says distinctly that the enemy entered by Boca Grande, as does Document No. 30, enclosure.

⁵ Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 116. See Document No. 27 *post*, Martín González's deposition, or a seaman's discussion of the importance of so entering.

all.¹ Late on Wednesday night, possibly because Don Pedro Vique was furnishing no men from the galleys, Captain Alonso Bravo and his company were called up from another part of the defences² and ordered to hold this unprotected portion of the Caleta pass. A half dozen wine butts were rolled up, behind which the men were to find what shelter they might, and these they filled as best they could, scooping up loose sand with their hands.

About ten o'clock on Wednesday night scouts sent toward Hicacos Point reported that the enemy was landing, but the truth of this report was questioned. Horsemen sent thither a little before midnight to discover the fact came back with assurance that all was quiet. Governor Fernández de Busto may have inferred that nothing would occur before the next day when, evidently, it was expected that Drake would demand the city's surrender and by such parley give ample notice of his intentions.³ In any event, the governor seems to have gone to sleep in his hammock on the beach and it is probable that a good many of his soldiers made the most of the opportunity to slip away from the posts they had been occupying since very early afternoon, if only, like Don Pedro Vique, to get 'a bite' to eat.

The governor had ordered⁴ a very considerable body of Spaniards and Indians forward to lay an ambushade on the way the enemy must follow if he advanced by the Caleta. They were to let the English pass and then fall upon their rear, thereby distracting and disorganizing them. This meant, obviously, that they must allow their own retreat to be cut off. Instead, as the enemy approached they retired. This defection was serious—a bad beginning indeed, as Don Pedro Vique remarked.⁵ The English claim⁶ to have met a hundred horsemen in the bush through which they made their way with difficulty, following an incompetent guide. These horsemen, falling back, or other scouts who had been sent out, brought to the main body of the defence at the Caleta the news that the enemy was indeed surely coming on.

¹ Special Judge Hidalgo Montemayor measured these distances, and they were set down in the records of his proceedings, *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fé 89. See also Document No. 27 *post*, Liranzo's and Bravo's depositions. In document No. 28 Hidalgo Montemayor misstates the uncovered distance—if his own official figures are correct.

² The Canapote fortification, east, on the beach. Cf. Document No. 27 *post*, Ball-esteros' deposition.

³ Document No. 30 *post*, enclosure. ⁴ Documents Nos. 22 and 30 *post*, enclosure.

⁵ Cf. Document No. 27 *post*, his deposition and Martin González's, and No. 30, enclosure.

⁶ Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

A signal shot was fired. Don Pedro Vique hurried back from the fort where he had gone to encourage its captain and men with heartening words, of which he seems to have been prodigal. As he passed astern of the galleys he ordered them to their position, bows on, at the Caleta. There, what men had not slipped away under cover of darkness stood at their posts.

Drake had set ashore perhaps 1000 men under Carleill at Hicacos Point. In boats, under Vice-Admiral Martin Frobisher, he had sent another party toward the fort and the entrance to the inner haven which was guarded by that blockhouse and a locked chain that had been swung across the channel. Whether this was a feint¹ to draw attention from the true attack at the Caleta or an attempt to occupy the inner haven, seize the bridge and so, practically, to surround the city, the Spanish documents in any event bear out the *Primrose* log's description of it as a lively engagement from which, discouraged by the fort's artillery² and the chain, Frobisher saw fit to retire, somewhat damaged. The English may have made a second attempt³ to force an entrance to the inner haven. It would seem that the enemy was still firing upon the fort when day broke and its warden was able to see that the men at the Caleta and the galleys had not come off as well as he.

Following the sea-wash (after some uncertainty under a poor guide), Carleill's column had pressed on through the black night. Sampson and Goring led the forlorn, Sergeant Major⁴ Powell the main-battle, and Captain Morgan brought up the rear.⁵ Of this formation⁶ the Spaniards could see little but the enemy's lighted match, for not a glimmer of dawn had as yet relieved the murkiness of that third watch.

The galley *Ocasion* fired, artillery and small shot, aiming at the

¹ Cf. Bigges, *Discourse*, p. 117; the *Primrose* log, pp. 18 and 19; and Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 46, note 1. Cf. Document No. 27 *post*, Mexia Mirabal's deposition; and Documents Nos. 21, etc., 29, etc.

² 'They had planted 16 pieces against us in the castle.'—The *Primrose* log, p. 19. This tallies exactly with Captain Mexia Mirabal's statement in his deposition, Document No. 27 *post*.

³ Documents Nos. 27 *post*, Mexia Mirabal's deposition; No. 28.

⁴ These Spanish documents refer repeatedly to the English *sargento mayor* (cf. Captain Bravo's deposition, Document No. 27 *post*), but the editor inclines to believe that the talkative English officer they mean was Carleill rather than Powell. Cf. Documents Nos. 30, enclosure, and 57. Frobisher was the Spaniards' other good informant: cf. Documents Nos. 27, Vique's deposition, and 30, enclosure.

⁵ Bigges, *Discourse*, p. 119–20.

⁶ The English square formation is repeatedly called their 'squadron' in the pertinent documents appended. Cf. Corbett, *op. cit.*, I, p. 42, n. 3.

lighted match. From behind the protection of their masonry wall and wine butts the Spaniards in the trenches fired their ordnance, arquebuses and muskets. The flag-galley fired as her sister ship had done, ordnance and small shot. In the glare of the artillery the enemy was seen to hesitate. But Carleill had kept his men near the sea's edge as he felt his way forward. It is possible that, to avoid the poisoned stakes which they knew had been set out, the English advanced actually wading through the water.¹ In any event, the Spanish fire went high. Carleill's picked forlorn now discovered the vulnerable breach in the Spanish work. Where the masonry wall ended in hastily placed wine butts he made his assault with good long English pikes, and here he encountered Captain Alonso Bravo and his men, with whom the English closed.

Now was there shouting, invocation of patron saints, exchange of insults, and the clash of steel. The English main-battle, ordered to come on, advanced yelling. The Spaniards answered with their classic war-cry of '*Santiago y cierra España!*' To which Don Pedro Vique added the further encouragement: 'They are heretics and few!' Captain Bravo was heard to shout: 'Here, soldiers! Here, lancers!' And again, 'Here, Spaniards!' When his superior called for Spaniards Cosme de la Sal,² ensign of Bravo's company leaped forward with his flag in one hand, his sword in the other, and there Carleill himself slew him as he fought 'very manfully to his life's end.'

Then a voice was heard crying, in Spanish: 'Retire, gentlemen, for we are lost!' Whether this was Captain Bravo's or not, seems not to be proven.³ In any event, it was heard; and heeded. Those who had not heeded it immediately found themselves presently alone at the Caleta. No efforts which Governor Fernández de Busto, Don Pedro Vique and lesser men there may have made or failed to make sufficed to check the rout which followed as, 'with pikes roundly together', the English broke through the Caleta at its weakest point.

¹ Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 119; p. liv *post*, n. 2. Castellanos, *op. cit.*, says (p. 175, cf. p. 184) that the English captured two negroes who warned them of the poisoned stakes. Cf. Document No. 30 *post*, enclosure.

² Or De la Sala or De las Alas? Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 118. See also *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fé 89, papers of his widow, Juana de Miranda, who assembled evidence of the manner of his death; cf. Document No. 27 *post*, depositions of Lirango Ariza and Alonso Bravo.

³ Bartólome Lopez accuses Bravo in defending himself against Lodeña's charges against him, in *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fé 89. It was alleged that Bravo was responsible for the loss of Cartagena because he went forward of the wine butts instead of remaining behind what shelter they afforded. He seems to admit that he did this, in his deposition in Document No. 27 *post*.

Untrained, inadequately armed¹ and very poorly commanded, the Spaniards ran for the shelter of their city.

Neck and neck with them, or sometimes a little ahead, ran the English. Dense darkness still enveloped all alike, making it impossible to distinguish friend from foe. English and Spanish together fell in and out of the trenches upon the beach and near the Dominican monastery. Many a curious incident occurred.²

Neither in these trenches, where it was hoped that in just such a crisis they would halt and re-form, did Cartagena's defenders make any creditable stand. They ran their best into the town and through it and out upon the other side, by the San Francisco bridge leading to the open country.³

Captain Martin Polo, on duty on the swamp road, and the horse which the governor had sent down to him,⁴ heard the noise of the battle at the Caleta and hastened back to the city, only to meet the panic-stricken mob which poured over that bridge. With a dozen or so men at his back—all that remained of his company—Captain Polo rode in and exchanged some shots with the enemy.⁵

The English were now in possession of the market-place, where they were cheering Saint George. They moved to cut Captain Polo off from the bridge, whereupon he made his way back to it and it may for a moment have seemed that the Spaniards might rally there, for some hundreds of them, including the governor and Don Pedro Vique, had paused at the Franciscan monastery. Paused, but apparently these officers made no real attempt to exercise command. Instead, ignoring demands for orders, they gathered up their horses' reins and rode away from Cartagena.

Don Pedro Vique had had time to send an order to the galleys to make their way out of the inner harbour and down the lagoon to

¹ 'Our pikes were somewhat longer than theirs, and our bodies better armed; for very few of them were armed: with which advantage our swordes and pikes grew too hard for them, and they were driven to give place.'—Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 118. Castellanos, *op. cit.*, p. 189, mentions that the English pikes were long. Cf. Document No. 27 *post*, Francisco de Avila's deposition.

² See Bravo's, Liranço Ariza's and Agustin's depositions in Document No. 27 *post*. The latter two would be difficult to surpass in *naïveté*. See also Document No. 22 *post* and Castellanos, *op. cit.*, pp. 194 *et seq.*

³ Document No. 27, *post*, Daça's deposition.

⁴ Note that the governor thought he saw lights at sea as the English approached the Caleta, which suggested that still more enemy troops were being landed upon the city's beach; therefore he sent the horse to reconnoitre just before the enemy attack at Caleta. Cf. Documents Nos. 22, 27, Francisco de Alba's deposition and Mexia Mirabal's; 29, 30 enclosure.

⁵ '... we wanne the Market-place, albeit they made head, and fought a while before we got it...'—Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

Boca Chica, where he said that he would rejoin them, riding down by land. As they were steering for Boqueron channel, where Captain Mexia Mirabal was from the fort signalling them to draw alongside to his support against the English artillery fire still battering him from the outer harbour, it seems that their crews mutinied. On board the *Ocasión* a barrel of powder was accidentally set afire. The slaves were unchained, and leaped overboard.¹ The captain of the flag-galley heard a voice urging him to go to the support of Captain Martin Polo at the bridge. In consequence, and amidst the greatest disorder, the galleys ran aground at Jesamani and their convict- and slave-rowers fled into the country where, as had been the case at Santo Domingo, their lawlessness added to the existing confusion. And that night these vessels were burned by Don Pedro Vique's order.

The fort held out all Thursday, under fire, its captain claims, both from the enemy in the city, where the English turned upon him Spanish guns captured at the Caleta,² and also from their ships in the lagoon which continued to play their artillery upon the block-house. His garrison diminished by desertion and possibly lacking munitions, Captain Mexia Mirabal demanded reinforcements. Since he could not furnish these and to hold the place longer was a useless gesture, the governor ordered the evacuation of the block-house.³

Sullen in their discomfiture, the governor, Don Pedro Vique, other officers and citizens withdrew to the Indian village of Turbaco, to their estates, to nearby villages, or even returned presently to the city. Drake was undisputed master there. English leadership won and held the place.

Discreditable as the defence they offered may have been to the Spaniards, thereby despoiling the English victory over them of the glory which enhances a hard fight, that victory was nevertheless a very considerable achievement to Drake's credit. By sheer audacity, military skill, organization and courage, he had taken the most important city upon the Spanish Main—a place strong in itself, duly warned, and sufficiently manned and armed to have enabled

¹ 'And the slaves and Spaniards in the galleys fell together by the ears, so that the Spaniards killed many of their slaves, and some they took with them, and very many of them did swim to us . . .'—The *Primrose* log, p. 20. Cf. Documents Nos. 24, 27, Martín González's deposition, 28, *post*. See Castellanos, *op. cit.*, pp. 195 *et seq.*

² Document No. 27 *post*, Mexia Mirabal's and Cueva's depositions.

³ 'The Spaniards kept their castle still, yet at last on a sudden fled away.'—The *Primrose* log, p. 20.

it to render a far better account of itself than it did.¹ The Spanish loss was seven or eight killed; the English, about 29, most of whom seem to have met death not at the Caleta (where the Spanish fire went high), but in the city during the fighting in the streets after daybreak on Thursday morning.²

Here, as at Santo Domingo, Drake occupied the principal square and made himself safe against any possible attempt on the Spaniards' part to retake the town.³ He brought his fleet closer in, now occupying in the outer harbour the anchorage where His Catholic Majesty's armada was wont to lie when in that port. He proceeded to careen some of his ships.

Because the people had had warning, which enabled them to remove their treasure, merchandise and chattels from the city, the sack of Cartagena yielded Drake little booty although his thorough search eventually discovered much of the bulkier sorts of merchandise (soap, oil, wines, etc.) which had been hidden because they could not be removed.

Negotiations⁴ for the ransom of the city began early—as early as the day after the English occupied it, when a citizen named Tristan de Orive approached Drake in the matter. Apparently the Englishman insisted⁵ that the governor and Bishop fray don Juan de

¹ *A. de I.*, 72–3–6, Santa Fé 1, Document No. 72, the Council for Indies to His Majesty, an arraignment of Vique and Busto. Both were in prison near San Lucar in Spain before the end of 1587. Cf. Dr. Bujada to the Crown, Sevilla, December 11, 1587, in the same *legajo*.

² '... they galled many of our men in the town.'—The *Primrose* log, p. 20.

³ '... at the entring (of the city) ... was some little resistance, but soone overcome it was, with few slaine or hurt. They had joynd with them many Indians, whom they had placed in corners of advantage, all bowmen, with their arrowes most villainously empoysoned, so as if they did but breake the skinne, the partie so touched died without great marvell ...' (Cf. Document No. 27 *post*, Vique's deposition.) '... some they slew of our people with their arrowes; some they likewise mischieved to death with certaine pricks of small sticks sharply pointed, of a foote and a halfe long, the one end put into the grounde, the other empoysoned, sticking fast up, right against our coming in the way, as we should approach from our landing towards the towne, whereof they had planted a wonderfull number in the ordinarie way: but our keeping the sea-wash missed the greatest part of them very happily.'—Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 119. Cf. Documents Nos. 27, Bravo's deposition; No. 23 *post*.

⁴ 'We fortified this town of our fashion, and planted their own ordnance against them.'—The *Primrose* log, p. 20. Cf. Documents Nos. 22 and 23 *post*.

⁵ Concerning these negotiations see especially Documents Nos. 27, Francisco de Avila's and the royal officials' depositions; 21, 31; and González Palencia, *op. cit.*, pp. 331–2. Cf. Bigges, *op. cit.*, pp. 125–6. See Documents Nos. 29 and 30, enclosure, for statement that the English made the first move—a message sent by a man described as a trumpeter or again an artilleryman.

⁶ Documents Nos. 21, 27 *post*, Francisco de Avila's deposition.

Montalvo should act for the Spanish, i.e., their highest officers. He issued a safe-conduct to these gentlemen who, despite Don Pedro Vique's indignant protests, went into the city to treat with the enemy in his camp. They went accompanied by a considerable retinue and we may safely assume that Drake extended to them an impressive hospitality at the headquarters he had established in the handsomest house in the city, which was his prisoner's—Captain Alonso Bravo's—residence.¹

The Spaniards offered 25,000 ducats for the city, a sum which Drake spurned. He said that the empty shell of the place had cost him blood and he at first refused to consider less than 500,000 in fine gold. Angered to see himself called a pirate in the royal despatches which he found lying open upon the governor's table² where the governor had dropped them when the enemy fleet was sighted, Drake's manner seems to have aroused the bishop to protest at his remarks concerning the Catholic Majesty of Spain and the *grandes*³ of Castile. In any event, the ecclesiastical dignity was ruffled and the bishop presently advised against paying the enemy any ransom at all. The governor continued to negotiate but, failing to arrive at an agreement, after about a week withdrew on the ground that he had no authority to negotiate. One infers that he feared to proceed in the face of the bishop's and Don Pedro Vique's opposition.

Don Pedro Vique claims that he besought the governor to bring up men from Turbaco and join him and his in a night attack upon the enemy in the city; but declares that the most he accomplished was to move Busto to lead some 200 in that direction, to a place from which they watched Don Pedro and a few friends ride closer and exchange shots with the English, whose accounts of this matter agree with his that he accomplished nothing,⁴ The truth was that the Spaniards did not desire to anger the enemy lest he should destroy their houses.

To hasten the negotiations for the ransom to a satisfactory con-

¹ It was Captain Goring, commanding the pikes of the forlorn, who captured Captain Bravo. Cf. Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 119, with the Spaniard's own lively account of the matter contained in his deposition in Document No. 27 *post*.

² Document No. 29 *post*.

³ Castellanos, *op. cit.*, pp. 208 *et seq.* Cf. González Palencia's edition, pp. xlvi, 276 (194). The word used, *corsario*, was losing its original meaning (of experienced seaman, i.e., cruiser) and acquiring that of pirate, to which Drake objected. And so did Sir Richard Hawkins; cf. his *Observations*, cited, p. 318.

⁴ 'All the while we were in this town the Spaniards gave us no fight, but they threatened us, showing themselves some times an hundred and two hundred in a troop, and shot at us, but soon would run away.'—The *Primrose* log, p. 21. Cf. Document No. 27 *post*, Vique's deposition.

clusion, after due notice Drake commenced to burn and raze,¹ beginning the destruction with the least valuable structures² on the outskirts of the town. The Spaniards offered him 30,000 ducats and he burned some of the better houses. He threatened to blow up the whole place unless it were promptly redeemed and brought out bombs with which to do it.³ The people appealed⁴ to the governor and to the bishop to permit them to act for themselves; the governor consented and the bishop gave it as his opinion that they might in good conscience so proceed. Through their emissaries the citizens proffered 80,000 ducats, then 100,000 which sums Drake declined.⁵

At this juncture three arches of the new cathedral fell in. The Spaniards assumed that Drake had wantonly damaged the structure, but the *Primrose* log states that it was the concussion following upon the firing of a large piece of artillery which brought the edifice down. Be that as it may, the damage done effected the negotiations and Drake now accepted 110,000 ducats for what remained of the city, a sum he reduced to 107,000 in bullion rather than accept 12,000 ducats in jewels, etc.⁶ He had burned and demolished the buildings covering the greater part of the city's area, but not the most or the best of its edifices, for he had not yet touched the central portion. Many of the houses still standing were damaged—windows and doors broken in. In addition to the cathedral, the Augustinian and Dominican monasteries had suffered.⁷

To raise the required sum the citizens had recourse to His Majesty's revenues, which were 'loaned' to them, and to other deposits. They obligated themselves to repay, and it was estimated that every man whose property was spared became liable for about one-fourth of its value. Further, Drake required 6,000 ducats from

¹ Document No. 29 *post*.

² 'This towne of Cartagena we touched in the out parts, & consumed much with fire . . .'—Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

³ Document No. 23 *post*. Cf. Tristan de Orive's deposition in Juana de Miranda's papers in *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fé 89.

⁴ The city's procurator so petitioned on March 19; the governor acceded next day. Cf. Juan de Miranda's papers in *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fé 89. It was specified that they must include the cathedral, hospital, monasteries and government house in any arrangement made.

⁵ Cf. Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 123, for the recommendation of a council of war that the Spaniard's offer be accepted. Evidently dissatisfaction among Drake's men was serious.

⁶ ' . . . the Ducat valued at five shillings six pence sterling.'—Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 125. Cf. especially Documents Nos. 23, 27 *post*, depositions of the royal officials and Captain Bravo.

⁷ Document No. 27 *post*, Ballesteros' deposition and (omitted) Special Judge Hidalgo Montemayor's brief official statement of the damage done.

Captain Alonso Bravo, for his release and ransom of his own and relatives' real estate, but remitted 1000 which would have fallen to him as his personal share, exacting payment of 5000 ducats only. He obtained further amounts from their masters for the return of slaves who had gone over to the English, or been seized; and, similarly, for any merchandise, furniture and the like, held by him which the owners or others were willing and able to buy back. He refused to ransom any of the artillery¹ and carried it all away. Further, he affected to consider the Franciscan monastery² and the fort at Boqueron, and a certain farm on Carey island, to be not included in the general agreement, and for the Franciscan house obtained a considerable sum of money. The Franciscan church he spared as a graceful courtesy to his prisoner, Captain Bravo, whose wife's very recent burial there Drake himself had attended. After blowing up the blockhouse he withdrew to his ships; and departed from the harbour on April 10, leaving Cartagena utterly defenceless, poor, humiliated and discouraged.

Four days later the English reappeared, brought back because the best vessel (Corço's) they had taken at Santo Domingo was leaking badly. Although as he approached Drake sent word ahead that no harm was intended, the people of Cartagena were nevertheless much alarmed. Evidently Drake unloaded and burned this now unseaworthy ship, shifted his cargoes about, baked bread and otherwise prepared himself for the long voyage before him. He left the city finally on April 24.

At Cartagena there had been disagreement among the English officers.³ Although three important cities had fallen—Santiago in the Cape Verde Islands, Santo Domingo and Cartagena—the booty so far obtained was much less than the English had anticipated in their overestimation of 'the wealth of the Indies'. Sickness had depleted their ranks.⁴ It must have been very evident that they were in no

¹ Cf. Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

² *Ibid.*, Bravo's deposition, and Document No. 24 *post*.

³ Bigges, *op. cit.*, pp. 121 *et seq.* Cf. Document No. 27 *post*, Vique's and Bravo's depositions, and note especially the remarks attributed to Frobisher; Documents Nos. 22, 28, 29, 30.

⁴ Document No. 27 *post*, Bravo's deposition; Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 120; the *Primrose* log, pp. 14, 21. See *A. de I.*, 72-5-21, Santa Fé 92, papers of Antonio de Barrios (1594) for his statement (question No. 7) that he poisoned the drinking water of Cartagena at the time of Drake's occupation. Barrios' account of his share in happenings there at that time, made eight years later and in demand of preferment, do not ring true; but that he made this claim and summoned witnesses to prove that Drake desired his capture or death because he had poisoned the water, is at least interesting. The editor has seen no other mention of any such poisoning.

condition to undertake much more; and that anything more they might then undertake would not yield the profit for which they had hoped. In a council of war it was decided that no attempt to hold Cartagena should be made.

For evacuating the city Drake was gravely criticized. To a student of Spanish papers it must seem that he could not in reason have done otherwise. The physical condition of his men justified withdrawal. Had he undertaken to remain, despite that 'liberal tendency' which moved Spanish colonials to do good business with 'heretic lutherans' when they could, to a man they would nevertheless have turned upon him at first sight of His Catholic Majesty's armada, such was their certainty that its arrival must accomplish the enemy's complete undoing. It does not seem possible that so far from home England could have sustained a naval station on the Main, or anywhere in the Caribbean, against the hostility of the land (which was very deep and real, despite the colonists' willingness to trade) and against Spain's opposition on the sea, once she saw fit to exert her seapower (as she had not yet done at any time in America).

In any event, not only did the English abandon Cartagena, but also Drake admitted before he left that he was deferring until a more propitious occasion¹ that attack upon the Isthmus for which the Spaniards understood that he had come prepared with² presents for his black allies, the *cimarrones*, and with pinnaces in sections,³ ready for easy portage to the Pacific Ocean.⁴ He steered for Cape San Antonio, where he sought firewood and fresh water.

Apparently the English were not too happy as they lay off that western end of Cuba. Potable water was not easy to find. Seemingly they could not make Puercos River, where it was to be had in plenty. Many were sick. Estimates of Drake's strength at this point vary from 1200 to fewer than 500 sound men in the fleet. Their morale must have been affected by the continuous heavy mortality among them and the comparative failure of the expedition, which was now obvious to all. Bigges relates that Drake exerted himself to hearten his men by his presence and by his example; and it is curious to observe that his spirit did not pass unobserved by the Spanish whom he held prisoners.⁵

At San Anton a council of war was held. If Drake had not

¹ Document No. 22 *post*. ² Documents Nos. 22, 23, *post*.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 49, enclosure.

⁴ It is possible that Drake actually expected to seize 'incalculable riches' at Pearl Island. Cf. *Spanish Calendar, 1587-1603*, No. 20, pp. 18 *et seq.*

⁵ Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 55; cf. Document No. 55 *post*, enclosure No. 2.

previously abandoned all intention to attempt Havana or to lie in wait for the New Spain fleet, which he surely must have known would remain at Vera Cruz, being duly warned of his presence, it is certain that he did so now, in this council, when, it would appear, the resolution was reached, or confirmed, to continue upon a course for home by way of Virginia. Extra artillery was stowed below decks.

Documents referring to the passage of the English fleet round the west end and along the northern coast of Cuba are very numerous at Seville. From among them Nos. 35-38, 40 and 41 have been selected for presentation.¹

No. 35 is a deposition made at Havana on June 26, 1586, by an Aragonese seaman whom the English captured off Cartagena. He escaped from them at San Anton and brought to Havana the most direct and interesting information the authorities there obtained concerning Drake. This person must have made another, probably earlier deposition, a summary of which constitutes enclosure No. 2 with Document No. 55. Although it is difficult to give much credence to a man who asserted that Drake was a Portuguese well known to possess a familiar spirit,² nevertheless it is interesting to note what this seaman had to say concerning the council of war held off San Anton, Drake's address to his prisoners, presumably especially to his Moorish prisoners (his assurance that he would return them to their own country),³ and his fear that news of a Spanish attack on England might be awaiting him in Virginia.

Nos. 36, 37, 40 and 41 are despatches from various officials at Havana to the Crown and the House of Trade, each from his own point of view telling the story of Drake's appearance and disappearance. Even more graphic and illuminating is No. 38, written by an eminent and outspoken citizen named Suarez de Toledo who, in passing, describes Virginia as he and Pedro Menéndez saw that region.

These documents, and many others which were consulted, relate that the first of the English vessels were sighted from the Morro (headland) of Havana at about three o'clock on the afternoon of May 29th. They were swift pinnaces chasing a ship which was coming up from Campeche laden with dyewood. She made Havana harbour, and a shot from the Morro and another from the Punta turned her pursuers backs.

¹ Compare throughout with Bigges and the *Primrose* log.

² '... muchos dan por testimonio que deve de tener algun demonio.'—Castellanos, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

³ Cf. *Papers relating to the Navy*, p. 95, n. 2; Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 62-3; 147, n. 1.

For months¹ the whole island of Cuba had been up in arms. To the defence of Havana troops had assembled from every settlement; powder and arms had come from Seville; and reinforcements had arrived from Mexico. Defensive works had been constructed to supplement the city's fortifications and on May 30, when Drake sailed by, a much greater force than he had encountered at Cartagena stood ready 'to take the covetousness out of him'. The weather was propitious² but the English made no attempt to land.

Instead, Drake anchored off Bucaranao³ where, apparently, his object was to obtain water. Once his pinnaces seemed to threaten Havana. By June 4 he had disappeared and, as Governor Luxan put it, these coasts rested from their unpleasant expectancy. There remained, however, much fear lest the enemy linger in Florida, i.e., upon the Atlantic coast of North America, thence at his leisure to sally in the spring to continue his depredations among the Antilles and along the Main. On June 6 Drake appeared off Saint Augustine.

From among papers at Seville bearing upon his visitation there, Documents Nos. 32, 33, 43-8, 51-5, have been selected for inclusion in this present volume.⁴ Nos. 32, 33, 43, 47, 48, 51, 52 and 54 are accounts of the matter furnished to the Crown and to the House of Trade by participants and eye-witnesses: the governor, the royal officials of Saint Augustine, two soldiers and a seaman. Nos. 44, 45, 46 and 53 are versions added by the governor, the warden and the accountant of Havana, and by that loquacious private citizen, Alonso Suarez de Toledo, whose opinion of Florida (including 'Virginia') was low. No. 55 is a vivid picture of conditions at sea at the moment. They surely required that every trusted advice-ship's master be a discreet hero and a wily diplomat, quick to run and resourceful in ruse and negotiation.

Governor Pedro Menéndez Marqués of Florida had been warned. He had hastily built a timber fort⁵ on an islet in a position to com-


¹ *A. de I.*, 42-1-8/3, Contratación 5108, Fernández de Quiñones to the House of Trade, from Havana, February 3, 1586.

² Cf. *Papers relating to the Navy*, p. 24; Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 54. See Documents Nos. 37 and 41 *post*.

³ These Spanish documents show that Drake did not call at Matanzas. Compare Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 54, with Documents Nos. 36, 38, etc.

⁴ Compare throughout with Bigges's *Discourse* and the *Primrose* log.

⁵ Fort San Juan del Pinillo. '... we found it built all of timber, the walles being none other but whole Mastes or bodies of trees set up right and close together in maner of a pale, without any ditch yet made, but wholly intended with some more time; for they had not yet finished al their worke, having begunne the same some three or four moneths before: so as, to say the truth, they had no reason to keepe it, being subject both to fire, and easie assault.'—Bigges, *Discourse*, p. 130.



mand the channel by which vessels must enter to reach the town of Saint Augustine, and especially the bar which they must cross to do so. When the look-outs he kept posted for the purpose signalled that sails were approaching, Menéndez Marquéz went into this fort with the men he had detailed to its defence. Meanwhile, the women and children and chattels were conveyed some distance to a place where supposedly they were safe.

Early on June 7 the English fleet, lying in a half moon off the bar, sent small craft to explore it.¹ Menéndez Marquéz's artillery fired upon them and the governor believed that his show of resistance drove them back to their ships. In any event, that afternoon the English landed men in formidable numbers, but necessarily at a disadvantage in that they must still cross water to get at the town.² Again the Spanish guns seem to have discouraged them, so that they took shelter behind some sand dunes and apparently sent to the fleet for reinforcements and ordnance, a shot from which brought down the Spanish ensign. Since martial music was heard the Spaniards understood that the commander-in-chief himself had come ashore.³

That night, Carleill, directing land operations, sent to reconnoitre the Spanish fort. Inside it, the governor held a council of war and forthwith evacuated, carrying out only his colours and his arms. His attempt to save his artillery⁴ by burying it was betrayed by deserters who informed the English that the garrison had gone.

The Spaniards' withdrawal should not be too harshly condemned.⁵ Apparently it was hastened by the attitude of the aborigines, who began to sack the town as soon as the English opened their attack upon the fort. The Indians' hostility made it evident that the non-combatants in their retreat were not safe from the tomahawk and the scalping-knife. The governor and his garrison of 60 or 70 men joined the women and the children to protect them. The English occupied the fort that same night and the next day made their way to the town, which they entered without meeting any resistance worthy the name.

¹ ' . . . none amongst us had any knowledge thereof at all.'—Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

² Cf. Bigges's plan, reproduced herewith, between pp. 166–7.

³ Documents Nos. 43, 51 *post*; the *Primrose* log, p. 24. ' . . . Here the Generall tooke occasion to march with the companies himselve in person, the Lieutenant generall having the Vantguard . . .'—Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

⁴ Falcons. Documents Nos. 43, 44 *post*. Cf. Bigges, *op. cit.*, pp. 129, 130.

⁵ ' . . . like faint-hearted cowards they ran away.'—The *Primrose* log, p. 24. Documents Nos. 32, 43–5, 54, etc., *post*. Cf. Bigges, *op. cit.*, pp. 129–31.

The English remained in possession of Saint Augustine¹ about a week. When they left they burned it and the new fort and destroyed the gardens, orchards and maize-fields in its vicinity. Here there was no talk of ransom. Carleill had advanced with red flags flying, which meant no quarter. Indeed, the people could have paid no ransom. Drake obtained all that he could possibly have wrested from them when in the fort he took His Majesty's strong-box² containing some 6000 ducats. He obtained also a dozen pieces of artillery and what munitions there were. At no other place he touched did he leave such utter desolation behind him. Presumably Santa Elena, a more northerly military outpost, escaped similar treatment at Drake's hands only because he could not find it (so the Spaniards believed) or, locating it, dared not attempt the dangerous entrance to its harbour.³

That Drake called at Saint Augustine and looked for Santa Elena toward the end of a voyage when his strength was low and his desire to get home must have been keen, would seem to suggest that what he sought and obtained in Florida was some refreshment, the opportunity to calk at least one vessel, occasion to humiliate⁴ Pedro Menéndez's carnal and political heir, and, in ruthlessly destroying his establishment, to cripple and unfit him to assume an aggressive attitude toward the English settlement in Virginia. The Spaniards observed that the enemy did not destroy the Indians' village close by the Spanish town of Saint Augustine, but, on the contrary, sought to gain their friendship.⁵

The English called at Oristan, for wood and water, and the concluding paragraphs of the *Primrose* log⁶ suggest that they suspected the Indians there of planning to attack them treacherously. From

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⁴ Cf. Document No. 48 *post*, for the governor's own statement that the English seemed to show particular animosity against him. Preeminently a seaman, Menéndez Marquéz had been sent to govern Florida because a strong and competent man was needed in a crisis which had arisen there.

⁵ 'There was nine of the savages set up a flag of truce about two miles from the town, which our men found and carried them to another.'—The *Primrose* log, p. 25. Cf. Document No. 54 *post*.

⁶ See p. 26. There seems to be something omitted in the first paragraph between the words 'garrison' and 'and there we understood.'

that point they proceeded to Roanoke, where Lane's settlement was struggling to maintain its existence.

Because Drake had carried away negroes whom he could not hold as slaves in his own country, and small craft unsuitable to the Atlantic crossing, and agricultural implements of all sorts, the Spaniards considered it certain that he meant to establish a permanent settlement in the Indies¹ or to strengthen one already established in the region which they called Jacan.²

As Drake lay off Roanoke island proffering Lane what support he might desire, a storm³ blew up, drove certain of his vessels ashore wrecked Lane's supply ship, and so disheartened the colonists that they decided, in panic, to return to England on board the ships of Drake's fleet. If to strengthen the Virginia establishment that it might serve as a base for further enterprizes was indeed a part, perhaps a very important part, of Drake's general scheme, then here at the end, as at the commencement, of his voyage Drake failed, although by no fault of his in this instance, certainly. He set sail from Roanoke in mid-June, 1586.

Hardly was he out of sight before a supply ship arrived which Raleigh had sent out with relief.⁴ Finding Roanoke deserted, it returned to England. In mid-August Sir Richard Grenville came up, as he had promised to do, with further support.

Where the English establishment had been Grenville found only an empty fort and two corpses, hanging. From an Indian prisoner he learned⁵ that Drake had taken the settlers home. Unaware that it had been decided to abandon Roanoke in favour of Chesapeake Bay, Grenville left there fifteen or eighteen men with provisions for two years, and sailed away.

Document No. 65 *post* throws considerable new light upon this voyage. The best English source for the history of it⁶ has nothing to

¹ Documents Nos. 44, 46, 53, 54, 59 *post*.

² Cf. Documents Nos. 52, 61 *post*. ' . . they have settled on the Florida coast, as we have previously reported and advised His Majesty and your lordship. By way of Florida it has been learned that they are settled in the Xacan . . .'—Luxan and Quiñones to the House of Trade, Havana, no date (end of 1585 or first half of 1586), in *A. de I.*, 42-1-8/3, Contratación 5108.

³ The *Primrose* log, p. 27; Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 133; Lane's Account, *Principal Navigations*, viii, pp. 344-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 347.

⁵ Cf. Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 234, for statement that Grenville 'cannot have known at this time that it was Drake who had taken off the colony . . .'

⁶ *The third voyage made by a ship sent in the yeere 1586, to the reliefe of the Colony planted in Virginia, at the sole charges of Sir Walter Raleigh*, in *Principal Navigations*, viii, pp. 346-8.

say of Grenville's adventures off Finisterre, of his unsuccessful attempt on Porto Santo, of his recrossing of the Atlantic to Newfoundland or his return to the Azores. There he evidently did procure some booty, but not enough to 'make' this voyage as the prize taken off Bermuda in 1585 had 'made' the preceding. Doubtless these 'exploits done by him in this voyage, as well outward as homeward¹ were too far below anticipation to merit recording. He reached England late in December, 1586.²

Drake had reached Portsmouth at the end of July. According to contemporary judgment his expedition had been very far indeed from 'a triumphant success'.³ If triumph is achievement of objective, he had failed. He had gone out to get treasure. In enormous quantity on board the Mainland fleet it had eluded him in October, 1585, at the outset of his voyage. At Santo Domingo and at Cartagena he had obtained something, to be sure; but the accounts⁴ of the proceeds of the undertaking show that if it paid a dividend of fifteen shillings in the pound Drake and his officers were left largely out of pocket. The plunder in ordnance was indeed considerable. The damage done in destruction of fortifications was little: a blockhouse spoiled at Cartagena, a timber fort burned at Saint Augustine, a frontier post at Santa Elena abandoned. The fact is there were as yet no fortifications in the Spanish Indies worthy the name. The loss of three galleys (one at Santo Domingo, two at Cartagena) was inconvenient, but not serious to Spain. These galleys were immediately replaced. Even the loss in shipping was comparatively small—at most a dozen traders of which only one (Corço's vessel) was of sufficient importance to occasion lamentation. The loss in stores at Cartagena was enough to be mentioned, for the English there helped themselves to supplies intended for the galleys and the galleons. Property loss in public edifices and private homes looted, damaged and destroyed was large. It seems to have been less at Santo Domingo than at Cartagena. As for Saint Augustine, the settlement was momentarily obliterated. Many an individual must have been left bankrupt. Certainly in all the Caribbean, in every island and on every coast, Drake spread in his wake humiliation, fear and poverty. 'Far more

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 348.

² Cf. Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

³ Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 58. See *Acts of the Privy Council* (New Series), xv, pp. 76-7, for statement that the voyage was not accomplished 'with so good successe as was hoped for'.

⁴ *Ibid.*; *Papers relating to the Navy*, pp. 85 *et seq.* Cf. *Acts of the Privy Council* (New Series), xvi, p. 63.

important', however, 'was the moral effect in Europe . . . ¹. For the moment Spanish credit was completely shattered.'²

Yet Drake had not succeeded in stopping the stream of Philip's American supply, for the homebound Mexican fleet under Don Juan de Guzman left San Juan de Ulua on July 12, 1586, and reached Havana on August 2, where its captain-general found stringent orders to stay. He disobeyed and with 30 sail from Mexico, Honduras and Santo Domingo left there after only nine days. He reached San Lucar on November 5, 1586, having lost seven vessels on the way, but by storm, not to enemies. He saved the bullion and some merchandise from all of them. This fleet brought safely home about two and a half millions in gold and silver, pearls, cochineal, hides, ginger, dyewood, indigo, sugar, etc. It is true that the larger revenues from the Main were delayed a year, but that they were so delayed was due in very large part, if not entirely, to conditions which advance news of Cavendish's enterprise had created in the Pacific.³ Meanwhile, Captain General Francisco de Novoa took out another Mexican fleet, which reached San Juan de Ulua at the end of September, 1586.⁴

Drake himself was not the man to be content with what he had accomplished. It is no wonder that he had little to say of an exploit which, while it may have filled all Europe with amazement, had profited him and his queen little in cash and nothing whatsoever in conquest or colonization.

In America, the immediate result of Drake's aggression was that, confessing his weakness even before he knew how thoroughly the Englishman had demonstrated it to all the world, Philip at last undertook to fortify his Indies to defend themselves. Hitherto he had relied upon his naval strength and never really exerted it to protect them. He had come to realize that it was unequal to the task even before Drake had advertised that fact.

The armada of Captain General Alvaro Flores had been despatched⁵ from Cadiz in Drake's wake, to bring home the plate. With it sailed Campmaster Juan de Texeda and Engineer Juan Bautista

¹ ' . . . the extraordinary impression the expedition made in Europe when a universal Spanish domination seemed inevitable.'—Corbett, in *Papers relating to the Navy*, p. xv.

² Corbett, *Successors of Drake*, II, p. 58.

³ Cf. *Spanish Calendar*, 1587-1603, pp. 258-60, No. 261, Mendoza to the Crown, Paris, April 5, 1588.

⁴ *A. de I.*, 143-3-17, Indiferente General 1098, the House of Trade to the Crown, Seville, March 3, 1587, etc., etc.

⁵ Cf. Document No. 49 *post*.

Antoneli. They had orders to prepare a comprehensive plan for the fortification of Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, Cartagena, the isthmus, San Juan de Ulua, Havana, and Florida. Great forts standing to this day express Texeda's opinion as to what was needed and Antoneli's idea of the forms it should take. In fine, just when Drake had shown his hold to be weak, Philip for the first time grasped his overseas possessions firmly.

No friend the Spanish colonies possessed had succeeded before him in accomplishing as much on their behalf as did 'the great corsair, Francis Drake.' 'Forts, artillery, garrisons, galleys . . . everything that his loyal subjects had in vain petitioned the Catholic King to provide, were forthcoming when instead of humble entreaties Philip heard among his islands, along his own coasts, the beat of Drake's drum and the roll of the guns of the Tudor navy.'¹ They ushered in other times. Philip II's life work was failing on finance. Not all the wealth America poured into Spain sufficed to support his great undertakings. Elizabeth forced him to spend largely on the Indies at a time when he was bankrupt and in desperate need—if he had had more money in the years after 1585 he might not have lost the Dutch provinces. Drake's raid was of immediate benefit to the Spanish colonials, and also played its part in ruining Spain. This was the end of a period.

There followed an interlude. The historian, to say nothing of his reader, finds himself sunk among multitudinous incidents. There is no major development to which to cling, as to a lifeline. English operations in the Caribbean and along the Main dropped to the level of petty thievery. There was no outstanding undertaking to dignify the whole. In consequence the corresponding documents hereto appended lack pattern. They are unconnected accounts of many separate incidents, similar in type, hard to distinguish one from another.

Individually unimportant, the privateers who prowled along the Indian trade routes which the fleets must follow, or dodged the galleys in and out of unfrequented harbours of the West Indies and the continents, nevertheless inflicted upon Spain an aggregate of enormous damage in these years (say 1587-1592). In their company, indeed entirely identified with them, it seems incongruous to discover revered colonial governors—the very founders of British empire in America. Out of this welter of more or less unimportant happenings the English were obtaining not only loot but also a colony in America; the United States were beginning; and the Spanish were building colonial fortifications and a navy.

¹ I. A. Wright, *The Early History of Cuba*, (New York, 1916), pp. 370-1.

mand the channel by which vessels must enter to reach the town of Saint Augustine, and especially the bar which they must cross to do so. When the look-outs he kept posted for the purpose signalled that sails were approaching, Menéndez Marqués went into this fort with the men he had detailed to its defence. Meanwhile, the women and children and chattels were conveyed some distance to a place where supposedly they were safe.

Early on June 7 the English fleet, lying in a half moon off the bar, sent small craft to explore it.¹ Menéndez Marqués's artillery fired upon them and the governor believed that his show of resistance drove them back to their ships. In any event, that afternoon the English landed men in formidable numbers, but necessarily at a disadvantage in that they must still cross water to get at the town.² Again the Spanish guns seem to have discouraged them, so that they took shelter behind some sand dunes and apparently sent to the fleet for reinforcements and ordnance, a shot from which brought down the Spanish ensign. Since martial music was heard the Spaniards understood that the commander-in-chief himself had come ashore.³

That night, Carleill, directing land operations, sent to reconnoitre the Spanish fort. Inside it, the governor held a council of war and forthwith evacuated, carrying out only his colours and his arms. His attempt to save his artillery⁴ by burying it was betrayed by deserters who informed the English that the garrison had gone.

The Spaniards' withdrawal should not be too harshly condemned.⁵ Apparently it was hastened by the attitude of the aborigines, who began to sack the town as soon as the English opened their attack upon the fort. The Indians' hostility made it evident that the non-combatants in their retreat were not safe from the tomahawk and the scalping-knife. The governor and his garrison of 60 or 70 men joined the women and the children to protect them. The English occupied the fort that same night and the next day made their way to the town, which they entered without meeting any resistance worthy the name.

¹ ' . . . none amongst us had any knowledge thereof at all.'—Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

² Cf. Bigges's plan, reproduced herewith, between pp. 166-7.

³ Documents Nos. 43, 51 *post*; the *Primrose* log, p. 24. ' . . . Here the Generall tooke occasion to march with the companies himselfe in person, the Lieutenant generall having the Vanguard . . .'—Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

⁴ Falcons. Documents Nos. 43, 44 *post*. Cf. Bigges, *op. cit.*, pp. 129, 130.

⁵ ' . . . like faint-hearted cowards they ran away.'—The *Primrose* log, p. 24. Documents Nos. 32, 43-5, 54, etc., *post*. Cf. Bigges, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-31.

The English remained in possession of Saint Augustine¹ about a week. When they left they burned it and the new fort and destroyed the gardens, orchards and maize-fields in its vicinity. Here there was no talk of ransom. Carleill had advanced with red flags flying, which meant no quarter. Indeed, the people could have paid no ransom. Drake obtained all that he could possibly have wrested from them when in the fort he took His Majesty's strong-box² containing some 6000 ducats. He obtained also a dozen pieces of artillery and what munitions there were. At no other place he touched did he leave such utter desolation behind him. Presumably Santa Elena, a more northerly military outpost, escaped similar treatment at Drake's hands only because he could not find it (so the Spaniards believed) or, locating it, dared not attempt the dangerous entrance to its harbour.³

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If one can see it as a great game which Elizabeth and Philip played, like chess, upon the Caribbean and the Atlantic, with merchant vessels laden with cochineal and indigo, dyewood and sugar, for pawns, then the Spanish knight moved forward against Drake's immediate successors was that fine and fortunate captain general of armadas named Alvaro Flores de Quiñones. As has been said, he sailed from Cadiz in the early spring of 1586 to bring home the plate menaced by Drake at sea. He spent the summer and winter of that year between Cartagena and Nombre de Dios. From the Main he sent reinforcements—men, artillery, munitions as he was able to provide them—to Havana (for that port and for Florida), and to Puerto Rico—where it seemed that the English might attack again.¹

On December 13 Miguel de Erasso came into Cartagena with a fleet from Spain and two days later appeared the two new galleys sent to replace those so ignominiously lost in the preceding February. Immediately, while the galleys fared forth after corsairs, Alvaro Flores escorted Erasso's fleet to Nombre de Dios and worked 'like mad', he said², to unload, to despatch the ships' cargoes, to get the plate down from Panama,³ and to lade and clear these vessels for their return home.

The plate was so late in arriving at Panama that not until 9 June, 1587, was Alvaro Flores able to leave from Cartagena. Avoiding Cape San Antonio, he reached Havana on July 2. That year's homeward Mexican fleet, under Captain General don Francisco Novoa, had preceded him into Havana by about a week⁴ and on 13 July, 1587, Alvaro Flores sailed thence for Spain, with over 100 vessels (from the Main, Santo Domingo, Honduras, Mexico). There were nearly nineteen millions⁵ on board them in plate, jewels and merchandise. News of Drake's major operations on the Spanish and Portuguese coasts had reached the Indies and Alvaro Flores was by no means sure that he would not encounter the English on his course.⁶

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The New Spain fleet which Alvaro Flores convoyed home (July-September, 1587) had, as has been said, come out toward the end of 1586 and from Dominica had sent ahead to La Española two galleys that had crossed in its convoy to replace those which had formerly patrolled the island's coasts. In the middle of October these galleys, Don Diego Noguera Valenzuela² commanding, went out after a corsair, sank his ship, and seized a bark, a pinnace and a prize which he had taken. Captain Noguera reported that this man was a famous French trader. Document No. 58 suggests that perhaps he was part of a joint English-French expedition. After this encounter the galleys proceeded to the north coast where they captured a corsair, who was hanged, and it is possible that this was an Englishman. His name is given in these Spanish documents as 'Roberto Coletto'.³ Among his men, condemned to the galleys and sent to Cartagena, was one 'Davitt Taller (Tailor?)'.⁴

The Santo Domingo galleys circumnavigated the island and returned to their base at the end of February, 1587. Noguera claimed that the corsairs then abandoned La Española and went to La Margarita and the pearl fisheries of the Main where apparently they did do a good deal of damage.⁴ As for Noguera's galleys, they rotted in Santo Domingo harbour, lacking supplies and munitions. Noguera declared that their inactivity was precisely what the people of the island desired, that they might continue unmolested to trade with roving foreigners.⁵

In May, 1587, Governor Pedro Menéndez Marqués was searching

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³ *A. de I.*, 72-5-21, Lima 92, petition, Cartagena, December 23, 1593.

⁴ *A. de I.*, 54-4-15, Santo Domingo 193, Luis de Rojas to the Crown, Santiago de Leon, March 31, 1587; 54-4-23, Santo Domingo 201, that city to the Crown, April 7, 1587; 54-4-28, Santo Domingo 206, royal officials of Rio de la Hacha to the Crown, May 13, 1587; '. . . corsairs took six or seven ships between here and Caracas during this last March . . .'—Town council of La Margarita to the Crown, April 7, 1587, in 54-4-4, Santo Domingo 182.

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the north coast of Florida for a northwest passage¹ and the English settlement² concerning which the authorities at Havana as well as he had received somewhat sarcastic inquiries from their better-informed superiors in Spain.³ The governor found nothing. There was nothing to be found, as John White and Simon Ferdinando, even then approaching with 'a new colonie'⁴ for Virginia, were to learn. The men whom Grenville had left at Roanoke had vanished.

If Hakluyt is correct in his statement⁵ that on June 18/28 White and his three ships were at Mosquito Bay on the south side of that island, then they can hardly have been those vessels which on the 8th of that month sailed by the colony's capital on the north coast and left a warning for the governor of Puerto Rico concerning a larger number of English vessels even then approaching.⁶ Nor does it appear that it could be they to whom the royal officials refer in their despatch which states that on the 20th the city of San Juan de Puerto Rico was thrown into a state of alarm by three English ships with two pinnaces which passed by. Certainly White's were not the only English vessels in the Caribbean at the moment.⁷

It was one of at least three sent out by Sir George Carey, Captain of the Isle of Wight, which at just this time off Havana captured a ship coming up from Santo Domingo and half a dozen smaller craft beside.⁸

Two galleys had been sent from Spain to protect that coast,

¹ Documents Nos. 61, 65 *post*; *A. de I.*, 139-7-14, Indiferente General 541, 1, f. 7 reverse, *cédula*, Madrid, November 27, 1586.

² '... and I am certain that the Englishman will have fortified in Florida in order to return to an establishment of his own next year.'—Francisco de Varte to the House of Trade, Seville, September 3, 1586, in *A. de I.*, 42-1-8/3, Contratación 5108.

³ 'Here they tell us that in 38° toward the Codfisheries the English have a fort on a bay. Since your honours say not a word of this we do not believe it can be true. If it were, it would indeed be unfortunate because they would be so close to the Pacific and because of the damage they might do in those Indies.'—The House of Trade to the governor and warden at Havana, from Seville, December 15, 1586, in *A. de I.*, 43-1-20/2, Contratación 5186.

⁴ *Principal Navigations*, VIII, pp. 386-403. Cf. Documents Nos. 62 and 65 *post*.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 387. ⁶ Document No. 60, *post*.

⁷ 'On June 20 three English ships with two pinnaces passed this port. The city became alarmed and we stood upon our defence.'—The royal officials of Puerto Rico to the House of Trade, Puerto Rico, July 7, 1587, in *A. de I.*, 147-6-5, Indiferente General, 1887.

⁸ *A. de I.*, 143-3-17. Indiferente General 1098, the House of Trade to the Crown, Seville, November 20, 1587, concerning two advice-caravels taken by English in the Old Channel.

⁹ Document No. 62, *post*.

Captain Cristóbal de Pantoja in command.¹ They had arrived at the end of September, 1586, and very early in 1587 had an encounter with French corsairs off Cape Corrientes, but when, in late June or early July, they went to Matanzas after the Englishman who had seized the Santo Domingo vessel, he had gone on his way to Virginia. He must have arrived there very shortly indeed before John White 'fel with the maine of Virginia' on July 16, since this rover found no sign of Grenville's men nor any 'new colonie' either, but only a branded mule. By way of the Newfoundland Banks and Ireland the English sailed to Bristol, to dispose of their booty there.

In the summer of 1588 Carey's ships returned.² Documents Nos. 62-4 furnish glimpses of them. At least the Spaniards believed they were the same ships that had been there in 1587 which in 1588 hunted for plunder through the Old Channel, as, without defence and in disorder, the Santo Domingo fleet that year came into Havana, to join other shipping for the trans-Atlantic crossing. The Isle of Pines, on the south side of Cuba, begins to emerge as a pirate rendezvous.³

Now, in 1587, looking forward a year, the Duke de Medina Sidonia and Antonio de Guevara had called attention to the fact that if reports then emanating from England concerning the activities of Drake and Hawkins were true, in 1588 not 25 or 30 galleons would suffice to assure the safe wafting over of the Crown's colonial revenues; and the expense involved in making ready such a fleet to convoy them would be enormous. Therefore they suggested that a dozen small swift vessels be constructed, preferably in Biscay, for the purpose of transporting the treasure belonging to the Crown and to private persons, the idea being to rely upon speed, as embodied in such craft, rather than upon strength, i.e., on galleons.⁴ Accordingly, in 1588, with instructions

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 126, Francisco de Moncayo to the Crown, Havana, November 25, 1586; Christóbal de Pantoja to the Crown, Havana, December 30, 1586.

² '... about fifteen days ago five ships appeared. It could not be learned whether they were corsairs or friends.'—Don Diego Noguera y Valenzuela, Santo Domingo, July 30, 1588.

³ 'They say four small English ships have been seen off this coast but they have not been seen here for many days.'—Martin Perez de Olarçabal to the Crown, Ocoa, August 30, 1588. Both in *A. de I.*, 53-6-14, Santo Domingo 80.

⁴ *A. de I.*, 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 126, Alvarez de Ruesga to the Crown, Havana, July 21, 1587.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 143-3-17, Indiferente General 1098, 'Statement of the manner in which in 1588 His Majesty's treasure and that belonging to private persons may be brought from the provinces of Tierra Firme, Peru and the kingdoms of New Spain and Honduras', San Lucar, March 31, 1587, signed by the Duke de Medina Sidonia and Antonio de Guevara.

to bring home the plate, Alvaro Flores proceeded to the Main in command of 'an armada of certain light vessels raised on the coast of Andalusia'.

This was a new development in the Spanish system. Hitherto the galleons had conveyed the plate and protected the fleets. Now the conveyance of the plate was to be entrusted to smaller, swifter vessels (frigates, galizabras), which sailed without regard for the merchantmen.¹

On ordering the substitution (in 1588) of these 'certain light vessels' for the galleons of the guard, the Crown frankly stated² that the heavy vessels were needed for other important work, that is, for the 'enterprize against England'.³ The colonial authorities on the Main were to assure private persons owning plate that the light armada would carry their treasure safely. Also these authorities were to see to it that all the treasure was embarked in that light armada. Alvaro Flores' vice-admiral, Gonzalo Monte Bernaldo,⁴ was sent to Mexico to bring away the Mexican plate in four small speedy vessels. He was to rejoin his commander in Havana.

Alvaro Flores came into that harbour on August 2, 1588, with the treasure from the Main. Monte Bernaldo had not yet arrived. On August 14 Alvaro Flores left without him. He reached San Lucar on October 22 with nine frigates and the Tierra Firme bullion. He had left orders for his vice-admiral to winter in Havana.

Accordingly, although Monte Bernaldo reached Havana on the last of August, 1588, not until 15 February, 1589, did he sail from that port. Nine merchantmen cleared with him.⁵ He saw them through the Bahama channel and then, since they were delaying him, left them in good order and hastened forward. He entered San Lucar on April 1.⁶ Thus were that year's revenues brought to Spain without

¹ ' . . . henceforth we hear of the *Armada*, *fregatas* and *flotas* of the West Indian trade . . . '—Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 338. Sir Julian's account of these matters is somewhat confused.

² *A. de I.*, 140-2-4, Indiferente General 582, II, numerous orders to colonial authorities.

³ i.e., the plan to invade.

⁴ Numerous despatches in *A. de I.*, 140-2-4, Indiferente General 582, II.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 54-1-34, Santo Domingo 118, the royal officials to the Crown, Havana, August, 9, 1588; Arana to the Crown, Havana, September 5, 1588; 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 126, Tomás Bernaldo de Quiros to the Crown, Havana, September 5, 1588, etc.; 143-3-17, Indiferente General 1098, Don Francisco Tello to the Crown, San Lucar, October 22, 1588.

⁶ *A. de I.*, 143-3-18, Indiferente General 1099, the Duke de Medina Sidonia to the Crown, San Lucar, April 1, 1589; and Monte Bernaldo's deposition of that date in the same *legajo*.

any serious interference. Indeed, the 'Invencible Armada' had given the English work to do at home.

In 1589 they were as occupied with the 'Counter-Armada'. Yet it may be assumed that Michelson and Mace¹ were not the only Englishmen in the Indies that year. Within nine days of its month of April twelve enemy sail were seen to pass by Puerto Rico.² An Englishman with two ships came near to carrying off the artillery from Bayaa in La Española.³ They were English who chased two vessels along the Havana coast in May, 1589, one of which ran aground to escape.⁴ At most, however, these were still petty marauders, did small damage and occasioned little or no real alarm. Among the islands and on the coast of Spain the situation was very different.

A large fleet of vessels bound for the Antilles and Mexico left Spain in July, 1588, Martin Perez de Olazabal in command,⁵ and an especially strong fleet (41 sail) for the Main was hurried off in the middle of March, 1589, under Diego de la Ribera.⁶ At the end of April Alvaro Flores was ordered to proceed to Cartagena with two *galizabras* fresh from the Biscay ways.⁷ His vice-admiral, Juan de Oribe Apallua, had preceded him. There they were to take over half a dozen of the best ships of the fleet, convert them into men-of-war at the expense of the rest (in men and artillery), and use them to reinforce the six armed vessels which had gone out with the fleet, for the safe conveyance of that year's treasure. The ships so stripped of men and guns remained on the Main, with Diego de la Ribera, ostensibly to protect Cartagena against the English, when, in the middle of September, 1589, Alvaro Flores and Martin Perez left Havana for the return passage with nine galleons laden with all the treasure⁸ convoying 50 or 60 vessels of the combined fleets.⁹

¹ *Principal Navigations*, x, pp. 156-7. '... ship called the Dogge...'

² *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, Juan de Texeda to the Crown, Havana, June 4, 1589.

³ *A. de I.*, 54-3-23, Santo Domingo 172, Lope de Vega Portocarrero to the Crown, Santo Domingo, July 4, 1589.

⁴ Document No. 67 *post*.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 143-3-17, Indiferente General 1098, numerous despatches.

⁶ *A. de I.*, 143-3-17, Indiferente General 1098, Tello to the Crown, San Lucar, December 18, 1588; 140-2-4, Indiferente General 582, II, instructions to Ribera, f. 27 *et seq.*, Madrid, February 22, 1589; 143-3-18, Indiferente General 1099, Duke de Medina Sidonia to the Crown, San Lucar, March 14, 1589, etc., etc.

⁷ *A. de I.*, 140-2-4, Indiferente General 582, II, f. 46 reverse *et seq.*, instructions to Alvaro Flores, San Lorenzo, April 30, 1589.

⁸ *A. de I.*, 143-3-18, Indiferente General 1099, the House of Trade to the Crown, Seville, December 8, 1589.

⁹ *A. de I.*, 143-3-18, Indiferente General 1099, Martin Perez de Olazabal to the Crown and Diego de Soto to the Crown, San Lucar, October 29, 1589.

These ships were early scattered by storm. One, apparently a galleon, was abandoned at sea, all on board and the treasure it carried having been transferred to another vessel.¹ Alvaro Flores' flagship and another vessel also richly laden with gold, silver and jewels, put into La Terceira,² as Linschoten³ has picturesquely described. Eventually they made Lisbon safely. Six galleons and a good many merchantmen, under Vice-Admiral Oribe Apallua, came into Fayal only to find the place ruined. Cumberland had passed that way. Oribe Apallua set ashore the treasure for which he was responsible, but not even under heavy guard in what was left of the fort did it seem safe, for the harbour was not good and the expedition which Drake and Norreys led against Lisbon had, on dispersing, let too many enemy ships loose among the islands and along the coasts of Spain. Therefore, upon receipt of assurance that the enemy was scattered and not sailing in strong squadrons, Oribe Apallua reladed the treasure into his ships and made sail for San Lucar, where he arrived safely at the end of November with his six galleons and the thirteen merchantmen who had chosen to remain in his convoy rather than take their chances in running for home alone. The English had taken some toll of the fleets but it was little indeed in comparison with 'the wealth of the Indies' which poured⁴ into Spanish coffers at Seville before the year 1589 came to its close.

That Drake's raid had indeed ushered in a new era for His Catholic Majesty's western colonies may have been less obvious at sea than it now became upon the land. Campmaster Juan de Texeda and Engineer Antoneli had returned to Spain with Alvaro Flores in September, 1587, having made a very thorough inspection. In 1589 they went out again, and everywhere—at Puerto Rico, Cartagena, Nombre de Dios, San Juan de Ulua, Havana—under Texeda's general supervision, exercised from Havana, the Spanish government began work upon extensive fortifications.⁵ This brought to each place fortified an influx of people (garrisons, workmen, slaves) and a directly corresponding increase of local prosperity.

¹ *A. de I.*, 143-3-18, Indiferente General 1099, Oribe Apallua's account of his crossing, arrival at the Azores, call at Fayal, etc., in his despatch of November 24, 1589.

² *A. de I.*, 143-3-18, Indiferente General 1099, many despatches, including the House of Trade to the Crown, Seville, December 7, 1589.

³ *Principal Navigations*, vii, pp. 68, 69.

⁴ *A. de I.*, 143-3-18, Indiferente General 1099, House of Trade to the Crown, Seville, December 8, 1589, statement of treasure received.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 139-7-14, Indiferente General 571, 1, ff. 31 *et seq.*, Texedas' instructions, Madrid, November 23, 1588, and many related despatches.

At sea, as we have seen, the immediate effect of English activity was to create the light armada. To those concerned, the use of small swift vessels to carry the plate may have seemed irregular—a temporary expedient rather than definite part of a large and well-planned programme of naval expansion, which it was. Nevertheless, it must have been obvious that the expedient was proving successful, for in the vessels of the light armada the plate was reaching Spain quickly with no loss.

It should be well noted that although the English sometimes made hauls of gold, silver and pearls—manifested or unmanifested—from captured merchant vessels, it is not recorded that they ever took a 'silver galleon' or any 'silver frigate' either.

Very elastic it was, that light armada, presently called simply 'the frigates'. It consisted of as many good sailers as were needed or could be provided which, under secret orders¹ and experienced commanders, moved back and forth as circumstances required.

In 1590 Juan de Oribe Apallua² returned to the Indies in command of the armada to fetch the fleets. The Tierra Firme fleet consisted of those vessels which had been left behind in 1589 on the Main with Diego de la Ribera. Artillery, cordage, men, etc., had been sent out to them.³ To Mexico went Rodrigo de Rada⁴ with orders to bring the New Spain plate to Havana in the small vessels which had taken over Viceroy Luis de Velasco and Gomez Perez das Marinas, governor for the Philippines. He was at the same time to escort merchant vessels from San Juan de Ulua to Havana.

That year's light armada consisted of two *galizabras*⁵ which left

¹ See, for example, *A. de I.*, 140-2-4, Indiferente General 582, II, f. 60 *et seq.*, orders to Marcos de Aramburu and Martin Duarte Bernaldo, issued from Madrid, December 16, 1589.

² *A. de I.*, 140-2-4, Indiferente General 582, II, . 87 *et seq.*, Oribe Apallua's commission; f. 93 reverse *et seq.*, his instructions. This is the 'John de Orimo' of Hakluyt's version of intercepted letters, *Principal Navigations*, x, p. 158. He left Gibraltar on May 18, 1590, according to Juan Sanz de Oyanguen to the Duke de Medina Sidonia, Gibraltar, May 19, 1590.

³ 'We who have remained here are thirteen good ships.'—Diego de la Ribera to the Crown, Cartagena, November 2, 1589, in *A. de I.*, 143-3-18, Indiferente General 1099, Cf. a list of the same date in 42-1-8/13 Contratación 5108. Cf. 140-2-4, Indiferente General 582, II, f. 60 reverse *et seq.*, the Crown to the House of Trade, Madrid, December 16, 1589.

⁴ Instead of Monte Bernaldo, incapacitated at the last moment. Cf. *A. de I.*, 140-2-4, Indiferente General 582, II, f. 60 reverse *et seq.*, 140-7-35, Indiferente General 741, Ybarra to the Crown, Seville, February 22, 1590.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 130-7-14, Indiferente General 541, III, f. 19 *et seq.*, contract, Aranjuez, April 15, 1589, the Crown with Agustin Espinola to provide these vessels. Agustin

Cartagena¹ on July 8 in command of Pedro Menéndez Marqués² and on the 23rd of the same month³ went forward from Havana for Spain with a precious cargo. On September 3, 1590, hard driven by storm and firing his guns to attract immediate attention, Menéndez Marqués made the port of Viana in Portugal. 'Laden with gold and silver'—the treasure from the Main—he came safely under the protection of its castle⁴ while, undoubtedly, the English were still hoping to meet the plate at sea.⁵ Eventually it was all brought to Seville by mule-train.⁶

At the end of April, 1590, certain vessels belonging to John Watts or 'Wattes of London Merchant'⁷ had reached Dominica. While one, the *Little John*, lingered there another, the *Hopewell*, with the pinnace *John Evangelist*, steered for Puerto Rico.⁸ Document No. 68 *post* shows that the latter was observed as she passed along the south side of that island. Document No. 69 *post* is the Spanish version of her encounter with the galley which Governor Vega compelled to go out from Santo Domingo harbour to attempt, at least, to protect vessels approaching on the usual course from Spain.⁹

was very shortly succeeded by his brother Ambrosio. 'Wretched craft', according to Texeda, *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, to the Crown, Havana, August 3, 1590. Cf. Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 338-9.

¹ *A. de I.*, 153-1-6, Indiferente General 2661, Oribe Apallua to the Crown, Havana, August 2, 1590; 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, Ribera to the Crown and to Ybarra, Havana, August 1, 1590.

² He left Florida on May 19, reached Seville on July 7, 1589, and was now back at sea, his element. Cf. *A. de I.*, 143-3-18, Indiferente General 1099, his communication to the Crown, Seville, July 7, 1589.

³ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, Rada to the Crown, Havana, July 30; Oribe Apallua to the Crown, August 2, 1590. Cf. Document No. 77 *post*.

⁴ *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109, Antonio de Puebl—(?) to Ybarra, Viana, September 4, 1590; 139-7-14, Indiferente General 541, III, f. 67 reverse, *cédula* to Pedro Menéndez Marqués, San Lorenzo, September 22, 1590, etc., etc. See also 143-3-19, Indiferente General 1100, House of Trade to the Crown, Seville, November 2, 1590.

⁵ Documents Nos. 68-77 *post*.

⁶ *A. de I.*, 139-7-14, Indiferente General 541, I, f. 122, instructions to Conde de Fuentes, Madrid, April 11, 1591. The bullion was in bars weighing 25 to 30 pounds each, total 13,243 *arrobas* and twenty pounds. 1125 pack animals were used. Cf. documents in 152-2-3.

⁷ Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 336. England's 'organized commerce-destroying' had begun.

⁸ *Principal Navigations*, VIII, pp. 406 *et seq.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 408. The editor has not seen any mention in Spanish documents of the *Hopewell's* landing on the north coast of the island, capture of a frigate laden with hides and ginger, escape of the mulatto Pedro, etc.; or the damage done at Mona or the wait at Saona for the fleet.

On July 2/12 the *Hopewell* was joined by Edward Spicer in the *Moonlight* and Joseph Harps or Harris in pinnace *Conclude*.¹ Including prizes, this little squadron was now perhaps eight vessels. That same day they sighted fourteen sail—the Santo Domingo fleet venturing after delay upon its course for Havana.

The English gave chase, and the second enclosure with Document No. 71 *post*² is an excellent account of their capture of three units of the fleet—*El Buen Jesus*, which the English correctly considered to be the vice-admiral, and two smaller vessels which were driven ashore near the harbour of Santiago de la Vega. The story in these depositions neatly supplements Hakluyt's version.

It is told from two different points of view, viz. from that of the despoiled owner of *El Buen Jesus* who had left the convoy and steered west, vainly seeking safety apart from his companions, and from that of the master of *La Trinidad*, captured near Yaguana from which the English took what French corsairs had left on board her. This man was a prisoner on a small light vessel, possibly the *John Evangelist*, which chased Vicente González, acting general on the harried Santo Domingo fleet, into the harbour of Jamaica with seven or eight of his convoy vessels. The *Little John* came up in time to join in this fight.

With prizes and prisoners the English ships then came on to Cape San Antonio. Arriving first, the *Moonlight* and *Conclude* had of necessity to stand by inactive while the Mainland fleet and Oribe Apallua's galleons—22 or 23 sail—rounded the cape. The very next day the *Hopewell* came up, just too late. Later still, the *Little John* reached the cape with two pinnaces (one probably the *John Evangelist*). The chagrin of the English at so narrowly missing the opportunity to attempt, at least, to cut out a few prizes was obvious to their Spanish prisoners.³

This mainland fleet and armada came into Havana harbour on July 29.⁴ With his small vessels and certain merchantmen⁵ from

¹ The news they brought out of England was promptly disseminated, as appended documents show. If, as Corbett states (*op. cit.*, II, p. 348) details of the English naval campaign for 1590 have not been preserved, these Spanish versions of it acquire special interest. Cf. Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

² See also Documents Nos. 70, 72, 74, 77.

³ Documents Nos. 71, enclosure No. 2; 74 *post*.

⁴ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, Oribe Apallua to the Crown, Havana, August 2, 1590.

⁵ Rada's fleet consisted of at least nine sail when he left San Juan de Ulua. Cf. in *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, a relation by Domingo de Leagui, captain of the advice-boat which left Havana on August 3 and reached Spain September 21, 1590. See also Document No. 77 *post*.

Mexico, Rodrigo de Rada had entered on the 13th¹ minus three of his convoy. They had separated from the rest and lagged, becalmed.²

The *Little John* attacked two of these vessels.³ The third fled back to Mexico.⁴ The first enclosure in Document No. 71 describes this encounter,⁵ from which the Spaniards emerged in worse condition than Hakluyt's account of it implies.

As soon as Oribe Apallua reached Havana (July 29), Cristóbal de Pantoxa, commanding Cuba's two galleys—the *San Agustín* and the *Brava*—was ordered to San Antonio where Oribe Apallua had not failed to see the two English sail which were there as he rounded the cape. A vessel was expected from La Margarita with pearls. Pantoxa was to remain off the west end of the island to escort her safely around that danger point. However, this vessel put in at Cartagena and therefore Pantoxa was summoned to return to Havana, from where he wrote in early September that the galleys had been unable to find any enemies anywhere.⁶

Oribe Apallua's instructions had been to leave Havana for Spain with the united fleets not later than July 25.⁷ At nine o'clock on the night of August 9 he received other orders⁸ to leave not later than August 10. Since he could not clear on 24 hours notice, because of the condition of his ships and especially because the season was so

¹ In *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127 are to be found many despatches to the Crown and to Secretary Ybarra from naval officers and other persons which establish dates of arrival and departure of vessels.

² The English also were 'becalmed . . . winde . . . very scarce . . .' Cf. Document No. 70 *post*.

³ The editor is indebted to Professor Quinn for distinguishing between the *Little John* and the *John Evangelist*; for establishing that the *Moonlight* belonged to William Sanderson and that Master Harps's pinnace was the *Conclude*, Joseph Harris, captain; for drawing attention to the *Little John's* participation in the fight off Jamaica; and to the fact that this vessel did not join the *Moonlight* and the *Hopewell* off the west end of Cuba, but followed a little after them eastward along the north coast of Cuba.

⁴ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, Rada to the Crown, Havana, September 7, 1590.

⁵ See also Document No. 77 *post*. White's meagre story of this incident may possibly be explained by his distance from the action. The *Hopewell* would logically have kept out of shoal water.

⁶ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, Oribe Apallua to the Crown, Havana, August 2; Pantoxa to the Crown, Havana, September 5, 1590. Cf. Documents Nos. 75, 76 *post*.

⁷ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, Texeda to the Crown, Havana, August 3, 1590.

⁸ Document No. 74 *post*.

far advanced (the 'hurricane season' imminent), he had no recourse but to winter in Havana.¹

Escorting the advice-boat sent with the news of the decision so to winter, vessels carrying monies to pay garrisons in Florida and Puerto Rico, and still others despatched to the Canary Islands for supplies, Luis Alfonso Flores² went out from Havana toward the end of August with a small squadron under orders to clear the coast of enemies so that foodstuffs for the detained fleets and the galleons might come into Havana unmolested. Alfonso Flores saw his convoy through the Bahama channel and by early September he too was back in port, reporting that neither had he seen any enemies.³

The *Hopewell* and *Moonlight* had gone to Virginia where John White, on board as the Spaniards knew⁴, found only relics of 'the lost colony'. The editor has seen no evidence that the Spanish had anything whatsoever to do with its disappearance or were even aware of that tragedy, but the probability of its occurrence is indicated in Document No. 65.

In Spain, news of the decision to hold the fleets in Havana until the spring of 1591 occasioned panic. Reflecting the grief of the business interests at Seville, the Council for Indies⁵ recommended that an adequate naval force be sent to bring them home and to teach the English renewed respect for Spain.

Humiliating as was the position of His Catholic Majesty's officers, 'corralled', as Texeda put it,⁶ while 'audacious Englishmen' without shame⁷ dared them at their own doors, in seeking to quiet agitation at Seville the Crown insisted⁸ that neither Havana nor the shipping in its harbour was in any immediate danger. Yet there seems to have been at least one occasion when Oribe Apallua saw fit to station ships at the harbour mouth to protect the port and the vessels of the united

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, minutes of the council so resolving, Havana, August 9, 1590. The decision was made in Havana, not in Spain. Cf. Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 349.

² Documents Nos. 71-7 *post*.

³ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, his of September 7, 1590 to the Crown. Cf. Document No. 76 *post*.

⁴ Documents Nos. 71, enclosure No. 2; 74 *post*.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 140-7-35, Indiferente General 741, the Council for Indies to His Majesty, Madrid, October 30, 1590, etc., etc.; 143-3-19, Indiferente General 1100, many related documents.

⁶ Document No. 75 *post*.

⁷ *Principal Navigations*, x, p. 163. Cf. Wright, I. A., *Historia Documentada de San Christobal de la Habana en el Siglo XVI* (Havana, 1927), I, pp. 137 *et seq.*

⁸ *A. de I.*, 140-7-35, Indiferente General 741, the Council for Indies to His Majesty, Madrid, November 19, 1590.

fleets and the armada lying in Havana bay against the possibility that the enemy might attempt to force an entrance¹ and his demands² for men and ordnance to strengthen the fleets and armada suggest serious apprehension.

A better cause for general alarm would seem to have been the situation off the coast of Spain itself and among the islands, where Hawkins and Frobisher were endeavouring to 'constitute a double blockade'.³ 'Owing to Philip's precautions', however, they met with nothing of any great value. 'Though by their captures the admirals were able to prolong their cruise until October, they had nothing tangible to show for their pains or to cover expenses.' They had taken only those wilful vessels⁴ which chose to disregard orders and to steal away from Oribe Apallua to attempt the crossing alone.

In Havana, as the winter wore on, Oribe Apallua, Ribera, Rada and their subordinates bickered and quarrelled; and Camp-master Texeda pressed work on six handsome⁵ frigates he was building for the service rendered by the light armada. 'A new kind of man-of-war specially designed for treasure-carrying,' they were reported in England to be 'built after the *zabra* fashion, but the keel long galley-wise . . . made on purpose for swift sailing with oars.'⁶ Constructed of 'excellent good and incorruptible'⁷ Cuban timber, Texeda's frigates were indeed fashioned for speed, yet they had the strength to fight anything they could not outsail. To their creation the campmaster gave the best⁸ of his administrative ability and by

¹ Document No. 77 *post*; see also No. 74.

² *A. de I.*, 148-1-18, Indiferente General 1957, IV; 139-7-14, Indiferente General 541, III.

³ Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 348. Cf. Documents Nos. 71, enclosure No. 2; 74 *post*.

⁴ *Derrotadas, arribadas*. But see also *A. de I.*, 148-1-8, Indiferente General 1957, IV. Oribe Apallua was blamed. Cf. Corbett, *op. cit.*, p. 350, reference to Linschoten's description of ' . . . spoiled men . . . cursing the Englishmen and their own fortunes, with those that had been the causes to provoke the Englishmen to fight.'

⁵ ' . . . like those the *Adelantado* Pedro Menéndez built . . . '—Martin Perez de Olazabal to the Crown, Seville, October 21, 1590, in *A. de I.*, 143-3-19, Indiferente General 1100, in praise of their excellence and suitability. For a detailed criticism of them see the Duke de Medina Sidonia to the Crown, San Lucar, February 3, 1592 and Ybarra's reply, Madrid, February 15, in 143-3-21, Indiferente General 1102. Cf. *Principal Navigations*, x, pp. 158, 160.

⁶ Cf. Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 338, and note, reference to Birch, *Memoirs of Elizabeth*, I, p. 82.

⁷ *Principal Navigations*, x, p. 164.

⁸ His despatches to the Crown and especially to Juan de Ybarra in *A. de I.* 54-1-15 and 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 99, 127, etc.

the summer of 1590 one vessel was ready for service—the one which went out with Luis Alfonso Flores after Watts's ships and in White's wake that August. The trial proved her worth.¹

Texeda was ordered² to rush work on his frigates. Oribe Apallua was instructed³ to remove from his ships all the gold and silver, pearls and more precious merchandise of both fleets, to lade it into the new craft and with them to proceed to Spain as soon as possible, leaving Ribera with the galleons to escort the merchantmen home at a seasonable time.

Accordingly, accompanied by three shallops and two barks which they outsailed, the four frigates which Texeda had been able to complete left Havana on February 10, 1591.⁴ The *Santiago*, the *Duquesa* and the *Texeda* reached the port of Cascaes in Portugal on the night of March 12.⁵ The fourth, Oribe Apallua's flag-frigate, the *Marquesa*, had separated from these in a storm which somewhat delayed them all and tried their strength, but she made San Lucar on March 19.⁶ They had brought safely over five or six millions in gold and silver, and 800,000 ducats' worth of cochineal.

From Lisbon the bullion landed there was carried to Seville by mule-train.⁷ By sea in early April Luis Alfonso Flores took the frigates and the cochineal round to join the flag-frigate at San Lucar. All four vessels were ordered to proceed to Cartagena immediately. Pedro Menéndez Marquéz was commissioned to command the light

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, Texeda to the Crown, Havana, September 5, 1590. Cf. Document No. 74 *post*.

² *A. de I.*, 140-2-4, Indiferente General 582, II, f. 103, *cédula*, November 14, 1590. At the same time Texeda was ordered to make six, or at least four, more frigates, i.e., ten or twelve in all. Cf. Document No. 82 *post*.

³ At his own suggestion. Cf. *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, his to Ybarra, Havana, September 5, 1590.

⁴ 'There go four frigates . . .'—Texeda to Ybarra, Havana, February 10, 1590, in *A. de I.*, 54-1-15, Santo Domingo 99. 'They have cost His Majesty 50,000 ducats and money is still being spent on them. They are built as never were any others which have left this harbour.' Cf. his of the same date to the House of Trade, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109, also referring to the 'frightful' cost of the frigates.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109; 153-2-3, Indiferente General; 2686, many despatches.

⁶ *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109, Oribe Apallua to the House of Trade, San Lucar, March 19, 1591.

⁷ *A. de I.*, 153-2-3, Indiferente General 2686, for various despatches describing the conveyance of the bullion weighing down over a thousand mules; 139-7-14, Indiferente General 541, III, ff. 122 *et seq.*, various *cédulas* to Esteban de Ybarra, Vice-Admiral Alonso de Chaves Galindo, Captain Luis Alfonso Flores, etc., etc., Madrid, March 27, 1591.

armada as now constituted by Texeda's frigates, with Luis Alfonso Flores as his vice-admiral.¹

Because money was desperately needed in Spain² Menéndez Marqués was ordered to leave with one frigate and two shallops for Tierra Firme at once to fetch it. Alfonso Flores was to follow with the other three frigates as soon as he could. Juan de Salas was to convey certain troops to Puerto Rico in three flyboats³ and then join Menéndez Marqués at Cartagena.

Ribera was instructed to wait in Havana for the 1590-91 New Spain fleet⁴, General Antonio Navarro de Prado commanding, and for Menéndez Marqués and the light armada. However, if the latter had not arrived there by 25 July, 1591 (the date finally set), Ribera was to leave all the treasure in the forts of Havana for the frigates to pick up when they should appear, himself proceeding to Spain with the assembled merchantmen. The order to wait reached Ribera on 7 March, 1591.⁵ Otherwise he would have left Havana within that month.

Their 1590 campaign had discredited Hawkins and Frobisher. Permitted to join Drake in the retirement forced upon men who were considered to have failed, they were replaced by Lord Thomas Howard and Sir Richard Grenville.⁶ The Earl of Cumberland, also, was at sea upon his fourth voyage.⁷ English ships swarmed along the Portuguese and Spanish coasts and then, since the treasure-frigates had escaped them, converged upon the Azores by which the fleets must pass. His Catholic Majesty warned his officers on land and sea,

¹ *A. de I.*, 139-2-1, Indiferente General, II, ff. 1 *et seq.*, Menéndez Marqués's commission, Madrid, April 20, 1591, and instructions; ff. 7, 16 reverse, Luis Alfonso Flores' commission and instructions, etc., etc.

² *A. de I.*, 139-2-1, Indiferente General 433, II, f. 11 reverse, *cédula* to Texeda, Madrid, April 20, 1591.

³ Cf. Documents 81, 83, 84 *post*.

⁴ *A. de I.*, 139-2-1, Indiferente General 433, II, f. 31 reverse. It left Spain in August 1590 and reached San Juan de Ulua at the beginning of January, 1591 with a heavy loss of vessels wrecked by storm at the very entrance to that port. A little later some of the surviving vessels were sunk in the harbour itself. Cf. *A. de I.*, 153-1-6, Indiferente General 2661, Antonio Navarro to the Crown, off Grand Canary, August 14, 1590; *id.* to the House of Trade, San Juan de Ulua, December 24, 1590.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109, Ribera to the House of Trade; 54-1-15, Santo Domingo 99, Texeda to the Crown, both from Havana, March 29, 1591. Cf. *A. de I.*, 139-2-1, Indiferente General 433, II, f. 31, *cédula*, Pardo, May 25, 1591, to Pedro Menéndez Marqués, etc.

⁶ Cf. Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 351 *et seq.*

⁷ G. C. Williamson, *George, Third Earl of Cumberland* (Cambridge, 1920), pp. 70 *et seq.*

everywhere, to be on guard against 'Lutheran corsairs'. To protect homebound merchantmen he ordered Don Alonso de Bazan to the islands with a good strong fleet which had been raised in the meantime.

In accordance with specific instructions¹ so to do, on 16 May, 1591, with seven ships, two *zabras* and the galleys, Ribera set out from Havana for Cape San Antonio to wait there for Navarro's New Spain fleet and to escort it safely into Havana harbour. Exclusive of the galleys Ribera had 2000 seamen and soldiers in his command. His artillery was not all that he might have desired but it was the best he could collect from the merchantmen at Havana. He had stores sufficient for two months. The New Spain fleet was expected in the second half of June. Up to the middle of that month no enemies appeared upon the north coast of Cuba although they were reported to be thick around Santo Domingo.² From the south side, however, came word that no fewer than eighty sail had been seen in one body steering west through the Old Channel. From Santo Domingo this word was sent to Cartagena and, via Puerto Plata, to Spain.³

By 13/23 June,, 1591 '3. ships of the honorable sir George Carey knight, then marshall of her Majesties houshold, and captaine of the Ile of Wight,'⁴ had come up to Cape Corrientes and there fallen in with Ribera's patrol. Followed 'a memorable fight', particularly between one of these vessels (the *Content*) and Ribera's squadron, especially the galleys, Cristóbal de Pantoxa in command, which formed part of it.

According to the English account⁵ of this incident Ribera's best vessels had been engaged before the psalm-singing fighters on board of the *Content* 'looked forth and descryed two saile more to the offen'

¹ *A. de I.*, 140-2-4, Indiferente General 582, II, f. 123 reverse, *cédula*, January 4, 1591.

² *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, Rada to Ybarra, Havana, May 5; Ribera to Crown, Havana, May 6, 1591; 54-1-15, Santo Domingo 99, Texeda to the Crown, Havana, May 16, 1591; 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109, Don Antonio de Mendoza to the House of Trade, Havana, May 22; *id.* to *id.*, June 19, 1591; 153-2-3, Indiferente General 2686, Conde de Fuentes to the Crown, Lisbon, June 1, 1591. Cf. Document No. 78 *post*.

³ Document No. 81 *post*. Only a little earlier Governor Vega Portocarrero had heard of 30 sail at La Palma which threatened to visit Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico, he said. Cf. his of June 5, 1591 in *A. de I.*, 53-1-15, Santo Domingo 81.

⁴ Later '... lord Hunsdon, lord Chamberlaine, and captaine of the honourable band of Her Majesties Pensioners . . .'—*Principal Navigations*, x, p. 178; see p. lxx *ante*.

⁵ *Principal Navigations*, x, pp. 178 *et seq.*

which were not the *Hopewell* and the *Swallow*, ‘. . . farre otherwise . . . they were two of the king’s gallies,’ the *San Agustin* and the *Brava*, with which the *Content* exchanged compliments¹ and shot. The editor has seen no mention of this encounter in Spanish documents except that contained in Nos. 79, 80, and 99 *post*. These record some of the effects of the *Content*’s fire. The Spaniards may have believed they had sunk their adversary but, badly battered, the *Content* made off ‘in the haze of night’, surviving to tell the story and to tell it very well.

As the presence of the *Hopewell* off Corrientes indicates, Carey’s three were not the only English vessels in this vicinity. ‘. . . Master Wats his ships of London . . .’ were once more about.² It may have been to them that the governor of Santo Domingo referred in Document No. 78 *post*. At about this time Juan de Salas lost³ a prize he captured in May in a hard fight. And off Mariel English vessels⁴ took seven units of the fleet which had set out for Havana from Santo Domingo on June 18.⁵ Ribera may indeed have seen as many as fourteen sail⁶ when he fired on a few, as he cruised off the west end of Cuba through June and early July of 1591, waiting impatiently for Navarro’s New Spain fleet and for Pedro Menéndez Marqués and the frigates from Tierra Firme. Both Navarro and Menéndez were somewhat overdue when Ribera left his post, contrary to his instructions but perhaps in conformity with his victualling, and returned to Havana. He re-entered that harbour on July 4.⁷

Navarro had been much delayed in his departure from Mexico. Not until June 13 did he leave San Juan de Ulua with 22 sail.⁸ By July 13 two of these ships had quit his convoy and were promptly

¹ Speaking of compliments, see Documents Nos. 82 and 95 *post*.

² *Ibid.*, vii, p. 49. Cf. Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 349 and n. 1. Cf. Documents Nos. 82, 85, 86, etc., *post*.

³ Document No. 84 *post*.

⁴ ‘Here be seven ships brought in as they say parcel of the West India fleet by merchants that went to second my Lord Thomas . . .’ *S. P. Dom.* Eliz. 240, No. 53, Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 324. Cf. Documents Nos. 82, 85, 86, 89, 95 *post*. On October 2, 1591, the bark *San Diego* reached San Lucar. It had left Havana with Ribera and Navarro on July 27 and brought apparently the first news that between Cape San Antonio and Mariel the Englishman who captured Diego de Navia (?) seized seven ships out of Santo Domingo and a bark belonging to Juan Batista Machorro with nearly 30,000 *pesos* on board. ‘May God deign to protect what is left . . .’—Varte to the House of Trade, San Lucar, October 3, 1591, in *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109.

⁵ Document No. 81 *post*.

⁷ Document No. 82 *post*.

⁶ Documents Nos. 87, 99 *post*.

⁸ Documents Nos. 85, 86 *post*.

seized by the enemy. One of these vessels carried plate belonging to His Majesty as well as some belonging to private individuals. The other errant unit of the New Spain fleet undoubtedly carried a good cargo but no plate.¹

The English had lain for days before Havana but now, wisely, while the weather still held fairly good, they steered for England, leaving Navarro and Ribera to explain as best they could how things like these could happen with such a concourse of Spanish vessels in that bay, including half a dozen galleons not lacking able officers. As for the irascible campmaster, Texeda described himself² as sitting, in a rage, upon the piece of ordnance Navarro had brought to him, surrounded by foot and horse but unable to lay hand upon the enemy who sailed back and forth under his very nose and added the insult of taunting messages to the very considerable material injury they had inflicted in the capture of at least nine ships.³

Came July 25 and Pedro Menéndez Marqués had not appeared. Therefore, on the 27th Diego de la Ribera set out for Spain in command of 73 sail.⁴ These were the armada of the guard, the merchantmen who had wintered in Havana, those whom Navarro had just brought in from Mexico, and other vessels which had succeeded in getting through from Santo Domingo, Honduras and other parts.⁵ The weather was adverse to their voyage and grew worse as they proceeded.

Documents Nos. 85 and 86 *post* are simple relations of 'one of the greatest disasters the American trade ever suffered'⁶ furnished by the

¹ Documents Nos. 82, 85, 86, 89, 95 *post*. The captor of Ygararan's ship, not yet identified, may have been assisted by Christopher Newport, Cf. *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109, Varte to the House of Trade, San Lucar, October 3, 1591.

The identity of the other vessel taken out of the New Spain fleet remains in doubt in so far as this editor is concerned. According to Document No. 85 *post* it was Agustín de Paz's. In Document No. 95 and elsewhere there is mention of a vessel 'taken with the plate ship' which is described as Navia's or Navea's. It may have been Paz's and it may not. The fact that ships were called by their own names (and usually had at least two, one sacred and one profane), by their owner's, by their captain's and sometimes by their pilot's, makes certain identification sometimes extremely difficult.

² *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109, Texeda to the House of Trade, Havana, September 29, 1591. Cf. Document No. 82 *post*.

³ Document No. 86 *post*.

⁴ Documents Nos. 85 and 86 *post*.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109, Don Antonio de Mendoza to the House of Trade, Havana, June 18, 1591.

⁶ Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 351. Cf. C. Fernández Duro, *Armada Española*, II, Appendix 10. Fernández Duro takes no account of the damage done the armada. Cf. *Principal Navigations*, VII, p. 49 *et seq.*

two officers who, when it was over, found themselves responsible for what was left of that armada and its ill-starred convoy. Struck by the tail end of a hurricane, which found them rotted by their long sojourn in tropical waters,¹ one after another the Spanish ships split and sank, beginning with Ribera's flagship which went down with him and practically all the rest on board. A dozen ships had disappeared before, broken into two squadrons, the fleets made Flores where Don Alonso de Bazan waited to receive and protect them. There, among the islands, still another storm blew, like chaff scattering Bazan's fine men-of-war and the battered merchantmen from Indies. Dead men and the wreckage of broken ships were strewn far and wide. If, as Linschoten says,² some thought that Sir Richard Grenville's spirit had summoned 'devils from the vasty deep' in these storms to take toll for the recent loss of the *Revenge*,³ certainly it must be admitted that they collected at a high rate of compensation. If anything could have consoled Spain and Seville in particular, as the ships which survived came limping home,⁴ it must have been the thought that the treasure—gold, silver, jewels and the more precious merchandise—was not on board any of these vessels, but still to be heard from in news of Pedro Menéndez Marqués and of Texeda's frigates in his command.

With the flag-frigate and two small vessels Menéndez Marqués had left San Lucar on May 5, 1591, and on June 9 reached Cartagena.⁵ Luis Alfonso Flores left Spain four days later and reached Cartagena on the 17th.⁶ Juan de Salas came up from Puerto Rico.⁷ They exerted themselves to embark the plate at Nombre de Dios and at Cartagena.⁸ Here Menéndez Marqués fell ill. What was worse,

¹ Some of these vessels had lain in Caribbean waters for two years and most of them were not new to begin with. It was well known that they were in bad condition. See, for instance, *A. de I.*, 42-1-4/9, Contratación 5109, summary of deposition, Melchor Baez, San Lucar, August 5, 1591.

² Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 363; Rowse, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

³ Concerning which Rowse has presented an excellent account (*op. cit.*, pp. 300-320).

⁴ *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109, Don Francisco de Varte to the House of Trade, Bonanza, October 25, 1591.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, Pedro Menéndez Marqués to the Crown, Havana, October 9, 1591.

⁶ *A. de I.*, 42-1-4/9, Contratación 5109, Luis Alfonso Flores to the House of Trade, Havana, October 2, 1591; 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, to the Crown, Havana, October 8, 1591.

⁷ Documents Nos. 81, 84 *post*.

⁸ *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109, Ruy Lopez Hurtado to the House of Trade, Havana, October 4, 1591.

he received so many warnings¹ that he expected to find Havana occupied by the English.² Not until September 7 did he dare to leave the shelter of Cartagena.³ The western end of Cuba was then probably free of corsairs but off Cape San Antonio he encountered evidently the same hurricane which was playing havoc with Ribera and the fleets. He said⁴ that it was by God's grace that he made Havana on September 29 with the frigates and some four and a half millions in treasure.

There he found two others of Texeda's frigates finished and ready to go forward. With these six vessels and 4,800,000 *pesos* more⁵ left for him by Navarro's New Spain fleet, with Salas's flyboats, four other small craft and half a dozen merchantmen,⁶ Menéndez Marqués finally got off from Havana on 7 December, 1591.⁷ After a stormy passage he reached San Lucar on 18 January, 1592.⁸ Luis Alfonso Flores had preceded him.⁹ Juan de Salas put in at Cadiz. The treasure eventually reached Seville safely.¹⁰

Little enough time did these men spend on shore! Luis Alfonso Flores succeeded¹¹ Menéndez Marqués in command of the frigates and with Salas as his vice-admiral left San Lucar on 1 April, 1592, for the Main.¹² They passed General Francisco Martinez de Leiva with the Tierra Firme fleet, west bound, although it had set out more

¹ Cf. Document No. 81 *post*. ² Document No. 83 *post*.

³ *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109, Pedro Menéndez Marqués to the House of Trade, Havana, October 2, 1591.

⁴ His despatch of October 2, just cited.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 42-1-9, Contratación 5109, Pedro Menéndez Marqués to the House of Trade, Havana, October 8, 1591; 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, to the Crown, Havana, October 9, 1591.

⁶ *A. de I.*, 42-1-5/10, Contratación 5110, Hernando de Bango (?) to the House of Trade, Lagos, January 20, 1592.

⁷ *A. de I.*, 143-3-21, Indiferente General 1102, Pedro Menéndez Marqués to the Crown, San Lucar, January 18, 1592; 42-1-10/5, Contratación 5110, Ruy Lopez de Hurtado to the House of Trade, San Lucar, January 16, 1592; Texeda to the same, Havana, January 18, 1592.

⁸ *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109, Varte to the House of Trade, San Lucar, January 19, 1592.

⁹ *A. de I.*, 42-1-5/10, Contratación 5110, Varte to the House of Trade, San Lucar, January 16, 1592.

¹⁰ *A. de I.*, 143-3-21, Indiferente General 1102, *Relacion de la plata y oro*, etc., House of Trade to the Crown, Seville, January 28, 1592; 139-7-14, Indiferente General 541, III, ff. 179 *et seq.*, the pearls and emeralds.

¹¹ *A. de I.*, 139-7-14, Indiferente General 541, III, various.

¹² *A. de I.*, 143-3-21, Indiferente General 1102, Duke de Medina Sidonia to the Crown, San Lucar, April 1, 1592.

than ten days before them,¹ and so they arrived in Cartagena before the merchantmen.²

This year's English privateers were already out. They swarmed like wasps. With various more or less definite objectives, alone or in small squadrons, they went adventuring along the Spanish coast and among the islands. Then, on the skirts, as it were, of the Mainland fleet itself, they bore away for Dominica or Trinidad,³ always ready to pounce upon stragglers. By arriving early in the Indies they hoped to pick up more or less valuable prizes in vessels converging on Cartagena or on Havana in anticipation of the fleet's coming. Surely among these English there was understanding that they were to gather off the west end of Cuba as summer ended, to take the plate, if they could, or at least to cut out prizes, from the Mainland or the New Spain fleet as the Spaniards passed Cape San Antonio, or to seize them off the north coast of Cuba, between La Sonda and Point Hicacos (near Matanzas) as the Spanish ships steered their difficult course for the haven of Havana. Again, as the combined fleets left that port for Spain, guarded though they were by the armada, the English dogged their crossing, sometimes sailing brazenly among them, hardly distinguishable from convoy units.⁴ This was the continuing pattern of Elizabeth's 'desultory war on Philip's trade' waged 'with weak squadrons and ever lessening returns'.⁵

Spanish documents make it plain that Hakluyt and Purchas did not succeed in recording all the English activities of the year 1592. Throughout the summer Elizabeth's desultory and sometimes unidentified warriors ranged the Main, from Coro to the Magdalena,⁶ trading where they could, taking what they might. They crossed back and forth among the Antilles and harried the settlements of Central America. Although they seized only insignificant prizes and sometimes encountered difficulties when they sought fresh food and water, they nevertheless threw the whole region into panic (some part of which was feigned).

Christopher Newport was out with 'a fleete of three ships and a pinnesse'. Possibly he had visited the Caribbean in 1591.⁷ Certainly he was to do so in 1594. Spanish documents appended concerning

¹ On March 19. *A. de I.*, 143-3-21, Indiferente General 1102, Medina Sidonia to Ybarra (?), March 20, 1592. He says elsewhere that this fleet moved so precipitously that many persons were left behind. It was hurried by news that Drake was putting to sea. Cf. Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 370.

² The frigates made Cartagena on May 19.

³ Newport fell with Dominica April 4/14; the Mainland fleet, May 1/April 18.

⁴ Document No. 86 *post*.

⁵ Corbett, *Successors of Drake*, p. 4.

⁶ Documents Nos. 91, enclosure; 95, 97 *post*.

⁷ Cf. Document No. 89 *post*.

his 1592 enterprize show that Twitt's account¹ of it is accurate down to very small details. In Spanish documents the editor has seen meagre mention of Newport's calls at Puerto Rico, Ocoa and La Yaguana.² Comparison of Twitt's account of his attack on Puerto Caballos with Document No. 89 *post* encourages the student to accept Twitt's word for the rest.³

After Newport possibly the next to sail⁴ was Captain John Middleton⁵ in the *Moonshine* with Captain Robert Frost⁶ on board. It would appear⁷ that off the coast of Spain they took a prize, of which Frost then assumed command. By the time these men appeared in the Indies (early June, 1592) they were three or four sail. They may have constituted a scouting party sent out by the Earl of Cumberland.⁸

Having refreshed themselves at Trinidad, they looked into the harbour of Margarita (still early June, 1592) where lay a vessel recently acquired by the Licentiate Manso de Contreras, incoming governor of Santa Marta.⁹ The licentiate said that he succeeded in driving these enemies off, but within a very short time appeared

¹ *Principal Navigations*, x, pp. 184 *et seq.*, '... voyage undertaken for the West Indies by M. Christopher Newport . . . Written by M. John Twitt of Harewich . . .'

² In *A. de I.*, 143-4-1, Indiferente General 1103, is a deposition made by Jayme de Ribas at Seville on July 10 to the effect that four English ships had visited Ocoa prior to his departure from the Indies on April 26, 1593. Cf. Document No. 96 *post* and others in *A. de I.*, 54-1-12 and 53-6-15, Santo Domingo 96 and 81, particularly a memorial in the last named *legajo*, Captain Juan Lopez Sequeria.

³ In *A. de I.*, 54-3-6, Santo Domingo 155, Diego Menéndez Valdés to the Crown, Puerto Rico, July 21, 1592, there is reference to 'two lots of negroes whom the English set ashore in the port of La Aguada in the months of April and May.' Cf. Twitt, *op. cit.*, p. 185; and p. 191 in the same volume.

⁴ On Good Friday, according to 'Resle', Document No. 91 *post*.

⁵ '... another of Cumberland's men . . .' according to Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 358. '... a detached privateer', according to G. C. Williamson, *op. cit.*, p. 76. Cf. *Principal Navigations*, VII, p. 41; VIII, p. 406.

⁶ Spanish documents seem to establish this name. Cf. various in *A. de I.*, 72-3-6, Santa Fé I, 113. It would be interesting to know if his mother's maiden name was Barrett. He cannot have been Captain Robert Crosse, since Crosse was at this very time more lucratively engaged in looting the great East India carrack *Madre de Dios* in the Azores. (*Principal Navigations*, VII, p. 113.) In August, 1594, Frost and ten companions were in the kindly hands of fellow countrymen among the Jesuits at Seville. The inquisition absolved them. The king was informed that they had become catholics and some said they wished to enter His Majesty's service. In December, 1594, the Council for Indies advised against executing the death sentence which had been passed upon them, recommending that they be exchanged for Portuguese prisoners held in England.

⁷ Document No. 91 *post*. ⁸ Documents Nos. 95, 97 *post*.

⁹ Documents Nos. 88, 97 *post*; but compare with No. 91 enclosure.

Benjamin Wood who, the licentiate declared, boarded and stripped the ship of all that he cared to take away.

Wood was in command of four vessels, owned by Lord Thomas Howard.¹ English sources have practically nothing to say of his voyage. Two of Wood's ships were blown off by storm. Bad weather also broke up Middleton's little squadron, but the other two of Wood's ships and two of Middleton's and Frost's ships (which had parted company not so very long before in the Azores) came together again (June 22, 1592) in the vicinity of Ycacos Point near Cartagena. There the latter had driven aground a frigate carrying wine. They enlisted Wood's help to loot it.

Governor Lodeña sent out a party to protect the frigate. The Spaniards laid an ambushade.² The English landed, possibly in some disorder—at least, separated into two parties. The Spanish horse and foot attacked them. Some were killed. Thirteen were captured, Captain Frost among these.

The smallest of his and Middleton's two vessels which had joined Wood's, had sunk the day before. The other, presumably Middleton's *Moonshine*, continued on a course which seems to have brought it off the south coast of Hayti in late June and back to the Main in August.³

Now, Captain William King of Ratcliff⁴ had come into the Caribbean by way of Dominica in the first half of April. Hakluyt's account⁵ would make it seem that his squadron was the nucleus of the enemy fleet which harassed the Spaniards at Havana, humiliating them by keeping that port as good as closed during the summer of 1592.

They were King's ships which engaged the galleys there as early as May when Governor Texeda forced them out to fight before the city.⁶ From the waterfront the population of the place watched what seems to have been a lively duel rendered a draw 'by reason of the increasing of the winde'. These antagonists fought again off Cabañas and the Spaniards seem to have had the worst of that encounter.⁷

As he lay north of Cabañas King was joined by the three vessels

¹ Document No. 91 *post*, enclosure.

² Documents Nos. 91, especially its enclosure; 93, 94, 100 *post*.

³ Document No. 97 *post*.

⁴ Monson, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

⁵ *Principal Navigations*, x, pp. 190-3. 'The voyage made . . . by William King, Captaine, M. Mone, M. How, and M. Boreman, owners, with the Salomon of 200 tunnes, and the Jane Bonaventure of 40 tunnes of Sir Henry Palmer from Ratcliffe the 26 of January 1592.'

⁶ Document No. 99 *post*.

⁷ *Principal Navigations*, x, p. 192. Cf. Document No. 92 *post*.

which represented Master John Watts in the Indies in 1592. They were in command of Captain William Lane.¹ There came up also 'Captaine Roberts in the *Exchange*, a ship of Bristol' and Master Benjamin Wood with Howard's four ships.² Texeda counted them carefully³ as they passed before Havana, tacking back and forth between Coximar and the Chorrera.

King's ships stood in so close that the governor used his batteries to drive them back.⁴ Texeda says⁵ that the English answer to his guns proved the inferiority of their artillery. The campmaster seems to have judged correctly that the enemy would not attempt to force an entrance to the bay but the people of the city cannot have felt certain that English audacity would not undertake even that.

Despite all he could do by sea and land, the English carried off one good prize from under Texeda's very nose.⁶ This was a ship out of Honduras which they took to England with what of her cargo (sarsaparilla, indigo, hides, balsam, etc.) the Spaniards had not been able to remove when they saved the people and the plate.

It is impossible from Spanish documents to determine what organization the English in the Indies in 1592 had, if they had any. Texeda thought he saw three flagships (Middleton? Wood? King? Lane for Watts?) and a vice-admiral. Cumberland, Howard, Palmer and the merchants of London and Bristol were surely represented in the 'foregathering' of heretic 'thieves' and 'drunkards' off his coast whom the arrogant and helpless governor of Cuba despised.⁷ By the end of August as 'the hurricane season' approached, they disappeared. Probably not all of them sailed for home.⁸

Texeda believed⁹ that the English off Havana in the summer of 1592 were awaiting the arrival of the Earl of Cumberland with a squadron. As a matter of fact that 'redoubted lord' was doing his best to get away from Plymouth with the expedition he presently turned over to Captain Norton and sent to the Azores.¹⁰ Further

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

² '... with captaine Kenel of Limehouse captaine of the Cantar of Weymouth.'
Ibid.

³ Document No. 95 *post.*

⁴ *Ibid.* Document No. 92 *post.*

⁵ Document No. 95 *post.*

⁶ Documents Nos. 98, 99 *post.*

⁷ Document No. 92 *post.* Newport was at Flores by the end of June, according to *Principal Navigations*, vii, pp. 112, 113.

⁸ There is some evidence in Spanish documents dated 1594 that one unit of Cumberland's squadron, perhaps Middleton in the *Moonshine*, wintered in the Indies.

⁹ Documents Nos. 91, 92, 95, 100 *post.*

¹⁰ Williamson, *op. cit.*, pp. 63 *et seq.* It would be interesting to know (cf. Document No. 95 *post.*) whether ill health influenced Cumberland's decision to resign command to Norton in 1592. In 1593 the earl was very sick indeed.

study of English sources must determine whether Elizabeth's shifting policy and the resultant uncertainty and delay which at this time disheartened Cumberland (and Raleigh) did indeed frustrate a design on Havana, i.e., on the plate either approaching that harbour or sheltered in it.

It had been the intention to send Oribe Apallua to the Indies with a strong armada to bring the 1592 fleets home in safety. Before the end of April this plan was necessarily abandoned and Luis Alfonso Flores was ordered¹ to escort the Tierra Firme fleet to Havana. Similarly, Martin Perez de Olazabal, who had brought a New Spain fleet into Vera Cruz at the end of September, 1591,² was instructed to proceed to that port.

Aware that enemies lay in wait, Luis Alfonso Flores with the frigates and Francisco de Leiva with the Mainland fleet remained at Cartagena until their course was clear.³ They did not come into Havana until early October, 1592. Not until two months later did Martin Perez appear with the New Spain fleet.⁴ He had lost some ships at sea by storm. As said, the enemy had vanished before the approach of hurricane weather but they had lingered long enough to compel the Spaniards to navigate dangerous seas in the most dangerous period of the year. In the middle of November orders were issued according to which frigates and fleets wintered in Havana.⁵

Not until 9 March, 1593, did they set sail for home, being about 40 sail, three warships among them. The vice-admiral of the New Spain fleet was lost in the vicinity of Bermuda. Martin Perez de Olazabal died suddenly at sea. By the end of April, however, the frigates had set safely ashore at La Terceira the bullion, the pearls, the emeralds. By the end of July, 1593, that treasure had reached Seville⁶ of which the English seamen dreamed in vain even as they

¹ *A. de I.*, 139-2-1, Indiferente General 433, II, ff. 85 reverse, 92, 93 reverse, 94 reverse, etc.; 167 *et seq.*

² *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109, various, among them Martin Perez de Olazabal to the House of Trade, San Juan de Ulua, November 26, 1591.

³ *A. de I.*, 42-1-10/5, Contratación 5110, General don Francisco Martinez de Leiva to the House of Trade, from Havana, October 8, 1592; 140-7-36, Indiferente General 742, for a narrative of the voyage and a despatch, Luis Alfonso Flores to the House of Trade, from Havana, October 8, 1592.

⁴ *A. de I.*, 42-1-10/5, Contratación 5110, Martin Perez de Olazabal to the House of Trade, Havana, December 22, 1592.

⁵ *A. de I.*, 139-2-1, Indiferente General 433, II, f. 180 reverse, *órdula* to Luis Alfonso Flores, from Viana de Navarra, November 15, 1592 and others immediately following.

⁶ *A. de I.*, 153-2-3, Indiferente General 2686, depositions of Julian de la Vimera and others; Bernabe de Pedroso to the Crown, Lisbon, May 7; Vicente Gonzalez to

gathered in the hides, the brazilwood, the indigo, the sarsaparilla, the ginger, the sugar they pilfered from coast wise traders or occasionally took from little more formidable merchantmen and sent home in their staunchest prizes to glut the London market for these goods.¹

Now, the destruction of the *Revenge* meant more to England than the loss of a good ship and of her bizarre commander.² It dramatized the emergence of Spain as a naval power to be reckoned with in deadly earnest. Obviously Elizabeth's warfare on Philip's sources of economic strength, much as it disturbed business, had failed to interrupt the flow of American revenues into Spanish coffers. There 'the wealth of the Indies' was transmuted into warships of the new *armada de la averia*.³ Other more direct, more aggressive tactics were demanded in 1593 if a second Spanish attempt to invade England was to be averted. Elizabeth once more turned from her 'scribes' to her people and to her outstanding man of war by sea. He was recalled to royal favour⁴ and the Spanish Indies felt an ominous chill as coming events again cast over the Caribbean and mainland coasts the frightening shadow of Sir Francis Drake.

Ybarra, same place and date; 143-4-1, Indiferente General 1103, Francisco Martinez de Leyba to the Crown, San Miguel, April 28; Luis Alfonso Florez to the Crown, La Terceira, April 29; Don Pedro de Alcega (succeeding Martin Perez de Olazabal) to Crown, off Cascaes, May 25; the House of Trade to the Crown, Seville, August 20, 1593; 152-2-15, Indiferente General 2597, Coloma to Ybarra and to the Crown, Cadiz, July 24, 1593.

¹ Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 368.

² The student will have observed a reference to this incident at the end of Document No. 85.

³ This fleet was paid for out of a general average tax on colonial trade.

⁴ Corbett, *Successors of Drake*, pp. 4, 5, 7.

Document No. 1¹

[Diego Menéndez de Valdés² to the Crown, Puerto Rico,
July 30, 1583]

(p. 1)

†

Catholic Royal Majesty

On Friday, the 26th instant, a letter and advice reached me from Salamanca³ to the effect that on Monday, the 22nd, seven vessels had arrived in Port Vargas, which is in this island and on that coast, toward the west, 30 leagues from here, five of them being large ships, one a shallop⁴ and one a pinnace. When they had anchored, from aboard the pinnace they asked the people on shore where Puerto Rico⁵ was, said they had come in only to repair one of their ships which was damaged, demanded refreshment, and declared that they intended no harm. Those on shore inquired who was in command and whether Don Antonio was with them. There was some talking among them before a reply was made, after which they answered that it was Mr. William Hawkins only. Forthwith they set about repairing their ship, and the shallop and pinnace were sent to explore the ports thereabouts.

Within an hour after I received this letter I sent a despatch-bark for Santo Domingo with the letter itself, that they might inform the galleys, which it seems are at La Yaguana, and warn Havana, whither I would have sent word direct if I had had a suitable vessel which could have sailed with requisite promptitude.

That night, from this city I sent out one⁶ of the men best suited to

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-3-20, Santo Domingo 169. 2 *pliegos*, original. Duplicated in 147-6-5, Indiferente General 1887.

² His Majesty's governor of the island of San Juan de Puerto Rico.

³ The settlement of San German, at Guadianilla, moved inland to protect itself from Caribs and pirates and took the name of New Salamanca.

⁴ . . . *chalupa* . . . 'A "shallop" was the Spanish equivalent to the English "pinnace", and had oars.'—Corbett, Sir Julian, *Drake and the Tudor Navy* (London 1912), I, p. 159, n. 1.

⁵ Meaning the city of San Juan. At the time, the town was Puerto Rico and the island was San Juan, a nomenclature which has since been reversed.

⁶ This man was *Alcalde* Diego Rodriguez Castellanos; cf. Documents Nos. 4 and 5. Menéndez de Valdés' instructions to him, dated July 27, 1582 (preserved in

meet this emergency to assemble what fighting men there are there, and to prevent the enemy from landing to obtain water and information. He is to keep me advised. I sent out two others, one along the north shore and the other along the south, to reconnoitre those ports and report.

The one who went to the south coast returned today with a letter from the *alcalde* of Salamanca which it seems the messenger took from a courier he met on the way, who was bringing it to me. This letter relates that the next morning after those above mentioned had arrived, three large ships appeared off El Desecho, which is about eight leagues from where they lay. The shallop of the fleet of seven which was off the coast, on sighting these ships went to them (p. 2) and immediately returned to its own vessels. These made sail forthwith, the one having been repaired. They steered for La Mona, which is on the course for Santo Domingo. The three which had just come up joined them but because night fell those watching could not see whether they sailed eastward along the north coast toward this city, as they might do.

This messenger whom I sent along the south coast, who brought me the letter, reported that on Monday the 22nd nineteen sail passed along that south shore past Coamo, and the following Wednesday a ship entered the port of Bayamo which is near there, struck sail and fired a gun. It must have been looking for some pinnace it had sent to reconnoitre and when it did not find it, made sail.

I would add that the fleet of seven sail asked the people on shore if they wanted to barter for women, and inquired who was governor of Puerto Rico.

It is my opinion that the nineteen vessels which passed along the south coast on Monday were the New Spain fleet because on the pre-

A. de I., 54-3-20, Santo Domingo 169, interrogatory and depositions concerning services he rendered at this time) were to reconnoitre, to report, to prevent the enemy from taking on water or subsistence and from trading, and to capture a prisoner. The questionnaire and replies show that on the third day out from San Juan he arrived at Punta de la Canoa, where Hawkins' fleet then lay. On July 31 from ambush, his force being himself and seven men, he watched the English take on water. They were about 150 men. When three boatloads had returned he fell upon two men who were washing clothes in the stream, took one alive and made off with him, despite pursuit.

This prisoner's name was Robert. Under torture he 'divulged the enemy's design and that they were thieves and among those who went to sack Isla de Fuego near Cape Verde.' See also *A. de I.*, 143-3-16, Indiferente General 1097, deposition, Antonio Gonzalez, Seville, May 9, 1584. Despite search the editor did not find Robert's deposition.

ceding Saturday night a ship which put in here had left that fleet off Guadalupe, although at the best it might be further on its way, but not much. That the whole fleet was not sighted might be because the rest of its ships were further out. The ship which passed Coamo on Wednesday I take to belong with the seven, and suppose that for their purposes they were to rendezvous at La Mona since it is a small place from which warning cannot be sent to these islands.

This fleet must have been driven into Port Vargas by necessity (to repair the ship) since that is a dead port. It is evident the ships put in for no other purpose because when a flag was displayed on shore and a light shown they would not land nor await refreshment, as corsairs do and those who come to barter. Instead, as soon as the ship had been repaired they departed, as I have said.

God protect Santo Domingo and Havana, and preserve us ourselves because from the indications, here reported, I am convinced that this is a very strong fleet and intends to locate a site for an establishment . . . (p. 8) . . .

. . . Puerto Rico, the fortress, July 30, 1583.

Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's humble servant kisses Your Catholic Royal Majesty's feet.

Diego Menéndez de Valdés (Rubric)

Document No. 2¹

[Captain Juan Melgarejo² to the Crown, San Juan de Puerto, July 30, 1583]

(p. 1)

†

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

. . . On the 22nd of this month seven ships arrived at Port Bargas on this coast, of which five were heavy galleons and two were shallops. They spoke to the people of San German, said that they were English driven up from Brazil, and that they sought a river mouth with water sufficient to allow them to overhaul their vessels and

¹ *A. de I.*, 147-6-5, Indiferente General 1887. 1 *pliego*, original.

² Presently high sheriff in Santo Domingo. Cf. Documents Nos. 12 and 56 *post*.

remain three or four days. It seems their idea was to await the rest of their fleet. They asked for this city and inquired who was governor and demanded to know his name. They said their general was William Hawkins.¹ Judging by what they have understood, the people of Guadianilla say the commander is Don Antonio of Crato.

Today, Tuesday the 30th, word arrived that off El Desecho three other large vessels had appeared and that one of the shallops went out to reconnoitre them and, having done so, the signal being given, the vessels weighed and all ten came together. The messenger who brought this news said that from a height which overlooked the sea he counted the vessels of the fleet and they were thirteen.

They write that there are many women aboard. Therefore some think they intend to settle in this island. I take a different view because in order to settle they must fortify, and nowhere better than on the island this city occupies where there is so (p. 2) good a harbour. Since they could have done this without beating back eastward and dismasting and stripping their vessels in the hurricane² season, I am convinced (especially if Don Antonio is aboard, as they say) . . . that they will fall upon Havana . . . (p. 3).

. . . Puerto Rico, July 30, 1583.

Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's servant kisses Your Majesty's royal feet.

Captain Juan Melgarejo (Rubric).

Document No. 3³

[Don Juan Sarmiento de Villadrando⁴ to the Crown, La Margarita, October 20, 1583]

(p. 1)

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Catholic Royal Majesty

. . . On June 3 of the present year of '83 an English corsair named William Hawkins arrived at this island with the greatest force in

¹ Don Guillen de Acles.

² 'The hurricane season' in the West Indies is August and September, or, lately, September and October, a slow shifting toward the end of the year being quite noticeable.

³ *A. de I.*, 54-4-6, Santo Domingo 184. 1 *pliego*, original.

⁴ His Majesty's governor of La Margarita.

men and ships ever seen in these parts. He lay at anchor in a port of this island, seeking to land. Observing how well defended it was, he remained within his ships, and with a pinnace and a dredge sought to bring up pearls. I learned that he got some and carried away samples of them.

From here he went to Puerto Rico and La Española where, thank God, he has done no damage since everywhere I had sent warning of his arrival at this island . . .

. . . La Margarita, October 20, 1583.

Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's servant kisses your Majesty's royal hands.

Don Juan Sarmiento de Villadrando (Rubric).

Document No. 4¹

[The municipal authorities to the Crown, San Juan de Puerto Rico, October 22, 1583]

(p. 1)

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Catholic Royal Majesty . . .

(p. 2) . . . By the latest ship to leave here advice was sent Your Majesty to the effect that seven English ships carrying many men and much artillery, captain said to be one Hawkins, had arrived off the San German coast of this island in Port Vargas, an event which occasioned no little alarm in this city. The outcome was that this fleet departed from this island without doing damage, thanks to the activity, valour and efficiency of the captain named for this purpose.

He is Diego Rodriguez Castellanos, *alcalde ordinario* of this city. Sent by the governor to learn the enemy's purpose, he went to where the fleet lay and with only seven men, whom he assembled on that coast, attacked the whole party the fleet had sent ashore. He lay in wait for them in the bush and fell upon them unexpectedly. Believing our force to be greater than it was, the enemy reembarked in his boats and fled. He captured two Englishmen; one he killed with lance-thrusts and the other he sent to this city, from whom

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-3-7, Santo Domingo 164. 1 *pliego*, original.

under torture applied before he was hanged it was learned that this fleet formed part of that which sacked Cape Verde.

Diego Rodriguez de Castellanos also took from them two negro slaves who are serving Your Majesty in work on the fort.

Because of this the enemy did not dare to land again, and departed without having done any damage. On what course they went is not known.¹

Inasmuch as the *alcalde* exposed himself to danger and rendered this service at his own expense, he merits reward of Your Majesty.

Our Lord preserve Your Majesty's Catholic royal person many years with increase of greater kingdoms and dominions.

In Puerto Rico, October 22, 1583.

Catholic Royal Majesty

We, Your Majesty's loyal vassals, kiss Your Majesty's royal hands.

Diego Rodriguez de Castellanos
Diego de Cuellar Daca
Francisco Alegre
Luis Perez del Rincon (Rubrics.)

Document No. 5²

[Diego Menéndez de Valdés to the Crown, San Juan de Puerto Rico, October 24, 1583]

(p 1)

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Catholic Royal Majesty

On July 30 I sent a ship with a despatch³ and advice for Your Majesty concerning the corsair fleet off this coast. A duplicate is enclosed. I will here report what followed.

Diego Rodriguez de Castellanos, the person I sent out under orders with what men he could raise on that coast to prevent this

¹ 'Concerning the English corsair who was in this island in the month of June . . . I have had no news . . .'—Diego Menéndez de Valdés to the Crown, Puerto Rico, January 4, 1584, in *A. de I.*, 54-3-6, Santo Domingo 155.

² *A. de I.*, 54-3-6, Santo Domingo 155. 2 *pliegos*, original.

³ Document No. 1.

corsair from obtaining water and subsistence and information, arrived at San German where the enemy was anchored. Being on watch with six men he saw about 150 English embark, and when he observed that few remained upon the beach he attacked these with his six men and came upon two English, alone.

One of these was killed and the other taken prisoner. Although the ships which lay at anchor very close in came to their aid with artillery, which they fired, and landed a large force of men who went into the bush after our six, they could not overtake them.

The fleet immediately made sail and came beating eastward toward this port for seven or eight leagues along the north shore. It came to anchor in another port but did not land men, presumably out of fear of an ambushade. One night it altered its course and nothing more has been seen of it.

The person I sent to reconnoitre found that they were seven ships. The others which joined them as they left Cape Rojo, as I wrote, must not have been of their company, and so went off.

This Englishman was brought to me and I examined him under torture which I ordered to be applied. I send his confession¹ with this despatch.

Two negroes from the same fleet were brought to me with the Englishman. They speak Spanish well and say they were captured in Isla de Fuego although the Englishman says they bought them there. They agree as to the course followed and events which befell the fleet after it left Santiago in the Cape Verde islands, and as to the number of men and armament, although not in such full particulars. These negroes say they are free men and while this is being looked into they have been deposited with Your Majesty's officials and are working with the rest on the improvement of the fortress.

I ordered the Englishman to be hanged . . . (p. 7) . . .

. . . from Puerto Rico, October 24, 1583.

Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's humble servant kisses Your Majesty's royal feet.

Diego Menéndez de Valdés (Rubric).

¹ Not seen. Cf. Document No. 1, *ante*, p. 1, n. 6.

Document No. 6¹

[An Irish gentleman to Cornelius, bishop of Killaloe, —, April 6, 1585]

(p. 1)

†

What they write to Cornelius, bishop of — in Ireland in letters dated April 6, 1585.

That Sir Richard Grenville and Francis Drake (the one who went to Peru) are in England with a great fleet and that among Drake's ships are two of the queen's, one called the *Madalena* and the other the *Bonadventure*, which are the largest and most important vessels she has. That the queen goes into this to worry His Majesty, whom she fears. That Drake has now been knighted in consideration of the wealth he brought from the Indies; and because the queen believes him lucky she has given him command of this fleet. That his intention is to look for His Majesty's ships as they come from the Indies, to relieve them of the gold, silver and jewels they carry. That on April 6 they had not yet left for this purpose but were working hard to get away.

They also write him that in England the parliament is considering giving open support against His Majesty to the rebel states of Flanders; but they do not say what support they will furnish these states.

He who writes this is a principal gentleman of Ireland to whom entire faith and credit may be given.

¹ *A. de I.*, 42-1-7/2, Contratación 5107. 1 *pliego*, copy. This was undoubtedly an enclosure with some despatch from Don Alvaro de Bazan to the House of Trade; see his of April 30, 1585, in *A. de I.*, 41-6-1/36, Contratación 5101; and of December 19, in 42-1-7/2, Contratación 5107, wherein the marquis describes the recipient of these advices as 'Bishop Cornelius whom His Majesty entertains in this city', i.e., a royal pensioner and, evidently, spy. He was Cornelius Ryan (or O'Ryan or O'Mulrian), papal bishop of Killaloe from 1576 to 1616 (R. Bagwell, *Ireland under the Tudors*, III *passim*.) This identification was kindly provided by Professor Quinn.

Document No. 7¹

[Diego Menéndez de Valdés to ———², San Juan de Puerto Rico, June 7, 1585]

(p. 1)

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Very Illustrious Sir

(p. 2) . . . On the 20th ultimo news reached me that at Las Boquillas³ (south coast of this island, some ten leagues east of our port of Guadianilla) a ship lay anchored which had landed men on the beach. Since ships pass daily and take in water along that coast, I supposed this was merely another one, and ordered that watch be kept upon it. On the 4th instant I received word that at that place there were two large vessels, that they had landed some 400 men and built a breastwork and trenches and were felling logs and constructing pinnaces, and that my lieutenant at San German (which is the place whither Guadianilla removed, and it is called Salamanca) had arrived where they were, with 40 men. Instantly I sent 35 arquebusiers to join him that all together they might endeavour to fall upon the corsairs as they went out to cut timber or take in water. A day's march out, these troops received a letter from my lieutenant saying that the corsairs had gone.

They left on the first of the current month. A post was brought me on which they left written, in wretched hand, the message enclosed herewith.⁴

A great breastwork was built, with a moat, and a long stretch of beach enclosed with (p. 3) trenches, huts erected and a smithy; and all in as great perfection as though they had purposed to remain there ten years.

To a flag of truce which they displayed my lieutenant sent to the centre of the beach two men to meet another two who said they were English and carried merchandise for barter at very good price, and that they were bound for New Spain, to trade. This is unlikely.

Arrived at Mona, these English took a bark belonging to Santo Domingo which was coming here for cargo, and next day they took a large frigate which was coming up from Santo Domingo laden with

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-3-6, Santo Domingo 155. 1 *pliego*, copy.

² To some fellow official in the Indies, perhaps in Havana. On the same date he wrote in similar sense to the House of Trade, a letter preserved in *A. de I.*, 42-1-7/2, *Contratación* 5107.

³ Grenville's Mosquito Bay.

⁴ Not found; but see Document No. 9 *post*.

clothing brought over by certain ships of Lorenzo de Vallejo's who crossed with the fleet. With malicious intentions and good weather Vallejo had permitted himself to be driven into Santo Domingo.

I assure your honour that when this news arrived the agitation and confusion among these poor citizens, who are ruined, was such that it seemed the greatest pity in the world! Immediately the owners went to see if they could ransom their misery. I do not know if it could be arranged.

It is said that three large ships and two pinnaces remain at San German. . . . (p. 4). . . .

. . . Puerto Rico, June 7, 1585.

Very illustrious sir

Your honour's servitor kisses your honour's hands.

Diego Menéndez de Valdés.

. . . After the above was written another courier reached me. My lieutenant writes that as ransom for the frigates they demand hogs, sows, young cattle, mares, horses, and that they do not wish to ransom the clothing. I have ordered him to give them nothing of the sort because unquestionably it is to establish a settlement, I don't know where; and certainly they expect four more ships. . . .

Document No. 8¹

[Diego Fernandez de Quiñones² to the president and judges³ of the House of Trade, Havana, June 23, 1585]

(p. 1)

+

Very Illustrious Sir

. . . five vessels (three large ships and two pinnaces) put into the port of Guadianilla on the south coast of the island of Puerto Rico and there built a fort and remained the length of time stated in the account⁴ which Don Diego de Alcega is furnishing to your lordship.

¹ *A. de I.*, 42-1-7/2, Contratación 5107. 1 *pliego*, original.

² For His Majesty warden of La Fuerza, Havana's fortress.

³ It will be recalled that the House of Trade (*Casa de la Contratación*) as an institution was addressed in the singular and entitled 'to the treatment of lordship.' So also were *Audiencias*.

⁴ Preserved in *A. de I.*, 41-6-1/36, Contratación 5101. The letter is dated Havana, June 22, 1585, and Document No. 9 *post* is the better version. In the first, however, Acega adds that it was a Fleming in his fleet who translated into Spanish the English carved upon the tree trunk at San German.

The governor of Puerto Rico informed Pedro Menéndez Marqués and me that these five ships were in San German harbour in that island and that as ransom they demanded horses, mares, yearlings, sucking pigs.

And yesterday, the 22nd of this month, there came into this port a vessel out of (p. 2) Puerto de Plata the master of which told Pedro Menéndez Marqués and me that five large vessels had arrived at Puerto de Plata. Of these five, one was a galleasse. He says that the person who sails in this galleasse is treated as a person of authority, with great respect and display of silver plate, and it was rumoured and stated that he is Don Antonio. He says these vessels called at the port of La Isabela in that island and as ransom demanded mares, horses, horned cattle and sheep, bits and saddles, and that on board the galleasse they had horses which he understood they had obtained in Puerto de Plata.

On the south coast of this island, at Cape Cruz, two other large vessels appeared, all in conformity with the advices I received from your lordship . . . (p. 3) . . .

. . . Havana, June 23, 1585.

Very Illustrious Sir

Your lordship's truest servitor kisses your lordship's very illustrious hands.

Diego Fernandez de Quiñones (Rubric).

Document No. 9¹

[Don Diego de Alcega² to the president and officials of the House of Trade, Havana, June 23, 1585]

(p. 1)

†

Very Illustrious Sir

. . . the governor of Puerto Rico says that three large ships and two small ones arrived at Guadianilla on the south side of that

¹ *A. de I.*, 42-1-7/2, Contratación 5107. 1/2 *pliego*, original.

² Commanding the New Spain fleet. In the omitted portion of this despatch he states that he left San Juan de Ulua on May 19 and on arriving in Havana found a warning against Drake.

island and there landed 400 men and erected a fort with a moat, inside of which they built certain pinnaces and set up a smithy. There they seized two frigates which were coming up from Santo Domingo and in exchange for their release demanded swine, yearlings, mares and horses. The governor understood that these things were wanted for some new settlement and did not permit the exchange, and so the business ended at that.

Cut into the bole of a tree in Gothic letters in the English language they left a statement which, translated into our tongue, reads: 'On May 11th we reached this place with the *Tiger* and on the 19th the *Elizabeth* came up and we are about to leave on the 23rd in good health, glory be to God. 1585.' . . .

Havana, June 23, 1585.

Very Illustrious Sir

Your lordship's humblest servant kisses your lordship's hand.

(Rubric).¹

Document No. 10²

[Enrique Lopez, Fayal, about November 18, 1585]

(p. 1)

†

Statement made by Enrique Lopez, resident in the city of Lisbon, who arrived in the island of Fayal on November 18, '85, in search of a vessel in which to continue on his way with certain companions who, having been robbed, were set ashore at the island of Flores.

He says that he and other merchants embarked as passengers in the ship called *Santa Maria de San Vincente*, master Alonso Corniele, native of Seville. This vessel left from the harbour of the city of Santo Domingo in La Española as flagship of seventeen others which set out in its convoy laden with hides and sugars and other merchandise. They were bound for the city of Seville, to which these cargoes were consigned.

He says that the entire fleet came to anchor at Ocoa, which is in that island, from where they made sail on the first day of July of this

¹ Equivalent to Alcega's signature.

² *A. de I.*, 153-1-6, Indiferente General 2661. 1 *pliego*, possibly a summary, and presumably of a deposition (not seen). The document is neither dated nor signed.

year on a course for Havana, there to join the Tierra Firme and New Spain fleets in continuance of their voyage. And after 30 days they came to anchor within the port of Havana and four days after they had arrived the Tierra Firme fleet came into that harbour, with General don Antonio Osorio in command.

He says that four days after the Tierra Firme fleet entered they all made sail, being some 33 vessels, on a course for Spain and eight days later disembogued. They had sailed on for two days and one night when the sea rose and the wind blew against them in such fashion that they had to strike sail and lie in a cross sea, and so remained all night, supposing that all the rest of the fleet would do the same. When day broke, however, they could discover only six or seven sail, all in one direction, and immediately made sail to follow and overtake the fleet. This they were unable to do, although they tried.

He says that since they could not overtake the fleet they kept on their course after it until they were just about athwart Bermuda. When they had reached this position, on September 4, about ten o'clock in the morning, they discovered a sail following in their wake which they thought was some one of the units of the fleet which had lagged, as some usually do, and, assuming this, they took in sail and waited for her, that the ships might continue on their voyage together.

And as they lay in this fashion the vessel came up, having the wind, and as she did so they fired a round of artillery to salute her in token of amity. Whereupon the ship opened fire (p. 2) and bore down on them, firing her guns with the intention of disabling them, and so cut up their rigging that they were disabled. Then recognizing that this was a corsair which intended to rob them, they made sail, hoping to get away, for they had neither arms nor artillery with which to defend themselves. One man on board was killed, four or five were injured, and two shots struck near the water line, so that they were sinking. In order not to go down they struck sail and lay in a cross sea. They could do nothing else because their ship was badly damaged.

The corsair then lowered a boat with 30 armed soldiers and a captain whom they called their general, named Richard Grenville. It was said that he left England with 14 ships for the Indies.

They say that as the English general and his men boarded he ordered the master and the rest on board to hand over all the gold and silver and other things they had in the vessel, promising that he would do them no bodily hurt. The passengers gave up the keys to their boxes and he unlocked some and broke open others and removed many lots of gold and silver and pearls which were in them.

He took possession of the ship's register and according to it demanded the gold and silver and pearls entered on it, and it was all delivered to him, nothing missing. The total was over 40,000 ducats.

He says that after he had taken possession of the ship the Englishman ordered twenty of its seamen to be taken to his vessel, which was done. This left only 22 persons, passengers and seamen, on board of theirs.

He says that after he had captured this ship with the aforesaid consignments of gold and silver and pearls and 200 boxes of sugar of 40 *arrobas* each, and 7000 hides and a thousand hundredweight of ginger and other merchandise, to a total value of 120,000 ducats, the Englishman kept his prize with him. The two vessels continued on a course to within 400 leagues of these islands, where, in a storm, the vessels were separated and they never saw the English ship again.

He says that the English general and 36 of his men had remained on the *Santa Maria de San Vincente* and now kept on their course with it alone. All on board suffered great hardship and want because they had almost no supplies, for the corsair had removed most of those they had had to his ship, being in need of them. It came to a point where they had only a few oats a day, cooked in (p. 3) salt water, and so continued until October 12 when they sighted the island of Flores.

He says that as soon as they sighted the land they approached it, that some craft might come out and show them the harbour, in order to anchor in it; and the general ordered that none of the Englishmen should speak or appear, but only the seamen and passengers of the captured vessel; and he asked that a boat with five men should be sent out to him. When these had come alongside he took them on board by force and made them prisoners, and told them that he would not release them until he was given the supplies he needed, for which he would pay. Recognizing that he was a corsair, the people of the island did not wish to furnish him supplies. One of the principal passengers in the ship (among those who had been robbed) then landed and begged the people of the island to sell them the supplies they wanted, for if they refused the English would throw him and his companions overboard to drown, and they would so be made to suffer for it. They believed that the general had determined to do this. Therefore, to avoid it, the people of the island sold the English the supplies they needed.

He says that as soon as the corsair had received these supplies on board he set deponent and the other seamen and passengers¹ on

¹ Not all were released. Some were carried into England. Cf. Document No. 65, *post.*

shore, in all about 22 persons, and as they left the ship to go to land he stripped them all to see whether they were carrying off anything hidden.

He says that this English corsair's ship was built like a galliase, was a swift sailer and carried a good armament and equipment, two tiers of ordnance on each side, and many fireworks. That the pilot was one Simon Fernandez, Portuguese, a native of La Terceira.

In talking with some of the private persons who accompanied the said Richard Grenville, they were told that in the Indies the English had been at Puerto Rico, on the north side of the island, where they took two frigates carrying merchandise, and from there with five ships went to Florida, where they nearly wrecked on certain shoals. There in Florida the general disembarked about 300 men with orders to begin to fortify for a settlement, and he sent a frigate to England with orders to have equipment and munitions ready for him upon his arrival that he might return immediately to where he left these people.

(p. 4). That Richard Grenville seemed to be a man of quality, for he was served elaborately on silver and gold plate, by servants. Many musical instruments were played when he dined, and his appearance was that of an important person.

Document No. 11¹

[The Licentiate Aliaga² to the Crown, Santo Domingo,
November 30, 1585]

(p. 1)

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. . . *Catholic Royal Majesty*

Two of the English ships which left England for these parts at the beginning of the present year were almost two months in the island of Puerto Rico, building a vessel. And when the people of the island came up to drive them out of there, they had sailed.

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-4-11, Santo Domingo 51. 1 *pliego*, original.

² The Licentiate Francisco de Aliaga was *fiscal* (Crown counsel) of the *Audiencia* of Santo Domingo; his commission, dated Madrid, September, 1585, is to be found in *A. de I.*, 76-3-9, Santo Domingo 900, H 5, f. 12 reverse.

From there they came to the north coast of this island, where they were some days, with five ships. These were their own two ships and the one they built. One of the other two was a frigate they took which was carrying clothing from this island to that of Puerto Rico. In it they captured some persons. They did them no harm whatsoever. At the place called Guadianilla, which is in the said island of Puerto Rico, they wanted to exchange the frigate for horses and cattle. These were not forthcoming; which seeing, the Englishman set the prisoners ashore and went off with the frigate and its cargo. The other vessel was a Frenchman whom he took in crossing to this island.

Captain Rengifo de Angulo, warden of the fortress at Puerto de Plata, who died some six days ago, met the general commanding these English four leagues below Puerto de Plata. According to what he understood from them, they were going to settle on the Florida coast up toward the Newfoundland Banks.

They carried 30 pieces of artillery and 500 men and some women. They were taking with them many plants of those parts, and horses and cattle of all kinds. It has not been possible to learn where they got them.

I report that Your Majesty may apply a remedy to this . . . (p. 2) . . .

. . . Santo Domingo, the last of November, 1585.

Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's servant.

The Licentiate Aliaga (Rubric).

Document No. 12¹

[Licentiate Aliaga to the Crown, Xagua (La Española),
January 13, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Catholic Royal Majesty

The last day of December of last year a Portuguese frigate was by stress of weather driven into the harbour of Santo Domingo, from

¹ *A. de I.*, 53-4-11, Santo Domingo 51. 1 *pliego*, original.

which we had news that 80 galleons had sailed from England and that 30 of them had sacked the island of Cape Verde.¹ On the 12th² instant 34 sail appeared off the port of this city, among which there were only 11 pinnaces or frigates; the rest were galleons from 400 tons, the largest, down to 200 tons, the smallest. What troops they carry may be deduced.

That night four galleons and nine of the pinnaces sailed past, to Hayna inlet. This is a small port three leagues from the city. There they landed nine companies, being about 1400 men, 800 musketeers and harquebusiers, the rest pikes and halberds.

Next day, the 11th of the month, about two o'clock, they arrived within sight of the city and took it almost without any resistance whatever, many of its inhabitants having escaped with what they could carry and hidden in the bush and on estates. The cash in Your Majesty's treasury, which I believe to have been about 50,000 ducats, could not be saved, although I reported it to the president. The shortness of time and his perturbation did not permit. There were some 12,000 ducats in silver and gold, and the rest in the currency of the country. They have occupied the city and fortress and do not come out.

What occurred before the city's capture is that about six months ago Licentiate Cristóbal de Ovalle, president of this *Audiencia*, received a letter from San Lucar, from Licentiate Armenteros, *alcalde de corte* of the *Audiencia* at Granada, which warned him to be on guard for there was reliable news of the said fleet to the effect that it had left England for these parts. Despite both warnings he lived as carelessly as the unhappy event demonstrates.

I advised him to write into the interior of the island, to summon people to this city, and to make ready the ships which were in the harbour, and to hold musters of the available foot and (p. 2) horse, and to assign these men to their advisable posts and places, and to give each one his orders what to do, where to present himself, and to keep look-outs along all the coast who with fire signals might warn the city, and to provide the fortress with powder and munitions. I believe that he did not do it because the residents here assured him that it was impossible to land men at the port of Hayna.

¹ For a description of this raid see *A. de I.*, 143-3-16, Indiferente General 1097, Alvaro Mendez de Castro to President Hernando de Vega of the Council for Indies, from Lisbon, February 8, 1586, and its numerous enclosures. Cf. Castellanos' *Discurso*, Canto II, p. 303:

'... un portugues que vio la maldad hecha ...
A grandes voces dice que navega ...'

² *Sic.*

When the English galleons appeared I begged him to select a dozen persons of experience and to go into council with them and to carry out such council's resolutions, for he listened to the views of everybody in the city, and decided nothing. He would not do so. In view of his failure to act, Licentiate Juan Fernandez de Mercado and Baltazar de Villafañe ordered the fortress and the few harquebusiers there to be provided with powder and munitions. They fortified the harbour in such manner that it was impossible for this fleet to enter it (as it did not enter). They laid three ships across the bar, with leaks bored, that they might sink in that position. It was held impossible for the enemy to enter by way of Hayna.

Four hours before they took the city it was learned that they were English and that they had landed in the said port of Hayna. This carelessness was due to the fact that the president believed that the galleons were Your Majesty's in command of Juan Martinez de Recalde and he so declared them to be.

The said judges sent twelve mounted men and as many harquebusiers to reconnoitre at Hayna. They made the reconnaissance, attacked and retired when one man was killed.

There was so great fright and fear on all the burghers of the city that only the honourable people would go out to fight the enemy, led by the said judges. Rather than accompany them the president left the city, proceeding up the river into the interior. Licentiate Arceo did the same, with Captain Juan Melgarejo, high sheriff of this city. Certainly it was temerity to do otherwise, in view of the enemy's great strength and the small number of poorly armed defenders left to the city.

Not more than 50 horse and 100 foot stood up to the foe. Among the latter were about 60 harquebusiers. The rest were armed only with swords, and some had halberds.

Realizing that it was foolhardy to attack, these troops fell back upon one of the city's gates called Lenba and there offered a little resistance with three pieces of artillery planted there. Since the said gates are flanked by not over 50 feet of wall and the rest is shrubbery, the enemy entered forthwith and all the inhabitants of the city (p. 3) withdrew into the country and bush.

It was indeed pitiful to see the women and children, nuns and friars, and the invalids, wandering lost through the bush and along the roads. All clamour and demand succour of Your Majesty. In Your Majesty's own name we entreat Your Majesty to protect and relieve us, for otherwise we have no hope whatever of life.

The said judges and some gentlemen and honourable persons have

withdrawn to a sugar-mill belonging to Don Antonio Pimentel, which is on this coast and called Xagua, whence they endeavour to prevent the enemy from obtaining supplies and to maintain themselves in the bush until such time as Your Majesty may furnish us relief. I will keep Your Majesty informed of events.

We do not yet know the president's whereabouts, nor Licentiate Arceo's. We are trying to get together because the people wandering . . . (torn) . . . life. There is nothing else to report to Your Majesty concerning . . . enemies except that if Your Majesty desire to hold this island safe, send here a person experienced in war and competent to exercise command.

The judges and I have tried to inform the island of Cuba and city of Havana and the Main of what has happened in this island and warn them to make ready and to be on guard against the enemy. Some say that Don Antonio is in command of these English.

Our Lord preserve the Catholic royal person of Your Majesty many and long years for the protection and relief of Your Majesty's vassals.

From the Xagua sugar estate, January 13, 1586.

About an hour ago advice was received that as he embarked on the river the president ordered the galley to be burned that the enemy might not make use of it.

Catholic Royal Majesty
Your Majesty's servitor.

The Licentiate Aliaga (Rubric).

Document No. 13¹

[Licentiate Fernández de Mercado and Baltazar de Villafañe² to the Crown, La Española, January 14, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Catholic Royal Majesty

On the 10th of the current month of January, at ten o'clock in the morning, there were first descried off the port of Santo Domingo in

¹ *A. de I.*, 53-6-14, Santo Domingo 80. 1 *pliego*, original.

² Judges of the *Audiencia*. Their commissions are preserved in *A. de I.*, 78-3-9, Santo Domingo 900, H 5, ff. 11 and 34 reverse, dated September 13, 1583, and May 13, 1585, respectively.

this island of Española certain ships which occasioned us much alarm because it was not known whence they came or whether they were friends. This alarm increased when their number and size became definitely known. They were 31, or 34 according to some, and it was observed that they neither sought to enter nor passed on elsewhere. In fine, for whatever might follow we began to make ready with all possible diligence and vigilance.

Although the galley which Your Majesty has here was in such bad condition that it could not put to sea, with certain artillery it was so placed that if the enemy fleet should enter by the port it could do much damage.

The fortress was made as ready as possible and we scuttled two vessels on the middle of the bar so that the enemy could not cross.

In short, we took what measures the state of affairs and the imminence of the danger permitted.

Because every inhabitant assured us that no ships could enter or damage us in any part except by way of this port and bar, we bent every effort to defending that quarter, contenting ourselves with sending look-outs to points on land whence anything could be feared.

Meanwhile the few men, foot and horse, who could be assembled were marshalled in military order.

Further, we sent responsible persons to speak with the said ships, who, finally, although they did not approach very near, by some indications which they observed recognized that they were English.

These precautions kept us busy through the whole night, which was one of great strain because we did not know what to expect or what these vessels were doing until next morning when we went out to see and gathered that they were gradually drawing off, since not half their number remained in sight and those which were visible were withdrawing, to no small relief of all. This relief was of short duration, for presently they reappeared and within a few hours began to take up positions off this city in an ugly manner.

About twelve o'clock on Saturday, which was the 11th instant, came word that at Boca de Hayna, which is three leagues from the city, a thousand men had landed and were advancing by land. Of these more than 800 (p. 2) were musketeers. They were advancing rapidly on the city in handsome array.

This news threw all the residents of this city into such consternation that it was immediately evident what an unhappy outcome must ensue, for there were no munitions or force of men to offer resistance.

Nevertheless, what horse there was and some harquebusiers

(mounted behind them) were sent out to divert the enemy and do what they could, which was nothing at all, owing to the enemy's speed and impetuosity. Ours were immediately dispersed and returned, flying in hopeless disorder.

Wherefore it was necessary for us and Your Majesty's *fiscal* to go out in person to lead them in military formation, but with so poor a showing that including foot and horse there were not 200 men, and these unarmed and so frightened that although they saw us in the van with some gentlemen and honourable persons on horseback, in grave danger from the musketry fire which rained upon all, not a man stood his ground to fire his harquebus. Our remonstrances were useless, as were the captains' exhortations to attack the enemy.

From the sea the enemy's ships supported the land forces with countless balls which they fired upon us.

In brief, it became necessary to retire, because to do anything else was fruitless, hopeless temerity.

The enemy entered the city without loss except by one cannon shot fired from the gate by which they came in to take the place, as taken it they have and the fortress as well which has no defence against attack from this side.

So far it is not known that more than three or four persons have been killed.

With some few persons who accompanied us we took our departure, reserving ourselves for a better occasion, if God will provide it. With some gentlemen who belong to this island, we are seven or eight leagues from the city, seeking to do what can be done, which is to remove supplies in order that hunger may compel these people to depart.

We are seeking to assemble some force, to meet whatever may offer. We will do our duty to the death, as we should. We do not know where the president, responsible for the civil and military government, and Licentiate Arceo are.

We decided to advise Your Majesty, that the remedy commensurate with so grave need and misfortune may be provided. In addition to the credit lost, Your Majesty puts to the hazard not only this island but all the Indies to which it is the key, as Your Majesty knows better than any. As things now stand not only the city but also the property of all its citizens are in the enemy's possession, ours included. We saved only the horses upon which we rode, nor do we hope for anything but death itself with which to settle our debt. In all that has occurred to the present moment, we have done our duty, as Your Majesty will be duly informed by unprejudiced persons.

Again we humbly entreat Your Majesty as quickly as possible to determine upon the remedy for this damage done before the situation be made irremediable by measures the enemy may take.

We have not been able to learn who is in command of these people. Signs are not lacking that it may be Don Antonio, prior of Crato. Your Majesty shall be advised of everything (p. 3) and at every possible opportunity. May God so direct affairs that soon we may write better news to Your Majesty, whose royal Catholic person God long preserve for the protection of His faith.

From La Española, January 14, 1586.

Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's humble servants and vassals kiss Your Majesty's feet.

The Licentiate Fernandez de Mercado

The Licentiate Baltazar de Villafañe (Rubrics). (p. 4).

... Let this be read immediately. Important. . . .¹

Document No. 14²

[The Licentiate Mercado and Villafañe to Don Diego de Zuñiga,³ La Española, January 14, 1586]

(p. 1)

†

Very Illustrious Sir

The misery of the moment does not permit me to go into greater detail than to say that disaster has befallen us wretchedly because no precautions had been taken at the point where thirteen ships (which, so far, they say are English) landed men, that is, at Boca de Hayna. To have landed there is to the natives of this land a thing more incredible than I can express. In addition to these thirteen, 23 other ships arrived which, while the others effected the landing, diverted us by menacing the fortress on the 10th instant. The next day the 800 or 1000 men they set ashore vanquished us by land.

¹ Part of envelope-superscription.

² *A. de I.*, 143-3-16, Indiferente General 1097. 1 *pliego*, original; copy in 53-4-11, Santo Domingo 51.

³ President of the House of Trade, Seville.

I do not think we have been lacking in our duty. The Licentiate Villafañe, Aliaga and I escaped by hard riding. The place offered no resistance, nor could offer any. We are wandering through the bush in such misfortune and nakedness that God alone suffices to give us patience.

We are reporting in full to His Majesty that he may take pity on the unhappiness of this land and furnish means to recover this key to the Indies. I would refer to that report. I cannot write at length sufficient to inform your lordship as fully as were proper. We will endure this wretchedness to the death, endeavouring to damage the enemy by every means possible to our weakness.

Of the president we know nothing except that he took no share in two encounters (p. 2) we had, and we understand that he survives.

We do not yet know certainly who is in command of these people except that with them is a native of this country who is a leader among them; he is a man who was subjected to public disgrace here for dealings with lutherans. From certain indications we suspect that the commanding officer is Don Antonio of Portugal.

We will continue to report on developments as long as life lasts. We do not even know yet whether these people intend to stay here or pass on with the plunder; nor can we at this time send other news than of our universal ruin. Our Lord remedy our situation, unmindful of our grave sins!

For love of Him we entreat your lordship, for your lordship's part to have compassion on our misery, issuing most urgent order to the galleons they say His Majesty has equipped to come in command of Juan Martinez de Recalde. His arrival would be opportune, I think, for the English are anchored outside the bar and I believe it would be impossible for them to come in because of the precautions we took there—the only quarter from which we expected the enemy!

God guide all and extend to us His hand! And preserve your very illustrious lordship as I desire.

La Española, January 14, 1586.

Very Illustrious Sir

Your lordship's servants kiss your lordship's hands.

The Licentiate Juan Fernandez de Mercado

The Licentiate Baltazar de Villafañe (Rubrics).

Document No. 15¹

[Antonio de Ovalle² to the Crown, La Yaguana, January
21, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Antonio de Ovalle, Your Majesty's captain in this town of La Yaguana, kisses Your Majesty's feet and reports that on Saturday, at noon, the 18th of this month of January, I received³ from Santo Domingo news which is very painful and grievous to your Majesty's subjects and vassals resident here, to effect that on Friday morning, the 10th instant, a large number of ships appeared off the city. Your Majesty's president called all the city to arms.

Apparently that night this fleet detached sixteen pinnaces and two ships which proceeded to the mouth of the Hayna River where, unobserved, they landed 800 muskets and pikes. Without being perceived they marched all that night toward the city. They were not perceived because no attention was paid to that approach, for all that coast is living rock. Therefore by break of day all this force had arrived within a league (level country) of the city without being perceived.

All the people assembled at the fort to defend the entrance to the harbour, for the ships took up their position in front of the city to bombard it.

Your president with three companies went out to prevent the enemy who was approaching by land from entering the city. Although little resistance was possible because the enemy made effective use of his artillery from the sea, yet he held them off until five in the afternoon—which was doing much, for in that time the women and children and other persons had time to get away. They could not remain in the city because of the damage they were receiving from the enemy's balls.

¹ *A. de I.*, 53-6-14, Santo Domingo 80. 1 *pliego*, original.

² Captain and *alcalde ordinario* at La Yaguana. For an *información* of his services, especially against the French, see *A. de I.*, 53-1-14, Santo Domingo 14 (April, 1584).

³ A letter written by Mercado and Villafañe from Xagua on January 14 reached the authorities at La Yaguana about sundown on the 20th; evidently Ovalle received an earlier report. Cf. *A. de I.*, 2-5-2/21, Patronato 266, 50-4, p. 2. Cf. Documents Nos. 22, 29, 30 enclosure, *post.* Advice which reached Cartagena on January 24 or 25 must have left Yaguana soon after the fall of Santo Domingo, not 'to-day' (see penultimate paragraph of this document).

The enemy occupied the city on Saturday at five in the afternoon. Your Majesty's fortress resisted the entrance of the ships until next day at noon; by that time the enemy's forces which were (p. 2) in possession of the city broke in the gates and occupied the fortress, and they remain in possession of it and the city.

They say these people are English and sacked Cape Verde.

The measures I have taken in this town since I received this news are to order the women and children out, each to her retreat,¹ leaving only the fighting men here, each with his arms and horse and on guard in hourly expectancy, although we are few, of rendering service to God and to Your Majesty. I am today sending two advice-boats, one to Your Majesty's governor at Cartagena and the other to [Santiago de] Cuba to warn the whole country and to go finally to Havana in order that from there information may be transmitted to Your Majesty and suitable remedy applied. What subsistence there is in this region I have ordered to be brought in, with all sorts of supplies, that the enemy may lack these, if he come here.

In this town I am serving Your Majesty as captain; and in this post or out of it I shall continue to serve Your Majesty until life fail me, whose very powerful person Our Lord preserve with length of life and increase of greater kingdoms, states and dominions, as we, Your Majesty's vassals, desire.

From La Yaguana, January 21, 1586.

Your Majesty's humble vassal kisses Your Majesty's royal feet.

Antonio de Ovalle (Rubric).

Document No. 16²

[Alonso Rodriguez de Azebedo³ to Diego Fernandez de Quiñones, Bayaha, January 22, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Very Illustrious Sir

Since other persons will have informed your honour of the utter ruin of the city of Santo Domingo, I will be brief because I was not

¹ Where corsairs were frequent visitors, as they were at La Yaguana, each family provided itself with a hiding place to which to retire whenever desirable. Some of these were comfortable, pleasant as well as safe resorts.

² *A. de I.*, 53-6-14, Santo Domingo 80. 1 *pliego*, original.

³ Serving under the commander of the galleys.

an eye witness. I was in this city of Bayaha¹ whither I had come with Don Diego Osorio's authority to fetch certain slaves who had deserted from the galleys. As I was about to return with these galley-slaves I heard the news of the loss of the city and fort.

Don Diego could do nothing but scuttle three vessels in mid-channel which prevented the enemy ships from coming further in than the fortress, where they are anchored in a dangerous position.

To take the city and fortress was easy for them because among 3000 men there was not one to put up a fight. There were 300 men in the fortress. On hearing that the enemy was advancing by land they abandoned the fort, leaving the gates open! So the enemy entered as a man enters into his own house . . .¹

Those who took the city were about 600 well armed men who had marched more than three leagues that day, which was the 11th of this month of January. They had with them more than 20 Spanish traitors. In the vanguard was recognized a youth who was publicly disgraced in Santo Domingo; he was not armed but wore a suit (p. 2) of green velvet. Among them is a soldier named Alonso de Villagomez whom Francisco Carreño whipped and sent to the galleys.

This fellow captured a mixed breed who had sheep in the slaughterhouse where they were being weighed. Five of the enemy seized him as he was endeavouring to set them loose. Asked if he knew me, he said he did and knew certainly where I was. Thereupon they released him and bade him betake himself to me and to tell me that there was a great prince with them who knew of the wrong which had been done me, for me to join them and he would make a grand lord of me. From this I deduce that that villain Mendiola must be with them. It is not known who this prince may be, but some suspect that it is Don Antonio.

A French ship which is here, at Monte Christi, says they took Cape Verde and Puerto Rico. Our Lord preserve your honour's repute and deliver you from disaster.

Fortune continues to persecute me. Since I expected to return immediately and through the bush I brought one old shirt, and they have left me stripped. This is why I do not go in this despatch-boat to serve your honour. I was utterly unable to get away and I'd rather die than present myself before your honour and give my enemies the great pleasure of seeing me [in this condition?] I am stripped naked and without recourse or expectation of any. God help us!

¹ This letter is so badly written and so wretchedly spelled that its meaning is obscure in places.

(p. 3) For the love of God, let your honour fortify yourself strongly! This traitor is strong. He has 32 large galleons and now from here he will take as booty over 70 pieces of artillery, including five culverins and eleven cannon larger than Little Saint Lorenzo,¹ and three extra large perriers, and all the munitions the fort and city had, for these damned fools did not throw them into the sea, but ran and left everything.

To relate how badly they conducted themselves is beyond words; the extent of it is unthinkable. It is actually as though they had been in conspiracy with the enemy. There were more than 3000 men, burghers and transients, and more subsistence than there has ever been in the city before—so much that the price [of biscuit?] was down to only fourteen *maravedis* the pound—and plenty of wine. Every hour, every minute relief could reach the fortress from the river.

A tremendous disaster this!

Nobody remembered to advise the king, nor would Havana be warned except for me . . .²

Our Lord keep your honour's illustrious person in augmenting estate.

Bayaha, January 22, [1586].

Very Illustrious Sir

Your honour's least servant.

Alonso Rodriguez de Azebedo (Rubric).

Document No. 17³

[The dean and chapter of the cathedral to the Crown,
Santo Domingo, February 19, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Catholic Royal Majesty

God, Our Lord, permitted an English fleet which the people of this city of Santo Domingo sighted on Friday, the 10th of January

¹ It will be recalled that in this period guns were named and known by their names.

² See note 1, p. 26. ³ *A. de I.*, 54-1-10. Santo Domingo 94. 1 *pliego*, original.

of this present year, to land men immediately, on the following Saturday. That day they entered into the city and sacked and destroyed it. We understand that it was Heaven's punishment on this people's manifold sins.

Although the inhabitants were so inexperienced and untrained in military affairs, there was such lack of powder and munitions it has long been understood that this city lay, a prize and a spoil, at the mercy of any enemy who might care to attempt it.¹

The English remained here 36 days, during which they treated this city as an enemy of their religion, of their queen and of themselves. They carried away everything they wanted and could transport; everything else they burned and destroyed. Notably, they burned two-thirds of the residences and edifices of this city and all its churches and monasteries and nunneries, its hospitals and hermitages, excepting the cathedral.

I should say excepting only the shell of the cathedral; for its altars, retables, crucifixes, images, choir, screens, organs, bells and all other objects usual in such churches, they broke up, overthrew, burned and destroyed. When they threw the bells down these fell upon the dome and demolished part of the sacristy.

Further, they burned many buildings belonging to the foundation of this church and to its chaplaincies, as well as eight other houses which were the property of the church hospital and constituted its principal income and capital.

They made a jail of two chapels in this church wherein they confined many residents whom they arrested; and, confined therein, these persons used the chapels as prisoners must any place in which they are long detained.

This church was the enemy's centre for business, where they dealt in and negotiated their evil affairs. It was their warehouse and dispensary, and served them for even viler purposes. In fine, within its premises they committed other abominations worse than the conflagration itself and more horrible.

The body of this church, then, and one hospital called Saint Nicholas's, and the third of the dwellings they left standing, because this much was ransomed with a certain sum of money. Nearly all the silver service of this church and all of the archbishop's (which he freely proffered although he had no house to be redeemed) went toward making up this sum.

By accounts of the matter which are being sent by the royal

¹ Probably this construction is intentional. Observe that an excuse for the city's fall is suggested but an accusation against the Crown also implied.

Audiencia and the municipal council Your Majesty will be more fully (p. 2) informed of other damage done in this city. Therefore we do not go into details in order not repeatedly to offend [Your Majesty's] ears . . . (torn) [with the full story] of so much sorrow and unhappiness. We confine ourselves to consideration of what this church and its hospital have suffered, these being particularly our charge.

The church stands, then, sacked, defaced, in ruins. We are helpless. Before Your Majesty we lay the situation with entreaty made as humbly and earnestly as we are able that with that royal spirit of religious piety with which Your Majesty is wont to raise new and sumptuous churches, temples and edifices to the honour of God—with that same spirit Your Majesty will now come to the support of this church which still stands, by His grace. . . .¹

Santo Domingo, February 19, 1586.

Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's chaplains and vassals kiss Your Majesty's feet.

The Dean

Canon Llerenas

Almoner Lebron de Quiñones (Rubrics).

For the dean and chapter.

Luis de Moral, their clerk.

Document No. 18²

[The dean of Cartagena³ to Alonso de la Torre,⁴ Cartagena,
February 16, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Very Illustrious Sir

Let it not be supposed that I am replying to your honour's letters. This is only to set forth the state of affairs at Santo Domingo and to

¹ They announce that they are sending a procurator to court.

² *A. de I.*, 2-5-2/21, Patronato 266, No. 50, 6. 1 *pliego*, authenticated copy, duplicated. Cf. González Palencia's edition of Castellanos' *Discurso*, pp. 296-8.

³ Don Juan Fernandez, according to Document No. 29 *post* and Castellanos, *op. cit.*, p. 327. Cf. González Palencia's edition, pp. 181, 332.

⁴ A judge of the *Audiencia* of Panama.

show what is hourly expected in this city. To your honour's letters I will reply when occasion may permit.

Today, February 16th, at five o'clock in the morning the look-outs sighted a sail in the direction of Castile and immediately this city rose to arms, every man taking up his post promptly and in good spirit. This sail kept close in and presently it was understood that it was an advice-boat. A boat went out to meet the vessel, in which Don Francisco Maldonado, son-in-law of the campmaster at Rio de la Hacha, presently came ashore. Obeying his duty as a Christian, a gentleman and a servitor of Your Majesty, at his own cost and by his own effort he sought to warn this coast of the state of affairs in Santo Domingo and of this corsair's designs upon the Main.

This gentleman says that he was in that city when the corsair entered and took it, and he and the president and other persons fled by sea to a safe place. The enemy met with no resistance, nor was there powder with which to offer any. Only Bachellor Hurtado was killed in his house by a stray cannonball. The people saved themselves, the women, gold, plate and jewels. Those who were in the fort escaped by way of certain of its passages.

This Captain Francis set 800 men ashore. After he had taken the city he demolished that part of it which he thought it advisable to destroy in order to make a place for his defence in case he were attacked by the people of the island. They say that the president negotiated for the city's ransom and for the purpose sent in persons he thought fitted to the undertaking, one of whom was this Don Francisco [Maldonado], who was three days with Captain Francis. In these negotiations he demanded 200,000 ducats. They offered him 20,000 maximum and say he scorned that sum. He said he would rather ransom the city for a lady's ring, and as a condition of the ransom laid down that he would not return the escutcheon which he took from the *Audiencia*. He offered to convey Don Francisco very safely to Rio de la Hacha, where his house is, promising that he would not touch it or even the city itself.

Don Francisco says he heard it said that the queen of England expressly ordered Captain Francisco to destroy the Indies and so he intended to do; and that he would not leave this city until he had levelled it to the ground, and that His Majesty could not feign to be ignorant of this matter since for two years he has known that Captain Francis was working to raise the fleet he brought with him.

Don Francisco says that the negroes of Santo Domingo, armed with

nicking knives¹ and swords, seriously harass these English continuously and kill many, and do daring things, although the English with harquebuses kill some. And many people say that this Francis treats his people harshly and hangs² many, and that he despatched ten galleons from the Canaries to Cape Verde and that they are bound for the Strait. This is quite credible in view of the advices from Castile that he laded lime, tile and brick, presumably to fortify himself in the Strait.

Your honour can imagine the condition of this city. So far what has been done is to make trenches, ditches and greatly to strengthen its defence; and now we are busy making wills and arranging all our affairs for a stand to the death, which end all are unanimously determined to meet like Christians in execution of their duty. I ride about and encourage them, which is hardly necessary. I go out at every alarm, as though I could still be of service, like the rest. Yet I am of some use, and my intention is good. And so this city awaits the enemy every hour, arms in hand.

The governor has 600 harquebusiers, 50 horse, 800 Indians, 200 hundredweight of powder, exclusive of the strength of the galleys which is 150 soldiers, not counting the galley slaves, of whom use will be made in case of necessity.

The statements in this letter are accurate, and a true report of what really occurred, and should be believed because this gentleman is a credible eyewitness. He says the enemy has sent no parties into the interior (p. 2) nor made any sallies from the city.

My respects to my lady, Doña Beatriz, and to the gentlemen [judges of the court]. Lack of time prevents me from writing more.

Our Lord preserve your honour's very illustrious person with advancement, as I desire.

Cartagena, February 16, 1586.

Very Illustrious Sir

Your honour's servant kisses your honour's hand.

The Dean of Cartagena.

¹ A curved knife strongly set at the end of a long shaft, used by herdsmen to hamstring cattle. This was the weapon which the successors of these same 'cowmen' used with deadly effect on the broad backs of Venables' unhappy soldiers.

² Bigges in *Principal Navigations*, x, p. 113.

Document No. 19¹

[The *Audiencia* of Santo Domingo to the Crown, Santo Domingo, February 24, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Catholic Royal Majesty

On January 10 of the present year, at about ten o'clock in the morning, warning reached this city and eleven sail were sighted which seemed to be steering for this port. At this news a person was immediately sent to endeavour to identify them and to determine their intention and course. So also for this purpose Don Diego Osorio, captain of Your Majesty's galleys, went out in person. Meanwhile, with the diligence and efficacy possible, given the scanty means we possessed, everybody was busied in preparing this city for whatever the event might prove to be. For not only was the powder in the fort and city scarce and of poor quality, but also the galley was dismantled, for it was being careened.

Nevertheless, with great activity, what men could be mustered were assembled, both foot and horse. After we had consulted with those residents who seemed best informed, in order to reach a determination as to what should be done, and been by them assured that there was no fear whatsoever that from the landward the enemy, if this were an enemy, could do us damage or disembark, unless it were at a certain inlet the sea forms at a place called (p. 2) Guibia, we sent thither troops who stood guard all night, to send warning and to defend that place. Meanwhile, all our effort was addressed to strengthening this harbour and its defences.

At nine o'clock that night Don Diego Osorio, captain of the galley, came in with the report that he had seen seventeen vessels which he believed to be English, owing to the cut of their sails and rigging. Whereupon preparations to defend the harbour and protect the city were redoubled; and the spirits of many of its residents commenced to weaken, who forthwith began to flee. Proclamations which were issued and other measures taken to the end of preventing this, proved unavailing.

The morning of the following Saturday (which was the 11th) seventeen vessels appeared off this port, and seemed to intend to

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-4-11, Santo Domingo 51. 2 *pliegos*, original, duplicated.

attempt to force an entrance. They tacked back and forth, without firing upon the fort, nor did the fort fire upon them, both because we were not sure that they were enemies (on the contrary, many asserted that they were Your Majesty's galleons) and also because the powder we had was of such wretched quality. In order not to lose reputation we delayed firing until it could no longer be avoided, which was very soon.

A shot was fired when the ships came up and stood off the streets ending on the waterfront, toward which these vessels turned their bows. A man we had sent to reconnoitre brought assurance that they were enemies. Since this shot did not reach them by a long stretch they determined to ignore our defence, as we learned afterwards.

We strengthened the harbour's defences and those at its entrance. We hastened to sink three ships along the bar, that theirs might not enter. Although with great difficulty, Don Diego also brought out his galley and laid it across at a point where with the artillery (and great effort (p. 3) which he put forth) he could do serious damage if the enemy entered the haven. Certain pieces of artillery which we planted in works and suitable positions would do no less.

But all this and the great endeavour made to encourage the people and to detain those who were leaving was of no effect, for about midday we received news that over land, half a league from the city, nine standards of very select infantry were advancing rapidly upon the place. This, when at the river's mouth for its defence we were not 200 men. All the rest, to a total of more than 400, had fled and abandoned their posts without our being able to prevent it.

Nevertheless, we brought out what cavalry there was—about 40 horse, harquebusiers mounted behind the riders, in order to do what we could. The rest were left to protect the river. Half a league out they encountered the enemy, who gave them a sprinkling of musket-shot in such fashion that the few who had arrived within range turned back on the run, to spread the certainty that we were entirely unequal to defending ourselves against such numbers.

As a last effort and trial of fortune we brought out what horse and foot remained, who in all were not 120 men, with the determination to attack and die rather than witness such damage and loss as has befallen us. But upon taking the field the men, especially the foot, began to exhibit such poor spirit (recognizing the enemy's strength) that many shamelessly abandoned their arms and took to the bush, fleeing; and it was impossible to get the rest into military formation or to attempt to fight, nor had the men equipment or suitable

weapons to meet even equal numbers, much less as many as well armed and disciplined foes as were advancing.

Ten or twelve of us who were mounted (p. 4) advanced within musketshot, to oblige the rest to do the same, in order to attack. Although we were in great danger from the many shots they fired at us, we were unable to make the rest move from where they stood. Therefore, on the advice of certain experienced men who were present, we changed our plan, or were forced to change it, because of the aforesaid situation and because, in addition to the musketry fire to which they subjected us from the land, their ships turned their bows toward the field, against us, and swept it with their artillery in such a manner that they left not a tree standing. Therefore in good order we returned to the city gate, where we had planted three pieces of artillery, which we fired. This artillery fire killed only two or three of their men, among them an ensign. In fine, they entered the city.

No other resistance was offered, because it was all open, without gates or defensive works. We fled from it as best we could, for we found ourselves deserted. They took the city and occupied it and the fortress, which has no defences upon the side toward the city nor had its warden means or men to hold it.

Amidst so much evil God granted that the honour of no woman should be jeopardized, for they had all fled with their children. Very few men were killed, by shots which from the sea their ships fired into the streets.

Presently we got some people together and removed subsistence from round about the city. A troop of horse under Don Diego Osorio has hung persistently on its outskirts and upon what occasions have offered has killed some of the enemy. We remained masters of the countryside although we never had the means to attack, lacking arms, and because the enemy, who entered by land and sea, was numerous.

According to the most reliable reckoning those who came up by land were as many as 1400, the third part musketeers and the others harquebusiers and cuirassiers. (p. 5) The rest raised the total to five or six thousand in all, very well armed and equipped, and so well disciplined that within a few hours they had so fortified themselves that a great force would have been required to retake the city.

In possession of it, they began to commit a thousand abominations, principally in the temples and with the images. They broke these all to pieces, heaping ignominy and vituperation upon our religion, profaning everything without distinction or consideration. Not

content with this, they opened the sepulchres of the dead and into them threw filth and offal of cattle they slaughtered within the churches, which they converted into slaughter-pens. They made even viler use of these edifices.

They looted the private property of the residents. Very little was saved. There is no man but has suffered notable loss. Especially have we, for the enemy took everything we had and carried it off. We removed nothing opportunely in order not to afford the people occasion to do the same and so leave the city empty and defenceless while we considered defence possible. So have we all come to extreme poverty, being in want of everything both to eat and to wear, of money and of all sorts of clothing and means to sustain life.

So also they burned all the vessels which were in the harbour, aboard which might have been shipped certain ginger which was left; this would in part have relieved our situation, but loss of the ships prevented this, too.

Seeing how unable we were to retake the city by arms, we entered into negotiations with them to recover it in exchange for money. The price they set upon it was excessive, for they asked a million at first, and, finally, a hundred thousand ducats, which we were as unable to raise as the million. Since they would not reduce that figure and we could not meet it, they began to burn the city and its temples, so that in a very short time (p. 6) they burned the greater part. Because the best portion still remained, through Garci-Fernandez de Torrequemada, Your Majesty's factor, we renewed negotiations with them to redeem it. He came to an agreement with them and arranged the matter at 25,000 ducats, which sum was with great difficulty raised among all the citizens, the archbishop and the church.

At this price, after they had been in the city five weeks, they left it on February 9, taking with them all our wealth, even to the bells of the churches, artillery from the fort, and ships, and other smaller things of every sort. They carried off the copper coin which circulates in this city. Much of it they melted up and wasted.¹

They took with them the galley-slaves from the galley, whose irons had been removed that they might help us. Later they rose against us and did more looting than the English. Many negroes belonging to private persons (who are the labourers of this country) went with them of their own free will.

The commanding officer of these people is Francis Drake—he who entered the Pacific by way of the Straits of Magellan. He is a

¹ Cf. Bigges' *Discourse*, p. 115; the *Primrose* log, p. 17.

cautious commander, equal to any undertaking. He brings with him veteran captains and soldiers from among the richest and most honoured in England.

The number of ships with which he arrived here was 30 or 31, including the seventeen with which he made the feint we have described, of intending to force the harbour entrance. The others came down at night, unobserved, to land troops at Hayna, which is a certain inlet where we never anticipated a landing because, in addition to the heavy sea which runs there and reefs which obstruct the entrance of ships, the native residents of this island guaranteed it against everything. But the English brought with them people so well acquainted with the vicinity that they showed them safely in.

Their ships have the best possible armament and equipment, munitions and choicest powder in superabundance. There are ships of over 700 tons, armament some 70 heavy guns, most of them bronze, not counting those they took from us.

Their course is for Cartagena, according (p. 7) to what we understood. We have taken care to send warning, as Your Majesty will see by the evidence enclosed herewith. Similarly, we warned Havana and other places, in good season.

And if similar warning had been sent from Cape Verde or the Canaries to us, this city would not have suffered the damage it has received, or it would have cost the enemy dearer. We cannot comprehend why no warning was sent us. We received none from any quarter. The ship which usually comes has not arrived, from which we infer that the fleet got in safely.

We have reported in such detail to Your Majesty lest advices which Licentiate Juan Fernandez de Mercado and Baltazar de Villafañe, Your Majesty's judges, sent by way of La Yaguana and Puerto Plata may not have arrived.

At first it was supposed that the commander of these people was Don Antonio, prior of Crato, but later it was learned¹ that this was not true, that he remains in England at the house of this Captain Francis, by whose hand so much damage has been inflicted.

To remedy which we humbly entreat Your Majesty to have pity on this sad city and its inhabitants, promptly providing as necessary for its restoration and taking measures such that it may hereafter protect itself and not be left so incapable to defence. We have neither artillery nor powder, neither arquebuses nor men experienced in war, which is what is most needed. Unless provided, these people are so terrorized, poor and defenceless that they will abandon the

¹ Correctly, too. Cf. *Papers relating to the Navy*, cited, p. 52 and note.

country, nor have we been able to prevent some from beginning to do so, seeing that the city's reputation of being impregnable by land (which alone sustained it) is lost, as well as its means of defence by sea, so that it has no recourse for its recovery except Your Majesty's clemency, which will not permit this country's ruin. Had it no other merit than that it was the first discovered in this New World, that it belongs to Your Majesty would suffice to assure its restoration, for Your Majesty is wont to relieve even the distress of others, how much more Your Majesty's own.

What else remains to be said of this matter we reserve until a person goes by whom Your Majesty may be fully informed of the condition in which we are left (p. 9) and of what is required for the protection and relief of this land, which lies at the mercy of a thousand ships, both English and French, which clutter the sea. A pair of galleys would be of very great service now; although they could not resist a royal armada, they would suffice against the attacks of petty marauders, which this port greatly fears.

For the love of Our Lord, may Your Majesty order measures to be opportunely taken while yet it is possible to remedy the dangers which impend, for we have understood both from these evil people and also from others that this and other fleets which cleared from England will meet at Cape Cañaveral, where they have made a settlement. We have heard also that the French have settled on Dominica and there are many indications that it is all true.

God help and preserve the Catholic royal person of Your Majesty with increase of greater kingdoms and happy achievements, as Christianity has need.

Santo Domingo, February 24, 1586.

Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's servants kiss Your Majesty's feet and hands.

The Licentiate Cristóbal de Ovalle

The Licentiate Arceo

The Licentiate Joan Fernández de Mercado

The Licentiate Baltázar de Villafañe (Rubrics).

Document No. 20¹

[The city of Santo Domingo to the Crown, February 26,
1586]

(p. 1)

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Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

To inform Your Majesty of the misery and distress in which this city of Santo Domingo, key and commencement of the conquest of the Indies, has been left, by this ship we write Your Majesty this brief and summary relation, since the president and judges of the *Audiencia* will doubtless report at greater length, describing events. By an advice-boat which will sail from here very shortly we will send a person especially by word of mouth to lay our miserable condition before Your Majesty and to pray for the remedy for so much damage.

Friday, at ten o'clock, before noon, on January 10, there arrived at this city a fishing bark which informed Licentiate Cristóbal de Ovalle, Your Majesty's president, that the night before off Cape Caucedo (six leagues from this port) it had seen at anchor seventeen tall ships, in burden more than 200 tons and upwards, which seemed to be English.

On receipt of this news the president ordered the alarm to be sounded and the townspeople to assemble in their companies, and those measures were taken which the shortness of the time left feasible. He ordered out a frigate then in this port, which had been launched a few days before as a companion to the galley. The galley was being careened, having fallen into such bad condition that otherwise it could not possibly render service. In this frigate went Don Diego Osorio, the galley's captain, to reconnoitre these ships and establish their identity. The president wrote to all the countryside, summoning the country people to come quickly from their estates, where most of the inhabitants were, engaged in harvesting their crops, for it is the harvest season.

Two hours before nightfall Don Diego Osorio returned with the report that the ships were very numerous, and by their lines and rigging, and by their heavy armament which he could distinguish, he judged it was an English fleet.

On receipt of this report, what men there were in the city having

¹ *A. de I.*, 53-6-4 (131), Santo Domingo 73. 1 *pliego*, original.

been assembled, a detachment was ordered to the beach at (p. 2) Guibia, about a quarter of a league distant, where the natives all supposed that the enemy would effect a landing. What men were available in the city were detailed to defend the fortress and the entrance to the haven with artillery of the fortress and from the ships in port.

At eleven o'clock that night ships smaller than those which had been described began to pass the harbour. As many as thirteen or fourteen sailed by the city and beyond Guibia Beach, without approaching. The people remained on the alert but with some hope that they were not bound for this city at all.

When the sun rose the small vessels which had passed by were not in sight, but there was descried a fleet of seventeen heavy galleons, some of them 400 and 500 tons burden. They began to tack off the port without giving sign of any hostile intention, and so they continued to do until ten in the morning of Saturday. By that time the enemy had landed 2000 soldiers at the mouth of the Hayna, where the river empties into the sea.

The city was entirely unprepared for this because between this place and that point not only are there three leagues of the thickest, most difficult jungle imaginable, but also in all the way not a drop of water is available. This was reasonable assurance that such a landing would not be made, up to the moment when certain horsemen, who were patrolling the seashore, at eleven o'clock before noon brought news to the effect that the English were advancing in two columns. These came on, a little distance apart, fearing ambushes.

The president ordered certain horsemen to go out with *harquebusiers* to occupy the narrow approach through the bush, in order to prevent them from emerging; but this order could not be executed before their vanguard came out from the bush. Nothing was possible but a brief stand, to entertain the enemy until the men who were on duty along the river and in the harbour could come up.

When they had so come up, as well as everybody available in the city, we were in all about 35 horse and 150 foot, so poorly armed that nothing could be effected with these troops. On sighting the enemy's vanguard, which at full speed was advancing straight upon the city, so well armed and in the best order imaginable, the commoner sort of the inhabitants abandoned their colours and vanished into a bit of bush which is close to the city.

The few captains and persons who remained with them fell back upon the city gates, to fire four pieces of artillery planted there, in order to enable the women and children and other people who had remained within the houses to escape by way of the river. This they did.

Wherewith the enemy arrived so near the city that, the rear column having come up with the van, they deployed along the whole front of the city and with muskets and harquebuses (of which they had many and good ones) and with the artillery of their ships which were anchored in that quarter, swept the approach to the city both from within and from without in such manner that it became necessary to give way.

To give way for them to enter this city, which for 90 years (p. 3) with the favour of Your Majesty's countenance had maintained itself above any enemy's insolence until now, when they found it as unprovided with arms, powder and munitions as through our procurators and by our letters we have many times reported to Your Majesty without Your Majesty's having deigned to remember how much and how well this city has served Your Majesty and the emperor, our master of glorious memory, both in the discovery of all these Indies and in putting down certain rebellions and tumults which occurred therein during this period of time. Because of these its services, its enemies, who had deemed it impregnable, took it upon themselves to reduce us to enduring hardship, and to the danger of falling prey to any weakling corsair.

Its temples burned and profaned, its monasteries demolished, its altars, images, and holy places destroyed, and most of its residences burned, without artillery or arms, the situation of this city is such that in order not to grieve Your Majesty with so piteous a relation we do not recount in detail the insolence these lutherans vented upon its edifices and fortress, and the ships which were in the haven, of which they carried off five. They burned all the rest, and the galley.

It is true that by Divine mercy no nuns, women or children were lost, for which we give infinite thanks to God, Our Lord. The houses which were left, the cathedral, part of the Dominican monastery and other buildings were ransomed with the miserable remnant of property which the women had been able to remove upon their backs. With much good judgment, in order that the city might not be razed, these were bought back for 25,000 ducats, which were delivered to the enemy. Unquestionably, it was all that could be raised. Even so, recourse was necessary to a large part of the cathedral plate.

*Some part
of the
Dominican
monastery*

This ransom was settled on Sunday, the 9th of this present month of February; and immediately on the following Monday, this fleet sailed, having held this city for 30 days during which the worst imaginable destruction was wrought continually.

Its captain general is Francis Drake, the same who twice entered the Pacific. Exclusive of seamen, he carries with him over 4000 foot, well armed, as was made evident here. He lays his course for Cartagena, according to what he let be understood, with the intention and by command of his queen to deal with every port in Indies as he has with this city, if he can. In order that he may not come upon them unawares, as he did upon us, a bark was despatched from La Yaguana for Cartagena, which left on the 21st ultimo. Another was sent to the island of Cuba and Havana.

Most humbly we entreat Your Majesty for the good of the royal service to issue orders to assure the safety of this (p. 4) city pending representation on our behalf, and petition for those things necessary to its relief and reconstruction and improvement, all so vital to Your Majesty's service and communications with the Indies. Because in such extremities promptitude is the best remedy which can be applied, we entreat Your Majesty to act with speed commensurate with so great hardship and calamity, whose sacred Catholic royal person Our Lord preserve with increase of more kingdoms and dominions, as is desired.

Santo Domingo, February 26, 1586.

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's humble vassals kiss Your Majesty's royal feet.

Melchor Ochoa

Don Pedro de Quero

Fernando de Laguna

Geronimo de Pedralvarez (Rubrics).

Document No. 21¹

[Tristan de Oribe Salazar² to a correspondent in Panama,
Turbaco, March 5-11, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Illustrious Sir

The advice boat which sailed on Ash Wednesday from the unhappy city of Cartagena for Nombre de Dios carried the news how

¹ *A. de I.*, 2-5-2/21, Patronato 266, 50-12. 1 *pliego*, simple copy.

² Described as a burgher of Cartagena: cf. Documents Nos. 29, 30 *post*.

on that day the queen of England's fleet, Sir Francis Drake commanding, entered the harbour. To which I will add that next day, Thursday, before dawn, Francis Drake landed a thousand men at Hicacos Point. These forces arrived at the Caleta half an hour before daybreak. There we awaited them, being about 230 harquebuses and 50 pikes. Another company was stationed elsewhere on the Swamp and 40 more men were posted over toward Galera Point. We feared lest Captain Francis might land men and attack by way of those two places.

At the Caleta we fought them a short while. We let them have three volleys and the galleys, which had been brought up bows against the Caleta, gave them two rounds of artillery and small shot, although the harquebus fire from the galleys did no damage because of the considerable distance. Perceiving the heavy damage he was receiving, the enemy shut his eyes and with furious impetus threw himself upon the city through a narrow place at the Caleta which was not protected with earth-works.

The troops detailed to the defence of that side abandoned their positions and fled. In a short time that part of the Caleta had been abandoned by our men. Since they were townspeople and utterly unused to war it was not possible to hold them there nor in the defences about the city. Therefore the enemy occupied the place within an hour, or less.

This is certainly a pitiable and shameful thing; so much so that I write this with tears which flow from the soul and with great grief that such a city as this should have been lost in so short a time.

At the same instant God saw fit to deal us a second blow, no less serious, which I have yet to relate, and this was that the galleys, which were in the position I have previously described, seeing the city lost, sought to get away by Boqueron channel, but it was low tide and there was not sufficient depth of water to permit it. They failed to consider that they might have held a position fighting alongside the fort, which remained in our possession all day, and that at noon the tide would come in. God and our ill-luck dulled their understanding and they ran the galleys aground at Jessemani. The galley-slaves were unchained and set at liberty with all the rest of the people. They burned the galleys and so, within an hour, we were left without them or the city.

The fort held out that day. It fought off certain pinnaces which sought to approach the city from that quarter. Seeing that they could not hold out because of a shortage of munitions, and fearing

lest the enemy take the fort from landward and cut their throats, the garrison abandoned it the next night.

This is the summary and unhappy account which I am able to give your honour of the tribulation of this place in general and my own in particular. I may add that in my house they took everything that I had except papers, silver plate and four shirts, for I never could persuade myself that we would not defend ourselves against even a much greater number of assailants. However, since its residents had removed their property and women and children into the bush, their sole desire was to rejoin them rather than to defend this city; and that they might more easily carry out this villainy God permitted the combat to take place an hour before dawn, so they were spared the shame of being seen as they fled.

On Friday, after the fall of the city, our esteemed governor, bishop and municipal councillors resolved to ask it back from the Englishman and to offer him a sum of money. To request of him a safe-conduct to facilitate negotiations I offered to go to the city, and did so that same day.

After he had received me in a flattering manner and extended to me his hospitality, Captain Francis gave me a safe-conduct for the governor and bishop and all other persons, declaring that the governor and the bishop must conduct the negotiations for the ransom. If they personally were not to attend to it, they might authorize Captain Alonso Bravo, who was a prisoner in his power, and me, only, to appear in the matter. In the end our side considered that it was not well to empower a prisoner for such business and so the governor and bishop appeared at the first meeting. They went into the city accompanied by about 30 of us who went with them. Immediately they took up the question of the ransom.

The Englishman demanded (p. 2) 500,000 *pesos* in fine gold and that day 25,000 ducats were offered.

When the governor returned he authorized Lieutenant Governor Diego Daça and me to resume the negotiations. On various occasions in the six days that we went back and forth we came to offer 100,000 ducats of 11 *reales* each and the enemy reduced his demand to 400,000 ducats. Finally, we convinced him that, do what he pleased, he would not get a penny more. For eight days now nothing further has been said; rather, some show of resistance has been made and diversion furnished to disturb him, and he has thrown up trenches and fortified.

The governor is probably making a lengthy report in full detail. Nevertheless, I will here set down what my memory suggests, though it is not of a sort to qualify me as a good chronicler.

This English fleet consists of 25 vessels. The flagship and vice-admiral and four others are vessels of as much as 400 or 500 tons. There are eight or ten of 150 to 200 tons. Six others are larger than launches, but little larger than our coastwise frigates. The rest are pinnaces.

I was aboard the flagship one day, invited by Mr. Francis Drake. I think he asked me, intending that I should see his strength. He showed me that ship in great detail. She carried six culverins at the bow and four in the poop, 30 pieces on the sides, and places and gunports for more. All these pieces were heavy guns. Similarly, there were many fireworks aboard the said flagship, and extra harquebuses. In addition, the vessel itself is very strong and there are many men on board. He told me that ordinarily she carried as many as 600 men. This, as far as concerns the ships.

I have carefully observed the number of men in the town and on board, and it seems to me that they are as many as 2500, although some of the English who speak Spanish, with whom I have conversed frequently, say that they are over 3000. Nevertheless, they are not more in number than I have stated, rather, fewer.

Captain Francis says openly that he intends to take that city of Panama and a man who has been there says that aboard the flagship and the other vessels he has pinnaces already made, of light draught, in which to go up the Chagre. These can even be transported in sections to the Pacific Ocean. They are made in fitted sections so that they can be taken apart and carried in pieces from Cruces to that city. This I have not seen and so do not affirm it. I only heard it, but of the rest nobody can give as accurate an account as I, because I have been in the city many times and aboard the ships.

Captain Francis Drake lies in the port of Cartagena at his ease. He has removed the masts and sails from some of his vessels. The flagship and vice-admiral and some others are being careened, and they are making certain repairs.

He says that he knows that Nombre de Dios is warned and that (p. 3) the bullion and valuables will have been removed. Therefore he prefers to remain settled at Cartagena, from here with his armada to damage the fleets and coastwise trade and commerce. He says that he is not worrying about the armada of galleons which His Majesty is despatching; on the contrary, he intends to await it. However, it is understood that he says this in hopes that, alarmed by his continuance, they may give him more money for the city, and that he has not the slightest intention of settling here, but will pro-

ceed to that city. At least, it will be advisable to prepare to prevent him from ascending the Chagre or crossing by land.

Of his audacity and good luck it may well be expected that he will try it although I think it will be difficult for him to reach Panama with his forces. This month and next, I think, the Chagre river is low and if he waits longer the galleons will catch him, for they may be expected next month at the latest. Although Captain Francis affects to despise them I fancy that should he meet them he would lay aside his arrogance, for his fleet is small.

Of the ships and troops I have mentioned above, except the captains and officers and as many as a hundred gentlemen he has with him, all the rest are very common people; but their general has them thoroughly in hand and well disciplined. When he set the thousand men ashore at Cartagena he told them that if they failed to take the city or any returned to his ship, he would not be received aboard, but hanged. That they might better accomplish their purpose he would, if necessary provide 500 men as a rearguard. These had not time to come up to take any active part in the fight, because the thousand sufficed for the purpose.

Of ours, seven or eight men were killed and some wounded and as many as ten were taken prisoners. The killed¹ were Juan Rodriguez Rico, merchant; Palencia, the elder; Juan Cosme de la Sal(a?), ensign; Zamora, the barber; Pedro Sanchez, the dean's nephew; and the rest were of even less importance. The Englishman says he had 25 or 30 killed, but from a person who was in the city it has been learned that his casualties were more than 150. This was because we fought from behind a masonry wall at the Caleta and they without any cover. Further, some others died from having fallen upon the stakes which the Indians had planted at the landing place.

Since from his relation and the governor's letters these matters will be recounted in fuller detail, I close here (p. 4) by saying that do as with your honour's own, as your honour may see fit, meaning if your honour removes your honour's own, do likewise with mine. I would warn your honour that to bury it is of no use for here in Cartagena they dug up the courtyards and stables and elsewhere.

Our Lord remedy this situation and preserve your honour's illustrious person.

Turbaco, March 5, 1586.

Tristan de Orive Salazar.

¹ Cf. Castellanos' mention of them in his work cited; and González Palencia's notes on them in his edition of the *Discurso*.

After I had written this a messenger came in from Santa Marta with letters and evidence to the effect that on that coast a pinnace was wrecked with seven English on board, of whom six were drowned. The seventh is a prisoner. From his deposition it appears that Captain Francis intends to take Nombre de Dios and Panama, and that he left England with 2500 effectives. This tallies with what I have said above, that they were as many as 2500 soldiers and seamen, for from this same deposition it appears that he had lost another 500 men from sickness. I refer to this testimony, which also the governor is forwarding.

I forgot to add that after he had burned two-thirds of Santo Domingo, as ransom for Damas [Ladies] Street and the Cathedral they gave him 25,000 ducats in addition to his having sacked the whole city. Nothing could be saved from him because he caught them so unprepared. So also he carried off from that city 113 pieces of brass artillery and burned all the ships except two, which he added to his fleet. One belonged to Señor Juan Antonio Corço, Juan de Palma, master. It is one of the best vessels the Englishman has, excepting his flagship and vice-admiral . . .

He has burned a large part of this city and is in a hurry. I don't know whether it is to proceed to that city, as I have said. It is necessary not to be off guard for this Englishman knows much and possibly he could cross thither. He says he did it once and it is known that now he carries presents for the negroes, of whom he expects to make use. Our Lord direct things for the best, amen.

March 11, 1586.

Tristan de Orive . . .

Document No. 22¹

['The sack of the city of Cartagena, done by Francis Drake, Englishman.'² No place, date or signature]

(p. 1)

† . . .

As soon as Pedro Fernández de Busto, governor of the city of Cartagena, received news that the English corsair Francis Drake

¹ *A. de I.*, 2-5-2/21, Patronato 266, No. 50-3. 2 *pliegos*, copy.

² Title heading of the document. The writer may have been *Sargento Mayor* Bartólome Lopez who was one of the small group—the old campmaster, Coronado, this person, the governor himself and the captain of the free blacks—which Bravo says the English mentioned as offering at Santo Domingo rampart the only real resistance they met after they had carried the Caleta. Cf. Document No. 27 *post*, Bravo's, Leranzo Ariza's and Agustín's depositions.

was coming to these parts with 37 galleons and other vessels (which was on January 5, 1586), he took all advisable measures for the defence of the city. He brought in the Indians of the *repartimiento* (with their arms) and assembled the townsmen of Tolu and Mompox, which lie in this jurisdiction. He built trenches about the city and with his troops took up strong positions commanding its approaches.

On the 20th¹ of that month he received word from La Yaguana that the enemy had taken the city of Santo Domingo on the 11th. On February 16 another advice-boat put in on board of which was Don Francisco Maldonado of Rio de la Hacha, son-in-law of the campmaster, who said that he had come from the city of Santo Domingo where he had been when the enemy sacked the place. He said that the corsair would arrive here within eight days and that he was very strong and had about 1000 effectives. As appeared afterwards, this gentleman was mistaken in believing the corsair to be so strong or to have so many men. His report caused cowardly persons to weaken with fright.

On the morning of Ash Wednesday, February 19, an advice-boat arrived from Spain with the information that His Majesty would send a large fleet thither in search of the corsair, which fleet would arrive very shortly. This news much consoled the people, who supposed that the galleons would reach here as soon as the enemy. At 12 o'clock on this day the enemy's fleet was sighted. It bore down upon the port and anchored near Point Hicacos, within the harbour.

The governor and all the foot and horse went out upon the beach in martial array, as did the Indians, that the enemy might see them as he came up to enter the port. Later he stated that he had estimated our troops to be over 1500 foot and 1000 Indians.

This corsair's galleons numbered 23 with three shallops and some pinnaces. Don Francisco Maldonado, who was here, said that this was not all of the corsair's fleet since at Santo Domingo he had 34 galleons and must have left the rest of his (p. 2) ships behind. This was considered very unfortunate, since so many men were required to oppose the fleet which was in the harbour.

The forces under the governor this day in the city were 25 horse and few more than 430 foot. To the captain of the fort at Boqueron he assigned 50 men. He had built an earth-work near Hanged Man's Swamp, on the beach, where three pieces of artillery were set up. If the enemy had left any ships behind, any forces landing

¹ Or 24th, according to Document No. 23 *post*. Cf. p. xlv *ante*, n. 7.

from them must advance by way of this work, to which the governor sent Captain Martin Polo with his company of 125 foot and 100 Indians, and half the horse, to patrol that part of the beach. To the Anchorage, on the mainland beyond the fort at Boqueron, he sent three horse and 30 foot to protect that approach because the enemy might land a party there and enter from the main highway which leads into the interior and so come into the city across the bridge. These men were sufficient to hold that pass. At San Francisco bridge he stationed a lieutenant with twelve men, to hold it.

The rest of his forces, numbering few over 200, and 200 Indians, the governor placed in the trench which had been built at the Caleta, lying across the beach route which leads in from Fort Point, so called, at Hicacos. It was considered certain that the enemy would land here, given the position of his fleet. The galleys were to support the city. They lay at the Caleta, their bows against the beach road, in front of the trenches. The plan was for their artillery to enfilade the enemy's¹ squadron but for this their position was not convenient.

As soon as night fell the governor sent one Carro and another man on horseback to the Point to endeavour to see what the enemy was doing, and whether he had landed men or would land them, on all of which they were to report. These (p. 3) persons went and returned about 10 o'clock at night with word that the enemy was landing forces. They were not believed and the governor sent one Juan de Villoria and Don Alonso de Mendoza, his son-in-law (as reliable persons), to advise him of what they might discover. Immediately he ordered 100 men out of the trenches and 100 Indians to go to lay an ambush at a certain point very advantageous for the purpose, so that when the enemy had passed they might maintain a fire upon him from the rear and so distract him.

As soon as word was brought in that the enemy was landing troops the general commanding the galleys (who was with the governor) went to see if he could get out with them, but there was not sufficient water.

At about 12 o'clock at night the two horsemen who had been sent to the point returned and reported that they had been there and that the enemy was quiet aboard his ships. They had not heard the sound of rowing nor anything else. Immediately the governor sent four horsemen to the Point to bring him news.

The governor was informed that a light had been seen at sea in the direction of the Humilladero (shrine). It was supposed that this meant that launches were approaching to land troops. The general

¹ See p. 1, n. 6, *ante*.

sent the horse he had with him to reconnoitre the beach to see what was happening.

At this juncture some of the soldiers who had been posted in the ambush came in to say that the enemy was advancing and that his troops were numerous and that they had not dared to await them. They had returned before the enemy could get ahead of them and occupy the road.

The governor ordered a signal to the galleys to be fired. They came up to the Caleta and took up the positions they were ordered to occupy. Their general came to the trench and the governor told him what was occurring.

The four horsemen arrived in haste to say that the enemy was close. The governor mounted and the general seized his gun, which (p. 4) a page was carrying, and took up his position in the trench. The governor inspected the whole position and prepared his troops for the fight which was imminent, pointing out to them the enemy's match. At this moment, just before dawn, more than 30 men were missing from the trench, having gone into the city. They were not persons whose duty it was to remain.

The enemy advanced in a body of 1000 men. In the forlorn were 100 gentlemen and soldiers who had served Don Juan in Flanders. They were in command of the sergeant major¹ from whom I learned this. He repeated it many times. This vanguard came up to the trench and because of the darkness they hesitated considerably. The enemy scattered out along the trench in order that each of our men there should be busied in defending his own place and that none should pay attention to what was happening elsewhere, each believing that the main attack was where he fought.

Our troops began to fight with as much spirit as veterans. They gave the enemy three volleys in such manner that the main-battle halted and waited to see how it went with the forlorn. A voice was heard—whose, it has been impossible to determine, but it is supposed that it came from the enemy lines, for there were among them many who spoke good Spanish. This voice cried out: 'Retire, gentlemen, for we are lost!'

Our people began to withdraw in haste. The governor, with whom I was, kept calling out: 'Do not retreat, brothers, but fight!' Since they would not stay, with the sword he had in his hand the governor laid on to his own men as though he had been fighting the enemy. It was of little avail. They were on the run. He remained

¹ Sergeant Major Powell commanded the main-battle, Sampson and Goring the forlorn.

on the beach, holding there some soldiers who stayed. The enemy's fire was so heavy that only God's grace saved us from hurt.

The people who were retreating came to a trench which was at the entrance to Santo Domingo street, where a culverin was planted. Among them was also the enemy's sergeant major and about twenty of his company who (p. 5) entered the trench along with ours and were not recognized, nor did they make themselves known. They carried pikes and halberds. The governor had remained behind in the trench at the Caleta and had gathered up the men who kept their positions there. He sought to lead them to the Santo Domingo trench and as he approached he said to those with him: 'Why didn't you make a stand, like these men here?' As he said this these English attacked and fell upon him. He turned his horse on them and then made off in great danger. The sergeant major recounts this frequently in his conversations.

The enemy was advancing along the beach. I found that I had lost the governor, and in seeking him I came upon a trench on the beach in a street adjacent to Santo Domingo. There I found the guidon and the campmaster and some few horse. I asked them for the governor but they knew nothing of him. I suggested that we should seek him. Arriving at the Santo Domingo trench, being a little in advance as we came upon the trench, and seeing men in it, I supposed that they were friends and said: 'Let us fire on that haste, brothers.' Entering into the trench, as day broke I recognized that they were enemies and pricked up my horse and by using my lance was able to ride on. The blows which the enemy's pikes dealt me left marks upon my cuirass. Pedro de Coronado, a page (?), who was near me, found himself in the same danger but got through. He received a pike wound from which he came near dying. Campmaster Alvaro de Mendoza was following us and the sergeant major seized the reins of his horse, for (he says) he thought that he was the governor. The horse swung completely around and struck the sergeant major with his flank, throwing him to the ground, and so the good old man escaped with a pike-wound in his face. The rest got away in another direction.

The enemy's troop advanced along the beach (p. 6) and when they came up to a shrine which is on the shore at the water's edge they entered the city by a street leading to the cathedral and halted in the marketplace.

Captain Martin Polo was advised of the loss of the city and came in with fifteen soldiers. The rest of his men had removed themselves to a distance. He took up a position on San Francisco bridge and

there faced and fought the English. He drove them back and pursued them into the city where he found them so strong it became advisable for him to retreat, and so he went out of the city. The enemy killed two of his men and he two of theirs.

Across Boqueron channel, where the fort is, the governor had hung a heavy chain, 65 *varas* long, between floats, which closed Boqueron channel so that not a launch or even smaller vessel could pass. This was very important, for only this chain prevented the enemy from sending his pinnaces in to the city, as the corsair himself said.

At the same time that the enemy attacked at the Caleta, armed launches attempted the fort and battered it. The fort defended itself well all that day until nightfall, when it was evacuated.

In the city the enemy took up a very strong position, as though he were dug in in Flanders. He had ten trenches and ten *corps de garde* and ten companies of 100 men each, in each trench its piece of the artillery they had taken with this city. This, with thirteen galleons in the outer harbour.

Following the English usage, they called the flagship the admiral. It, the vice-admiral and rear-admiral and another galleon of the queen—these four were vessels of 500 to 600 tons, with good armament. The others, up to fifteen, were not so large nor so strong. The rest were vessels of little or no strength. (p. 7) In all this fleet the queen had only two galleons; the rest belonged to her subjects and the vice-admiral to John Hawkins.

The enemy burned 250 houses in the city. He left these in ashes and in all the rest did great damage. He spoiled the churches. To save the ci . . . [torn] a ransom had to be provided, which was set at 110,000 ducats. He made it a condition that . . . the gold *castellano* should be reckoned at 16 *pesos* and the *peso* . . . current . . . at 8½ *reales*. He demanded me as a hostage and I could not get out of it. It cost me four head of the best slaves I had, for he hid them from me and afterwards demanded a ransom for them. In like manner he carried off 50 slaves from this city.

On Palm Sunday he evacuated the place and on Holy Thursday burned the *saetia* and other worthless craft which had been sunk. He did this because he could get no money for them.

He left this port with the intention of proceeding to Jamaica to obtain meat, of which he has none; and also *cassava* bread. They said they had plenty of flour but in reality they were short of biscuit but well furnished with wine and oil and supplies which they had stolen.

The enemy cleared on April 9 and returned within four days because Corço's ship, seized in Santo Domingo by a dog of a

brother of the corsair, was leaking badly. The damage must have been great. He transferred as much of her cargo as he could to other vessels and set her afire with 2000 hides and a lot of sugar and ginger aboard. He scuttled her and left the port on April 24.

I learned a great many things in my intercourse with those accursed people. I learned that the English (p. 8) lost 78 men killed in this city; and they killed twelve of ours. I understood that between Santiago in the Cape Verde islands and this city 350 gentlemen had died and many more of the baser sort. The men were young and many were gentlemen and had been soldiers in Flanders on His Majesty's pay.

I understood that when he left this harbour the heretic was somewhat at odds with the gentlemen and leaders and that both sides were drawing up documents. Therefore, I understood, he was laying his course straight for England and on the way would attempt to take Havana. When he entered this city he fully intended continuing to Panama and was prepared to do so. He desisted because he had been detained here longer than he had anticipated and feared the armada when he learned that it was coming from Spain in search of him. While I was his hostage I heard the corsair say that he was leaving the voyage to Panama for another occasion and that he would lose no opportunity. Captain Nuñez, a Peruvian half-breed and a good seaman, was captured from the Englishman while he was here.

I understood that the Englishman brought much clothing with him for the negroes of Vallano and that when the corsair was on the isthmus he planned for this return. Further, I understood that he had with him certain persons who were to put him into communication with the negroes and that he very much regretted to hear that they were at peace with Spaniards.

Of the galleys there is nothing to say except that they were lost . . .

Document No. 23¹

[Pedro Fernández de Busto² to the *Audiencia* at Panama,
Turbaco, March 12, 1586]

(p. 1)

Very Illustrious Sirs

I do not know how to begin to tell your lordship³ of my misfortune and of the loss of Cartagena. I can only say that it must be God's

¹ *A. de I.*, 2-5-2/21, Patronato 266, 50-13. 1 *pliego*, copy, duplicated in 2 *pliegos*. Cf. González Palencia's edition of Castellanos' *Discurso*, pp. 325 *et seq.*

² His Majesty's governor at Cartagena.

³ Cf. Document No. 8 *ante*, n. 3.

chastisement of my sins and of those of others. Our Lord be praised for all!

On Wednesday, first day of Lent, Captain Francis's fleet appeared off the port of Cartagena at noon; and at sunset he occupied the harbour with 23 ships, not counting pinnaces. On the beach I displayed to him what men I had ready, numbering some 450 harquebuses and pikes. I divided these troops to cover the three approaches to Cartagena, supposing that the enemy had left ships behind from which to land forces, for Don Francisco Maldonado, who came from Santo Domingo with news of the loss of that city, assured me that the enemy had more vessels than had entered the harbour. Therefore I left Martin Polo's company of 120 men to meet this advance. With the rest I went to the Caleta where, with the 220 men who remained to me, I awaited the event.

That same night, as soon as he had anchored, from his boats the enemy landed 1000 men, pikes and harquebuses, in square formation. At two in the night the enemy arrived at the Caleta. It was the blackest night I have ever seen in my life.

It had been agreed that the galleys should land 150 harquebuses to support me, and that the galleys should remain at the Caleta in order that their artillery might damage the enemy as he came up. The galleys took up their position but they sent no soldiers ashore. Only Don Pedro Vique, his nephew¹ and certain others landed.

The enemy attacked the Caleta with great impetus and the men I had there put up good resistance for a quarter of an hour. Our land batteries and the galleys' artillery fired but, because the night was so dark, we could not see what we were doing.

The enemy opened fire with his artillery and with increased fury attacked in close formation. Because our men were few they were overwhelmed, turned tail and retreated through the town, on which friends and enemies came down together, without firing upon each other because they did not recognize each other. Pell-mell they entered the town and when the day began to break the enemy force of more than 500 men was in possession of the market square and more than 500 were fighting through the streets with the inhabitants of the place. In fine, they drove us out with harquebus fire and remained masters of the city.

The galleys attempted to make away with all their people on board but did not have water enough for it. Furthermore, we had placed a chain across the channel by the fort in order that no

¹ Don Pedro Marradas, mentioned in Don Pedro Vique's deposition, Document No. 27 *post.*

launch or ship might enter. They were unable to loosen the chain nor was there sufficient depth of water for the galleys to leave, for it was ebb-tide. Fire started in a barrel of powder on board of one of the galleys where there were I do not know how many galley slaves. Forthwith they all leaped overboard and the vessel went aground at Jesemani. Immediately the (p. 2) other galley piled up behind the first. All the slaves were loosed from their irons and they, the captains and soldiers, have done more damage to the countryside than has the enemy, in stealing valuables which were buried. Finally four or five of them were hanged, which put an end to that.

Some soldiers, especially Moors, deserted to the Englishman, as did the black slaves of the city, whom they find very useful.

The fort held out all that day—the fort which is at Boqueron. All that day they were unable to take the fort, but at night the captain and those with him evacuated for lack of munitions.

The enemy is master of all. They are well entrenched in great trenches. According to an Italian¹ who deserted to us, the intention is there to await the fleet and armada which His Majesty may send. In each outpost they maintain a *corps de garde* in good order.

I have frequently gone in, under safe-conduct, to treat of the ransom of this city, a thing very necessary and advisable because of the fleets and for many other reasons, and for the sake of the people who are scattered through this open country and would all perish if the city were not redeemed. The enemy will not come down from the figure of 400,000 ducats which he demands and says that he will blow up the whole place unless this sum be forthcoming. He has already burned half of it, I mean, of the area—everything that is not masonry.

Since he has entrenched himself so strongly, as I have said, at the solicitation of persons interested in what of the city remains to be burned and razed, I have granted them permission to ransom their houses, and to this end yesterday, Tuesday the 8th instant, a messenger was sent to treat of the ransom, with the intention of giving him 60,000 ducats. This sum made no appeal to him, and he answered that if between today, Wednesday, and tomorrow, Thursday, notification was not sent him that the 100,000 ducats had been raised, he would blow up the whole town, leaving not even the memory of anything. For this purpose he had brought out certain large brass bombs full of powder, with very small holes, to blow up all the buildings. In view of this imminent destruction and the damage which would follow on it, the residents and officials of the

¹ Cf. Document No. 49, *post*, especially its enclosure.

place have decided to give 100,000 ducats, if he will pledge his word not to return to Cartagena, neither he nor any captain of his nor any English corsair, while he be in command for the queen. He is to furnish them a guarantee to this effect, sealed with the queen's seal and with that of the members of her council who are with this fleet. Tomorrow a decision will be reached in this matter and I will report the outcome.

At Santa Marta a boat from this fleet was wrecked near the swamp. There were seven men aboard, of whom six drowned and one escaped by land to the swamp. He was seized and his deposition taken, copy enclosed.¹

The Italian who I have said deserted here, I hold a prisoner. He says that he was present at the taking and destruction of Santiago at Cape Verde and Santo Domingo, and here at Cartagena. He agrees with the statements made by the man captured at Santa Marta. Furthermore, he says that the corsair intends (p. 3) to go to Nombre de Dios and Panama by way of the Chagre with the pinnaces he has brought. He says that aboardship they have pinnaces made in sections so that the soldiers can carry them on their backs and so enter the Pacific.

Both deponents state that he has 2000 soldiers exclusive of the seamen.

This Italian declares that between Cape Verde and Dominica more than 500 men died.

The Italian says that when he took Santo Domingo no defence whatever was made. He landed 1000 men at Hayna and with them took the city without any opposition at all, for they abandoned it, and it was sacked. Francis says that the booty was worth 200,000 ducats. He burned three-quarters of the city and for 25,000 ducats ransomed one-quarter, which was Damas (Ladies) Street and the cathedral.

The sack of Cartagena gained him not 4000 *pesos*, and so they confess, because many days before I had ordered the women to leave the city and that chattels and merchandise be removed to safety. This had been done, except bulky stuff like iron, soap, wine and tools, implements, etc., some part of which remained. Therefore the enemy demands a higher ransom because he says he got no booty.

This corsair is very confident that all the negroes of Vallano who have come in from the bush will assist him and that they will immediately join him; and for this purpose he has brought them

¹ Not seen.

many presents. Your lordship should order good care taken with respect to them.

I have written to your lordship in order that His Majesty's monies and those belonging to private persons may all be removed to safety, for the enemy's fleet is much stronger than the defence of any settlement on the coast.

I have sent warning to Havana and have a reply from the governor there, who tells me that he has advised New Spain of the fall of Santo Domingo in order that the fleet may not sail, for the enemy says he will wait for it. Captain Francis captured the vessel which brought this letter from the governor. He took it in this harbour, but all the crew escaped. The messenger who is the bearer of this despatch was on board. He is willing to take the great risk of carrying this letter to your lordship. He goes by Nicolau Pinol's barque, which carries the first advice.

In the fighting at Cartagena the following were killed: Juan Rodriguez, merchant; Palencia, burgher; and Pedro Hernandez, a nephew of the dean; Zamora, barber; and Juan Cosme de las Alas, ensign under Captain Alonso Bravo; and three or four of the soldiers who came from Tolu and Mompox. There were many wounded. Captain Bravo and Robleda, the merchant, and Alonso Serrano and Francisco Bollaños of Mompox, are prisoners. The enemy lost heavily in men killed by poisoned stakes as well as by artillery- and harquebus-fire. Some 200 of his soldiers were killed, although they denied that more than 30 died. These they have buried and hidden with great secrecy, according to this Italian, (p. 4) who is a prisoner, and according to the boat-loads of dead our sentries saw pass next day.

This Italian also says that the enemy has some men sick in Cartagena, but those who go there to treat of the ransom have not seen them.

If credence is to be given to this Italian, the night the enemy landed men at Cartagena he sent ashore 1000 in the first party and 500 afterwards as reinforcements, who were to approach in pinnaces from the sea; and another 1000 were to attack at Boqueron, the commander remaining on board alone with the yonkers. However, these statements are not credible. The deposition made by the prisoner taken at Santa Marta should be preferred. He was present at the attack on Cartagena.

The news of the loss of Santo Domingo was sent to Spain within four days after the event, but the enemy took the vessel. Two other advice-boats cleared from Cuba on January 20.

On the day that Captain Francis entered the port of Cartagena, four hours previous there had entered an advice-boat from Spain and as I was weighing on my scales¹ the despatches he brought the alarm sounded that Captain Francis's armada was in sight. There were some despatches for your lordship and some for Peru and they were left on a table where the enemy took them next day. They saw the warnings in them to the effect that Captain Francis was coming to these parts with a large fleet and that we should be prepared. I think the despatches contained nothing else. There was some private correspondence for that realm which will be sent as soon as opportunity offers.

Our Lord grant your lordship better fortune in this matter than we have had.

Turbaco, March 12, 1586.

Very illustrious sir

Your lordship's servant kisses your lordship's hands.

Pedro Fernando de Busto.

To the very illustrious president and judges of the royal *Audiencia* of the realm of Tierra Firme.

This despatch is left open that it may be read at Nombre de Dios and thence forwarded to Panama . . .

Document No. 24²

[Statement, Santos de Vergara, Nombre de Dios, March 22,
1586]

(p. 2) . . . Statement made by Santos de Vergara, burgher of Alcala de Henares, who was on board of the flag-galley when Captain Francis Drake entered the harbour of the city of Cartagena, which is as follows:

First, he states that the said Captain Francis Drake entered the harbour of Cartagena on Ash Wednesday, which was the nineteenth

¹ Presumably postage was reckoned by weight.

² *A. de I.*, 2-5-2/21, Patronato 266, R. 50-14. This document is part of a despatch (2 *pliegos*, copy) from Diego del Castillo to the *Audiencia* at Panama, written from Nombre de Dios on March 22, 1586. 'Within the hour', it being nine o'clock at night, a small vessel had come in from Cartagena with Governor Fernandez de Busto's open letter of March 12 (Document No. 23 *ante*). While it was being copied, that the original might be hurried forward and the copy retained for consideration, this account of the situation at Cartagena was furnished by a man who saw the taking of the city from aboard the flag-galley.

day of the month of February, at three or four o'clock in the afternoon. He came in with 23 ships, large and small, and with fourteen or sixteen pinnaces.

Seeing them, the governor of Cartagena went out to the first work, which is towards Santa Marta, with what men he had, and followed him along to the other work, which is on this side, toward the harbour. The governor ordered four or five pieces to be fired and none did the enemy any damage.

The commander of the galleys, named Don Pedro Vique, ordered all his soldiers aboard the said galleys; and he ordered the galleys to swing a chain, which had been made of iron, across the channel from the fort at its entrance to the other side. Because a few links were lacking (p. 3) they went to the jail and brought the chain which was there, with which they supplied what was missing, and fastened it to floats in such manner that no launch nor any ship could enter.

That same night Captain Juan de Castañeda came aboard the flag-galley in representation of Don Pedro and issued orders like a commanding officer. He ordered that that night the said galleys should ply between the fort and the Caleta, and here they did ply, watching for the enemy until one or two in the morning, when they saw the horsemen return who had been reconnoitring. They brought word that the enemy was advancing.

As soon as he perceived the enemy, the said Juan de Castañeda ordered the artillery which was in the galleys to be fired and it was so fired against the enemy three times. In the glare from the artillery the enemy squadron was seen entering. By that light could be seen the damage this artillery did. While said artillery was playing against him the enemy held back but, observing that there was delay in firing it, the enemy pressed forward at great speed and when dawn broke was found to be in possession of the city.

At this time, as that galley was endeavouring to get out by the channel where the fort is, to escape from the enemy, a barrel of powder caught fire on board the *Ocasión*, of which Captain Martin Gonzalez was in command. Three or four men were burned to death and eight or nine injured. The rest abandoned the galley. Seeing the fire, the flag-galley supposed it to be the work of certain enemy launches. They rowed for the Jesemani shore and drove aground. The soldiers and the galley-slaves (their irons having been removed) landed and deserted the galleys. At nightfall, in order that the enemy might not bring the galleys off and take them away with him, it seemed well to Don Pedro Vique to burn them and so they were set

afire and burned. Afterwards the enemy went to them and carried off (p. 4) the artillery and the *Napolitana*, frigate.

The enemy having entered (sooner than seemed possible) and taken the city, everybody left in disorder, each hastening to where his wife and household were. So there remained none to offer any offence to the corsair excepting Anton de Barros who with some men was in the vicinity of San Francisco monastery and elsewhere about the city, seeking to do him damage; and Pedro Mexia Mirabal, who was at Boqueron; and Juan de Castañeda, captain of the *saetia*, who also was with him. They held the fort all Thursday until one o'clock at night. They had orders to evacuate since they could not defend it against the force which menaced them.

At the post which Captain Alonso Bravo Montemayor was defending with his company, they captured him and killed his ensign. His ransom was arranged at 2000 pesos which they said he paid with jewels and valuables from his house. Freed from prison in exchange for the jewels which were paid for his ransom, they said his wife fell sick at Turbaco on an estate there and died on the 15th of the present month of March; and while declarant was in Colpique he heard many people say that Captain Francis had permitted her body to be brought for burial to the Franciscan monastery and there the said captain caused her to be interred with the greatest solemnity possible, with flags reversed and drums muffled, and they say that he himself was present at the funeral ceremony.

After the city was taken the bishop and the governor and the dean, Fray Juan de las Parras, and many other persons, returned to it to treat with Captain Francis of ways and means. He received them and people of all conditions well, especially the gentlemen and soldiers; but with the seamen he is harsh. Finally, in the form and manner that has been written to the *alcalde mayor* of the city of Nombre de Dios and to the gentlemen of the royal *Audiencia* at Panama, they agreed upon a ransom for that part of the (p. 5) city which had not been burned.

When they had come to an agreement on the ransom, they asked the Englishman to depart from the city and fort on receipt of the sum they had fixed upon. He replied that he did not know whether he could do it that same day, but within three or four days following he would do so. The payment will be completed on next Monday, the 24th, and it is understood that he will proceed to this city of Nombre de Dios, for he himself has so announced.

During the time that this enemy has been in the harbour he has been careening his ships as though he were in his own country.

Three vessels have happened to enter the port. He took two, but the third, which was from Jamaica laden with *cazabi*, defended itself and put into an inlet which is near Gaspar Bernal's estate of Los Piques. With some Indian bowmen and four soldiers he had on his estate he sallied to its assistance and they killed a captain¹ of whom Francis was very fond (he much regretted his death) and another of whom not so much was said.

He states, further, that when the said agreement had been effected, to ransom the city for the said 110,000 *pesos*, Captain Francis said that he would leave the city and port of Cartagena on the understanding that if on the way to the city of Nombre de Dios or other destination he should be driven back by bad weather he might enter the port and they would give him what supplies he might need in exchange for the value thereof. They protested that they did not wish to furnish him supplies because to do so was forbidden by their king, but that he might take² what he needed and pay what it was worth.

. . . Nombre de Dios, (p. 6) March 22, 1586 . . . Santos de Vergara . . .

Document No. 25³

[Diego Daça⁴ to the municipal authorities of Havana,
from Punta de la Canoa, April 8, 1586]

(p. 1)

†

Very Illustrious Sirs

On Ash Wednesday, which was February 19, the Englishman Captain Francis Drake entered this port with his fleet consisting of 27 sail, of which twenty were large- and medium-sized ships and the rest pinnaces. And the following Thursday before dawn, having

¹ This was Thomas Moon, former carpenter of the *Swan*, in command of the *Francis*. See Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 125; *Sir Francis Drake Revisited* as reprinted by the Hakluyt Society, Ser. II, No. 71, p. 272. Cf. Document No. 27 *post*, Captain Bravo's deposition.

² By force, of course; i.e., the usual fiction followed in *rescates*.

³ *A. de I.*, 42-1-8/3, Contratación 5108. 1 sheet, authenticated copy, forwarded to Spain with a despatch from the authorities at Havana to the House of Trade, wherein it is stated that the original was received at noon on May 2. Compare with Document No. 27 *post*, Daça's deposition.

⁴ Lieutenant governor under Fernández de Busto.

landed about 1200 men by way of the Caleta, he took possession of the city and has remained in occupation until today.

Negotiations with him were opened for the ransom of the place. He demanded 400,000 ducats and the matter dropped. Seeing that these negotiations for the ransom were not resumed, he began to burn and burned a large part of the city. He left unburned the more valuable buildings and their owners begged that each might ransom his own property, and license was given them so to proceed, in consideration of the fact that these few householders thus at their own expense purchased the city where His Majesty's fleets and armadas may find favour and purveyance of what they need. So the cathedral and temples and other edifices were redeemed for 110,000 ducats, which were delivered to the enemy. It is pitiful to see in what condition this city is.

As for the galleys, which were lost, I give your honours no relation, for I would not know how to tell it; nor do their captains, responsible for that loss, know how to account for it. The suggestion offered in explanation of it is that the loss of them and of the city was Heaven's punishment of our sins.

This advice-boat reached this coast on Saturday preceding Easter Sunday, with His Majesty's warning to us to be on guard against the Englishman's coming, and instructions to clear the vessel immediately with the same warning to your honours. To attend to the matter by order of the governor I came from the place to which he has retired, which is six leagues inland. Along with this one, the pilot, Tomás Ginoves, carries a despatch for His Majesty giving him an account of all that has happened. Your honours will be good enough to see to it that Tomás Ginoves continues speedily upon his voyage to Spain, because it is very advisable that His Majesty know what has occurred here.

According to what we have learned this English fleet intends to go to take that city. Your honours will endeavour to act for the good of His Majesty's service and the welfare of its inhabitants.

Our Lord preserve your honours' very illustrious persons, etc.

From this coast, Punta de la Canoa, April 8, 1586.

Very Illustrious Sirs

Your honours' servitor kisses your honours' hands.

Diego Daça . . .

Document No. 26¹

[Don Pedro Vique y Manrique² to the Crown, Cartagena,
April 5, 1586]

(p. 1)

†

Catholic Royal Majesty

On Ash Wednesday at mid-day the corsair Francis Drake appeared before this city with 27 sail, large and small. He had ten large ships of 600 tons, and ten or eleven others from 150 to 200 tons. The rest were pinnaces.

From windward this city of Cartagena had been warned a month before that the corsair intended to attack us. Therefore during this time trenches and ditches and very good defensive works were built, especially in that quarter we feared most, in which the enemy attacked, called the Caleta, where it is not a hundred paces from sea to sea.

There we had a masonry wall a *vara* and a half high, and a ditch which I dug. In this work there were four pieces of artillery and 300 harquebuses and 100 pikes and 200 Indian bowmen. Here, too, were both galleys, bows to shore, with ten pieces of artillery and 150 harquebuses. It seemed impossible for the enemy to enter the city this way.

Yet here, on Thursday, an hour before day broke, he attacked us with 500 to 600 men in such manner that we were almost man to man in numbers, and we had the trenches and ditches and artillery. The galleys fired (p. 2) their artillery and killed about 100 men, and from the trenches we gave them two rounds. They let us have another two.

I saw that the enemy had halted and did not dare to come up. I came out of the trench, sword in hand, crying 'Victory!' The enemy trumpets began to sound retreat. When I was outside the works, already surrounded by enemies, I turned to see whether our men were coming after me and observed that, instead of following up the advantage, they had turned their backs and were fleeing at

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fe 89. 1 *pliego*, original. Compare with Vique's deposition, Document No. 27 *post*.

² Commanding His Majesty's galleys on station at Cartagena. Cf. Fernández Duro, *op. cit.*, II, p. 397; Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 45.

full speed. When the enemy saw this he shouted, rallied, and went after ours. I went along in the midst of the enemy and so entered the city where, at a street, I got out from amongst them.

I went to the wharf and called to the galleys and sent aboard a comrade of mine named Captain Pedro de Cornas, with order to Captain Martin Gonzalez and Captain Juan de Castañeda to get away with the galleys, out of the port by Boca Chica, for, live who might or die who must, I was going to the head of the bridge to gather up the people, since it was now broad day and the English were scattered in disorder through the streets, and we could easily kill them.

So I went and got together some 300 arquebuses and returned by the bridge to face the enemy; and when I began to skirmish they again left me alone, and so the city was lost because it was Your Majesty's luck to have in it the most cowardly subjects there can be in the whole world. Had they been other than they are, a not very difficult victory would have been won instead of the very easy loss of the city.

When I supposed the galleys outside I discovered some of their slaves and soldiers approaching by land. When I asked an explanation they told me to turn my head and see that they had gone aground, without putting up a fight or trying to get away. Their captains, who were on board, will explain the how and the why in their defence.

My excuse for not being on board of them is that in the councils of war held (the municipal council, the governor, captains of infantry and Captains Martin Gonzalez and Juan de Castañeda, all being assembled together) it was resolved that the galleys should not leave the haven, for if they did the city would be easily lost, but with them could defend itself. And they could get away at any time. And since on board of the galleys were Captains (p. 3) Martin de Gonzalez and Juan de Castañeda, by Your Majesty commissioned to command, it was decided that I should stay on shore to command and fight with the militia because this was for the good of Your Majesty's service, since the militia had no officer to lead them. They demanded that I do this and so signed their opinion, all of them. Afterwards, especially in the market-place of this city, in public acclamation the captains of the militia and their ensigns and sergeants and all the population many times repeated to me that if I fought with them they would die in defence of the Faith and Your Majesty's service, but if I did not remain with them it was their desire to abandon the city. The bishop of Cartagena and the three monasteries demanded the same of me. And in view of this I re-

mained to fight with them and they failed in their promise. Of all this I will furnish Your Majesty sufficient evidence on the first occasion that offers.

The corsair entrenched himself in the city and burned the buildings outside his trenches, which were some 250. For those which remained within his trenches, although they were half demolished, these people have been pusillanimous enough to give him 110,000 ducats to keep him from burning them. It was of no avail for me to advise the governor that to do so was contrary to the good of Your Majesty's service. He nevertheless himself negotiated with the corsair for the ransom and went into Cartagena under the enemy's safe-conduct. Finally they effected the ransom at the price mentioned. The Franciscan monastery, which stood outside the trenches, was ransomed for 700 ducats and they would not let me defend it, saying that if I did the enemy would burn their houses.

The corsair came in on Ash Wednesday and to-day, which is the last day of Lent, he is in the harbour, aboard (p. 4) his vessels with yards across. I do not know when he will leave. God confound him and grant Your Majesty many years of life with increase of many kingdoms and lordships as this humble vassal desires.

From this land of Cartagena, April 8, 1586.

Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's humble vassal who kisses Your Majesty's feet and hands.

Don Pedro Vique y Manrique (Rubric).

Document No. 27¹

[Francisco de Alba, Martin Gonzalez, Pedro Mexia Mirabal, Diego Daça, Diego de Ballesteros, Don Luis de Guzman, Alonso de Tapia, Juan Liranzo, Don Pedro Vique, Alonso Bravo, Mancio de las Cuevas, and Agustin, free black, depositions made at Cartagena, April 20-May 5, 1586]

(P. 19) In the city of Cartagena on the twentieth day of the month of April in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty six . . .

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fé 89, No. 3, testimony and proceedings (the fall of Cartagena) as sent to the royal *Audiencia* of the New Kingdom of Granada by Diego Hidalgo Montemayor. 45 *pliegos*.

This is a legalized copy, so full of curious repetitions and confusions of all sorts

Francisco de Alba, chief ensign of the cavalry of this city¹ . . . (p. 20) stated . . . that one day last January (he believes it was the eve of Epiphany) an advice-ship brought to this port news that Captain Francis, an Englishman, had left the port of Bayona in Galicia with a large fleet and, judging by the weather when he left there and the course he took, it was understood he was coming to these parts of the Indies to do damage. Governor Pedro Fernández de Busto assembled the municipal authorities in this city, to whom he showed a letter from the president and officials of the House of Trade which conveyed this news; and in this meeting, in order better to take the measures most advisable and necessary for the good of His Majesty's service and defence of this city, he demanded that each councilman present give his opinion as to what should be done; and certain resolutions were taken, such as to send warning concerning the enemy to the kingdom of Tierra Firme and to other parts of this coast, to remove His Majesty's and private monies, and the women and children, to safety, and to take other steps looking to defence; and these resolutions were carried into effect (p. 21) as will appear in the record of these matters which was kept, to which deponent refers.

After which, for his better guidance and information, the governor summoned a council of the captains and persons experienced in war who were to be found in the city, and informed this council of the news and asked the opinion of all present as to what should be done for the city's defence both by its inhabitants and by the galleys here stationed for the protection of this coast. In this council certain resolutions were drawn up as to what should be done, to which deponent refers, the originals being in his possession.

In accordance with these resolutions and other measures which it seemed proper to take in this city, work was begun on trenches and ditches in different places; and they commenced to repair the artillery and make ready the weapons and munitions, and to hold musters and reviews better to train the people, and to take other preparatory and preventive measures which seemed advisable in defence of this place. They ordered a quantity of pikes to be cut and iron heads made for them; they put the arquebuses into condition and refined the powder and trained the artillery. In these and similar

that to translate it has been exceptionally difficult because the text itself is obscure in many places. The document has been shortened as much as possible by the omission of questions, legal formalities and irrelevant passages.

¹ Also notary public and clerk of the municipal council of Cartagena. See *A. de I.*, 73-3-6, Santa Fé 1, *consulta* of March 31, 1594.

matters the time passed. The enemy was expected any moment. A *corps de garde* was maintained nightly and the infantry captains took their turns, making the rounds and inspecting sentries, anticipating that any instant the enemy might appear.

Until on Ash Wednesday of this present year the look-out on duty at Canoa Point (which is four leagues from this city) came in to report that a number of sails were in sight at sea (p. 22) and at the same time that this news was received these sails were seen. Those who counted them said they were 27, large and small.

Immediately the alarm was sounded and the foot and horse assembled and went to the beach, formed their squadrons and showed themselves to the enemy in battle array, under the royal standard (which deponent carried) and the flags of the infantry captains of the city, until such time as the English with their fleet had entered the harbour.

This being the state of affairs (the English anchored in the port and our people in military formation on the beach), lest the enemy land men at Tesca Swamp Martin Polo's company, consisting of some hundred men, was sent to hold the trench which had been built at Hanged Man's Swamp, and there they remained on duty defending that approach all that night. And because news was brought that the enemy was going to disembark a party at Juan Nuñez de Villegas' Anchorage landing, certain troops were sent to protect that approach; and a few more were sent to guard this city's bridge. With the men who were left on the beach the governor remained at his post all night, with the captains of foot and horse, guarding and protecting the Caleta approach. He sent two horsemen to the harbour to bring him word if the enemy landed troops.

This being the state of affairs, (p. 23) after midnight these two men returned from the port and informed the governor that six pinnaces had gone to Hicacos Point, which is a league from this city, and that they believed the enemy was landing there.

The governor sent Don Alonso de Mendoza and Don Juan de Villoria, his father-in-law, to learn if this were true. They rode down and returned after a good while and said that they had seen nothing. Therefore it was supposed that what the others had told was not true. The people were somewhat quieted and again the governor sent Juan de Torres, *alcalde ordinario*, and Cristóbal Mayne de Mercado, who returned to report that the enemy was advancing and when they asked 'Who comes?' had replied 'Men of war.'

They brought this news to the governor who at the Caleta took up a good position in the trench with his men to prevent the enemy

from entering there. All expected the enemy at any moment and apparently had a mind to do their duty, and all were alert.

At this juncture the governor thought he saw lights at sea and supposed that they must be enemy pinnaces approaching to land men on that side. He sent deponent and (p. 24) the other horse who were with him to ride along the beach as far as the trench where Captain Martin Polo was, to discover if there were any pinnaces there. The horsemen went and when they had arrived where Martin Polo was they heard harquebus and artillery fire from the Caleta, which indicated that the enemy and ours were engaged there. When they heard this they returned with their horses, but the Caleta work was already lost and the enemy was advancing up the beach amidst much shouting and outcry, with heavy fire from their harquebuses and bows, so that it was necessary to escape from among them, for the horsemen found themselves between the English who were advancing along the beach and others who had already taken the Santo Domingo defences. These also fired on the horse so that they had to escape from the beach by Geronimo de Avila street and withdraw toward the bridge, inasmuch as the infantry had preceded them in that direction, in retreat.

And so, because the governor and his captains and foot awaited the enemy all that night at the Caleta and faced him and fought until the enemy took the place by force of his arms and superior strength, deponent considers that they did their duty and none may be (p. 25) charged with cowardice. Given the enemy's strength, as deponent has since seen it to be, in men, artillery, munitions, fire-works and other artifices of war, deponent believes that had they who were at the Caleta stayed there longer than they did all or most of them would have been killed or captured, as some were, because they had few weapons of the kinds required for hand to hand fighting (such as pikes, halberds, partisans, swords and targets) and among them were very few skilled in handling these arms. After this manner it happened that the English took the city by force of arms.

Some days after the city fell Tristan de Orive went by the governor's order, according to deponent's understanding, to treat with Captain Francis, that he might not burn the city or damage it. This man returned with word that Captain Francis asked that the bishop and the governor appear to negotiate in this matter.

Considering how much it behove His Majesty's service and the universal welfare of this quarter of the Indies that this city be preserved and not lost, because it is a necessary port of call for all His

Majesty's fleets and armadas sailing to these parts whence most of these Indies are supplied with everything they need, these gentlemen (p. 26) determined to treat with the Englishman for the city's ransom. They went and in a chamber these two and deponent only entered into conference with Captain Francis and his vice-admiral and lieutenant-general¹ and considered the matter of the ransom.

For the town, the artillery which he had taken with it, and his prisoners, the governor offered twenty-five thousand ducats. As though this were a jest Captain Francis replied that he would not give the artillery alone for three times the sum offered to him. For the ransom of the city he demanded five hundred thousand ducats in gold and he maintained this demand as long as deponent was present, and made many threats and boasts.

Whereupon the bishop and governor returned and in the village of Turbaco called a meeting of all the people who could be assembled who had houses and were interested in the city, that each man might give his opinion as to what should be done with respect to the ransom. All were unanimous in agreeing that it was desirable to effect this ransom, for many reasons which were set forth, and they gave the bishop and the governor their hands on it, that they might conclude the matter, borrowing money to make the payment wherever it could be found, and afterwards assign to each man his share as might correspond to his property holding. Accordingly the procurator general presented certain petitions (p. 27) and certain evidence was taken and the governor issued a writ, to the records of all which deponent refers.

Tristan de Orive Salazar and Lieutenant Diego Daça went in to treat of the ransom with the Englishman and they say it was fixed at one hundred ten thousand ducats, from which amount the Englishman deducted three thousand. To raise this sum two hundred bars of silver were borrowed from His Majesty, which silver Geronimo de Hojeda, master, had turned over when his ship came into this port. Monies which were in the possession of the depositary general were borrowed, as well as from other persons, all of which was necessary to raise so great a sum. And in deponent's presence Tristan de Orive and Pedro Lopez Treviño paid it to the Englishman, of all which there is legalized record in deponent's possession.

Some persons have obligated themselves to refund to His Majesty their share for the ransom of their houses according as these were evaluated and appraised by the bishop and governor who are charged with assigning to each the amount he is to pay; and now,

¹ Campmaster in the original. Carleill or Sergeant-major Powell?

further to formalize this apportioning, officials have been named to appraise and evaluate the buildings which were left standing in the city in order that, once this appraisal is satisfactorily made, to each owner may be assigned his share pro rata in the amount paid for the place. At a rough estimate it seems to work out that each owner will contribute one-fourth of the value of his property and that in effect ...¹ (p. 28).

Asked to state who of the responsible military officers deserted the posts to which they had been detailed, and so gave an opportunity to their men to flee and to the enemy to take the place, deponent replied that, as he has said, by the governor's order he had gone with the horse to patrol the beach and was not present when the English broke through. However, because he saw our men with good spirit awaiting the enemy in the work at the Caleta and inasmuch as they stood there and fought, he thinks that no blame can be attached to any person. He considers that had they remained there longer the enemy would have killed and captured the most of ours, as they captured Captain Alonso Bravo and killed his ensign, Juan Cosme de la Sala, and others of his company, because of the enemy's superior strength and the rest that he has deposed.

Asked to state what he learned of the force the enemy landed, with which troops he took this city, deponent said that he understood and had heard it said that the enemy landed over a thousand men to take the city and that, to reinforce these, another three or four hundred were to follow; and that these troops were resolute and well armed to fight, being equipped with harquebuses, bows, pikes and helmets.

Asked how many effectives we had at the Caleta when the enemy arrived, deponent said he thought that not counting those who were scattered elsewhere, there were at the Caleta at the time mentioned about two hundred men, poorly equipped with arms suitable to hand-to-hand fighting.

Asked to state whether he is informed how many men were killed on both sides, he said that there is a wide divergence of opinion and assertion on this point. Deponent has generally understood that we lost about fifteen men; and they say the enemy lost about 27.

Asked if it is true that on the day the enemy's fleet was sighted, His Majesty's galleys, which by his order were stationed here to protect and guard this coast, did not go out to sea to harass him and prevent him from entering the harbour but, on the contrary, kept close to the wharf, this side of a chain which had been hung across

¹ An omission in the original.

Boqueron channel, their general and captains so failing to carry out His Majesty's orders governing such cases; and if these captains and soldiers and galley-slaves burned the galleys and abandoned them . . . deponent said that what he knows of the matter is that in a council of war held in Captain Alonso Bravo's house it was resolved that these galleys should not go out because if they went (p. 30) out to sea and the enemy entered the harbour they would find themselves outside and unable to get back or render any service; and if they went to the harbour entrance they could not return later for lack of water in Boqueron channel, but must remain outside and unable to aid the city at all; and so it was decided that in order to prevent the enemy from coming in by way of the Caleta the galleys should draw up there and help defend that approach, and this was the reason why it was resolved that the galleys should not go out. Since the enemy attacked before daybreak and the loss of the city befell so suddenly, the galleys did not have the effect that was anticipated; and therefore, since everything was lost, in order that the enemy might not profit by the galleys, their artillery, munitions and slaves, they were set on fire and burned, and deponent has seen them, burned, beside the wharf. Don Pedro Vique, commanding the galleys, was on shore; in his stead on the flag-galley was Captain Castañeda, who had been in command of the *settee*,¹ and deponent refers to the records of proceedings taken in regard to this matter . . . (p. 31) . . .—Francisco Dalva . . . (p. 32).

In the city of Cartagena, on the twenty-seventh day of the month of April in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty six . . . Martin Gonzalez, captain of the galley *Ocasion* . . . stated . . . (p. 33) that on the eve of last Epiphany there arrived in this harbour from the kingdoms of Spain an advice-boat sent by the House of Trade for Indies which brought a warning from its officials to the effect that a large fleet had sailed from England, and that it was presumed to be coming hither to do damage in these parts. The governor of this city summoned its municipal councilmen and Don Pedro Vique, general commanding the galleys, their captains and other residents of the place to a conference; before which council the governor laid the news he had of the enemy's coming and bade each person present express his opinion as to what should be done for the fortification and defence of the city. The resolutions taken in this conference were set down in the municipal council records of this city, to which deponent refers.

In consequence of this conference, at the entrances to all the streets which lead to the sea, they built trenches, terraplened, and

¹ . . . *saetia* . . .

with palisaded barricades, in each of which works a piece of artillery was planted. Similarly, they decided on the place where the people were to assemble when the occasion should arise, and certain posts were assigned, as appears in the aforesaid records. (p. 34).

Further, men were called from Tolu, Mompox and the other places nearby in this jurisdiction, and the Indians were summoned; so also the soldiers were selected who were to serve in the formation on which this council decided.

On January 22 there arrived in this port a ship which brought letters from La Yaguana. These contained the news that the Englishman had taken the city of Santo Domingo and that it was understood that he would come hither, to take this place. Upon learning which the governor of this city summoned the municipal councilmen and they also called upon Don Pedro Vique and deponent to be present at this meeting, which considered the enemy's approach and deliberated means to defend the city, all of which was set down in the records, to which deponent refers.

Deponent observed that in consequence a watch was set on the point at the harbour mouth, and at Tesca Swamp. Deponent moved this council to detail an artilleryman and a leading citizen with some soldiers and Indians to each piece of artillery which had (p. 35) been placed at the street entrances (in case the enemy might seek to land men on the beach), to the end that they might prevent the enemy from effecting a landing.

Deponent further expressed the opinion that it was extremely important for the defence of the city, for its preservation, and for that of the galleys, to prevent the enemy from entering the harbour. Unless he could get his fleet into the protection of the port he could not offend the place inasmuch as this is wild coast and he could not land men except with great difficulty, particularly since we could oppose his landing with artillery. Outside the harbour he could not maintain himself because the northeast wind is strong and the coast dangerous.

Deponent stated that the entrance to the harbour could very easily be defended by placing four or six pieces of artillery (since it was abundant and good) on either Hicacos or Carey Points which form the harbour mouth; such a battery and the support of the galleys would most certainly suffice to prevent the enemy's entrance, no matter how powerful his fleet might be, because the channel is so narrow that necessarily they must sink some ships and halt and hold back the rest in such fashion that they would be carried beyond the harbour mouth. It is notorious that the wind is so strong, that no

matter how brief this delay (p. 36), it would waft them past and then it would be very difficult indeed for them to work back to the entrance.

To which some replied that it was not advisable to plant any artillery on Hicacos Point because if it were lost the enemy might turn it against the city. Deponent answered that if the enemy was coming with such strength as was reported, once within the harbour if he needed artillery he would land it from his own ships and so have no need to take ours; further, to keep him from using our pieces even if he should take them, it was only necessary to spike them and smash the carriage wheels to prevent their being of service to the enemy. Even if they were lost there it would be under more creditable circumstances, while rendering a good account of themselves, than if they were left lying useless within the town.

Deponent was quite sure the enemy would take the city if he took the harbour, since he saw that although the wall at the Caleta was built of masonry it was not in a position, nor suitably constructed, to serve as a strong work. Further, deponent recognized that the townspeople felt little spirit or inclination to defend it because they were terrified to see that the city of Santo Domingo (larger and stronger than Cartagena) had (p. 37) been so easily lost.

To which the majority of those present replied that they would go next day to see whether to plant this battery were desirable; but neither did they go nor did they detail responsible persons to stand by the artillery although deponent brought up the matter on many other occasions, nor does he think they entered it in the records. Nevertheless, all who were present in that council know that deponent made this suggestion, supporting it with the reasons he has given.

Deponent is certain that had the measures which he proposed been adopted the enemy would not be in the city now, for it is notorious that the general of the English fleet and its captains said repeatedly that they feared nothing more than lest there be a battery at the harbour mouth and that the galleys might be outside Boqueron channel, because if they failed to get into the lagoon they could accomplish nothing.

Furthermore, deponent said that on the sixteenth of February Don Francisco Maldonado, resident of Rio de la Hacha, arrived in Cartagena and stated that he had been in Santo Domingo when the English took the city, and that he knew certainly that the enemy would very shortly appear here because their commander had himself told him so.

The consequence of this news was, as deponent observed, that the governor and Don Pedro Vique summoned all (p. 38) the people, both from outside the city as well as from the city and from the galleys, and they were all very fearful because they said the enemy had four thousand men. The governor and Don Pedro Vique encouraged them, showing them a letter said to be from Don Diego de Osorio,¹ bidding them be of good courage because the enemy's troops were much fewer than they supposed, being not over one thousand five hundred men. Don Pedro Vique gave the people his word of honour that he would not go outside the harbour with the galleys, but he and all his men would fight on land.

They ordered deponent to help and hurry work on a trench which was being built at Canapote. The trench was made with a ditch more than a pike's length in width and about a man's height in depth.

On the nineteenth of February, deponent being on board the galley *Ocasion*, of which he was captain, the call to arms was sounded in the city. It was said that sails had been sighted. When he had assembled all the men of his galley and there issued the necessary orders, deponent went ashore and saw all the forces of the city in formation, with Don Pedro Vique in the vanguard, whom deponent frequently urged (both privately and before witnesses) to change his mind (p. 39) about keeping the galleys this side Boqueron channel. Deponent clearly foresaw that they would be lost if they so remained since, as his honour knew, the enemy was coming in such strength that he must take the city of Cartagena if he occupied the harbour; and once the city was taken, it was sure that the galleys would be lost because, if they were in the haven, he could sink them with the city's own artillery, and kill all on board as they might seek to get out, a thing not at all times possible to them because of the bar. Even if they succeeded in crossing that, they must still face as great danger of loss in that they must pass through the enemy's fleet, and the harbour is narrow in that part. Deponent called Don Pedro's attention to these matters especially on February 16, when Don Francisco Maldonado came in with news that the enemy was approaching.

Observing that he could not move Don Pedro from his original determination, deponent talked with Captain Juan de Castañeda and with one Luis de Guzman, commissary and treasurer of the galleys, and with Juan Bautista Carrillo, accountant and inspector

¹ Not seen. It will be recalled that Osorio commanded the galleys on station at Santo Domingo. See depositions of royal officials and of Don Pedro Vique, *post*.

of same, urging upon them the view that it would be greatly to the good of Our Lord God's service and of His Majesty's, and to the welfare (p. 40) of this coast, for the galleys to go out to fight and to do as much damage as possible to the enemy with as little to themselves as might be, hoping that they would say as much to Don Pedro Vique and force him to take up the matter in a council of them all. Deponent is aware that they repeated it to him and sought to persuade him, but he would never summon a council. On the contrary, as said, when the call to arms sounded he took his place with the townspeople.

Observing this, deponent sent him word by Captain Antonio Rodriguez and other soldiers that he had his men ready on board his galley, and so they were all at their posts aboard the flag-galley, for his honour to come on board before the tide ebbed completely and made it impossible for the galleys to get out and meet and offend the enemy. Don Pedro Vique's answer to this was to keep with him the captain and the soldier who took him the message, until after the enemy had occupied the harbour.

At this juncture Don Pedro Vique came to the wharf where the galleys were and deponent left his and said to him: 'All these gentlemen on board the galleys and myself are worried (p. 41) more than I expected to be in my life, that your honour has kept us shut up here with a heretic enemy in sight. Come on board your galleys and let us go out with them to do the work I have previously talked of, before the enemy hamper us and further block our egress.' To this Don Pedro replied by asking if there was water enough to get out. Deponent answered that there was the *Napolitana*, which could go to see if there was. So all boarded that vessel and went to the bar of Boqueron channel and found the depth of water there to be insufficient.

Therefore Don Pedro Vique again went ashore and caused a heavy chain (made for the purpose) to be hung from the fort to the mangrove swamp, thus shutting the galleys into the inner haven, in opposition to the opinion of deponent and of the other naval officers.

An hour after nightfall deponent went to Don Pedro Vique's lodgings and again sought to persuade him to embark and go out with the galleys, and to determine what was to be done with them, since where they were they could accomplish nothing profitable because they were shut in, and if, as he insisted, men were to be sent ashore from them, for him to state who and how many, and not to wait to the last moment. In reply to which Don Pedro Vique

ordered deponent to get back on board his galley, adding that he would himself go to his galley when (p. 42) the time should arrive. Whereat deponent went back to his galley.

Whither Don Pedro Vique came some two hours after midnight in the *Napolitana*. He summoned deponent to that vessel and together they proceeded to the flag-galley and there were joined by Captain Juan de Castañeda, Don Luis Guzman, treasurer, and Captain Cornas. All together we went to Boqueron channel to see if there was water enough and there was not enough for the galleys to get out.

At this juncture a piece of artillery was fired at the Caleta where the governor was. When he heard it, Don Pedro Vique ordered deponent to go on board his galley and to bring it up to the position which had been indicated to him, alongside the trench at the Caleta; and deponent understands he issued the same order to Captain Pedro Victoria who was acting as Don Pedro Vique's substitute on the flag-galley.

When we had taken up this position we were informed that the enemy was advancing. Deponent asked Cristóbal Maynel de Mercado (who at this juncture passed by, on land, on horseback) whether certain match which we saw through the mangroves was the body of 30 harquebusiers which it had been resolved should lay an ambushade there, in command of Francisco Diaz; and Maynel said no, because these had withdrawn ahead (p. 43) of time without accomplishing anything. And this resulted in the total loss of the country.

At this time the enemy was advancing rapidly and came so near to the galleys that deponent called out to Maynel to get out of the way and give him a chance to fire the artillery. Deponent fired his artillery as soon as the enemy came opposite, and let him have good volleys of small shot from muskets and harquebuses, and the flag-galley did the same.

Nevertheless the enemy came on and deponent saw how, when they came up to the trench, three or four pieces of artillery and a good volley from the harquebuses were fired. When this was over deponent thought that the enemy went forward because no further resistance was offered at the trench, but deponent could not determine who deserted that work either first or last because it was not yet daylight and he was at some little distance, on board his galley. Certainly when day broke he saw the whole of San Francisco bridge crowded with people who were leaving, and heard some harquebus shots within the town, but not many.

They called out to deponent from the flag-galley, and from the *Napolitana* Master Herquera shouted that Don Pedro Vique had come to Francisco de Alba's wharf and ordered the master to tell the captains of the galleys to go out through the channel and the enemy's fleet, die who must (p. 44) or live who might, that he would rejoin them at Boca Chica or at Tolu, whither he would proceed overland.

In obedience to this order deponent brought his galley off and steered her for Boqueron channel, to go out, and as he proceeded he encouraged his men, saying to the crew: 'Brothers, you have seen what's happening. Have courage and let us take this galley through the channel and that fleet. I pledge you His Majesty's word that the sentence of those of you who are condemned for life shall be commuted to four years, and the time remaining to those who are sentenced for fixed terms shall be cut in half, and the youngers¹ shall be freed of chains in the hour that you bring this galley through that fleet.'

And as we steered for the channel the navigator and the boatswain began to protest, saying that there was a chain across and not enough water on the bar for them to get out, for it was low tide. To them deponent answered that it made no difference, they would wait there for the tide, and meanwhile to shout to the flag-galley to send the key to unlock the chain. This key was asked for and sent by the *Napolitana*, but they never unlocked the chain.

And while deponent was at the entrance to Boqueron channel, waiting while all this went on, he heard some of the soldiers and seamen, who lacked courage, saying: 'We don't know where this captain thinks he's taking us, the galley being so short of rowers, (p. 45) out through the fleet, where we'll be knocked to pieces and sunk.' With much spirit deponent reprehended them, saying: 'Gentlemen, drop that matter, for I am going out with this galley. Believe me, I think as much of my life and honour as any man, and I do not expect to lose them. Rather, by God's grace, to carry this through at much less risk than you think, for I know a channel by which we will go out, at a good distance from the enemy.' Deponent said this that they might cease to fear.

At this juncture, the situation being as described, the rowers shouted to the flag-galley, which was off Jesamani, demanding to know whether the *Ocasion* should follow thither. Supposing Don

¹ '... buenas boyas . . .' Cf. Corbett, *op. cit.*, I, p. 385 and n. 1. Was *buena boyas* a corruption of the Italian *bonavoglia*? If so, were 'men who had voluntarily enlisted for the benches' wearing chains?

Pedro Vique to have embarked on board his galley, deponent ordered the boatswain to take her over; and when this had been done deponent talked with Captain Victoria and with the other gentlemen who were on board of the flag-galley, asking them what was happening and what was wanted. Captain Victoria and the others replied that they had received orders to land men because the city was not lost, that Captain Martin Polo held it, wherefore the flag-galley had begun to land men and the galley-slaves were being unchained.

Upon hearing and observing this, those on board the *Ocasion* raised a disturbance, demanding that the same be done with respect to them, (p. 46) and many seamen and soldiers threw themselves into the skiff. To prevent the damage which he foresaw if these men left in this fashion, sword in hand deponent sought to restrain and compel them to go back on board. To accomplish this deponent had to get into the skiff. While he was so engaged the powder-master was giving out powder to certain soldiers who lacked it, one of whom came up carelessly with match lighted and set fire to the powder barrel, which burned. Everybody thought that the galley was burning and many of those on board leaped into the sea, both galley-slaves (who in the excitement were unchained) and seamen, and many of both sorts were drowned and burned. This accident having occurred, there were very few persons left on board of the galley, whereas so many crowded into the skiff that they would have sunk it had not deponent again driven them out.

*Unfortu-
nately
match sets
fire to the
powder*

At this time the flag-galley was aground, deserted, flag down. Seeing which, and that on board of his galley also very few persons remained, and that they were leaping overboard, considering that if the galley were so abandoned it would be lost and (p. 47) the enemy might make use of it to do us damage, deponent ordered holes to be bored to scuttle her in such position that she might be raised and refitted.

Because he knew that there was no more powder in the country, and that the enemy had taken what was in the city, deponent ordered what was on board of the galley to be carried ashore to a safe place; and when no one remained on board, with three or four companions who stood by him, deponent left his galley and, having assembled as many as thirty more ashore, with these and his flag, took up a position at the slaughter-house which is close to San Francisco bridge by which the people of the city withdrew. Deponent's intention was there himself to resist the enemy if he sought

to pursue them in following up his victory, neither the governor nor General don Pedro Vique nor any of the militia captains having stayed. Deponent maintained that position all that day with the said troop, for this purpose, and when night fell Don Pedro Vique ordered fire to be set to both galleys.

As he quitted his galley deponent saw that Captain Castañeda was leaving the flag-galley, on board of which he served as an adventurer, not as a regular officer of it. He boarded a bark with seven or eight soldiers and as many barrels of powder, which he took out of the (p. 48) flag-galley. Captain Castañeda went into the fort at Boqueron and there fought and by this relief enabled it to hold out all that day until nightfall, when Captain Pedro Mexia, who was in command, abandoned the fort.

Don Pedro Vique ordered fire to be set to both galleys

Deponent knows also that Captain Martin Polo was on duty with his company at a point called the Anchorage, which is a league from this city.

Asked how many rowers (convicts, youngers and galley-soldiers) there were on board of the galley *Ocasion*, of which he is captain and which was in his charge, deponent referred to the muster-roll whereon appear the names of officers and of crew, and said that convicts, youngers and slaves were about a hundred fifty five rowers, in addition to which there were soldiers and seamen, about seventy-four petty officers, he thinks. The exact numbers will appear upon the rolls which the accountant has in his possession.

Asked, since he knew of the enemy's approach, as he has stated, whether his galley was properly supplied with munitions, war materials and subsistence, deponent said that he had plenty of foodstuffs (p. 49) and munitions, lacking only oars, of which the galley was sixteen short of the required number, and what she did have were poor; and also some cordage was lacking.

The galley lacked sixteen oars

Asked how many pieces of ordnance there were in the galley *Ocasion*, ready to fire upon the enemy, deponent said that there was one 45-pounder in the prow, and four small pieces and two bases. The soldiers of said galley were all armed with harquebuses and pikes, of wretched quality.

Asked as an experienced captain to explain why, if, as he has said, he knew what was advisable he did not prevail on Don Pedro Vique, captain of the flag-galley and commander of both, to follow the line of conduct he considered becoming and urged upon him, deponent stated that he has already mentioned some of the many efforts he

made to do so, that His Majesty may observe the desire he had to serve him, and he will go in person by the first ships which leave these parts for Spain, to make this plain. Before Diego Daça, lieutenant governor of this jurisdiction, and Lope de Valencia, notary, deponent has taken evidence¹ of very prominent persons, zealous in the service of God and the king, to show that many times he argued with Don Pedro and entreated the royal officials of the fleet to persuade and urge him to summon a (p. 50) council in the matter, etc., etc., as contained in the said testimony, to which he refers, and that this may appear he makes formal demand on Sr. Diego Hidalgo to have a legalized copy of the said evidence made and incorporated in the records of these present proceedings, since certainly it was not in deponent's power to do other than he did inasmuch as by His Majesty's command he must obey his superior officer, who is Don Pedro Vique; moreover, in military discipline it is not customary nor admissible for a subordinate to question a superior unless his opinion be asked, when he may express his views in matters affecting the good of His Majesty's service, as deponent did. But the royal officials of armadas and armies may so do. Certainly had deponent known that it would be considered meritorious in him to take his galley out against Don Pedro Vique's orders he would have done so and the vessel in his command would not have been lost as it was, without his being able to prevent it because he had to obey orders from the flag-galley even to the point of losing his own.

Asked who set (p. 51) fire to the galley *Ocasion* and by whose order, deponent said that the corporal of the flag-galley and a bombardier of the galley *Ocasion* told deponent that Don Pedro Vique ordered fire to be set to both galleys.

Asked who ordered the galley-slaves to be unchained, and permitted it to be done, deponent said that this will appear in the evidence which he has petitioned to have incorporated in the records of these proceedings.

Asked to say whether any artillery and munitions were saved from the galley *Ocasion*, deponent stated that because the artillery was very heavy and there was nobody on board the galley, it was not possible to save it. When deponent left his galley he brought away seven barrels of powder and many balls and match, all which he delivered to Don Pedro Vique and this has been used up to the present, and in order to save these munitions deponent left all his own clothing on board the galley, saving only the garments he wore and his arms.

¹ Not seen.

And all that he has deposed is the truth . . . and he affirmed and ratified . . . (p. 52) and signed it with his name.—Martin González . . .

In the city of Cartagena . . . on the thirtieth day of the month of April in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-six . . . Captain Pedro Mexia Mirabal, householder of this city, being duly sworn . . . (p. 53) . . . said . . . that as soon as advices reached this city concerning the enemy's coming, after the conference held in the matter of the city's defence, deponent went to the fort and castle of the harbour to inspect it, with the artilleryman and a carpenter, to look over the artillery and see what repairs were necessary. He found there only two pieces of ordnance, their carriages and wheels so rotten and very old that they were entirely useless. He found no munitions or other arms, nor any gates to the fort.

... Captain
Pedro
Mexia

Forthwith he called upon all the carpenters and smiths and began to make and set up carriages (p. 54) for the guns in the fort and for six more pieces which were on the city wharf, unmounted. He made carriages and trucks and mounted all of them in the said fort, and provided platforms, so that they could be fired and moved in any direction required. They were busied in this work, day and night, holidays and Sundays, from the day after the news was received until the very day the enemy attacked. They made ready this ordnance, strengthened the port's defences and made gates for the fort, and deponent built a stockade around the fort at a distance of twenty-five feet from it, so forming a moat with water over a man's head. These were heavy fifteen-foot stakes, driven seven feet into the ground, only their tops showing above water.

So also deponent made the munitions¹ necessary for this ordnance consisting of (p. 55) much chain-shot, cut and whole; angle-shot, diamondpoint-shot, lanterns full of stones, nails and bolts, to repulse them, cartridges of dice-shot and bits of iron, bombshells and fire-works. Similarly, he made fifteen pikes for the soldiers who had none, and some halberds; and huge strong gates, lined with bull's hide reinforced with many nailheads.

He conveyed into the fort plenty of subsistence, such as *cazabe* biscuit, salt beef and pork, wine and water, cheese, oil, vinegar and other foodstuffs and medicines for the soldiers' use. For all of which

¹ The editor confesses to much misgiving in respect to the accuracy of the translation of the lines immediately following. The original text reads: ' . . . *balas de cadena, cortadas y enteras, balas de angeles, balas de puntas de diamante, lanternas llenas de pedernales y clavos y pernas para despedilles, cartuxas de dados y cortadillas de hierro, bombas [artefactos?] de fuego.*'

deponent paid out of his own pocket, his total expenditure being about one thousand five hundred *pesos*.

Deponent frequently took his soldiers to the fort to train and exercise them, that they might be expert in what they were to do when the enemy should appear; and he was so engaged in this because it was His Majesty's service, in order to distinguish himself therein, and so occupied that, for this reason, and also in order not to dishearten the householders, transient population and inhabitants of this city, he failed to remove much very valuable property which (p. 56) he had in this city, then worth over twenty thousand *pesos*. It would be worth much more today, and this is the truth.

As soon as the enemy was sighted from this city, deponent went into the said fort and castle of which he is captain, and in it found eight pieces of brass ordnance which, as said, he had made ready. And these were two perriers, three sakers, two demi-culverins and a falcon, with the munitions aforesaid, which the governor sent that night, added to three he had previously received; and twenty-five soldiers who had been assigned to deponent in the first council which was held, and ten or twelve seamen who went to the fort with him and eight or ten negroes belonging to deponent and other persons. They were to send deponent fifty soldiers more and as many more Indians, and one galley was to come up close to the fort to protect it, but none of this was done. Deponent had only the men who embarked with him. His twenty-five men had muskets, harquebuses and pikes and so did the seamen.

Asked what use he made of these preparations, munitions and arms (p. 57) in defence of this city and offence of the enemy, he stated that these people and materials being, as said, assembled in the fort, and everything in readiness, he determined to die if necessary in the service of God and the king and in defence of this city, and so was very vigilant and kept up the courage of his men from the time that the enemy occupied the harbour, and all the following night he held his post in such manner that the enemy could not pass that way or land men, nor did any enemy enter by Boqueron channel which deponent defended.

According to what deponent has understood since, at Hicacos Point, which is about a league from this city, the enemy landed one thousand two hundred men. Deponent was told by an interpreter, who he believes was their commander's interpreter, that to take this city it had been resolved aboard ship to land one thousand eight hundred men in sixteen companies, of which troops one thousand two hundred were to be set ashore on Point Hicacos about ten

o'clock at night. (p. 58) In launches and pinnaces six hundred were to leave at dawn to attack and take the fort and enter that way and occupy the bridge, which is the way out of this city to landward. They thought that if they carried out this plan they would capture the whole population of the city and the galleys.

Toward dawn, from the fort, deponent was aware that the said English who had landed at Hicacos Point, marching by land, had arrived at the place called La Caleta where there was a great uproar of artillery and harquebus fire exchanged, apparently, between ours and the enemy, these seeking to enter and ours to prevent their entrance; but as to this, since he was not present, deponent refers to the testimony of those persons who were there and says no more.

At the same time deponent had become aware that pinnaces were approaching by sea and he was keenly alert until the enemy entered the city, which was as the day began to break. In seven launches and four pinnaces and two small shallops the enemy attacked the fort where deponent was. Half of these craft kept to the seaward (p. 59) side, over by the mangroves, and six kept close to the mangroves which are to landward. They came up, intending to lay alongside the fort where deponent was, but on discovering the palisade they paused and opened fire with artillery and harquebuses against the fort and its garrison.¹ Deponent ordered his men to return this fire, to defend the fort and to damage the enemy. The second shot fired sank a pinnace and the others brought down the rigging and mast of another vessel and, according to what was learned later, did much damage to the rest of these vessels, so that they withdrew and those on board of them, observing the defence offered, went back to their ships, carrying thither their dead and wounded. It was said that Captain Francis himself then embarked in these pinnaces, demanding to know why they had not taken that little blockhouse; and he came up with the vessels and battered the fort a second time. Its fire badly damaged a launch in which was the vice admiral, carrying away the poop. Captain Francis flew a quartered flag and a shot carried away its masts (p. 60) and cut four or five men in two with a chain-shot. Observing the damage they were receiving the English again withdrew and returned to their ships.

¹ 'In which attempt the Vice-admirall had the rudder of his skiffe stroken through with a Sakershot, and a little or no harm received elsewhere.'—Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 117. '... we had the rudder of our pinnace struck away, and men's hats from their heads, and the top of our mainmast beaten in pieces, the oars stricken out of our men's hands as they rowed, and our captain like to have been slain.'—The 'Primrose' log, pp. 18-19.

Seeing the resistance offered them there and that they could not enter the city nor take the bridge, they went back to their ships and Captain Francis took three or four pinnaces and about two hundred men and went out of the harbour to the sea, to land on the Caleta beach.

He removed the city's artillery from the Caleta and set it up on the wharf and from there battered deponent. From the direction of the harbour the enemy fired very heavy ordnance on the fort until night closed in. In similar fashion deponent fired his pieces in the direction where Captain Francis was and at some pinnaces in the port.

Observing that his men had decreased in number and that only seven or eight soldiers remained with him, deponent sent to the

governor for reinforcements and relief, since only seven or eight men were left to him, as he has stated, saying that if reinforcement was sent he would defend the fort until he was driven out or killed there, for deponent had plenty of munitions and subsistence, enough for more (p. 61) than fifteen days, and needed only men. The

*The
governor
sent word
to deponent
to retire and
evacuate the
fort*

governor sent deponent word that he had none left to send to him, for everybody had gone, and for deponent to retire and evacuate the fort, for the enemy was determined to slit the throats of deponent and all those with him in the fort. Deponent sent the same message to Don Pedro Vique, general of the galleys, who replied in the same sense as the governor. Nevertheless, deponent did not desire to abandon the fort, but rather to die there, fighting. But when the soldiers who were with deponent heard these replies made by the commanding officers, bidding them withdraw and leave the fort, they began to insist and to protest to deponent, even threatening to leave him quite alone, and some took their departure. In view of which, about two hours after nightfall, deponent ordered the artilleryman to spike the ordnance and to gather up the munitions and powder, and he ordered the ensign to run down the flags. He bade them bring away all the munitions and subsistence and with what men were left to him deponent (p. 62) embarked and went ashore. He went next day to where the governor was, in the village of Turbaco, which is four leagues from the fort, and there reported to him in full upon these happenings.

Asked whether our English enemy carried off the artillery of the fort, deponent stated that the Englishman took with him all this artillery and the rest of the ordnance in the city and on board of the galleys excepting four iron pieces which are useless, and these he left behind, spiked.

Because the judge is informed that the galleys were fired and lost at a point very near to the fort, deponent was asked what he knows of this matter. He stated that when the enemy appeared these galleys were in their usual position by the wharf. That night they came nearer the fort. About midnight deponent fired a gun from the fort and by order of the captains the tender came to inquire of him why he had done so and deponent replied that toward Hicacos point he had heard voices (p. 63) which sounded like orders to embark and that he believed the enemy was advancing by land and by sea, and he had fired that shot to warn ours to be alert. As soon as the tender had returned with this news the galleys weighed and went towards the Caleta, by which the enemy's column must pass. An hour before dawn deponent heard artillery and harquebus fire from the galleys and from the city's battery.

Shortly after this, from the fort where he was deponent saw the galleys coming and watched them arrive at Jesamani Point. Deponent signalled with the flag for them to come to the fort, in order that they might know that the enemy had not taken it. The English pinnaces were battering it. Deponent saw the galleys go aground near the fort and such was their haste to disembark that they set fire to the powder and burned part of one galley, and some persons were burned and others drowned on leaping overboard to get away.

Captain Castañeda came in a small boat to the fort, where deponent was, to place in safety two boxes which they said contained monies belonging to His Majesty and a secretary¹ with papers they said belonged to Treasurer don Luis de Guzman, and some barrels of powder. From the fort Captain Castañeda sent these things to land, to safety, and himself remained (p. 64) with deponent in the fort.

Immediately deponent sent men to the galleys and they brought off powder which remained there and harquebuses and pikes which the galleys' soldiers had abandoned, and some food supplies. They brought this to the fort and the galleys lay abandoned by men and officers. That night deponent saw flames arising from them and heard it said that Don Pedro Vique, their commander, had ordered the galleys to be burned. And this is the truth on the oath he took . . . and he signed it with his name.—Pedro Mexia Mirabal . . .

On the said day, in the month and year aforesaid . . . Diego Daça, lieutenant governor of this jurisdiction of Cartagena, being duly sworn . . . stated that in the first conference and meeting which

¹ A box, containing a penman's equipment.

the governor of this province, Pedro Fernández de Busto, called to determine on measures to be taken for the good of His Majesty's service and defence of this city (p. 65) if the English enemy who was expected should arrive here, as lieutenant general of this jurisdiction deponent was ordered with six soldiers to defend the bridge which leads from the city to the Franciscan monastery, and to prevent any soldier from leaving by this bridge; any man so leaving in desertion of his captain and flag to be rigorously punished. Therefore from Ash Wednesday, when the enemy appeared off this city with his fleet, deponent took up his post at the bridge with his arms and horse, which he kept in readiness to serve His Majesty, and with the soldiers he chose to accompany him; and there he remained all that afternoon and that following night until Thursday morning, when all the foot began to withdraw because the enemy was numerous.

*Diego
Daça,
witness*

Although deponent and the soldiers under him and his men who accompanied him sought with many words to compel these people to wait for their general and captains and not to make such a serious move on their own responsibility, deponent was unable to resist them or check their retreat, despite the fact that as a defence against them at the head of the bridge he had built a barricade of uncemented masonry and had there a piece of artillery loaded and ready to fire. And so everybody crossed the bridge, but deponent remained at his post awaiting the governor-captain general, to receive his orders.

After a long time, which seems (p. 66) to deponent to have been an hour, when most of the foot had left the bridge, the governor came, alone, on horseback, sword in hand with which and much good argument he reprehended the soldiers, commanding them to stay. But neither reasons nor threats sufficed to check their flight. Deponent joined the governor and they remained a good while at the head of the bridge, after which they proceeded to the Franciscan monastery.

And while they were at a house belonging to Martin Polo certain horse began to come up, and while they were all there together victorious shouting was heard and it was said that Captain Martin Polo, who was on duty at the Canapote trench, had come up to the bridge with his company and killed Captain Francis. Then the governor with the horse which had assembled there returned with them to re-enter the city by the bridge, and ordered deponent to hold all soldiers he could and send them toward the bridge to the relief of Captain Martin Polo. Deponent went forward a little, say

twenty paces, to try to detain the soldiers, but found himself unable to do so. He then returned toward the city and a little beyond the Franciscan monastery found the governor and the horse (p. 67) coming back because there was nothing in the report of Captain Martin Polo's success, for, although he was at the bridge, he had only eight or ten soldiers who stood by him, all the rest of his company having deserted him and the flag as he came down the beach . . .

Since he was on guard to hold the bridge, as he has stated, and it was by the bridge that the Spaniards fled who were this city's defence, and he knows well what persons were named to command foot and horse, deponent was asked to state in what order they left—who were the first captains to depart, and the second, and third to leave by the bridge, and whether they went before or after the city of Cartagena was taken and their men had fled. Deponent replied that, as he has said, after most of the soldiers who were on duty to defend the city had left by the bridge and with the governor he had arrived at Martin Polo's house, at the time and when the governor and the horse with him turned back to the city and deponent, as said, stepped twenty or thirty paces aside to try to check the retreat. As he was going toward the city to rejoin (p. 68) the governor deponent met Alonso de San Miguel, appointed to be one of the infantry captains. Mounted and alone he was travelling down the Turbaco road. And two hours, more or less, after that, when all the soldiers had crossed the bridge and nobody remained in the city, deponent saw Martin Polo and another of the infantry captains coming along.

Asked to state whether he heard or knows who abandoned the city first—whether it was the soldiers who forsook their captains or the captains who left their men—deponent replied that from the post to which he was detailed he could not see whether the soldiers deserted their officers or the officers first deserted their men, but when many soldiers appeared on the bridge and deponent rebuked them for retreating so soon, without having faced the enemy and leaving their general in the field, many answered: 'What are we to do, since our officers have gone off and left us?' In the confusion deponent heard this, but could not distinguish who said it . . . and he signed . . . his name . . .—Diego Daça . . . (p. 69).

On the said day in the month and year aforesaid . . . Diego de Ballesteros, householder in this city, being duly sworn . . . said that . . . news of Captain Francis Drake's fleet having reached this city measures to prepare were taken, as will appear on the municipal council's books, to which he refers. Musters and reviews were held

and each officer was furnished with a list of his men and the men acknowledged their officers.

On Ash Wednesday, which deponent believes fell on the eighteenth of last February in this current year, at about noon, at sea or about to enter this city's harbour, sails were sighted which deponent thought were twenty-three in number, large ships and small; and immediately, because of the advices which had been received, it was deduced that this was the enemy. The people of the city forthwith took up their arms and went out upon the beach, each company under its captain, and it was understood that the enemy entered the port and anchored. As this fleet was passing to enter the port, from the work which is near the Shrine two shots were fired at a ship which was near shore, but apparently did no damage.

Deponent understood that (p. 70) Alonso Bravo and his company were to await the enemy at the place called Canapote, where the captain had been working to build a trench. He had told deponent he was to take up his position there because the governor had so ordered. It happened that as the people marched along the beach, the enemy in sight, it was ordered that the vanguard should march as rearguard, the troops merely turning right about face as they stood, and Captain Alonso Bravo passed between the line from the van to the rear, and so they marched toward the Caleta and remained there all that afternoon and that night until in the third watch order came for them to go into the trench, and so it fell to Captain Alonso Bravo and his company to hold the end toward the sea where the work was not entirely closed up. They took some old wine butts which were there, at hand, and scooped up sand to fill them, and deponent fancied the sand ran out again, so warped were these hogsheads by the sun.

In the third watch, about half an hour before daybreak, it was reported that the enemy was advancing to attack in that quarter, for it appeared that he had landed that night at Hicacos Point, some three-quarters of a league from this city, without encountering any resistance. The English marched down the beach and so came near to the place where Captain Alonso Bravo was. When they were perceived by the galleys, which lay a little further up, a piece of artillery was fired on them and in the glare deponent saw a company which seemed to him to be English, (p. 71) with a flag. Many of these men carried pikes and others carried halberds. The word went around to lay match to serpentine and so, forthwith, both from the galleys and also from the position which ours held, as deponent has stated, fire was opened on the enemy, which fire he returned. Every

soldier fired as best he could and with speed and determination the enemy began to enter by the side where Alonso Bravo was.

At this time it was so very dark that one could hardly distinguish the man next to him and deponent heard Alonso Bravo and another or two others calling out: 'Here, soldiers! Here, lances!' At this juncture deponent was felled by a blow on the body. He does not know with what weapon it was struck, only that it went through a reinforced breastplate. He fell wounded in the right leg and when he got up he saw none of ours thereabouts. Rather he observed that in disorder they were retreating in every direction. Finding himself alone and realizing that the enemy had broken through and were entering the city that way, deponent followed by himself toward a trench in Diego Caro street where he found Hernan Lopez, high sheriff of this city, mounted, and Captain Blas de Herrera, who was beside a piece of ordnance which was set up in that trench to defend the city and offend the enemy.

Since Blas de Herrera was a captain of artillery (p. 72) deponent bade him fire that piece and showed him where the enemy was advancing. This man made a disdainful gesture with his hand and forthwith proceeded up the street, deponent after him, and at the corner of the street deponent met Licentiate Luis de Soto, lieutenant general of this city, and told him that the enemy was advancing, having already taken that trench. Licentiate Soto continued along that street and deponent hastened three or four paces forward to overtake his friends and saw none of them, for all had withdrawn by that street, and so deponent continued the way he had been going and from there came out upon the part of the beach they call Canapote where he found some of his friends who were retreating as fast as they could toward the bush of Canapote beach because the enemy had occupied the town. And, understanding that the English had taken the place, deponent continued along the beach to his farm.

Asked to state who of our men were killed, wounded or captured in the storming of the city, deponent stated that while he was on his farm, from persons who came there he learned that where Alonso Bravo was the (p. 73) enemy killed Juan Cosme de la Sala, his ensign, and captured Captain Alonso Bravo, who had received certain wounds, and also killed four or five men at the place where deponent and Captain Alonso Bravo were, and he understood that others were wounded and taken prisoners, of which matter at the present moment he has no definite knowledge.

Asked how many English were killed by our friends in the storm-

ing and capture of this city, deponent said that he does not know because some persons say that many were killed and others say few . . .

Asked what damage the enemy did in this city, deponent said that he did a great deal of damage because he burned and demolished the greater part of the city—half of it—and the cathedral and a large part of the monasteries, and stole what he found. It had not been possible to remove everything from the place, especially not bulky merchandise, which was hidden and buried. Since the enemy was here a long time his men all hunted and found and appropriated it in such fashion that, according to the general complaint, he obtained a large sum. In this spoliation the enemy seized and took what ordnance there was in this city and its port, and on board the galleys; it was a lot of good artillery. And the galleys were lost.

The city was ransomed for one hundred and seven thousand ducats which were delivered to the enemy and even after that he got more for the Franciscan monastery and the slaughter-house and the fort and Carey island, which they claimed were not included in the ransom. Further, it is well known that they got five thousand *pesos* from Captain Alonso Bravo, ransom for his person and three pairs of houses (two being his and the other belonging to his nephew). This matter the enemy kept apart from the general agreement and deponent has seen the receipt which Alonso Bravo has, to which he refers.

Deponent believes that Alonso Bravo was instrumental in preventing the enemy from doing even greater damage, for after he took the captain prisoner and became acquainted with him while (as is well known) he stayed in his house, he showed friendliness toward him and granted his requests.

The enemy was some fifty days entrenched in this city, and maintained *corps de garde*; at the end of which period he left the port and made sail and the fourth day re-entered the harbour, which caused no little disturbance. He said he was driven back by stress of weather and remained in the harbour about eight days more, during which time many English came peaceably into the city and it was said that some poor persons did business with them. At the end of that time the enemy left and it is not certainly known whither he went . . . (p. 75).

Asked how many soldiers there were at the Caleta where the enemy entered, deponent said that inasmuch as it was night he saw only his ensign and his captain and perhaps a dozen (p. 76) men.

Although, as he has said, he heard his captain, Alonso Bravo, call out: 'Here, soldiers and lances!' he did not observe that anybody responded, nor did he see pike or horse, from which he deduces that merely upon perceiving that the enemy was approaching most of the soldiers there retired. Further, it is true that the men who appeared for the musters and review held in this city were divided among many posts, for on the Canapote side was Captain Martin Polo with part of the men from the city; and in the fort (in the city's harbour) was Mexia Mirabal with some soldiers; and they also sent some soldiers aboard the galleys, although deponent does not know how many they were. And this is the truth on the oath he took . . . and he signed it with his name.—Diego Ballesteros . . .

In the city of Cartagena on the first day of the month of May in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-six . . . Treasurer Don Luis de Guzman and Accountant Alonso de Tapia, royal officials of His Majesty's royal treasury for this realm of Tierra Firme . . . being duly sworn . . . (p. 77) . . . stated that on the fourth of January there entered this city's port an advice-boat cleared by the judges and royal officials of the House of Trade for Indies of the

*Wit-
ness(es),
the
treasurer
and the
accountant*

city of Seville with the news contained in a letter, copy of which they have seen in the possession of the judge, authenticated by Francisco Alva, government notary of this city, to which they refer. This letter was addressed to deponents and to the governor of this jurisdiction. The latter received and opened the despatch and showed it to deponents, charging them to receive the (p. 78) powder and munitions and harquebuses and the rest mentioned in this letter, in order to deliver same to the captains he might name. With the town council and persons whom he saw fit to summon the governor held councils and took measures recorded by the government notary, to which records deponents refer.

A few days later, they think about the fifteenth of February, Don Francisco Maldonado, resident of Rio de la Hacha, arrived. He also reported the fall of Santo Domingo. As soon as he came ashore Governor Don Pedro Fernández de Busto and Don Pedro Vique took him with them to the governor's house and, alone with him, endeavoured to ascertain what was happening and the enemy's strength. Therefore deponents did not do so.

*Don
Francisco
Maldonado*

It was very generally reported through the city that Don Francisco had said, privately, that the enemy was very strong, because he had thirty-nine or forty vessels, of which twenty-nine were large

ships and the rest pinnaces and shallops; and four or five thousand men. This was the estimate made by persons of common sort who (p. 79) came with Don Francisco. This report disheartened the people of the city. The governor and Don Pedro Vique and Don Francisco Maldonado conferred alone in private, which augmented the people's suspicion and it became necessary to animate them and to give them to understand that the enemy's strength was not so great.

Don Francisco Maldonado's news disheartened the people

A mass meeting was called in the cathedral where an address was made to each company by itself to encourage them, and to this end a letter was read to them from Don Diego Osorio written to Don Pedro wherein it was stated that the enemy might land as many as two thousand men. But the common people held that this was faked, for they were convinced that the enemy had over four thousand men because they believed what the seamen and others who came with Don Francisco in his vessel told them. They presumed that Don Francisco had himself privately told the governor the same. Wherefore, or so deponents believe, the people were much disheartened. Renewed effort was exerted to build trenches and other works necessary for the city's defence, although the enemy arrived so soon after Don Francisco that these could not be completed as they should have been. It is to be borne in mind that there were in this city the number of men shown by the muster rolls, or about four hundred and fifty (p. 80) men, of whom three hundred and fifty were harquebuses and the rest pikes.

On Ash Wednesday, the nineteenth of February of the said year, the enemy was sighted and some twenty-three sails were counted, ships and pinnaces. Since Don Francisco had said and insisted that the enemy had 39 or 40 vessels, it was deduced that those lacking had been left behind and did not come within sight in order, when night should fall, to land men at Tesca Swamp, which is where this could be done inasmuch as, presumably, the enemy had pilots and persons on board who knew this country, to act as guides.

Therefore what forces were available for the city's defence were divided and Captain Martin Polo with his company, being about 120 men, was ordered to go to this swamp to resist the enemy if he should seek to enter there. The horse were ordered to patrol the coast. Similarly, presuming that the night he entered the harbour the enemy might debark troops at the landing in Juan Nuñez's brickyard whence they could easily seize the bridge by the Franciscan monastery, which bridge is the way out from this city into

the country, 50 men with their captain were detailed to that landing place. Further, in the fort there were some 60 men, deponents believe; and fifteen men were ordered to hold the (p. 81) bridge, under Lieutenant Diego Daça. All this dividing up of troops was because of the enemy's supposed strength and to safeguard the approaches by which he might do damage, and in order that he might not surround ours, and kill them.

Deponents have some reason to think that the 50 men who were on the road to Juan Nuñez's brickyard were recalled that night, to be at the Caleta, so that they believe that at the Caleta, which was where the enemy attacked and entered, there were for its defence Captains Alonso Bravo and Alonso de San Miguel and the captains from Mompox and Tolu with these 50 men. Further, deponents understand and are quite sure, given the opinion of persons who were present, since the night was very dark, many soldiers of these companies deserted, nor could their officers prevent some from going to their homes and inns for refreshment. Others left because they did not believe the enemy would land men that night. Still others went from other motives. In fine, that night, in the third watch, the enemy was perceived as he advanced along the beach directly on the Caleta.

Deponents were on board of the flag-galley which, with the other galley called *La Ocasión*, by the general's order had taken up a position at the Caleta from which to offend the enemy if he should approach (p. 82) by that way, and from this position deponents saw that as soon as it was discovered that the enemy was about to attack our people who were at the Caleta, and some lighted match was seen, because the galleys had been told, by a man on horseback who came down to the water's edge, that the enemy was coming on, forthwith on the sight of this match the galley *Ocasión* began to fire her artillery, and harquebuses and muskets which were distributed by the arbalister, did the same. After this round from the said galley, the flag-galley fired in the same fashion, artillery, muskets and harquebuses. The galleys fired three rounds and from on board of the galleys deponents heard similar heavy firing of harquebuses and muskets by the men at the Caleta. They considered that the men on board of the galleys and those on shore were doing their duty very well and resisting the enemy, because the fire of small shot and artillery was so hot from both quarters, and were feeling well pleased, when on the flag-galley it was remarked that the enemy must have carried the Caleta since no more firing was heard there, whereas some harquebus shots were heard in the direction of, and in, the city. This was very shortly before dawn.

When day broke Captain Cornas came up in the tender and called out to the flag-galley that Don Pedro Vique said that the city was lost, and for the galleys to get out, die who must, escape who might, that he would go by land to rejoin them. Having delivered this message he (p. 83) went to unlock the chain which hung across the mouth of Boqueron channel by the fort, and the galleys turned their bows toward the channel to go out, but when they tried to do so there was not enough water to permit it.

While they were so engaged, it being broad day by now, voices called out from Jesamani that our people were defending the bridge, that Captain Martin Polo had won the day, for the galleys' men to support and assist him. On hearing this deponents and many soldiers got into the skiff to go to his relief, and from there they heard order transmitted from the flag-galley to the *Ocasion* to do the same. They saw a great blaze on board the *Ocasion* and later learned that a barrel of powder had been set on fire.

As deponents, accompanied by the soldiers who had landed in the first skiff-load, were proceeding to Captain Martin Polo's support, they encountered a lot of people who said that the enemy had taken the bridge and many prisoners with it, that everything was lost beyond any remedy. On hearing which all the soldiers, and many convicts who had been unchained and had landed with arms, began to scatter and every man went his way into the bush to find a road to safety.

Deponents heard that the governor and Don Pedro Vique were going down the Turbaco road and they went the same way, where they found Don Pedro, mounted, standing on the highway, of whom they inquired what his orders were. Don Pedro made no reply. Deponents went on, in search (p. 84) of the governor. Over a league from the city they learned that he was ahead of them . . .

Asked whether they have had other advices than those they have mentioned to the effect that a greater number of English may have come to these parts, deponents stated that from the president and officials of the House of Trade for the Indies, in the city of Seville, a letter dated the fourth of January came by the advice-boat which arrived while the Englishman was still in the harbour; which vessel the governor despatched the night of the second day after it came in, that the English might not learn of it. This letter brought them news that, according to advices received from the Canary islands, it is understood that 70 or 80 or more corsair vessels have crossed to pillage these Indies, as will appear from the original despatch, which deponents exhibited, of which a copy was made, to be incorporated in these records . . .

. . . the munitions mentioned in the first letter . . . they received by order of the governor . . . (p. 85) . . . in the form and in the quantities stated in a book wherein this was entered, in the accountant's office; and by similar order of the governor they dealt these things out to the persons whom he authorized to receive same, as will appear in the aforementioned book; and they do not know what may have become of these munitions. The governor will have a record of that, for they delivered them by his order.

Asked whether the enemy carried off anything of His Majesty's which was in deponent's custody, they said that on the first advice they received, being informed of the enemy's approach, they exercised great diligence to remove to safe keeping His Majesty's books and papers which were in their charge, and everything appertaining thereto.

Because the soldiers were obviously in great need, the governor sought to have them relieved from the royal treasury, assuring deponents that His Majesty would approve or, if he did not, he would refund the amount of two thousand *pesos* current silver. He cited as precedent the fact that in similar matters and emergencies this was done elsewhere, and was an expenditure made in defence of His Majesty's realms. Although deponents objected that there was no royal order to make this disbursement, finally, when the governor's importunity had worn them down, deponents decided, on such surety, to find current silver, both by collecting from certain persons who owed and also by borrowing; and so they got together something, they believe, over five hundred *pesos*. Since they had removed His Majesty's monies to safety (p. 86) it was not possible for them, without risk, to bring any money from there.

The day the enemy arrived deponents had this sum in a secretary in the government house along with the punchions and royal stamp and hammer and weights. When deponents betook themselves to the flag-galley, where they believed they could be of most service to His Majesty, they brought this secretary thither and the aforesaid articles that they might be more safely kept on board of that vessel. When the event fell out as it did and the galley was lost, Captain Juan Castañeda sent word to me, Don Luis de Guzman, that he had brought the secretary off the galley and had possession of certain papers which were in it, and had taken out the gold and silver and the royal stamp and punchions, and that the gold was in his possession, and that he would deliver it to me, and that he had hidden the silver, the stamp and the punchions, burying them in the bush where they were quite safe. Some days later Captain Castañeda saw Don Luis de Guzman and delivered to him a little brick

and some pieces of gold and told him that the other things were buried, but he would go and unearth them when he had time. A few days later the captain went to find them with a mulatto who had buried them but neither then nor later, when they looked again, could they be found. The captain told deponents that he thinks the mulatto has stolen these things from where they hid them. He is holding the mulatto in custody in order to make further search. (p. 87) Unless found, this will represent a loss of three to five hundred *pesos*, or thereabouts, in current silver. This, in respect to their joint responsibility as royal officials of this jurisdiction.

In addition to which Don Luis de Guzman is treasurer and purveyor under the appropriation for the galleys, and for their maintenance had in storage a quantity of *cazabe* and other things, military supplies, building materials and equipment, such as cordage, tar, tallow, etc., of which he has no record and these things are missing to a value, according to his estimate, of about four hundred *pesos*, current silver . . . (p. 88).

. . . deponents estimate that the enemy were one thousand five hundred effectives and over, at the least, not counting the seamen who, to judge by the large number of ships, must have been over one thousand, all equipped with arms and arquebuses to fight when necessary; and as far as deponents observed they were all Englishmen . . . it is generally supposed that the galleys and our other forces killed over one hundred English; but some say more (p. 89) and others say fewer . . . they understand that of ours ten or twelve were killed and Captain Alonso Bravo and eight other citizen-soldiers were wounded and taken prisoners . . .

Asked who were the first to retire and abandon the city, whether the men or the general and captains left first, deponents stated that they could not know because, as they have said, they were on board the galleys and there is diversity of opinion, but it should be presumed that the general and captains would do their duty (p. 90) as they should, being persons of standing.

. . . the galleys and their tender did not put to sea although they saw the enemy and the reason for this will be found in the minutes of the councils of war which were held . . . they do not know who favoured or aided the unchaining of the galley-slaves except that they released each other . . . the night after the city fell it was publicly said that Don Pedro Vique ordered the galleys to be burned that they might not fall into the enemy's hands . . . although the galleys were burned, (p. 91) because they lay in shallow water the enemy removed and carried off their artillery.

Asked to state whether it is true that the city was ransomed from the enemy for one hundred seven thousand ducats, and to say where the money came from to pay this ransom, deponents replied that they referred to the records kept in this matter where the facts will appear.

Since the governor took two hundred bars of silver from His Majesty's revenues for the ransom, as appears in the records before the judge, and there is no certainty as to their value in *maravedis* nor explanation of how the governor came to have them in his possession at the time that these records were set down, being asked to explain, deponents stated that the two hundred bars of silver which were taken from His Majesty's revenues are those which Master Gerónimo de Ojeda left here when he was driven into this harbour while on his way to the realms of Spain in convoy with General don Antonio Osorio's fleet. When they were left they were delivered in the presence of the governor and Francisco de Alva, notary of record, according to the stamps, numbers and qualities of same, and not by weight or value, for Gerónimo de Ojeda maintained that the record and receipt covering these bars was on board the flag-ship in charge and possession of Don Antonio Osorio, commanding. When deponents undertook to convey His Majesty's monies into safety they and the governor conferred as to means and place to which these bars should be removed, and he knew of the matter. Therefore they replied that (p. 92) the bars were in the possession of the governor because from Canapacoa, where they were, they had been brought to Turbaco to the governor's own house, where they were safer; and according to the same reckoning by which deponents took them over they were taken from deponents to be paid to the enemy, of which matter and of their value Francisco de Alva, notary, before whom these transactions occurred, will bear witness.

. . . deponents have heard that in addition to the one hundred seven thousand ducats for which the city was ransomed, certain persons ransomed their property for thirty thousand ducats, some paying more, others less; and some estimate it at about twenty thousand . . . they have heard that the enemy obtained five thousand ducats in jewels and money and articles worth money, for the release of Captain Alonso Bravo . . . (p. 93).

. . . this is the truth . . . on the oath they took . . . and they signed it with their names.—Don Luis de Guzman.—Alonso de Tapia . . .

In the city of Cartagena on the second day of the month of May in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-six . . . Juan

Lirango, resident in this city, being duly sworn . . . (p. 94) stated that . . . at the beginning of this year news arrived concerning the enemy's coming. It was repeatedly confirmed and in view of these advices measures were taken and preparations made to defend this city, as written in the minutes and resolutions of the councils of war which are in the judge's possession, wherein they will appear, to which records deponent refers . . .

*Witness,
Juan
Lirango*

. . . the first day of Lent in this present year, about mid-day, there were seen from this city at sea 23 or 24 vessels, which entered its harbour. Comprehending that this was the enemy, all the men in the city took up their arms and reported to their captains, and so deponent went to the company of Alonso Bravo, his captain; and these companies went out in formation, displaying themselves on the beach to the enemy. The enemy anchored in the port without encountering any resistance and the captains with their men remained on the beach all that afternoon and night.

Deponent understands that these forces were distributed as follows: Martin Polo's company, some 120 men, went to the (p. 95) trench in Hanged Man's Swamp; Alonso San Miguel's company, about 100 men, went to the Caleta; and so did Alonso Bravo's company, which was 120 men. The Mompox company, which was some 70 men, was at the Caleta and there they took up their positions in the trench in the third watch and remained until, a little before daybreak, they had news that the enemy was coming and that he was near.

Deponent does not undertake to say how many men were at the Caleta to meet the enemy, but he thinks about half were lacking from the number who first appeared upon the beach in the said companies, and this he knows because a little before the enemy came up deponent's captain summoned his squad leaders and ordered each to assemble his men and get them ready in the trench, and then half were missing and did not take their places, from which deponent infers that the same was the case with the other companies. So Captain Alonso Bravo bade the squad leaders to distribute what men there were at their orders along the trench in the part of it which fell to them, which was the end toward the sea where the trench was not completed, as was the rest of the work, nor the ditch dug. This unfinished stretch was 60 or 70 feet to the water line.

And so, in position in the trench according to their captain's order to them, they waited for the enemy to appear, as appear he did about half an hour before dawn. When it was perceived that

the enemy (p. 96) was near, their captain ordered deponent and the rest to be alert, for a horseman had come in who said the enemy was near the trench. Being in this expectancy, an harquebus was fired as a signal to let them have a volley, and all fired their harquebuses and gave them three or four rounds, one after the other. At the third volley deponent heard Captain Alonso Bravo crying repeatedly: 'Here, lancers, quickly!' From which deponent understood that the enemy was then in the trench.

At this time a piece of ordnance was fired from one of the galleys and in the glow and glare of the discharge deponent saw a white flag and a squadron extending clear across the spit of land, 40 or 50 men, and they seemed to be in among certain wine butts which were laid from the trench to the water's edge.

And although Captain Alonso Bravo was calling out, crying: 'Here, lances!' nobody went up to where he was except Juan Cosme de la Sala, his ensign. Flag in hand, he had been some 50 feet to one side of the trench. When this ensign heard his captain call for men and saw that nobody responded, he came up with his flag, crying: 'Here, Spaniards! Here, soldiers!' And with the flag wrapped around its staff he attacked the enemy to check (p. 97) his advance, and deponent believes that in the onslaught he made the English killed him, for deponent never saw him again nor did he hear his voice, but has since learned that in this very place where he attacked with his flag they found his dead body.

At this time, when deponent had become certain that the men among the wine butts and the squadron advancing with the white flag, as he has said, were the enemy, on looking around for ours who were at the Caleta, he saw very few and these were retreating toward the city. Supposing this to be his captain's order, deponent withdrew. Further on, toward the city, he encountered a lot of English. Mingled among them deponent and the rest who were with him came with the enemy to the trench which is near the Dominican monastery, where there were some soldiers. Believing that those approaching were all English, these men gave them a sprinkling of harquebus shots.

When deponent and the rest had come to the trench they stopped there and the artilleryman who was in the trench with a culverin called out for help to adjust this piece, for it was high, and deponent and two other soldiers went up to the gun and with two or three twists trained it as the artilleryman directed. When he had it aimed he asked for a dagger in a hurry to open the pan and touch hole of the said piece of ordnance. When the artilleryman asked for the

dagger there were two men (p. 98) with halberds beside the wheels of the gun-carriage and one of them raised his halberd, saying 'Villain! Villain! And now you ask him for the dagger!'¹ By his manner of speech deponent recognized that these were enemies, and, understanding that he was not equal to resisting them there, deponent withdrew and went into the city and came directly to his captain's house, which is on the market-place.

As he stood at the door, having ordered the boy to catch a horse belonging to Alonso Bravo which was loose in the courtyard of the said house, 40 or 50 English harquebusiers came into the square, firing their weapons at certain persons who appeared. Seeing that he could wait no longer, deponent told the negro to let the horse go and come along with him to the bridge.

When he got there deponent saw Captain Martin Polo's company, 25 or 30 men, advancing toward the bridge. Deponent waited for them on the bridge itself but before this company could arrive where witness was, the English appeared at the head of the street by which they were coming on and an exchange of harquebus fire ensued. The soldiers held the enemy for some time, until his relief came up. The enemy was enveloping Martin Polo's company by way of another street, so that it became necessary for ours to fall back on the bridge and there some harquebus shots were exchanged in such fashion that two of our soldiers were killed.

It was evident that the enemy's strength was overwhelming and all who were there withdrew by way of the bridge, and at its other end, near the Franciscan monastery, deponent found (p. 99) Governor Pedro Fernández de Busto and Don Pedro Vique and others, mounted. Deponent and others with him asked for orders what to do and none of these persons made any reply whatever, but gathered up their reins and took the road to Turbaco. Therefore deponent and the rest went every man the way he chose and the enemy remained in possession of the city.

At the time that deponent crossed the bridge and was going down the Turbaco road he asked the governor after his captain, Alonso Bravo, and the governor answered: 'They say he is ahead, further on.' Deponent replied that he could not be ahead because a negro of his was holding his horse on this side of the bridge, from which deponent inferred that it was not possible for him to have left the town. Deponent was grieved, rather supposing him to have been killed or captured when the enemy carried the trench (for deponent

¹ '*Vellaqui! Vellaqui! Ahora le pides le daga!*' An attempt this, to imitate the foreigner's speech.

thought he had seen him among the enemy). Deponent took the said Captain Alonso Bravo's horse from a negro who was holding it and went along the Canapote road, looking for his captain, and came out again on the beach, and he arrived at the trench where Martin Polo had been. From a height there, where the trench is, from which he could see the whole beach as far as the Caleta trench, he could discover nobody from whom to inquire after his captain. Since there was no one of whom to make inquiry, deponent returned by the same road to a farm they say belongs to (p. 100) Diego Lopez del Riego.

Next day deponent went to Turbaco to learn whether his captain was there, or if they had news of him, but witness could find nobody to give him any tidings except that Tristan de Orive had gone to the city and would return that same day and would bring word of those who were missing. And that same evening Tristan de Orive came and brought news that they had killed the ensign and held Captain Alonso Bravo a prisoner, wounded with four or five wounds.

When deponent learned that his captain was a prisoner he came to the city to see him and found him in a room of his own house, wherein Captain Francis had established his headquarters. He was wounded, as said. Deponent asked certain of the English where they had captured Captain Alonso Bravo and they answered, at the Caleta among the wine butts, fighting like a good captain.

He has since understood that the ransom of the city was negotiated and carried out in the form which will appear from the records, to which deponent refers.

Asked who were the first to flee, abandoning the city, or to give an excuse or opportunity to do so, deponent stated that he does not know more than he has stated in saying that Captain Alonso San Miguel was among the first who left and what he has said is the truth . . . on the oath he took . . . and he signed it with his name . . . —Juan Lirango Ariza . . . (p. 101).

In the city of Cartagena on the third day of the month of May in the said year one thousand five hundred and eighty-six . . . Don Pedro Vique y Manrique, captain general of the galleys stationed on this coast, being duly sworn . . . said that . . . a vessel brought . . . news that Captain Francis . . . had . . . destroyed . . . Santo Domingo . . . (p. 102) . . . and while Governor Don Pedro Fernández de Busto was reading these despatches deponent arrived at the governor's house and heard the whole story contained in them; and, because of what he had heard, deponent said: 'Let us put our beard to soak, since we see our neighbour's burning,' and left the governor's

house with Captains Martin González and Juan de Castañeda, by His Majesty commissioned to command the galleys, and with many other soldiers assembled there. And as soon as he was out of the governor's house he said to his captains and to the soldiers who were with him: '*Ea*, gentlemen! Off with our capes! Hands to weapons!'

Deponent and the others he has mentioned went to the wharf where with all speed he ordered the masters, boatswains and other petty officers of the galleys to assemble, each of whom he bade take up the work which fell to his office—the boatswains to mast the galleys, make ready all the oars, and immediately to lay in the supplies and munitions and equipment they might need. And accordingly deponent sent (p. 103) for the galleys' carpenters, who had gone to El Paso de Maria to fell timbers to repair these vessels. All this was done within two days.

On the day following the governor assembled his council to which deponent was summoned with Captains Martin González and Castañeda and Ensign Juan Falcon, and all the municipal councilmen and captains of this city. There the governor and captains, and the rest who were present at the council, bade deponent give his opinion as to what should be done for the city's defence inasmuch as he was a man who understood such matters. Since this defence was not deponent's responsibility he answered that there were many among those present who could furnish better advice than he; nevertheless he would give his opinion since they again asked him to do so.

Accordingly deponent recommended that, first and foremost, lookouts be posted on Hermoso Headland, which is twenty leagues from this city; and at Camba, and at Bohio del Gato; and on Point Canoa, in order that the city might be warned promptly if the enemy should appear. He recommended that four mounted (p. 104) men be selected, and that they be very reliable persons, who, when the alarm was given, should ride, two to the east to see whether the enemy landed men, and that these should be men cool enough not to return until the enemy had so landed; the other two to ride to the harbour headland on similar business. And they were so named forthwith in that council. Those who were to ride east were Don García de Serpa and Juan Ruiz de Reina, and those who were to go to the other headland were Domingo Feliz and Cornas.

Deponent then added that if the English fleet was strong he considered that it would be better to prevent the enemy from landing forces east of the city, for most or all persons thought that if the enemy came from the east he would land his forces east of the city

on Canapote beach. To prevent this deponent thought that it would be well for him to go out with the galleys and take up a position in the fathom and a half of water which they required for navigation. Then, if pinnaces were sent toward shore he could prevent them from approaching. The galleys would be safe from the artillery of the enemy's ships inasmuch as these could not come close (p. 105) because they would require at least five or six fathoms of water and this is not obtainable except a long way out, for the beach is shallow.

There in the council they opposed deponent, declaring that it was not advisable for the galleys to go outside the harbour because if once they went out and the enemy entered into the port they could not come back, first, because the enemy fleet would occupy the channel and, secondly, because to do so would be risky and dangerous since little depth of water is usually to be found in Boqueron channel by which they must enter, close by the fort, where they generally ground until the high tide comes in. Deponent answered that this was the only difficulty, but if once he went out he would not re-enter. Everybody protested that the city would be quickly lost if the galleys went out, but if they remained inside the harbour, it could readily defend itself against the enemy. Therefore, if necessary, they formally demanded that I remain in the harbour, and all the captains and all the others present signed a demand to this effect, and it was decided that the galleys should not leave the port.

Then the governor and city councilmen and militia captains there present proposed that, inasmuch as deponent had two captains of his galleys, commissioned by His Majesty, deponent should remain on land and fight with (p. 106) the land forces and command them when the enemy should appear, for the governor was very old and unequal to the task, and the people of the city would be greatly encouraged to know that deponent would be on land with them; and if deponent did not so remain they would lose courage, if he went to sea.

Similarly, it was resolved to hold a muster of the available militia and to inspect their arms; and to send to Tolu for what men could come up; and to Mompox; and to summon all the Indians available in the country; and to form a company of free blacks; and to name news captain of artillery; and to select from among the seamen of the . . . in the harbour those best able to assist this captain of . . . to build trenches and to dig ditches, first at Canapote, Bus . . . places and at the ends of streets, as might appear and in other . . . defence of this city; and to order pikes and pike-advisable for the gun

heads made; and to name a *corps de garde* where men should assemble when the alarm sounded, thence to proceed to their various posts as necessary for the defence; and to set up a *corps de garde* in Campmaster Alvaro de Mendoza's house, as is customary where there are military forces; the horse to patrol the coast nightly from the harbour headland to Tesca Swamp to watch for the enemy; and when the alarm should sound, all the people having assembled in the *corps de garde*, (p. 107) all the troops should then march out upon the beach and in square formation proceed thence in any required direction. It was decided that Captain Martín González and Juan de Castañeda should go on board the galleys with all the galleys' forces to defend the Boqueron entrance to the inner haven; and if the enemy should approach by the Caleta the galleys were to come up, bows on, in order to play their ordnance and small shot on the enemy to prevent his advance. It was so resolved and signed by all, as will appear in the minutes of the council, to which deponent refers.

All this was taken in hand and Captain Martín González undertook to build a earth-work at Canapote, and did so as promptly as he could, for they did not furnish him the necessary tools and materials. Deponent sent Captain Martín González forty posts for the work and a cart to convey them. Deponent took it upon himself to build another trench at the Caleta and began to build it, but did not finish it because they took away the Indians for other tasks. Of this work one wall is so badly built it was useless, rather a menace than any protection, for it did not reach the sea but left a good long distance without any shelter whatever. Recognizing that the enemy might enter there, as in fact he did enter, in the presence of third persons deponent repeatedly said to the governor: (p. 108) 'Master governor, provide me with 30 Indians, for at my own expense I want to carry that wall along to the sea, with its ditch, since if I do this I shall feel quite sure that the enemy will not come in there. If this be not done, it is there that our cause will be lost.' The governor never saw fit to furnish the Indians, but preferred to finish a ditch that was being dug on the beach, after which he said he would let me have them. Wherefore this work could not be completed.

With his men deponent built another trench at the entrance to the street which lies back of the Dominican monastery, a very good work where two pieces of ordnance were placed. One was a heavy culverin and the other a very good piece. All of the posts used in this work were deponent's. Which trench was built so that 20 or 30 soldiers stationed there could check any disorderly retreat, for men falling back would halt there, and recover; and, similarly, other

barricades were built at the ends of streets and all leading out to the beach were supplied with ordnance. In this manner the city was made very strong.

While the trenches were being built musters were held of the townsmen and of the seamen; and each man's munitions were inspected (p. 109)—powder, match and ball. These were furnished to those persons who had none. So also musters were held of the galleys' men, who were very well armed, for they were all harquebusiers and musketeers. So also reviews were held of the horse and of the Indians, and it was found that in numbers there were in the city some 400 harquebuses, 100 pikes, 400 Indians, 25 free black musketeers, and 54 horse, all very good men.

A few days later from the east there hove in sight a vessel from La Española, brought over at his own charge and cost by Don Francisco Maldonado, son-in-law of the campmaster of Rio de la Hacha, who came to warn this city of the enemy's fleet. He had been an eye-witness present at the enemy's capture of Santo Domingo. Since this ship was sighted in the direction of Canoa Point, the alarm was sounded and the people assembled in the *corps de garde* as had been planned; and the galley-captains and their men went on board their galleys; and deponent went with the townspeople to the beach and drew up the troops in square formation, out of which he selected a body of 100 harquebusiers and gave his nephew, Don Pedro Marradas, command of it. (p. 110) In this fashion they waited to see what this ship was and whether others would appear. It came along before the city and in its boat Don Francisco Maldonado came to shore and landed on the beach at the Caleta. When he saw the galleys, bows to land, with so many men, and a handsome square formed at the Caleta, and the horse, he said in a loud voice: 'Captain Francis will make no profit here, for you are not off your guard, but very well prepared, and here he'll come a cropper.'

Deponent and the rest who were there went with Don Francisco to deponent's house, for Don Francisco put up at deponent's lodgings. And to deponent he delivered a letter he brought him from Captain don Diego Osorio, commanding the Santo Domingo galley, in which the writer told of the enemy's fleet and what forces he had, saying that the enemy had 30 ships, of which eight or nine were very large and the rest small, seven or eight being pinnaces. In all 30 sail.

Forthwith deponent ordered subsistence—*cazabe*, maize, wine and oil and other necessary things—to be conveyed on board his galleys, with all care and diligence. When the people of the city saw deponent taking on so many supplies they became agitated and every-

body commenced to say (p. 111) that deponent intended to run away with the galleys. When Captain [Alonso] Bravo Hidalgo de Montemayor and Diego Caro and the rest heard this, they came to tell deponent and sought him out on the wharf, where he was overseeing the embarkation of necessary things, and said to him: 'Sir, what is this? The whole city is disturbed, for it is said that you are preparing to leave with the galleys. If this is true then they will go into the country and abandon the city.' To which deponent replied: 'I am not sending supplies on board the galleys with the intention of running away with them, but because when we are fighting the enemy neither the galleys nor we who remain on land can attend to the business of lading these supplies. In any event, they are better off on board the galleys. But come, let us go to where the governor is and there we will apply a remedy to this situation.' When they had come before the governor, I said: 'The people of the city are agitated because they have seen me lading supplies into the galleys, and they say that I am preparing to run off and so desert them. It would be a good thing if your honour would officially summon all the people of the city to meet tomorrow and speak to them all, in general.' Deponent (p. 112) agreed to accompany the governor and also address the people and assure them that their suspicion was unfounded; and it was so done.

An official summons was issued and the people met next day and deponent even brought out all the galleys' soldiers and marshalled them before the cathedral that the people of the city might see them and be encouraged by them. Then each company by itself was called into the church and the governor began to talk to them, telling them that the enemy was near, and for them to fight like Spaniards, and not to imagine that the galleys would leave the harbour or this deponent fail to stand by them on land, as had been agreed. When the governor had finished his address deponent spoke to them, saying: 'Gentlemen, the hour has come or is drawing nigh in which to keep your word so frequently pledged to me to fight like good fellows for Christ's faith and for our king and homes. For I will keep my word which I have given you to die or to live with you, and I herewith again pledge it to you, for it has been so determined from the beginning.' They all replied (p. 113) that they were resolved to fight and die for God's religion and their king, and deponent said, further: 'Gentlemen, if any man among you feel himself unable or disinclined to fight, I beg him to tell me so, openly or in private, and I give him my word of a gentleman to bring him out of the city and to give him money for his journey.' To which all replied that

there was no man among them but would fight with right good will.

While deponent was with them and as they came out of the church everybody in loud voices said to deponent: 'If you are with us, let all England come on, for we are not afraid.' And so they were quieted and disabused of the suspicion they had been entertaining.

Then all the sentries were strengthened and deponent took it upon himself to send six soldiers nightly to the point, and deponent's horse; and six other men in the frigate *Napolitana* to patrol the sea at Indian Point.

On Ash Wednesday, about 11 o'clock, the enemy's fleet appeared off Point Canoa, and the alarm was sounded and all the troops, foot and horse, went out upon the beach of the city. Captains Martin González and Castañeda went on board of the galleys with all their men. On the beach deponent (p. 114) marshalled the troops into formation and with them marched as far as the Shrine where there were five pieces of artillery. There he halted the entire body.

Meanwhile, friars from all three monasteries (Dominicans, Franciscans, Augustinians) went among the people, encouraging them; and many confessed there. These friars and the bishop of the city, whenever they met deponent, said to him: '*Ea*, good captain! If you are here the victory is certain.' Before the enemy arrived the bishop and the priors of the monasteries repeatedly and insistently demanded of deponent that he remain on land, declaring that for him to do so was for the good of the services of God and the king.

In this formation they awaited the enemy, who came coasting along, as many as 23 sail, large and small, a medium-sized vessel ahead, like a scout. As they came within range the artillery fired as they passed battery after battery along the waterfront, and some said that one vessel was damaged by a shot from the galleys. So we showed ourselves to the enemy and gave him to understand that we were not off guard, for on the beach there were the city's three companies of foot, being 300 harquebuses; and about 80 pikes; and two more companies formed by the men from Tolu and from Mompox (in both (p. 115) some 130 men, 100 harquebuses and the rest pikes). There was another company of free blacks, being 25 muskets; and another three or four companies of Indians, who were some 400 in number, armed with bows and poisoned arrows; and another company of 54 horse. All of these troops remained on the beach before the city, and the enemy with his fleet passed on and entered the port and anchored in the port at Boca Grande at about three or four o'clock in the afternoon.

Deponent left the troops upon the beach and with two of his comrades went to the wharf where the galleys' smithy is and there urged the smiths and carpenters of these vessels to all possible speed, to finish with certain links and planks a chain which they had been ordered to make, about 35 fathoms long, and as thick as a man's wrist. He ordered them to drag it along to Boqueron channel under the fort, to certain very strong posts which many days before deponent had prepared there; and there it was to be hung, with a lock which could be opened and closed. This task was carried out and finished over two hours after nightfall. Deponent ordered that the key to this chain be left on board the galleys in order that they might be able to open the lock in case it became necessary to go out (p. 116) with the galleys. Therefore the boatswain's mate of the flag-galley had this key. This task completed, with Don Francisco Maldonado and Captain Cornas and Diego de Torres deponent went to deponent's lodgings and had a bite to eat.

After this they again went down to the beach where deponent passed from company to company, talking with the captains and the men, encouraging them and bidding them move down toward the Caleta trench and there get into the positions they were to occupy, to fight. As far as deponent could see there were at the Caleta 300 arquebuses and about 100 pikes, and the free black musketeers. The two galleys had not yet come up to their position.

About midnight deponent awakened the governor, who was asleep in a hammock, and said to him: 'Sir, I am going on board the galleys and if there is water enough in Boqueron channel I will go out with the two galleys and give the enemy one wallop, or as many as I think proper, with the artillery and small shot of the galleys, in such manner as to do them damage and compel them to alter their plan.' The governor replied to deponent that he thought it a good idea, and so with Don Francisco Maldonado and Captain Pedro Cornas (p. 117) and Diego de Torres and Don Pedro Marradas, my nephew, deponent went to the wharf and embarked and went to the galleys and boarded the flag-galley, where were Captain Juan de Castañeda and all its men, and looked to see whether there was water enough for the galleys to go out by Boqueron channel, and there was not enough water, although the tide had begun to come in.

Inasmuch as he could not get out, deponent took the galleys' skiff and went to the fort, where Captain Mexia Mirabal was in command, with about 50 men, saying to the captain, as he entered the fort: '*Ea*, soldiers! *Ea*, gentlemen! The hour's come to fight and

die like good fellows', and without letting me say more captain and men answered: 'Don Pedro, here we are, determined to do our duty like men to the death. As far as this fort is concerned, your honour need not worry, but go to land and make the landsmen fight.'

At this time the men in the Caleta trench, where the governor was, missed deponent and began to shout: 'What's become of Don Pedro? Where is he? If he is not here we won't fight.' And so they sent three horsemen, one after another, to the wharf, to call across to deponent. Deponent was told that one of these men was Lieutenant Soto. Not content with this, from the trench they fired a piece of ordnance more certainly to compel deponent to return quickly.

When deponent heard this shot in the fort, where he was at the time, he said to his comrades: 'That shot is to summon me. Let us hurry to embark,' and so they embarked and passed astern of the galleys and deponent said to the captains: '*Ea*, gentlemen! Each to his place, as we've agreed. The enemy is coming.' And so immediately they lifted their anchors and took up their positions, bows (p. 118) against the shore at the Caleta.

Deponent landed on the wharf with all speed and proceeded to the Caleta trench on the run, and upon reaching it found the governor mounted upon his horse, and he said to deponent: '*Ea*, your honour, Don Pedro, here's Francisco Diaz, captain of the party,¹ and he's returned without accomplishing anything.' Deponent asked Don Francisco Diaz: 'What have you done?' And he answered: 'Nothing, because the people with me turned back on me, asking me if I was leading them to slaughter.' Deponent became angry and said to him: 'A bad beginning, this! At least you must have seen if the enemy is advancing.' And Don Francisco said that they were coming on.

The governor then sent two others on horseback, who were Don Juan de Vitoria and Don Alonso, who reported that the enemy was not coming, nor had they discovered anything, and they denied that the earlier assertion was true. It turned out to the contrary, for the enemy was on their heels and came up immediately.

The signal was sounded in the trench and every man assumed the defensive with very good spirit. Then the galley *Ocasión* fired her middle great gun at the light of the enemy's match and in the glare of that discharge the people in the trench saw to fire a very good volley from their arquebuses at the enemy. The enemy replied with a volley from his arquebuses and divided his forces, for only a vanguard of 25 or 30 of the enemy continued to advance. The

¹ i.e., the party that should have laid the ambush.

main-battle was left more than 500 paces from the trench, and in the glare of the piece of ordnance which was fired deponent saw the enemy's forlorn advancing along the sea wash.

Deponent was at the end of the masonry wall, from where he had fired an harquebus shot at the enemy, and he thought it well to go to encounter (p. 119) the enemy at the water's edge among the wine butts there, filled with sand, which were intended to afford shelter. Deponent took his stand by the fourth hogshead and from there fired his harquebus three times.

The flag-galley then fired her middle great gun and in the glare of that discharge the people in the trench again fired another round at the enemy and the enemy replied with a great outcry in words deponent could not understand, but he gathered that they were invoking their patron. The men in the trench answered, as vociferously calling upon Heaven and Saint James, and saying: 'Come on, heretic dogs!'

By the light of the middle great gun deponent saw that some fourteen or fifteen of the enemy had come up to the wine butts and when he heard the shouting of the men in the trench he came out from among the hogsheads, harquebus in one hand and drawn sword in the other, crying: 'Close in, Spain! Saint James and at 'em! They are heretics and few!' And being actually among the enemy deponent turned to see if the men of the trench were coming out to charge the enemy with him, because many a time they had promised him to follow his example. He saw, however, that these people had abandoned the trench and were fleeing toward the city. Then the enemy's forlorn called out to the main-battle to come on, because ours were in retreat, and so deponent and the enemy's main-battle together passed through the wine butts (p. 120) and the enemy ran after our men. Deponent presently encountered Captain Pedro de Cornas and a black slave belonging to deponent, and they marched toward the city, and a great many of the enemy passed ahead of them and others came behind.

Supposing that our men would come to a stop at a trench behind the Dominican monastery and there re-form, deponent hastened thither, but when he arrived all of ours had already passed on at full speed down the beach, toward the bridge, the enemy after them; and so hotly in pursuit that they paid no attention to deponent nor to Pedro Cornas nor to the slave.

Therefore after he had been in the trench deponent had opportunity to turn down the street in the direction of the wharf. The way lay past the lodgings where deponent resided, and there, in the

doorway, he met a king's slave named Alvaro Vique who was coming out with a horse belonging to deponent, and said to him: 'Sir, mount this horse, for you are tired.' So deponent mounted the horse and with Captain Cornas, on foot, went to the wharf to which the frigate *Napolitana* had just come up. Deponent ordered Captain Pedro Cornas: 'Embark in that frigate and go to the galleys and tell Captains Martin González and Juan de Castañeda, since they have the key to the chain, to take those two galleys out to Boca Chica, die (p. 121) who must or live who may. In any event, to go out with the galleys', for deponent was going to the bridge, since it was now day, to assemble two or three hundred harquebuses and turn on the enemy, who would readily be dispersed, for they were in the streets in small parties of ten or half a dozen. Therefore Captain Cornas went on board and went to the galleys and gave this order to their captains.

Deponent went to the bridge and found none of ours, for all had crossed the bridge, to the side where the Franciscan monastery is, with the governor. Deponent saw only Captain Martin Polo coming along Negrete Street with fourteen or fifteen men, the rest of his company having deserted him, and he was making for the bridge to save himself. There this captain made what stand he could.

Seeing Captain Martin Polo in Negrete Street deponent rode to the bridge at full gallop and arrived where the governor was, with some 300 harquebusiers. On coming up he shouted out to them: 'What shame is this, gentlemen! Spaniards, now that it is light let us return to the enemy, for our friend Martin Polo is still in the city! Let us go thither!' And some 200 harquebusiers made to cross the bridge. But when they got there, almost to the end of the bridge, and again saw the enemy, once more the townsmen turned and fled as they had fled from the Caleta and left deponent alone.

He withdrew to where the governor had halted, whither all the people had returned, flying from the bridge, and in great anger deponent said: 'Devil take it! (p. 212) What chicken-hearted cowards all these have today shown themselves to be!'

Next deponent saw a convict from one of the galleys and said to him: 'What's this?' And the convict replied: 'What does your honour expect? Turn your eyes and you will see the galleys gone aground.' Then deponent looked and saw the galleys aground a very little beyond Jesamani. He saw many of their men, convicts and soldiers, and said to a group of soldiers from the galleys: 'What does this mean, gentlemen?' To which they replied: 'We can tell your honour only that we besought Captain Juan Castañeda, who was on board

the flag-galley, clamouring "Captain, attack the enemy from the rear from the Caleta or from the wharf! We'll slaughter them!" This demand was many times repeated, to which Captain Juan de Castañeda replied: "I have no such order from Don Pedro", and went forward and ran the galley aground. Not content with this, he called out to the other galley to run ashore, saying that they were calling for help from the land.'

All the soldiers were aware that Captain Castañeda was an enemy to deponent, a fact publicly known, as deponent stands ready to prove, as well as that he wilfully ran the galleys aground either thinking to damage deponent or because of his own lack of spirit. Deponent requests and petitions and if necessary demands that the evidence he will assemble on this point before your honour be incorporated with these proceedings, that this fact may appear to His Majesty.

Then deponent saw (p. 123) Captain Martin González and said to him: 'What does this mean, captain? How is it that the galleys have run ashore?' And the captain replied: 'Don't ask me, your honour, for I don't know what devil's voice it was in which they called out to me from the flag-galley, saying that your honour asked for help. I was going out by way of Boqueron where the chain is, but when I heard that, I turned my bow and grounded alongside the flag-galley.' And deponent, his hands clutching his beard, cried: 'Oh, may she regret it who brought me to light and the father who begot me! Can there be so black wickedness in the world—to say that I asked for help, who want God's only!' And deponent took up his horse's reins and tried to detain the people—the soldiers and the convicts and the landsmen—but because deponent was alone, unaided by anybody, he could not stop them, although he endeavoured to do so until near nightfall.

Then, since night was coming on and they had all gone, and the governor had already proceeded to Turbaco, and deponent was left with only two or three friends, he said to certain seamen of the galleys who were there: 'Brothers, let us go and bore holes in the galleys to scuttle them. We will then fire the upper works and spike the ordnance, that the enemy may not make any use of them.' The seamen replied, 'For this it is not necessary that your honour go, for we will do it,' and so they did. When night had fallen deponent withdrew to a farm¹ which is two and a half leagues from the city and there he remained while the enemy was in possession of Cartagena.

¹ His own, as is made clear in omitted portions of Cueva's deposition, *post.*

Three or four days later deponent wrote (p. 124) a letter to the governor at Turbaco, saying to him that he thought it looked bad for the enemy to be in Cartagena and us in retreat in the bush, for him to gather me up what men he could, for I had 50 or 60 soldiers assembled and was going to fall on Cartagena and damage the enemy, and that I awaited him there. Whither deponent went and the governor came with as many as 200 men and, since it was about dinner time, deponent and the governor and his companions dined together at a table, and at the end of the meal deponent said to the governor: 'Sir, I want to surprise¹ the enemy tonight at a point which I know where, with God's aid, we can among others clean out a *corps de garde*, your honour with your men furnishing a diversion in another quarter.' He said that he approved, and deponent rose immediately and went to station a guard on the highroad that no negro or other person might go in to warn the enemy of what was planned. He posted this guard and told his men that they were to put on their shirts and gave them their orders as to where they were to go in and kill the said guard, and all deponent's men were very well pleased and thought well of the project.

This done, deponent returned to where the governor was and it appeared that somebody had talked to him and said: 'If Don Pedro does them this damage it will cause (p. 125) the enemy to burn our houses,' and nothing further was needed to dissuade the governor, for when deponent came back the governor said: 'It will be better for these people to return to Turbaco Water and remain there; and I am going to Turbaco.' Deponent lost his temper and exclaimed: 'God's body! To what have we come that I should kill myself to defend your property! Fetch me that horse. I too am going.' And deponent and about twenty horsemen, who were there, mounted their animals and with the city's standard and two infantry companies, which were some 200 men, were about to depart when the governor said: 'Let us not leave without showing ourselves to the enemy.' And so we marched toward the highroad, where the enemy's sentinels could see us from the top of the cathedral.²

Immediately the enemy sounded the alarm and we marched on until we came to the commencement of the highway and there the

¹ 'Darle una encamisada', i.e., a nocturnal attack wherein to enable its members to identify each other the attacking party wore white shirts on the outside. Cf. Drake's attack on the packtrain at Venta Cruces, in the Hakluyt Society's No. LXXXI (Second Series), p. 304.

² '... the Centinell, upon the Church-steeple . . .'—Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

governor and the militia halted, but deponent on his horse and Joseph de Barro, a householder of Cartagena, also mounted, and some fourteen or fifteen soldiers, pressed on as far as the slaughterhouse and there began to skirmish with the enemy. This (p. 126) skirmish lasted a considerable length of time, until certain *zabras* which were close to land over toward the fort, inside the haven, began to fire their artillery in such manner that they could do us heavy damage and we could do them none. When deponent saw that none of the townspeople had come up, he ordered his soldiers to withdraw, for their remaining there could do no good.

Deponent returned to where the governor was and all together went back to Lorenzo Martin's farm, which is a cannon-shot from the city. Arrived there the governor informed deponent that he desired to depart, and so he and all of his men went, and deponent passed that night there. As the townspeople were leaving with the governor they said to deponent: 'Sir, do nothing to the enemy, for it will cause him to burn our houses.' And in this fashion they left, and the next day deponent withdrew to the farm which he has previously mentioned.

Three or four days later the governor wrote deponent a letter in which he requested him to do him the pleasure of going to Turbaco, for they were going to consider the matter of ransoming the city. Deponent replied in another letter saying that from that moment forever he closed the door upon any proposal from the governor or anybody else concerning any ransom to be paid to the enemy, for deponent did not approve of any (p. 127) such dealings. If it was a question of going to fight the enemy, he would go, but they need not approach him in any other sense, and for this reason they never again broached the matter of ransom to him; but deponent repeatedly wrote to the governor to come to damage the enemy, to which the governor invariably replied that he had learned by experience that the people of Cartagena were no fighters and there was no recourse but to commend the issue to God.

Deponent knew that they were negotiating with Captain Francis for the ransom of the city and that the enemy had so managed it that the governor and the bishop were going into the city to treat of the matter where he was although he had given them no hostages, or else they offered to go. When deponent learned this he wrote a letter to the governor urging him not to do this by any means; first, because in no part of the world was it customary, and secondly, because it was unbecoming and belittled his authority to the enemy; and, finally, because it was dangerous to trust to a heretic's

word, for if he broke it and held them prisoners, who was going to demand an accounting? They replied that they were going into the city. When deponent learned that they were actually going and were on the way, he went out to meet them, to dissuade them from entering the city by any manner of means, rather to negotiate for the ransom from outside after an exchange of hostages. They said that the matter could not then be helped (p. 128) and deponent answered: 'Well, then, commend it to God,' and so he remained behind and they went on and entered into the city.

This gave the corsair Francis an opportunity to say many shameless things, both of His Majesty and also of the *grandes* of Castile, and of other persons, for he complained that in certain royal *cedulas* and despatches addressed to the governor, which the governor left upon his desk when he retired, His Majesty called him '*corsario*'. Because of this he said many shameless things and with this the governor and the bishop returned. Next day deponent learned that they had raised the amount offered as ransom for the city to seventy thousand ducats.

Deponent was told by a nephew of his named Don Pedro Marra-das who in Cartagena talked with the vice-admiral of the enemy's fleet that, among other things, the vice-admiral asked him why he called such a shameless rascal as that Captain Francis 'your excellency' when he was a low fellow who had been given command of the fleet because he knew this coast; and that they would deliver the city over for thirty thousand ducats as readily as for a hundred thousand, for what did it profit them to burn walls when what they came after was money! When deponent heard this he wrote instantly to the governor, informing him of it. Nevertheless, two days later they raised their offer of ransom to a hundred and ten thousand ducats. (p. 129).

Inasmuch as deponent knew that this money, or most of it, must come out of His Majesty's strongbox, he wrote a letter to Accountant Alonso de Tapia, accountant of this royal treasury, and to Treasurer Don Luis de Guzman, warning them by no means to furnish the money for the ransom out of the treasury, for His Majesty would greatly disapprove. If the governor should demand it, for them not to give it until they were imprisoned and greatly pressed to do so, and they replied to deponent in another letter saying that they intended so to proceed and sincerely thanked him for the advice. Deponent has since learned that His Majesty's monies were handed over to Captain Francis.

Asked to say by whose orders the galleys were burned, deponent

referred to his preceding statement in this regard, and said that he ordered them to be burned that the enemy might not enjoy them, for he knew certainly that if they fell into the enemy's hands he would not by any means consent to their ransom because when they sought to ransom the galley he took in Santo Domingo he would not agree to it and said that he would not return it for any amount of money.

Asked about how many of the enemy he thinks were killed in the storming of Cartagena, deponent said that the enemy was damaged (p. 130) by the artillery fire from the galleys, for many saw their lighted match fly, and immediately the next day two pinnaces came along the seacoast and they say that they were loaded with the enemy's dead . . . of ours, deponent knows that Juan Rodriguez, merchant, and Palencia, householders in the city; and Pedro Fernández, merchant; and Zamora, barber; and Juan Cosme, ensign of Captain Alonso Bravo de Montemayor's company, were killed; and he heard the captain of the Mompox company say that he was two or three soldiers short, concerning whom he knew nothing, but they put in an appearance later. Captain Alonso Bravo was wounded and taken prisoner, as was one Robleda. Further, aboard the galleys one convict died of an harquebus shot and another was hit in the leg; and he has heard that some persons were captured, but they were unimportant.

And what he said is the truth, on the oath he took, and he is about 44 years old; and he signed it with his name . . .—Don Pedro Vique y Manrique . . .

. . . Captain Alonso Bravo de Montemayor . . . on oath said that (p. 131) on the eve of Epiphany of this present year there came into this port an advice-boat, cleared by the House of Trade *Witness* for the Indies, with a despatch addressed to the governor of this city and others intended for the ports of the Main. Witness saw the despatch sent to this city, in the council and conference called in the matter at which he was present in his capacity of city councilman. In brief, according to his recollection of it, this despatch said that Francis Drake had left England with a large fleet and after sacking the outskirts of Bayona had crossed to these parts to do what damage he could here. It was supposed that he would come to this city, and so the warning was sent out that they might make the necessary preparations, to which end were sent a certain number of muskets and harquebuses, and munitions. From this city the warning was sent to the Main and the vessel itself went to carry it to Havana . . . (p. 132)

. . . the day after this news arrived the governor summoned a council wherein the news of the enemy's coming was considered, and there were issued such orders as the governor and council thought advisable for the strengthening of the city's defences, all of which was written down in the council's book, to which deponent refers.

Then the governor consulted Don Pedro Vique and Captain Martin González, captains of the galleys on duty on this coast, and asked their opinion because they were soldiers experienced in defence and fortification, as to what should be done to prevent the enemy from entering the city, if he should come here. And it was decided to build barricades at the ends of the streets on the seaward side; and these were built. Similarly, they endeavoured to strengthen the trench at the Caleta and to build others on the side toward Hanged Man's Swamp. This work was begun so late and done with so few workmen that when the enemy arrived it was not completed in either place despite the fact that there had been time enough to finish.

Many days before (p. 133) it was begun, being a man who understands these matters, deponent told the governor that this should be done, and, similarly, that another trench should be built from the Caleta to Hanged Man's Swamp, with two ditches before it, running from sea to sea. From one point to the other is a distance of about 150 paces, sea to sea, and the work could easily be done.¹ It would convert this city into an island, as can better be seen on the map² of the city which deponent intends to send to His Majesty. It is exactly like the one the English captain carries.³

Observing that the governor did not ask his opinion in these matters, deponent took Captain Martin González outside of the city and in the presence of Pedro Lopez Treviño, a householder of Cartagena, to him expressed himself as he had done to the governor. Since this man had given a different opinion to the governor he did not approve witness's idea, nor did he reject it, but remarked to deponent that a bulwark which was to be built at Hanged Man's Swamp would better be made of timbers and sheet tin and packed with earth, rather than of *guamachos* and box-thorn which is a tree⁴ that cannot be handled because of its poisonous thorns which pro-

¹ The distance across the Caleta from the sea-wash to the water of the inner haven was about 150 paces, but Hanged Man's Swamp was at a distance, on the other side of the city.

² Not seen.

³ The same presented in the printed editions of Bigges' narrative?

⁴ It is a shrub.

duce very lively pain to the touch. These trees are very abundant in that quarter and deponent recommended that many branches should be cut and strewn along the beach where it was supposed that the enemy (p. 134) would advance. Ten or twelve days later, without saying anything to deponent, the governor and Don Pedro Vique and Martin González began these ditches and bulwark and trenches, but with such lack of enthusiasm that although there was time to make and finish them they were not made or completed when the enemy arrived.

Similarly, because pikes were lacking in this city, deponent so informed the governor that he might fetch wood to make them, and he accordingly ordered as many as 200 shafts to be brought, to which iron heads were fitted. These were distributed among the people of the city in such manner that all of us had more than enough weapons, for in the musters and reviews held it was seen that all had weapons with which to fight; and in deponent's house, for he was one of the captains, there were extra muskets and harquebuses and pikes and halberds and partisans.

. . . of the horse, Francisco de Carvajal was captain and Francisco de Alva ensign, and deponent believes they had about 50 mounted men. Alonso de Mendoza was campmaster of the city, and the infantry captains were Alonso de San Miguel, (p. 135) Martin Polo and deponent, and Bartólome Lopez was *sargento mayor*. These three infantry captains had 330 men among them. Pedro Mexia, captain of the fort, had 50 soldiers. Captain of the men who came from Mompox was Diego Perez, with as many as 60 soldiers; the captain of the men from Tolu was one Venegas, householder in that place, who had 60 soldiers. The governor gave Don Pedro Vique 40 or 50 men for his galleys, chosen from the city's troops, to be under his command. There were two royal galleys in the haven and a frigate called the *Napolitana*, and on board of these was a great lot of soldiers and convicts, very well equipped and provided with munitions and everything necessary to enable them to render good service . . .

. . . a despatch-boat sent by the *alcalde* of La Yaguana came to this city with news that the enemy had arrived at Santo Domingo and taken that place; and later appeared Don Francisco Maldonado, householder of Rio de la Hacha, saying he came from the island of Santo Domingo, and that (p. 136) he had been present there when the city fell and had had close and very special dealings with the English commander, who had told him that he was going to take this city.

Seven or eight days later, on Ash Wednesday, there reached this

city a ship sent from Spain by the officers of the House of Trade for Indies which in Santo Domingo had learned of the loss of that city and of the arrival of the Englishman's fleet. It was then in the harbour of Santo Domingo city with yards across, ready to sail for Cartagena. And in the afternoon of that same day, Wednesday, about noon, this fleet was sighted. Twenty-three or twenty-four sail were counted, eleven being tall ships, seven small ships, and seven pinnaces. Immediately the alarm was sounded and all the fighting force assembled in the *corps de garde* of this city, foot and horse, and from there proceeded in good order to the beach where they remained until the enemy entered the harbour.

The governor distributed these troops. He ordered the horse to patrol the beach in both directions and to watch where the enemy landed men. He ordered Captain Martin Polo and his company to hold the trench out by Hanged Man's Swamp. The Tolu company was ordered to hold San Francisco bridge. Captain San Miguel (p. 137) and Captain Diego Perez were sent to the Caleta trench. Deponent's company was in a sand trench on the beach.

At the third watch they ordered deponent to take up a position between the end of the masonry trench at the Caleta and the sea, a place where there was no protection. When he had taken up that position with his company they gave him six wine butts with which to make a trench over a distance of a hundred feet, which was open, without any shelter whatsoever. The men had nothing with which to fill these hogsheads, but their hands.

Within, say, an hour that deponent and his men had been there, the governor and Don Pedro Vique and the campmaster and *sargento mayor* and Captain Alonso de San Miguel and Captain Diego Perez with their companies, being in the masonry trench, the enemy appeared. With a troop of harquebusiers out of his company deponent took a stand in front of these wine butts, ordering his men not to fire until he should give the order.

As the enemy came out of the bush upon the beach, about a musket-shot from the trenches, the galleys began to fire their artillery and small shot at the enemy, who was less than 100 paces away. Neither the artillery nor the small shot had any effect because the fire went high. That it might do them no damage the English kept over toward where deponent and his men were. The governor ordered the artillery which was in the trench to be fired and deponent ordered (p. 138) his muskets and harquebuses to fire. Deponent had instructed part of his men to fire first, another lot to fire next while the first reloaded, but they did not follow his instructions.

Turning back to them to make them come forward, and to send the pikes to the seaward side where the enemy was advancing, deponent saw that the flags which were there with their soldiers were fleeing, and many of deponent's company did the same. Deponent again came to the place where the enemy was advancing. Believing them to be his own men whom he had posted and sent there, deponent went in among these English. By the time he recognized them they were already in among the wine butts, close to his flag, which his ensign held with eight or ten soldiers. They began to fight with their swords and there is where the most fell killed and wounded, or were taken prisoners. Deponent's ensign died with no man's hand to help him, neither horse nor foot of those who were in the trenches, for all ran without stopping, abandoning the place.

Fighting and defending himself, deponent fell back as far as a trench which was some twenty paces from there, where he supposed some soldiers to be. As he came over the top he was wounded with many pike thrusts which fell on a steel shield he carried and a tough buffalo hide.¹ (p. 139) He was thrown into the trench and when he tried to get up an English captain and four men appeared and again struck him to earth and, although he never surrendered, he was taken prisoner. Deponent was wounded in six places.

By this time all the enemy's forces had gone forward along the seawash, avoiding this sand trench, and they then carried deponent along to the Santo Domingo trench where he found the English sergeant major with seventeen soldiers. These were they who broke through the trench. The English who assembled there numbered 22. Those who broke through where deponent and his men and flag were posted were ten companies of 60 men each, as deponent learned while he was a prisoner.

The full strength of the enemy's forces landed that night was 550 men, and inasmuch as they advanced in disorder and not in the usual military manner, deponent believes that had a hundred men stood up to them they would have prevented them from entering then. And if all the people of the city had joined with the galley's men, they would have been in all about one thousand effectives against whom the enemy's forces would not have sufficed to do damage. Deponent is very certain that had there been discipline among ours not a man of the enemy who landed would have lived to re-embark, for he knows that in the city and in the galleys and in the fort there were more soldiers and citizens than 550, and they

¹ ' . . . un cuero de ante (anta?) fuerte . . . 'Ante . . . anta . . . buffe . . . búfalo'—
John Minshew, *Spanish-English Dictionary*, London, 1599.

were very well armed, who might have been selected; and there were nearly as many again who, had they seen these fight well, would have done the same; and the enemy's retreat to the sea was more than a league, and he had no horse nor any artillery, as we had . . . (p. 140)

. . . at the time that deponent was taken prisoner and his ensign and some others of his company killed . . . he did not see the governor nor anybody else at hand to aid or favour him.

. . . The English sergeant major and some of his men told deponent that they met no further resistance except from two or three men on horseback, one of whom was Campmaster Alvaro de Mendoza, a man over eighty years of age, who was wounded in the face. The sergeant major had hold of his horse's reins but did not kill him because he seemed so old. The campmaster wounded the sergeant major in the face¹ and, finding himself wounded, he let go the horse. Similarly, from the enemy deponent learned that they had seriously wounded Pedro de Coronado, householder of this city, who was one of the three mounted men.² He got a pike-thrust on the target he carried and was badly wounded in the left breast. The English sergeant major also told deponent that an old man mounted on horseback had come up, who wore a shirt of mail and a helmet, and out of pity he had not wounded him. From this description deponent inferred that this was Governor Pedro Fernández, for he wore mail and a helmet.

So they left the trench to which the captain and the men who had taken him had brought deponent, and from there with the seventeen who were in the trench they took deponent up one of the city's streets. It was now daylight. They arrived at the *corps de garde* (p. 141) where the English were cheering Saint George, and not a Spaniard was to be seen.

But presently there were answering shouts from a street by San Francisco bridge, from where Captain Martin Polo and perhaps fifteen men were firing toward the place where deponent was, surrounded by the enemy. These drew a little aside and went down a street, to cut him off from the bridge, but he and his men had already withdrawn to the bridge, where the English killed two of the men he had with him.

¹ Cf. Document No. 22. Campmaster Mendoza was wounded in the face. If, as this document states, Sergeant Major Powell was also so wounded, English accounts do not mention it. It is possible that this deponent is confused as to fact or, more likely, a clerk may have erred in transcribing.

² The third being the unidentified author of Document No. 22.

They carried deponent up to his house and from a verandah of it which commands sea and land deponent saw that not a Spaniard was to be discovered on that side of San Francisco bridge, by which most had fled . . . (p. 142)

Asked how many of the enemy were killed and wounded in the trench when they attacked and entered, deponent said that between the wine butts and the seawash where the enemy entered witness saw some fall and while he was a prisoner the English told him that five were killed and ten or twelve were wounded by harquebus shot or steel. Later deponent learned that eight or ten were caught on the stakes, of whom as many as three died. Deponent thinks that, according to his reckoning, from harquebus shots and wounds and sickness¹ about 30 English died that morning.

Later, at sea, close to shore, five or six Spaniards defended a caravel which two pinnaces had attacked, and killed two English captains (p. 143) who were among the best who came over, and two or three soldiers . . .

While he held him prisoner Captain Francis treated deponent well and told him many things, for deponent was a prisoner in his own house which he owns in this city. Because it was the best in Cartagena, Captain Francis lodged there and usually they talked and ate together. By this Captain Francis, who told him so, deponent was given to understand that he brought 3000 men out of England in his fleet, seamen and soldiers, and that so far 500 had died of sickness; but other officers and private individuals of the fleet, especially one who claimed to be a Greek but deponent believes was a Spaniard, all told him that he had not brought out of England over 2200 or 2300 seamen and soldiers, and that at the moment he had in this city and its harbour about 1500 or 1600 men, the rest having died before he reached this city of an epidemic which broke out in the fleet. Deponent does not believe they were even as many as these said.

There were ten flags ashore and three at sea. Of these, excepting about 200 men who seemed to be veterans, and some of them explained that they had served in the Low Countries of (p. 144) Flanders, in Holland and Zealand, all the rest were the most miserable people witness ever beheld at war, little skilled in arms and undisciplined in military matters, for deponent carefully observed all the musters he saw held of these men, and watched them post and change the guard, and believes that at the beginning, before they had fortified themselves in the city, if Governor Pedro

¹ i.e., of the poison on the stakes?

Fernández and Don Pedro Vique and the other captains had gathered up their troops and attacked the enemy from the direction of Hanged Man's Swamp, where he had no guard set, they would have killed many of them and dispersed them and driven them out of the city. Deponent believes that the Spaniards who abandoned Cartagena were better men than the English who occupied it. If the Spaniards had assembled their full strength they would have been double the number of the enemy, for more than a thousand could have been made up from the men who came ashore from the galleys—convicts, Turks, Moors, who at that time all demanded arms with which to fight the enemy—if they had been offered their liberty in exchange, as they asked.

So also deponent understood from Captain Francis that a nephew¹ of his left England more than a year ago with four ships to enter the Pacific by way of Magellan's Strait, and that many other vessels also had gone out from England to damage His Majesty's possessions where they might. And that he had sailed as captain general of this fleet by order of the queen of England to do damage on the coast of Spain, at Cape Verde, Hispaniola and in these parts of the Indies, and to raid the Antilles and go to Havana and there wait for the New Spain fleet (p. 145) to take it, since he had missed the Mainland fleet by only twelve hours.

From certain of his captains and soldiers deponent learned that the Englishman had promised the queen of England to fetch her a million as her share, and he was disturbed to see how little profit he had so far obtained; and even all his captains and soldiers were aggrieved because he had promised them so much and they saw that their part would be small, and so all the gentlemen said that he would not again find any to go out with him from England . . .

From the English deponent learned that they had with them two or three Spanish soldiers, although these denied that they were Spaniards; and as many Portuguese seamen, persons of little account. In this city they seized a mixed-breed from Panama, a silversmith who belonged to the Mompox company, whom deponent believes they carried off with them . . . (p. 148)

In deponent's presence Don Pedro Vique told the governor of this city that he would bring out of the galleys all the soldiers there and many of the convicts, to whom arms were to be given, and all these were to fight and face the enemy in the trenches at the Caleta; and so Governor Pedro Fernández de Busto believed that Don

¹ John Drake, engaged in the second enterprize of the Muscovy Company? Cf. Corbett, Sir Julian, *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, II, p. 335.

Pedro would do, for he had so promised. The afternoon that the enemy reached this port the governor put very few soldiers into those trenches and sent the rest to less important posts, believing that Don Pedro Vique would keep his word. Later, understanding that the moment had arrived for Don Pedro to do as he had undertaken and agreed to do, and that he was not doing it, the governor called up deponent and his company and placed him between the masonry trench and the sea, where there was no shelter. Don Pedro had left this place entirely unprotected, having undertaken to build the trench and dig the ditch there. Because that place was open the enemy came in, as deponent has said . . . (p. 149).

From the verandah of his house deponent saw the galleys burn, the enemy having given no occasion for their destruction nor does it appear that anybody was threatening them. They could have gone out by Boqueron and passed him without the enemy being able to annoy them unless they chose to come up to where he lay, for there was water enough for them to go out, according to what Captain Antonio Rodriguez told deponent, and he was on board . . .

Asked if it is true that this city was ransomed from the English enemy for one hundred seven thousand ducats, to pay which 200 bars of silver were taken from the royal treasury and monies in the custody of deponent as depositary general . . . deponent stated that the ransom of the city was arranged with the enemy at one hundred and ten thousand ducats, despite the fact that deponent repeatedly told Diego Daça and Tristan de Orive not to offer even eighty thousand, for certain of the English told deponent that Francis Drake would accept that sum and not burn the city because he had promised (p. 150) the queen of England to fetch her a large sum of money from the Indies (for he expected to encounter the fleets) and was perplexed by his failure to obtain it. From the hundred and ten thousand ducats agreed upon the Englishman deducted three thousand at the entreaty of Tristan de Orive and Pedro Lopez Treviño and deponent, on the understanding that twelve thousand ducats which were to be paid in jewels should be paid in silver instead. The 200 bars paid over as part of the ransom were from His Majesty's treasury. And while deponent was held a prisoner by Captain Francis the governor sent an order to *Sargento Mayor* Bartólome Lopez for some twelve or thirteen thousand ducats which deponent had on an estate of his, these being monies deposited with deponent as depositary general. The *sargento mayor* carried them off and it is well known that they went toward the ransom of the city.

. . . after he had received the ransom of the city the English-

man bade deponent ransom his person and his residence and the houses adjoining and others on the corner opposite Saint Augustine's, where (p. 151) a nephew of his lived, and they fixed it at six thousand ducats, of which one thousand would have been Captain Francis's share. He remitted this thousand and deponent paid the other five in gold and jewels and pearls worth that amount, as appears at greater length in the receipt which Captain Francis gave deponent. The judge ordered deponent to exhibit this receipt and he did exhibit the original document of which an exact copy was made to be incorporated in the records of these proceedings, and the original was returned to Captain Alonso Bravo.¹

Continuing his deposition he said that in addition the Englishman demanded three thousand ducats ransom for the Franciscan church and house and when they were not forthcoming began to pile firewood up in three or four places, to set fire to it. Deponent went to the house of Saint Francis where Captain Francis was with his men, prepared to burn the place, and repeatedly begged him to do him the favour not to burn the buildings. He replied to deponent, in the presence of many Spaniards, that because deponent's wife, Doña Elvira de Azevedo, was buried in the church he would respect that lady and not burn the church, and forthwith he ordered his sergeant major to take good care not to burn the church or damage it, because the imprisonment in which he had held deponent had occasioned the death of Doña Elvira de Azevedo. Deponent besought him again on behalf of the house and monastery and the ransom of that house of Saint Francis was fixed at six hundred ducats.

Similarly, (p. 152) an estate on Carey island was ransomed for 400 ducats and High Sheriff Hernan Lopez ransomed some soap and other merchandise in considerable amount, and so also Mexía Mirabal ransomed wine and oil and soap and other merchandise, and Tristan de Orive ransomed part of a lot of demijohns they had taken from him. Pedro Martinez de Susuaga and other persons ransomed slaves and things they said were theirs. Everybody said he was ransoming his own property, but deponent has heard it rumoured that some people ransomed property not their own, especially Mexía Mirabal.

And what he has deposed is the truth on the oath he took . . . and he signed it with his name.—Alonso Bravo . . . (p. 156).

In the city of Cartagena on the fifth day of the month and year aforesaid . . . Mançio de las Cuevas, householder of this city, being

¹ Cf. *The English Historical Review*, XLIX, No. 193, January, 1934, pp. 22-3.

duly sworn . . . said that many days before the Englishman reached this city there was advice and warning from His Majesty that Captain Francis was coming. Deponent seems to recall that the warning was received about two months before he came. So the governor of this city and the municipal officials held frequent councils to treat of measures necessary to the city's defence, and as a consequence began to build barricades at the heads of streets leading to the sea. As time passed and numerous warnings were received from His Majesty, many persons began to consider and suggest what might be done toward the city's fortification, and went to talk to the governor about it.

Juan de Atencia, city notary, brought before the governor a convict, a man they said was expert in military affairs who had been present at the taking of many cities. He said that his whole life had been spent (p. 159) in wars. He said his name was Salazar, and this convict called Salazar advised the governor to build a trench at the Caleta from sea to sea, promising that he would there construct certain timber defences in such fashion that not a man could enter. But the governor had no confidence in this convict.

Similarly, Diego de la Puente, resident in this city, told the governor that if he would furnish him four barrels of powder he would lay a mine which would blow up all the enemies who might seek to come in by the Caleta. But the governor did not care to do as Diego de la Puente suggested. Rather, he became angry with any who undertook to give him any opinion or advice in military matters, so nobody dared to speak, and they let him alone.

So also one Francisco de Breña, artilleryman who lodges in the house of Doña Ynez de Mendoza, told the governor that if he would supply six pieces of artillery he would undertake to plant a battery on Hicacos Point, at the harbour mouth where ships entering pass close to land, that would sink every enemy vessel that came in there. The governor did not believe him either, nor would he do it. This work would have been such that had this ordnance been planted on the Point the city would not have fallen, for the entrance to the harbour is narrow and ships must sail close to land where the artillery was to be set up. Had this battery been there the enemy would not have dared to attempt the port, for had he done so it would have sent all his ships to the bottom, easily.

Likewise deponent (p. 160) talked with Captain Pedro Mexía, commanding the fort, and said to him: 'Captain, why isn't care taken to mount those six pieces of ordnance which are on the wharf, even though they belong to the settee?' Adding: 'Since we are at

war, why isn't any care taken of the ordnance in the fort itself, or guard set over that artillery lest the enemy come along and spike those guns?' To which Mexía Mirabal answered: 'What do you expect? I swear to God that I've told the governor to set a guard of a man or two there, and he won't do it, or furnish a penny toward it, and I've spent a lot of my own money. Every time I go to talk with him he becomes angry with me and wants to know what I've come after and what I am going to ask for now.' Thus indicating that the governor was greatly disinclined to do anything toward the military defence of the city. In the same manner he frequently lost his temper with other persons who sought to give him advice about the fortification of the city, showing that he was not interested.

In fact, this seemed to be his attitude, for he played chess every day with a soldier named Calderon, right up to within a few days of Captain Francis' arrival.

Further, a soldier named Aguirre, eldest of two brothers who have fought in the Italian campaigns, gave him some advice as to the horse, as being unnecessary, and the governor (p. 161) rebuked him, gave him a dressing down and said such things to him that this Aguirre never gave him any more advice because he took it so badly.

Nevertheless the captain of artillery, called Blas de Herrera, Portuguese, asked the governor to give him men to move the ordnance from one place to another where it was needed, and the governor told him to let him alone. Captain Blas de Herrera retorted that he could not well himself carry it to position, without men. As a matter of fact Blas de Herrera told deponent that he begged the governor to give him what he needed for the artillery and he would not provide or do anything, but let the matter lie in such manner that the captain was angered and tired of urging him to take many necessary military measures. Captain Blas de Herrera swore to God that he did not know what to do or to say in the face of so great remissness, for the governor would do nothing they asked in respect to the city's defence, and so they all fell away from him, wearied of importuning him to strengthen the place. The governor did nothing at all which seemed to promise to be of use, for all he did was to construct some worthless trenches. (p. 162)

To such degree that many in the city urged him to take four, or two thousand *pesos* (as he might prefer) to pay certain soldiers who had come from Tolu and Mompoxt to the support of this city. Pedro Lopez Treviño offered to furnish two, or three, thousand *pesos* for the purpose, the householders to obligate themselves to

refund if His Majesty would not allow this amount, but the governor let day after day pass without acting in this matter, and when he did agree to bind the people to the arrangement Captain Francis appeared forthwith and so there was no opportunity, witness believes, to give a penny to any man nor with such money to build any work of fortification to defend the city against the enemy.

The governor throughout was most remiss and careless in everything, and with regard to the fortification of the city, for he would not do the necessary work at the Caleta (by way of which the city was taken). Yet everybody knew that this was its weakest spot and therefore the galleys drew up to the Caleta from the inner haven, because it was supposed that the enemy would come up there.

It is public and notorious (p. 163) (although deponent did not see this) that the governor sent to save a dress or basque or skirt of his wife's and certain slippers which had been left behind in his house, but he did not send for His Majesty's despatch or despatches which contained much information. Because he left them there they fell into the hands of the English Captain Francis and out of this arose detrimental complications in the negotiation for the ransom of the city. Other things also will show clearly that the governor was exceedingly careless and that the city was lost through his fault and remissness.

In the council Don Pedro Vique asked that deponent be detailed to the galleys for their defence. These galleys accomplished nothing, either, except to run aground and wreck themselves. The convicts on board of them unloosed their chains and leaped overboard and when he saw the convicts abandoning the vessels deponent also left.

This is the truth on the oath he took . . . and he signed it with his name.—Mançio de las Cuevas . . . (p. 164)

On the same day, month and year aforesaid . . . Agustin, free black, being duly sworn . . . said that . . . news of the enemy's approach having been received, for the defence of the city various measures were taken and captains were named; and deponent was made captain of the free blacks and mulattoes.

The night that the enemy entered the city deponent was at the Caleta, in the place where the governor put him, and there remained until the English broke through and entered by the Caleta, on its seaward side where there was no rampart. Witness stayed in his place until Francisco Amador came up to him and said: 'What are you doing here? Don't you see that the English have gone in and the

*Agustin,
free black,
deponent*

Spaniards are on the run?' Then deponent looked about him and, seeing that this was so, he ordered his men to withdraw.

As he was retiring, near the (p. 165) Caleta and the place where the English came in, deponent came up with Don Pedro Vique who was alone, going toward the city, with no arms but a sword sheathed in his belt. Deponent seized him by the arm and said: 'General, now is the moment for men to show themselves men. Check these people and let us die here fighting these dogs.' Don Pedro Vique replied: 'Since the country's already lost, what do you suppose we can do about it?'

And so they kept on toward the trench by the Dominican monastery where deponent found Bartólome Lopez, *sargento mayor* of the city, on his horse, standing near the trench, to whom deponent said: 'What are you doing, *señor sargento mayor*?' To which he replied: 'What do you expect me to do, brother?' And witness said to him: 'Stop those men who are coming on and let us die fighting.' And the *sargento mayor* pricked up his horse and shouted: 'Gentlemen, halt!'

Deponent followed after him to the Santo Domingo trench and as he entered there Don Pedro Vique entered on deponent's right and three English pikes entered on his left. Deponent said to Don Pedro: 'These coming here are English!' (p. 166) and deponent laid hand to his sword and struck at one of them. When these English saw that we were not of their party they drew back and deponent and the rest went into the trench, and at a turn in the trench was one of our harquebusiers who fired and felled one of these English. Deponent raised his musket to fire on the advancing enemy and an Englishman nearby struck at him with his pike. Deponent ducked his head and fired.

At this time all the Spaniards entered into the city and crossed San Francisco bridge. Deponent inquired for the governor and for General Don Pedro Vique and some persons told him that they had taken horse and were departing down the Turbaco road. Similarly they told him that Captain Alonso de San Miguel had crossed the bridge earlier than they, for when day broke they were at the Anchorage. They also told him that Captain Alonso Bravo had gone but this appeared later to be untrue, for he was wounded and a prisoner of the enemy. They killed his ensign at the Caleta where they entered.

A little after (p. 167) deponent had crossed the bridge Captain Martin Polo came up with a dozen or fourteen men and there held the English and many people got over. The enemy killed two of Captain Martin Polo's men there. He retired finally because many

English came down upon him. Deponent knows nothing more except he thinks that if Don Pedro Vique had gone out with his galleys to defend the harbour entrance and annoy the enemy this city would not have been lost, for the governor would have been guided by Don Pedro's opinion, and by the galley captain's, since they were experienced in military matters. Deponent thinks the governor would have done anything they told him to do, for deponent heard Don Pedro ask the governor to give him charge in military affairs, saying he'd see how well he'd manage it, and the governor told him to do as he liked, that anything he ordered would be approved. Deponent believes that the governor did what he could for the defence of the city, and this is the truth on the oath he took and he did not sign because he said that he does not know how to write . . .

Document No. 28¹

[Diego Hidalgo Montemayor² to the Crown, Cartagena,
May 23, 1586]

(p. 1)

†

Catholic Royal Majesty . . .

. . . I reached Cartagena on . . . April 16 and found Francis Drake, Englishman in command of 23 vessels, large and small, in the harbour, with a great number of English in Cartagena. And although there was a diversity of opinion, the generally accepted and most reasonable explanation is (p. 2) that in agreement with the queen of England fleets were raised in her ports, the purpose of which was to take the royal fleets and raid the coast of Your Majesty's realms and dominions, the said Francis Drake having given assurances that he could win a victory and bring off a great sum of money. Thirty sails were assembled, belonging to the queen, to Drake and to other private persons, aboard which were sent 3000 young men, the eldest being Francis Drake himself who admits that he is 46 years old. He is red complexioned, under medium in stature.

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fé 89. 3 *pliegos*, original, badly damaged at the edges.

² Special judge. See p. xliii *ante* and notes 1 and 2.

They left England last year, '85, and steered for the altitude and vicinity where they were informed the Tierra Firme and New Spain fleets sailed, which fleets he says they missed by twelve hours. They took a ship laden with hides and sugar and coasted along the shores of those realms. Of their procedure there Your Majesty is fully informed.

They sailed to the Canary Islands and, desiring to . . .¹ at La Palma, were prevented by the inhabitants who . . .² his ships. He withdrew and steered for Cape Verde.

The enemy took the town, killing many of its residents. There was no ransom. They burned and destroyed the whole town and steered for these parts.

Drake took two of the advice-boats which were sailing hither.

He arrived at La Española and three leagues from the city of Santo Domingo landed troops with which, supported by his fleet from the sea, being unperceived, with little difficulty he took the city and sacked it, obtaining great wealth from it. He burned and razed the greater part of the city. Damas street, which remained standing, was ransomed for 25,000 ducats. He battered the fort, burned the galley, took the artillery and ten or twelve ships which were in the haven. He did other things which, since it is certain that Your Majesty is accurately informed . . . summarily related.

(The) city of Cartagena and its governor had warning of the enemy's approach and of his strength, which warning was brought by a ship which arrived at Epiphany of this present year, and by three others which came in later; and from La Española they had news of the loss of Santo Domingo and that the enemy would attack Cartagena.

The governor ordered the women, children and invalids, treasure, clothing and merchandise out of the city, and for its defence some works of little importance were built. Of these the principal one was at the Caleta, by way of which the city had been taken on previous occasions. They left the door wide open in that over the 75 feet which lie between the old trench and the seawash they built no moat nor trench nor any other defence whatsoever. They could easily have made the approach by the Caleta safe against the enemy's entrance by that way, had they dug a deep ditch in the dead sand there, from sea to sea, a distance of 150 (p. 3) paces, or closed up the trench as far as the water's edge and furnished the powder, for which they were asked, to blow up the enemy, should he come that way; and if on the shore of a point at the entrance to the harbour, through

¹ Water?

² Fired upon?

which vessels pass in single file, they had planted a battery to offend the enemy and to prevent him from coming in. This the governor did not do although many captains and men of war pointed out that it was advisable, nor did he ask Your Majesty's royal *Audiencia* for help.

There were in the city for its defence 450 Spaniards, 300 of them harquebuses, the rest pikes and horse, and this does not include the soldiers and crews of the galleys, the Indians, the negroes, or the military officers: Captain General Pedro (Fernández de) Busto, governor; Campmaster Alvaro de Mendoza; . . . horse (?) Francisco de Carvajal; Infantry Captains (Alonso Bravo? Martin . . .) Polo, Alonso de San Miguel; *Sargento Mayor* Bartólome Lopez . . . Among the men there were some of good courage and some quite lacking it, for there were many poor soldiers . . . not anybody to furnish them even food.

A chain was made . . . which was hung from a fort which commands a channel . . . near this city as far as the mangrove swamp, in order that no ship or launch could get in to land men from that direction. Within the channel, alongside the fort, were the two galleys, well armed and equipped, which patrol this coast.

This being the state of things, on the first day of Lent, February 19, of this present year, at noon, from this city (twenty-) three sails were seen to be steering for the port . . . to be the enemy, the alarm was sounded and the people gathered . . . for the city's defence. In military formation they . . . showing themselves to the enemy. The galleys remained where they were . . . might . . . to the sea and entrance to the harbour to harass the enemy . . . occupy it . . . and land a party. Meeting no [opposition] the enemy entered and anchored in the port.

Believing that the enemy had more vessels than had entered the harbour, and that he had left some behind to land troops, the governor divided what forces there were for the city's defence, as follows:

He stationed Captain Martin Polo with 120 men above and outside this city at a point called Hanged Man's Swamp, where there was a trench and moat and two pieces of artillery, to prevent the enemy from entering in case he had landed men in that direction. And he sent troops to the Anchorage, which is half a league from this city. He ordered Lieutenant Diego (p. 4) Daça to guard the bridge with fifteen soldiers. He ordered the horse to patrol the coast. The other captains and men he sent to the beach.

Fray Don Juan de Montalvo, bishop of this city's holy church, was not summoned or consulted by the governor upon receipt of

warnings which arrived concerning the enemy's approach; nor was he consulted concerning advisable measures for defence. Nevertheless, observing the emergency, he and the dignitaries of the church, priests and friars from the monasteries, went down to the beach and confessed and absolved the soldiers; and the bishop encouraged them, reminding them of their obligation to resist the enemy because these were infidels, schismatics, and had come to (rob) them (of) their country, their homes and properties.

When night fell the chain was hung across the channel from the fort to the swamp. It was fastened with a lock and the key was delivered to the flag-galley. The galleys remained inside the chain, toward the city, on board them a good force of men, for in addition to their usual complement the governor had sent them more, and still other persons went voluntarily. In the fort Pedro Mexia Mirabal was in command of 24 soldiers, whom the governor sent him, and still more whom he got together by his own industry. Don Pedro Vique remained ashore at the request of the governor and of the city's inhabitants in order that, being a man experienced in war, he might assist them.

Consequently, at this time there were not 200 men on the beach; and from them the governor sent a party to Hicacos Point, and some Indians, to see whether the enemy was landing men. If he was, they were to do him what damage they could. They came back without going so far or accomplishing anything. Under cover of the darkness of the night many soldiers fled although the governor remained there . . . dawn . . . the governor ordered to the Caleta what men had remained to Captain Alonso Bravo together with some additional soldiers, posting them where the work was open, without breastwork, moat or other protection whatsoever. The rest of the troops were in the trenches nearby. The galleys drew up to the Caleta, bows almost against shore, in order from that position to enfilade the enemy if he should attempt to enter there.

A little before day, the night being very dark, an enemy force consisting of 600 English was discovered advancing to enter by the Caleta. When they thought that they were passing, the galleys fired their artillery, muskets and harquebuses. Although they did some damage to the enemy, it was slight. It is supposed that the artillery was aimed too high and so missed them. In the light of the artillery fire the captains and men who were at the Caleta saw the enemy, and the work (p. 5) at the Caleta fired its artillery and the soldiers on duty there fired two or three rounds from their muskets and harquebuses. Although the enemy hesitated a little, they charged

with determination on that part where there was no trench or protection, and there those who were defending it killed some English. The enemy killed Juan Cosme de la Sala, ensign to Captain Alonso Bravo, and three other men of his company and wounded Captain Alonso Bravo in six places, overpowered him and took him prisoner, as they did two other soldiers whom it is well known that they captured.

At this juncture the Indians and free negroes began to run, and the soldiers as well. The governor, who was near there . . . called upon them to stop and to fight, which was of no avail . . . enemies met no resistance . . . Those who should have defended it entered into this (city?) . . . in disorder nor stopped running . . . fleeing to cross San Francisco bridge which is the exit from it . . . pell-mell and all at once.

The governor and all the horse were there at the bridge . . . horse accomplished nothing whatever although Pedro (Coronado?) . . . was one of them who came off badly wounded and Alvaro de Mend (oza, camp-)master, despite the fact that he is a man of 80 years, went out to meet the English when they came in by the Caleta. They seized his horse by the reins and wounded him in the face and beat him up. They did not kill him, they said, because he was old and it would be a pity. The camp-master struck with his blade at the E(nglishman) who had hold of his horse's reins; he let go his hold, and the horse . . . master from among the enemy, who took possession . . . daybreak.

Captain Martin (Polo?) . . . with his men . . . position to which the governor assigned him . . . realizing from the firing in the city that the enemy . . . came up with fifteen men, for the rest had (deserted?) him, and entered the city as far as the market-place where many English were. They fired some harquebus shots at him. When they tried to cut off his retreat he withdrew to the bridge. The enemy followed and killed two of his men. By this time there was not a man of ours left in the city.

From the sea seven enemy pinnaces tried to enter by the channel to the city's wharf. The fort fired some pieces of artillery at them, but did them no damage. Nevertheless this and the chain prevented these pinnaces from getting in. They withdrew.

These things having occurred, Don Pedro Vique sent an order to the galleys (p. 6) to break for the sea. They tried to do this but were unable, because of the lack of water, for it was low tide. Rumour spread among the soldiers and crews that they were being taken out like sheep to the slaughter. The soldiers leaped into the boats to go

to shore and although the captains tried to prevent this they were unable. At this juncture a barrel of powder was set afire on board the galley *Ocasión*, and the men mutinied. The galleys went aground. The galley-slaves were loosed, landed and dispersed. Captain Castañeda took six barrels of powder and went into the fort with Mexía Mirabal. Don Pedro Vique ordered the galleys to be burned lest the enemy seize them and they were burned without removing the artillery, arms or supplies which were on board.

The fort held out that day. It was evacuated that night, the artillery being left in it. Captain Mirabal says that the governor ordered him to (evacuate). The governor, captains and all the rest went inland . . . the enemy . . . in possession of Cartagena.

Captain Francis Drake, his lieutenant, vice-admiral and captains entered into the city, entrenched and fortified themselves, and seized and gathered up the artillery which was in this city and forts and galleys. It was more than 50 pieces. And Francis Drake gave his word to respect any person who might care to come into the city to treat for its ransom.

When the governor learned this, the bishop and certain citizens met together and considered that it would be well to ransom Cartagena before the city should be damaged, and also the artillery and what else they had left there; and they decided that the bishop and governor and other private persons should go in to see Francis Drake in this matter. This was done but without results at that time because they offered him 25,000 ducats and the Englishman (demanded) 500,000.

It happened that Francis Drake had in his possession certain of Your Majesty's royal despatches which were found in the governor's house. They were warnings of the coming of the English; and because in them it read 'Francis Drake, corsair' he was much offended, as though he were not a corsair. And because he had a good deal to say on this point the bishop replied to him with much spirit and courage in words becoming to Your Majesty's service.

Since the ransom was not arranged some days went by in which negotiations were not resumed and the enemy burned and razed the greater part of this city, in extent although not in number of buildings, including part of the cathedral and monasteries. They announced that they would not accept ransom for the artillery, and the bishop said that he was no longer inclined to offer any ransom at all.

Without the general (p. 7) consent of all the interested parties the governor continued the negotiations and effected the ransom at

107,000 ducats, not including in the arrangement the release of Captain Alonso Bravo (whom the enemy held prisoner) or two houses of his or others belonging to his nephew. Because Francis Drake held him prisoner he demanded that he be ransomed separately and it was arranged at 6000 ducats, of which he paid 5000 and the remaining 1000 which Captain Francis said was his share, the Englishman remitted because he had lodged in the captain's house, and in consideration of the hospitality and jewels which he received from him. In addition to which Captain Francis obtained a good deal more money from private individuals who paid him to redeem . . . negroes which fled from them to the English . . . and for wines and oils and other merchandise which they had left . . . buried and hidden elsewhere which the enemy . . . and other things which they ransomed . . .

. . . ducats of the said ransom paid for this city . . . bars of assayed silver which the governor . . . treasury and deposits with the depositary general . . . persons in whose custody . . . and the governor without having given any notification to Your Majesty's royal *Audiencia* nor obtained authorization . . . has assigned the said 107,000 ducats among the residents of this city, compelling them to make themselves responsible for the amount which . . . he states . . . approximately . . . may be appraised by the bishop and by himself (?) to pay it to Your Majesty's royal officials by Christmas Day . . . end of the present year. Although some persons declined . . . to enter into such undertaking and alleged that they did not agree to the ransom, and set forth other excuses, these are not admitted; on the contrary, he menaces (?) them, saying that he will confiscate their houses for Your Majesty, and . . . fully informing Your Majesty's royal *Audiencia*, for . . . reply may be had in 50 days, yet the governor does not do so . . . although the bishop opposes him and says that as far as he is concerned he will do nothing until the royal *Audiencia* shall have acted.

The English remained in this city from February 19, when they took it, until April 10, when they left the port. They carried with them some of the galley-slaves and negroes who deserted to them. On April 14 they came back and re-entered the port, but in peace and with the assurance that they were forced to return. They landed many men and at this time I went into the city and tried to prevent trading with the enemy.

They say there was disagreement between (p. 8) Francis Drake and some of his officers and that he removed some from their posts, and others say he executed them.

On April 24 the enemy departed from this harbour and made sail. According to the weather, winds and direction they were seen to take, and to what the Englishman told some persons, they have steered for Havana to take that place and there await the fleet from New Spain, to take it—which God forbid!

Francis Drake told Alonso Bravo that more than a year ago a nephew of his had left England with four ships for the Pacific and that other vessels had left for other destinations.

. . . blame . . . except as is above related, does not appear to attach to the residents . . . in this city. Having all fled and deserted the city, each one lays the onus on the others and says that the others . . . fled and he himself left because he found himself alone among the enemy . . . and the (governor?) to exculpate himself reports that the enemy was strong . . . killed many English, and other impertinent matters, declaring that . . . a voice saying: 'Withdraw, gentlemen!' And he does not know whose voice it was . . . trying to evade the blame which is generally laid upon him. . . . sought to place an excessive value on this city, more than it is worth, in order to give the impression that it was advisable to effect the ransom.

This city was left ruined and without artillery. There are few people. Because the soldiers have gone the people return unwillingly. They are unarmed and fearful lest any evil-intentioned vessel which arrives at this port may do them damage. Your Majesty will provide the remedy as Your Majesty may see fit.

I am leaving for Santa Marta which is on this coast and is frequently affronted by the enemy because it lacks defence and forces. During the time which Your Majesty may desire to make use of my . . . great diligence to defend it while life may last.

There is there an Englishman who is presumed to be a person of importance because of the effort Francis Drake made to get hold of him. He was captured when a pinnace was wrecked on the coast, in which he was with others who were drowned. I will send him forward by the galleons or first vessels leaving for those parts along with the deposition he has made, in order that he may be dealt with as Your Majesty may be pleased to order.

Our Lord preserve your Catholic Royal Majesty many years in prosperity with increase of kingdoms and lordships.

Cartagena, May 23, 1586 . . . (p. 9)

Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's servant kisses your Catholic Royal Majesty's feet.

Diego Hidalgo Montemayor (Rubric).

Document No. 29¹

[Pedro Fernández de Busto to the Crown, Cartagena,
May 25, 1586]

(p. 1)

†

Catholic Royal Majesty

By an advice-boat which arrived three leagues from this city on April 5 last, and there anchored (the Englishman being then present in this harbour with his fleet), I reported² to Your Majesty on the disastrous loss of this city and despatched that vessel on the 8th of the same month for Havana. I sent a detailed account of the event but will repeat that relation here because communication by sea is hazardous, so that if that account does not reach its destination this one may. This is what occurred:

On January 4 of this present year an advice-boat which had been cleared by the president and officials of the House of Trade at Seville reached this city with news that Captain Francis Drake was off the coast of Galicia with a great fleet of 30 ships and eight or ten pinnaces, carrying 4000 men; and that it was understood that he would come to do damage in these parts, for which reason we should be ready and on the alert to defend this city, if he should arrive here.

As soon as I received this despatch I held a muster of the forces I had and found these to be 300 Spaniards, many of them artisans of every trade, and nearly all unarmed. In a few days they were all furnished with harquebuses, and pikes which were made, for there was not one in the city. I summoned the people from Tolu and Mompox, which are villages of this jurisdiction. From each of these two villages came 50 men with their respective captains. From the seamen was formed another company of another 50, so that in all I got together 450 harquebuses and pikes. In addition to which I named three other captains of infantry to command these people. I gave them all munitions and instructions and the necessary drills were held.

With the advice of Don Pedro Vique and his captains and other persons expert in these matters, I fortified all the streets and entrances to the city, building barricades and digging ditches. I planted artillery in the trenches at the ends of streets, assigned artillerymen, and issued

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-4-6, Santa Fé 37. 1 1/2 pliegos, original.

² Despatch not seen.

orders with the advice of the aforesaid captains. I held a general rally of the inhabitants of the city, at which the commander and captains of the galleys were present, and in this council the plan of defence we should follow was determined upon. It was unanimously resolved that the galleys should not leave the harbour. It was so set forth and agreed to, as will appear from the record of the proceedings which was kept. We believed that our united strength was sufficient to defend the city.

On the 24th of the said month an advice-boat came in from La Yaguana which brought the news that Captain Francis had taken and sacked the city of Santo Domingo. In a frigate sent solely for the purpose, I forwarded this news to Tierra Firme and sent also that brought by the House of Trade's advice-boat from Spain. They received these despatches and I had an acknowledgement of the receipt.

From there (p. 2) they wrote me that they were advising Peru and New Spain, although from La Yaguana they told me that they had also warned Havana and Mexico. Later I received a letter from the governor at Havana saying they had reported the loss of Santo Domingo to Spain. So also to Santa Marta and to Rio de la Hacha I sent word of the loss of Santo Domingo and warning that the enemy intended to visit all this coast.

On February 15 arrived Don Francisco Maldonado, burgher of Rio de la Hacha. He had been in Santo Domingo when the Englishman took the place and assured us that the Englishman intended to attack this city and that he had 30 ships and ten pinnaces and in them 5000 men.

This news so very greatly disheartened the citizens and soldiers that it became necessary to assemble all the people in the cathedral and encourage them with the best words that could be addressed to them. Nevertheless, from that day I observed that they were very much afraid; indeed, so much so that had I fulfilled my obligation not to lose credit with Your Majesty I would have abandoned the city, for I saw in the people the weakness they were to exhibit when the test came. I set everything aside in order to serve Your Majesty.

On Ash Wednesday, the first day of Lent, Your Majesty's second advice-boat came in, and while its master was at noon delivering Your Majesty's despatch to me, the mounted look-out I had posted four leagues from this city arrived to say that the Englishman's fleet was approaching, and it was sighted immediately. Forthwith I ordered the alarm to be sounded and sallied upon the beach with all the foot and horse, that the enemy might see our full strength.

At this juncture I sent a frigate to Nombre de Dios with warning of the corsair's arrival.

The enemy with his fleet made straight for the port and entered it with 23 ships and four pinnaces. And Don Francisco Maldonado, who brought the news I have mentioned above and was with me on the beach, declared that, with the intention of attacking from some other quarter, the Englishman must have left behind as many ships as he had brought into the harbour. With the approval of all who understood the situation it was resolved to detail Captain Martin Polo's company, consisting of 120 harquebusiers and 50 Indian bowmen, to guard our rear, where, it was deduced, the ships which had lagged would attack.

With the rest of the foot and horse I went forth, in sight of the enemy, who was entering the harbour, and took a stand with my forces at the Caleta, where a masonry wall was built from the inner haven to the sea. There I received news that as soon as the ships had anchored in the port they sent off pinnaces with men, to land them at Juan Nuñez's brickyard, and it became necessary to send 40 harquebusiers and 50 Indians thither.

In the fort at Boqueron channel, by which ships come up to the city, I had stationed Captain Pedro Mexía with 50 soldiers—harquebusiers—and eight pieces of artillery complete with artillerymen, and an iron chain of very heavy links, in its wooden case, to hang from the fort to the mangrove swamp opposite, in such manner that no boat or ship could enter that way.

With the rest of my men, who were about 250 harquebuses and pikes, I remained at the Caleta and sent two horsemen to see what the enemy was doing after he had anchored. They brought me word that everybody was boarding the flagship. I sent two other horsemen, after the first returned, and they brought me word that the enemy was landing men from his pinnaces.

On learning this I fired a piece, which was the signal to Don Pedro Vique to come up with 150 harquebuses which he had promised to give me to reinforce me at the Caleta, and for the galleys to draw up at the Caleta, as had been agreed. The galleys took up their positions and Don Pedro Vique presented himself with only one or two soldiers.

In view of all these preparations, which I have described, I was certain of victory, relying upon Your Majesty's good fortune and the care that I had taken; (p. 3) but this Our Lord gave to the enemy because of my sins and other people's. Of little avail is it to prepare if God decide against one. It happened in this fashion:

At ten o'clock at night the enemy landed 1000 pikes, harquebuses and muskets, and addressed his men saying that the strength of Cartagena, as displayed, was about 1000 and these not soldiers, but merchants and artisans not accustomed to war; he ordered them to take Cartagena, for if they failed to do so he would not receive any of them aboard the ships of his fleet nor give them any assistance whatsoever. With this he returned aboard his flagship. The enemy began to march by land. In the forlorn were the foremost officers of the expedition.

They came within sight at three o'clock in the morning. The night was so dark that one could not see the man next, nor could we recognize one another. Nothing was visible but the lighted match of the harquebuses. The battle then closed with great fury on both sides, an hour before dawn.

The galleys fired their bow-chasers and the shots struck the enemy's column and did heavy damage, as did the artillery I had planted at the Caleta. For a while our men fought well, until the enemy mingled with them, when it became apparent that our opponents were numerous. A voice was heard on our side crying: 'Retire, gentlemen!' Forthwith the soldiers turned, all of them, and withdrew in great haste. Neither I nor Don Pedro Vique could stop them. He was personally present in the fight where, in my opinion, he did his duty as became him.

And so—English and Spaniards commingled, not recognizing each other—we entered the city by way of another barricade in a street adjacent to the Dominican monastery, where I made every possible effort to hold the people, without avail. Like soldiers, in column formation, the English came in by another street and when day broke they were found to be in possession of the market-place, their force constituted by a thousand men.

I tried to hold the San Francisco bridge and to make the soldiers face about. Neither was this possible, and the English remained in the town, entrenched themselves and fortified strongly.

They found little pillage in the city because on receipt of news of the loss of Santo Domingo I ordered all Your Majesty's monies, books and accounts to be conveyed into safety, and bade the citizens to do as much for themselves. I ordered that not a woman, child nor boy remain in the city—none to stay but effectives—and this was done. There was left in the city nothing but certain demi-johns of wine and oil, some iron and soap, which could not be carried into safety.

The enemy was busied five or six days in entrenching himself.

When day dawned Captain Martin Polo saw that the city was lost. He came up with some soldiers (others of his men had deserted) and skirmished with the enemy in two streets and killed some of them; they killed two of his men and he was compelled to leave by the San Francisco bridge.

In the battle at the Caleta, what with the artillery and harquebuses and stakes which were set out along the way by which the enemy entered, it is understood that we killed 150 English, although next day they very carefully removed their dead and buried them in trenches they dug which are being discovered daily. Cartagena lost eight soldiers, some 20 were wounded, and eight were taken prisoners, among them Captain Alonso Bravo who with his company was stationed at the most dangerous point, where in my opinion he did his duty.

In addition to the 1000 of his main landing party, in his pinnaces by sea the enemy sent 500 to support the attacking column. They showed a light. As soon as I saw it I ordered all the horse to patrol the coast and not to let them land, if they should come up to the shore, and it was done accordingly. When the horse returned they found that the Spanish had retired from the city.

Against Boqueron, where Captain Pedro Mexía was, the enemy (p. 4) sent some 600 men in boats and pinnaces, the vice-admiral among them, to attack the fort and enter the city from that way. Because the fort had a palisade, some 50 feet out in the water, and the chain, the enemy withdrew when he discovered this, with heavy loss inflicted by the captain of the fort who defended himself all that day until night, when he concluded that the fort was useless since the city was lost, and evacuated it.

Under the circumstances which existed in Cartagena, on so dark a night, in any town in Spain possessing no better troops than I did, the enemy would have done great damage; how much more in this place where there was not a soldier who was a real soldier—only artisans and their apprentices and a few merchants.

Inasmuch as the enemy had carried the Caleta and entered the town, the galleys sought to put to sea. They could not make it, for lack of water and because the flag-galley grounded. The slaves were unchained and went ashore, following the route by which the rest were retiring. Aboard the galley *Ocasión* the powder got afire and burned seven or eight galley-slaves. The rest were unchained and went to land, where we found ourselves in as much trouble with them as with the English, for they committed highway robberies, and this to such an extent that if four or five had not been hanged

the damage they were doing would have become much worse. They all scattered in different directions, setting out for the Kingdom [of New Granada] and other parts. The galleys were burned and the enemy removed the artillery from them and carried it off, as he did the city's artillery, which was fifteen pieces, large and small.

When the enemy had been in town six days he sent a trumpeter to bid us come to ransom the place, for otherwise he would burn and destroy it all. A citizen named Tristan de Orive was sent under the enemy's safe-conduct to negotiate. Francis would not hear him, declining to negotiate the ransom with him, but only with the bishop and governor. He proffered us safe-conduct if we cared to come in for the purpose.

The people of the city came to an Indian village where the bishop and I were and urged us to have pity on the city because of its loss, and to go to negotiate the remedy and the ransom. Moved by consideration for them and in view of the damage this city would suffer otherwise, we arranged with Francis to extend us safe-conduct for ourselves and 20 citizens to accompany us. He gave it and we went in and he received us well.

After we had set forth the poverty of this land and explained that there was no money here, he answered that he knew quite well that this was one of the principal cities in the Indies and very rich. In reply he was reminded that Santo Domingo, a very much larger place than this is, had been ransomed for little money, and we said that for Cartagena we would give him 25,000 ducats. He answered that in Santo Domingo he had obtained pillage, for the people there had saved only themselves and there had been no bloodshed, whereas in Cartagena there had been no booty and there had been bloodshed, for all of which he must be compensated with money, and that he must have 400,000 ducats as ransom. In view of this demand, nothing further was said in the matter and we returned. Therefore Francis began to burn the town, beginning with the least valuable portion; and he burned about 100 houses, the most worthless in the place.

In view of the damage he was doing a person was sent to urge him not to burn, for the ransom would be negotiated. And so they went to offer him 30,000 ducats. He retorted that he would not accept less than he had demanded; unless he got it he would destroy everything. The messenger returned with this answer and meanwhile the enemy burned another 100 houses of a better sort, tiled and of masonry.

Seeing the damage he was doing the people assembled and

appealed to the prelate and to me, pleading that if I had no authority to negotiate the ransom I should empower them to ransom each man his own house before the enemy should completely raze the city. Having consulted the bishop, who gave his opinion in writing signed with his name, to effect that the ransom (p. 5) could be effected without burdening of conscience, I gave them leave to ransom each his own house.

They sent in Diego Daça, lieutenant governor, and Tristan de Orive, with their authority to treat of the ransom. These persons went and with every visit increased their offer of ransom from the 30,000 which they had proffered to 80,000, and the bishop recommended that they make it as much as 100,000. On this recommendation and with the consent of the interested persons this sum was offered. And the enemy refused it.

At this juncture one morning showed that three arches of the cathedral had fallen in. It was completed, lacking only the tiling of the fourth part. Captain Francis had ordered it to be demolished by a culverin shot which he caused to be fired at it an hour before dawn. A ball struck a main support of one arch and this dragged down two more and all the woodwork with them. The damage he did here amounted to more than 10,000 ducats.

In view of this damage, which must have been more than he intended, although in my opinion because it was the church he would have preferred to do it very much more, he said that he would accept 107,000 ducats, and to this they agreed, and they paid it to him.

It would not have been possible to meet his demands had not 79,000 ducats out of Your Majesty's treasury been lent to the citizens, each pledging himself, his person, goods and house, to repay his portion of it by Christmas Day. They assumed this obligation. Had this not been done the enemy would have razed the whole city, leaving not even the memory of it. To do so he had already brought ashore fireworks to blow up the large edifices and he meant to demolish all the rest. He said that when he had finished the utter destruction of this place he would go and do the same to Nombre de Dios.

Four or five considerations moved me to make this loan and undue use of Your Majesty's revenues. First, because were this city and Nombre de Dios to be razed, when the fleet (which is expected soon) should arrive on this coast, it would find no place to discharge its cargoes and the vessels would be compelled to return laden to Spain. This would have meant a loss to Your Majesty of more than

300,000 ducats in duties and to this city a similar loss of 100,000. What is more, all that is owing to Your Majesty in this province would have been lost, because each creditor would have betaken himself elsewhere on his own account, and no collection could have been made. Second, 400,000 ducats in debts which are owing from Panama and Lima and Cartagena would also have been totally lost because the people would have been scattered, each going his own way. This would have meant a heavy loss to Your Majesty, arising out of the cessation of trade. Third, all the business of Seville with this city, Nombre de Dios, Peru and the New Kingdom of Granada would have come to a stop for some years, which also would have entailed very heavy loss on Your Majesty. Fourth, it would have meant the death of more than 4000 persons, children and adults, which is the population which went out from this city. They were scattered in the bush and in the hills where they must have suffered hunger, there being no means of relief while the enemy held the sea, as he held it. Fifth, divine worship must have ceased in this city and province and three monasteries and one cathedral would have been lost. I considered that it was not for the good of Your Majesty's armadas and fleets for me to do otherwise than I did.

All these reasons moved me to take the course I took, believing that in so doing I was serving Your Majesty and avoiding all the losses above mentioned, without entailing that of a single *real* of the royal revenues. Nothing will be lost because the parties will fulfil their obligations by Christmas, and the amounts taken from Your Majesty's royal treasury will be forwarded to Your Majesty by the fleet which must winter here. (p. 6)

The person who most importuned and persuaded me to make this use of Your Majesty's revenues and to ransom the city was the bishop of this province. Not that he wished to do the city a service but that he fancied that in this manner he could do me grave harm, and that it would fare ill with me. Similarly he encourages every matter that bodes evil for me, because he is my enemy. I have deemed it advisable to write this to Your Majesty that Your Majesty may understand that insofar as they refer to me any relations he may make are prejudiced, and the reason of it is that I have defended the royal prerogative against him and have procured provisions from the royal *Audiencia* of the New Kingdom of Granada to prevent his encroachments upon it. Similarly, the royal officials in charge of Your Majesty's revenues urged me to effect the ransom and to authorize negotiations and to make use for the purpose of Your Majesty's money which was in their custody. I assert this because

they took certain steps to make it appear that I did it against their will.

The persons interested paid the ransom of 107,000 ducats to the Englishman, as I have said, mostly out of Your Majesty's revenues, some out of certain deposits, and other persons paid with their own cash. The Englishman gave a receipt for everything and left the city to its inhabitants. On board his ships, he remained in the harbour until April 10, and on the 11th with his fleet cleared from the port on a course for Jamaica where he expected to obtain meat and water which he did not have when he left here.

He sailed four days and on the 14th returned to this harbour because Corço's ship which he had seized at Santo Domingo sprung a leak. It was laden with all the booty he obtained in that city and the artillery he had seized. He unloaded all this and distributed it among the other vessels of his fleet.

He held a council of all his people, to whom he made an address, informing them that Your Majesty's armada was on its way to these parts and would soon arrive, that he meant to await it for, if they would do their duty, he was confident he could take it. All the principal persons and officers of his fleet answered that without exception they would all die or capture Your Majesty's armada. With this intention the enemy remained in the port until the 24th of the said month of April, when he left with his fleet, consisting as he left of 22 large vessels and six pinnaces and brigantines. The six galleons of this fleet were 600 tons burden and upward, very well supplied with artillery and thoroughly equipped. The flagship carried 60 pieces of heavy brass artillery in tiers. The other vessels were 100 to 200 tons.

When the enemy entered the port of this city he brought in 3000 men. The muster he held when he left showed that he had only 2500. The night the city was lost his casualties were about 150 and the rest died of sickness during the time he was here.

He sailed on a course for Havana with the intention of attacking that city and its fortress and, if they were successful, of awaiting the New Spain fleet there. I am quite certain that he will not attack Havana because there was great dissension among them and they could agree on nothing. Three days before they left there was much argument and dispute. Therefore I am sure that he was going to Matanzas to take on water and meat and continue his voyage to England.

Nevertheless Francis said publicly that he intended to go to the island of Madeira and endeavour to take it, and send word to

England that they might furnish him food supplies and more ships in order that there he might await the fleets coming out of these parts, to take them. For the principal purpose of this corsair is to prevent Your Majesty and private persons from receiving revenues from these parts. I informed the realm of Tierra Firme that the enemy had left this harbour for Havana, in order to put an end to the expense they were incurring.

The damage this corsair did this city amounts to more than 400,000 ducats, including the artillery which (p. 7) he carried off. He burned and demolished 248 houses, two-thirds of them masonry and tile, and one-third of them palmboard and thatch. The principal buildings were left, which were appraised at 450,000 ducats in order to determine what amount each one must pay toward the ransom. This business will all be finished and done by the end of the present month in order that the royal officials may collect from the parties concerned by Christmas.

The bishop will offer strong opposition to everything, with what intention I have explained above, but he will not be able to prevent affairs from being carried through for the best good of Your Majesty's service and for the protection and maintenance of this city, which was left so ruined and destroyed that it is imperative that Your Majesty relieve it promptly with artillery and galleys, for otherwise any enemy may offend it.

In my opinion what Your Majesty should do in this matter is to select a person competent in naval and military matters and place this city and its galleys in his charge, such person to be a subject of the Crown of Castile; for the chief cause of the loss of Cartagena was that the command was divided. Further, it is advisable that Your Majesty permit and issue mandates sanctioning the laying of a tax on meat, wine and merchandise to a total of 15,000 ducats needed for the construction of three forts which are required at the three approaches to this city. Although its natural position is strong, it is an open place and has four approaches by which it may be offended. Each needs a fort for its defence, since the population of Cartagena cannot be so numerous but what, divided (as I had it divided) among three positions, all must be weak.

The Englishman was not out of the harbour when Doctor Chaparro, the sole judge left in the *Audiencia* of the New Kingdom, sent a judge to investigate into the loss of Cartagena because of a false account he had from another judge he sent into this jurisdiction on very unnecessary business and at an excessive salary. This person is Diego Hidalgo, a burgher of Santa Fé who acts as treasurer in

charge of Your Majesty's royal revenues in the New Kingdom of Granada. He is a brother of Captain Alonso Bravo whom Doctor Chaparro deemed culpable, according to information sent him; whereas Captain Bravo was not to blame, having done his duty, as I have said. It seems unreasonable to send one brother to investigate the culpability of another. Because of these things this city fears that Doctor Chaparro will send many judges on excessive pay to investigate into everything which occurred here, and this will mean further ruin little less than that inflicted by Captain Francis . . . (p. 8) . . .

The night of the battle with the Englishman, Don Juan Fernández, dean of this holy cathedral, was present all night, encouraging and exhorting the soldiers; and he remained present throughout events up to the rout. In the battle he lost a nephew killed and had a brother wounded. He served Your Majesty like a good minister and servitor, as did also the prior of the Franciscan monastery, Fray Pedro de Orovio, and his monks, who heard confessions all night. They were both of great assistance to the Spaniards. The bishop left us a day before the fight, retiring two leagues from this city.

Many other accounts of these matters will be sent to Your Majesty, and they will perhaps differ from this one, for each writer will wish to relate his own prowess, whereas all were lacking in it. I entreat Your Majesty to order this version to be held until time shall show that it is the truth.

They write that on receipt in Lima of the news of the loss and seizure of Santo Domingo, the viceroy forbade the clearance of the small fleet which was about to leave with Your Majesty's revenues and treasure of private individuals; when he hears of the loss of Cartagena he will probably keep it even closer in harbour, supposing that the enemy will go from here to Nombre de Dios and Panama. It is considered certain that he will not send it forward until he knows that the enemy has left this coast. I have advised him of the enemy's departure and that he may forward Your Majesty's revenues and treasure belonging to private persons. He will have received this advice promptly.

Our Lord preserve and lengthen Your Majesty's life through long years, with increase of greater kingdoms and lordships, as Christianity has need.

Cartagena, May 25, 1586.

Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's servant kisses Your Majesty's royal feet and hands.

Pedro Fernández de Busto (Rubric).

Document No. 30¹

[Don Luis de Guzman and Alonso de Tapia² to the
Crown, Cartagena, June 1, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty will have learned of the fall of this city and loss of the galleys from a letter³ which Governor Pedro Fernández de Busto sent by the advice-boat that anchored four leagues from this port, the English fleet being in possession of the harbour. Lest it fall into the enemy's hands he sent this vessel without informing us of its departure. In case that advice-boat may have run into danger, and because it is so important to inform Your Majesty as soon as possible that Your Majesty may take measures for the good of the royal service, this vessel is despatched, Blas González⁴ master. And from the fully detailed relation which we send herewith Your Majesty will learn what happened from the receipt of the first warning concerning this corsair's approach and design, and what measures of preparedness and defence the governor and Don Pedro Vique, commander of the galleys, took before and after the news of the fall of Santo Domingo reached here. It all seems a scourge and chastisement which Our Lord was pleased to visit upon us on account of our sins, because in burning and looting it the English left this city so completely destroyed and desolate that its present condition merits the deepest pity.

For reasons which he will have explained to Your Majesty the governor deemed it to be for the good of the royal service to ransom the city and not to permit it all to be burned and levelled to the ground, as the enemy had begun to destroy it and would have continued, leaving not a stone upon a stone. Out of such destruction very grave detriment would have ensued in the loss of revenues and customs dues which here accrue to Your Majesty and also of debts owing, according to Your Majesty's account books, by burghers and persons dwelling here, and, further, in respect to Your Majesty's armadas and fleets which, except for this port, have no safe haven on

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-5-1, Santa Fé 72. 1 *pliego*, original.

² The royal officials, treasurer and accountant, at Cartagena.

³ Not seen, but repeated in Document No. 29.

⁴ Cf. Document No. 55 *post.*

all the coast between here and Nombre de Dios; nor is this latter a safe harbour the most of the year. Moreover, it would have entailed notable loss upon Your Majesty's vassals who reside here, for with their women and children they were scattered in flight in the bush and through the woods, where they must all have perished and died if, when the rainy season set in, they failed to find this city standing, whither to return to their houses.

After many demands had been made and countered, and negotiations carried on, the ransom was agreed upon at 107,000 ducats. To raise this sum the governor came to us for 200 bars of silver (p. 2) left in our custody in Your Majesty's strong box by Gerónimo de Ojeda's ship which was driven in here out of Don Antonio Osorio's fleet. On receipt of the first news we had of this enemy's approach we had removed this bullion into safety, along with papers and royal account books. After the enemy took the city these had been conveyed to an Indian village called Turbaco and were in the governor's house there because it was the safest place.

We replied that we had not Your Majesty's order to deliver these bars and protested against his taking them for the ransom, or touching them. Your Majesty will see what writs were issued and protests made in the matter, as appears in the records which we forward.¹ By force and against our will, while he had us in prison, alleging that it was for the good of Your Majesty's service, he took this silver on loan, that the burghers and owners of houses might redeem them and repay the amount to Your Majesty by Christmas of this year of '86.

The loss of the galleys has been sharply felt for they were the defence and security of this city and of all this coast and its settlements. Except against a royal armada as powerful as the fleet this corsair brought, they suffice to protect Cartagena and to keep the coast free of enemies. When there were no galleys traffic was impossible between this place and Nombre de Dios, Veragua, Santa Marta, Rio de la Hacha and all other points on this coast; and this must be so again. The royal revenues will lose much, for all this coastwise trade (which is of much importance) will come to an end, unless Your Majesty provide a remedy promptly, since the burghers and merchants do not sleep safe even in their own beds. Most of them are endeavouring to adjust and dispose of their affairs to leave

¹ These records accompany the document translated and are dated Turbaco, March 21, 1586. The high sheriff having cast them into the public jail, the royal officials are moved by the governor's demand to lend His Majesty's silver to the citizens, who will bind themselves to repay it as stated.

Cartagena unless the situation is remedied, because they do not consider their merchandise and goods to be safe in their houses but rather, along with their wives and children, to be at the mercy of any pair of corsairs who may choose to come to disquiet and to rob the city. Especially since many are convinced that these same enemies will shortly return here, as many of them have declared that they will.

It will be a pity to see so deserted and diminished one of the finest cities Your Majesty possesses in all the Indies, the most convenient and most important port here, so far as Your Majesty's armadas and fleets are concerned; which, if Your Majesty favour and fortify it, will daily become more productive to the royal exchequer.

Our Lord preserve the Catholic royal person of Your Majesty infinite years, as we Your Majesty's servants desire and need.

Cartagena, June 1, 1586.

Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's servants kiss Your Majesty's royal hands.

Don Luis Guzman

Alonso de Tapia (Rubrics).

(Enclosure)

(p. 1)

†

An account of what happened in Cartagena in the Indies from the receipt of the news that Captain Francis Drake was coming in command of the English fleet.

On the 4th day of the month of January in the current year of '86 an advice-boat named *La Concepción*, Estéban de Yraçar master, entered the port of this city. This vessel had been despatched by the president and judges of the House of Trade in Seville. It brought letters from them wherein they informed this city that Captain Francis Drake with a certain fleet was leaving England for these parts and that on the 21st of October of last year, 1585, he had set out upon his voyage from the city of Bayona where he had occasioned some disturbance and done damage in that port and in other parts of the kingdom of Galicia, and that it was generally reported that he was crossing to the Indies. They warned this city to be on the alert.

Arrived here, the aforesaid ship's master stated that he had left together with two other advice-boats, one bound for the city of Santo Domingo and the other for New Spain, and that on the voyage the others had become separated from him, and that in the neighbourhood of La Dominica he discovered sails, eight or nine of which pursued and chased him without overhauling him. He continued on his course. From what was learned from the English themselves it is understood that they took the other two advice-boats, this preventing them from completing their voyage.

On receipt of this news the governor and Don Pedro Vique, commanding the galleys on station upon this coast, each within his own jurisdiction busied himself to make ready by land and sea. Land defences were erected as well as it was known how to build them, trenches were made and other military preparations effected. The musters which were held brought out 450 to 500 Spaniards, counting some 50 free blacks. Two companies, each 40 or 50 men, came up from Mompox and Tolu. Three were raised in and around Cartagena, which made five companies, and another of negroes, six, in all not 600 men. Meanwhile the galleys, which had laid up for the winter, were made ready, their masts set, armament placed, crews prepared. On board them were some 160 to 180 effectives which with the rowers made a total of about 600.

A small vessel from La Yaguana reached this city on January 25 with news that the English fleet had taken the harbour and city of Santo Domingo, and with information concerning the organization, quality and number of men the English had used to capture that city and its forts, and concerning the pillaging and destruction of it which followed. This news caused this city to arm and to intensify its efforts to prepare for defence, although it was supposed that the Englishman would content himself with the Santo Domingo enterprize without desiring (p. 2) to come here, and that if he did come it would be impossible for him to take Cartagena with such ease as he did.

Sunday, February 16, another small vessel was sighted at dawn. It had come from the island of Santo Domingo and had called at Rio de la Hacha and at Santa Marta with warning of the state of affairs there and with news about the Englishman. On board this vessel was Don Francisco Maldonado, son-in-law of the campmaster at Rio de la Hacha. To bring this warning he had risked leaving in said vessel from that island, where he was at the time the city fell. He told the bishop, the governor and Don Pedro all that had happened and occurred in that city and how by order of the president and *Audiencia*, householders and persons concerned in Santo

Domingo he had accompanied the emissary sent to treat for the city's ransom although most of it was already laid low, and how for what remained standing, including the cathedral in which the English were fortified, but not including the artillery or bells, they had paid 25,000 ducats; and how, during these negotiations, Captain Francis Drake took him on board his fleet where he saw what ships and forces he had, this being some 38 to 40 sails and 4000, or 5,000 fighting men; and how the enemy had careened his vessels to attack this city. Don Francisco added that when he left that island certain vessels were even then lying off that port which would unquestionably be upon this city within the week. This was fearful news for Cartagena. Although all the women and merchandise and invalids had been taken out to the estates and neighbouring places, much goods and property still remained, of which as much as could be, was removed as quickly as possible.

The governor and Don Pedro desired not to advertise this news of the enemy's strength in order not to dishearten the people but, although they earnestly endeavoured to keep it secret, it could not but become known since the master and crew of the vessel which brought Don Francisco shared his knowledge of events. Thereupon the people of this city became greatly discouraged, in comparison to their former attitude, for they considered that the force available in the city and the galleys would not suffice to resist the enemy's great strength. Nevertheless, these leaders encouraged and exhorted the people as best they could and continued to do their utmost to prepare for the imminent event.

They resolved that the galleys should go out and to this end the necessary subsistence and munitions were sent on board. When the people of the city observed this activity they were alarmed and protested, intimating that if the galleys departed from the port, leaving them unprotected, they would forthwith abandon the city. Complying with the city's demand and to forestall any charge that they were to blame for the evacuation which would follow on the departure of the galleys, believing that with the support of galleys the citizens would defend themselves and fight better, the said Don Pedro and the governor and the rest of the authorities determined that the galleys should remain anchored in their usual position and from that anchorage should come up bow on to the Caleta, where it was presumed that the enemy would make his assault on the city, in order that from this position they might fire their artillery. Further, if it were necessary, the galley slaves were to be unchained in order with the soldiers to reinforce any point where such help might be most

needed. From the time when the first warning arrived it was ordered that the galleys' tender should go out each afternoon with six soldiers to do sentinel duty at Boca Chica, returning each morning to the city.

Ash Wednesday, the 19th of the aforesaid month, in the morning, this tender came in with news that a small boat had entered by Boca Chica. This boat belonged to an advice-ship, Blas González, master, which the night before had anchored elsewhere, outside the port, having been unable to make the harbour. It brought certain despatches from His Majesty warning of the approach of the English.

This same day about noon, the enemy's fleet was descried. It followed the coast on the course taken by Spanish armadas and fleets as far as the channel or entrance to the port called Boca Grande. The wind was very favourable to the enemy.

By this time the six companies above mentioned were out upon the beach, as many of their men as could be assembled being in their places. It was later learned from certain of the English leaders that the display looked to Captain Francis and his officers to be about 1000 effectives. The soldiers of the galleys went to their posts on board these vessels.

When he had arrived inside the harbour the Englishman came to anchor, meeting with no resistance and making no noise or disturbance. They say Captain Francis ordered out 1000 men. Although some declare they were fewer and others insist they were more, this is the correct number, as was learned from the enemy's campmaster sergeant major¹ and vice-admiral.

Our people never supposed (p. 5) that the enemy would attempt anything until the next day, Thursday, 20th of the month, after some preliminary demands and answers; but that same day, Wednesday, in the early part of the night he landed his party at Hicacos Point, three quarters of a league from the city. With these 1000 men whom Captain Francis [set ashore] his campmaster sergeant major and other officers formed their column, and when it had been formed they say he told them that there they were, a thousand men, and that they were going to take that city; that they must take it or die rather than return without taking it, for, he assured them, they would not be readmitted to his vessels [unless they did take it] and that he would hang any man who should attempt so to retreat. He told them that, judging by what he had observed that afternoon, the city's defenders were about another

¹ By 'campmaster sergeant major' the writer seems to mean one man, presumably Lieutenant General Carleill.

thousand men, all townspeople and merchants, and for them to play the part of soldiers. They say he then returned to his ships and of the men left on board his vessels ordered 500 soldiers into the pinnaces. This party followed along the seacoast outside to relieve the first thousand if necessary. He made ready another 500 for a purpose which will be related presently.

At midnight this force began to march, as silently as possible. They say the campmaster sergeant major selected 30 men (some make them thirteen, which is impossible), these 30 being the pick of them all, in his estimation: fifteen pikes and fifteen shot. These marched in the van, about an harquebus shot ahead of the main-battle, to make the assault and first attack.

Along the beach from the landing place the governor had caused sharp stakes to be planted, where many of the enemy were injured and died in consequence. Similarly, that night he ordered out an ambuscade of 25 soldiers and certain Indians; because they heard no noise that night at the landing place these retired too soon, without accomplishing anything. Until it was broad day that night was so dark that one party could not see the other at all, which was disconcerting.

At the narrowest neck of land between the inner haven and the sea, at the Caleta, there was a great work with three pieces of heavy artillery and four companies, being as many as 150 men. Most of the number lacking from these companies had gone, some to supper and some to get their belongings into safety, believing, as has been said, that there would be no engagement with the enemy that night, nor until next day. A little beyond this point were the two galleys, bows on to the pass by which the body of the enemy was advancing. (p. 5).

Because Don Francisco Maldonado stated that the enemy had 30 or 40 sails and that day only 22 had entered the harbour or been sighted, the governor and Don Pedro and everybody else believed that the missing vessels had remained behind to land troops that night by Tesca Swamp, a good league from this city. On this road was another earthwork with some artillery and here another company, the best of all five, was stationed to protect that approach; and here they remained, so deceived, until the city was lost, without accomplishing anything at this post.

The rest of the people were stationed at regular distances along the beach, but these were few. Some were at the bridge and others in the fort at the entrance to the haven. That channel was closed with a chain which had been made for the purpose. The horse were

few and they were scattered, some on the beach, others patrolling the coast and doing sentry duty.

Two mounted men went to reconnoitre at Hicacos Point, after the people who had lain in ambush had retired. It seems the enemy column followed their footsteps and trail and for that reason the stakes did not do them more damage. These mounted men encountered the advancing enemy and hardly had they got back to the earthwork at the Caleta with the alarm than, almost on their heels, the enemy arrived.

An exchange of harquebus shots began. We gave them three rounds from the trench and here the ensign and other soldiers of one of our companies were killed.

Meanwhile, the galleys fired their artillery—two or three rounds. They say the first shots did the enemy heavy damage. Because the night was so dark, as had been said, although it now lacked but an hour till dawn, the artillery could not be aimed nor could it be seen where most damage might be done. Although they fired again it had no effect. Except by the light and flare from the artillery, nothing could be seen at all nor could the enemy be distinguished.

The enemy carried this barricade, passing around the right end of it on the seawash side, keeping to the water's edge. It was low tide at the time. And so, in this manner, and because the earthwork did not extend from sea to sea, he easily took it and came out behind our men, on the other side. With an interchange of firing along the beach the enemy pressed on, following up his victory. In view of the great strength of the enemy, ours continued to withdraw until they had entered the city.

Once inside the city they disappeared and scattered along the streets, the enemy closely pursuing, (p. 6) but in his square formation and always maintaining excellent order, until he arrived at the market-place. Having little experience, our people tried to rally at the bridge but they were in disorder, and so abandoned the city and the enemy seized the bridgehead and prevented the departure of those who sought to make off that way. By this time it was broad day.

In accordance with the governor's order Captain Martin Polo with his company had been on duty on the swamp road. He now returned, marching to the city. As soon as he entered he perceived that the enemy was in possession. When his men saw that the city had fallen they began to desert their captain, some here and some there, until he had only fifteen soldiers. With this following he exchanged some harquebus shots with certain of the enemy who were posted at the heads of the streets near the bridge and drove them

back as far as the market-place, where he discovered the enemy's main body. Realizing how few men he had and how many the enemy were, and that it would be impossible to oppose them without incurring heavy loss, this captain decided to withdraw to the bridge, which he found was held by certain English. He had a skirmish with them and fought his way across with loss of some of the men who accompanied him. They took the bridge and departed by it, leaving the enemy in possession.

In the city the English captured eight or ten Spaniards, some of whom were ransomed.

When Captain Francis heard the artillery of the galleys in action they say he ordered the 500 men who, as has been said above, he had made ready, to get into pinnaces and they proceeded in the direction of the fort at the entrance to the haven where the chain was, to take it and enter the city from that direction. The fort defended itself with its artillery and resisted their advance, inflicting heavy damage on them. In view of this damage the enemy determined to return to his ships.

The moment the city fell Don Pedro Vique went to Hernan Gomez Montalvo's wharf, where he found the galley's tender, and commanded Captain Pedro Cornas to go in her to the galleys, which had left their position at the Caleta and were rowing to the fort where the chain was, to order their captains to unlock the chain and endeavour to get out at any cost, and so to Tolu or elsewhere, wherever they might be safe. Seeking to execute this order, the galley captains sent the tender to unlock the chain, but they found that there was not enough water, nor was it high tide, to permit them to leave the haven by this channel. (p. 7)

At this point it happened that a barrel of powder on board the galley *Ocasion* exploded and injured some slaves and soldiers who were close by, though the damage done the galley and its crew was not much. It was not enough to have prevented them from working out, although there was insufficient water, since they were all of a mind and determined to get out if they could, even though the galleys might suffer severely from the artillery of the enemy's ships; but they were deterred by demands for help made on them from the bridge.

They were summoned to support the people there, who told them that we still held the city and for them to come to the relief of the bridge where Captain Martin Polo was fighting and shouting that he had won. It was at this moment that with fifteen or twenty men he had driven the English back on their main body in the market-

place and returned to skirmish with those who were on the bridge, in order to leave by way of it. At this summons the galleys and the tender grounded, bows on, at Jesamani. The galley-slaves were quickly unchained and, with the soldiers, landed and marched toward the bridge to its relief. But from here now came word that the enemy was already in complete possession of the city and that none of our people remained inside it. This was after Captain Polo had taken the bridge and left by it. When these people saw that their reinforcement was unavailing they scattered hither and yon without order or control.

Observing that nobody remained on board the galleys and that they were unable to reassemble those who had gone, the captains of the galleys managed to get together a few soldiers and with these, and what powder and subsistence they could remove from the vessels, went into the fort where the chain was, there joining its captain and garrison.

There they remained all that day, Thursday, firing their artillery on the enemy's pinnaces which continued their effort to take the fort. The artillery did heavy damage; but, perceiving that the enemy's forces were now quartered in the city and that they were now of no avail and that to hold out was a waste of time, when these pinnaces again withdrew toward their ships the captains resolved to evacuate the fort and therefore, when night fell, abandoned it, bringing off what powder remained in the fort.

That night, in order to prevent the enemy from possibly making use of them, Don Pedro ordered the galleys to be burned.

That night the seamen and soldiers and all the rest (p. 8) of the people withdrew to estates and neighbouring places adjoining the city, and although other military measures were attempted they are here omitted since they came to naught.

Having taken the city and established their headquarters in the market-place, the enemy entrenched and fortified themselves there, closing every access and street by which they supposed they might be offended. They sacked the city and, little as the booty was, it was nevertheless a very great deal.

Thursday night one of our artillerymen arrived at Turbaco (four leagues from the city, where the bishop and governor and other gentry of the city were in retreat) to tell them that one of the enemy's officers had summoned him and bade him go to the governor and on his behalf say that if they wished to negotiate for the city's ransom to come or send a representative with whom to treat. They considered this message but were not sure that it was authentic and

reliable, and therefore next day, Friday, in the morning, 21st of the said month, they resolved to select a person to go to ascertain from the enemy whether he had sent this message by the artilleryman.

To this end they bade Tristan de Orive Salazar undertake the matter and he went in and saw Captain Francis and the determination he brought back was that the bishop or the governor or some other person of authority sufficient to effect the ransom should go in. The enemy demanded speedy action; otherwise he would raze the city in accordance with his orders from his queen.

Therefore Friday night and Saturday morning, the 23rd, it was resolved that Tristan de Orive should return to the city and divert the enemy, that he might not do damage, while the governor sent to summon the citizens and merchants and other persons interested who were in neighbouring places, assuring him that on Sunday, the 24th, in the afternoon, he would be informed of whatever resolution might be taken, for they would convey their decision as then reached to Captain Francis.

Tristan de Orive carried out his mission and as many people as the governor could assemble met in Turbaco and among them all agreed to ransom the city. With this resolution, on the said Sunday the bishop and governor and a party of some twenty persons came to this city and entered. They were very courteously received and treated.

The negotiations were opened by the enemy's interpreter who set a price of 500,000 *pesos* in good gold, which sum is equivalent to 750,000 Castilian ducats. They offered him 25,000 ducats, which he scorned, and they brought the conversation to an end without deciding anything except (p. 9) that they would resume the negotiations. The Spaniards took their leave and returned to Turbaco.

Many days passed in the making of demands and counter-demands. Tristan de Orive continued to act in the matter and through him 100,000 ducats were proffered. The Englishman scorned this sum as he had the first offer of 25,000 ducats and at this point made a gesture as though he would destroy the city in fact.

He razed and burned all the outskirts where the houses were built of lath and planks.¹ In the city itself he demolished many masonry houses, in all perhaps 280, and a great part of the cathedral fell, this being a costly work for this country. And this destruction would have gone further had not the aforesaid Tristan de Orive

¹ . . . *de lata y table (sic)* . . . Around Cumana *lata* meant *caña brava* (wild cane, i.e., bamboo). Cartagena's poor outskirts may have been *bohios*, native-style thatched huts.

arrived the next morning. He placated the general with pleasant words, promising that the matter of their ransom would be taken up with the owners of the houses which remained standing.

In fine, the ransom was agreed upon at 107,000 ducats. This sum was paid to him on March 23. It was impossible to persuade him to leave any artillery. He left only the bells. That week he evacuated the city, embarking all his people aboard his ships.

In an effort to obtain more ransom he sent 200 soldiers to the Franciscan monastery, which is outside the city on the other side of the bridge, to raze it, the slaughter-house and the fort, claiming that these were not included in the arrangement because they were outside the city. He asked 10,000 for them. The governor insisted that everything was covered by the general ransom. The Englishman would not agree and set fire to the monastery. The prior and friars came out to prevent this and ransomed their property for 1000 ducats. Because the fort stands actually on water they could not blow it up, and so demolished it.

Most of the slaves and many of the convicts from the galleys went off with the English as did some of the negroes belonging to private owners. Although their masters were willing to ransom them the English would not give them up except when the slaves themselves desired to go.

They carried off the galleys' tender and burned all the ships, frigates and barks they found in the harbour except some trading frigates which their owners redeemed.

On the 5th or 6th of April another ship came in from Spain with the same advices as the first. It anchored two or three leagues from the port and was sent back to Spain with news of what occurred.

Thursday, April 9, in the morning the English departed from this city with 20 or 21 sail on the course which the fleets take for Havana. As soon as it was known that the enemy had gone the people returned to the (p. 10) city. Just when it had become fairly quiet and certainly no disturbance was anticipated, on the morning of the 13th of that month these vessels were sighted again. Because it was known that the galleons momentarily expected from Spain were as many sail, everybody in the city thought that these were the armada and the people were much rejoiced by this hope, until it was recognized that they were the enemy. Once more everybody fled from the city and to see the women and other helpless persons go was very pitiable.

The enemy re-entered the harbour in the same manner in which he came in the first time. Having from his flagship seen the alarm

and flight of the people, the Englishman sent his interpreter with a message to the city stating that he regretted to see its alarm and disturbance and the flight of the people from the place, for his was a forced return, certain of his ships being in bad condition. One of them, Corço's vessel, overladen with artillery, was about to sink. He bade them be quiet and to rest assured that he would do them no damage or harm during the time he must be in the harbour repairing his fleet. This somewhat tranquillized the people who had remained, and those who had left returned.

The enemy sent to ask for certain refreshment of meat and the use of ovens to bake biscuit. The ovens were assigned to him and he landed flour and bakers from his fleet. The meat was promised him and to hold him off he was told that we had sent inland for it, the hope being that meanwhile the galleons would arrive and catch him in the port.

The enemy held a council of his officers and they bound themselves to die in the undertaking on which they left England though they might encounter the whole strength of Spain.

Many of his men died in this city and harbour and every day he lost more from dysentery. His forces were much fewer than was supposed.

And without awaiting the meat he left this city on Thursday, at dawn on April 24, on the same course for Havana which he followed the first time, where it is presumed that he will do damage and lie in wait for the New Spain fleet. God preserve (p. 11) it all and confound him who has done so much evil.

When he was driven back he left two or three small vessels in this port, scuttled and burned, and he departed with eighteen sail, large and small. . . .

Document No. 31¹

[The city of Cartagena to the Crown, June 4, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Catholic Royal Majesty

The city of Cartagena in the Indies, Your Majesty's subjects and loyal vassals who kiss Your Majesty's royal feet and hands, desiring to report upon its present condition, state that the advices which

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-4-6, Santa Fé 37. 1 *pliego*, original.

Your Majesty sent us concerning the English fleet were received, although so late that the first which Your Majesty despatched arrived the same day that the English fleet, in command of Captain General Francis Drake, entered this city, which was the first day of Lent this present year.

Although we had previously been warned by the House of Trade in Seville that this fleet had left from Bayona in Galicia, it was not held certain that its destination was these parts until advices came from the city of Santo Domingo stating that the enemy was in possession there. On receipt of this news this city made ready for war as best it was able, in such manner that it was believed it could defend itself against this enemy.

On this supposition and with this determination we awaited him in a place called the Caleta, where a breastwork had been built of masonry with a ditch before it; and that same day, Ash Wednesday, about an hour and a half before dawn he landed about 1000 well armed men. At the same time he sent toward shore another 500 in pinnaces to that part of the harbour where the city has a fort.

Those approaching by way of the work at the Caleta came on with so great impetus that without fear or consideration for the artillery and troops and galleys opposing them there, they attacked this work, where the city had as many as 250 men stationed for its defence. They killed and captured many persons. Being undisciplined in war and not regulars, ours retired in disorder rather than perish there. Thus, by force of arms, the English seized and possessed themselves of this city and began to (p. 2) burn it. They commenced with the temples, to which they show themselves to be most inimical.

Negotiations for the city's ransom were undertaken in view of the importance of this place to Your Majesty and in consideration both to the common and universal welfare of all these parts of Indies, since most of them are supplied from this city, and also to that of the fleets and armadas which regularly come from Spain and necessarily call here on the outward and upon the homebound voyages; and, further, because of the great destruction and detriment to follow were Cartagena to be left razed and burned. At the request and demand of all the people, the governor authorized these negotiations, and it was not possible to arrange the ransom at less than 108,000 ducats.

Since when it left for Spain the fleet carried with it all the money which had accumulated in this city, there was no way to pay this ransom except by borrowing from Your Majesty's royal treasury 80,000 ducats left here by a ship which was driven in from General

don Antonio Osorio's fleet, its master Gerónimo de Ojeda. That this ship should have been forced in seems to have been an act of Divine Providence since otherwise there would have been no way to prevent the utter destruction of this city, such an inclination to raze it did this corsair exhibit, declaring that he had his queen's express mandate to level it. With this money, and more which was raised among merchants, this damage was prevented.

The enemy's fleet remained here 2(?)5 days and at the end of this time left for Havana, to judge by the course taken.

It has been ordered that the owners of the houses left standing, to whom was loaned what was taken from the royal strongbox, shall return this money by next Christmas Day, and these houses have been given as security under mortgage in guarantee of Your Majesty's royal revenues. This, in order that the money loaned may go forward by the next fleet. This arrangement has assisted this city through the worst calamity and loss which has befallen it since it was settled.

Cartagena is left so stripped and so unable to defend itself that it has not a single piece of artillery. The enemy took it all. In addition a thousand things are lacking, for which reason, and because of the loss of the galleys which Your Majesty had stationed here for the protection of this coast, we are in exceedingly great danger, since any corsair may again take the town unless Your Majesty, as our king and master, relieve us as promptly as the emergency demands, by providing artillery, munitions and garrison to preserve this city. While the war lasts, which Your Majesty is waging with them, these English will not cease to molest us and to come to do us damage. Inasmuch as this city is of such importance to Your Majesty, we entreat Your Majesty (p. 3), as quickly as has been suggested, to send the relief which it so grievously requires in order that it may return to what it was and defend itself against its enemies. We entreat Your Majesty to aid us with requisite generosity and to assist this people in such hardship and tribulation.

One of the greatest necessary measures of relief, most acceptable and important, will be for Your Majesty to allow us six years' time in the repayment of this money which has been taken from the royal treasury. With such assistance this city can be rebuilt and its inhabitants will gain more strength wherewith to serve Your Majesty and defend it. And let Your Majesty order two other galleys to be sent with two frigates to defend this coast, and 300 men to constitute a garrison to preserve and protect this land. Let Your Majesty deign to give entire jurisdiction to the governor here, or to be sent

here, over this province, that Your Majesty may be better served, for otherwise whenever it is attacked with such force as it was on this occasion, it will be lost.

Our Lord in His mighty hand preserve the Catholic Royal person of Your Majesty many years.

Cartagena, June 4, 1586.

Your Catholic Royal Majesty's subjects and loyal vassals who kiss Your Majesty's royal feet and hands.

Pedro Fernández de Busto.

Gaspar Bernal.

Joan de Torres.

Francisco de Carvajal.

Don Joan de Villoria y Davila.

Alonso Bravo Montemayor.

Antonio de Paredes.

Domingo Feliz.

Don Gregorio Fernández Serpa.

Notary Francisco

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(?) (Rubric).

Document No. 32¹

[Pedro Menéndez Marqués² to the president of the House of Trade, San Agustin, June 17, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Very Illustrious Sir

I am reduced to such a situation that I do not know where to begin to relate the hardship and misery which have befallen this land. Therefore this communication will not be long, as will be observed.

On the 6th instant Francis Drake arrived at this port with 42 sail, 23 being large vessels and nineteen pinnaces, frigates and shallops. At dawn on the 7th he landed 500 men and with seven large pinnaces sought me forthwith in the fort. With 80 men I had in the fort I resisted him until nearly midday. In view of my resistance he sent to the ships which lay outside the bar for reinforcements, and in nine vessels landed some 2000 men and planted four pieces of artillery among certain sand dunes near the fort, with which he

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-6, Santo Domingo 128. 1 *pliego*, copy.

² Captain general, His Majesty's governor of Florida.

began to batter it. I retired as best I could, to protect my women and children (more than 200 persons).

Having occupied the fort, the enemy took and sacked the town and burned the church with its images and crosses, and cut down the fruit trees, which were numerous and good. He burned the fort and carried off the artillery and munitions and food supplies.

We are all left with the clothes we stood in, and in the open country with a little munition which was hidden. We are without food of any sort except six hogsheads of flour which will last twenty days at half a pound per head.

I am reporting to His Majesty in full in the accompanying despatch¹ and entreat your lordship to forward it immediately, and to favour me as far and as speedily as possible, since help for Florida must come from your lordship's hands.

Our Lord, etc.

San Agustín, June 17, 1586.

Pedro Menéndez Marqués . . .

Document No. 33²

[The royal officials of Florida to the Crown, San Agustín,
June 17, 1586]

(p. 1)

+

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

As soon as news was received here of the damage which the English corsair had done in Santo Domingo, desiring to prepare as best he could (after consulting the persons best able to advise and after having reached an agreement with us to that effect), General Pedro Menéndez Marqués built a new fort at the harbour mouth, at the bar, at the end of the channel, to protect the entrance. There he placed all the artillery and munitions. Considering how quickly it was done and by how few people, and with what scanty materials, the fort was very effective and well situated.

¹ Not seen. Cf. *A. de I.*, 42-1-8/3, Contratación 5108, 'The Duke' to the House of Trade, San Lucar, September 3, 1586, for statement that Pedro Bernal Cermeño, who came in on that date with despatches, said that 'off the Cape', i.e., of San Vicente, he had seen the enemy take an advice-boat with despatches 'which Pedro Menéndez was sending with an account of events in Florida.' Cf. Document No. 55; especially enclosure No. 3 (p. 219 *post.*)

² *A. de I.*, 54-5-14, Santo Domingo 229. 1 *pliego*, original.

Therefore we removed thither the royal strong-box and all the books and papers of the accountant's office and others in addition which seemed important, together with our own valuables, even our clothing. And so did the general and the other soldiers who were there when the enemy arrived and assaulted with such vigour that we were compelled to withdraw under such stress of risk and danger that we could save nothing but the garments on our backs, and our arms and munitions. The enemy took everything. The royal strong-box contained little money because, payments due on account of these two forts being made, there is never much over, most years nothing.

Concerning the enemy's approach and the strength with which he attacked us, the general will report to Your Majesty, in whose compassion we confide, trusting that Your Majesty will decide to order that we be favoured and provided for in such great affliction and calamity as this in which we remain, and so do we humbly entreat Your Majesty, whose sacred Catholic royal person Our Lord preserve many and happy years with increase of greater realms and lordships as Christianity has need.

San Agustin, June 17, 1586.

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's humblest servants and vassals kiss Your Majesty's royal feet.

Alonso Sancho Saez

Rodrigo de Junco

Bartólome de Arguelles (Rubrics).

Document No. 34¹

[Don Francisco de Varte² to the Crown, San Lucar,
June 25, 1586]

(p. 1)

†

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Tomás Ginoves' advice-ship has this moment crossed the bar of this port. He comes from Cartagena and is one of those sent thither

¹ *A. de I.*, 143-3-16, Indiferente General 1097. 1 *pliego*, original.

² Factor [*juéz oficial real*] of the House of Trade, the name was 'de Uarte', i.e., Duarte.

began to batter it. I retired as best I could, to protect my women and children (more than 200 persons).

Having occupied the fort, the enemy took and sacked the town and burned the church with its images and crosses, and cut down the fruit trees, which were numerous and good. He burned the fort and carried off the artillery and munitions and food supplies.

We are all left with the clothes we stood in, and in the open country with a little munition which was hidden. We are without food of any sort except six hogsheads of flour which will last twenty days at half a pound per head.

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Our Lord, etc.

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[The royal officials of Florida to the Crown, San Agustin,
June 17, 1586]

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Concerning the enemy's approach and the strength with which he attacked us, the general will report to Your Majesty, in whose compassion we confide, trusting that Your Majesty will decide to order that we be favoured and provided for in such great affliction and calamity as this in which we remain, and so do we humbly entreat Your Majesty, whose sacred Catholic royal person Our Lord preserve many and happy years with increase of greater realms and lordships as Christianity has need.

San Agustin, June 17, 1586.

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's humblest servants and vassals kiss Your Majesty's royal feet.

Alonso Sancho Saez

Rodrigo de Junco

Bartólome de Arguelles (Rubrics).

Document No. 34¹

[Don Francisco de Varte² to the Crown, San Lucar,
June 25, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

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¹ *A. de I.*, 143-3-16, Indiferente General 1097. 1 *pliego*, original.

² Factor [*juéz oficial real*] of the House of Trade, the name was 'de Uarte', i.e., Duarte.

by Your Majesty's order. He brings word that with 27 sails, 20 of these being large and medium vessels, and seven pinnaces, Francis Drake arrived off Cartagena on Ash Wednesday and occupied that port and place. He met little resistance. When he had burned a third of the city they ransomed the cathedral and other temples with what edifices remained for 110,000 ducats, in addition to which he stole a certain amount of silver and gold and household furnishings and other merchandise which he found buried there. He burned Your Majesty's two galleys and careened his fleet to go to attack Havana. He was riding with yards across ready to depart on April 8, as Your Majesty will see in greater detail by the pilot's deposition¹ which the Duke de Medina forwards and the despatches which came for Your Majesty. God deign to remedy the situation for the best good of His and Your Majesty's services . . . (p. 2)

. . . San Lucar de Barrameda, June 25, 1586.

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's humble servant who kisses Your Majesty's hands and feet.

Don Francisco de Varte (Rubric).

Document No. 35²

[Pedro Sanchez, deposition, Havana, June 26, 1586]

(p. 1)

†

In the city of San Cristóbal de la Havana on the twenty-sixth day of the month of June in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-six, the very illustrious Señor Gabriel de Luxan, for His Majesty governor and captain general of this island of Cuba, stated that he was informed that at Cape San Antonio, fifty leagues from this city, eight men fled from the English fleet commanded by Francis Drake, whom the said Englishman took prisoners in the city of Cartagena, and that one of these men had arrived at the San Felipe cattle ranch, thirty leagues from this city. And in order to determine how they came to be with this Englishman and to learn what happened in the city of Cartagena with respect to him, and to

¹ Not seen.

² *A. de I.*, 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 126. 1 *pliego*, legalized copy. Cf. Document No. 55 *post*, enclosure No. 2.

SAINT AUGUSTINE

KEY

- A The place where the whole Fleete came to ancker.
- B The place where the Pinnaces and Shipboats did set vs on shore.
- C A Beacon or high scaffold standing on the sand hills, wherein the Spaniards did vse to discover ships at sea.
- D The way which our army marched along the sand by the sea side towards their fort.
- E The place where our Pinnaces put our ordinaunce on land.
- F A lowe plaine or meadow ground through the which our troupes passed, to go towards the woods right ouer against the Spaniards forte.
- G A wood growing hard by the riuer side, hauing betweene it and the riuer side a high bancke of sande, in which wood our men encamped themselues, and in the said great bancke of sand, being fitted for the purpose was placed also two peeces of ordinaunce to beate the Spanish forte, which was done with such expedition as they were planted and discharged twice or thrice the same day we landed, meaning the next day to haue had more ordinaunce brought, and to haue it planted on the same side of the riuer wherein the fort is, whither Master Carleill our Lieutenant generall was minded the same night to transport himself & some part of the army, to lodge himself in some trenches close by the fort, but the Spaniards perceiuing the approach abandoned the place before the day.
- H A Pinnace which the Spaniards had lying hard by their forte in the little riuer.
- I The fort which the Spaniards had made of the bodies of Cedar trees, they placed therein some fourteene great and long peeces of artillery, which at our ariuall there to the sand bancke played vpon vs, the forte was called Saint Iohn de Pinos, which afterward we burned.
- K Our Pinnaces as they towed vp the riuer being all full of men, who because the way was not passable were faine to embarke them selues to take the towne of Saint Augustine, which being wonne was at our departure burned to the ground.
- L The towne of Saint Augustine where dwelled a hundred and fifty Spanish souldiers.
- M The towne house.
- N A high scaffold for a watchman.
- O The Church.
- P The liuely purtraicture of a fish called the Dolphin, which is of three searall coullours: the top of his backe and all his fins be blue, all his sides are of light greene, the belly white, his head almost all blue, the taile one parte blue, and the lower parte greene, he is very pleasant to beholde in the sea by day light, and in the night he seemeth to be of the coullour of gold, he taketh pleasure as other fishes do by swimming by the ship, he is excellent sweete to be eaten, this fish liueth most by chasing of the flying fish and other small fishes, they are caught most commonly by our mariners with harping irons or fisgigs.

ascertain his design, what forces he has, what ships and artillery, and what damage he has done in the Indies, he ordered that this person be fetched to this city in order to learn of these matters from him and to inform His Majesty of them.

Whom, when he arrived, his honour the governor ordered to be brought before him in order that, being sworn, he might make his deposition accordingly; and he so provided and ordered and signed. —Gabriel de Luxan. Before me, Gerónimo Vazquez.

And upon this said day, in the month and year aforesaid, for the above-stated purpose, when this man, who said that his name is Pedro Sanchez and that he is a householder in Zaragoza in Aragon, transient in this city, had appeared before him, and when he had been duly sworn in legal form and had promised to tell the truth, the governor ordered him to be examined in accordance with the preceding writ, and he stated that . . .

At the time when Francis Drake, corsair, with his fleet, came into Cartagena deponent was in Tolu, serving as a seaman on board a bark, and as deponent was returning aboard this bark to Cartagena, in the vicinity known as La Carbonera, a pinnace of the said Englishman's came up with the bark and took it and its crew. They sent deponent aboard the vice-admiral. The vice-admiral was a Portuguese whom the English called Canbra.

They captured deponent at the time when the English fleet returned to (p. 2) Cartagena after it had been there about two months. And as the corsair so put into Cartagena a second time he sent a pinnace ahead to tell the people not to be alarmed inasmuch as he was returning to overhaul a ship of his which was sinking. This vessel was Corço's ship which he had seized.

This second time the corsair remained in the city of Cartagena more than fifteen days and unloaded the said vessel and set fire to her; and afterwards they left the port of Cartagena and said they were coming to Havana, to take it.

Deponent saw how the English fleet arrived at Cape San Antonio and there anchored and burned a frigate; and then sailed for Rio de Puercos or Matanzas, saying that they sought water. They tacked back and forth and could not make the port of Rio de Puercos and since they could not make it returned to Cape San Antonio and there took on water and thence again sailed on a course for Havana.

At the time that they were taking on water at Cape San Antonio they set deponent ashore to aid in this work and he did aid, and then hid in the bush in order not to leave with the fleet but to remain in this island. After the fleet had gone deponent joined the seven other

men who also had fled (they were Spaniards and one Fleming), who said that the English had made them also prisoners . . .

Asked what forces he thinks the English fleet carried at this time and of how many vessels it consists and what artillery they have, deponent stated that they have a great many pieces of artillery and that he thinks there are in the whole (p. 3) fleet as many as one thousand two hundred persons, more or less, including youngers and seamen, all. And they said that many men had died and there were sixteen ships and four pinnaces and barks and boats for the service of the ships.

And this is the truth on the oath he swore. He did not sign because he did not know how to write.

He also stated that the Englishman is carrying along with him many Moors from the galleys, to take them to his [their?] country: and he heard it said that Don Antonio was coming to these parts and that he would bring a great fleet and that he would raise more than thirty thousand men.—Gabriel de Luxan. Before me, Gerónimo Vazquez . . .

Document No. 36¹

[Gabriel de Luxan² and Diego Fernández de Quiñones³ to the Crown, Havana, June 26, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty . . .

. . . On May 29 at three o'clock in the afternoon the corsair was sighted by the sentinels on duty on the Morro—just sighted, only, but they could count fourteen sail, and during that night he moved from that position toward the land. Friday the 30th found his entire fleet twelve leagues from this port, close in toward shore, and there, in that place, he took a frigate bound for this harbour laden with salt.⁴ It belonged to persons who reside in this city. Its crew escaped into the bush from where they counted all the ships of the corsair's fleet and they were sixteen large vessels and fourteen pinnaces and other small barks, which raised the number to 30 sail in all. Saturday,

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 126. 2 *pliegos*, original.

² His Majesty's Governor of Cuba.

³ Warden of La Fuerza.

⁴ Cf. the *Primrose* log, pp. 23-4, and 25.

in the afternoon, the frigate's crew arrived in this city to furnish us this information and since then to the present date the corsair has not reappeared nor have we been able to find him.

From the 29th of May, when he was sighted, until the 3rd of the current month, we were continually under arms, day and night . . .

. . . we sent Captain Vicente González and Jorge Manrique out to reconnoitre all the coast as far as Matanzas to learn if the corsair had been seen or had entered any port there. They went with all diligence and returned without news of him and without being able to find him . . . (p. 3)

Meanwhile . . . a man came to this city who was one of eight who escaped from the English fleet at Cape San Anton. It lay there five days hurriedly taking on firewood and water. This man tells how there, at Cape San Antonio, he procured wood and water, after which the corsair summoned a council of pilots and captains and they considered what they should do, and decided that from there they would sail straight for the Newfoundland Banks. They did not dare to attempt to take this city and harbour because they feared this, Your Majesty's fortress, and the careful preparations we had made to serve Your Majesty, and because his forces were few and sick. He had in all not 1200 effectives in the fleet, including seamen and soldiers, for many had died of illness and continued to die daily. And there he put all the artillery below decks, in each ship leaving four or five pieces above decks, lashed down, and closed the gunports.

This man says the fleet consisted of only sixteen fighting vessels, two pinnaces among them, the other fourteen being large vessels, of 400 or 300 tons . . . and the rest were only four pinnaces and a lot of barks for the service of the ships, on which the corsair spread as much sail as large frigates use, a trick to give him the appearance of a great fleet.

Apparently, since he has not reappeared, and judging by Vicente González's account, he has certainly disembogued . . . (p. 6)

. . . from this, Your Majesty's fortress, June 26, 1586.

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's most loyal faithful vassals and servitors kiss Your Majesty's royal feet.

Gabriel de Luxan

Diego Fernández de Quiñones (Rubrics).

Document No. 37¹

[Juan Bautista de Rojas² to the Crown, Havana, June 26,
1586]

(p. 1)

†

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty . . .

(p. 2) In this city the judicial authorities humiliated an aborigine, native of this island, named Juan Guillen, and he was condemned to the Santo Domingo galleys. Apparently he is now in the corsair's company, or so we have understood from a seaman, formerly of Cartagena, who escaped from the English at Cape San Anton with six others who up to the present have not arrived here. I suspect that the Englishman set this Indian ashore to reconnoitre. I am convinced of it because the enemy was off this coast three or four days, and in weather favourable for an attack upon us, and because the Indian was so thoroughly acquainted with the country and its harbours I am sure of it; especially since he did not attack us. Everything was so well prepared and in such readiness, and the people here so desirous of having at the enemy, without doubt knowing it, he dared not venture. If he had, not an Englishman of all who landed would have returned to his ship, and he would here have paid for the damage that he has done.

This man says that the corsair said that if he did not take Havana now he would return with a larger fleet to take it. Your Majesty will deign to order this looked into and to provide suitably for this contingency . . . Such is this corsair's daring it may be presumed that he will act again unless Your Majesty see to his chastisement . . .

(p. 4)

Havana, June 26, 1586.

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's humble servant and vassal,

Juan Bautista de Rojas (Rubric).

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 126. 1 *pliego*, original.

² His Majesty's treasurer at Havana.

Document No. 38¹

[Alonso Suarez de Toledo to the Crown, Havana, June 27,
1586]

(p. 1)

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Catholic Royal Majesty . . .

On the 27th [of May] there arrived in this city a lookout who had come overland. He was one of those on watch at Cape San Antonio. He reported that on May 22 the corsair's fleet arrived at that cape, south side. It consisted of 30 sail, sixteen being large vessels which anchored near a watering place there, and fourteen pinnaces, eight of which beat back and forth off the cape while six took in firewood and water. It seemed that they intended to wait for the fleet.

On the 29th arrived another message that on the 25th with good weather the fleet had sailed in the direction of Las Tortugas. Necessary works were built and preparations made in this city. Orders they were to observe were issued to officers and men and posts assigned which each was to take and hold in the trenches that extend from the Caleta² to the Punta and harbour's mouth, where there is a fort. There is another on the opposite side, on the Morro (headland). In these works there was ordnance—*pasamuros*³ and small culverins. About twenty pieces of artillery have been taken from ships and planted in the trenches and in the fort, which works extend over nearly half a league lying between the Caleta and the mouth of the harbour, and here nearly 700 men were on duty. A hundred were detailed to the *corps de garde* at the fort and 50 to the fort itself. In all, they were 900 men. It was a pleasure to see these people in such excellent array and desirous to meet the enemy, as they showed themselves to be.

On the 30th, in the afternoon, the enemy fleet appeared within sight of the port. Before it ran a ship out of Campeche laden with dyewood. Six pinnaces were in pursuit of her and they came near to the port. Two pieces were fired at them, one from the Punta and the

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 126. 1 *pliego*, original. The date of the document is given in a paragraph omitted toward its end.

² Havana's recent growth and civic development has filled up Guillen's inlet which formerly existed in front of the old Lepers' Hospital near the foot of the fortified hill between Havana proper and Vedado.

³ The *pasamuros* was a small culverin to be fired through an embrasure.

was publicly known. Further details Your Majesty will learn from the depositions of these men,

Two frigates have been sent out, one to New Spain and the other to Honduras, to bid the fleets come on. These vessels left here on June 15 . . .

. . . Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's servant,

Alonso Suarez de Toledo (Rubric).

Document No. 39¹

[Licentiate Francisco Marqués de Villalobos² to the Crown, Jamaica, June 27, 1586]

(p. 1)

+

Catholic Royal Majesty . . .

(p. 3) . . . A large English ship, 100 tons, with a pinnace, came to the north coast of this island and was by storm driven ashore;³ and by the time this became known only two Englishmen were to be found, for the rest had died. One of these is named Duarte and what I could learn and understand from him was:

That June 1,⁴ 1585, they left England from a port called Falmouth, from which cleared four ships and two pinnaces. As pilot

¹ *A. de I.*, 2-5-1/20, Patronato 265, item 44. 1 1/2 *pliegos*, original. There are enclosed with this document the records (3 *pliegos*) of certain proceedings held at Santiago de la Vega in respect to 'two English taken at Point Negril.' This document shows that on December 7, 1585, the abbot was officially informed that two or three Englishmen who were not catholics, had landed on the north coast. One was dead and two survived. He proceeded to investigate. Witnesses whom he examined tell of a naval duel off Negril between a French ship and the English vessel. The latter won the fight. The Englishman examined 'spoke thickly and knew no Latin.' Apparently he declined to answer questions as to his religious convictions, and once broke in with: 'So much commending to God! Hang me and have done with it!'

² Abbot of Jamaica.

³ Observe that the event occurred prior to December 7, 1585, when the survivors' depositions were taken. They might well have been set ashore the preceding summer.

⁴ Grenville's expedition cleared from Plymouth, not Falmouth, on April 9, not June 1, and consisted of five sail, not four, with two pinnaces.

aboard the flagship they carried a Portuguese called Fernando whose surname he did not know.

The general in command of these four ships was (p. 4) Sir Richard Grenville¹. His second in command² was deponent, called Don Armedes Eduarte³. He is a gentleman, a good clerk and accountant.

He says that as they left England, about 100 leagues at sea, they met a storm which separated this ship from the other three. It arrived at this island in great distress from hunger, and the captain set many men ashore. He kept the seamen, and departed.

But when they⁴ went to the other coast they found only two alive, this man and another who goes forward with him; the rest had already died of hunger.

This man states that they left England to settle in Florida. He says that about eight years ago the Portuguese Hernando explored a certain part of Florida to discover whether it was suitable for settlement and was unable to reach there,⁵ but meanwhile fell in with Puerto Rico whence he sailed on the course he desired to follow and reached the Florida coast at a headland which, looking at it on the chart, is in $38\ 1/2^\circ$. This Englishman says that on the English chart it was in 36° , where, he says, the ships anchor. From there a great bay leads to where certain islands lie, and this is sweet water four leagues out to sea; and according to the Indians this is the best part of all that coast, and is a passage to the Pacific.

He says that when this Portuguese discovered this port he sought to land at one headland and the savages ate 38 Englishmen. He went to the other headland where there is good anchorage and found that the savages there were better people. He asked them if there was gold or silver and the Indians said that there was a great deal and so gave them four pounds of gold and a hundred of silver and hides and many other valuable things.

The Portuguese took off with him two of the aborigines and left two Englishmen as hostages in token that he would return, as now they are returning with these Indians and merchandises to give as presents to the aborigines and with the intention of building two

¹ . . . *Don Ricardus gran feild.*

² . . . *almirante . . .*

³ *Amadas?*

⁴ I.e., the Spaniards. The two Englishmen seem to have made their way around to the west side of the island from the uninhabited north coast where they had been set ashore.

⁵ This would seem to constitute a statement that in 1578 or 1580 (see p. xxi *ante*) Simon Fernandez had been unable to make 'Florida', i.e., the Atlantic coast of what is now the United States, on a direct course. He was compelled to come up by the southerly route via Puerto Rico, which the English thereafter preferred.

forts. Meanwhile, pending advices that these are fortified, they were raising 1000 men and women to make a permanent settlement.

The English who landed on this island were 20. Deponent says he knows nine died because he saw them die of hunger. The rest went into the interior where they have doubtless perished. A captain landed with them named John —¹

In view of this satisfactory deposition and relation made by this Englishman, I decided to send them both to the House of Trade in Seville that Your Majesty might order what is to be done with him. Perhaps there, where he can be understood, more may be learned from him. Because this island is without defence² and we are not sure of the negroes and have no interpreter who can understand him (p. 5) I did nothing with him. I am shipping both [the man and his deposition] that Your Majesty may proceed as may be for the good of the service.

Our Lord preserve your Catholic Royal Majesty long and happy years with dominion over the world, as this humblest chaplain desires.

Jamaica, June 20, 1586.

Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's humblest chaplain kisses Your Majesty's royal hands.

Licentiate Francisco Marqués de Villalobos, abbot (Rubric).

Document No. 40³

[Pedro de Arana⁴ to the House of Trade, Havana, June 28,
1586]

(p. 1)

†

Very Illustrious Sir . . .

On (May) 20 the corsair Francis Drake with his fleet appeared off Cape San Anton where he lay five days, taking on water and firewood, and on the 29th at about vespers fourteen sail were sighted from this port. When next day dawned he was four leagues to the east of this harbour with 30 sail, of which sixteen were large vessels and the rest pinnaces and large barks, all their sails reefed and half a league from shore. This day they took a frigate laden with salt,

¹ . . . *Copeltope* . . .

² I.e., against reprisals.

³ *A. de I.*, 42-1-8/3, Contratación 5108. 1/2 *pliego*, original.

⁴ His Majesty's accountant at Havana.

but the crew escaped in a canoe. On the 31st they were off Bainoa, ten leagues from here, beating back and forth. About three hours after nightfall, when we were all at the Punta, the sentinels on the Morro and the beach assured us that launches were passing in the direction of La Chorrera, where it was supposed he would land his men. We were waiting for them, well prepared and so delighted and happy that I give your lordship my word it was admirable to behold. And since the enemy attempted nothing, nor dared to attack this port, everybody feels great disappointment, as Pedro Bernal Cermeño will fully inform your lordship, for he was present throughout these events and witnessed the efforts we made to discover the corsair, who has disembogued with his victory and booty. (p. 2) If His Majesty's armada sailed direct for this port not a ship could escape it.

I send your lordship herewith a memorandum¹ of what I have been able to learn concerning the robberies and damages which this corsair has done, and of his design . . .

The fleet has been regularly informed of everything that has occurred so far and we expect it in this port by the 20th of next month.

The ships which left San Juan de Ulua this year for Santo Domingo arrived safely, with which vessels and others from the Canaries a fleet has been assembled which this year will sail by way of La Saona . . .

. . . Havana, June 28, 1586.

Very Illustrious Sir

Your lordship's true servitor kisses your lordship's hands.

Pedro de Arana (Rubric).

Document No. 41²

[Gabriel de Luxan to the House of Trade, Havana, June 29,
1586]

(p. 1)

†

Very Illustrious Sir . . .

(p. 2) . . . The English fleet was sighted by the sentinels on the Morro on May 29 at three in the afternoon and as many as fourteen

¹ Not identified.

² *A. de I.*, 42-1-8/3, Contratación 5108. ² *pliegos*, original, duplicated in one.

ships were counted. They had the best weather they could desire for attempting this port and beach. Next day they chased three coasting barks and took one, carrying salt, but its crew escaped in the canoe. These persons counted sixteen large ships and fourteen pinnaces and barks, carrying a lot of sail in order to make a great showing, and for (p. 3) three days they beat back and forth in sight of land but did not dare attack us although they had such propitious weather. We sent experienced persons to reconnoitre as far as Matanzas by land and by sea as far as Cabezas de Martires and another vessel went to Las Tortugas, but not a thing was seen, wherefore we are certain that the enemy disembogued . . . (p. 5)

. . . Havana, June 29, 1586.

Very Illustrious Sir

Your lordship's servitor kisses your lordship's hands.

Gabriel de Luxan (Rubric).

Document No. 42¹

[Rodrigo Fernández de Ribera² to the Crown, Santo Domingo, June 30, 1586]

(p. 1)

†

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

The destruction of this, Your Majesty's city, and the evils which have befallen us, Your Majesty's servants and vassals, cannot be recounted without tears because not only have we lost property and lives but also, which is more grievous, we have seen our enemies trample and burn its images and churches and blaspheme against our Christian religion while we, miserable creatures, stood by, unable to offer defence! The blame I lay upon no man, only upon our sins; if it belong elsewhere, Your Majesty must judge.

My intention is only to relate to Your Majesty the truth of what occurred and to entreat Your Majesty, as our liege lord and king, whose creatures we are, to provide the remedy and not to leave us,

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-6-14, Santo Domingo 80. 1 *pliego*, original.

² His Majesty's accountant for Hispaniola.

as heretofore, abandoned in the hands of others who deal with us like mercenaries.

On January 11 of the present year Francis Drake, Englishman, entered this city with 30 ships, large and small, and three leagues away landed about 1200 men unperceived because we had expected him by way of the river and port, near which his ships lay.

The fortress began to fire upon these ships, as it should not have done. It could not offend them because it lacked powder and munitions and other materials, and therefore its balls did not reach the ships, whereas those fired from these ships passed completely over the city and reached the bush and killed there. This betrayed our weakness to our enemies and they said to themselves that the city was theirs.

While this was going on word came that they had landed men who were advancing. We went out—some 25 men on horseback—to encounter them a league from the city. We approached well within range of their musketry and felt lively desires to die there, which were contradicted and restrained (p. 2) by the sense and prudence of others who said that it was temerity and foolhardiness, since we would not only lose our lives but even jeopardize our salvation.¹ Therefore we retired, falling back upon the city gates, still seeking to prevent the enemy's entrance.

Our number had diminished by the time we arrived here, and the few foot—not 200 men—deserted, demoralized because the enemy's strength was obvious and it was plain that there was no resistance in the fort nor any defence in the enclosure and gates of the city, nor arms, nor troops enough to withstand the foe. We few who made our stand at the city gate saw the enemy entering at other points.

And so they came in and sacked the city and burned many residences—almost half the city, including the Franciscan monastery and two nunneries and part of the fortress. They carried off the artillery, leaving us unarmed—defenceless against any corsair who may undertake to finish us off—unless Your Majesty's hand apply the remedy.

They took what funds were in the royal treasury, which were about 16,000 ducats, according to the treasurer, most of it in copper coins. I had been serving Your Majesty two months in the office of accountant and therefore cannot certify to this because I did not see the money deposited and the book wherein the entry was made, which was in the strongbox, could not be found to establish the fact.

¹ I. e., it was suicide (a mortal sin).

On this point the treasurer's word should be accepted, for he is a Christian conscientious man. The official record books, registers and papers which were in my charge I got out of the city one night, at great danger to myself, three days after the place fell. Not a note was lost concerning amounts to be collected and debited, as will appear by the accounts sent this year. All my personal belongings I lost, as is well known; nothing was saved. In addition, they burned my house because they learned that I had rescued the royal books and papers. They seized such things as these, too, in order to exact ransom for them.

They remained here 30 days and went to Cartagena, which had been warned by Your Majesty and from this city . . .¹ . . . (p. 3) . . . Had we been prepared as was Cartagena I have no doubt we would have stopped the enemy right here and he would have found himself fooled, such was the spirit and inclination many showed . . .

. . . Santo Domingo, June 30, 1586.

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's very humble servant who kisses Your Majesty's royal hands.

Rodrigo Fernández de Ribera (Rubric).

Document No. 43²

[Juan de Lepe, Bartólome Cordoriel, Francisco Hernández,
Juan Alvarez, depositions made at Havana, June 30, 1586]

(p. 1)

. . . †

In the city of San Cristóbal de la Habana, . . . Cuba, . . . on the thirtieth day of June in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-six . . . (p. 3) . . .

¹ He recounts news received from Cartagena.

² *A. de I.*, 40-3-1/23, Contratación 4802. 4 *pliegos*, authenticated copy; duplicated in 54-1-15, 54-2-4. Depositions to be found in 54-5-14 (15) have also been used.

These depositions were taken on receipt in Havana of news from Florida concerning Drake's visitation there. Juan de Lepe and Bartólome Cordoriel had gone to Saint Augustine aboard the vessel dispatched from Havana to warn Florida that Drake had appeared off San Anton. Evidently they came back aboard it after the storming of Saint Augustine. This document comprises, after the depositions presented, a copy of a communication from Menéndez Marqués to the authorities at Havana wherein he states that Ensign Francisco Hernández will tell them what has happened.

. . . Juan de Lepe, seaman, . . . being duly sworn . . . stated that about twenty days ago deponent being in the fort at San Agustin . . . from said fort twenty sails were descried, and these vessels anchored off the port and landed men from pinnaces. Deponent thinks about 1000 men came ashore. They landed artillery and began to batter the fort of San Agustin. The fight continued through two days, and through two nights they were under arms.

While this attack was going on deponent was putting the women and children on board his bark, in order to convey them to safety in the interior among the peaceable Indians.

Deponent heard that in view of the Englishman's strength and the damage he was doing, the garrison withdrew to the bush.

While deponent was in the bush with the women and children, Pedro Menéndez Marquéz arrived there with the troops, which were retiring.

Later deponent returned and saw that the fort, where Pedro Menéndez Marquéz was, had been burned. The English had burned it and the town and the old fort. They razed the maize fields (p. 4) and carried off everything in the town, and His Majesty's strong-box together with what was in it, which deponent heard was five thousand ducats.

The English remained there seven days, careening a vessel. At the end of that time they left, and three negroes who escaped from them (of those the English had seized in Santo Domingo) said that the Englishman was going to Santa Elena to take that place, and that from there he would proceed to Newfoundland; and this is the truth.

Further, the English carried off all the artillery and subsistence. The general had buried certain pieces but three of ours, who deserted, informed of this and they found these and carried them off . . .

This is the truth, on the oath he took. He did not sign because he does not know how to write; and he is about 24 years old . . .

. . . Bartólome Cordoriel . . . being duly sworn . . . stated that . . . he was in the fort of San Agustin on Friday after Corpus Christi when from the fort fifteen sail were sighted.

These being sighted, that night General Pedro Menéndez Marquéz ordered deponent to go with his bark to convey the women and children up the river from the fort into the bush, and so deponent did, making two trips. He also carried up six barrels of flour. Therefore deponent did not see the fight, but he heard the artillery fire exchanged between the fort and the English fleet. They fired and fought two days and two nights.

What deponent did see was nine English (p. 5) dead on the ground, and he heard it said that two of the enemy's pinnaces had been sunk. Three negroes who deserted from the English said that some English had been killed. No Spaniards were killed; but three soldiers deserted to the enemy, one of whom was French, one Flemish, and one Spanish.

After the two days and two nights that the siege lasted, the general withdrew to where deponent was with the women. Sixty men accompanied him.

The English held the port seven days. They careened a ship and at the end of that period burned the town and the fort and destroyed the estates and trees and razed the maize fields, felling and demolishing everything.

Deponent saw His Majesty's chest taken into the fort and later saw that it was not saved, because the English ruined and burned everything . . .

He signed his name and is about 28 years old . . .

Francisco Hernández, ensign of the fort at San Agustín . . . being duly sworn . . . stated that on Friday after Corpus Christi, on the sixth of the present month of June, certain vessels appeared at sea off the port. They anchored at the entrance at the bar, and, according to persons who counted them, and to three negroes who deserted from the English, these were 23 large ships and many pinnaces and boats, to a total of more than 50 sail in all. Deponent could not count them because he was in the fort, which is more than a league from where they anchored.

Saturday morning (p. 6) at dawn boats and frigates and pinnaces put in, to land men. Twenty pinnaces and boats landed troops which deponent estimates at a thousand men.

They marched in formation with six flags flying, all red, without any other colour whatsoever. As they advanced a piece was fired from the fort, at which they paused and took shelter behind certain sand dunes. Other pieces were fired, which sank two pinnaces which were off the coast with seamen aboard.

As soon as the English discovered the fort, its position, and where they could plant artillery, they informed the English commander, who was on board the ships outside the bar. Thereupon, with twenty additional boatloads of men, the English commander came ashore with all his music. He brought four pieces of artillery and these were set up on land and began to batter the fort. The enemy so busied himself until nightfall on Saturday. The exchange of artillery fire continued until night fell.

At nightfall they took down the masts of all the pinnaces, boats and skiffs preparatory to reembarking therein, for they could not reach the fort except in skiffs, because there was a river between.

Next day in the morning watch without being observed they crossed the river in skiffs at a point where a launch belonging to the fort is stationed. The men there sounded the alarm and those on board this launch fled¹ to the fort. Similarly, laden pinnaces crossed at another place and the fort was surrounded.

Seeing which, and that it was impossible to resist such numbers, since he had only 70 effectives and the fort was made of timber, General Pedro Menéndez Marquéz withdrew to where the women and children were to a total number of 200 souls. Had he delayed he and all his men must certainly have perished; and had they perished it was certain that the hostile Indians would have attacked the women and children (p. 7) and all would have been killed. Therefore the general took this measure to protect them.

The English held the fort seven days, at the end of which period they burned the town and forts, razed everything, even the trees and plantings, carried off all chattels, so that nobody saved anything at all. They took His Majesty's chest. The general had buried certain pieces of artillery, but three soldiers who deserted to the Englishmen told him where and he carried them away . . .

He signed his name and is about 40 years old . . .

. . . Juan Alvarez, soldier of the Florida garrison, being duly sworn . . . stated that deponent was in the said fort on the sixth of the current month of June when off the port, at sea, appeared 23 large vessels and pinnaces, as many as ten of them with sails, and so many more boats and barges that deponent could not count them.

The same day, Friday, they came to anchor off the bar and Saturday morning in boats and barges and pinnaces sent men to shore and landed a party, the size of which deponent does not know. Once landed, in formation they marched on the fort, in squadrons with their flags flying, and halted behind certain sand dunes and from there withdrew toward the coast, and returned to report to their general. He came ashore with reinforcements and they brought up four pieces of artillery and planted them behind the sand dunes (p. 8) and from there opened fire on the fort. From the fort an answering fire was kept up Saturday afternoon, until nightfall. The fire from the fort sank two pinnaces in which certain men were killed, and later more were killed, to a total of over twenty English casualties. The Englishman killed nobody.

¹ So fast, apparently, that they left a child behind! Cf. the *Primrose* log, p. 25.

Saturday afternoon the English took down the masts of their pinnaces and boats; on observing which the general summoned a council to determine what to do, of which council deponent knows nothing except that he heard that in view of the enemy's very great strength and since the general had only 80 effectives and could not defend the fort because it was weak, made of timbers, and since if these men died the Indians would kill the women and children, the general [was of the opinion that the garrison should withdraw] and so they retired to where the women were.

The English held the fort seven days and burned the town and razed everything, even the maizefields, at the end of which time they withdrew.

. . . He signed his name and is about 30 years old; and he heard that the English carried off the artillery and the contents of the royal chest . . .

Document No. 44¹

[Gabriel de Luxan and Diego Fernández de Quiñones to the Crown, Havana, July 1, 1586]

(p. 1)

†

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Monday, the last of June, at one o'clock in the day, a small launch entered this harbour which Pedro Menéndez Marqués, Your Majesty's governor and captain general of the provinces of Florida, sent with news that on June 6 the corsair Francis Drake appeared off San Agustín with all his fleet. Observing his strength and realizing his own inability to resist the enemy, after the English began to batter the fort and he had done his duty, Pedro Menéndez Marqués was compelled to retire with all his garrison, and so he did, in order to go to the relief of what was left of San Agustín. For as soon as the English came down upon the fort, the Indians began

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 126. 2 *pliegos*, original. Duplicated in 42-1-8/3, Contratación 5108, in despatches dated July 2 and addressed to the House of Trade by Fernández de Quiñones alone.

to burn the town, according to what Pedro Menéndez Marquéz reports at length to Your Majesty in the enclosed despatch.¹

At the end of seven days, after he had completely razed the fort and destroyed what the Indians had left, and had spoiled the plantations and carried off everything, even to trifles and hardware and the furniture of the houses, leaving nothing whatsoever, according to what Pedro Menéndez Marquéz writes, the Englishman departed on a course for Santa Elena where we are certain nothing will have remained, given the corsair's purpose which, they said, originally was to proceed direct to Santa Elena, paying no attention to San Agustín. However, the Portuguese pilot he carried along, paid as expert and guide solely for the Florida coast and navigation of it, told him, when they reached the neighbourhood of San Agustín that there was the fort wherein the general resided and that it could very easily be taken since in all the forts there were only 300 men, and so to take San Agustín would not delay him. Therefore he carried out the attack.

All the people found safety in the bush. No subsistence whatever or anything else was left, and by this launch Pedro Menéndez Marquéz sent to ask help in food supplies and equipment, (p. 2) nails, iron, augers, axes, saws, smithy, in order to reestablish the settlement and fortify it.² He saved only his harquebuses and a barrel and a demijohn of powder . . .

We feel certain that nothing will remain of Santa Elena because the aborigines there have never been truly pacified or friendly. If our people escape from the Englishmen, the Indians will fall upon them or both will attack together. Our Lord guide all by His Divine hand!

Because the corsair carried off so many small things of all sorts, leaving nothing, nor any craft, large or small, that he could take along, we certainly believe it to be his intention (p. 3) to make a settlement at some point on the Florida coast so situated as to serve as a base from which to over-run all the Indies and attack the fleets. He has taken with him everything required, by land or sea, to establish a settlement, including even negroes which he seized at Santo Domingo and Cartagena.

Three of these fled from him and remained with Pedro Menéndez Marquéz, and they relate certain things concerning which he will report at greater length to Your Majesty. Pedro Menéndez Marquéz

¹ Not found. See p. 164 *ante*, note 1.

² The relief was sent. Pedro Menéndez Marquéz was urged to send his women and children to Havana.

was not without his traitors, for they say that one or two of his Spanish soldiers deserted and went over to the enemy and furnished him full information, advising him not to fear, for the garrison was small and short of munitions. So also a foreign fifer deserted.¹ This encouraged the enemy to attack with greater spirit . . . (p. 4) . . .

If in passing the corsair called at Santa Elena, as we suppose to be most likely, everything will have been burned and lost, even if the enemy does not remain in occupation. Hereafter, if those forts are to be maintained, they cannot be of timber only and scantily garrisoned. It will be necessary for Your Majesty to take measures so to fortify that they can resist both the Indians and outside enemies; for when the crisis arrives both (p. 4) are foes to the death and our establishments cannot survive unless Your Majesty order the country settled and fortified once for all . . .

. . . from Your Majesty's fortress (Havana), July 1, 1586.

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's most loyal and faithful vassals and servitors kiss Your Majesty's royal feet.

Gabriel de Luxan

Diego Fernández de Quiñones (Rubrics).

Document No. 45²

[Alonso Suarez de Toledo to the Crown, Havana, July 3,
1586]

(p. 1)

†

Catholic Royal Majesty

On June 30, on the eve of the clearance of this advice-boat which Pilot Pedro Bernal is taking over, there came into this harbour a bark from San Agustin in Florida with news that on the 12th of that month the English corsair's fleet arrived off that fort. From ten pinnaces he landed 300 harquebusiers at San Agustin, where the fort is, and at the mouth of the channel in a swamp, where it was

¹ ' . . . a French man being a Phipher . . . playing on his Phiph the tune of the Prince of Orange his song . . . ' who, to the English, claimed to have been a prisoner among the Spaniards. Cf. Bigges, *op. cit.*

² *A. de I.*, 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 126. 1 *pliego*, original.

never foreseen that he would land, he set ashore 200 men and five heavy siege guns.

Pedro Menéndez Marquéz was in the fort with 80 men, and all the morning (until the siege guns came up) he defended it and killed some of the enemy, including a captain who was much esteemed by the English commander.¹

The friendly Indians came down upon a certain estate at a distance from the fort, where the women and children had taken refuge; in view of which, and finding himself surrounded by the enemy and Indians, Pedro Menéndez Marquéz withdrew and abandoned the fort.

The English carried off everything from the houses and from the fort and burned and razed and took away all the artillery.

From there they are proceeding to Fort Santa Elena with which they will deal in the same manner even more easily because it is less defensible and the Indians hostile.

To maintain Florida is merely to incur expense because it is and has been entirely unprofitable nor can it sustain its own population. Everything must be brought from outside. If, although Your Majesty possess Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Yucatan and New Spain, the garrison of Florida has nevertheless suffered actual hunger, what would happen to foreigners there who must bring their subsistence from a great distance to an inhospitable coast? The land itself would wage war upon them! To say that they can maintain a base there from which to damage the fleets is idle talk because from Cape Cañaveral (which is the end of the Bahama channel) to San Agustin is a bay of 50 leagues and dangerous coast. Let Your Majesty improve this harbour instead, and fortify it, and send the galleons and the armada on this course—that is what is needed, and plain speaking.

Havana, July 3, 1586.

Our Lord preserve the Catholic royal person of Your Majesty in health and life and prosperity as the holy faith and these realms have need.

Catholic Royal Majesty

(I kiss) Your Majesty's royal feet.

Alonso Suarez de Toledo (Rubric).

¹ Sergeant Major Powell? Cf. Bigges, *op. cit.*, p. 131; the *Primrose* log, p. 25.

Document No. 46¹

[Pedro de Arana to the House of Trade, Havana, July 4,
1586]

(p. 1)

†

Very Illustrious Sir

Just as the two advice-boats were about to sail, Pedro Bernal and Blas González masters, there entered a little open launch from San Agustin in Florida, despatched by Governor Pedro Menéndez Marqués. He reports that the corsair Francis Drake with his fleet was sighted from the forts at San Agustin on the 6th ultimo. He landed men and set up artillery on a hill which commanded the position in which Pedro Menéndez Marqués had fortified himself because it was a stronger position than San Agustin itself. And after he had used his artillery, events developed as your lordship will see by the enclosed depositions . . .²

The corsair took about 6000 ducats from His Majesty's strong-box and as much more belonging to private individuals who had buried it. He carried off the artillery and food supplies. The total he obtained must be over 8000 ducats. He did more than 40,000 ducats damage in burning the town and razing all its (p. 2) plantations. After he had done this the enemy sailed away on June 13 saying that he was going to Santa Elena.

He will have taken that place as easily and Gutierre de Miranda will have run even greater risk. It is considered that it will have been difficult for him to escape from the Englishman; and if he does, it will be only to encounter worse enemies in the Indians . . .

Of His Majesty's armada there is no news here, nor has the fleet arrived yet . . .

Persons coming in from Florida state that the enemy is stronger in ships and men than we were informed . . . He could come out to meet the fleet from Santa Elena and that coast where unquestionably there is an English settlement.

If there were not, and Francis Drake did not intend to proceed thither after disemboaging, there would be no sense (p. 3) in his

¹ *A. de I.*, 42-1-8/3, Contratación 5108. 1 *pliego*, original. Copy in 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 126.

² Document No. 43.

taking the pains he took to carry off launches and frigates, imple-
ments, locks and all sorts of hardware and negro labourers who in
his country are free . . .

. . . Havana, July 4, 1586.

Very Illustrious Sir

Your lordship's faithful servant who kisses your lordship's hand.

Pedro de Arana (Rubric).

Document No. 47¹

[Alonso Sancho Saez² to the Crown, San Agustin, July 12,
1586]

(p. 1)

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Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty . . .

The advent of the English corsair, Francis Drake, has brought this city and fort, civilians, soldiers and civil servants of Your Majesty, to the danger, want, calamity and ruin which may be imagined, to which he and his followers were pleased to reduce us. From this follow the damage, loss, hardship and confusion which our general indicates to Your Majesty in his letter,³ to which I refer. When the fury of his attack had passed, learning that the enemy had sailed away, apparently on a course for Fort San Marcos at Santa Elena, which is 60 leagues from this fort, we returned to this city from the bush whither we had retired, according to the general's wise provision. Here, naturally, we found our misery and labour doubled by the irreparable damage which had been done.

For, although this land was so newly occupied and cultivated, it was one of the best and most populous to be found in all the Indies, and well supplied with fine fruits because, although we did not know whether it were Your Majesty's intention to carry this establishment on, we who live here had been so much inspired by the harvest obtained in the conversion of the natives (p. 2) to God's service that we were encouraged to build houses which, although made of wood, were expensive because so good. All this, by Your Majesty's most Christian favour, enjoyed for so long, had laid the good commencement and foundation which was to be anticipated—the first fruits and reward which God prepared for him who is accustomed to labour for the exaltation of His holy faith. And if perchance because

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-5-16, Santo Domingo 231. 1 *pliego*, original.

² His Majesty's accountant in Florida.

³ See page 164 *ante*, note 1.

of our sins (I mean the sins of us who live here) this disaster has occurred, it is not to be supposed that in Your Majesty's most Christian breast there will be lacking the warmth which is expected in order that so holy a work may proceed; just as courage and valour were not lacking in our general's heart to enable him to make the most of the juncture which presented itself, when in an instant he had to make a decision upon which hung the fate of all, whereby may be judged his great astuteness and prudence. Had he acted otherwise than he did, it would have been the greatest temerity, since he was eye to eye with death, as the saying goes. It would be a lengthy and tiresome business to seek to furnish Your Majesty with a detailed account of matters which without such are usually inferred, and I will conclude by saying that having in Fort San Juan lost the papers of the accountant's office and the funds from the deceased persons' estates which were in my charge, this represented nothing more or less than the culmination of my poverty and other persons fared as badly, having trusted solely in that fort. In truth, there was no other place as strong. The royal officials, my colleagues, and I have resumed the work of our offices . . .

. . . San Agustin in Florida, July 12, 1586.

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's most humble servant and vassal kisses Your Majesty's royal feet.

Alonso Sancho Saez (Rubric).

Document No. 48¹

[Pedro Menéndez Marqués to the Crown, San Agustin,
July 17, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty . . .

. . . As reported to Your Majesty in my other despatch, copy² enclosed, the corsair left here on June 12 and on the 17th entered

¹ *A. de I.*, 147-6-5 (4), Indiferente General 1887. 1 *pliego*, original; duplicated, Copy in 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 126. Enclosing copy of Menéndez Marqués's instructions to Vicente González to go to Spain with news and demand for relief, of the same date as this document.

In *A. de I.*, 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 126, there is a similar despatch, dated July 16, Menéndez Marqués to the House of Trade, with which the present document went forward. A resumé exists in 2-5-2/21 (51), Patronato 266.

² Not seen.

Cruz bay with his small vessels, leaving the larger ships outside. He supposed he was at Santa Elena, but Cruz harbour is seven leagues this side. So he departed thence and passed by Santa Elena bay in the night and arrived at Oristan, which is three leagues beyond it. There also he entered in the same order.

God was pleased that he should not find Santa Elena harbour, for it has many shoals and he kept well to sea. He fired his artillery many times expecting to be answered, but he was not.

At Oristan he took on plenty of water and firewood, and a mast for a vessel which was badly in need of repair; and disappeared from there on June 26 with all his fleet.

This was learned from the lookouts which Gutierre de Miranda had among the natives there; further, the warning I sent by sea and land had just reached Santa Elena, from where, in a launch, they immediately sent me eight barrels of flour and a little munition. God be praised for all! The fact that that fort stands is a great help . . . (p. 3).

The corsair cannot have departed out of love with this land, since he found it in such good order, and fruitful and cultivated, although he ruined everything and ordered it to be burned and razed, showing himself especially severe with my property, against which it seemed he wished to show his greatest rigour. It is to be feared that he, or others whom he will encourage, will not forget that they fared well and will endeavour to damage Your Majesty further; wherefore it will be advisable to be prepared for eventualities since this retreat is suited to their purposes, for it lies on the course by which the fleets and all shipping disembogue . . . (p. 4)

. . . The three negroes who remained here (of those with the corsair) say that they belong to Your Majesty and are part of the lot working on the fort in charge of Bachiller Tostado in Santo Domingo . . .

San Agustin, July 17, 1586.

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Your sacred Catholic Royal Majesty's least servant kisses Your Majesty's royal hands.

Pedro Menéndez Marqués (Rubric).

Document No. 49¹

[Don Pedro de Lodeña² to the Crown, Cartagena, July 30,
1586]

(p. 1)

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Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Having left Cadiz on May 29, this Your Majesty's royal armada sighted La Dominica on June 30, from which point General Alvaro Flores steered on a course for Puerto Rico. He sent Campmaster Juan de Texeda ahead to inspect that place in accordance with Your Majesty's instructions. We were two days off Puerto Rico and finally anchored at San German because of the people's need of water and other refreshment. Despite this detour we arrived in this harbour of Cartagena on July 18.

Where we found that Francis Drake took this place because he found it without soldiers and without arms. Having arrived one afternoon with 23 sail of all sorts, he landed as many as 400 men in the part they here call La Caleta and marched on the city. From the galleys they fired a piece or two at the enemy, who retreated. With seventeen or eighteen men the English sergeant major fled³ toward the city and while seeking cover discovered (p. 2) fourteen feet where a breastwork was incomplete, through which they passed and found the city in such a state that the best soldiers the corsair had were those of this place and their leaders, for they burned the galleys and ran without making any sort of resistance, a thing certainly I am embarrassed and ashamed to relate before Your Majesty, concerning Spaniards.

The enemy did the city more than 400,000 ducats of damage, its loss including (?) 107,000 ducats which they paid over in cash and 86 pieces of artillery, plus 250 houses burned and the further damage done to the cathedral (which is not little), and the booty he got, to say nothing of the loss of the galleys.

Pedro Fernández de Busto says that if Don Pedro Vique had

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fé 89. ² *pliegos*, original. Duplicated in 72-4-6, Santa Fé 37.

² His Majesty's governor, succeeding Fernández de Busto.

³ '*... huyo pa. Adelante . . .*' This fleeing forward or retreating toward the front is a peculiarity of English fighting men upon which history has more than once remarked!

supported him with people from the galleys, as was agreed, he would not have lost the city; and they tell me the other says as much of Don Pedro Fernández de Busto.

With an engineer he brought with him this corsair busied himself in measuring and sounding this port. On the landward he examined the swamps and approaches by which it might be entered. He made a map¹ which, lost or ransomed, remained here and is enclosed herewith that Your Majesty may see it. I am certain that any person who so carefully inspected and investigated this place did not mean to be satisfied with what he had done, but plans to return with intent to do greater harm than that yet inflicted. Your Majesty will act as may be best for the royal service . . . (p. 3) . . .²

. . . I understand that this corsair had many of Your Majesty's despatches, *cédulas*, advices and letters belonging to private persons, and, as I wrote from Cadiz, this could be remedied by the use of ciphers . . . (p. 6) . . .

I found here a Florentine who came in Francis Drake's fleet. His deposition is enclosed herewith that Your Majesty may order it seen . . . (p. 7) . . .

. . . Cartagena . . . July 30, 1586.

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's servant and vassal kisses Your Majesty's royal feet and hands.

Don Pedro de Lodeña (Rubric).

(Enclosure)

[Octavius Toscano, statement,³ Cartagena, July 28, 1586]

(p. 1)

†

In the city of Cartagena in the Indies, on the twenty-eighth day of the month of July in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty six, before me, Francisco de Hoyos, His Majesty's notary

¹ Not found.

² He asks for artillery, etc., men, powder and galleys to defend the demoralized city. He held a muster and found there were 340 effectives, of whom 150 were harquebusiers and twenty cavalry.

³ 1 *pliego*. Original.

public in his realms and dominions, the very illustrious Señor Don Pedro de Lodeña, governor and captain general of this city and its province, ordered to be brought before him an Italian calling himself Octavius Toscano, now held prisoner in the city jail by the holy office of the inquisition, whose statement was taken in the following terms:

Asked what his name is and nationality, he said that, as above stated, his name is Octavius Toscano and that he is a native of the city of Florence . . . He came to this city in the English fleet on the first day of Lent in the present year, because the English took him prisoner at Santiago, Cape Verde . . .

. . . he went from Cadiz to the island of Tenerife in company with Leonardo Turiano, an Italian engineer, who by His Majesty's order was proceeding to the island of La Palma to plan and build a wharf there. They made the journey in a ship with Captain Juan Nuñez, governor of those islands; and he has no trade. From there he went to Santiago, Cape Verde, in company with Nicolas Bendibobere, a German, with a cargo of wine from Garachito to trade for slaves at Cape Verde.

. . . they captured him on (p. 2) the seventh of December, one thousand five hundred and eighty five, and made him serve and lay the table, and lead and fetch a mount for a captain named Carassa, who ordered him to teach him Italian . . .

. . . he said that at Cape Verde the Englishman had eighteen vessels, six large and the rest small . . . on board these vessels he had about three thousand men, seamen and soldiers and servants.

Asked whether any vessels were detached from the English fleet after they captured him, or if he understood that any had been detached previously, he said that none were detached nor did he understand that any had been.

Asked how many ships the English had when they reached Santo Domingo, he said that they had the same eighteen, but not as many men, for most of them had died.

Asked whether the Englishman received any reinforcement from England or elsewhere, or whether any other ships joined him during the time that he was with the fleet, he said only five ships which he took at Santo Domingo, two in the haven when he occupied it and the others when they came up from outside.

. . . from Santo Domingo they steered for the mountain range at Santa Marta and thence to this city . . . when they reached here they were about one thousand six hundred men, many of them sick; and five or six hundred landed.

(p. 3) Asked what he understood the enemy's plan to be had they met resistance here, he said they talked among themselves of going to Nombre de Dios and of crossing to the Pacific with the aid of the *cimarrones* who were their friends, they said, and to this end on top of the ballast they carried vessels in sections which could easily be carried to the Pacific and there set up for use.

Asked how long after reaching this city he deserted from them, he replied fifteen days.

Asked if he knew what they purposed to do after leaving this city, he said that, as he has stated above, they planned to cross to the Pacific; and he said that they brought with them many cases of shoes and garments because they said they would be three years in the Pacific before they returned to England; and that many of these and other things were presents they said they intended for the *cimarrones* who they claimed were their friends.

All which he declared to be the truth, and all that he knows of the foregoing matters, which statement he affirmed and reaffirmed and signed with his name on the day, in the month and year aforesaid . . .

† *Octavio Toscano* . . .

Document No. 50¹

[Francisco de Avila² to the Crown, Cartagena, August 8,
1586]

(p. 1) Jesus, Mary

†

Sacred August Catholic Royal Majesty

The reason and the love which impel rustics and cowards to undertake great deeds gave me the courage to write to so very excellent a monarch, whom his subjects and the world are happy to serve; for I desire to accomplish a thing beneficial to Your Majesty's royal service and to prevent Your Royal Catholic Majesty from being misled by a false account of events at Cartagena and of the loss of the city.

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fé 89. 1 *pliego*, original. An endorsement of page 4 shows that this communication was referred to the president of the Council for the Indies.

² Not identified.

On February 19, '86, Ash Wednesday, at noon, the corsair Francis Drake appeared with 23 ships, five large and the rest medium, and in two hours, with the favouring wind he had, he was inside the harbour and safer than in his own country. This happened because the advice of some poor soldiers was not taken, which was to plant six pieces of artillery at the harbour mouth and to station the galleys there to defend the channel. Ships must enter in single file and as they enter they expose themselves on the landward side. Unless he could make the port the currents and winds were against the enemy and he could not have done the place the damage he did.

At the hour mentioned we went out on the north beach in five companies of foot, being 600 men, with 50 horse. Two hundred of these men were strangers in the city who were compelled to serve, without pay and badly lodged. More than twenty days before this they had made the end of the adventure plain. The rest were merchants and traders whose felicity is rather in their merchandise than in the profit to be had from opportunities. Persons little accustomed to noble acts are disconcerted by occasions for such. Those who are not merchants (as are even Your Majesty's royal officials) are retail dealers in the food supplies produced by the country. Therefore I admit recalling Romulus' way of thinking—that the government of the *res publica* should be left to the old and military affairs to the young—and, considering that the Chinese put their fortresses in charge of natives of the place, I don't know who could have been entrusted with either, here.

And so on the beach we remained that night, until dawn, when most of the people withdrew. We were badly distributed (p. 2) in a poorly constructed earthwork near the sea, which work ran from east to west. Here they say, were the general commanding the galleys and the governor of the land, both unarmed and each on his bed. They were not on the alert, as the event demonstrated. All the rich men had removed their belongings to safety and must have had horses ready, in order not to risk their persons; and many infantry captains and other officers had horses in readiness that night, from which facts an evil outcome was prognosticated.

Wherefore when the enemy attacked, which was about an hour and a half before day, when two rounds had been fired from the arquebuses and it came to the third, so few men remained that it was a pity. Before God, I speak the truth in saying this and in the rest, for where the enemy broke through, which was on the north side near the sea, there were not 50 men, because, when the emergency came, the rest had already retired, following after their

leaders as after guides. I did not see them because the third watch was the blackest I've ever experienced, either before or since, in this country. The sky was clear the first watch and the last; and I believe this was Heaven's punishment on our sins.

These sins augmented with the coming of the galleys, their officers and crews. Though few in number, and the most of them creatures of little fortune and less conscience, they so greatly increased these sins, both public and secret, with killings, robberies, insolences and unrighteous intercourse between the Moors of these galleys and slave women and Christian Indians, and even other women of other sort, moved by desire which overmasters every other consideration. No punishment was meted out to them from any quarter because of the great friendship between the governor and the general commanding the galleys. Inasmuch as these sins met with no correction or chastisement Our Mighty Lord sent an executioner of His justice in this corsair. Therefore in one hour he took the city and remained therein until Thursday before Quasimodo.

The galleys were lost inside the harbour, without having accomplished anything, whereas they might have been saved and made their way out. When the city was abandoned the general might have gone aboard them and gathered up many men from the land, and with the galleys have harassed the corsair who would not then have lain so long at anchor. They say, however, that immediately he took horse and removed himself to an estate of his, three leagues from the city. And after the town and the galleys had been lost, in all the time the enemy remained no military movement was made against him, either by sea or land.

On the contrary, they began to deal and trade with the English under cover of negotiating the ransom of the town. Some entered the city with the permission of him who could grant it, and others without any. They say they gave the enemy 110,000 ducats as ransom for the city, and private individuals must have furnished him more than 200,000 on their own account and in the course of their dealings with him. Even when he came to go, they say they provided him with meat and products of the soil, all this being prejudicial to the service of God, Our Lord, and of Your Majesty.

Thus the rich profited and we poor remained without a roof or shelter over us, because they burned and demolished the half of the town which lay outside the line of their entrenchment. They occupied the best part, where were the houses of those who negotiated the ransom, for these were the principal citizens. In this and

in the rest they act many times on a mutual understanding which is detrimental to the *res publica*, and they report falsely to Your Majesty (p. 3) with untrue accounts, declaring what they ask to be for the general good whereas other things would be preferable . . .

. . . the imperfections of this indiscreet communication and those of its author I resign to Your Royal Majesty's great clemency, whom God preserve in things spiritual and temporal with increase of greater provinces, as He is able and Your Majesty deserves and I, Your Majesty's least vassal, desire.

Cartagena de Indias, August 8, 1586.

Sacred August Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's least vassal, who prays for Your Majesty's augmented health.

Francisco de Avila (Rubric).

Document No. 51¹

[Alonso Sancho Saez and Miguel de Valdés, depositions
made at San Agustin, August 12, 1586]

(p. 1) . . . In the city of San Agustin, provinces of Florida, on the twelfth day of the month of August in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-six, before me, the undersigned notary public.²
(p. 3)

. . . Alonso Sanchez³ de Mercado, accountant of these provinces, being duly sworn . . . stated that . . . on the sixth of last June in the current year, about two or three in the afternoon, sails were sighted which were steering straight towards the bar of this fort. When they had come nearer, eighteen large ships were counted and five smaller ones, a number of pinnaces, frigates and barges, which all stood off along the bar.

The next day, which was Saturday, before daybreak, being with General Pedro Menéndez Marqués and other soldiers he had selected for the purpose, in the fort of San Juan, newly constructed to repel the enemy, deponent saw that the enemy sent to land large pinnaces to attack the fort. They advanced as day broke, sounding the bar.

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-5-24, Santo Domingo 229, 15-1. 8 *pliegos*, legalized copy, enclosed in Rodrigo de Junco's to the Crown, San Agustin, December 15, 1586.

² Pedro X Suarez de la Pola.

³ Possibly a copyist's error for Saez.

When they were discovered and the artillery could be directed upon them, fire was opened and the resistance possible was offered.

In view of this, the corsair ordered (p. 4) his pinnaces back to the fleet and, since the large ships could not come up because of the bar and the fort was resisting, they returned to the fleet; and in these pinnaces and in the frigates and barges which had remained with the fleet, they sent to shore a large number of men. Deponent believes that these numbered eight hundred.

Behind certain sand dunes they drew up in formation, flags flying and drums beating; and deponent saw how the pinnaces and frigates and barges withdrew to the ships, and nineteen of them returned a second time and landed about four hundred men.

With these troops they again attacked the fort, which met them with such fire from its artillery that they again withdrew with the loss of one pinnace which was sunk. It was publicly said that the men aboard it were killed.

At this the officer in command of these craft sent a boat to the flagship and deponent observed that two large and nine small frigates came to shore in which apparently they brought large reinforcements and four pieces of heavy brass artillery. (p. 5) They planted these in four positions within an arquebus shot of the fort, which they began to batter. At the same time a large number of men landed from the frigates, pinnaces and barges. Deponent estimates the total number at a thousand men. It was understood that Francis Drake, corsair, was among them because where they set up the artillery in the afternoon there was music of cornets, sackbuts and flageolets.

The exchange of artillery and musketry fire continued all that afternoon. Some English were killed, as appeared later when the corpses were found.

That afternoon the general ordered Juan de Contreras, Indian interpreter for the district around the city, to make a night attack. Since he could not find Indians to accompany him, with only ten of them he attacked the enemy that night and they say that they killed four Englishmen but could not do more because of the enemy's much superior force.¹

Observing that his assault had had little effect, as soon as night fell the corsair removed the masts from his pinnaces and frigates and in the darkness reconnoitred (p. 6) the position of the fort, so making ready to land his forces. They came up to a launch belonging to His Majesty, and took it, although momentarily it was defended against them.

¹ ' . . . the savages and others came out of the woods, and with a very strange cry assaulted our men.'—The *Primrose log*, p. 24.

When the moon rose, observing that all the enemy's pinnaces had come up close to the fort, and that he had landed men on both sides of it, realizing that he was lost beyond earthly help and that it would be a great temerity with so few men to await the attack of so many, and that he could not fire his artillery against the enemy's batteries, appreciating that if the garrison were lost, it meant also the loss of the non-combatants, women and children, who by his order had withdrawn to the bush to the number of about two hundred and fifty persons, the general held a council of the most experienced persons present with him to decide what should be done. As a result they all retired, withdrawing through a swamp, since there was no other way they could go without falling into the enemy's hands. They retired to the place where the rest were, without bringing out of the fort anything except the flag and their arms. As the soldiers left they cast two bronze falcons into the moat, which was not completed.

So also deponent knows and saw that while the general was in the fort, fighting, and the civilians were in retreat, the Indians (p. 7) sacked this city and stole everything there was in the houses. From this may be inferred the evil intention they entertained, and if the general had not taken the wise measure of withdrawing at the moment when he did, these people would certainly have perished at the hands of the Indians, as was obvious.

Next day the corsair occupied the fort and sacked it. He took possession of the town, where he remained six or seven days. At the end of this period he burned and razed it, and carried off everything portable. On retiring he did the same by the fort and withdrew to his fleet and sailed straight for the fort of Santa Elena where it was supposed that he would conduct himself in like manner, since he was strong.

All which has brought great damage and loss on the royal exchequer and private individuals, and devastation on this city, which was well populated, comfortable, fruitful and abounding in many things. Everybody was left naked, stripped of everything, in the open country, and without recourse.

Deponent observed that the general fulfilled his duty, doing everything he possibly could do.

This is the truth on the oath he took and he stated that he was about thirty-six years old; and signed his name.—Alonso Sancho Saez . . . (p. 8).

. . . Miguel de Valdés, soldier of the garrison, being duly sworn . . . stated that on Friday last, June sixth of this current year, General

Pedro Menéndez Marquéz being in Fort San Juan with a part of the people who were to assemble when the enemy should appear, the look-out made signals that ships were approaching. Thereupon from the fort the signal was given for the rest to report, although the first signal was that a launch was arriving from the fort at Santa Elena. Then the look-out gave the warning signal that many ships were approaching, and accordingly the corsair Francis Drake came up with a fleet of vessels and stood off, along the bar. Deponent estimates (as nearly as he could count) that there were 23 large ships and a great number of smaller craft.

On Saturday following, before dawn, nine large pinnaces entered and sought the fort. As soon as they were seen and the artillery could be fired, the defence opened by sinking one of these pinnaces. They retired (p. 9) and withdrew towards the beach and landed their troops to the number of six hundred men, it was estimated. They drew up in formation behind certain sand dunes there and the pinnaces returned to the fleet. Nineteen pinnaces and frigates and barges came back to land with reinforcements which seemed to be about two thousand men. They again attacked the fort. They met with resistance and again withdrew with the loss of another pinnace which was knocked to pieces.

In view of this the corsair landed heavy artillery which he planted in four different positions at about an harquebus shot from the fort, among the sand dunes. With these he began to batter the fort. The artillery and musketry fire continued until nightfall and some English were killed.

The general ordered Juan de Contreras, interpreter for the Indians of this vicinity, to make a night attack on the enemy. They say that they killed six Englishmen. Because the enemy was numerous they found it convenient to withdraw.

That night the corsair removed the masts from his pinnaces and in the darkness reconnoitred the position of the fort, preparatory to landing the rest of his men. He carried off a launch belonging to His Majesty which was in a bayou near the fort. It offered some resistance. When the moon came up the enemy's pinnaces were discovered near the fort and his troops on shore on both sides of it.

Observing this and in view of the fact that he was lost beyond earthly help and that it would be temerity for so few men to await the attack of so many and in such force, because the fort was built of timbers and not completely finished, and since if he and the men with him were lost it meant nothing more nor less than the loss of the non-combatants who, by his order, had retired to the bush,

women and children, to the number of about two hundred and fifty persons, the general summoned a council of the persons of most weight who were present to determine what should be done. They resolved to withdraw through a swamp, at great risk because they were surrounded by the enemy. They removed from the fort nothing but their persons, the flag and their arms because there was no opportunity to do more.

They withdrew to the place where the rest of the people were in retreat. The only thing they could do before they left was to throw two bronze falcons into the moat, which was being built.

Deponent knows, and it was obvious, that had not the general taken this measure, not only the men with him in the fort but also those who had withdrawn to the bush, must have perished because of the evil intention which the Indians demonstrated in that, when they saw the soldiers in the fort fighting and the rest of the people in retreat, they sacked and looted the city, entering its houses (p. 13) and carrying off everything, leaving nothing.

The day after the garrison evacuated it became known that the corsair took possession of the fort and sacked it. Immediately he entered the town, where he remained about six days. At the end of this time he burned everything and carried off what food supplies there were and the artillery. Similarly he burned Fort San Juan and made sail on a course for Santa Elena. They said that although the corsair made every endeavour to converse with soldiers of the fort, the general was vigilant to prevent this.

This is the truth on the oath he took, and he signed his name. He affirmed and ratified this deposition and said that he was about thirty-six years old.—Pedro Miguel de Valdés . . .¹

Document No. 52²

[Pedro Menéndez Marqués to the House of Trade, San Agustín, August 30, 1586]

(p. 1)

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Very Illustrious Sir

By way of Havana I have twice reported to your lordship on events here, and so also I reported by Captain Vicente González

¹ The depositions which follow add nothing substantial to these two and are therefore omitted.

² *A. de I.*, 42-1-8/3, Contratación 5108. 1/2 *pliego*, original.

who left here on July 17 with despatches. Therefore in this communication I will not repeat nor say more than that two days later, on the 19th of July, Captain Juan de Posada arrived with the reinforcements and relief he brought, which came very opportunely.

According to what he says and what we have learned here from the Indians I think that this corsair has an establishment in this country and not far from here, for some of his ships entered a harbour beyond Santa Elena and told the Indians that they were going to their village, which was nearby.

If this is true he will not fail to return this spring to raid this coast and if he returns he will reduce it to utter ruin. I am writing to His Majesty in the matter, entreating him to send relief quickly or, at least, to combine the forts in one, which will then be reasonably strong, although the corsair is so powerful that everything is puny in comparison. Unless this relief arrives, or promise of it, during the month of December, or the middle of January at latest, we shall be completely lost.

I beg your lordship to favour me in so far as may be possible to your lordship, whose very illustrious persons and houses Our Lord preserve and increase through many years as we servitors of your lordship desire.

San Agustin, August 30, 1586.

Illustrious Sir

Your lordship's servant kisses your lordship's hands.

Pedro Menéndez Marquéz (Rubric).

(p. 2) As I was closing this letter an Indian came in from Santa Elena to say that as he left there, which must have been on the 18th of this month, eight sail appeared off Santa Elena, five being large ships and the other three, small; and these three entered and sounded the bar, and went out again, after which they all disappeared. When this Indian was asked why he brought no letter from Gutierre de Miranda he said that he was busied with his men in defence of the place and could not write but bade him relate what he saw, adding that if anything further occurred Gutierre de Miranda would advise. This may be a fabrication of the natives. Nevertheless I immediately sent an ensign in a small bark which I had here, to learn the truth. He will be back in fifteen days at latest. If it is anything important I will inform your lordship by a ship I have here.

Very Illustrious Sir

Your Lordship's servant kisses your lordship's hands.

Pedro Menéndez Marquéz (Rubric).

Document No. 53¹

[Diego Fernández de Quiñones to the Crown, Havana,
September —, 1586]

(p. 1)

†

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty . . .

(p. 2) . . . On the 18th [of August] . . . at four in the afternoon a launch from Florida entered this harbour . . . It brought news that the corsair Francis Drake had not found the harbour of Santa Elena. Seeking it, he entered another seven leagues this side. Since he did not see the fort he made sail and passed by Santa Elena in the night. He put off pinnaces to locate the entrance to the port and fired artillery, to see if the fort would reply. Gutierre de Miranda recognized that this was the corsair, for Pedro Menéndez Marqués had previously warned him, and ordered that no piece of artillery or harquebus be discharged nor any light shown. Since he could discover nothing, the corsair sailed by and entered another port four leagues beyond Santa Elena and there again fired his artillery. Since he found no fort there he took in water and firewood, felled masts for his ships, and from there proceeded on his course toward the Newfoundland Banks.

Pedro Menéndez Marqués writes me that he took the depositions of three negroes who speak Spanish and remained behind when the corsair left. They say he meant to leave all the negroes he had in a fort and settlement established at Jacan by the English who went there a year ago. (p. 3) There he intended to leave the 250 blacks and all the small craft he had, and cross to England with only the larger vessels with which he threatened these forts and this city, to which he says he will return when it shall be less ready to receive him.

This settlement and fort of theirs at Jacan are directly west of Bermuda, 250 leagues from Santa Elena, from which position they can readily attack the fleets at any season . . .

. . . San Cristóbal de la Habana, September —, 1586.

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Your Majesty's most loyal, faithful vassal and servant kisses Your Majesty's royal feet.

Diego Fernández de Quiñones (Rubric).

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 126. 1 *pliego*, original.

Document No. 54¹

[Juan de Posada² to the Crown, San Agustin, September 2,
1586]

(p. 1)

†

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

Fifty days after I left those realms I arrived in these provinces, having called at no intermediate port, a thing no man before me has accomplished. I sailed on a course different from that taken by other pilots who have come hither. And certainly I believe this was ordained by God for, although my arrival was late with respect to the corsair himself, because the damage was already done and he had gone, I came in time to avoid that which our people feared from the aborigines since ours had no fort, artillery, food supplies, or munitions, and, what was the worst, the natives were plotting to kill them all—soldiers, women and children—as has been ascertained within the last eight days. The reinforcement I brought in men and supplies put an end to this danger, and to want, and to the audacity of these savages. Had I arrived fifteen days later I do truly believe that all would have perished . . .

The Englishman left happy, it seems, to fall upon Santa Elena, but because there are shoals along the shore he kept well out and when he sighted the coast again he found that he had passed by. He had a fair wind, so that he could not turn back. Therefore he entered a bay there, where he landed a party and greatly flattered the Indians of that district, assuring them that in the spring the English would return and that they had a settlement on the coast near.

All this was learned in consequence of measures the general took and gifts which he gave those Indians. The Indians say that from there he sailed coasting the land toward the northwest. (p. 2)

What confirms the supposition and assures his return, in addition to what was learned of the Indians, is that although he had burned this city and fort he did no damage at all to an Indian village which is a cannon's shot from here. On the contrary, he sent persons there to flatter these natives, just as he did with those yonder; but they

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fé 89. 1 *pliego*, original.

² Cf. Document No. 52.

found the village deserted because in addition to being Catholics and such close neighbours, they had withdrawn to the bush with their women and children.

The corsair carried off with him a great many negroes and Turks from the galleys, according to the three negroes belonging to Your Majesty who ran away from him and are here. They understand certainly that the enemy has a settlement near these provinces and that these slaves are for use there . . . (p. 3) . . .

. . . San Agustín, September 2, 1586.

Your sacred Catholic Royal Majesty's humble servant who kisses Your Majesty's royal feet.

Juan de Posada (Rubric).

Document No. 55¹

[The House of Trade to the Crown, Seville, September 5,
1586]

(p. 1)

†

Sacred Catholic Royal Majesty

On the 3rd of the present month the caravel of which Pedro Bernal Cermeño is master entered the port of San Lucar de Barrameda. He was dispatched by the governor and royal officials and warden of the city of San Cristóbal de la Havana with news that Francis Drake with his fleet appeared within sight of that city on May 29 and disappeared on the 31st without landing men or doing any damage there.

On June 6 he arrived at the port of San Agustín in Florida and on the 7th landed troops and artillery and battered the fort for two days and two nights. Although Pedro Menéndez defended himself, because he could no longer defend himself against the enemy he decided to evacuate the fort and the town and to retire to the bush, whither he had sent the women and the children and his invalids. Francis Drake burned the fort and houses of the town and

¹ *A. de I.*, 42-1-8/3, Contratación 5108. 1 *pliego*, draft. The original, signed by Licentiated Diego de Zúñiga, Ochoa de Urquiza and Juan de Spinosa, is preserved in *A. de I.*, 46-6-3/7, Contratación 5169, Vol. 7, f. 159 reverse.

remained there until the 12th, careening a ship. He steered thence for Santa Elena but because he could not make the port he could do nothing and continued on his course.

Being informed of the loss of San Agustin, the governor and officials of Havana sent the relief in food supplies and artillery and other things for which Pedro Menéndez Marqués asked, as shown by lists and writs which they sent us, of which accurate copies are enclosed herewith, and by the deposition which Pedro Bernal Cermeño made at San Lucar (also enclosed) to which we refer . . .

We also enclose another relation furnished by the governor and officials of Havana of a deposition they received from Pedro Sanchez, seaman, native of Zaragoza, who escaped from Francis Drake's fleet at Cape San Antonio where the Englishman lay five days, taking on water and firewood. From this Your Majesty will see, in brief, what Francis Drake did at Cartagena and the intentions he had of going to Rio de la Hacha and Honduras and other parts, and the reason why he did not do so. According (p. 2) to this account and to advices so far received it does not appear that he has done more than take Santo Domingo and Cartagena and San Agustin.

Pedro Menéndez Marqués sent Captain Vicente González in another caravel with news of the loss of San Agustin and events there and to report to Your Majesty on all that happened. From the accompanying deposition Your Majesty will understand what a crossing he made and the corsairs he saw and the adventures he encountered.¹

Blas González, master of another advice-caravel, has also arrived, sent by the governor and royal officials of Cartagena to report Francis Drake's departure with his fleet from that port, and from the deposition which he has made (enclosed herewith) Your Majesty will see that this fleet was in that harbour 64 days, and what it did there . . . (p. 3).

From Havana and from Florida and from everywhere else they ask for artillery and arms and munitions and equipment, in order to be prepared, for Francis Drake has threatened those coasts. We entreat Your Majesty to order this looked to in season and to provide them with what they ask, inasmuch as there are many corsairs and they cannot defend themselves without these things. . . .

¹ If Vicente González made a deposition in these matters it has eluded the present editor's best efforts to locate it. It will be noted that the text may not refer to a deposition made by him, but to others, perhaps those here presented as enclosures, which refer to him.

(Enclosure No. 1)¹

[Pedro Bernal Cermeño, deposition, San Lucar de Barrameda, September 3, 1586]

(p. 1)

... +

In the city of San Lucar de Barrameda on the third day of the month of September in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty six, by order of his excellency the Duke de la Ciudad de Medina Sidonia, Pedro Bernal Cermeño, master of the ship *San Francisco y San Buenaventura*, which has just come in from the ports of San Juan de Ulua and San Cristóbal de la Havana, having gone thither from the harbour of this city with despatches from His Majesty for those places at the end of last year, was duly sworn and on his oath so taken was examined as follows:

Asked when deponent left the port² of San Juan de Ulua in New Spain and who dispatched him, he said that he left that port for Havana with certain infantry sent thither in the beginning of the month of April of this year, and that he was sent to Havana by Don Juan Velasco, captain of the fortress of San Juan de Ulua . . .³ . . . and . . . he reached Havana . . . on the sixteenth day of . . . April.

Asked if he encountered any corsair ship on the way, he said no.

. . . deponent left Havana for Spain on (p. 2) the fourth of last July, sent by the governor and warden and royal officials of Cuba.

The English fleet arrived six leagues east of Havana in the vicinity of Jaruco. According to the account given by the pilot of a frigate who saw them, they were fourteen large vessels and eleven pinnaces. This fleet had chased the frigate and compelled her to drive ashore eight leagues from Havana. The crew escaped by land and as soon as they came into Havana the governor and warden sent Captain Vicente González and another man on horseback down the coast as far as Matanzas to learn where the English fleet was and what it was doing. These men went and returned within four days with the report that they had ridden along the whole coast as far as Matanzas and seen no sail.

Then the governor and warden sent out two frigates with soldiers from the garrison, deponent in command of one of these vessels and

¹ ² *pliegos*, legalized copy.

² As he set out came news that Drake was lying across his course with 30 sails. See numerous documents in *A. de I.*, 42-1-7/12, Contratación 5107.

³ To shorten, questions, etc., have been omitted as far as possible.

Captain Vicente González in command of the other. Orders were that deponent should go to the vicinity of Las Tortugas and La Sonda and reconnoitre there and thence cross on a southerly course to the island of Cuba and return past the Organos and Pan de Cabañas and Mariel, while Captain Vicente González went to the Cabeza de los Martires which is on the Florida coast, there to learn from the Indians whether they had seen any ships. Deponent and Captain Vicente González carried out these orders punctually (p. 3) as given them by the governor and warden, and in none of the places mentioned saw any ship or any person who could give them news of any.

As soon as they returned to Havana the governor and warden sent a frigate to the viceroy of New Spain and to the general of the fleet which is there, informing them of these happenings, as deponent has related them, and then ordered deponent to return to Spain with certain despatches, wherefore deponent sailed on July fourth . . . he took a north-northeasterly course and disembogued in four days.

Asked whether he saw any ship in the channel, deponent said no, and that he left the port of Havana in company with a ship, Blas González Maraña, master, which was sailing as an advice-boat for Spain from the city of Cartagena, and another vessel which the governor and warden of Havana were sending to Florida with food supplies and a body of soldiers. Before they entered the channel, two days after they left Havana, they were separated in a storm and deponent did not again sight the ship which was going to Florida, but did presently see Blas González's ship, in company with which deponent crossed as far as the Azores, without encountering any other ship during this crossing.

It was on the first day of August that they (p. 4) sighted Cuervo island, for which they had been sailing in forty and a half degrees. Off that island at daybreak there were in sight from deponent's and from Blas González's ship, to the eastward, two large ships¹ and a pinnace which approached deponent's ship and Blas González's and chased them from dawn until mid-night of that day. Ten leagues from Cuervo island on the north side they overhauled Blas González's ship and carried it off.

Because he was becalmed and the corsairs were coming on, using sails and oars, deponent put off his boat and with all of His Majesty's despatches and private mail abandoned his ship, under full sail and headed for the open sea, while he pulled for shore. When the corsairs observed this they put off a Biscay shallop, manned, in pursuit,

¹ Unidentified; French.

but deponent reached the shore before the shallop could overtake him.

When he abandoned ship deponent left on board a letter addressed to the commander of the said three vessels in which he said that if he desired to admit the ransom of the said ship, to let deponent know at Cuervo island, and he would redeem it. Two days later the three corsair ships and deponent's and Blas González's ships arrived at Flores island, which is three leagues (p. 5) from Cuervo island, and as soon as he saw them proceeding thither he crossed to Flores and the general commanding the three ships, who was called John —(?)¹ wrote deponent a letter in which he earnestly entreated deponent to go to see him, saying that he would admit ransom of his ship. Blas González brought this letter to deponent and returned to the said general to arrange for the ransom of the said ship, for deponent did not care to go to see him, in order not to leave His Majesty's despatches unprotected. Blas González arranged with the said general for the ransom of deponent's ship and it was fixed at three hundred and fifty ducats, which deponent paid and received back his ship; and the general departed with his three vessels and left behind deponent's and Blas González's.

Blas González told deponent that the general told him that he had come from the coast of Jamaica and that off Puerto Rico he had taken a ship laden with wines which had sailed from Garachico for the Indies; and that his second in command, called Captain Thomas, in a boat with his pilot and some men, went on shore at Cape San Antonio to dry meat on an estate belonging to a resident of Havana, and the owner of the cattle ranch with some Indians and men he had with him surrounded and captured Captain Thomas (p. 6) and killed the pilot, but the rest escaped to the ship in the boat. He said that Captain Thomas was a prisoner in Havana where, when deponent left, the governor was holding him for delivery to General don Juan de Guzman to bring to Spain.

While deponent with his ship, and Blas González with him, lay at anchor at Flores, two days after the three French ships had left, an English ship of fifty tons and a pinnace arrived and came upon Blas González's ship while the crew were on shore getting water. They took it out and carried it off with them and then attacked deponent's ship. Deponent had taken refuge under the guns of a bulwark in that island. Nevertheless, without any fear of the battery and without its being able to damage them, the English boarded deponent's ship and looted it. Because when he went ashore with

¹ ... *Vordoneles* ...

his men deponent had removed the foresail, they left the ship but carried away the mainsail and everything deponent had in the vessel, and with Blas González's ship this English vessel and its pinnace went off.

After three days deponent sailed for La Terceira to refurnish and get sails, and as he proceeded he encountered a ship on board of which was Captain Vicente González who had left Havana for Florida and was coming from Florida to Spain with despatches for His Majesty; and presently, on board a frigate, Blas González (p. 7) Maraña came into the harbour of La Terceira with the despatches he had for His Majesty which the corsair general had returned to him (he did not touch them), and so also there came into the port of La Terceira a dismantled ship with some sailors on board who were coming up from Brazil with Pedro Sarmiento de Ganboa, governor of the Strait of Magellan. They had been robbed by two English ships off La Terceira and these English carried away Pedro Sarmiento and the pilot and four other men. On his ship deponent took nine of these seamen, and in his Vicente González took the rest and Blas González, and in this fashion deponent with his ship, and Vicente González with his, left the port of La Terceira on the twenty-first of August last and sailed in company six days, to a point about thirty leagues from Cape Saint Vincent, where with his ship, Vicente González withdrew from the company of deponent, who never saw him again.

Two days after they had so separated five English ships chased deponent. Their flagship was 500 tons burden and the others 300, and they pursued him from one dawn until eleven o'clock, when they took another course, and deponent is very certain that those five ships had captured Vicente González's vessel because they were sighted at daybreak in the quarter where Vicente González's ship was seen at nightfall, and in company with the five ships deponent saw a small one resembling (p. 8) that of Vicente González, which made deponent even surer that he had been captured.

And so deponent continued on his course until this morning when dawn found him off this city's bar, and this is the truth on the oath he took and he signed it with his name.—Pedro Bernal Cermeño.—Leonardo de Ayala.—Read by the original which remains in my possession.

Leonardo de Ayala (Rubric).

(Enclosure No. 2)¹

[Pedro Sanchez, summary of a deposition made at Havana]:

(p. 1)

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Pedro Sanchez, seaman, native of Zaragoza, at Cape San Antonio, escaped from the corsair Francis Drake by whom with a pinnace he was captured at Tolu on the Main where he was on board a bark laden with maize when the corsair put in at Cartagena, says that:

The corsair had sixteen large ships, including in this number two shallops; and he has four pinnaces and barks, to the number of 30 sails.

He has 1200 men, seamen and soldiers, wretched people. Many of his men have died.

He carried off the Moors from the galleys at Cartagena and at Santo Domingo, about 200, whom he promised to send to their own country, for they would pass through the Strait of Gibraltar.

He carried off 150 negroes and negresses from Santo Domingo and Cape Verde—more from Santo Domingo.

He left Cartagena destroyed; what remained of the city, with the Franciscan monastery and some bells, was ransomed for 120,000 ducats.

Merchandise the enemy seized at Cartagena was ransomed.

They got a great deal of plate and money out of the houses where it had been buried. The booty obtained amounted to over 200,000 ducats, not including the ransom of 120,000 ducats.

They burned all the images they found.

After they had come to an agreement the citizens had ordinary intercourse with the corsair; and they dined together while negotiating the ransom.

Their admiral is a Portuguese and is called Don Francisco Dragon; and all the pilots are Portuguese and Genoese, and the ships' masters also, all well acquainted with this course and with the ports of Indies.

He treats all nationalities well excepting Spaniards, and if they are Castellians or Biscayans he treats them ill and they spit in their faces.

They called the people of Cartagena poltroons, and ridiculed them because with so few men the corsair had taken a land so well populated and so rich. (p. 2)

¹ 1 *pliego*.² Cf. Document No. 35.

After he had left Cartagena he returned again to unload a trading vessel which he took in Santo Domingo because it was leaking. He was there fifteen days and burned five more of his large vessels because they leaked badly.

The governor and Don Pedro Vique did not appear in Cartagena while the English were there.

When he left Santo Domingo this corsair intended to go to Rio de la Hacha but his pilots told him it was an open beach and there was a heavy sea, and advised him not to do it.

After he left Cartagena he wanted to go to Jamaica to provide himself with *cazabe* bread and meat, and he held a council on this point and changed his mind.

All the time he was in Cartagena and after he sailed from there he took no Spanish vessel except one bark at Tolu laden with maize.

He has with him a soldier called something-or-other Villagomez who was degraded in this city, and one Nicolas de Mendiola, native of Mexico, whom the *Audiencia* of Santo Domingo sentenced to be quartered because he forged a royal provision; and an Indian of this island, reared in this city and its jurisdiction, called Juan Guillen. He was whipped here and condemned to the galleys of Santo Domingo, whence he fled with the corsair.

The corsair intended to attack Havana and these three men mentioned in the preceding paragraph told him they would bring him safely into the city, but that the fortress would kill all his men and the townspeople would take refuge in the fortress and that everything was in good order and that the troops were good and that Havana would be relieved from New Spain and from other parts every eight days, and that he would be lost; and so the corsair said that if he had 6000 men he would make the attempt and that he was amazed that, knowing that he has been working for four years to raise this expedition, His Majesty should not have taken greater precautions.

Don Antonio wished to come with this fleet and the queen of England (to whom three of its ships belong) would not con(p. 3)sent to it, but sent Francis Drake because he was well acquainted with the Indies.

Don Antonio will come next year with a great fleet to these parts and to New Spain.

He did not wish to bring very large ships because of the bars and shallows on these coasts.

He feared that His Majesty would have sent an armada and army against England; and if His Majesty took that realm, which he did

not think likely, they would go to Barbary, for the queen had her ambassador with the Turk, to whom she had sent great gifts.

He said that if he met the New Spain fleet he would take it and for this purpose he desired to fall upon Havana shortly.

The people of Cartagena dallied and delayed paying the ransom and the corsair said to them: 'You think that I do not understand you, that you are expecting the galleons,' and bade them to comprehend that he cared nothing for the galleons, that not one of them should escape him, for he had great inventions and fireworks to burn up opposing ships.

The fleet from Nombre de Dios had remained in port for fear of the enemy.

At Cape San Antonio he took on water and firewood, and the corsair himself helped to load and went into the water to his armpits, fully clothed and shod, carrying barrels and demijohns of water.

He is proceeding straight to Newfoundland to learn whether His Majesty is attacking England and according to what news he receives he is prepared to sail with his fleet.

The vice-admiral and a galleon were leaking badly and although he said that at Matanzas in Cuba (p. 4) he intended to careen he did not do so because of the fear he entertained lest His Majesty be attacking England and lest he run short of food supplies.

He is carrying off 120 pieces of heavy ordnance, not including the artillery he got at Santo Domingo, which must be more than 80 pieces, all brass.

He said that he had sent part of his fleet to the Straits of Magellan and to the Pacific.

He said that last year the English settled on the Florida coast, far beyond Santa Elena.

That from Santo Domingo he sent to England six vessels laden with hides, sugars and ginger and other things.

(Enclosure No. 3)¹

[Blas González, deposition, Sevilla, September 4, 1586]

(p. 1)

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In the House of Trade for Indies in this city of Seville on the fourth day of the month of September in the year one thousand five hundred

¹ 2 *pliegos*, original.

and eighty six, by order of His Majesty's president and officials of the said House, Blas González, shipmaster on the Indies course, who has just come in from the said Indies was duly sworn and promised to speak the truth, to whom the following questions were put:

Asked to depose and state in detail everything that happened to him on his voyage to the Indies, both on his way out and upon his way back, and what news there is of English and French corsairs, and whatever else he may have to say, deponent said that . . . he left from the bar of San Lucar de Barrameda on the twenty-second of last December, eighty five, as master of his ship, sent as an advice-boat by His Majesty's president and judges of the said House, with His Majesty's despatches and theirs for Santo Domingo and Cartagena and Honduras and Santa Marta. Between San Lucar and the Canaries they met a strong southwesterly wind and unpropitious weather which broke their mainmast and they were six days in making the Canaries where they had to put in to repair the said mast.

There in the Canaries deponent was informed that the corsair Francis Drake had been there and at Palma island with thirty or forty sail of his fleet, and it was said there that he had gone to the Strait of Magellan.

Deponent continued upon his voyage across the Atlantic until he fell in with Matalino island which is two hundred leagues from Santo Domingo. From there he continued upon his course, avoiding La Saona, until he sighted Cauzedo, which is five leagues from Santo Domingo, toward the north. Thence he coasted (p. 2) along, steering for the port of Santo Domingo. Ashore near Cauzedo they saw people and a flag, a little back from the beach in the woods. These persons made signals, waving to deponent's ship. Observing that there was no vessel there to offend him and supposing that these were friends, deponent put off in his boat with three or four seamen and youngers and went in near to the land, whence he recognized that they were fifteen or twenty Spaniards and natives of the island. They demanded to know what deponent was doing in steering for a harbour which was lost, in that English corsairs with a very large fleet of forty ships had taken and sacked Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico and La Yaguana. They said there were a hundred corsair ships thereabouts which were going to take Havana and Cartagena and the places along the coast of the Main. They said that the enemy's fleet was in occupation of the port of Santo Domingo and that the English were in possession of the city.

Deponent asked where the *Audiencia* of Santo Domingo was and they said that it was at Santiago de la Vega. Deponent bade these

persons await him there and he would return to his ship and fetch the despatches he had for Santo Domingo that they might deliver them to the persons to whom they were addressed.

As he was returning toward his ship a lookout (whom deponent always kept in the top) called out that two pinnaces were coming from the port of Santo Domingo and that they were steering straight for the ship. Therefore, in order that they might not take his ship with all the despatches he carried, deponent hurried on board, hauled up his boat, and without waiting to deliver the despatches, for there was no time, (p. 3) made sail in great haste and fled to sea, and the pinnaces pursued him for three leagues. The wind favoured him, and it was so strong that his ship sailed fastest, and so he steered for Cartagena. As he fled from the pinnaces deponent saw many sail both in the port of Santo Domingo and outside it, along the bar.

Deponent desired to go from there to Santa Marta, to warn that place, and from there to send warning to Cartagena by land and by sea, but he encountered such strong contrary winds that he could not make Santa Marta and steered for Cartagena. He fell in with Punta de la Galera on the twelfth day of March of the current year near nightfall and deponent with his ship went in among the shallows there between the islands and lay in a cross sea all night.

Next day, which was Shrove Tuesday, the thirteenth of that month, deponent saw in the sea many pieces of wood of a ship which seemed to have broken up, and he suspected that Cartagena might have fallen. Therefore that day in the afternoon he passed between the mainland and the island of Carey, which they call the Boca Chica entrance to the harbour of Cartagena, and in a hidden inlet on the landward side he anchored in a place where he could not be seen from the port of Cartagena. When night fell he put off his boat and with five seamen and His Majesty's despatches addressed to Cartagena deponent made his way into the port. To landward they saw a light and cautiously drew near to it and found that it was a Cartagena frigate which was leaving laden with clothing but lay at anchor there, and those on board informed deponent that the Englishman had not arrived at Cartagena.

(p. 4) They said that the galleys' tender with soldiers on board was stationed like a sentinel at Boca Grande entrance to the harbour, and they went to the tender and there four soldiers came on board from their boat and they all proceeded to disembark with the despatches at Cartagena.

They arrived in the city at dawn on Ash Wednesday, the four-

teenth of March, and the soldiers conducted deponent to Don Pedro Vique's house, to whom he delivered the despatches he carried addressed to him. From there deponent went to the house of the governor of Cartagena, Pedro Fernández de Busto, and delivered to him all the other despatches he had, both those addressed to him and also those for Peru and Santa Marta and for Honduras, that he might have them in charge, for the governor asked for them all, saying that he would take care of those which were to be forwarded. Deponent asked the governor for a man or an Indian to take to Santa Marta the despatch for that place, because it was two days journey, for which deponent would pay. The governor told him to leave it to him, that he would forward the despatches. Deponent then distributed some of the mail he had for private persons, as set down in his register.

While he was at dinner, in the house of the treasurer for Cartagena, at about mid-day, a great noise arose, a call to arms and outcry that the corsair was entering the harbour. Deponent went to the waterfront and in his boat conveyed soldiers to the fort, which is in the harbour at the entrance to the inner haven. He then went to look after his ship, which had come in by Boca Grande. When he reached it he took it into an inlet within the lagoon, through some shoals, and hid it in an arm of the sea among thick mangroves, and cut the masts that they might not be seen, and there deponent remained two days.

From there he saw how (p. 5) Francis Drake's fleet entered the port of Cartagena. It consisted of some 21 large ships and other small craft. That night he landed men on Hicacos Point and took and sacked Cartagena. The following dawn found the city occupied and despoiled, deponent understood from persons who passed by, one after another. During the morning deponent sent a man from his ship into Cartagena to see what was happening and to carry a letter to the high sheriff. This man returned the same day and stated that Cartagena was in the possession of the English and that its inhabitants were scattered in the country.

At the end of two days deponent left his ship where it was and went to Cartagena and to its environs where the inhabitants were encamped. The enemy was in possession of the place and fortified there with trenches and ditches and artillery, and he learned and heard it publicly said that the enemy had taken Cartagena without a fight and without any defence whatever having been made. He also heard it publicly stated that General Francis Drake said that he was going to write to His Majesty about the lack of preparedness

and little defence he had encountered at Cartagena. Deponent estimated the corsair's forces to be four thousand men, rather more than fewer. A few days later deponent's ship burst her bottom where she lay hidden, and went down.

Deponent remained in Cartagena and its environs about two months, during which time he observed that the Spaniards moved about Cartagena freely and were unmolested. The governor (p. 6) was at Turbaco, three leagues from Cartagena, and deponent heard that Don Pedro Vique was on an estate of his.

Deponent understood that the people of Cartagena gave the Englishman one hundred and twenty thousand ducats ransom for the city and that although they offered part of this in jewels he would not accept but demanded that the ransom be paid by weight, and that they paid him the whole sum in bullion with silver belonging to His Majesty and to private persons, which silver was left in Cartagena by Ojeda's ship, and that they were endeavouring to collect it and were collecting it, and assigning his share to be repaid by each property owner.

The Englishman burned nearly half of the houses in the city and badly damaged the cathedral and monasteries.

The corsair remained in Cartagena 38 days the first time and left with his fleet. It was reported that he was going to Honduras. After five or six days he came back to Cartagena, driven by a storm, and was there with his whole fleet for a total of some 60 days, but this second time Francis Drake did not land more of his men. After which time he departed from Cartagena and the report was that he was going to Honduras.

It was said that Francis Drake remained so long at Cartagena in order to await the armada from Spain, for he wanted to fight it.

As soon as the enemy fleet had gone deponent at Cartagena bought a small ship in which to come to Spain and left Cartagena the fourteenth of June with despatches from the governor and royal officials for His Majesty and for the president and officials of this House.

Because he had word that there were corsairs off Cape San Antonio deponent came to Havana without sighting (p. 7) land elsewhere and entered the port in fear of a ship they saw. The governor of Havana held him there six days and despatched him in company with a vessel which was being sent with food supplies and munitions to Florida, and delivered to him the despatches which he brings from there. They disembogued and the vessel bound for Florida went on its way and deponent continued on his course

until he sighted Flores island at the beginning of the month of August.

There they encountered two French corsair ships and a large *zabra* which captured them and robbed them of everything they had and of the despatches and letters, and carried them to Flores island along with Pedro Bernal Cermeño. They robbed him also and carried off his ship. At Flores deponent ransomed the despatches for fifty ducats and they gave him his ship. Very shortly afterwards, deponent being on shore with the despatches, two other ships came up and untied his ship and carried it off.

From Flores deponent proceeded in a boat with the despatches to Fayal and thence to La Terceira, where he found the ship of Vicente González, coming from Florida, in which deponent came to Spain and landed at Ayamonte for fear of the Moors. Thence they travelled overland to bring the news to this House, and this is what occurred.

Asked what troops there were in the garrison at Havana and in what shape they were, deponent said he understood that they were in very good shape and in good spirit and that they were numerous, but he did not learn how many men there were.

In Havana he heard it said that the English (p. 8) fleet had passed by the port and had stopped there and sent boats to the harbour mouth, and that the ships tacked back and forth for some days in sight of Havana, after which they had disembogued and gone to Florida and destroyed the forts, and that the ship which left with deponent from Havana carried subsistence and munitions and other things for the relief. Deponent does not know what else the Englishman's fleet did except that it was said that he was going to attack Santa Elena.

At La Terceira deponent heard it said that the English fleet had taken a vessel coming from the Strait of Magellan but he is not definitely informed as to what happened. And this that he has stated and declared is the truth on the oath he took, and he is over forty years old, and he signed it with his name.

Blas González (Rubric).

Before me, *Diego de Cordoba*, clerk (Rubric).

Document No. 56¹

[García Fernández de Torrequemada² to the Crown,
Santo Domingo, February 1, 1587]

(p. 1)

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On February 23 and April 14 of last year I wrote³ to Your Majesty concerning the hardship which came upon this city with the arrival of the English fleet. I outlined the situation in the large, only, and dealt with the most urgent matters and the general state of everything and the great danger in which all this colony will be, invariably, if reliance is placed in force, arms, defensive measures, and the military prowess of this people, for among them there is not a soldier, nor a captain, who knows what war is, or strategy, or has seen, or perhaps even heard of such. That I may at no time fail to advise Your Majesty of the country's needs, in case Your Majesty be pleased to hear of them and order necessary provision made, it has seemed to me to be my duty to go into details in this despatch (as I did not in the other) concerning the matter which gave rise to the event.

Your Majesty is doubtless fully aware of the few precautions and little discipline usually observed by an untrained and untried population as against veteran and experienced soldiery; and also it is notorious that the inhabitants of this city are persons assembled to do business in trade and to attend to suits at law, and, further, that only one or another of them understands these matters although very few desire to know anything else. While musters are held as a matter of course and various sorts of persons figure in them, some are litigants and others are merchants, some are haggling shopkeepers and others those who find their profit and support in rural parts. These reviews usually bring out 500 men, but withal it is to be borne in mind that among them not a hundred nor even 60 can be called *harquebusiers* nor would dare to lift such a weapon to their shoulders because to do so is not their proper calling nor pertinent thereto, nor is it the purpose which brought them thither or the means of their support here.

Similarly, as to the horse, although 300 mounted men be assembled

¹ *A. de I.*, 53-6-14, Santo Domingo 80. 2 *pliegos*, original.

² His Majesty's factor for Hispaniola. '... a Dominican, I think—a fellow of fine phrases (the first example I have found of true tropical eloquence!) ...'—Wright, I. A., *The Early History of Cuba* (New York, 1916), p. 341.

³ Not seen.

by summoning to such a muster those persons who live six and eight and ten leagues round the city, engaged in growing food crops and raising cattle, it is not easy to get them together in less than ten days, and the animals on which they appear will eat nothing but grass and are not accustomed to be shod. They are good only for field work and for nothing else and their (p. 2) riders are unarmed except for a sort of lance of little worth and a poorly cinched wooden saddle. Actually, to assemble in this city a couple of dozen horses for a tourney is impossible and explains why a mount in a proper stable represents a cost of 200 ducats a year. Few persons can afford it, and therefore on the day the Englishman appeared there were 36 horse, a number which diminished to sixteen; and it must be added that of these not more than ten or twelve were suitable mounts.

Both foot and horse were without defensive weapons except lances and shields (for the horse) and harquebuses (for the foot)—mostly without munitions—and mouldy pikes and rusty swords. The climate here is such that every harquebus, sword and halberd needs a man with no other occupation, to keep it clean. I speak of this from such experience that I assure Your Majesty that the sword I carry in my belt is cleaned every time I return home and nevertheless it rusts. This happens to the most careful person, and the same is true of all other weapons. Your Majesty will realize what occurs, then, in the case of the merchant or shop-keeper or litigant who comes and remains here only to earn his living and get back to Castile, or, if he be a resident of the colony, seeks only to feed his wife and family, inasmuch as the misery and poverty of this land yields no further profit, and even this only at the price of much sweat and exertion and sickness.

As for powder, the little there is in my house is refined in the sun nearly every day and nevertheless it deteriorates. Further, it must be remembered that all the powder is imported into the island and usually it is not to be purchased, nor are there any armourers who know their business, or artisans acquainted with any sort of weapon, to repair it. To put into condition 30 muskets which the officials at Seville sent as relief—they arrived four months after the Englishman left—has required another four months time.

These muskets came with another 28 harquebuses (mostly in bad condition) and ten hundredweight of powder, arriving in the month of June following upon the catastrophe of the preceding January. This, as against a royal armada of 32 sails, carrying five or six thousand men, provided with musketproof corselets as became the veterans which most of them were, and the third part of their shot.

musketeers! Given, too, the whole course of the event, our lack of warning, arms, preparation and of competent military officers of any experience whatsoever, from the first in command down. This thing must have had Divine sanction, as a punishment for the people's sins.

Although it is true that men become ministers and masters, it is understood that they usually pass through an apprenticeship and learn from a beginning, through means, in training under experienced teachers. If this be not so, undesired results follow; and I humbly entreat Your Majesty to deign to permit me to say that in making appointments to office consideration should always be had to each candidate's qualifications, his aptitudes, condition, experience and talent.

I have written at length in order to give Your Majesty a full account and, in fine, I will conclude by saying that if the impetus and force which Francis Drake brought to bear here had suddenly appeared at the gates of Seville it would have put that city to flight, had it found the place as defenceless, without arms or soldiers, as was this city, and without any previous warning. I speak as an eye-witness who saw whereof I write, and measured the enemy's strength and organization and know how many veteran troops he had and what very experienced military officers; and I appreciate also the weakness of this city.

A third of the Englishman's foot (p. 3) were musketeers and he marched in good order with pikes in his van—and in his rearguard. He divided his forces into two columns with troops of shot, in which formations I know (from conversation with the enemy himself) that he had 2500 men whom he landed three leagues from this city.

The place was only half, or little more, enclosed by a very weak wall, without gates or artillery. Only the fort had ordnance with which to offend any enemy entering by the river, and for this there were few munitions and powder so poor in quality that the necessary range could hardly be obtained or any real effect produced.

The fort itself is merely a strong site suitable for the construction of a fortification for the defence of the harbour only. Against an enemy advancing by land it is of no use whatsoever. If Your Majesty were pleased to remedy this situation it would be very

*Engineers
needed to
determine
what
fortification
the city
might have*

necessary for engineers to make an inspection and plan other forts in the harbour itself and on the heights of the city, where the Franciscan monastery is, or the parish church of Santa Barbola, which shall be better adapted to the defence and protection of the city than this fort is. As I wrote to Your Majesty on May 17, 1578, and on

June 8 and 15 of 1580, and in other letters, it has many defects, and so I again do assure Your Majesty.

Leaving aside the event itself, lest by chance Your Majesty be pleased to know how I proceeded in the negotiations with the Englishman, I will here report thereon. For it appears that the president of this royal *Audiencia* sent Captain Juan Melgarejo, high sheriff of this city, to treat with the Englishman. He went and returned with demands and replies which were not satisfactory. Therefore, seeing their city ablaze, the people asked that I be sent in the matter. This mission was suggested to me three leagues from the city by the president, who thought only of the danger to me. I bade him consider only whether it were advisable for me to go or not, since my personal safety was of no moment. In effect, I undertook the business and concluded it the same day, and there was more than time to travel the six leagues there and back.

When I arrived the Englishman asked me if I desired to take up at once the matter upon which I had come and I replied that first I wanted to know with whom I spoke and to inform him of my identity, in conversation. My object was to stir up talk of his country and of its affairs, past and present, and of those of other realms, concerning which, because I have travelled, I am thoroughly informed, so to learn his inclinations and purposes and move him and his to my object and end. When I recognized an opportune moment, in which I had their attention, I delivered the president's letter to him, the gist of which was that he left the business entirely to me.

We met in a room—nine or ten English officers, their commander and myself—and, the matter of an agreement being proposed according to which the enemy should leave the city, I said that the first condition must be that the cathedral was not to be touched; otherwise, the people did not desire that a house remain standing. His first proposal was that I treat of the issue in Your Majesty's name, since I am Your Majesty's servitor and the fort, arsenal and government buildings here are your Majesty's. I replied that it was unanimously agreed to let the whole city burn rather than to permit any negotiation whatsoever in Your Majesty's royal name, nor did Your Majesty's greatness permit subjects by agreements to shorten Your Majesty's arm, long to avenge an affront.

In view of this determination he repeated his demand for a million ransom and I replied that I would take my departure and that he might continue to burn the city as he had begun, since in my opinion the city could not pay over 10 or 12,000 ducats. In the course of the argument, in three or four hours that the conference

lasted, (p. 4) he came down to 100,000 ducats and from that to 40,000. Because they were getting out of control and most of them dealt in the matter with an heretical animosity inclined rather to destruction, in order that the whole negotiation might not fall through, I put an end to their violent talk by saying that I had not definitely determined what the city could pay, and asked that, in order to decide upon this finally, they give me paper and ink and leave me alone awhile to calculate the maximum that could be paid. This they did. All along I had assured them that the island was by no means as rich as they supposed.

I came forth in an hour and told them that, in order to give my calculations substance, I wanted to see what houses they had already burned, since nothing could be obtained for these. They answered that all this was shilly-shallying. I argued and after two hours they ordered four or five soldiers to go with a fellow-citizen who had accompanied me,¹ whom I sent to make a list of the houses burned. When he returned I decided that the city could pay 20,150 ducats. When it seemed that the negotiations would fail he agreed to 25,000 ducats although for my part I gave him no assurance except that I would return with an answer, yes or no, within three days. This, in order that they might hope for nothing further.

They said that although Captain Juan Melgarejo had asked to visit their fleet and they had not wished to show it to him, they did desire to let me see it and to entertain me aboard the flagship. I replied that these were matters for a happy time and that I could have no pleasure in them, for I desired only to terminate the business upon which I had come. With this the idea was dropped and I went back that day to report upon what I had accomplished. Later I returned to them with the money.

In the three or four days of this interlude, at the city gates some of our people had had some argument with certain English upon points of theology which should never have come up. So it happened that at noon at the table the English general related the incident and an accursed preacher of his discoursed upon it. As a conclusion of his heretical interpretation he brought forth a Bible and here I cut short his sermon by saying in Latin that my profession was not theology and I had not come to a disputation, for them to leave that for another time. Whereupon Francis Drake ordered the argument to be closed, and closed it was.

He also insisted that he wished to give me all the sugar and hides

¹ Don Juan Maldonado? Cf. Document No. 30, enclosure.

that he had taken with the city, saying that he would deliver them wherever I might desire. I answered that I accepted in the name of the people, in order that each man might find in his house what was his. He repeated many times that I should accept the merchandise for my own since he could give it to me inasmuch as it was his to give, and he would deliver it safely wherever I might prefer. I ended this by declaring to him that I had not come to do business for myself but for the people and he had seen plainly that although I had suffered heavy loss I had not mentioned it to him.

In fine, this is what happened between us and although other arguments might be recorded I do not write them to Your Majesty because what I have related is the essential part, and sufficient.

Francis Drake knows no language but English and I talked with him through interpreters in Latin or French or Italian. He had with him an Englishman who understood Spanish a little and sometimes acted as interpreter. Drake is a man of medium stature, blonde, rather heavy than slender, merry, careful. He commands and governs imperiously. He is feared and obeyed by his men. He punishes resolutely. Sharp, restless, well-spoken, inclined to liberality and to ambition, vainglorious, boastful, not very cruel. These are qualities I noted in him during my negotiations with him. (p. 5)

In this island Your Majesty has two other fortresses which are Puerto de Plata and Bayaha, and both are an excuse to the inhabitants to settle and establish themselves in those ports for the greater accommodation of their trade with French and English. As for defence, they are none at all nor can resist a single ship if it comes to attack them, for the larger place has only 30 residents, young men and old. Especially since half a league and a league away there are other ports wherein to debark and approach the forts very easily. The fort at Bayaha has artillery, but unmounted—good for nothing but to be carried off by any enemy who may desire to do so. The best defence would be to remove the people from the sea-ports and make them live at least five or six leagues inland.¹ Then perhaps contraband trade would cease.

The president died on last November 29, 1586 . . .

God preserve Your Majesty's Catholic person.

From Santo Domingo in the island Española, on February 1, 1587.

Factor and inspector to the royal treasury
García Fernández de Torrequemada
(Rubric).

¹ This idea was later carried into effect in the extraordinary government measure accurately called 'the depopulation of the north coast of La Española.'

Document No. 57¹

[Pedro, Indian, précis of his deposition, Cartagena,
February 16, 1587]

(p. 1)

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Summary of the deposition made by Pedro, Indian, native of the province of La Margarita, prisoner in the city of Cartagena on the main, in the confession received from him on February 16, 1587, by Don Pedro de Lodeña, governor and captain general of the said city and its province, before Francisco de Hoyos, His Majesty's notary.

He said that he has been with Francis Drake, the English corsair, for twelve years, and that he fell into his power because the captain of three French ships captured him at La Margarita (of which island he is a native), from whom Francis Drake took him when he went to the Indies for the first time, in order that he might act as his interpreter with the Indians, for deponent knows English and Spanish and the language of the Indians of La Margarita, where he was born.

He left London with the corsair and went to Cape Verde and to Santo Domingo and to Cartagena, and in all three places was with him. When he started the Englishman had twenty vessels and on the way took another English ship and in Santo Domingo he took four.

In Cartagena the Englishman ordered the Indian to remain ashore and to become a muleteer and learn the roads of the realm and find out whence they got the gold and silver and to await him there, for this year he would return and take the place. He bade him await him at night at Canoa Point, for he would make a signal with a light, at sight of which the Indian was to go down to the Point, to which the Englishman would send a pinnace to fetch him. If there were no galleons in the harbour of Cartagena he would enter the port immediately and take the city. (p. 2).

He heard Francis Drake himself say that he would remain at Cartagena and would send his vice-admiral to burn Panama, for he would bring many more men than the first time; and that he would bring 50 ships, and on entering Cartagena would not land men at Canoa Point, because there are Indians along the way who might discover him before he arrived. He stated that the vice-

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-5-18, Santa Fé 89. 2 *pliegos*, a brief obviously drawn up in Spain.

admiral who is with Drake knows his way to Panama because he has been there before; and that at sea they would separate, the vice-admiral with 30 vessels to go to Panama and Francis Drake with twenty to go to Cartagena, and if the vice-admiral failed to take Panama he would return to rejoin at Cartagena.

That when he attacked and entered Cartagena Drake landed at Hicacos Point because that afternoon two horsemen showed themselves there, who went to see what the fleet was doing. Forthwith that night the enemy landed men there, who followed after the horses. They were led by Tristan,¹ their military commander. They lost heavily in the assault because from the flagship, where informant was, twenty men were missing and he does not know how many from other vessels.

When this Indian landed a Spaniard took him to the house of González, the pharmacist, a Portuguese, and kept him hidden two days in his house that he might not be seen. Along with this Indian the Englishman set ashore another (p. 3) named Juan, from Santo Domingo, who immediately went inland. He does not know where he is.

He says there were in the fleet many Italians and French and some Portuguese, and only one Castillian, a native of San Lucar, named Rodrigo, who had been in England a long time, whence he made voyages back and forth to San Lucar. There was with him another, a Portuguese called Melchor, both of whom (when Drake was ready to leave with his fleet) went to England from San Lucar to go with him to the Indies, for they were pilots who knew these coasts. And there was also in the fleet another Portuguese named Philip.

At La Margarita as a spy Francis Drake left an old Portuguese called Don Juan and his servant, also a Portuguese, named Francisquito. He set him ashore at the mouth of the harbour of La Margarita. This man was a confidant of Drake's. He is small in stature, grey beard cut in the usual fashion, dressed in red silk, with cape and black hat; and the boy is dressed in black, with a cloak of mixed² material.

Further, in Cartagena he left as a spy another Portuguese named Francisco who was a seaman aboard the flagship, a man of 27 or 28 years, tall, reddish beard, breeches and cape black, red jerkin. When the English had gone this man left by the first maize boat for

¹ Lieutenant General Carleill was in command.

² *Mezcla*, i.e., mixed in fibre and probably also in colour. Obviously, a cheaper garment.

Nombre de Dios and said he was going to Panama (p. 4) and promised to return for this Indian and to give him clothing.

At Rio de la Hacha Drake also left another man, a comrade of his, who was a small old man, dressed in black. While Drake was at Cartagena this man came here to bring him some pearls, and he came on horseback with two negroes. He can speak French. The said Juan, Indian, was to go to find this man to learn where the pearls are produced, in order to tell Francis Drake.

The said Juan had Drake's order to pass the time working at Rio de la Hacha and next summer to await Drake at the mouth of the Rio Grande, whither Drake would send three pinnaces for him. Francisco the Portuguese was to await the vice-admiral in Panama, to tell him where the silver is, and what the land affords.

This Don Juan came to England with Don Antonio (the one they call king) and there shipped with Francis Drake and was his comrade and remained in La Margarita and is to be in Curazao. In Drake's fleet it was reported that Don Antonio would raise a fleet and come to the Indies with Francis Drake and afterwards take La Terceira.

In Cartagena, in Don Alonso de Mendoza's house, he has seen an Italian called Octavius¹ who came with Francis Drake and remained (p. 5) in Cartagena; he was captured at Cape Verde and came on board of the vice-admiral, but he does not know how nor why he remained behind.

At San Lucar on the first day of June, '87, to identify the Rodrigo mentioned in this deposition, who claims to be a native of San Lucar, Juan Fernández, *alcalde* for maritime affairs, was questioned. This portion of the deposition having been read to him he stated that in twenty-four years he has not known any such man in San Lucar nor does he know or recall that from San Lucar any seaman has gone to England, except that some three years ago the English took Corniele's ship which was coming from the Indies with the armada, when it lagged behind at La Terceira, and on board this ship was a young fellow from San Lucar named Francisco García. He is well built, round faced, aged 30 years, and his head is bald from scurvy he has had. This man remained with the English and then wrote to his mother that he did not wish to return and that Francis Drake wanted to take him to the Indies, with the coasts of which he is very familiar, and that Drake had promised him to leave him there.

¹ Cf. Document No. 49 *ante*, enclosure.

Document No. 58¹

[Rodrigo Jorge, deposition, San Lucar, March 1, 1587]

(p. 1) . . . Captain Rodrigo Jorge . . . passenger on board Pedro de Bango's ship, first advice-boat of General Francisco de Noboa's New Spain fleet . . . at San Lucar de Barremeda, March 1, 1587 . . . stated that he embarked in the port of San Juan de Ulua in New Spain . . . on December 6, 1586 . . . From that port he proceeded directly to San Cristóbal de la Habana where he stayed nineteen days.

There, from the captain and master of a lateen ship which came into that harbour from the Canaries with a cargo of wines while deponent was there, the name of which deponent does not recall, but knows that it had called at Santiago de Cuba and delayed there for fear of five French ships which for more than a month had been trading in the harbour of La Isabela, deponent heard that Captain don Diego de Noguera, commanding His Majesty's two galleys stationed at Santo Domingo, had been patrolling that island and at Cape San Nicolas had encountered an English ship of a hundred and fifty tons burden and had engaged and sunk it, at Cape San Nicolas; and that six or seven negro slaves had escaped from the ship and that the captain captured them and five or six English. The rest of those on board the ship made off in a pinnace they had, which pinnace went to the port of La Isabela to warn the other five ships there that the two galleys were making for that port, whereupon they left.

When this lateen ship from the Canaries (p. 2) heard that they had gone, it proceeded to Havana and Don Diego de Noguera returned with his two galleys to La Yaguana and was there making chain-balls, for he had none, with the intention of hunting for these enemies.

Deponent left Havana harbour on January 14, 1587 . . .

Rodrigo Jorge (Rubric).

¹ *A. de I.*, 143-3-17, Indiferente General 1098. 1 *pliego*, original.

referring me to the bearer, who is an intelligent and reliable person. He says that yesterday, Wednesday, he was on an estate of his a league from Arrecibo and saw these ships along the coast. A boat came to land to get water and in it were eleven Englishmen and one Spaniard. The latter talked with this man and told him that he had been my servant and felt indebted to me, and therefore he warned me that fourteen ships had left England to take this harbour and city. He said that a galleon grounded on La Anegada, 50 leagues to windward (p. 2) of this place, and they were careening or taking on water at the Virgin Islands, which lie about twenty leagues east of this port, and once made ready they would without doubt fall upon us.

In token that he had been my servant this Spaniard accurately described incidents which occurred in my company, and on the supposition that his warning is true I am making my preparations ...¹

... Puerto Rico, June 11, 1587

Diego Menéndez Valdés ...

Document No. 61²

[Pedro Menéndez Marqués to —, ³Havana, June 22,
1587]

(p. 1)

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In Florida on the 2nd of last May I received a dispatch from His Majesty in which he orders me to discover whether any corsairs have settled on that coast, and whether there is a passage, as they say there is, to the other sea. Within five days after I had received it I sailed from San Agustín in the same frigate which brought the dispatch and with two small boats to execute His Majesty's command.

First leaving munitions and reinforcements at Santa Elena, I coasted to latitude 37°, very near Jacan, which is Santa Maria bay. Before one arrives there are three bad shoals which extend far to sea;

¹ He asks for artillery, 200 soldiers and subsistence for the 70 men Alvaro Flores had left with him.

² *A. de I.*, 42-1-8/3, Contratación 5108. 1/2 *pliego*, original.

³ To the House of Trade?

elsewhere the coast is much better, both the bottom and the shore, than it is between Santa Elena and Cape Cañaveral, for there are very good ports.

Along all the shore that I coasted there is no knowledge of any corsair. I did not go further because the day that I was to enter at Jacan a tremendous storm blew which drove me from the coast and damaged my sail. It drove me to the Lucayos, off this island. Of my two small boats I there lost one, with all its equipment. Luck enabled me to save the crew.

I reached this town three days ago and will leave within four. Next year I will go better prepared and start a little (p. 2) later. The month of May is too early for that coast.

I am reporting¹ fully to His Majesty and also requesting him to give me leave to reconnoitre all that coast as far as St. Johns, in order that once for all we may learn its secret; and thence to go in person to report in the matter, that His Majesty may issue orders according to his pleasure, since there will be time for everything because I will not leave San Agustín till the end of May.

Really, it is imperative to explore all that coast, for what I saw of it is very different from what the chart shows. Your lordship can do me favour by recommending this matter to His Majesty.

Meanwhile, God preserve your lordship.

Havana, June 22, 1587.

Pedro Menéndez Marqués (Rubric).

Document No. 62²

[Pedro de Arana to Juan de Ybarra,³ Havana, July 22,
1588]

(p. 1)

†

In June, 1587, off the entrance to Matanzas, the English captured Alonso Ruiz, seaman, native of Cartagena, in a frigate belonging to Captain Francisco de Avalos and, with others, they carried him to England, whence he returned to this port in the manner I will recount . . . (torn) . . .

¹ Not seen.

² *A. de I.*, 54-1-34, Santo Domingo 118. 1 *pliego*, original.

³ Knight of Calatrava, His Majesty's secretary in the Council for Indies.

I understand they sailed . . . (torn) . . . coasting along Florida as far as Santa Maria bay, in 37°, where they took in water. There they found signs of horned cattle and a branded mule. From these indications I infer that this is where the English had their settlement. I am informed that the natives proved poor friends to the English and that Francis Drake carried off those who survived.

I have desired to report this to your honour because I would like His Majesty to know where the English were established and what became of them.

This man says that they remained three days in that bay, at the end of which time they made sail, with a ship from Santo Domingo which they took off Matanzas. At Cayo Romano they waited for the fleet from Santo Domingo and there seized three frigates. One was an advice-boat and two were coastwise traders. They took two more off Matanzas, not counting that of Francisco de Avalos.

They sailed along the coast as far as Newfoundland Banks, from where they steered for Ireland, southern coast, entering a port called Vilar¹ where they took in water and announced that they came from the Indies. From there they crossed to England in a day and a night to the city of Bristol, where they sold all their cargo.

The ships that committed these robberies were three in number and their pilot was a Portuguese mulatto pilot of this course named Domingo Diaz. He is a Lutheran, according to what this seaman tells me, and a native of Aveiro.² He was born under the arcade. He is about 40 years old, greyish, heavy-set, broad faced, and says he came as pilot of the advice-boat which the Marqués de Santa Cruz despatched to Santo Domingo with news that Francis Drake was coming to these parts in the year '86.

At the end of three months after he reached England this seaman regained his liberty, along with thirteen other Christians. They crossed to Havre and made their way by land to Brittany, to the city of Saint Malo, whence they sailed for San Lucar. There he shipped as a seaman on Domingo González's vessel which went ashore a league from this harbour in running from the English who were chasing it, as is being reported to His Majesty.³

These English are the same who were here last year and have been waiting for the fleet from Santo Domingo, which escaped them because every vessel took its own course. It was very inadvisable for them to come up by the Old Channel. I reported last year that the enemy would lie in wait there for the fleet. I informed the *Audiencia*,

¹ 'Viler' = 'Bere' (Berehaven). ² . . . *Abero* . . .

³ Not seen, except Document No. 63 *post.*

but evidently they did not bear in mind what I told them. I had it from a Portuguese pilot whom the English captured, a man thoroughly acquainted with all this course. They told him their plans for the present year and did not keep him with them because he fell dangerously ill. They sent him to shore nearly dead in a small boat. I made friends with him and he told me everything and I reported fully to the *Audiencia*. God was pleased to keep the ships from Santo Domingo out of the hands of these thieves this time. Next year it would be well for His Majesty to command them to sail by way of Cape San Antonio, these galleys to await them there, those from Santo Domingo (if they are in condition) to escort them as far as Cape Tiburon.

The captain in command of the said English ships last year was named Irishe¹ native of the Isle of Wight² and they were sent out by George Carey³, Master of the Wight.

If anything else of importance (p. 3) occurs I will inform your honour, whom God preserve, etc.

Havana, July 22, 1588.

Pedro de Arana (Rubric).

Document No. 63⁴

[Pedro Alvarez de Ruesga⁵ to the Crown, Havana, July 23,
1588]

(p. 1)

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Sire . . .

. . . On July 6 we received word that 20 leagues from Havana there were two English ships with two pinnaces. We started for them immediately and could not find them, but we did find part of the fleet from Santo Domingo, some ships of which we assembled and with them returned to Havana, since we had no news of enemies. As we were escorting them we came upon a ship which had gone

¹ . . . *Yres* . . . (Captain William Irishe.)

² . . . *ysla de Vique* . . .

³ . . . *Jorge Carlos, señor della* . . .

⁴ *A. de I.*, 54-2-4, Santo Domingo 128. 1 *pliego*, original.

⁵ Captain commanding the galley *Brava*, one of two stationed at Havana.

ashore. It was from the Canary Islands, carried a cargo of wine, and the English had chased it. They got no prisoners and little merchandise, for immediately relief was sent from the garrison and from La Fuerza.¹

I assure Your Majesty that it is a pity the way the Santo Domingo fleet comes up, for the ships are totally unarmed and a pinnace suffices to take a number of them. They come along from Santo Domingo, each sailing as it pleases, following neither flagship nor vice-admiral.

Ten or twelve vessels from Honduras and Santo Domingo will leave here tomorrow. God waft them safe over, for I imagine that this year enemies will not be lacking hereabouts.

Here we are all on the alert, as we should be in Your Majesty's service. May Your Majesty remember these galleys' appropriation, for certainly they are in want; and God preserve Your Majesty's Catholic royal person as Christianity has need.

Havana, July 23, 1588.

Pedro Alvarez de Ruesga (Rubric).

Document No. 64²

[The royal officials to the Crown, Havana, August 13,
1588]

(p. 1)

†

Sire

. . . In a preceding despatch we have informed Your Majesty that the galleys went out from this port upon receipt of news concerning the English who appeared off this coast and word that a Canary Islands wine ship had gone ashore a league from this harbour to

¹ Cf. *A. de I.*, 54-2-7, Santo Domingo 129, dossier assembled by Juan Bernardo de Quiros. Among papers setting forth the services of his father, Captain Tomás Bernardo Quiros, in command of La Fuerza at the time, is a certificate signed by Pedro Menéndez Marqués, who was a witness to the salvaging of this vessel's cargo, testifying to the active part the captain of La Fuerza took in the matter (dated Madrid, August 1, 1594).

² *A. de I.*, 54-1-34, Santo Domingo 118. 1 *pliego*, original.

escape from them. And although an English (p. 2) pinnace had already seized this ship and had removed as much of its cargo as possible, the prize was taken from them by a relief party which came up by land, with which party was I, the treasurer. I, the accountant, went by sea . . .

Among those who went out by land was Captain don Diego de Avila who arrived first, because he had been on El Morro,¹ and his going cost him his reputation because he took out his men without munitions. Had it not been for the two parties which came up later with munitions the prize would not have been taken from the enemy. We are informed that to cover his misconduct in refusing to obey the governor, Don Diego has caused evidence to be taken before Alvaro Flores de Quiñones to show that he and his company recovered the prize from the enemy. We make this report to Your Majesty that the truth may appear . . .

Havana, August 13, 1588.

Juan Bautista Rojas (Rubric).
Pedro de Arana (Rubric).

Document No. 65²

[Pedro de Arana,³ his summary of his examination of Pedro Diaz; Havana, March 21, 1589]

(p. 1)

†

In Havana on the twenty-first day of March in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-nine, Pedro Diaz, resident of La Palma, pilot of this course, furnished the following account as a person whom the English corsairs captured and carried off as he was sailing for Spain in the flagship⁴ of the Santo Domingo fleet, — commanding, in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-five. This vessel was seized in the vicinity of Bermuda by a ship of the

¹ I.e., was nearer to the scene of action.

² *A. de I.*, 54-1-34, Santo Domingo 118. 1 *pliego*, original.

³ Under date of March 26, 1589, Pedro de Arana forwarded this summary of his examination of Pedro Diaz to the Crown through Secretary Ybarra, to whom he wrote at the same time. These communications are preserved in the *legajo* mentioned in the note immediately preceding.

⁴ Cf. Document No. 10, *ante*. This was Alonso de Corniele's ship.

queen called the *Tiger*, under the command of a principal English gentleman named Sir Richard Grenville,¹ the same who in that year was in the island of Puerto Rico and at La Isabela, where he obtained cattle, horses and dogs with which he went to establish a settlement in Florida.

Leaving there a hundred men and cattle, mules and dogs, he sailed thence, and kept informant with him in such manner that he could not escape until the beginning of May, 1588. As follows:

After they captured him in the vicinity of Bermuda they carried informant straight to England by way of the island of Flores. They reached England, port of Plymouth, on November 26, 1585, and the said captain went to London. His home and residence are at Bideford² which is on the bar of Barnstaple.³

There he equipped six vessels, one of 150 tons and the rest from 100 to 60, and with these and 400 seamen and soldiers and supplies for a year he made sail on May 2, 1586, and steered for Finisterre. There he encountered fourteen French and Flemish ships out of San Lucar and Cadiz for France and Flanders, of which he captured two. The rest escaped. With these he took a great quantity of merchandise which he sent to his home in the prizes themselves. Later he met a Flemish flyboat bound for San Lucar with a cargo of merchandise, and kept this vessel with him after removing its cargo to the six ships of his squadron. He armed this flyboat to fight, for it was a good sailer.

With these seven ships he came up to Porto Santo, an island close to Madeira, and sent a boat to shore to discover conditions there, and to take water and whatever else they might find to hand. The people there were few but they stood on their defence to prevent the English from landing. They offered to give them a ton of water for each ship, if they would not land. This angered the commander and he attempted to land (p. 2) with the intention of burning and destroying the place and its inhabitants. For this purpose he made ready his boats and ordered his men into them and went to the shore, but the people there prevented him from landing and fought valiantly, in such manner that the Englishman returned to his ships.

Next day he brought his ships close in, to sweep the beach with their artillery. This did the people there little damage because of their defensive works. They held him off until midday, when the Englishman made sail and continued on his course for Florida, where he had left settlers, in altitude 36°.

Beyond Santa Maria Bay the coast runs to the northeast for

¹ '... *gerricharte gran fe* ...'

² '... *biriforte* ...'

³ '... *bastable* ...'

about 80 leagues to Cape San Juan; from there the coast runs north and south twelve leagues to where this settlement is on an island¹ close to the main. The island can be crossed on foot. The island was inhabited by Indians who were at war with those of the main, for which reason they admitted the English, of whom the mainland Indians killed some four and Francis Drake took the rest away because he found them dispersed and greatly in need of food supplies. The land produces little to eat. There is only maize and of that little and poor in quality.

And so they found the island deserted. They found an Englishman and an Indian who had been hanged. Of the natives they found only three, and as they were conducting these to their ships two escaped. The other was held prisoner, and of him they learned that Francis Drake had taken away what settlers there were in the island.

They have there a timber fort of no great strength, which stands in the water. There is an abundance of timber. The soil is sandy and wet and swampy. Pero Diaz does not know the quality of the soil of the main, but it seems fertile and heavily wooded.

In this fort the Englishman left eighteen men. He would not permit Pedro Diaz to land or to go into the fort. The captain remained there fourteen days and in the fort were left four pieces of iron ordnance and supplies for the eighteen men for a year. In command of them he left a master, Englishman,² and another called Chapman.³

This Englishman's idea of settling there is that on the (p. 3) main there is a great deal of gold and a waterway from the Atlantic to the Pacific, they say. They think it is nearby, and they intend to establish themselves firmly wherever they find wealth.

This done, the captain made sail with his ships and steered for the open sea with the intention of encountering vessels from the Indies. He reached the Azores with his men very sick. About 34 died. From there he crossed to Newfoundland and entered San Francisco Bay where the men went on shore to refresh, and they laid in a supply of fish.

From there he returned to the Azores again, about 400 leagues sailing, and he had been among the islands about eight days when he took a bark with passengers from San Miguel de la Terceira.

¹ It should be borne in mind that the Spanish word *isla* (here used in the original document) meant a locality, a region, as well as a piece of land entirely surrounded by water.

² '... un maestre cofar yngles ...'

³ ... chapeman.

They were humble folk and he carried them along with him and most of them died.

A lad told him that a vessel with a cargo of hides was at an island called Villafranca, where they had unloaded the hides to careen the ship because it leaked. The Englishman went there and carried the hides into his ship.

Off San Miguel he sent a ship to La Terceira which came up to another English vessel which was chasing a frigate from Puerto Rico and together they took her. After which he steered for England where he arrived on December 26, 1586.

He held Pedro Diaz a prisoner, under guard, along with the other Christians he had carried off, about 40 in number. He insisted that only Pedro Diaz knew where that settlement was.

The commander then went to London and raised men for that establishment to the number of 210 persons, men and women, whom he sent out on board of three ships in charge of a Portuguese named Simon Fernández, married in England, a great pilot and the person who induced them to settle there. He left for this place in March of 1587, from London, and Pedro Diaz remained incapacitated in the house of the English commander.

These ships reached the settlement and did not find the eighteen men who had been left there, nor any trace of them. They left the settlers there and returned to England where the English commander made ready two small vessels¹ in which seven men and four women embarked for the said settlement (p. 4) with supplies for them of biscuit, meat and vegetables, with which cargo he sent these vessels out in command of Captain ——² with Pedro Diaz as pilot.

They proceeded on their voyage and had reached a point some 30 leagues from the island of Maderia when, having sighted a sail, the faster vessel pursued it and so became separated from the other. The vessel where Pedro Diaz was, continuing on its course, met a French ship which overhauled it, came alongside and sent aboard 30 men with whom the English fought until most of both parties were killed or wounded. The English vessel surrendered to the Frenchman, who looted it, removing what he wanted. He left the vessel to some of the English who on their knees begged him to leave Pedro Diaz with them because without him they could not proceed, and would perish. For his part, Pedro Diaz so exerted himself to persuade the Frenchmen not to leave him with the English that he prevailed and the Frenchman took him with him, promising to set him ashore in the Canaries . . .

¹ *The Brave and the Roe*. Cf. Rowse, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-1. ² . . . *Artefas* . . . *Amadas*?

Pedro Diaz escaped . . . from the Frenchman at Isla de Mayo . . . he reached Havana¹ in the month of March, 1589, where he is at present, intending to go to Spain with the fleet.

Pedro Diaz believes that the settlers of the said establishment will have died of hunger or suffered very grievous want and danger . . .²

Document No. 66³

[Pedro de Biedma, deposition, La Margarita, April 21,
1589]

(f. 59)

†

Acting on behalf of Don Juan Sarmiento de Villandrando, for His Majesty proprietary governor and captain general of this island of La Margarita, I, Gerónimo Doca . . . petition that . . . the witnesses who may be presented by my principal be examined according to the tenor of the following questions . . .

ii. If they know that six years ago he came to this island and took possession of the governorship on the sixth day of the month of January in the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-three . . . (f. 59 reverse) . . .

iii. Idem, if they know that at Pueblo Viejo de la Mar an English corsair named so-and-so Hawkins anchored with nine large vessels, many men and means of offense; and that the said governor went immediately with what force he could to said port. When the said corsair sought to land on pretence of trading in merchandise the said governor opposed and prevented it, and was present in the said port nine days and nights until the said corsair left and cleared from that port without having done any damage ashore or traded any part of his cargo, which outcome was all due to the industry, diligence and spirit of said governor . . .

. . . (f. 61) . . . In the city of Asunción of this island of La Margarita, on the twenty-first day of the month of April in the year one thousand

¹ By way of Santiago in the Cape Verde Islands and Cartagena de Indias.

² Arana sent this man to court with despatches and recommendations on his promise to report concerning Virginia to the Crown.

³ *A. de I.*, 54-4-4, Santo Domingo 182. *Información de don Juan Sarmiento*, 10 pliegos, legalized copy, sewed into other legal records.

five hundred and eighty-nine . . . (f. 61 reverse) . . . the said Gerónimo Doca . . . presented as witness . . . Pedro de Biedma, *alcalde ordinario* of this island . . . (f. 62) . . .

iii. In reply to the third question witness deposed that the said English corsair, named Don William Hawkins, came to this island with nine or ten large vessels and was in De la Mar harbour in this island eight or nine days. On learning of his presence said governor sent deponent with men to see what fleet it was and what its intention. Deponent reported to him, (f. 62 reverse) for he remained behind to marshal the rest of the people.

Witness went to said port and saw that the English corsair had nine or ten sail, and intended to land men. Deponent reported this to the governor who forthwith came down to the port with what troops he could get together.

Witness remained in the port with the said men to defend it and to prevent the corsair from landing his party, and the governor returned to this city, and mustered all the men who had remained behind and brought them down to the harbour in good shape, and stayed in the port until the corsair left because he was unable to barter the merchandise and slaves he carried.

To his doing business in these the governor would at no time consent. On the contrary, he sent the corsair word to leave the harbour because the only exchange they would effect with him would be in powder and shot, and none would be made in any other commodity.

Wherefore, seeing that the governor would not allow barter, the English corsair sailed from the said port of this island and made no other call here. Therefore deponent knows that the said governor caused him to depart without doing damage or business in this island with anybody.

Deponent knows and saw that to the said governor's ministers and captains who were on duty in said port one of the Englishmen who were with the said corsair William Hawkins sent a rich present of hollands and silver and gold tissue (f. 63) and they would not receive it because they understood that it was not agreeable to the governor for them to do so; that, on the contrary, he would punish them. Wherefore this witness knows that the governor rendered notable service to the king and to Our Lord in driving the said corsair from the port . . .

Document No. 67¹

[Francisco Carço,² deposition made at Havana, November 6, 1589]

(f. 13) . . . in the month of May of this year two ships with cargo bound for Havana from the Canary Islands encountered four English ships which pursued them until they came very near to this port, (f. 13, reverse) into which one entered, fleeing from the enemy. The other was unable to make the harbour and went aground. The alarm was sounded in this city's fortresses and in defence of this ship all the soldiers went out to the shore and beach. They were assigned posts and it fell to Captain Jusepe Treviño's company to go to where the ship had grounded.

When they arrived there deponent saw that those persons who had been in the ship had deserted her and gone ashore, running from the enemy. A number of the enemy had come up in two pinnaces and boarded and were taking what they found.

The enemy's ships fired their artillery on the said company, that they might not relieve the ship, and from the pinnaces and the ship (f. 14) fired their harquebuses and muskets that they might not come up. Nevertheless they advanced and began to relieve and defend the ship. More than fifty English were then on board of her, looting.

It being evident that they could not defend the ship from the land, Lesmes de Oñis jumped into the water (other soldiers following his example) and boarded, and because Lesmes de Onis was the first to board the enemy wounded him badly with a musketshot in the neck and a cut on the head. Everybody thought he was killed but deponent went to him and helped him up. Wounded as he was, with the rest of the soldiers he fought the enemy and drove them from the ship and took the booty away from them, so that they carried off nothing, but went into their pinnaces and fled from the great danger and the damage which was being done them. They went to their ships, which were very near, (f. 14 reverse) and fired their artillery until the galleys came out. As soon as they saw the galleys they fled and Lesmes de Onis was very ill from his wounds . . . and this is the truth . . . on the oath he took and he signed it with his name . . . Francisco Carço . . .

¹ *A. de I.*, 144-2-28, Indiferente General 1254. An *informacion*, services of Lesmes de Oña.

²Evidently a soldier in Jusepe de Treviño's company, part of Havana's garrison.

Document No. 68¹

[Diego Menéndez de Valdés to the Crown, Puerto Rico,
May 13, 1590]

(p. 1)

†

Sire

. . . eight days ago . . . there arrived [on the south side] . . . an Englishman, 50 tons burden, 30 crew, six pieces of artillery, two being brass pieces.

He said that he was going to Florida to take off 200 English cast away there with their ship . . .

. . . Puerto Rico, May 13, 1590.

Governor Diego Menéndez Valdés (Rubric).

Document No. 69²

[Lope de Vega Portocarrero³ to the Crown, Santo
Domingo, July 4, 1590]

(p. 1)

†

Sire . . .

(p. 2) . . . This winter there have been many corsairs off this island and on the north coast they have traded. It could not be prevented. They are bold because they know that the galleys are out of commission. They have taken five vessels which were coming up from Cadiz and San Lucar . . .⁴

¹ *A. de I.*, 147-6-5, Indiferente General 1887 (82), 1 *pliego*, original.

² *A. de I.*, 53-6-6, Santo Domingo 72. 1 *pliego*, original.

³ His Majesty's governor and captain general of La Española, president of the *Audiencia* of Santo Domingo.

⁴ Elsewhere he wrote: '. . . they have taken seven vessels since April . . .' Cf. 53-6-15, Santo Domingo 81, Vega Portocarrero to Ibarra, Santo Domingo, July 5, 1590.

I compelled one galley to go out, furnishing it some men from the townspeople. It met an English ship off the island of Puerto Rico and fought her for a while, using artillery. The ship was in good condition and the galley was poorly armed and so did not dare to come to close quarters. The result was to drive the Englishman from here, where he was on the course which must be followed by all vessels from Spain.

In every letter I have informed Your Majesty that these galleys are worthless. One is now completely out of commission.¹ In the year and a half that I have been here the other has left the port twice, once for eight days and once for six. And in this period they have cost 90,000 ducats . . .

. . . Santo Domingo, July 4, 1590.

Lope de Vega Portocarrero (Rubric).

Document No. 70²

[Rodrigo de Rada³ to Juan de Ybarra, Havana, August 20,
1590]

(p. 1)

†

. . . Off Cape Tiburon the ships which cleared from Santo Domingo for this port, fourteen in number, encountered six English vessels which fought with them. They took one of our ships. Two smaller vessels were forced to run aground, one of which sank and the enemy carried off the other. The rest made the harbour of Ja(p. 2)maica.

In the vicinity of La Tortuga (having taken soundings there), three vessels belonging to private individuals left my convoy and followed another course instead of the one to which I kept, expecting them to come up. That night they kept to the course they followed so that next day they were not to be seen; and so it happened that they dropped down and encountered calms for many days and sighted the Organos twenty leagues from Cape San Anton.

There they met two English ships and the Englishman attacked

¹ ' . . . and the other lacks little of it . . . '—*Ibid.*

² *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127. 1 *pliego*, original.

³ General in command of the New Spain fleet.

and took them because those aboard fought very badly. One of these vessels drove aground and they sank the other. The third vessel was not with these, having separated from them. I presume it has dis-embogued since it has not arrived here.

Barges have gone out from here with men to try to save something from the vessel which went ashore; and so have the galleys gone, for the same purpose.

And this sort of thing will occur ordinarily in all the Indies if His Majesty does not order the situation to be remedied by providing an armada, since the galleys are of no service—not to be counted upon—for when they leave the coast they are of no effect against the enemy, nor can do him any damage. On the contrary, they are likely to receive it from him . . .

The shamelessness of these English ships has reached such a point that they have come very close to this harbour, even pursuing the barges which bring water from a league away. Therefore it has been decided to send out four vessels (p. 3) in good shape to clean the coast and protect it from them.

Our Lord preserve your honour many years.

From Havana, August 20, 1590.

Rodrigo de Rada (Rubric).

Document No. 71¹

[Juan de Oribe Apallua² to the Crown, Havana, August 23,
1590)

(p. 1)

†

Sire . . . (p. 2) . . .

From the enclosed depositions Your Majesty will learn what has happened to the Santo Domingo fleet and the two vessels from New Spain . . . (p. 3) . . .

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127. 1 *pliego*, original.

² In command of the armada of the guard; see enclosures. According to the Relation previously cited (this same *legajo*), his command consisted of 23 sail (cf. *Principal Navigations*, VIII, p. 412). Nine were the galleons and the rest were merchantmen constituting the Mainland fleet.

Certain English ships which have lain off here of late have let no ship or frigate enter or depart for food supplies. To prevent them from doing damage, and to clean the coast, the campmaster,¹ admirals and vice-admirals deemed it advisable to send Luis Alfonso Flores out in search of them with two medium-sized ships and Your Majesty's frigate (which was completed) and a shallow. But because no enemy sail has been sighted for two days now, this has not been done. The vessels are ready to go on news of any such . . .

Havana, August 23, 1590.

Jhoan de Oribe Apallua (Rubric).

(Enclosure No. 1)²

(p. 1)

†

Concerning the Vessels out of New Spain

In the city of San Cristóbal de la Habana on the ninth day of the month of August in the year one thousand five hundred and ninety, Juan de Oribe Apallua, for the king, our lord, captain general of his royal armada at anchor in the harbour of this city and of the other ships and fleets which are to return to Spain in his convoy, stated that:

He has just been informed that off the Organos certain English corsair ships encountered two vessels out of New Spain laden with indigo, hides and other merchandise, which had sailed in convoy with the fleet in command of General Rodrigo de Rada; and that the enemy sank one of these vessels and compelled the other to run ashore on a key of the said Organos; and that some of the merchandise aboard this grounded vessel might be saved; and that some of the persons who were aboard it have reached this city.

And to obtain information in this matter and to learn the present condition of this vessel and merchandise, in order to take measures advisable with respect to them and for the best good of His Majesty's service . . . [he] ordered to appear before him Jorge Soler, who was constable aboard the said vessel, *Nuestra Señora del Rosario*, Miguel de Acosta, master; who, being duly sworn . . . stated that:

¹ Juan de Texeda.

² 2 pliegos, legalized copy.

This vessel sailed last year, eighty-nine, from the island of La Palma with a manifested cargo of wine for New Spain and in New Spain laded merchandise, hides and indigo, for Spain and cleared from the port of San Juan de Ulua on the seventeenth of June in the convoy of the fleet in command of General Rodrigo de Rada . . .

. . . Some ten or twelve days (according to his recollection) out from the port of San Juan de Ulua they left the convoy, the occasion being that Juan de Carena, pilot aboard the said vessel, took soundings and found eighty (p. 2) fathoms and therefore, the flagship being in sight, for it was daytime, he fired a piece and tacked. The flagship did not tack but he nevertheless kept on his course and so this ship separated from the convoy as did also that of Juan de Borda which followed her on her course . . .

. . . on the seventeenth day of July (according to his recollection) of the current year they took soundings off Las Tortugas in ninety *varas*, on the west side . . . they sailed that day and the following night toward land, to the south, and . . . sighted it at Rio de Puercos, three leagues west of that river.

Land was sighted in the morning and in the afternoon, at sunset, two sail were seen, which vessels that night fired on them with artillery and musketry.

Next morning both vessels attempted to lay alongside. The largest was about one hundred and eighty tons.

The vessel aboard which deponent was threw a cable over the stern to Juan de Borde's vessel (because it was small and weak) and the English turned their artillery on Juan de Borde's vessel and sank it. When those on board of it had come on board the vessel where deponent was, they cut the cable and the vessel sank, but before it went down the English laid alongside and took what they could out of it.

They then turned their fire on the vessel on board of which deponent was and put many shots into her at the water line. Because she was sinking they grounded her on a key which lies at the end of the Organos, to the west. They left her on the key, having in her boat conveyed the wounded ashore.

Last Monday, the sixth instant, being on the way hither, at noon, off Puercos River they met the galleys which patrol this island and informed the commanding officer of what had occurred that the galleys might proceed to where the vessel lay and where they supposed the enemy to be. (p. 3).

Asked how many people were aboard the said vessel and how many the English killed and wounded, he stated that there were

sixty persons aboard, large and small, and that they killed two and wounded eight.

Asked what artillery the said vessel carried, he replied that she carried eleven muzzle-loaders, some of them sixteen hundredweight; and that aboard the vessel were perhaps eight thousand hides and he does not know how much indigo . . .

(Enclosure No. 2)¹

[Manuel Fernández Correa and others, depositions,
Havana, August 10, 1590]

(p. 1) In the city of San Cristóbal de la Havana on the tenth day of the month of August in the year one thousand five hundred and ninety, Señor Juan de Oribe Apallua, for His Majesty commanding the [armada] anchored in the harbour of this city and the fleets and ships which in its convoy are to sail to the kingdoms of Castile, stated that he has just been informed that certain ships of English corsairs off Cape Tiburon attacked the fleet which was coming up from Santo Domingo and took a ship of the said fleet, owner Captain Manuel Fernández Correa, its cargo being sugar, hides and ginger and other merchandise, and that they set Captain Manuel Fernández Correa ashore and that he is in this city, as well as some other persons from that ship;

And in order to know and understand what is happening in this matter and to report to His Majesty and provide as may be for the good of his service, he ordered to be made and made the following examination.—Juan de Oribe Apallua. Before me, Ruy Lopez Hurtado.

On the said day, in the month and year aforesaid, the said general ordered to appear before him Manuel Fernández Correa, owner and captain of the ship called *El Buen Jesus*, who, being sworn in legal form, on his oath promised to tell the truth . . .²

. . . he stated that he left the city of Santo Domingo in La Española on the seventh of last July in the present year, with a cargo of sugar, hides and ginger and other merchandise manifested for the kingdoms of Spain, in company with thirteen other ships . . . laden with similar merchandise . . . Captain Vicente González acting as general in command.

¹ 4 *pliegos*, legalized copy.

² Irrelevant material omitted, to shorten.

. . . as they were sailing all together, on the twelfth (to the best of his recollection) of the said month of July, off Cape Tiburon they sighted eight ships under sail. (p. 2) Suspecting that these were enemies, Vicente González's flagship steered for the open sea. It was about two hours before nightfall. Deponent and the other ships followed him on this southerly course while daylight lasted and after dark steered southwest. When day broke deponent could see none of the ships of his company. He lost them because no light was shown that night. All he could see were three English ships, one of which was about one hundred and sixty tons burden, another of eighty tons and the third, a bark of thirty-five tons.

These vessels fought with deponent for four hours, firing their artillery without attempting to lay him aboard, instead firing artillery and muskets.¹ They killed three men on² board deponent's ship and he surrendered, for he could not defend himself any longer.

These English ships carried deponent's along with them and proceeded to Cape San Antonio, the smaller vessel with the bark sailing ahead, and, according to what deponent understood from the English, these saw the armada and the Tierra Firme fleet round Cape San Antonio. The next day the large ship with its prize came up with them at Cape San Antonio . . .

. . . They set deponent ashore at³ the first Organo on the west side, with all the men of his company except the master, the clerk, the constable⁴ and five or six others, whom they detained against their will. As deponent was coming to Havana in a canoe he met the galleys of the guard of this island and informed their commander that the said ships were at the cape. From the Organo to this city the others travelled overland . . . (p. 3) . . .

. . . on board of the largest English ship deponent saw Anton Martin,⁵ who lives on the island of Garachico and is a native of that place, or so deponent understood. At the end of last year in the port of this city of Havana this man engaged as pilot of the ship *Buen*

¹ 'A breech-loading swivel top-piece, not the infantry weapon . . . Lucar . . . ranks . . . [muskets] as the smallest kind of ordnance.'—Corbett, Sir Julian, *The Spanish War* (Navy Records, 1897-8), pp. 301, n. 1; 332.

² ' . . . of theirs 4 slaine and 6 hurt.'—*Principal Navigations*, VIII, p. 411.

³ ' . . . the place . . . was of their own choice on the Southside of Cuba neere unto the Organes and Rio de Puercos.'—*Ibid.* Obviously it was on the north, not the south side of the island.

⁴ Cf. deposition immediately following, ' . . . Mata former constable . . . ' He and the others with him were not detained long.

⁵ The first mention the editor has identified of this man, who became a notorious pirate.

Jesus (the same which was taken from deponent). As to whether Martin accompanied the enemy of his own volition or not, deponent can only say that the said Martin being on a voyage (deponent is not sure whether to New Spain or Jamaica), with a laden frigate, it was wrecked on La Beata. When he returned to Santo Domingo Martin was confined in jail because of that loss but they let him out for 30 days at Easter. In that interim, he entered into an agreement with a resident of Santo Domingo, a man deponent believes had served time in the galleys, to go to recover part of the merchandise which was lost on La Beata with the frigate. To this end Martin got this person to buy a little vessel, deceiving him with the idea that he would use it for this purpose. When this craft was ready Anton Martin embarked one night with another seaman whose name and nationality deponent does not remember.

When deponent was a prisoner on board the English flagship he saw Anton Martin mistreat the Spanish prisoners and heard him say that the crow could not be blacker than its wings; and deponent heard a gentleman named Don Juan and another called Don Luis de Gamarra, and others, seamen, say that Anton Martin prayed with the English according to their rites and berated Spaniards because they would not remove their caps and pray with them. So also he heard the English of those ships say that Anton Martin and his companion had joined them of their own accord . . . (p. 4) . . .

. . . deponent believes that Vicente González steered southwest and he understood from the English that they had agreed to follow the same tack that night with their five ships; and so deponent thinks they will have encountered our ships.

Asked why he saw none of the convoy either ahead or astern if, as he has said, his ship continued all night on the southwesterly course she took at nightfall, deponent said that inasmuch as he is not a seaman it might be that the pilot of his ship altered the course but as to whether he did or not deponent refers to the seamen who were on board of the vessel.

. . . deponent understood from the corsairs that they had been sent out by a company of merchants. Each ship went its own way and he did not understand that there were more than these. As he has said, the eight were together and the other two had separated from them. He understood that the largest vessels were one hundred and sixty, one hundred and twenty, one hundred, and seventy tons burden, some of more and some of less tonnage. They place their reliance on their artillery and musketry. He understood that they would endeavour to learn whether or not the fleet would winter in

this harbour, in order to shape their voyage accordingly; and he understood that if the fleet did winter here they would go direct to the Terceiras to lie in wait for prizes there . . .

. . . deponent understood that the day the English encountered him one of their ships had been just thirty days out of London and brought news that seventeen queen's (p. 5) ships were being made ready to sail, as were many other vessels privately owned. When they first began to prepare they said they were going to Cape San Antonio to wait for the fleets but afterwards, inasmuch as they understood that His Majesty's armada was making ready, they feared lest it be intended for England and for that reason the queen postponed the departure of her ships and of those of private individuals. After that, since it was said that the Catholic king's armada was not going to England but to France, the queen ordered these vessels out in three squadrons: one to the Terceiras, another to lie off Cape Saint Vincent, and the third to cruise about. Deponent had this from the English and understood, further, that many privateers were out, each on his own.

. . . because the English carried off his manifest and other ships papers, deponent cannot say exactly but as far as he can recall his cargo consisted of two hundred boxes of sugar, over five thousand hides, over two thousand hundredweight of ginger and about four hundred hundredweight of *guayacan* wood and ten or twelve hogsheads of *aji* and twenty hundredweight of zarzaparilla and twenty hundredweight of cane and about four thousand ducats in pearls, gold and silver.

. . . deponent's ship was about three hundred and fifty tons burden and her armament was nine pieces of iron (p. 6) and brass artillery and 30 muskets. There were 35 persons on board (including officers, crew and fifteen passengers).

And this is the truth on the oath he took and he signed it with his name.—Juan de Oribe Apallua.—Manuel Fernández Correa.—Ruy Lopez Hurtado.

In Havana on the thirteenth day of the month of August in the year one thousand five hundred and ninety . . . Antonio de la Mata, former constable of the ship called *El Buen Jesus* . . . deposed that . . . as they were sailing on a course for this island, off Cape Tiburon on Thursday, the tenth day of the month of July they sighted eight enemy sail about vespers. He thinks the largest of these ships was perhaps one hundred and sixty tons. The others were smaller.

On sighting these enemy sail the flagship of the Santo Domingo vessels steered for the open sea, running from them, and the rest of

the convoy followed all that afternoon and part of the night until, (p. 7) some three or four hours after nightfall, Manuel Fernández Correa told the pilot and master of *El Buen Jesus* to steer for this island despite the fact that the flagship and the rest were continuing on a course for Jamaica. The pilot and master declared that they desired to follow the flagship and an argument ensued. In effect, Manuel Fernández was obeyed and at about the time stated the ship altered her course and no longer followed the flagship.

Having sailed all that night, after one or two in the morning they saw three English ships near them, one being the enemy flagship of 160 tons burden, the second of about 80 tons and the third, a pinnace of perhaps 30. The flagship had the wind of Manuel Fernández's ship and kept sounding her trumpets until day broke. When dawn came the three ships opened fire on *El Buen Jesus*, the flagship from the windward and the other two from the lee. They came up within range of their musket and small shot. Manuel Fernández and the rest of the people in the ship stood on their defense and fought for about three hours. During this time the English killed three men on board and seven or eight of their cannonballs struck her so that, by the captain's order, at the demand of the pilot and certain passengers who were on board, they offered to surrender and, in fine, did surrender. The captain of the English flagship and other persons boarded and carried everybody, prisoners, to their ship and to another, and they went off with the ship and her cargo.

In Manuel Fernández's ship there were 68 persons, passengers and crew, and her armament consisted of nine pieces of ordnance, calibre fifteen to sixteen hundredweight and less. There were about 100 persons on board the English flagship, counting seamen and (p. 8) soldiers, and she carried 22 pieces of iron artillery, calibres twenty-two to sixteen hundredweight. With her prize she proceeded to Cape San Anton, the pinnace ahead, and according to what he understood from them they saw the Tierra Firme fleet pass . . .

. . . at Point Hicacos . . . they set deponent and four other persons on shore and from Matanzas deponent made his way to this city by land.

. . . from some of these English deponent gathered that in Florida in a certain harbour where they have a settlement, they mean to join as many as 40 vessels which are to assemble there. Four of these vessels are bringing over women to settle in Florida. They intend to come out to wait for the Tierra Firme fleet which they understand is sailing this year for Castile; and next year, '91, a fleet of 150 sail

will attack this port, which fleet the queen of England will raise unless an armada is raised in Castile to attack England.

. . . deponent is not a mariner and therefore does not know what course Vicente González would take but from the English deponent understood that the other five English ships of their company had gone after him and would easily take ours, for the English were all strong ships, the vice-admiral alone being more than the equal of all the Santo Domingo ships.

. . . from the English deponent understood that more than 40 ships had left England for Indies and would all rendezvous in the same port and settlement which they have in Florida; and that the queen was raising a great fleet.

. . . Manuel Fernández's ship was over 300 tons burden. And this is the truth on the oath he took. He is about 35 years old and did not sign because he does not know how.—Juan de Oribe Apallua.—Before me, Ruy Lopez Hurtado.

In the city of Havana on the fourteenth day of the month of August in the year one thousand five hundred and ninety, Juan de Oribe Apallua caused to appear before him a man he had just heard had reached this port, who has been a prisoner in the power of the English in the ships which are off Cape Tiburon and this coast and brings news of the Santo Domingo fleet.

Being sworn (p. 10) he promised to tell the truth and . . . said that his name is Blas Lopez and he is a seaman and was master of the ship called *La Trinidad* which sailed from La Yaguana about two months ago . . . owner, Marcos de Escobar . . . about 60 tons burden . . . cargo, hides and *cassia fistula*, bound for this port to go to Spain in company with the fleet.

About three days after they had left La Yaguana, off Point del Guanao, *La Trinidad* met a French ship of about 80 tons, armament thirteen pieces of artillery, carrying fifty men, which bore down upon her. Seeing that they could not defend themselves against this Frenchman, for there were only sixteen men on board and no ordnance whatever, they surrendered and the Frenchman boarded and removed the hides to his ship but left about one thousand three hundred hides and 250 hundredweight of *cassia fistula* which he could not carry off. With which, because the French had taken their water and meat, they returned to La Yaguana.

Within two days after this French ship had departed, between Tomónycó and El Guanao, an English ship (about 60 tons burden, carrying 60 seamen, with seven pieces of artillery) and a pinnace which accompanied her, met *La Trinidad*. When (p. 11) deponent

and the other seamen saw this English ship and pinnace they took to their boat and made for land, the pinnace after them. It captured them and carried them to the ship which, with them prisoners and their vessel a prize, sailed toward Cape Tiburon, where they arrived in four days.

There they found two other English ships, companions of their captor, and at the cape they lay in wait twelve days for the Santo Domingo fleet. At the end of that time they were joined by five English ships, so that they were eight in all. And that very day, as they lay off the cape, the Santo Domingo fleet was sighted about noon.

The English had the wind of the fleet and steered for the fleet. Similarly, the flagship and other units of the fleet altered their course and ran from them. The English gave chase all that day and night until at a late hour three of the English ships and the vessel on board which deponent was drew off. The others went by the north coast to Jamaica.

When day dawned the fleet was again sighted, steering for Jamaica. The said vessel, where deponent was, crowded on sail and followed in pursuit, her companions lagging more than two leagues behind her.

When the fleet was two or three leagues from the harbour of Jamaica and the vessel had fought for a while with Vicente González's ship, which was the flagship of the fleet, she turned and fired her artillery on the other units of the fleet, which were running aground to escape. Two ships drove ashore and the others would have done the same had not the enemy given over the chase. Since he did, (p. 12) they did not all run ashore.

At this juncture the English vice-admiral came up, a ship of about 160 tons burden, and with the first vessel resumed the fight with Vicente González's ship. When they had fought a while, exchanging artillery fire, and Vicente González was about to ground, both enemy vessels withdrew out of fear lest they also run aground, and Vicente González made the harbour of Jamaica, on the south side, with six or seven ships.

The English ships sent their pinnaces to the two ships which had run aground (the people made their escape to land) and pulled them both off the shoals. They were carrying them off but one sank before they could remove the cargo. They took the other with everything in it and remained thereabouts until the next morning when they made sail from that port on a course for Cape Corrientes. They stayed there four or five days and then came on to Cape San Antonio. Because the prize they had taken from the Santo Domingo fleet had

lost its rudder they scuttled it when they had removed the cargo it carried, which consisted of sugar, ginger and hides.

They were three days at Cape San Antonio. At the end of that time they set deponent and three other men on shore and steered for the Bahama Channel. They said they were going to disembogue. That was about seventeen days ago.

. . . with the English . . . deponent understood (p. 13) was Anton Martin, native of Garachico in the island of Tenerife, married in Vera Cruz; and another Spaniard whose name or residence deponent does not know except that he heard that he was a resident of Santo Domingo; and an Indian, native of that island, a herdsman. These two came out from the island of Santo Domingo in a boat and joined the English. Anton Martin was on board the English flagship and deponent heard it said that he accompanied them of his own accord. They set the Indian and the other man ashore at Cape San Antonio. Deponent does not know why they landed them and gave them a negro to go with them. Deponent also understood from the English that this Indian and the other man accompanied them of their own desire and they set them ashore because they were not seamen.

. . . deponent did not understand from the English that there were more than these eight ships in these parts. He learned from them that 150 sail had set out from England in squadrons, some of them queen's ships. These eight intended to disembogue and proceed to the Terceiras, there to await the fleet, sending their booty to England.

On board they had a governor (p. 14) to be left in the settlement they have made in Florida, whither they will go for that purpose.

And this is the truth, on the oath he took, and he signed it with his name. He is 37 years old.—Juan de Oribe Apallua.—Blas Lopez.—Before me, Ruy Lopez Hurtado, notary . . .

Document No. 72¹

[Luis Alfonso Flores² to Juan de Ybarra, Havana, August
23, 1590]

(p. 1)

+

. . . Eight English ships attacked the Santo Domingo fleet and took three of its units; and off the Organos they took three others

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127. 1 *pliego*, original.

² Admiral of the Tierra Firme fleet as far as Cartagena, where he was superseded. Cf. his of this same date in this *legajo*, which treats of this matter, and Document No. 73 *post*.

which had sailed from New Spain. It was no little luck that they did not meet Rodrigo de Rada as they met these, for they'd have taken him, also.

They are so daring along this coast that their pinnaces chase the barges that go to La Chorrera for water. In view of which it was resolved to send out against them, and this task was assigned to me; wherefore I am leaving with four vessels. Excepting mine they are small, but they are well prepared. May it please God that we meet the enemy . . . (p. 2) . . .

. . . Havana, August 23, 1590.

Luis Alfonso Flores (Rubric).

Document No. 73¹

[Juan de Oribe Apallua to the Crown, Havana, August 24,
1590]

(p. 1)

+

Sire . . .

(p. 2) . . . Lately certain English corsair ships have been seen off this port and coast. They have seized or chased every vessel entering or leaving the harbour. Therefore, and because those which are ready to go to New Spain and to the Canary Islands for food supplies as well as this advice-boat are thereby detained, it seemed well to me and to Campmaster Juan de Tejada and to the generals and admirals who are here, to send out certain ships of this armada to drive the corsairs from this coast. So four vessels have been made ready for this purpose and with them Vice-Admiral Luis Alfonso Flores will go out tomorrow, escorting as far as Matanzas the ships leaving for the islands and for (p. 3) New Spain and this advice-boat, and those which carry the appropriations for Florida and Puerto Rico. He will endeavour to clear the coast and free the entrance and exit to and from this port, that food supplies may enter and vessels go forth to seek such supplies . . . (p. 4) . . .

. . . Havana, August 24, 1590.

Jhoan de Oribe Appalua (Rubric).

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127. 2 *pliegos*, original.

Document No. 74¹

[Diego de la Ribera² to the Crown, Havana, August 24,
1590]

(p. 1)

†

Sire

By the advice-boat which left here on the 6th instant I reported our arrival in this port and on the 9th at nine o'clock at night the second advice-boat came in, which was sent with Your Majesty's of May 9th written from San Lorenzo. As soon as I received it we met in council to consider our departure.

The council resolved that we winter here because the margin of time allowed us in which to get away is so short that we could not leave within the period set. The ships are not yet ready to go. The voyage from Cartagena here was hard on them, so much so that some of them had necessarily to be careened, among others my flagship and the *Campechana*.

The corsairs are very daring off this coast. Off Cape San Antonio we saw a ship and a pinnace and after we arrived here the master and owner of the vice-admiral of the Santo Domingo fleet came in and said that off Cape Tiburon he was chased by a ship and two smaller vessels who took him and held him prisoner until they set him and his men ashore at Cape San Antonio. The corsair who took him joined the two we had seen off the cape. These told him that we had passed and he showed very great disappointment at not meeting us.

This corsair was three days off this harbour. They say there is with him the governor of the English settlement in Florida whither they are conveying him and where they will winter.

They told this man that at Cruz de Padre, which is 30 leagues east of this place, a very swift pinnace is stationed to go to inform a squadron of English ships lying off the Terceiras whenever we leave.

They add that their vessels slipped out of England one by one in order to gull Your Majesty, that the armada might not be sent out. They say that they formed squadrons, some to sail hither, others to lie in wait at the Terceiras, and still others off Cape Saint Vincent.

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127. 2 *pliegos*, original.

² Captain general in command of the Mainland fleet.

The rest of the Santo Domingo fleet is in Jamaica. Two vessels were lost there but the rest are in Jamaica.

Off the Organos these corsairs took a ship laden with hides and cochineal which had left New Spain with Rodrigo de Rada. It drove ashore in sight of the Organos, toward Cape San Antonio. Two frigates were sent out to see what could be salvaged but they found the ship under water. The cargo was lost. Similarly they took another laden with flour and biscuit. They carried off the biscuit but left the flour and the vessel came into this harbour some three days ago.

There are here, in manifested gold and silver from the Main and Mexico, six and a half millions belonging to Your Majesty and to private individuals, exclusive of merchandise. It was not right to take any chances with it in a time like the present, dangerous both because the season is so far advanced and also because of the news of corsairs. Your Majesty's armada now in this port does not seem to me protection enough to warrant running any risks with this treasure within the time limit Your Majesty has set.

Juan de Oribe brought three ships. Excepting my flagship, the vice-admiral, the *Campechana* and Gaspar Nunez's, the rest here are not to be counted upon, for they are old and small, with little armament and that of iron and small calibre. Your Majesty will deign to consider this matter and reinforce us with ships and men and artillery. If, because of our sins, things were to go wrong it would be a very heavy blow to Your Majesty's realms and to all Christendom . . .

In view of the audacity of these corsairs and because they have made us sound the alarm in this city three or four times, we thought best to make ready four ships, which are the *Creciente*, Your Majesty's frigate which was built here, the flagship Rodrigo de Rada brought from Spain and the *Esperanza*, *zabra*. These have been furnished with ordnance and men from the other vessels and are ready, Vice-Admiral Luis Alfonso Flores in command. They will proceed as far as Cruz del Padre. If they find no news of corsairs they will return but as long as we remain here they will be held in readiness to go out promptly on any occasion that may present itself. This seemed to us to be the measure most advisable at the present time. . . .

. . . Havana, August 24, 1590.

Diego de la Ribera (Rubric).

Document No. 75¹[Juan de Texeda² to the Crown, Havana, August 24, 1590]

(p. 1)

†

Sire . . .

Enemies are numerous off this coast. Although the galleys are at sea they have not encountered them. Seeing that they take the food supplies which come to us from outside and that our reputation suffers somewhat from their keeping us corralled, four vessels have been made ready (p. 2) to go out after them and to clean the coast . . .
 . . . Havana, August 24, 1590.

*Juan de Texeda (Rubric).*Document No. 76³[Juan de Texeda to the Crown, Havana, September 5,
1590]

(p. 1)

†

Sire

This coast has been so over-run with corsairs, sailing in pairs and in quartets, that not a vessel left this port that it was not immediately captured. In view of this situation the generals of the fleets and armada which Your Majesty has here, and I also, agreed to make ready four ships which were lying here using up provisions to no profit, and to send them out to clean the coast. They went and found nothing because the season is far advanced and the enemy had disembogued . . . (p. 2) . . .

The galleys on patrol duty here have had little effect, yet they are

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127. 1 *pliego*, original, duplicated.

² Campmaster, knight of Santiago, for His Majesty governor and captain general at Havana. Cf. Wright, *op. cit.*, II, p. 142 *et seq.*

³ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127. 1 *pliego*, original.

as good as the best Your Majesty has today in Italy, which to me seems a pity and I have desired many times to take them in hand to see whether I might have better luck in meeting the enemy than they have had on occasions when they have gone out . . .

The reason the galleys have accomplished nothing this year, so many enemy ships having meanwhile sailed by the entrance to this port, is because they are so restricted by the order Your Majesty has issued to me that they must await the passing of the fleets at Cape San Antonio. The enemy is perfectly aware of this order and so with utter impunity frequents this coast, merely avoiding Cape San Antonio, which they know is the place where the galleys are usually lying. Therefore I entreat Your Majesty to leave it to my discretion to send the galleys wherever they can do most damage to the enemy, even though it be only to try out their worth and report whether they should be maintained here or not. I would prefer to see four frigates of the armada detailed to protect this coast. They would cost less and could go out in any weather . . .

. . . Havana, September 5, 1590.

Juan de Texeda (Rubric).

Document No. 77¹

[Antonio de Vera, deposition made at Seville, October 20,
1590]

(p. 1)

†

In Seville in the House for Trade with Indies on the twentieth day of the month of October in the year one thousand five hundred and ninety, by order of the president and officials of the king, our master, in the aforesaid House, Antonio de Vera, who has just arrived from the city of San Cristóbal de la Habana, was duly sworn by Holy Mary, on which oath he promised to speak the truth to the best of his knowledge in the matters concerning which he might be examined, and stated that . . . General Juan de Oribe Apallua sent as advice-boat from the city of Havana a settee, Diego de Sotomayor, master, on board which deponent is a seamen. It left the port of Havana on its voyage on the twenty-fourth of last August in the present year . . .

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127. 1 *pliego*, authenticated.

Within eight days after they left Havana they disembogued by the Bahama Channel in which they saw five sail which looked like English ships of a 100 to a 150 tons burden, and two of these came after the settee, pursuing her all that day, until nightfall, when they altered their course and did not see these sails again . . . (p. 2) . . .

. . . the master sent deponent to land with His Majesty's despatches and private mail, which deponent brought to this House.

. . . deponent came from New Spain with the fleet in command of Rodrigo de Rada. He brought in four ships with plate belonging to His Majesty and to private individuals, and with these, in their convoy, came twelve or thirteen other small vessels, among them one ship of 400 tons burden, Miguel de Acosta, master.

Deponent was on board of the flagship, in which was the Marqués de Villamanrique, and they entered Havana at the end of June and there lay until the end of July when Pedro Menéndez Marqués came into the harbour of Havana with two *galizabras*. Seven or eight days later General (p. 3) Juan de Oribe Apallua came in with the ships of the Tierra Firme fleet and they were in that port on the 24th of August when deponent left in the advice-boat, as he has said.

During this time two or three ships came in from Santo Domingo . . . Deponent did not learn how many ships had left from Santo Domingo.

They brought news that they had met seven or eight English corsair ships and these attacked a vessel of which Miguel de Acosta was master and another of which Diego de Bodes was master. Miguel de Acosta's ran aground in the vicinity of the Organos and its cargo was lost. They sank Diego de Bode's ship, and it was said that certain vessels of the Santo Domingo fleet had gone into the harbour of Jamaica. Deponent does not know how many these were.

. . . there were corsair ships within sight of Havana and one day he saw two barks come in, fleeing from them, and the general ordered four or five ships to take up positions at the mouth of the port to defend the harbour and the other ships lying in it. . . (p. 4) . . .

. . . no passengers crossed on board the advice-boat . . . it carries no cargo except some sarsaparilla and hides, as appears on its manifest.

This is the truth on the oath he took and he signed it with his name. He is over twenty-five years old. Antonio de Vera.—Gonzalo de las Casas, notary . . .

Document No. 78¹

[Lope de Vega Portocarrero to the Crown, Santo Domingo,
June 15, 1591]

(p. 1)

Sire

Some twelve days ago I reported to Your Majesty upon the state of affairs here, civil and military, and that this fleet has been detained in port by news of enemies. This delay seeming prolonged I determined (eight days ago) that it should leave. The flagship and another went out before dawn and when day broke five large English ships were seen off this harbour. They chased the flagship and the other vessel, firing upon them with their artillery, and would have taken them had not the galley gone to their relief. The shore artillery and forces here encouraged them and so they escaped.

Since then these enemy ships have remained in sight of the port and others have joined them. In view of this it has finally been decided that this fleet shall proceed direct to Cartagena, for this is the safest course although the longer by some days. The galley will escort the fleet well out to sea.

Corsairs have been more numerous than usual this year. In the last fifteen days more than twenty sail have passed here or along the north coast. Five ships arrived at La Yaguana, which is on the north shore of this island, and there took four which were lading.

Yesterday a Portuguese fled to the English ships and this has worried me because of the information he will have furnished them concerning the fleet. He was a seaman and will have told them of the course to be followed. Last year another one did the same thing and the enemy took three vessels of the fleet.²

There is nothing more to report. Our Lord preserve Your Majesty through the years as Christianity has need.

Santo Domingo, June 15, 1591.

Lope de Vega Portocarrero (Rubric).

¹*A. de I.*, 54-3-20, Santo Domingo 169. 1 *pliego*, original.

²Cf. *Principal Navigations*, VIII, p. 410.

Document No. 79¹

[Hernando Mendez Carrasco, certificate concerning services rendered on June 23, 1591]

(p. 25)

+

I, Pedro Alvarez de Ruesga, captain of the galley *Brava*, one of two galleys on duty in this island of Cuba for the king, our master, hereby certify to all whom it may concern that I know Fernando Mendez Carrasco, native of Baeza in the kingdom of Spain, as a soldier aboard the flag galley *San Agustin* . . .²

. . . in the year 1591 the said galleys, being off Cape Corrientes in this island, engaged with an English ship, the said Fernando Mendez Carrasco, fighting bravely, arms in hand, in the right wales of the flag galley, was shot through the left leg below the knee. The wound left him markedly lame although still of service . . .

. . . and that the facts may appear I gave him this present certificate . . .³

Pedro Alvarez de Ruesga (Rubric).

Document No. 80⁴

[Francisco Moncayo, etc., depositions, concerning services rendered by Miguel Romero]

(p. 5) . . . Miguel Romero, soldier of the flag-galley, one of two on station at this island of Cuba, Cristóbal de Pantoja commanding, . . . petitions that . . . the witnesses I may present be sworn and depose . . . (p. 7) . . . whether they know that the said Miguel

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-8, Santo Domingo 130, an *información* of which this certificate is part.

² Omitted portions testify to Mendez Carrasco's good record, honest character and personal appearance ('. . . medium sized, good face, blonde beard . . .') and the witnesses, who deposed in Havana in October, 1591, add nothing to Mendez Carrasco's assertion that this encounter occurred on June 23 off Cape Corrientes, that the enemy vessel was sunk and he was wounded.

³ Dated at Havana, May 2, 1594.

⁴ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127. 12 *pliegos*, legalized copy. The depositions were taken in Havana, September 23-October 11, 1591.

Romero is serving His Majesty in this island on board of the flag-galley and has taken part in all of the encounters which (p. 8) the galleys have had with English and French corsairs, always fighting like a good soldier, until lately from an English ship which the galleys fought and sunk off Cape Corrientes he was shot twice in the right leg . . .

. . . (p. 10) . . . Francisco Moncayo, His Majesty's accountant of the said galleys . . . said . . . (p. 12) . . . that during the cruise which the galleys made this present year to Cape San Antonio, in the fighting with English corsairs which occurred Miguel Romero distinguished himself like an honourable soldier and when the flag-galley fought with an English ship he was in the post of most danger, that is, in the bow in the wales with his arquebus and arms, fighting with great spirit, encouraging the others, and on this occasion in this skirmish he was wounded . . .¹

Document No. 81²

[Lope de Vega Portocarrero to the House of Trade, Santo Domingo, July 15, 1591]

(p. 1)

†

On the 13th of this month I was advised from Santiago de Cuba that a letter had been received in Baracoa³ to the effect that in the Old Channel a vessel had encountered 80 English ships which were steering for Havana, Francis Drake in command. I think they were not seen from Puerto Rico or from this island nor would they have been seen from Cuba had not this vessel met them. According to what they write he reached Havana on the 9th or 10th of June. Although he did not dare to land men to attack, it must be his intention to wait there for the fleets which will fall into his hands if they have not been able to get warning to them out of Havana.

On May 10 General Diego de la Ribera went out to Cape San

¹ Other depositions follow but add nothing of the facts. The general tenor of these depositions shows that the Spaniards believed they had sent one English vessel to the bottom and damaged another.

² *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109. † *pliego*, original.

³ Across Cuba, on the north coast.

Antonio with eight ships. If the enemy learns of that, he will be in danger.

As soon as I received this news I sent a ship to Cartagena with it, for the governor and for Pedro Menéndez; and because it seemed to me that they might not have been able to clear an advice-boat from Havana I thought it well to send this one from Puerto de Plata, which is the best route. Your lordship will order the voyage paid and extend what favour may be possible.¹

In addition to these 80 ships which were sailing together, 30 more have passed here in squadrons. They have burned five or six ships in these ports.

This city's fleet left this harbour on the 18th last. It consists of ten ships. Greatly do I fear that they will meet the enemy off Cape San Antonio or at the entrance to Havana.

The flyboats which brought the soldiers to Puerto Rico arrived safely but in bad shape. On the way they met a French (p. 2) ship which they took, with a loss of 30 killed and over 40 wounded.

There is no other news.

Our Lord preserve your lordship.

Santo Domingo, July 15, 1591.

Lope de Vega Portocarrero (Rubric).

Document No. 82²

[Juan de Texeda to the House of Trade, Havana, July 27,
1591]

(p. 1)

†

I have received the piece of ordnance which Antonio Navarro brought for this port and it is just the thing, if only there were more like it. As it is, these English are losing all respect for me, for every hour they sail under my nose and because the galleys are at Cape San Antonio waiting for Pedro Menéndez I cannot scare them off.

Diego de la Ribera returned to this harbour on the 4th [of July] and the New Spain fleet came in on the 16th. As it entered it left

¹ The despatch of advice-boats was something of a 'racket'. In cases like this they carried merchandise enough to pay expenses at least; anything received from the House of Trade was 'gravy'.

² *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109. $\frac{1}{2}$ *pliego*, original.

two ships in the enemy's claws and one had some of His Majesty's plate on board. If the general commanding that fleet was in any way to blame, or Diego de la Ribera, who saw the whole thing from the port, plenty of persons are going to Spain who will give an opinion. I have nothing to say except that I shall not cease to regret it as long as I live. With my horse and infantry I was a spectator, unable to prevent it.

In the future I would like to be prepared, that the enemy may not so insult me without my being able to get at him. I am asking His Majesty to exchange these two galleys, (p. 2) which have proven so fruitless, for four of the frigates I am building here. They will suffice me to clear this coast and punish any enemy loitering here in such manner that they will not send me love-messages and compliments as these drunkards did.

The two frigates which His Majesty ordered me to have ready by the time Pedro Menéndez should come, are finished and have been ready since the 11th, waiting for the first four which it will give me no small pleasure to see. The plate is in La Fuerza. As soon as Pedro Menéndez arrives whatever orders he may bring will be executed with a will. As for the other six frigates which His Majesty orders to be built, some carpenters have been taken on but there is no money with which to pay them nor equipment with which to begin this work. In the warehouse there are only 45 cases of assorted nails and eight barrels of tar and a little iron, If the work is to go forward may your lordship be pleased to provide promptly and generously and command me.

May our Lord preserve your Lordship.

Havana, July 27, 1591.

Juan de Texeda (Rubric).

Document No. 83¹

[Juan de Texeda to the Crown, Havana, October 2, 1591]

(p. 1)

†

Sire

After this ship had set sail with the despatches it carries, Sunday morning, the 29th of this month, as Your Majesty will see by their

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-1-15, Santo Domingo 99. 1 *pliego*, original.

dates, we sighted fifteen vessels. I ordered the ship not to leave the harbour until it was known what these were and in the afternoon Pedro Menéndez came in with the four frigates and the flyboats and some small craft and the ships of the Santo Domingo fleet which escaped from the enemy.

He arrived sick and very fearful lest he find this port occupied, since he had so many warnings concerning enemies. Our Lord had arranged the matter better . . . He is making ready to leave with the six frigates whenever Your Majesty shall send him order . . . (p. 2) . . .
 . . . Havana, October 2, 1591.

Juan de Texeda (Rubric).

Document No. 84¹

[Juan de Salas² to the Crown, Havana, October 9, 1591]

(p. 1)

+

Sire

In compliance with Your Majesty's order I left Lisbon on April 18 and in three and a half days sighted the Canary Islands. Having passed a hundred leagues beyond them I had calms and contrary winds for twelve days.

On May 6 I discovered a corsair with a ship of 180 tons burden and a crew of 70 men who had all sworn to die rather than surrender. The vessel had come from the Cape Verde Islands, armament fourteen pieces of iron ordnance.

When I hailed, demanding to know what ship he was, he answered that he was from England; and when I ordered him to strike sails for Your Majesty he bade me strike mine for the queen of England. Thereupon he fired on me with six of his largest pieces of artillery and with arquebuses. Summoning me to battle with a trumpet, he sought to lay me aboard. But I and the good men I had with me did our duty in such fashion that I killed 47 men and captured thirteen badly wounded whom I took with me to Cartagena and then brought

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127. 1 *pliego*, original.

² Commanding the flyboats which carried troops to Puerto Rico. Cf. Documents 81, 83 *ante*.

to Havana where they remain. Most of these survivors are natives of Dieppe in France.

The captain was a Lutheran and had on board many Lutheran books, which I have in my possession.

On board this ship I found a quantity of hides and some ivory and I took the vessel with my squadron, placing an old soldier who was with me in command of the prize.

When we arrived at Dominica a little wind which blew drove this vessel off the course we were following and because she had no experienced pilot on board, only a seaman who did not know as much as I might have desired, she sailed in among the islands and there met four English ships which were steering for (p. 2) Cape San Antonio.

They fought with her for a day and when next morning she saw that they were disposed to continue the fight, those on board decided to run her aground and save themselves and fire the ship that the enemy might not profit from her or her artillery. And in the ship's boat they made their way to Puerto Rico.

There I left Captain Salazar with the men and the stores, as Your Majesty ordered me to do.

When these people arrived I had departed for Cartagena and as I came to anchor in that harbour I learned that General Pedro Menéndez had gone on to Nombre de Dios.

His order was delivered to me to wait for him there and when he arrived I showed him Your Majesty's order to me and came on, as he bade me, to Havana where I am at present making ready for sea the new frigate which Your Majesty orders me to take across in my command.

The port of San Juan de Puerto Rico was thoroughly prepared and in good shape for any military event that could occur.

The battle with the corsair lasted three hours and because my flagship outsailed the others she alone laid him aboard. Five soldiers were killed and 30 wounded and I received a shot which carried away the thumb of my left hand at the joint and two other wounds from which, thank God, I recovered and so remain desirous, as is proper, to employ myself like a loyal subject in Your Majesty's service until I die.

Our Lord preserve Your Majesty's Catholic person as He is able to do.

Havana, October 9, 1591.

Juan de Salas (Rubric).

Document No. 85¹

[Aparicio de Arteaga² to the House of Trade, Cadiz,
October 10, 1591]

(p. 1)

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The New Spain armada and fleet, General Antonio Navarro in command, left that port³ on June 13 and, being on its course, before arriving at the harbour of Havana, the ships which belonged to Agustin de Paz and Martin de Ygararan left the convoy with such adverse fortune that off the coast of Havana they were taken by the English. Agustin de Paz's vessel was of little importance, for it had no plate on board, neither His Majesty's nor any belonging to private individuals, but Ygararan's ship carried 10,000 *escudos* belonging to His Majesty and a little more belonging to private persons.

General Antonio Navarro prosecuted the pilots and holds Ygararan's a prisoner because he was found to be to blame in that in La Sonda de las Tortugas at night he steered on a course different from that taken by his flagship and the rest and so withdrew from the fleet, which entered the harbour of Havana on July 16.

There we remained until the 27th, in accordance with His Majesty's order to wait until the 25th for Pedro Menéndez Marqués. Of him there was no news except that he had reached the Main. So we left Havana, being 78 sail of the armada and Diego de la Ribera's and Antonio de Navarro's fleets and other vessels which had joined in that port.

We sailed on our voyage with adverse weather. It remained unfavourable and on August 24 began to grow worse. We were then 200 leagues this side of Bermuda. On the 26th General Antonio Navarro with thirteen sail, among them Vice-Admiral Rodrigo de Rada's ship, became separated from the rest of us. I remained with General Diego de la Ribera and when the storm had passed we assembled all the ships (p. 2) except those thirteen.⁴ Everything possible was done to discover them but they could not be found.

On the first of September the weather turned worse. There was a strong north-west wind against us. On the 3rd the wind blew strong

¹ *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109. 1½ *pliegos*, original. See also his deposition in this same *legajo*, same place and date.

² Vice-admiral under Navarro.

³ I.e., San Juan de Ulua.

⁴ According to his deposition they were twenty.

from every quarter and raised a wild sea. It seemed like the tail-end of a hurricane. That night the wind blew from the north with great violence and the seas were very high. That night the flagship (where Diego de Ribera was) split and on the 4th, between eight and nine in the morning, went down within sight of many vessels unable to help. Over 200 persons were drowned, among them the general and the inspector and other persons of importance. Some 30 persons only were saved, picked up by the ships which were nearest.

This same day at eight o'clock at night Hernando de Guillen's¹ sank suddenly. It split and even those who were on board could not understand how it happened. Some twenty persons were saved who, by the nearest ships, were found floating next day, hanging on to wreckage.

At four in the afternoon my pinnace took off the people from Antonio Veloso's ship. Their boat went down as they tried to launch it. The ship was foundering.

On the 5th of September aboard my ship I received the people from Homes' and from Rodrigo González's² and Fuentidueña's³ ships which also were sinking. And on the 8th we took on board those from the ship called *Pena de Francia*⁴ and from Pedro Bernal's shallop. On September 10 we took on board those from Gaspar Nuñez's ship⁵ and the *Salvadora* (these were units of the armada) and from Antonio Madurera's vessel from Honduras. The storm in which Diego de Ribera went down and the gales we met afterwards had wrecked them all.

All these ships lost, which were the best of the fleet, I was left with 49 sail, with which, according to His Majesty's order, I proceeded on my course in 39½° for Flores. We sighted two corsairs (p. 3) a hundred leagues before we reached that island and saw a third twenty leagues from it on September 22, the day we sighted Flores.

Next day, the 23rd, at daybreak, I fell in with three shallops of His Majesty's armada which were posted to wait for the fleet, and from them learned that Don Alonso Bazan was there with His Majesty's armada. That day at four in the afternoon I came up with it and found that General Antonio Navarro with the ships which had been separated from us with him, excepting Rodrigo de Rada's vice-admiral which had opened and gone down.

¹ The *Santa Catalina*, 450 tons, according to a list of these vessels preserved in *A. de I.*, 42-1-8/3, Contratación 5108.

² *San Juan Bautista*, 400 tons.

³ *Nuestra Señora de Borgoña*, 230 tons.

⁴ *Nuestra Señora de la Peña de Francia*, 280 tons.

⁵ *Santa María del Juncal*, 500 tons, a new vessel.

All the surviving ships of the fleet being then together with His Majesty's armada, Don Alonso Bazan summoned the commanding officers of his and of the other squadrons and persons of importance to a council held on board of his flagship. It was resolved that the armada and the fleet should proceed to La Terceira to refurnish with supplies and other things which were needed and there take on board the Malucca treasure and artillery which was to go to Lisbon, since in those islands there were no corsairs who could worry Pedro Menéndez Marqués. The shallows to remain off Flores to advise him. In this manner His Majesty's order to wait in that vicinity until the 8th instant would be obeyed.

On the 26th in the afternoon a storm struck which scattered us all and on the 27th after midnight three ships were wrecked on the north side of La Terceira. One was Pedro Millanes', from New Spain, the flagship of that squadron, one was a flyboat, and I could not learn whose the other was. The next day they abandoned the ship *Santa Maria del Puerto*, from New Spain, less than two leagues from the harbour of La Terceira because they could not keep her afloat, so badly was she leaking. Vice-Admiral Rodrigo de Rada was on board, having sailed in that ship after he left his own. All the people (p. 4) escaped to vessels that were near.

I anchored in the port of La Terceira on September 28 to take on water and food supplies, which were badly needed, and to get rid of some of the people overcrowding my ship, whom I had received on board from the vessels left behind us. Next day I was blown off by strong winds which struck me and other ships and Don Bartólome de Villavicencio, who had anchored there the day before. The weather was so bad that I could not keep company with him or the others, although I tried, and so I came on alone without a lot of my people and the ship's master who went ashore for the water and supplies which were needed. God knows what we have suffered!

There I learned that Don Alonso Bazan was at the beach on the other side of the island with twelve sail. He sent to bid us who were there in that port to join him where he was, for he meant to proceed to the coast of Spain. The armada and the fleet were scattered and could not rejoin because of adverse weather.

Vice-Admiral Rodrigo de Rada remained in the port of La Terceira, intending to sail in Pedro de Retana's vessel (which was Juan de Oribe's flagship) and to gather up the ships there.

The *Creciente* came into that harbour in such bad condition that she will be abandoned there, I understand.

This year's hardships and loss have been very heavy and it will

always be so as long as the fleets sail so late and unless His Majesty and your lordship apply the remedy.

I came into this bay at noon today with a strong south wind which has been blowing since yesterday. Therefore I did not dare to proceed to the bar of San Lucar because the weather is wretched and it is neap tide and a cross sea running.

(p. 5) . . . Don Alonso Bazan had an encounter with the English fleet off the island of Flores where the enemy lay in wait for the fleets. He took the enemy's vice-admiral, one of the queen's good galleons, and the vice-admiral, named Richard Grenville, a person the English esteem very highly. He died five or six days after he surrendered, of a musket wound in the head. He sank one of the king's old galleons and a flyboat of the fleet. He carried 46 pieces of artillery, each in its port, and six extra pieces. He would have fled like the rest if Martin de Vertendona's galleon, which got the wind of him, had not torn away his foresail with the bowsprit.

God preserve your lordship many years as we your lordship's servants desire.

From the bay of Cadiz and this vice-admiral, October 10, 1591.

Aparicio de Arteaga (Rubric).

Document No. 86¹

[Antonio Navarro² to the House of Trade, Lisbon,
October 12, 1591]

(p. 1)

† . . .

At every opportunity I have reported at length to your lordship on everything concerning this fleet up to April 1. I will now relate what else occurred.

From April 25 on I had my ships, with yards across, ready to make sail, but His Majesty's gold and silver were not delivered to me until June 13, Corpus Christi, and that very same day I sailed with 22 ships. Three or four days later, because it was leaking and for other reasons, Agustin de Paz's ship lagged. I encountered great

¹ *A. de I.*, 42-1-9/4, Contratación 5109. 2 *pliegos*, original.

² Captain general in command of the New Spain fleet.

calms and the voyage was a little tiresome. We reached the Sonda de las Tortugas on July 13.

That night, all my convoy being together, as we passed through the Sonda steering southeast, Martin de Ygararan's ship, of which Juan Gayon was pilot, waited until an hour after nightfall and then, for no known reason, turned the other way and steered west. When day broke and we counted the ships I observed that it was missing. I waited all that day, hoping that it would come up. When it did not I proceeded (p. 2) on my course, for the pilots thought that it must have gone ahead. Next day in the afternoon I sighted land and in order to make the port early I lay to and assembled my ships.

Off the Mesa del Marien, six leagues from the harbour, we discovered nine ships converging upon Castillo's ship. Although we all thought that this must be Diego de la Ribera, who would be on guard at that point, I turned upon them and they immediately took another tack and fell back.

In view of the large amount of treasure on board my ships and because to do otherwise was not only to risk the treasure but, further, to risk making Havana at all, the season being so far advanced, I went into the port and there found Diego de la Ribera with his armada ready, he told me, to go out that day after the corsairs in order to clear the way for me. They had been waiting there three days and had come up within half a league of El Morro.

When I learned that Ygararan's ship had not come in, which had on board plate belonging to His Majesty and to private individuals, nor Agustin de Paz's, which carried no plate in its manifest, I asked Ribera to pursue these corsairs and clear the way for those two ships. He said that now that I had come in he would not go out without His Majesty's order. I demanded that he should go out or, if not, give me four or six vessels of his armada that I might do so, while my vice-admiral and he unloaded and stored all the plate my ships had brought in the fortress, as His Majesty commanded, and overhauled and made them ready to sail. (p. 3) If men, subsistence or munitions were lacking, I would supply these from my vessels and leave that night. It was resolved not to do so. I appealed to Campmaster Juan de Texeda in vain. And so the corsairs hung about for four days.

At the end of that time Agustin de Paz and Ygararan and many other persons came into Havana in a boat with the news that the corsairs had taken them and seven other ships of the Santo Domingo fleet and had steered for England, having given them that boat in which to come to Havana.

Forthwith I arrested Juan Gayon, pilot, for having steered off his

course simply because he chose to do so. I prosecuted him and, by a judge from Mexico called Dr. Farfan and by the lieutenant governor of Havana, he was sentenced to public disgrace¹ and ten years on the rowers' bench in the galleys, loss of goods and privation of office. I assure your lordship that if they had not taken the case out of my jurisdiction I'd have hanged him. I granted his appeal that your lordship may do so, for if these things are tolerated, as they have been hitherto, the great damage arising therefrom will much increase hence forward.

I had His Majesty's order to wait for Pedro Menéndez Marqués until Saint James' day. Since he neither came nor was there any news of him, we decided to set out but because the weather was not suitable we did not leave on the 26th. (p. 4) On the 27th, however, Diego de la Ribera and I departed with 73 ships assembled from every quarter, most of them very small. We disembogued in seven or eight days and within eleven very unfavourable contrary winds began to blow, which lasted some days.

On the 26th a storm struck us which separated Diego de la Ribera and me. Nearly all the fleet and Aparicio de Arteaga, my vice-admiral, remained with him. Few ships, but good ones, stayed with me, among them Diego de la Ribera's vice-admiral, Rodrigo de Rada, and some other units of his command. I found myself with sixteen sail and when I had brought them together I discovered three strangers among them.

When I drew near to take a good look at these they realized that they were recognized and converged on Castillo's ship. They broke out a flag and I saw that they were English. They had been trailing us for a whole day and a night. They fell back but continued to accompany me until we were almost at the island of Flores.

On September 3 the storm increased and the vice-admiral of the Tierra Firme fleet, on board of which was Rodrigo de Rada, split and sank. I saved all on board and distributed them among this flagship and some other vessels of the fleet. With the rest Rodrigo de Rada went to the ship *Del Puerto*² which belonged to two brothers and we continued on our course for the islands, which I sighted on September 16.

At Flores I found the royal armada in command (p. 5) of Don Alonso de Bazan, whom I joined, and although I was short of water and needed to repair my ships I bore him company nine or ten days,

¹ That is, he was exposed to public vituperation and perhaps also compelled to wear insignia advertising his degradation.

² The *Santa Maria del Puerto*. See enclosure with this document.

until Vice-Admiral Aparicio de Arteaga came up with 49 sail, all small except his ship and Retana's¹ which General Juan de Oribe had taken over as flagship of the Tierra Firme fleet.

Aparicio de Arteaga told us that between September 3 and 10 eleven ships went down, among them Diego de la Ribera's flagship. He was drowned. The vessels lost are listed in the enclosed separate memorandum.

Don Alonso summoned a council and showed us his order from His Majesty not to leave until the 15th of October, until which date he was to wait for Pedro Menéndez Marquéz's *zabras* and these fleets, in order to bring them all together. In view of our imperative necessities it was unanimously resolved that we should proceed to La Terceira for water and to overhaul our ships, and that His Majesty's order should be obeyed although to do so was to risk everything.

As we were sailing for La Terceira a storm blew from the north-east to the north² of such intensity as will be inferred from the wreckage it left behind. In order not to grieve your lordship I will not recount the matter here except to say that no two ships were left together. Most of them could not make the islands and those that did so made them to their greater grief, as will be seen by the (p. 6) enclosed memorial wherein are stated the facts as so far certainly known. It will be no little favour of Our Lord if the loss is not far heavier yet. The truth will become known little by little, that it may hurt the worse.

By the weather and by the fear of corsairs which our ships must feel, I judged that they would make for this port as being the nearest in which to find shelter. I came here to assemble them and arrived on Monday, October 8, in company with seven other ships of the armada and fleet. Here I found three or four and the same night others entered; and on the 10th Don Alonso de Bazan came in with his flagship and three others so badly damaged that I think they must necessarily winter here. Every day ships arrive here and at Setubal.

I have not previously advised your lordship in order to be able to render a substantial report, but now I send this post with statement of what ships are here and at Setubal I am overhauling and furnishing them as best I can in order, God willing, to leave here within four days, if weather permit. At present it is not suitable.

In everything I have applied to the prince cardinal, who referred

¹ *La Concepción*. See enclosure with this document.

² . . . *del noroeste asta el norte* . . .

me to Conde de Fuentes, and he attended and continues to attend to everything that comes up with such earnestness that your lordship and the university must write and thank him for it.

I have asked him and Don Alonso de Bazan to give me an armed (p. 6) escort to accompany me and although everything possible has been done they cannot furnish me more than five of the galleons to escort me as far as Cape Santa Maria or to Cadiz if necessary, for of all the other ships of the armada not one is in condition to put to sea nor can any be made ready with the speed which the situation demands. And so, if Our Lord give me weather, I will leave with these ships and any others that may come in within the next four or six days, during which time the galleons and the ships will be put into as good condition as possible.

I am worried about my vice-admiral for, although I know that on Saint Michael's day she was blown away from port and that her masts and the rest were sound, some say that she was driven ashore on San Miguel. I hope in God and in Aparicio de Arteaga's diligence that she may be already in that city. God grant it as He is able and [preserve] your lordship many years.

Lisbon, October 12, 1591.

Antonio Navarro (Rubric).

(Enclosure)¹

(p. 1) List of the ships which, up to the present, it is known that the English have taken in the Indies or have been lost out of the fleets of New Spain and Tierra Firme and from the royal armada in the storms which have occurred:

Near Havana, off the Mesa de Marien, three English ships took seven ships from Santo Domingo which were coming up to join the fleets at Havana.

Agustin de Paz's ship, which separated from the fleet shortly after it left New Spain, was seized by the English on July 15. It carried no plate.

Martin de Ygararan's ship left the fleet off Las Tortugas at night, its pilot having declined to follow the light. It fell in with the said English and they took it. It carried plate belonging to His Majesty and to private individuals.

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¹ 1 *pliego*, original.

The ships lost in the first storm, when Generals Antonio Navarro de Prado and Diego de la Ribera were separated, of those which remained with Diego de la Ribera are the following:

Diego de la Ribera's flagship. He and those on board were drowned. Some 30 persons were saved, among them the ship's master and the assistant pilot.

Hernando Guillen's ship. Those on board drowned except 20 persons.

Veloso's great ship. Those on board saved.

The Omes' great ship. All on board and some artillery saved.

Rodrigo González's ship. Those on board saved.

Fuentidueña's ship. Those on board saved.

(p. 2) The ship called *La Peña de Francia*. Those on board saved.

Pero Bernal Cermeño's shallop. Those on board saved.

Gaspar Nuñez's ship. Those on board saved.

The ship *Salvadora*, belonging to Theodoro Espindola. Those on board saved.

Madurera's ship. Those on board saved.

Of those which went with General Antonio Navarro, the vice-admiral of the Tierra Firme fleet was lost, on board of which was Rodrigo de Rada. Those on board were taken off by the flagship and other vessels and the vice-admiral went on board the ship *Santa Maria del Puerto*.

The vessels which it is certainly known were lost in the storm at Las Terceiras are the following:

The ship *Santa Maria del Puerto* on board of which was Vice-Admiral Rodrigo de Rada. Those on board made La Terceira.

Diego Sanchez Barragan's ship, lost on Terceira. Those on board saved.

Pedro Milanés' ship, lost in sight of La Terceira. Almost none saved.

The *Campechana* from Tierra Firme, sunk. It is not known that anybody survived.

Pedro Martín's ship went aground on San Miguel island near Villafranca. It is not certainly known whether those on board survived or not.

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The royal armada suffered very heavily. So far, in addition

to the two ships sunk when they fought the Englishman, it is certain that the following have been lost:

The ship *Vegona*¹ which belonged to Pedro de la Alguera went down and Alonso Hidalgo saved 140 persons and in his ship, which is *La Concepción*, Retana, carried them as far as San Miguel, where he left them. All the rest on board were lost.

(p. 3)

The ship *Madalena* of the royal armada was lost within sight of her flagship. I do not know that anybody was saved.

Many galleons are missing which were dismasted and damaged, among them the galleon *San Martin*. God preserve and bring them safe to port. I
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2²

All the galleons of the armada, including the flagship, are very badly damaged and in such shape that only five could be made ready to escort the fleet. Marcos de Aramburu is in command of them.

Lisbon, this day, October 12, 1591.

Antonio Navarro (Rubric).

Document No. 87³

[Pedro Alvarez de Ruesga to the Crown, Havana,
November 6, 1591]

(p. 1)

†

Sire . . .

As soon as Your Majesty ordered us to go to Cape San Antonio we did so and remained there from May 15 to August 8. During this time we saw some enemy ships—perhaps fourteen sail—in squadrons which came to anchor off the cape. We fought three of them. The breeze sprang up and they escaped but we had fought them for an hour and a half and damaged one. This occurred on August 1 and

¹ *Santa Maria de Begoña*.

² The editor has added this marginal calculation, which raises the total of vessels lost to 28.

³ *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127. 1 *pliego*, original.

because the sea rose we could do nothing more to offend them, for they steered out to sea . . . (p. 2) . . .

. . . Havana, November 6, 1591.

Pedro Alvarez de Ruesga (Rubric).

Document No. 88¹

[The Licentiate Manso de Contreras² to the Crown, La Margarita, June 4, 1592]

(p. 1)

+

Sire

. . . because I had no way to proceed upon my voyage, finding myself isolated³ and much depressed by my inability to serve Your Majesty, and also put to expense, I purchased a ship in which to continue and to convey the fish which Your Majesty ordered the governor of this island to provide for the armadas and fleets which are at Cartagena. And as she lay, with yards across, ready to sail, an English corsair happened to come by with three vessels. He anchored in the harbour where my ship lay. When he saw men board her to defend her, or because he did not need her, he left without doing her any damage.

Presently, within three days, another corsair came up with as many vessels and surprised my ship, seized her, and boarded with a large party.

Observing that none on the island came forth to defend the harbour, with a single companion I went post haste down to the port, which is two leagues distant, and assembled some sailors who had already abandoned the ship. With these I made some showing of defence. We fired some shots on our part and from on board the pinnace and the ship they fired musketry and artillery in such

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-4-6, Santo Domingo 184. 1 *pliego*, original.

² Recently appointed governor of Santa Marta; after January 17, 1593, his jurisdiction included Rio de la Hacha. Cf. *A. de I.*, 180-3-1, Caracas IK2, *cédula* of that date.

³ He was very unpopular because he was to make inquisitions into preceding administrations and evidently demonstrated early his determination to proceed vigorously against *rescates* (illicit trade with the enemy).

manner that it was rare good luck we were not killed for we were close and had no cover on the open beach. We were well within range.

In any event, supposing the defence to be more than it was, they departed, abandoning the ship. They stripped her of sails, cordage and nails and left her in bad shape. To replace these things will cost me a good deal of money.

I leave this island tomorrow for Santa Marta at considerable risk, for it is understood that these corsairs lie across my route (as the pilot tells me they usually do). God will dispose the event as may be suitable to His service. In Your Majesty's it is becoming to suffer this and much more . . . (p. 2) . . .

Margarita Island, June 4, 1592.

The Licentiate Manso de Contreras (Rubric).

Document No. 89¹

[Diego Martin de Angulo² to the Crown, Puerto de Caballos, June 15, 1592]

(p. 1)

†

Sire

I have been serving Your Majesty in this city of San Juan de Puerto Caballos, in the province of Honduras, Your Majesty's domain, since the year '78, by Your Majesty's command so to serve in the post of captain whenever the occasion might arise, and to make report thereon. Therefore, in fulfilment of the obligation of my office and as is my duty as Your Majesty's humble vassal born, I herewith advise Your Majesty of events which have occurred in this city and upon this coast.

On May 25 four English ships with four pinnaces entered this port. In the Bay of Truxillo they had seized a ship which left here on May 19. They took her on the 21st. The fort at Truxillo fired on them several times and they withdrew.

¹ *A. de I.*, 64-1-15, Audiencia de Guatemala 58. 1 *pliego*, original.

² In 1578 Martin de Angulo was governor's lieutenant at Puerto de Caballos. See Wright, I. A., *Documents concerning English Voyages to the Spanish Main*, Hakluyt Society, Series II, LXXI, p. lvii, n. Since that volume was issued the editor has seen still more papers concerning Barker and Coxe in *A. de I.*, 63-6-10, Guatemala 10.

Prisoners taken with this vessel informed them of four ships loading here for Spain and they immediately steered for this port. They did not find the ships here because I had compelled them to get out two days before, that is, on May 23. They did not see them when they passed on a course for this port because ours were anchored close inshore (as they are accustomed to lie every night).

As I have said, the enemy entered this port on May 25, flying Your Majesty's colours. They made the signals which are usually given by vessels entering in peace. All this was done in order to take us off our guard. Because this is a season when ships do not usually come hither I suspected immediately that this might be a ruse and warned the people (p. 2) to remove their most valuable belongings to the bush. I brought ashore a lot of plate which was on board a frigate. By the time I got it to land the enemy had set ashore 200 muskets and pikes. Therefore with the plate I went into the bush along with the inhabitants of this city, some fourteen in number. This course was advisable because this port is an unprotected beach more than two leagues in extent and men can be landed anywhere without our being able to offer any defence.

The enemy followed us half a league through the bush and so got a lot of stuff although not of much value. They looted the hospital's church, maltreated the images and carried off the bells. From Your Majesty's custom house they carried off the quicksilver which was there. The governor tells me it was some 60 hundredweight. Your Majesty's officials had not yet sent it up, I am told by Governor Sanchez de Carranza,¹ who forthwith came to this port with relief. Because the enemy had already gone his coming was useless and must be paid for by persons who have been negligent.

From me they took 4000 ducats, not in money but in merchandise. Because I was rendering good service in saving the plate which had been embarked, I did not look to my own interest.

The enemy left on May 27 to overtake the ships. God granted that two should leave Truxillo for Havana a day before they arrived. Its

¹ ' . . . Twice has this unhappy city (Puerto de Caballos) been visited by enemies. The first time they took certain loose ships which had come in from Cartagena and Havana. Although they attacked the city of Trujillo twice the people there defended themselves valiantly so that these attacks failed. Enraged thereat, the enemy came to Puerto de Caballos where there were fourteen men, eight of them mulattoes and the rest invalid. Although I came down to the relief with all the people of the province, because this was a journey of 40 or 50 leagues from the interior, I did not arrive in time and they had opportunity to loot the town . . . ' The Comendador Carranza to Don Francisco Coloma, Puerto de Caballos, April 25, 1594, in *A. de I.*, 54-2-5, Santo Domingo 127, dulplicated in 63-6-10, Guatemala 10.

owner stripped another and drew her up under the battery. She was small and he was able to do this. The fourth, which had come with manifested cargo, owner Cristóbal Monte, remained at Minguiche(?) where he unloaded the best of its cargo. When the enemy came up he set the ship on fire in order that they might not profit by the merchandise [remaining on board] and went ashore.

The enemy got no gold or silver because these ships were of so little strength that Your Majesty's revenues had not been placed on board them, nor bullion belonging to private individuals. There is nothing to brag of in the booty they took.

They tried repeatedly to get me to go to talk with their general concerning the ransom of the town, saying that otherwise they would burn it. I did not go and afterwards learned that their intention was to do me personal harm because with them were three sons of one of the Englishmen whom I captured in 1578 and executed on March 4 of that year when at my own expense I sent out a ship and two pinnaces to Golfo Dulce with 60 (p. 3) men. Fourteen of the enemy were killed or captured. In a galliot which could navigate among the shoals seventeen escaped and of the seventeen three were among this lot and they were the ones who asked for me. I bore the entire expense of that expedition, as Your Majesty's royal high court at Guatemala reported at the time.

The number of enemies in these ships was about 350 and their commander is one of the captains who helped take the ship off Havana last year. He lacks an arm which at that time was carried away by a cannon-ball . . .

. . . San Juan del Puerto de Caballos, Province of Honduras,
June 15, 1592.

Diego Martin de Angulo (no rubric).

Document No. 90¹

[The Licentiate Manso de Contreras to the Crown,
Santa Marta, July 14, 1592]

(p. 1)

†

Sire

In a preceding despatch² I informed Your Majesty of my arrival here twenty days ago and of the numerous alarms the corsairs

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-4-18(4), Santa Fé 49. 1 *pliego*, original.

² Not seen.

occasioned us by standing off, within sight of this place. Observing that there is some defence here they do not now appear so frequently.

But one corsair ship, with a caravel which it had seized, anchored two leagues from this port in another called Concha harbour. I sent three mounted men to make a reconnaissance. Later I sent after them a captain with 50 harquebusiers to prevent the enemy from making a landing, should he attempt it. It seems that two hours before this troop came up the first three attacked a boat and killed two men. The rest very hastily returned to their ship, which departed immediately.

For six days now no enemy has been seen. Nevertheless we are very much on guard. The citizens are entirely ready for anything that may occur. These people seem to me to be honest and quiet . . . (p. 3) . . .

. . . Santa Marta, July 14, 1592.

The Licentiate Manso de Contreras (Rubric).

Document No. 91¹

[Don Pedro de Lodeña to the Crown, Cartagena, July 28,
1592]

(p. 1)

†

Sire . . .

(p. 2) . . . A considerable number of enemy ships having appeared off this coast in small squadrons or singly and done some damage to vessels engaged in the coastwise trade, there being also news concerning a fleet leaving England, such general alarm was aroused that every ship and pearl-fishing canoe that could get away from Rio de la Hacha sought refuge in this harbour. They came in from everywhere else also, frightened by rumours from every quarter. Furthermore the enemy took two coastwise traders almost under my nose. The galleys were at Nombre de Dios.

When I received word that in fleeing from the enemy one of these two vessels had run ashore at a point six leagues from this city, within an hour I sent 40 harquebusiers and twelve horse to lay an

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-4-6, Santa Fé 37. 2½ pliegos, original.

ambuscade. To insure the better success of the enterprize I sent Captain Paniagua with them under instructions to endeavour (p. 3) to take prisoners that we might get definite news and clear up our confusion. The event fell out as desired.

They killed and drowned some of the enemy and captured thirteen alive, among these one of the ships' captains named Robert Frost.¹ He and all the other prisoners say that he is a prominent person. In exchange for himself he offers any prisoner in England.

This was a capture of considerable importance, given the circumstances then prevailing, because from these prisoners, especially from Captain Robert, we learned how many ships there are in Indies and what others were making ready in England, as Your Majesty may see at greater length from their depositions accompanying this despatch . . . (p. 8) . . .

. . . Cartagena, July 28, 1592.

Don Pedro de Lodeña (Rubric).

(Enclosure)²

(p. 8) . . . In the very noble and very loyal city of Cartagena, Mainland coast, the Indies of the Ocean Sea, on the twenty-third day of the month of June in the year one thousand five hundred and ninety two, his honour Don Pedro de Lodeña, for the king, our lord, governor and captain general of this jurisdiction, stated that:

Being informed that at Point Ycacos, which is six leagues from this city, up the coast, two English ships had driven ashore a frigate belonging to Francisco García, which was conveying a cargo of merchandise to the city of Mompox, he sent out Captain Francisco de Paniagua, of this garrison, with certain soldiers and other (p. 9) residents of this city with orders they were to observe in operations against the English who might come ashore from the said ships;

Which force, having gone out and followed his honour's orders, by God's grace captured and brought to this city thirteen of the English who landed from the said ships at Point Ycacos and killed many others as they sought to regain their boats;

And whereas it is desirable from the prisoners to learn what their

¹ . . . *Bost* . . .

² *A. de I.*, 2-5-1/20, Patronato, 265, Ramo 53. 13 *pliegos*, legalized copy.

purpose was, how many ships there are, and whether a fleet is setting out from that kingdom for these parts;

His honour ordered the prisoner's depositions to be taken, which was done, as follows . . .

. . . the said governor ordered to be brought before him one of the English who said his name was Thomas —, ¹ that he is a Catholic and not a lutheran; who was duly sworn according to law, on which oath he swore to tell the truth, and was by the governor advised to tell the exact truth in reply to the questions to be asked of him for if he did so he would be treated with consideration but if he failed to do so he would be punished; and he promised to tell the truth . . .

. . . he said that he is a native of a place called Hull² which is in the northerly part of England, a hundred and fifty miles from London . . . he left . . . England (p. 10) . . . with a captain named Benjamin Wood³ who was in command of four ships that set sail from England . . . about two and a half months ago . . . The four ships belong to my Lord Thomas Howard⁴ who was in command of the fleet at Terceira last year . . .

The commander of these four ships . . . is in my Lord Thomas Howard's service and sails by his order and with the queen's licence. Asked whether he carries the queen of England's patent, deponent stated that he does and that he himself saw it . . .

Benjamin Wood is in supreme command and . . . they call him admiral. Of the other ships, the captains are Captain —⁵ . . . Captain Coche,⁶ and a tall man whose name deponent does not recall.

. . . The (p. 11) largest of the ships is 120 tons; another, 110; another about 80 tons and the other 60, he believes, and they have no pinnaces, only the boats which they carry aboard the ships . . . the craft that came up yesterday to land men . . . were the ships' shallops and the one that came to the relief is a vessel they took at the pearl fisheries at Rio de la Hacha . . .

. . . after they left England they went to the island of (Grand?) Canary but did not land. In the harbour there they fought a galleon for about an hour at night but left it presently and proceeded to the island of Trinidad where they took on water and the Indians gave them bananas and pineapples and other fruits in barter for knives. Deponent does not remember when they arrived there.

¹ . . . *Atmar* . . . ² . . . *Hul* . . . ³ . . . *Bengemen VI* . . .

⁴ . . . *Melarte Tamas Hagua* . . . ⁵ . . . *Babisar* . . .

⁶ . . . *Cuchi*, . . . Cf. Williamson, *op. cit.* p. 178.

From Trinidad they went to La Margarita and in a port of that island (he does not know what port it was) they found two ships, empty and without sails or anybody on board, which ships they left, taking only a cable. From there they went to Caracas¹ and came upon a little ship which ran from them to land. The (p. 12) captains boarded and found two women and a boy and a little negro and some oil and wine. They took the ship but presently released her. They kept twenty or thirty demijohns of wine.

From Caracas they proceeded to Cabo de la Vela and there at the pearl fisheries took the vessel he has mentioned. She carried no cargo, only stones. They stood off the town of Rio de la Hacha but could capture none of the pearl canoes which they found under water with holes bored to sink them. Off Rio de la Hacha, in the harbour, they seized a vessel which had come from Spain. It had already unloaded. The commander sent deponent on shore to bid the people give him twenty casks of water. He would provide the casks. In consideration of the water he would release the ship, sails and all. They would not give him the water so they removed the sails and cordage and burned the vessel.

From Rio de la Hacha they went to Santa Marta. The commander already knew that there were seven pieces of artillery there. They approached the port and drew fire. Two shots struck the ship. There were only two ships then because one had been separated from them by storm off Caracas and the other also (p. 13) was driven off by storm at Rio de la Hacha and they saw neither of these ships afterwards.

They left Santa Marta and came coasting along to Sand Islands Point and there came upon two little English ships. Deponent estimates that one is about 50 tons burden and the other 30.

The people aboard of these little ships bade deponent's commander come aboard for they wanted to talk, and they told him they had caused a ship carrying oil and wine to run aground there. Deponent does not know what else they told him.

The smallest of these two little vessels struck some rocks and sank presently. Those on board put off in their boat and went to the other ship, their consort.

While deponent's commander was aboard with them they sent a messenger to land to bid the people there send somebody out to the ship to parley. He pledged his word to let such a messenger return to shore. They had a white flag in the boat and on land saw only three or four mounted men. About ten men landed from his

¹ Caracas is and always has been an inland city. Cf. Document No. 97 *post.* Coro?

two ships and another boat with men came up from another vessel with whom they had no communication.

After they had landed the soldiers and people who were on land came up and seized them and brought them (p. 14) prisoners to this city. Some were drowned. Those who had remained in the boat (five or six men) returned to the ships. The prisoners taken were, he thinks, some thirteen Englishmen . . .

On board the three ships . . . there are about one hundred eighty men . . . the largest vessel carries fourteen or fifteen pieces of artillery; the other, ten or twelve pieces, among them two brass, the rest iron.

Asked how such small vessels dared to approach so close to land, knowing that there were galleys at Cartagena, deponent said that indeed they had heard there were galleys at Cartagena but if there is any wind galleys cannot fight ships—only in a calm. At Rio de la Hacha they were told by a man with a white flag that there were galleys at Cartagena.

Asked concerning fleets and ships which have left England, deponent said that they four went out, and that the same night three others of about their burden or even smaller left also, for Indies. No others had sailed previously. About (p. 15) twenty more ships were in London to sail in a squadron. They were not all queen's ships. Sir Walter Raleigh¹ was in charge of the work of fitting out these twenty ships and some said he would sail in command of them; others said it would be Francis Drake.² Deponent did not know their destination. The Earl of Cumberland³ was in the port of Plymouth with three large and two small ships. It was said that he would go to Indies . . . (p. 16) . . .

Asked whether his ships had a rendezvous to meet other English vessels anywhere, deponent said that they had no such rendezvous. He thinks that the vessels missing from his company have gone to Cape San Antonio because these two intended to proceed thither, or so he understood on board.

. . . their pilots are English. The other little ship which joined them has a Portuguese pilot⁴ (p. 17) whom deponent does not know.

. . . he said that he was twenty-three or four year old and signed: Tomas ———⁵

. . . the governor caused to be brought before him one of the English prisoners who said that his name was John ———⁶ and

¹ . . . *el capitan ser guatre dal . . .*

³ . . . *el conde de can borrean . . .*

⁵ . . . *Aturan . . .*

² . . . *francisco draque . . .*

⁴ Diego Perez? See Document No. 97 *post.*

⁶ . . . *Serfin . . .*

claimed to be a catholic. Being duly sworn he promised to tell the truth . . . (p. 18)

. . . He said that he was born and reared in London . . . He left England aboard the ship *Pilgrim* (?),¹ master, John —, ² the captain of said ship being Thomas Scott (?).³ Asked who was in command of the ship, he stated that it was Benjamin Wood.⁴

. . . They were four ships, one of a hundred tons, another of 60 tons; the flagship, 120 tons, and the other, 80 . . . (p. 19) They left England ten weeks ago, eleven weeks come Monday . . . They set out from London and called at Plymouth for supplies . . . The ships belong to a lord named Thomas Howard.⁵

Asked if the said lord is in command . . . he said that he is not a man to take actual command in person. The commander is the said Benjamin Wood⁶ . . . to whom the queen of England issued her licence to sail with the said four ships . . . the captains are Benjamin Wood . . . —⁷ . . . and (p. 20) Coche.

. . . They set out from England for this Main coast of the Indies and some sailed along the east side of La Palma and others along the west side and all rejoined at the island of Trinidad where they took in water and the Indians brought them fruits on board in exchange for knives.

At the Canaries Captain Thomas Allen⁸ sank a ship. Captain Allen had three ships and a pinnace in his command and was not part of their squadron.

Leaving Trinidad they sighted Margarita and took in water where the coast was low. They anchored at Cabo (p. 21) de la Vela and sought water but did not find it. In the port of Rio de la Hacha they came on a small vessel which the commander ordered to be burned. Thence the said ships proceeded to Santa Marta and anchored, being unaware that there was a settlement thereabouts. About a dozen pieces of artillery fired on them. They left Santa Marta for this coast and came as far as Ycosos Point. Two ships came, for the other two had been separated from them by storm . . . At Point Ycosos they came upon two other vessels.

Asked if they had intended to attack this city of Cartagena . . . he said no, for they were few ships and the masters and captains realize that fact.

¹ *Pelegrina. Peregrine?* Cf. Williamson, *op. cit.*, p. 118. In 1593 the *Pilgrim*, serving Cumberland was out with a Spanish pilot, Diego Petruc . . .

² . . . *Elesme* . . .

³ . . . *Escot* . . .

⁴ . . . *bengemud* . . .

⁵ . . . *tomas uguares* . . .

⁶ . . . *benamasalbe* . . .

⁷ . . . *dababeres* . . .

⁸ . . . *alen* . . .

Asked what was their object in landing yesterday . . . he said that they were after fresh food and by the other ship had been told that they could bring off a frigate aground there, carrying wine, oil and other cargo. Fifteen or sixteen men put off in their boat and he does not know how many came from the other ships, but they were many men in the boat where he was and in another . . . they carried muskets and on landing found the soldiers who captured them and brought them to this city . . .

. . . there were some three hundred men on board the four ships . . . The largest ship carries twenty guns, the other ten; and he does not know what armament the other two have. Of these pieces of artillery two are brass and all the rest iron. The brass pieces are large and mounted at the bow . . .¹ (p. 24)

. . . Asked if this squadron had orders to join other ships at any place . . . he said they were alone and were not to join up with anybody . . . Ben Wood² is the pilot and master and captain and one little ship has a Portuguese pilot named Diego Fernández³ and the other pilots are English . . .

. . . He said that he had told the truth, on the oath he took, and said that he does not know how to write . . .

. . . Governor Don Pedro (p. 25) de Lodeño caused to be brought before him one of the said English who said that his name was Robert Barrett,⁴ . . . native of . . . Guernsey (?),⁵ which is an island between England and France.

. . . He said that he left England with two small ships, one 50 or 60 tons burden, the other about the same, himself in command of them . . . he left from the port of Fowey (?)⁶ with the licence of the queen of England . . . (p. 26) . . . No other vessels left with him . . . yesterday he joined Captain Wood . . .⁷ in command of four vessels . . . two of which had been separated from the two which came up yesterday . . . These four ships belong to Lord Thomas Howard⁸ . . . carrying the queen's licence . . . the captains of these four ships (p. 27) are in my lord's service but he does not know their names . . . the vessels are 120 to 130 tons burden, ten tons difference either way, and have two valiant captains, one called Captain Wood⁹ and the

¹ He describes a fleet of 25 or 26 sails which was making ready in England to sail for the Indies when he left. He supposes them to be at La Terceira now.

² . . . *benut* . . .

³ Diego Perez? Cf. Document No. 97 *post*. Note that Perez boasted of his service with Cumberland. Here Fernández is described as serving Howard.

⁴ . . . *roberto barraet*. Yet this was Frost. ⁵ . . . *setenbresbe* . . . ⁶ . . . *foy* . . .

⁷ . . . *vot* . . . ⁸ . . . *el conde tomas vrt* . . . ⁹ . . . *vl* . . .

other Captain Coche. Their armament is sixteen or eighteen pieces. One of the captains is a seaman and the other a soldier.

Asked what pinnaces they were which came to land yesterday and how many men they brought . . . he said that one was his, carrying seventeen or eighteen men; and he does not know how many were in the others . . . they came to take wine from a frigate there and were having a try for it when the horse and foot soldiers came out and captured them . . . (p. 28) . . .

Asked what course they had followed since they left England, up to now . . . he said that they proceeded to Finisterre and to the islands and there found other English ships. He does not know how many. From there they steered for another island. He could not say what land that was. From there they coasted along and came to Cabo de la Vela and from there they followed the coast and passed by this city eight leagues to sea. They kept clear because they had not the force with which to approach. They went to Baru islands and took a ship carrying live hogs. Its owners fled. Had he not done so they would have let him have his vessel and the hogs.¹ They set the women on shore because they wept, and a man; and kept two boys, one bigger than the other, whom he intended to send to land yesterday . . .

. . . he did not know that the galleys were not here . . . (p. 29) . . . the pilots are English except one. He does not know whether he is English or Castillian . . . His ships carry forty-two men and he does not know how many are on board of the others. . . . no other ships had left for Indies when he set out . . .²

. . . one of his vessels capsized two leagues from land and the other is now with the other ships. They have probably made off, fearing the galleys.

Asked how they captured the frigate . . . he said that they chased her and she drove aground. They sent off their boat with five or six seamen (p. 31) . . . He does not know what they carried off in two trips they made to the frigate. One of the men named ——³ who was in the boat is among the prisoners and can say what they took.

. . . this is the truth on the oath he took and he signed it. Robert Frost.⁴ . . .

In the city of Cartagena on the twenty-fourth day of the month of June in the year one thousand five hundred and ninety two, the said governor caused to be brought before him one of the said

¹ This vessel was abandoned at sea off Baru.

² He describes a fleet making ready to sail when he left England (Raleigh).

³ . . . *rengila* . . . ⁴ . . . *roberto crosa* . . .

English, a prisoner who said that he was called William Cole (?),¹ native of Hull² . . . he came out on board of the ship of which Benjamin Wood³ is master, captain and pilot, called *The Little Sloop* (?)⁴ They left England on April 3 . . . (p. 32) They were four ships, the said Benjamin Wood⁵ commanding, each about 120 tons burden except one, aboard which was a pilot named Diego Fernández,⁶ a Portuguese. It was about 70 tons . . . The ships belong to my Lord Thomas Howard?⁷ . . .

Asked what other vessels have left England for Indies . . . he said that a man who owned ships, named Master John Watts⁸ left with three the very night he sailed . . . The largest of his ships was less than 100 tons. He does not know their destination except that they were out to find their living. He did not know of any other vessels having left previously . . .

. . . (p. 33) . . . Questioned concerning the voyage made by the said four ships which came out of England . . . he said that they sailed close by the Canary and in the port of that island saw two vessels and drew near with the intention of entering. These ships fired on them three or four times and they replied and left them. From there they went to the island of Trinidad and got water and went to a port of La Margarita where they found two empty ships which they boarded with the pinnace. Since they found them empty they left them and went coasting on and came to Santa Marta but did not land because they were fired upon from the city. Beyond Santa Marta they came ashore under a white flag to get water but the Indians would not allow this. At Rio de la Hacha they sought, with the pinnace, to get water but were not permitted to do so. In the harbour they found a ship, empty except for three hogsheads of wine, and they took her, but nothing else. They burned this vessel and proceeded to Rio Grande⁹ and there found water and since have done nothing until they reached the Point where they were captured.

They saw cattle on land (p. 34) and went after meat and then the horse and foot came out and captured them after they had fought like good soldiers until their powder became wet. In his boat there were sixteen men. He does not know how many there were in the pinnace and another boat. In his boat they had eight or nine muskets and pikes . . .

¹ . . . carbon . . . ² . . . sol . . . ³ . . . bengemenuto . . .

⁴ . . . la chalandilla . . . ⁵ . . . benxemenuto . . .

⁶ Cf. Document No. 97 *post*. ⁷ . . . el conde tomas egua . . .

⁸ . . . maestre juas . . . ⁹ The Magdalena.

... he declared that this was the truth on the oath he took ...
William Cole.¹

... one of the said English prisoners ... named Walter ———² ... catholic ... being duly sworn ... said ... that he is a native of London ... (p. 35) ... and ... that he left England on Good Friday in the ship called the *Resplendent Moon*³ of which John Middleton⁴ was captain and he corporal ... He said that only one ship set out from England. On the coast of Spain they met and took another. Captain Robert then went on board of it, for the arrangement made in England was that as soon as they should have taken a prize each was to have his own vessel. They came on alone, then, in this ship to the Canaries and there found four English ships belonging to Lord Thomas Howard.⁵ Two of these vessels were of 120 tons, one of a hundred tons, and the other 50 or 60 tons. Ben Wood⁶ was in command and this squadron of four ships left England after they did. The flagship carries 80 men. He does not know how many there are on board of the others. The armament of the flagship is twenty pieces of artillery. He does not know what armament the other vessels may have. At the Canaries these four ships left the two with which deponent sailed and they did not see each other again until they met six leagues from this (p. 36) city ...

From the Canaries they proceeded to a land inhabited by savages, where they got water. This was 30 or 40 leagues from La Margarita.

At La Margarita they found two ships in the harbour and many men came down to them so that they did not approach these vessels, but presently came coasting along and met nothing. Although they found water in two or three places, they saw nobody.

On the coast of Cartagena they found a vessel with hogs and some men and women on board. They took 30 hogs and what else they found in this vessel and abandoned it. They sent the people to shore.

Later—last Saturday—they sighted a frigate and gave chase and so forced her aground and took from her what they could carry off in the boat. He did not see whether the other ship got anything or not.

When they were captured they had come ashore after cattle which they saw on land opposite where the ships lay. There were fourteen men in deponent's boat. He does not know how many there were in the other boats. The horse and foot came out and seized them and brought them to this city although they resisted all they could.

¹ ... guillermo carbon ...

² ... guatie resle ...

³ The Moonshine?

⁴ ... juan melaton ...

⁵ ... el conde tomas eguart ...

⁶ ... venud ...

Asked what plan these ships had and what they came after . . . he said they came out to seek their fortune with the queen of England's licence which he saw, sealed with the queen's seal.

. . . (p. 37) . . . three of Master Watts¹ ships left England the same day that they left; and four other vessels left London twenty days earlier than they for he does not know what port in the Indies, Captain Newport² commanding. These did not belong to the queen but to merchants of a company. He does not know what size they were because he did not see, only heard about them. . . .³

Asked whether among the English prisoners brought to this city there are any (p. 38) well known men or men of noble blood, he said that there are none except Captain Robert, who is an important person, rich, always at court with the gentry. In the queen of England's encounter with the Duke de Medina⁴ he commanded one of the queen's ships of 300 tons burden and he also went to France to the relief of the heretics in company with the persons in command of those troops. Deponent himself is a man well born, but poor . . . —Walter — . . .

In the very noble and very loyal city of Cartagena in the Indies on the twenty-seventh day of the month of June in the year one thousand five hundred and ninety two, Don Pedro de Lodeña, governor and captain general of this jurisdiction, said that whereas the night before his honour had put certain questions, very important to His Majesty's service, to Captain Robert, the English officer who is his honour's prisoner . . . he ordered (p. 39) . . . that the said Captain Robert's confession as made to his honour the governor should in his honour's own handwriting be included in this record [as follows]:

On June 26, 1592, in reply to definite questions put to him by me, the governor, Captain Robert said that:

. . . Captain Newport⁵ sailed some three weeks before he did, with four large vessels (from 300 to 350 tons burden, armament 30 pieces of heavy artillery), and that his destination was Santo Domingo and those islands and that he would land men. He had some 400 men.

Deponent was the next to leave, with his two ships.

Four other ships left, belonging to Lord Thomas [Howard] and under his captains with 250 men and more. Three of these vessels

¹ . . . *maestre guatre* . . . ² . . . *nyoport* . . .

³ He describes Raleigh's activities and a 200 ton ship making ready at Plymouth, presumably for Indies, captain . . . *juan quin* . . .

⁴ I.e., the Battle of Gravelines. ⁵ . . . *nyoporté* . . .

carried twenty pieces of heavy artillery and were between 150 and 140 tons burden.

Master Watts, a rich merchant [left?] with (p. 40) three vessels of 100 to 150 tons burden. These are the best ships afloat and carry some 300 men, 22 pieces of the best artillery made, the four pieces at the bows being brass . . .¹

Document No. 92²

[Juan de Texeda to the House of Trade, Havana, August
16 [-21], 1592]

(p. 1) . . . On the 12th there arrived an advice-boat sent out by General Luis Flores which brought the despatches for His Majesty which are forwarded herewith and an order to me to send them on at once. He wanted to know conditions here.

This boat put in at Batabano, twelve leagues from here on the south side, and it is a very good thing that it did so, for had it come directly to this port it would have been lost since for the last 48 days nineteen large ships and four small vessels have lain off the harbour: that is, from the eve of Saint Peter's which was June 28, to the eve of Our Lady of August's day.³

I consider the delay of the frigates to be indubitably the best course. Otherwise they would certainly meet with mishap, given the vigilance and strength of these enemies.

As for the New Spain fleet, I had already assured its safety by sending Martin Perez word not to leave until this coast should be free; and he has acted accordingly. The frigates have been saved by similar advice for I had also warned them concerning these enemy ships and their purpose, which warning I sent out from the same port of Batabano⁴ on the 14th of the present month.

The organization and strength of these heretics is thirteen heavy ships and a pinnace. Not a single day have they failed to tack to and fro off this harbour and so close in that I have been obliged to use

¹ Captain Robert told the governor of Raleigh's and Cumberland's activities; that Drake had been summoned to court (cf. Corbett, *op. cit.*, II, p. 370 and note 2); that Don Antonio's son would be ransomed, etc., etc.

² *A. de I.*, 42-1-10/5, Contratación 5110. 1 *pliego*, original.

⁴ Spelled Matamano in both places in this document.

³ August 15.

artillery to compel them to draw off. Their persistence in hanging daily off this port indicates that they are not sure whether the New Spain fleet is inside the bay or not. I am certain that to this date they do not know because to the present they have not captured any vessel out of this island or any person from whom to learn the facts, so effectively have I (p. 2) closed all the ports on this coast to the enemy. We fear little from them although they keep us busy. As often as they appeared just so often did I summon my people to their stations where defence is to be offered.

In addition to fourteen ships on watch at the entrance to this port, off Cape San Antonio there are three ships and two pinnaces. These remain there, day and night, and every three days three others and a pinnace come up to them from the direction of the Sonda de las Tortugas and then return thither.

The total number of large ships which have been seen so far is nineteen with four pinnaces. These ships are not less than 200 tons or over 300. I have not been able to learn who is in command. I suspect that it is a foregathering of thieves, for among these fourteen vessels are three flagships and a vice-admiral. They are racebuilt ships with large crews but wretched artillery. Twice now that the galleys have fought them my artillery has over-reached their ships while their shots fell short by half the distance. They keep so together that I have not been able to catch a single vessel alone. In this they are much aided by the fact that there has not been one hour of calm weather, only very fresh winds which enable them to laugh at the galleys. I consider that the galleys here are of little service and heavy expense and so I make no use of them except to guard the port . . . (p. 3) . . .

. . . Havana, August 16, 1592.

After this was written, that very date, eleven English sail appeared off the port, as usual; and they remained there, tacking back and forth, until today, August 21. If they do not return I will send this advice-boat on its way tonight.

Juan de Texeda (Rubric).

. . . Received October 21. (p. 4)

Document No. 93¹

[Robert Frost, deposition made at Cartagena, September
12, 1592]

(p. 11) . . . On June 20, 1592, we sighted a frigate eight leagues from the city of Cartagena, over toward the Magdalena River, and we gave chase immediately. Recognizing us, this vessel fled toward land and went aground. When we saw this both our ships dropped anchor near the frigate and forthwith in our boats we sent ashore what men we could. It was now night and we stationed our (p. 12) sentries and at once sent four men to board the frigate to see what there was in the vessel. They returned soon and told us that she had a cargo of merchandise. We thereupon withdrew all our men and went back to our ships because we feared an ambushade on the part of our enemies. We remained at anchor all this night and next day until early evening when we made sail to sea.

Next day after dinner, which was June 22 of the current year, we sighted two ships and a pinnace and followed them until we overtook them and immediately recognized that they were English, our friends. We spoke each other and they asked us what news there was of the coast and we told them that we had driven a frigate ashore and that we were not certain what cargo she carried but, if they desired, we would all go back together to where we had left her, and that we would lead the way because of the shoals. And so we all five sails steered for the land. One of our ships which was ahead struck on a (p. 13) rock and sank in half an hour. All those on board escaped by swimming. Nevertheless the remaining four ships came on and anchored near the frigate. This was about three in the afternoon.

We sent a boat to reconnoitre, to learn if there was anybody on board of the frigate or nearby, and, having made the reconnaissance, the boat returned to report that nothing had been seen.

At this time we saw cattle on the beach and felt some suspicion that perhaps this was a trick of our enemies, but by this time we had decided to land and so in the only two boats we had we sent ashore as many men as we could. Because the boats were crowded they could not get away together and so we landed at two different places a good distance apart.

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-5-21, Santa Fé 92. This document is embodied in the *información* concerning his services which was assembled in December, 1594, by Captain Antonio de Barrios. It is a legalized copy.

I and my men landed nearer the frigate than the other party. We neither saw nor heard anybody to oppose us and so set about stationing our sentinels in order that our parties might co-operate and safely accomplish our purpose.

Fearing the surf, I ordered my boat to draw off a little (p. 14) in order that we might find it ready for use in case anything happened. This so done I was about to order out my sentinels on land when we saw a body of horse come out of the bush. They charged us with great fury. One, whom I took to be the captain, was in the lead.

I and the men who were with me fired on them with our muskets and supposed that we had killed the leader or some of his men. We then dropped our muskets and took up our pikes, for the horse gave us no time to do anything else. At this juncture certain foot opened fire on us with harquebuses. On the other hand the captain of the horse, in the vanguard of all his troop, kept after us with such spirit and followed us so fast and pressed us so hard he drove us into the water beyond our depth where he killed and wounded some of my men and me.

After he had several times wounded me with his lance and I had struck at him with my pike many times, seeking to wound him and to defend myself against him, this captain finally overpowered me. After he had taken me he personally delivered me over to certain soldiers to hold (p. 15) and I saw with my own eyes that until he had captured me and broken up all my party this man did not pause; rather, with much spirit and courage he kept ahead of all, and so he appeared to me to be a person valorous indeed on occasions such as this. Inspired by his courage all the rest, both foot and horse, acquitted themselves very valiantly, and although they were few in number, such worth and spirit did they show it is my opinion that, led by so good a captain, they were equal not only to our landing party but to an even larger one, had it come ashore.

Ever since I have been in Cartagena I have been and am the prisoner of the aforesaid captain. I have sought information concerning him from certain persons of whom I have enquired his name and I have learned that he is Captain Antonio de Barrios. Further, from what I have observed in his house during the time that I have been his prisoner and from what I have heard from interpreters who have come to talk with me, I know that he is a man ready to serve His Majesty and that he merits great favour (p. 16) from His Majesty.

And this I say not because of the good treatment I have received in this captain's house and still receive. I am not moved by any such

consideration although I well might be. I am moved solely by the fact that this is true and is publicly known to be so.

All that I have set forth above is the truth and nothing but the truth.

Further, I have heard from these interpreters and from other persons through them that this captain spent his youth in His Majesty's service, on His Majesty's frontiers, and has taken part in many frays, so that he is, as I have said, worthy of His Majesty's favour.

And he signed it with his name in Cartagena, September 12, 1592. He so declared and signed before me, Francisco Lopez de Morales, notary . . . witnesses, Pedro Osorio and Sebastian de Silva, residents in this city.—Robert Frost . . .¹

Document No. 94²

[Don Pedro de Lodeña to the Crown, Cartagena, September
15, 1592]

(p. 1)

†

Sire . . .

(p. 6) . . . I assure Your Majesty that the numerous warnings I received from every quarter concerning enemies and (the galleys being in Nombre de Dios) their seizure of two frigates engaged in the coastwise trade made almost within our sight, threw business men and passengers and persons who were to manifest their shipments into such a state, on the supposition that the same condition of things was prevailing all along the Main, that while the situation lasted I neither slept nor rested two consecutive hours.

One afternoon they drove ashore a frigate carrying wine and oil and other cargo which had sailed with two other vessels prior to receipt of any warning whatsoever of enemies. This happened at a place six leagues up coast from this city. I imagined that they would not have dared to remain on board of her through the night because she lay close ashore in such position that she could be entered

¹ The amended transcription of the signature seems to make it very plain.

² *A. de I.*, 72-4-6, Santa Fé 37. 5 *pliegos*, original.

easily from the land. Therefore I resolved to send out next morning at dawn a party of 40 foot and twelve horse to lay an ambuscade because at this juncture it was very advisable to obtain information of them and to learn how many ships they have hereabouts and where, in what strength and (p. 7) what their purpose is. God granted as successful an outcome as could be desired, for when 70 or 80 English came ashore after certain cattle which to this end were driven to the coast, they were nearly all killed. Thirteen were captured with a captain named Robert Frost,¹ who they say is a leading man, a great mariner and soldier, as will appear from their statements.²

I advised General Luis Alfonso Flores immediately, the information being of the value that he will report. In addition to which the whole cargo of the frigate was saved, her loss being not 200 *pesos* . . . (p. 19) . . .

. . . Cartagena, September 15, 1592.

Don Pedro de Lodeña (Rubric).

Document No. 95³

[Juan de Texeda to the House of Trade, Havana,
September 17, 1592]

(p. 1)

+

. . . Since August 30 no enemy has appeared on this coast . . .

. . . They say that the ships which were here daily expected the Earl of Cumberland⁴ to join them with another squadron and that because of his death they gave up their designs and left. I have learned this from prisoners they released and from a Flemish artilleryman who deserted them when they sought water. Among these persons is a Portuguese pilot, a man of rather more understanding, who was with them five months. They captured him at Cape Verde.

He says there were nineteen ships off this coast, among them three belonging to the Earl of Cumberland; two from Bristol;⁵ six belonging to London merchants; and five to one Robert —.⁶

¹ . . . *Bost* . . .

² See enclosure with Document No. 91 *ante*.

³ *A. de I.*, 42-1-10/5, Contratación 5110. 1 *pliego*, original.

⁴ . . . *Conde del Este* . . .

⁵ . . . *Bristow* . . .

⁶ . . . *Branhaut* . . .

This is the man who took Navea¹ and the plate ship out of Antonio Navarro's fleet. He wrote me a letter full of compliments and menaces. I did not reply because I consider them a lot of drunkards. The captains speak and write Spanish because they have all been merchants or factors in Seville and San Lucar.

This pilot says that their seamen are a low lot and mere boys but their ships are good. The artillery cannot be very good because when they fired on these forts (p. 2) (and it is to be supposed they used their best and longest ranged guns) no ball weighed over eleven pounds . . .

. . . Havana, September 17, 1592.

Juan de Texeda (Rubric).

Document No. 96²

[Lope de Vega Portocarrero to the House of Trade, Santo Domingo, December 14, 1592]

(p. 1)

†

The 27th of last July there lay at anchor in the harbour of this city a flyboat of some 200 tons burden which had come in off its course for Brazil. Its captain is Bartólome Medina, a Fleming who lives in the city of Lisbon. His father is there and his home. The ship's master's name is Pedro de Burbua. This captain and master had asked me for licence to proceed to Lisbon and I was unwilling to give it because I had His Majesty's order to let no vessel leave this harbour until I should be otherwise instructed. Regardless of this prohibition, at midnight the captain and master of this vessel hoisted anchors to depart.

I was at the windows of my residence which overlook the harbour and heard the noise. I sent to inquire into it and their answer was to warn that anybody approaching the ship did so at the risk of his life. They then made sail. I went to the fortress and as they passed ordered six shots to be fired but they would not strike sail. With them they carried off a Portuguese caravel which the English seized the next day. This ship, which was richly laden, carries no manifest

¹ See page lxxxv, introduction, note 1.

² *A. de I.*, 42-1-10/5, Contratación 5110. $\frac{1}{2}$ *pliego*, original.

and no licence to leave. Your lordship order such boldness punished, as an example.

As the vessel left port it ran up English colours.

The captain's father lives in Lisbon and they tell me he is very rich. I send your lordship herewith a full account of the case.¹

So far there is nothing further to report except that this summer in squadrons 30 enemy sail have passed within sight of this city.

They took the city of La Yaguana, which was the finest settlement in this island. They have captured eight or ten frigates. (p. 2) Not a ship dares approach this city for, since the galleys left, there are always enemies athwart this harbour. Therefore this city is as good as under siege. Many things are lacking and prices are so high one cannot exist here . . .

Our Lord preserve your lordship.

Santo Domingo in Hispaniola, December 14, 1592.

Lope de Vega Portocarrero (Rubric).

Document No. 97²

[Diego Perez³ to Lope de Vega Portocarrero (from La Saona?), December 18, 1592]

(p. 2) . . . *To his excellency, Señor Lope de Vegacarrero, for the king, our master, president [of the 'Audiencia' of Santo Domingo].—Sir:*

The great desire I feel to serve your lordship and the king, our master, compels me to write this communication giving you an account of what I wish to do, if your lordship will favour me in it. It will be very advantageous to your lordship and to Christendom; and will save my soul from hell.

¹ Not seen. According to a note at the end of this despatch (added in Spain) this *información* and probably the despatch itself seem not to have been delivered to Antonio de Frias until April 1, 1593, for transmittal to His Majesty's prosecutor.

² *A. de I.*, 53-4-11, Santo Domingo 51. 2 *pliegos*, authenticated copy. Compare throughout with No. 91 *ante*, enclosure. The authenticity of this communication was questioned presently in legal proceedings in Santo Domingo in 1594 (*A. de I.*, 53-1-15, Santo Domingo 15).

³ ' . . . a Spanish pilot Diego Petins . . . '—Williamson, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

Know, your lordship, that for five years past I have been in England where I enjoy the favour of many. Among these is the Earl of Cumberland, who makes me pilot of all his vessels that sail for the war. Last year he gave me four ships, with which I came to His Majesty's Indies and arrived at La Margarita on June 6 where I found two empty vessels and did them no harm whatsoever.

I then went down the coast as far as Coro, which place our general wished us to take, and that night (it was June 10) our two ships dropped anchor. The others did not anchor. As we were about to let down the boat the weather turned so foul that we could do nothing against it and the three ships left me in such wise that I was alone.

I entered the Lagoon on June 13 in search of my ships and could not find them. Then, on June 18, I crossed to La Española desiring to (p. 3) write to your lordship but no opportunity offered because no vessel from that city was taken until July 28 when I captured — (2) de Haro (2) with *cazabe* bound for Puerto Rico, nor had I opportunity then.

I decided to take a man to carry this message but when I talked with him he told me that he would not take it because he would not deliver the message to your lordship, and then he went to my captain and told him that I wished to turn traitor and that there were at Santo Domingo a caravel and a flyboat carrying gold and silver. Forthwith we released the vessel carrying *cazabe* and came to Mona and were there two or three days.

One Sunday morning the caravel came out and we seized it and the captain sent it to England with Englishmen and three Portuguese.

Then I took a man and told him my wish and he said yes, that he would deliver my letter; and so I carried him and another with me to the Main. They were with me from August 8 to December 18 when I set one ashore with this communication. The second man I will keep with me and land him on the island of Saona with another letter when I return from England that your honour may be advised of what I now state to your lordship.

Which is that I intend to go to the port of Ocoa and will try to take the sugarmill. Your lordship have 45 or 50 men ready and when the ships are seen to pass that port have them proceed to Ocoa and with the negroes from the ranches and the sugar estates have them lay an ambuscade on the road to kill the landing party. In taking the men who land your honour takes the ships as well. I urge your lordship not to fail to do this. So shall I be freed and I will serve His Majesty well with respect to England. This will be seen. And the day I pass that port I will pass with no top sail and this will be the signal.

For God's sake, your lordship, let this be kept secret for if it be generally known among the seafaring men we might capture some person so informed who, when asked for news of the land, would tell it and so prevent us from accomplishing anything. This is all for now, except to say that I will return soon.

December 18, 1592.

Your lordship will pardon the scribe. He was agitated by his fear of our men.

Our Lord preserve your lordship many years for the protection and benefit of Christians.—Diego Perez.

For President Lope de Vega Portocarrero, captain and governor of La Española . . .

Document No. 98¹

[Cristóbal Pantoxa, Luis Liranço, Alonso Lopez de Quintanilla, depositions² made at Havana, October 20, 1593 at the request of Captain Francisco de Rojas]

(F. 12 r.) . . . Cristóbal Pantoxa . . . being duly sworn . . . said that in command of the galleys he went out . . . with his galleys to the relief of the ship which was at La Chorrera where the enemy had driven it ashore, and he saw Captain Francisco de Rojas go forth on horseback with his men along the beach to prevent the enemy from landing, for the enemy ships were close in shore. From the ships the enemy fired their artillery on the horse and foot who were advancing along the beach, in an effort to prevent the horse from getting to the ship. They also fired their muskets and from their ships wounded one soldier in the arm with a ball. Regardless of all these dangers Captain Francisco de Rojas advanced, jeopardizing his life and exposing his person to great risk, like a good captain, so that he prevented the enemy from effecting a landing . . .

(f. 18 r.) . . . Luis Liranço . . . being duly sworn . . . said that . . . the horse and foot which went out on this occasion went by order of

¹ *A. de I.*, 53-1-14, Santo Domingo 14. 49 folios.

² According to the interrogatory Captain Rojas presented, Question III, the event concerning which his witnesses were to be questioned occurred 'in the year (15)92 when eighteen or twenty English ships, constituting a formidable fleet, lay off . . . (Havana), practically besieging the place, worrying and wearying it for three months or more . . .'

deponent issued in his capacity as *sargento mayor* . . . the campmaster was informed that at La Chorrera nine enemy ships had cornered a vessel coming up from Honduras and immediately ordered deponent to sally with 50 harquebusiers and musketeers and with horse to the mouth of Chorrera river there to do whatever might be necessary to defend the land. Deponent did as he was ordered and arrived at the place where the ship lay. Nine enemy pinnaces were endeavouring to carry her off. Deponent fired three or four rounds from his harquebuses and compelled them to retire. At the same time and a little previous to it, the foot and, with the foot, the horse advancing along the shore, were in great danger from the enemy's artillery.

This engagement lasted from nine in the morning until four in the afternoon when, having reinforced their pinnaces, the enemy bore down on the Honduras ship, which was anchored, made fast a cable and bore her off. Meanwhile they did not abandon the beach nor did they retire afterwards until the English were two leagues to sea. The men on board the ship had meantime removed all the plate and coin and other valuables from the vessel so that the enemy got only an empty hulk. This merchandise was conveyed from the ship to the city and those who had been on board went also . . . Captain Francisco de Rojas and the rest of the horse ran grave risk that day because the enemy had plenty of artillery and used it, the range was short and horses are a large target . . .

. . . this past year four or five enemy ships lay athwart the mouth of Havana harbour and they came close in . . .

(f. 33 r.) Lopez de Quintanilla, warden and captain of La Punta . . . being duly sworn . . . said that he saw Captain Francisco de Rojas sally with his company of horse to the mouth of the Chorrera where the enemy made a feint of landing. The enemy had pursued a vessel which was coming up from Honduras and overtaken it at the mouth of that river, two leagues from this city. Captain Rojas stood by with his company of horse until the foot came to his support and it was because of this that the people on board and the coin and other valuables the vessel carried were saved. The enemy turned broadside to shore and used his artillery because the horse had come into the open . . .

Document No. 99¹

[Pedro Alvarez de Ruesga, interrogatory presented at Havana, April 26, 1594 and depositions]

(p. 4) . . . VIII. If they know that in the year one thousand five hundred and ninety one, His Majesty having ordered Diego de la Ribera, captain general of the Mainland fleet, at the time in this harbour, to go with his armada and the galleys to Cape San Antonio to meet the New Spain fleet because many enemy ships were lying in wait for it, being at Cape San Antonio after General Diego de la Ribera had returned to Havana with his armada, the galleys fought certain English ships they had discovered; on which occasion Captain Pedro Alvarez with his galley conducted himself very creditably, like a good soldier, and has done the same on many other occasions in which he has found himself. Let the witnesses state what they know and saw.

IX. If they know that in the year one thousand five hundred and ninety two, in the month of May, an enemy squadron consisting of at least fourteen or sixteen sails being off this port, by order of Campmaster Juan de Texeda, then governor and captain general of this island, Captain Pantoxa and the galleys went out against the enemy, on which occasion Captain Pedro Alvarez (p. 5) and his galley fought with the enemy and played his artillery on the enemy, who returned the fire, and gave good evidence of personal bravery. Let the witnesses state what they know and saw of this matter . . . (p. 19) . . .

. . . Lazaro Luis Yranco, sargento mayor . . . (p. 20) . . .

IX. In reply to the ninth question . . . stated that . . . by order of Campmaster Juan de Texeda he went by land to the relief of a ship coming up from Honduras which was being chased by nine English vessels. The two galleys constituting this island's coast patrol also went out for the same purpose and deponent had them under constant observation because his orders from the campmaster were if he should see them in difficulties to embark with his men in the galleys' boats and go to their support. These nine enemy ships kept within artillery range and from a very short distance exchanged fire with the galleys. As the latter were sailing in among the enemy

¹ *A. de I.*, 54-2-6, Santo Domingo 128. Various documents sewed together, among them an *información*, services of Captain Alvarez de Ruesga who wanted the post of warden of Punta Castle.

ships a breeze sprang up which carried them to landward so that they could not continue. In view of this deponent pressed forward and relieved the ship and saved the plate and the people who were on board, and then withdrew to the city. To accomplish this took from seven in the morning until five or six o'clock in the afternoon, at which hour deponent withdrew. As he returned he found the galleys in the same place that he had left them for they had not desired (p. 21) to go back into the harbour. Then, they by sea and deponent by land, all returned to the harbour from which they had set out . . . (p. 22).

. . . Melchor Sardo de Arana . . . (p. 24) . . .

VIII. In reply to the eighth question deponent declared that at the time stated in the question he saw General Diego de la Ribera leave the harbour with some of the vessels of his armada then in port, and he took the galleys with him. They went to Cape San Antonio and anchored on sentinel duty there to watch for the New Spain fleet, General Antonio Navarro commanding. While they were there, General Diego de la Ribera having returned (after he had had encounters with English ships which were waiting for the said fleet), the galleys had encounters with the said English ships and fought them very creditably, exchanging artillery fire until night fell and the wind came up and the enemy fled. The galleys pursued them (p. 25) until they were lost to sight in the haze of night . . .

IX. In reply to the ninth question deponent stated that what he knows of the matter is that at the time mentioned there were from fourteen to sixteen English ships off this port in squadrons which kept it closed and they held the coast from Chorrera to Coximar, a distance of two leagues with the entrance to the harbour midway.

The enemy ships being off Coximar, deponent saw the galleys go out to attack them. As the enemy was coasting along by the harbour mouth, moving toward the Chorrera, a cannon's shot from Morro Castle, the galleys opened heavy fire on them, to which they replied and some even struck their sails, waiting for the others to come up. They fired on the galleys, which conducted themselves valiantly, and the said Captain Pedro Alvarez with his galley *Brava* distinguished himself, pressing ahead of the flag-galley, advancing among the English, thereby showing the good spirit he had (and always has) to serve His Majesty. All this deponent knows because he saw it with his own eyes from this city's fortress where deponent remained by order of Campmaster Juan de Texeda, as many other persons (both civilians and soldiers). This engagement occurred less than half a league away, within sight from this port . . .

Document No. 100¹

[Antonio de Barrios, interrogatory presented at Santa Fé
December 20, 1594]

(p. 5)

... †

*Very Powerful Sir*²

Captain Antonio de Barrios, resident in Cartagena . . . states that . . . ³ . . . (p. 6) . . . having hired out 30 pack mules to go with⁴ certain loads at the price of ten ducats each, since governor Don Pedro Lodeña needed animals in order to send soldiers to the relief of a frigate which had left that port for the New Kingdom [of Granada], because he received word that the vessel was being chased by two enemy ships which drove it aground seven leagues from this city, he gave him the use of these mules without charge when no others were to be had, in order that the soldiers might proceed. He preferred rather to serve your highness⁵ on that occasion than to receive the profit from their hire.

And he offered to go in person to the defence of the frigate but the governor had already given the matter over to Captain Francisco Paniagua with eight horse and 30 foot. Wherefore voluntarily and to serve your highness he went after the said captain with two horse and twelve slaves, all armed, and with the necessary food supplies. He overtook him on the road and they arrived at Point Hicacos where the frigate lay. The said ships had put to sea.

Therefore the soldiers were of the opinion that they should return to the city but he and Captain Paniagua persuaded them to wait to see whether the enemy would return. Meanwhile he sought to remove the frigate's cargo to a safe place and with his slaves and certain seamen did so remove all the merchandise and conveyed it to safety. While they were unloading the vessel the two English ships returned, looked the frigate over and withdrew. In the after-

¹ *A. de I.*, 72-5-21, Santa Fé 92. 70 *pliegos*, legalized copies.

² I.e., the *Audiencia* of Santa Fé, before which high court Captain Barrios presented his petition, his questionnaire and his witnesses in December, 1594.

³ References to his services against Hawkins and Drake, omitted. Cf. Wright, I. A., *Spanish Documents concerning English Voyages to the Caribbean*, 1527-1568, The Hakluyt Society, Second Series, No. 62, 1928, pp. 76-77, 78n., 1, 84.

⁴ To Barrancas, according to Question 9.

⁵ Again, the *Audiencia*.

noon four came back with a pinnace, which they sent in to reconnoitre.

In the meantime he and Captain Paniagua ordered all their men into concealment and drove a lot of cattle to the beach where they could be seen by the enemy, who landed. When they began to fire their arquebuses and muskets at the cattle, Captain Paniagua and he with their men came out from their ambushade, and he with his horse attacked the enemy and killed many of them, driving them into the water in flight.

Endeavouring always to distinguish himself, on this occasion he fought with Robert Frost,⁶ captain of one of the ships, whom he wounded three times with his lance and captured. He brought him out of the water a prisoner and delivered him to the soldiers along with twelve other English whom he had vanquished. Most of those who landed were killed. For which reason, observing this, those on board of the two ships fled and the Spaniards remained victorious.

This victory was of so great importance and effect that it restored quiet throughout the country, which had been in arms and fearful of these enemies.

And from these prisoners news was had that great fleets had left England to take the frigates in command of General Luis Alfonso Flores, who was immediately warned, which was why they did not capture him off Havana, where they lay in wait . . .

The aforesaid governor gave Robert Frost into petitioner's custody and during many days he kept him in his house and fed him and cured his wounds, until he was sent to Spain . . .

. . . Santa Fé, December 20, 1594 . . .

⁶ . . . *Rovertto Froste* . . .

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