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io6 HERBERT SPENCER

results, which we endeavour thus to formulate, are the out-
come of principles of activity, the mode of operation of
which is inexplicable. We formulate the laws of evolution
in terms of antecedence and sequence; we also refer these
laws to an underlying cause, the noumenal mode of action of
which is inexplicable. This, if I interpret him rightly, is
Mr Spencer's meaning."

Our own impression is that Spencer was guilty of
^ctwobbling" between two modes of interpretation,
between scientific description and philosophical ex-
planation, a confusion incident on the fact that his
Principles of Biology was also part of his Synthetic
Philosophy. Biology as such has of course nothing
to do with "the Ultimate Reality behind mani-
festations " or with the "implied noumenon." And
when Spencer says " it is impossible even to imagine
those processes going on in organic matter out of
which emerges the dynamic element in Life," or when
he illustrates his difficulty by pointing out how im-
possible it is to give a physico-chemical interpretation
of the way a plant cell makes its wall, or a coccolith
its imbricated covering, or a sponge its spicules, or a
hen eats broken egg-shells, we do not believe he was
thinking of anything but "phenomenal causation."
When he says " The processes which go on in living
things are incomprehensible as results of any physical
actions known to us," we see no reason to take the
edge off this truth by saying that Spencer simply
meant that the Ultimate Reality is inaccessible.

In any case, whether Spencer meant that we cannot
give any scientific analysis in physico-chemical terms
of the unified behaviour of even the simplest organism,
or whether he simply meant that the ralson tfetre, the
ultimate reality of life, was an inaccessible noumenon^



	io6 HERBERT SPENCER results, which we endeavour thus to formulate, are the out- come of principles of activity, the mode of operation of which is inexplicable. We formulate the laws of evolution in terms of antecedence and sequence; we also refer these laws to an underlying cause, the noumenal mode of action of which is inexplicable. This, if I interpret him rightly, is Mr Spencer's meaning." Our own impression is that Spencer was guilty of ^ctwobbling" between two modes of interpretation, between scientific description and philosophical ex- planation, a confusion incident on the fact that his Principles of Biology was also part of his Synthetic Philosophy. Biology as such has of course nothing to do with "the Ultimate Reality behind mani- festations " or with the "implied noumenon." And when Spencer says " it is impossible even to imagine those processes going on in organic matter out of which emerges the dynamic element in Life," or when he illustrates his difficulty by pointing out how im- possible it is to give a physico-chemical interpretation of the way a plant cell makes its wall, or a coccolith its imbricated covering, or a sponge its spicules, or a hen eats broken egg-shells, we do not believe he was thinking of anything but "phenomenal causation." When he says " The processes which go on in living things are incomprehensible as results of any physical actions known to us," we see no reason to take the edge off this truth by saying that Spencer simply meant that the Ultimate Reality is inaccessible. In any case, whether Spencer meant that we cannot give any scientific analysis in physico-chemical terms of the unified behaviour of even the simplest organism, or whether he simply meant that the ralson tfetre, the ultimate reality of life, was an inaccessible noumenon^