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philosophy out, bat no one will deny the grandeur of
his aim in seeking to present a unified system of
scientific knowledge. As Prof. A. S. Pringle-Pattison
has said: " It was much to hold aloft in an age of
specialism the banner of completely unified knowledge;
and this is, perhaps, after all, Spencer's chief claim to
gratitude and remembrance. He brought home the
idea of philosophic synthesis to a greater number of
the Anglo-Saxon race than had ever conceived the
idea before. His own synthesis, in the particular
form he gave it, will necessarily crumble away. He
speaks of it himself, indeed, at the close of First
Principles (ed. L), modestly enough as a more or
less rude attempt to accomplish a task which can
be achieved only in the remote future and by the con-
bined efforts of many, which cannot be completely
achieved even then. But the idea of knowledge as a
coherent whole, worked out on purely natural (though
not, therefore, naturalistic) principles—a whole in
which all the facts of human experience should be
included—was a great idea with which to familiarise
the minds of his contemporaries. It is the living
germ of philosophy itself."