THE CATASTROPHE 93
million poods)—a further proof of the condition of this
once most fertile region. The Commissary for Agriculture in
the Ukraine, Paperny, is quoted as saying, in the autumn of
1934, that by the spring 75 per cent of the smaller collective
farms would have to obtain their seed grain from outside.
The fact that Western Siberia is among the districts granted
additional grain proves that the "elemental catastrophe" was
not confined to the south, and indicates the value of the Soviet
press assertions that the deficiency due to drought in the south
would be compensated by surpluses elsewhere.
Compared with this admission of the distress in the collective
farms, what significance has the alleged success of the harvest
campaign, with its "two million tons more" than the "record
harvest" of the previous year? It is noteworthy, too, that in the
carrying out of the decree care was taken to protect the seed
corn delivered to the collective farms from the clutches of the
starving. This is shown by a telegram1 from Odessa stating
that the district organizations had the strictest instructions to
see that the grain given to the collective farms was protected-
They were to keep a close eye on the personnel of the
sentries and take care that the stocks were watched day and
night.
It is characteristic that officially these grants are made
only for a period of a few months; in autumn, directly after the
new harvest, the stocks have to be repaid to the Government,
plus 10 per cent. Everywhere else in the world goods or money
advanced in connection with an act of God is repaid over a
series of years. It is also striking that the decree does not
contain a word about assistance to individual peasants. This
confirms that the physical destruction of the remaining indi-
vidual peasants is a special plank in the Government's
programme.
Although, as stated above, the decree speaks of food relief,
this is quite a secondary matter. The chief aim is not to assist
1 Published in the Sociatisticheskoe Zemledelie*