274 HUMAN LIFE IN RUSSIA
enough^ what they wanted to hear. As the report states, he
explained the vast possibilities of Russian-American trade, the
realization of which depended on a correct attitude towards
trade questions being adopted. There can be no doubt what he
meant by a correct attitude—a readiness to grant Moscow
extensive credits. For this purpose, or, as Troyanovsky called
it, in order to stimulate trade, the formation of a Russian-
American export and import bank was decided upon.1
Since the summer of 1934, however, there has been a sig-
nificant change in the relations between the U.S.A. and Soviet
Russia, and in the attitude taken up by the American press in
dealing with the famine and famine relief. This change was
brought about by, among other things, the fact that the promised
Soviet purchases were not forthcoming.
As mentioned elsewhere, the New York Times published the
report of the Innitzer Committee with comments of its own.
The Chicago Tribune, and other important papers, reported in
detail the argument between the Russian Ambassador2 at
Washington and the writer. Troyanovsky's denials of the
existence of a famine and of the number of its victims proved
unavailing, and the discussion of the actual situation in Russia
continued. On January 5, 1935, William Randolph Hearst
broadcast a speech based almost entirely on the account of the
1 While Litvinov was on his way to New York, the Profintern (the trades
union counterpart to the Communist International) issued a publication
called Roosevelfs Famine Programme* which contained this passage: "The
leadership of the [American] masses must pass into the hands of the Com-
munist Party and the revolutionary organizations. The dissatisfaction
among the workers must be exploited to organize a gigantic struggle of the
American proletariat against Roosevelt's plan." Thus, while the captains
of industry and their wives were enthusiastically applauding Litvinov's
words, the Communist International had already prepared its material.
* New York Times, July 11, 1934. Significantly enough, Duranty coupled
his admission that the hopes of Soviet trade had been disappointed with a
reference to the alleged prospects of an exchange of goods between Great
Britain and Soviet Russia. No doubt this was intended to create the impres-
sion that unless tlie United States were to grant credits, etc., to Soviet
Russia at the last moment, it would be Great Britain that would bring off
the big deal with that country.