The Works Of James Arminius

Volume 2

THE APOLOGY OR DEFENSE OF JAMES ARMINIUS Part 2

CERTAIN articles relating to the Christian Religion are now in a course of circulation. In a paper which was not long since delivered into my hands, the number of them is distinguished into two series, one consisting of twenty and the other of eleven articles. Some of them are attributed to me, others to Adrian Borrius, and several both to him and me. Those persons by whom they were first disseminated, attempt in them to render us suspected of having introduced into the church and the University of Leyden, novelties and heretical instructions, and to accuse us of error and heresy, that both the students of Divinity and the common people may stand on their guard against us, who have this black mark imprinted on us, lest they become infected with the same envenomed disorder, and that those persons who enjoy the supremacy both in Church and State, may seasonably interpose their authority, to prevent the evil from extending any further, or rather to extinguish it in its very commencement; which, if "they neglect to do, they will be instrumental in producing the greatest detriment to Divine Truth, and to the Political and Ecclesiastical concord of these Provinces."

The dispersion of some of these articles is not a very recent circumstance; for, above two years ago, seventeen out of these thirty-one came into my hands, expressed exactly in the same words as those that occur in the writing which is the subject of my present remarks. But I was silent, and concealed my regret; for I thought that those articles would, in their very infancy, die a natural death, since part of them were destitute of the truth of historical narration, by not being attributed to those who had been the authors of them; and part of them were void of all real theological sense, by the strange intermixture of truth and falsehood. But the issue did not answer my expectation. For they not only remained without diminution, but gained an increase, by the addition of other fourteen to the former seventeen articles, and by a far wider dispersion of the whole than had at first been made. This unexpected result had the effect of inducing me to think that I ought to oppose their progress by a moderate answer, lest my continued silence should be interpreted as tantamount to a confession. If this be the interpretation which, on many occasions is given to silence, it is an easy matter thus to construe it respecting any doctrine that is aspersed as. a heresy, "under which imputation," it is said in a vaunting tone, "St. Jerome would have no man to remain patient."

In this reply I will use candour and conscience. Whatever I know to be true, I will confess and defend. On whatever subjects I may feel hesitation, I will not conceal my ignorance; and whatever my mind dictates to be false, I will deny and refute. May the God of truth and peace direct my mind and my hand by his Holy Spirit! Amen.

ARTICLES I & II

I. Faith, that is, justifying faith, is not peculiar to the elect.

II. It is possible for believers finally to decline and fall away from faith and salvation.

ANSWER

The connection between these two articles is so intimate, that when the first of them is granted, the second is necessarily inferred; and, in return, when the latter is granted, the former is to be inferred, according to the intention of those persons who framed these articles. For if "faith be not peculiar to the elect," and if perseverance in faith and salvation belong to the elect alone, it follows that believers not only can, but that some of them actually do, "fall away from faith and salvation." And, on the contrary, if it be "possible for believers finally to fall away from faith and salvation," it follows that "faith is not peculiar to the elect," they being the individuals concerning whom the framers of these articles assert, that it is impossible for them not to be saved.

The reason of the consequence is, because the words FAITH and BELIEVERS, according to this hypothesis, have a wider signification than the words ELECTION and THE ELECT. The former comprehend some persons that are not elect, that is, "some who finally fall away from faith and salvation."

No necessity, therefore, existed for composing both these articles; it was quite sufficient to have proposed one. And if the authors of them had sought for such amplification, as had no real existence, but consisted of mere words, it was possible to deduce the Second from the First in the form of a consectary.

Thus it is evident that the multitude of the articles, was the great object to be attempted for the purpose of making it appear as if those persons ERRED IN

VERY MANY POINTS, whom the too sedulous curiosity of the brethren is desirous without cause, of rendering suspected of heresy.

I. But, to treat of each article singly, I declare, respecting THE FIRST, that I never said, either in public or in private, "Faith is not peculiar to the elect."

This article, therefore, is not attributed to its proper author; and thus is committed a historical error.

I add, even if I had made such a declaration as this, a defense of it would have been ready. For I omit the scriptures, from which a more prolix discussion of this subject might be formed; and since the Christian Fathers have with great semblance of truth defended their sentiments from that divine source, I might employ the consent of those Fathers as a shield to ward off from myself the charge of NOVELTY; and the Harmony of Confessions, which are severally the composition of those Churches that have seceded from Popery, and that come under the denomination of" Protestants" and "the Reformed," I might adopt for a polished breast- plate, to intercept or turn aside the dart of HERESY which is hurled against me. Neither should I be much afraid of this subject being placed for adjudication in the balances of the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism.

1. Let St. Augustine, Prosper, and the author of the book entitled The Vocation of the Gentiles, be brought forward to bear testimony respecting "the consent of the Fathers."

(1.) AUGUSTINE says, "It is wonderful, and indeed most wonderful, that God does not bestow perseverance on certain of his sons, whom he hath regenerated in Christ, and to whom he has given faith, hope and love; while he pardons such great acts of wickedness in sons that are alienated from him, and, by imparting his grace, makes them his children." (De Corrept. et Gratia, cap. 8.)

(2.) PROSPER says, "It is a lamentable circumstance which is proved by many examples, that some of those persons who were regenerated in Christ Jesus, have relinquished the faith, and, ceasing to preserve their former sanctity of manners, have apostatized from God, and their ungodly course has been terminated under his displeasure and aversion." (Ad Capita Galatians resp. 7.) (3.) The author of The Vocation of the Gentiles says, "God bestows the power of willing to obey him, in such a manner as not to take away, even from those who will persevere, that mutability by which it is possible for them to be unwilling [to obey God]. If this were not the case, none of the believers would have departed from the faith." (Lib. ii, c. 9.) 2. The HARMONY OF CONFESSIONS might in the following manner, contribute to my defense: This dogma states that "faith is the peculiar property of the elect," and that "it is impossible for believers finally to decline from faith and salvation." Now, if this be a dogma necessary to salvation, then that Confession which does not contain it, or which asserts some thing contradictory to it, cannot be considered as harmonizing with the rest on the subject of religion. For wherever there is harmony, it is proper that there should be neither defect nor contradiction in things pertaining to salvation. But the Augustan or Lutheran Confession says that "it condemns the Anabaptists, who deny that those persons who have once been justified, can lose the Holy Spirit." Besides, Philip Melancthon with his followers, and the greater portion of the Lutheran Churches, are of opinion, that faith is bestowed even on the non-elect." Yet we are not afraid of acknowledging these Lutherans for brethren.

3. The BELGIC Confession does not contain this dogma, that "faith is peculiar to the elect ;" and without controversy it cannot be deduced from our CATECHISM. For when it is said, in the article on the Church, "I believe that I shall perpetually remain a member of the Church;" and, in the first question,

"God keeps and preserves me in such a manner, as to make all things necessarily subservient to my salvation;" those expressions are to be understood of a believer, in reference to his actual believing. For he who is truly such a one, answers to the character of a Christian. But no man is such except through faith. Faith is therefore presupposed in both the expressions.

II. With regard to the SECOND Article, I say, that a distinction ought to be made between power and action. For it is one thing to declare, that "it is possible for the faithful to fall away from faith and salvation," and it is another to say, that "they do actually fall away." This distinction is of such extensive observance, that even antiquity itself was not afraid of affirming, concerning the elect and those who were to be saved, "that it was possible for them not to be saved;" and that "the mutability by which it was possible for them not to be willing to obey God, was not taken away from them," although it was the opinion of the ancients, "that such persons never would in reality be damned."

On this very subject, too, the greater part of our own doctors lay down a difference. For they say, "that it is possible for such persons to fall away, if their nature, which is inclined to lapses and defection, and if the temptations of the world and Satan, be the only circumstances taken into consideration: but that they will not finally fall away, because God will bring back to himself his own elect before the end of life." If any one asserts, "that it is not possible for believers, in consideration of their being elect persons, finally to fall away from salvation, because God has decreed to save them," I answer, the decree concerning saving does not take away the possibility of damning, but it removes damnation itself. For "to be actually saved," and "a possibility of not being saved," are two things not contrary to each other, but in perfect agreement.

I therefore add, that in this way I have hitherto discriminated these two cases.

And at one time I certainly did say, with an explanation subjoined to it, "that it was possible for believers finally to decline or fall away from faith and salvation." But at no period have I asserted, "that believers do finally decline or fall away from faith or salvation." This article, therefore, is ascribed to one who is not its author; and it is another offense against historical veracity.

I subjoin, that there is a vast difference between the enunciation of these two sentences. (1.) "It is possible for believers to decline from the FAITH ;" and (2.) "It is possible for believers to decline from SALVATION." For the latter, when rigidly and accurately examined, can scarcely be admitted; it being impossible for believers, as long as they remain believers, to decline from salvation. Because, were this possible, that power of God would be conquered which he has determined to employ in saving believers. On the other hand, if believers fall away from the faith and become unbelievers, it is impossible for them to do otherwise than decline from salvation, that is, provided they still continue unbelievers. Therefore, whether this hypothesis be granted or not, the enunciation cannot be accurately expressed. For if this hypothesis (their perseverance in faith) be granted, they cannot decline; but if it be not granted, they cannot do otherwise than decline. (2.) But that first enunciation includes no hypothesis; and therefore an answer may be given to it simply, either that it is possible, or that it is impossible. For this cause, the second article ought to be corrected in the following manner: "It is possible for believers finally to fall away or decline from the faith;" or rather, "Some believers finally fall away and decline from the faith." This being granted, the other can be necessarily inferred, "therefore they also actually decline from salvation." Respecting the truth of this [Second] article, I repeat the same observations which I made about the First. For the following expressions are reciprocal to each other, and regular consequences: "Faith is peculiar to the elect," and "believers do not finally fall away from the faith." In like manner,

"Faith is not peculiar to the elect," and "Some believers finally decline from the faith."

ARTICLE III

It is a matter of doubt, whether the faith by which Abraham is said to be justified, was a faith in Jesus Christ who was still to come. No proof can be adduced of his having understood the promises of God in any other manner, than that he should be the heir of the world.

ANSWER

There are two members in this article, or rather, those members are two distinct articles, each of which presents itself to be separately considered by us, after I have observed, that in this passage no affirmation or negation, each of which properly constitutes a heretic, is attributed to us, but a mere doubt alone, that betokens a consciousness of ignorance and infirmity, which those who arrogate to themselves the knowledge of all these things, ought to endeavour to remove by a mild course of instruction, and not to make it a subject of reviling or provocation.

I. To the FIRST MEMBER I reply:

First. I never uttered this expression; but have, on more occasions than one, taught both in public and private a contrary doctrine. Yet I remember, when a certain minister at Leyden had boasted of the clearness of this article, and was astonished how any persons could be found who entertained a different opinion about it, I told him, that the proof of it would not be a very easy occupation to him if he had to encounter a powerful adversary, and I challenged him to make a trial, which challenge I now repeat. I wish him to prove this assertion by such plain arguments, as will not leave a man just reasons for doubting any longer about the matter. This is a point on which the labours of a divine will be more profitably expended, than on publishing and magnifying the doubts of the infirm, whose confidence in themselves is not equal to that which he manifests.

Secondly. "Faith in Christ" may be received in two acceptations. Either according to promise, which was involved in the types, figures and shadows of words and things, and proposed in that manner: Or, it is according to the gospel, that is clearly manifested. The difference between these two is so great, that with regard to it the Jews are said "to have been detained or kept under the law before faith came, concluded or shut up unto that faith which should afterwards be revealed." (Gal. iii, 23.) And the Apostle says, "the children of Israel were prevented, by the veil placed over the countenance of Moses, from steadfastly looking to the end of that which is abolished," (2 Cor.

iii, 13,) that is, to the end of the law, as is evident from the whole chapter, and from Romans x, 4, where Christ is said to be "the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth." Let the whole description of the faith of Abraham, which the Apostle gives at great length in Romans 4, be attentively considered, and it will appear, that no express mention of Jesus Christ is made in it, but it is implied in such a way as it is not easy for any one to explain.

Let it be added that faith in Jesus Christ seems to some persons to be used by metonymy, for "that faith which is concerning the types and figures which adumbrate and prefigure Jesus Christ," although it has not united with it an understanding of those types, unless it be a very obscure one, and such as appears suitable to the infant Church, according to the economy of the times and ages which God in his wisdom employs. Let a comparison be instituted between that servitude under which the heir, so long as he is a child, is said by the Apostle to be held, (Gal. iv, 1-3,) and that bondage from which the Spirit of the Lord is declared to liberate the man whose heart is converted to Him; (2 Cor. iii, 16-18,) and this doubting will then be considered ascribable to the proper fear of a trembling [scrupulous] conscience, rather than to a disposition that has a powerful propensity towards heresy.

II. TO THE SECOND MEMBER OF THIS ARTICLE, I ANSWER:

First. I never made such an assertion.

Secondly. If even I had, it would not have called for any deserved reprehension, except from a man that was desirous by that very act to betray at once the weakness of his judgment and his want of experience. (1.) It is a sign of a judgment not the most accurate, to blame any man for saying that which, it is possible to prove, has been written by the Apostle himself in so many words. For if the heir-ship of the world was promised to Abraham in these words, "Thou shalt be the father of many nations," what wonder is there if Abraham understood the promises in no other manner than as they had been divinely pronounced? (2.) It is a mark of great inexperience in the men who framed these articles, to suppose that the heir-ship of the world which was promised to Abraham, appertained to this animal life and to carnal benefits; because the world of which mention is made in that passage, is that future world to which belongs the calling of the Gentiles, by which vocation Abraham was made the father of many nations. This is apparent from the consideration, that he is said to have been made the heir of the world by the righteousness of faith, of which St. Paul (Rom. iv, 13,) proves the Gentiles likewise to be partakers; and in Ephes. iii, 1-11, the Apostle treats on the vocation of the Gentiles, and says, it belongs to "the grace of the gospel, and to the fellowship of the mystery which from the beginning of the world hath been hidden in God and is now brought to light by Christ, by whom God created all things." I repeat it, that vocation does not belong to the wisdom by which God formed the world, but to that by which he constituted Christ his wisdom and power to salvation to them that believe; and by which he founded the Church, which will endure forever. See 1 Corinthians i, 21-23; ii, 6-8; Ephes. iii, 1-11. If the forgers of this article say, "that they have likewise perceived this, but had supposed that my opinion was different;" I reply, it is not the part of a prudent man to frame a foolish adversary for himself.

ARTICLE IV

Faith is not an effect of election, but is a necessary requisite foreseen by God in those who are to be elected. And the decree concerning the bestowing of faith precedes the decree of election.

ANSWER

Of this article also there are two entire members:

I. In the FIRST of them, three assertions are included. (1.) "Faith is not an effect of election." (2.) "Faith is a necessary requisite in those who are to be elected or saved." (3.) "This requisite is foreseen by God in the persons to be elected." I confess, all these, when rightly understood and correctly explained, agree entirely with my opinion, on the subject. But the last of the members is proposed in terms too odious, since it makes no mention of God, whose benefit and gift I acknowledge faith to be.

I will now proceed to explain myself on each of these assertions: 1. With regard to the FIRST, the word "Election" is ambiguous. For it either signifies "the election by which God determines to justify believers, while those who are unbelievers or workers are rejected from righteousness and salvation: "Or it signifies "the election by which he determines to save certain particular persons, as such, and to bestow faith on them in order to their salvation, other particular persons being also rejected, merely in reference to their being such particular individuals." Election is received according to this latter signification, by those who charge me with these articles. I take it in the former acceptation, according to Romans ix, 11: "For the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said unto her, the elder shall serve the younger."

I will not now enter into a prolix disputation, whether or not the sense in which I receive it, be the correct one. It is evident, at least, that there is some decree of God by which he determines to justify believers; and which, since it excludes unbelievers from righteousness and salvation, is appropriately called

"the decree according to election" or "with election," as being that which does not include all men within its embrace. This decree I consider as the foundation of Christianity, of man's salvation, and of his assurance of salvation; and it is this of which the Apostle treats in the ninth, tenth and eleventh chapters of his Epistle to the Romans, and in the first chapter to the Ephesians.

But I have not yet declared what my sentiments in general are about that decree by which God is said "to have determined absolutely to save certain particular persons, and to bestow faith upon them in order to their salvation, while others are reprobated from salvation and faith;" although I have confessed, that there is a certain decree of God, according to which he determines to administer the means to faith and salvation, as he knows them to be suitable and proper to his righteousness, mercy and severity. From these premises it is deduced as a most manifest consequence, that faith is not an effect of that election by which God determines to justify those who believe.

2. With regard to the SECOND assertion, from the particulars thus explained it is concluded, that "faith is a necessary requisite in those who shall be partakers of salvation according to the election of God ;" or, that "it is a condition prescribed and required by God, to be performed by those who shall obtain his salvation."This is the will of God, that whosoever believeth in the Son hath eternal life; he that believeth not, shall be condemned." The propositions contained in this passage cannot be resolved into any other than this brief one, which is likewise used in the Scripture, "Believe, and thou shalt be saved." In which the word "believe" has the force of a demand or requirement; and the phrase "thou shalt be saved" has that of a suasion, by means of a good that is promised. This truth is so clear and perspicuous, that the denial of it would be a proof of great perversity or of extreme unskilfullness. If any one say, "It is a condition, but yet an evangelical one, which God may himself perform in us, or, (as it is better expressed,) which he may by his grace cause us to perform; "the man who speaks thus, does not contradict this truth, but confirms it when he adds this explanation, "of what description soever that condition may be."

3. With regard to the THIRD, I say that we must distinguish between the condition by which it is required, that by which it is performed, and that by which it is seen or foreseen as performed. This third member, therefore, is proposed in a manner much too confused. Yet, when this confusion is corrected by the distinction which we have stated, nothing of absurdity will be apparent even in that member. Because foreseeing or seeing, in the very nature and order of things follows the performance itself; the performance has its own causes into which it is to be resolved; and the efficiency of those causes is not necessary, unless faith be prescribed and required by the law of faith and the gospel. Since therefore faith is said "to be foreseen by God in those who are to be saved," those causes, without the intervention of which there could be no faith, are not removed, but are rather appointed. Among those causes, I consider the preventing, accompanying and succeeding

[subsequent] grace of God, as the principal. And I say, with Fulgentius,

"Those persons will be saved, or they have been predestinated and elected, who, God foreknew, would believe by the assistance of his preventing grace, (I add and of his accompanying grace,) and would persevere by the aid of his subsequent grace." In this first member, then, there is nothing except truth of the greatest purity.

II. The second member is, "The decree concerning the gift of faith, precedes the decree of election;" in the explanation of which I employ the same distinction as in the former, and say, "The decree of election, by which God determines to justify and save believers, precedes the decree concerning the bestowment of faith." For faith is unnecessary, nay it is useless, without this previous decree. And the decree of election, by which God resolves to justify and save this or that particular person, is subsequent to that decree according to which he determines to administer the means necessary and efficacious to faith, that is, the decree concerning the gift of faith.

If any one says, "God wills first absolutely to save some particular person; and, since he wills that, he also wills to bestow faith on him, because without faith, it is not possible for him to be saved." I tell him, that he lays down contradictory propositions -- that "God wills absolutely to save some one without regard to faith," and yet that, "according to the will of God, he cannot be saved without faith." Through the will of God it has been revealed to us, without faith it is impossible for any man to please God, or to be saved. There is, therefore, in God no other will, by which he wills any one to be absolutely saved without consideration of faith. For contradictory wills cannot be attributed to God. If any person replies, "God wills the end before he wills the means leading to the end; but salvation is the end, and faith the means leading to the end," I answer, first, Salvation is not the end of God; but salvation and faith are the gifts of God, bound and connected together in this order between themselves through the will of God, that faith should precede salvation, both with regard to God, the donor of it; and in reality. Secondly.

Faith is a CONDITION required by God to be performed by him who shall be saved, before it is MEANS of obtaining that salvation. Since God will not bestow salvation on any one, except on him who believes, man is on this account incited to be willing to believe, because he knows that his chief good is placed in salvation. Man, therefore, tried by faith, as the means, to attain to salvation as the end; because he knows that he cannot possibly obtain salvation except through that means. And this knowledge he does not acquire except through the declaration of the divine Will, by which God requires faith from those who wish to be saved, that is, by which he places faith as a condition in the object, that is, in the person to be saved.

ARTICLE V

Naught among things contingent can be said to be NECESSARILY done in respect to the Divine decree.

ANSWER

My opinion concerning Necessity and Contingency is "that they can never be applicable at once to one and the same event." But I speak of the necessity and contingency that are both of the same kind, not those which are different in their genus. The schoolmen state, that there is one necessitas consequentis -- an absolute necessity -- , and another, necessitas consequentiæ -- a hypothetical necessity. The former is, when the necessity arises from a cause antecedent to the thing itself. But necessitas consequentiæ -- a hypothetical necessity -- arises from certain premises, or principles, antecedent to the conclusion. A consequent, or absolute contingency cannot consist with a consequent, or absolute necessity; nor can they meet together in one event. In the same manner, one conclusion cannot be both necessary and contingent in regard to its consequence; that is, it cannot have, at the same time, a necessity and a contingency that are hypothetical. But the cause why one thing cannot be necessary and contingent at the same time, is this "that what is necessary, and what is contingent, divide the whole amplitude of being. For every being is either necessary or contingent. But those things which divide the whole of being, cannot coincide or meet together in any single being. Otherwise they would not divide the whole range of being. What is contingent, and what is necessary, likewise, differ in their entire essences and in the whole of their definition. For that is necessary which cannot possibly not be or not be done.

And that is contingent which is possible not to be or to be done. Thus contradictorily are they opposed to each other; and this opposition is infinite, and, therefore, always dividing truth from falsehood: as, "this thing is either a man or it is not a man;" it is not possible for any thing to be both of these at once -- that is, it is impossible for any thing of one essence. Otherwise, in another sense," Christ is a man," as proceeding from his mother, Mary; "he is not a man," in reference to his having been begotten of the Father from all eternity; but these are two things and two natures.

But they say: "It is possible for one and the same event to be necessary and contingent in different respects -- necessary with regard to the first cause, which is God -- and contingent in respect to second causes." I answer, FIRST.

Those things which differ in their entire essences, do not coincide in respects.

SECONDLY. The necessity or contingency of an event is to be estimated, not from one cause, but from all the causes united together. For after ten causes have been fixed, from which a thing is produced, not necessarily but contingently, if one be added from which the thing may be necessarily completed, the whole of that thing is said to have been done not contingently but necessarily. Because, when all these causes were together appointed, it was impossible for that thing to hinder itself from being produced, and from being brought into existence. That thing, I confess indeed, when distinctly compared by our mind with each of its causes, has a different relation to them respectively. But since none of those causes is the total cause of that event, and since all of them united together form the total cause, the thing ought itself to be accounted and declared to have been done from that total cause, either necessarily or contingently.

It is not only a rash saying, but a false and an ignorant one, "that a thing which, in regard to second causes, is done contingently is said to be done necessarily in regard to the divine decree." For the divine decree itself, being an internal action of God, is not immediately the cause of the thing; but, whatever effects it may produce, it performs them by power, according to the mode of which a thing will be said to be either necessarily or contingently. For if God resolve to use an irresistible power in the execution of his decree, or if he determine to employ such a quantum of power as nothing can resist or can hinder it from completing his purpose, it will follow that the thing will necessarily be brought into existence. Thus, "wicked men who persevere in their sins, will necessarily perish," for God will by an irresistible force, cast them down into the depths of hell. But if he resolve to use a force that is not irresistible, but that can be resisted by the creature, then that thing is said to be done, not necessarily but contingently, although its actual occurrence was certainly foreknown by God, according to the infinity of his understanding, by which he knows all results whatever, that will arise from certain causes which are laid down, and whether those causes produce a thing necessarily or contingently. From whence the school- men say that "all things are done by a necessity of infallibility," which phrase is used in a determinate sense, although the words in which its enunciation is expressed are ill-chosen. For infallibility is not an affection of a being, which exists from causes; but it is an affection of a Mind that sees or that foresees what will be the effect of certain causes. But I readily endure a catachrestic metalepsis, when it is evident concerning a thing, although it is my wish that our enunciations were always the best accommodated to the natures of the things themselves.

But the inventors of these articles try to prove by the examples which they produce, that "one and the same thing, which, with respect to second causes, is done contingently, is, in respect to the Divine Decree, done necessarily."

They say "It was possible for the bones of Christ to be broken, or not to be broken. It was possible for them to be broken, if any person considers the nature of bones; for they were undoubtedly fragile. But they could not be broken, if the decree of God be taken into the account." In answer to this, I deny that in respect of the DIVINE DECREE, they could not be broken. For God did not decree that it was impossible for them to be broken, but that they should not be broken. This is apparent from the manner in which the transaction was actually conducted. For God did not employ an irresistible power by which he might prevent the bones of Christ from being broken by those who approached to break them; but by a mild kind of suasion, he caused that they should not will to break the bones of Christ, by an argument drawn from its inutility. For, since Christ had already given up the ghost, before those who broke the legs had arrived at the cross, they were not at all inclined to undertake a vain and fruitless labour in breaking the legs of our saviour. Because the breaking of legs, with the design to hasten death, was only done lest the bodies should remain suspended on the cross on a festival or sacred day, contrary to the divine law. Indeed, if the divine Wisdom knows how to effect that which it has decreed, by employing causes according to their nature and motion -- whether their nature and motion be contingent or free, the praise due to such Wisdom is far greater than if it employ a power which no creature can possibly resist. Although God can employ such a power whensoever it may seem expedient to his Wisdom. I am therefore, of opinion that I committed no offense when I said, "No contingent thing -- that is, nothing which is done or has been done CONTINGENTLY -- can be said to be or have been done NECESSARILY, with regard to the divine decree."

ARTICLE VI

All things are done contingently.

ANSWER

This Article is expressed in such a stupid and senseless manner, that they who attribute it to me, declare by this very circumstance, that they do not perceive under how many falsities this expression labours; nay, they do not understand what is the meaning of the words which they employ. For if that is said to be done contingently which it is possible not to do, or which may not be done, after all the causes required for its being done have been fixed; and, on the other hand, if that is said to be done necessarily which cannot be left undone which cannot but be done-after all the causes required for its performance have been fixed; and if I grant, that, after some causes have been fixed, it is impossible for any other event to ensue than that the thing should be done and exist, how then can I be of opinion that" all things are done, or happen, contingently?." But they have deceived themselves by their own ignorance; from which it would be possible for them to be liberated, if they would bestow a becoming and proper attention on sentiments that are more correct, and would in a friendly manner obtain from the author a knowledge of his views and opinions.

I have both declared and taught that "necessity, in reference to its being said to be or to happen necessarily, is either absolute or relative." It is an absolute necessity, in relation to a thing being said simply "to be or to happen necessarily," without any regard being had to the supposition, or laying down, of any cause whatever. It is a relative necessity, when a thing is said "to be or to happen necessarily," after some cause had been laid down or fixed. Thus, God exists by an absolute necessity; and by the same absolute necessity, he both understands and loves himself. But the world, and all things produced from it, are, according to an absolute consideration, contingent, and are produced contingently by God, freely operating. But it being granted that God wills to form the world by his infinite power, to which NOTHING ITSELF must be equal to matter in the most perfect state of preparation -- and it being likewise granted that God actually employs this power -- it will then be said, "It was impossible for the world to do otherwise than exist from this cause;" or,

"from this cause, the world could not but exist." And this is a relative necessity, which is so called from the hypothesis of an antecedent cause being laid down or fixed.

I will explain my meaning in a different manner. Two things in this place come under our consideration, the CAUSE and the EFFECT. If both of them be necessarily fixed, that is, if not only the effect be fixed necessarily when the cause fixed, but if the cause also necessarily exist and be necessarily supposed to operate, the necessity of the effect is in that case simple and absolute. In this manner arises the absolute necessity of the Divine effect, by which God is said to know and love himself; for the Divine understanding and the Divine will cannot be inoperative, [cannot but operate]. This operation of God is not only an internal one, but it is also ad intra, [inwards,] tending towards an object, which is himself. But whatever God may do ad extra,

[externally,] that is, when acting on an object which is something beside himself, [or something different from himself,] whether this object be united to him in understanding and he tend towards it by an internal act, or whether it be in reality separated from him and towards which he tends by an external act, the whole of this he does freely, and the whole of it is, therefore, said to be absolutely contingent. Thus God freely decreed to form the world, and did freely form it. And, in this sense, all things are done contingently in respect to the ]Divine decree; because no necessity exists why the decree of God should be appointed, since it proceeds from his own pure and free [or unconstrained] will.

Or, to express it in another form: That is called the simple and absolute necessity of any effect, "when the cause necessarily exists, necessarily operates, and employs that power through which it is impossible for the thing not to exist," [or through which it cannot but exist]. In the nature of things, such an effect as this cannot be contemplated. For the intellect of the Deity, by which he understands himself, proceeds from a cause that necessarily exists and that necessarily understands itself; but it does not proceed from a cause which employs a power of action for such an understanding.

Under this consideration, the relative necessity of any event is two-fold.

FIRST. When a cause that necessarily exists, but does not necessarily operate, uses a power of action that cannot be resisted. Thus it being fixed, that "God, who is a necessary being, wills to create a world by his omnipotence," a world must in that case necessarily come into existence.

SECONDLY. When a cause that does not necessarily exist and yet necessarily operates, acts with such efficacy as is impossible to be resisted by the matter or subject on which it operates. Thus, straw is said to be necessarily burnt [or consumed] by the fire, if it be cast into the flame.

Because it is impossible either for the fire to restrain its power of burning so as not actually to burn, or for the straw to resist the fire. But because God can prevent the fire from burning any combustible matter that is brought near it or put into it, this kind of necessity is called partial in respect to the cause, and only according to the nature of the things themselves and the mutual affection

[or relation] between them.

When these matters have been thus explained, I could wish to see what can possibly be said in opposition.lam desirous, that we should in preference contend FOR THE NECESSITY OF GOD ALONE, that is, for his necessary existence and for the necessary production of his ad intra [internal] acts, and that we should contend for the CONTINGENCY OF ALL OTHER THINGS

AND EFFECTS. Such a procedure on our part would conduce far more to the glory of God; to whom by this method would be attributed both the GLORY of his necessary existence, that is, of his eternity, according to which it is a pure act without [the exercise of] power, and the GLORY of his free creation of all other things, by which also his goodness becomes a supreme object of our commendation.

ARTICLE VII

God has not by his eternal decree determined future and contingent things to the one part or the other.

ANSWER

A calumny which lies concealed under ambiguous terms, is capable of inflicting a deep injury with the greatest security; but after such equivocal expressions are explained, the slander is exposed, and loses all its force among men of skill and experience.

The word "DETERMINED" is of this ambiguous description. For it signifies (1.) either "the determination of God by which he resolves that something shall be done; and when such a determination is fixed, (by an action, motion and impulse of God, of whatever kind it may be,) the second cause, both with regard to its power and the use of that power, remains free either to act or not to act, so that, if it be the pleasure of this second cause, it can suspend [or defer] its own action." Or it signifies (2.) "such a determination, as, when once it is fixed, the second cause (at least in regard to the use of its power,) remains no longer free so as to be able to suspend its own action, when God's action, motion and impulse have been fixed; but by this determination, it

[the second cause] is necessarily bent or inclined to the one course or the other, all indifference to either part being completely removed before this determined act be produced by a free and unconstrained creature."

1. If the word "DETERMINED," in the article here proposed, be interpreted according to this first method, far be it from me to deny such a sort of Divine determination. For I am aware that it is said, in the fourth chapter of the. Acts of the Apostles, "Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together against Jesus, to do whatsoever God's hand and counsel determined before (or previously appointed) to be done." But I also know, that Herod, Pontius Pilate, and the Jews, freely performed those very actions; and (notwithstanding this "fore-determination of God," and though by his power every Divine action, motion and impulse which was necessary for the execution of this "fore-determination," were all fixed,) yet it was possible for this act (the crucifixion of Christ,) which had been

"previously appointed" by God, not to be produced by those persons, and they might have remained free and indifferent to the performance of this action, up to the moment of time in which they perpetrated the deed. Let the narrative of the passion of our Lord be perused, and let it be observed how the whole matter was conducted, by what arguments Herod, Pontius Pilate and the Jews were moved and induced, and the kind of administration [or management] that was employed in the use of those arguments, and it will then be evident, that it is the truth which I here assert.

2. But if the word "DETERMINED" be received according to the second acceptation, I confess, that I abominate and detest that axiom (as one that is FALSE, ABSURD, and preparing the way for MANY BLASPHEMIES,) which, declares that "God by his eternal decree has determined to the one part or to the other future contingent things." By this last phrase understand "those things which are performed by the free will of the creature."

(1.) I execrate it as a FALSEHOOD: Because God in the administration of his Providence conducts all things in such a manner that when he is pleased to employ his creatures in the execution of his decrees, he does not take away from them their nature, natural properties or the use of them, but allows them to perform and complete their own proper motions. Were it otherwise, Divine Providence, which ought to be accommodated to the creation, would be in direct opposition.

(2.) I detest it as AN ABSURDITY: Because it is contradictory in the adjunct, that "something is done contingently," that is, it is done in such a manner as makes it POSSIBLE not to be done; and yet this same thing is determined to the one part or the other in such a manner, as makes it IMPOSSIBLE to leave undone that which has been determined to be done. What the patrons of such a doctrine advance about "that liberty not being taken away which belongs to the nature of the creature," is not sufficient to destroy this contradiction: Because it is not sufficient for the establishment of contingency and liberty to have the presence of a power which can freely act according to nature; but it is requisite that the use and employment of that power and liberty should on no account be impeded. What insanity therefore is it, [according to the scheme of these men,] to confer at the creation a power on the creature of acting freely or of suspending its action, and yet to take away the use of such a power when the liberty comes at length to be employed. That is, to grant it when there is no use for it, but when it becomes both useful and necessary, then in the very act to prevent the exercise of its liberty. Let Tertullian against Marcion be examined, (lib. ii. c. 5, 6, 7,) where he discusses this matter in a most erudite and nervous manner. I yield my full assent to all that he advances.

(3.) I abhor it as CONDUCING TO MULTIPLIED BLASPHEMIES. For I consider it impossible for any art or sophistry to prevent this dogma concerning "such a previous determination" from producing the following consequences: FIRST. It makes God to be the author of sin, and man to be exempt from blame. SECONDLY. It constitutes God as the real, proper and only sinner: Because when there is a fixed law which forbids this act, and when there is such "a fore-determination" as makes it "impossible for this act not to be committed," it follows as a natural consequence, that it is God himself who transgresses the law, since he is the person who performs this deed against the law. For though this be immediately perpetrated by the creature, yet, with regard to it, the creature cannot have any consideration of sin; because this act was unavoidable on the part of man, after such "fore-determination" had been fixed. THIRDLY. Because, according to this dogma, God needed sinful man and his sin, for the illustration of his justice and mercy.

FOURTHLY. And, from its terms, sin is no longer sin.

I never yet saw a refutation of those consequences which have been deduced from this dogma by some other persons. I wish such a refutation was prepared, at least that it would be seriously attempted. When it is completed, if I am not able to demonstrate, even then, that these objections of mine are not removed, I will own myself to be vanquished, and will ask pardon for my offense. Although I am not accustomed to charge and oppress this sentiment

[of theirs] with such consequences before other people, yet I usually confess this single circumstance, (and this, only when urged by necessity,) that "I cannot possibly free their opinion from those objections."

ARTICLE VIII

Sufficient grace of the Holy Spirit is bestowed on those to whom the gospel is preached, whosoever they may be; so that, if they will, they may believe: otherwise, God would only be mocking mankind.

ANSWER

At no time, either in public or in private, have I delivered this proposition in these words, or in any expressions that were of equivalent force, or that conveyed a similar meaning. This assertion I confidently make, even though a great number of persons might bear a contrary testimony. Because, unless this Article received a modified explanation, I neither approve of it at present, nor has it at any time obtained any portion of my approval. Of this fact it is in my power to afford evidence, from written conferences which I have had with other people on the same subject.

In this Article there are three topics concerning which I am desirous of giving a suitable explanation.

FIRST. Concerning the difference which subsists among the persons to whom the gospel is preached. Frequent mention of this difference is made in the scriptures, and particularly in the following passages. "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes." (Matt. xi, 25.) The explanation of these words may be discovered in 1 Corinthians 1 and 2. "Into whatsoever city or town ye shall enter, inquire who in it is worthy; and there abide till ye go thence. And when ye come into a house, salute it. And if the house be worthy, let your peace come upon it; but. if it be not worthy, let your peace return to you." (Matt. x, 11- 13.) The Jews of Berea "were more noble than those in Thessalonica, in that they received the word with all readiness of mind," &c. (Acts xvii, 11.) "Pray for us, that the word of the Lord may have free course, and be glorified, even as it is with you; and that we may be delivered from unreasonable and wicked men. For all men have not faith. But the Lord is faithful," &c. (2 Thess. iii, 1, 2.)

SECONDLY. Concerning the bestowing of sufficient grace what is to be understood by such a gift? It is well known, that there is habitual grace, and

[the grace of] assistance. Now the phraseology of the article might be understood according to this acceptation, as though some kind of habitual grace were infused into all those to whom the gospel is preached, which would render them apt or inclined to give it credence, or believe the gospel.

But this interpretation of the. phrase is one of which I do not approve. But this SUFFICIENCY, after all that is said about it, must, in my opinion, be ascribed to the assistance of the Holy Spirit, by which he assists the preaching of the gospel, as the organ, or instrument, by which He, the Holy Spirit, is accustomed to be efficacious in the hearts of the hearers. But it is possible to explain this operation of the assistance of the Holy Spirit, in a manner so modified and appropriate, and such sufficiency may be ascribed to it, as to keep at the greatest possible distance from Pelagianism.

THIRDLY. Concerning the expression, "By this grace they may believe, if they will." These words, when delivered in such a crude and undigested form, are capable of being brought to bear a very bad interpretation, and a meaning not at all agreeable to the scriptures, as though, after that power had been bestowed, the Holy Spirit and Divine Grace remain entirely quiescent, waiting to see whether the man will properly use the power which he has received, and will believe the gospel. When, on the contrary, he who wishes to entertain and to utter correct sentiments on this subject, will account it necessary to ascribe to Grace its own province, which, indeed, is the principal one, in persuading the human will that it may be inclined to yield assent to those truths which are preached.

This exposition completely frees me from the slightest suspicion of heresy on the point here mentioned; and proves it to be a report not entitled to the least credit, that I have employed such expressions, as I am unwilling to admit, except with the addition of a sound and proper explanation.

In reference to the REASON which is appended to this proposition, that, otherwise, God would only be mocking mankind, I confess it to be a remark which several adversaries employ against the opinion entertained by many of our divines, to convict it of absurdity. And it is not used without just cause, which might easily have been demonstrated, had it pleased the inventors of these Articles, (instead of ascribing them to me,) to occupy themselves in openly declaring on this subject their own sentiments, which they keep carefully concealed within their own bosoms.

ARTICLE IX

The temporal afflictions of believers are not correctly termed

"CHASTISEMENTS," but are PUNISHMENTS for sins. For Christ has rendered satisfaction only for eternal punishments.

ANSWER

This Article is attributed to me by a double and most flagrant falsehood: the first of which will be found in the Article itself, and the second in the reason appended.

1. Concerning the FIRST. Those who are mere novices in Divinity know that the afflictions and calamities of this animal life, are either punishments, chastisements, or trials. That is, in sending them, God either intends punishment for sins, in regard to their having been already committed, and without any other consideration; or, He intends chastisement, that those who are the subjects of it may not afterwards fall into the commission of other or similar offenses; or, in sending afflictions and calamities, God purposes to try the faith, hope, charity, patience, and the like conspicuous virtues and graces of his people. What man would be so silly as to say, when the Apostles were called before the Jewish Council, and were beaten with rods, that "it was a PUNISHMENT!" although "they departed from the presence of the Council, that they were counted worthy to suffer shame for his name." (Acts v, 41.) Is not the following expression of the Apostle familiar to every one? "For this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep. For if we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged. But when we are judged, we are CHASTENED, (reproved and instructed,) OF THE LORD, that we should not be condemned with the world." (1 Cor. xi, 30-32.) By not reflecting on these and similar passages of scripture, the persons who attributed these articles to me betrayed their ignorance, as well as their audacity. If they had bestowed the least reflection upon such texts, by what strange infatuation of mind has it happened, that they ascribe to me a sentiment which is thus confuted by plain and obvious quotations from the word of God?

On one occasion, when the subject of discussion was the calamities inflicted on the house of David on account of criminal conduct towards Uriah; and when the passages of scripture which were adduced tended with great semblance of truth to prove, that those calamities bore some relation to PUNISHMENT, I stated, that "no necessity whatever existed for as to allow ourselves to be brought into such straits by our adversaries the Papists, from which we could with difficulty escape; since the words appear to make against the opinion which asserts that they have by no means any reference to punishment. And because sin merits both an eternal punishment corresponding with its grievous enormity, and a temporal punishment, (if indeed God be pleased to inflict the latter, which is not always his practice even with respect to those who persevere in their transgressions, as may be seen in Psalm 73, and Job 21,) it might, not unseasonably, be said, that, after God has pardoned the guilt so far as it is meritorious of eternal punishment, he reserves or retains it in reference to temporal punishment." And I shewed, that, "from these premises, no patronage could be obtained for the Popish dogma of a Purgatory," which was the subject of that discussion.

2. With regard to the REASON appended, it is supported by the same criminal falsehood as the preceding part of the Article, and with no less absurdity of object, as I will demonstrate. For I affirm, in the first place, that this expression at no time escaped from my lips, and that such a thought never entered my imagination. My opinion on this subject is, "Christ is our Redeemer and saviour from sins, which merit both temporal and eternal death; and He delivers us not only from death eternal, but from death temporal, which is the separation of the soul from the body." But it is amazing, that this opinion

"Christ has rendered satisfaction for temporal punishments alone," could possibly have been attributed to me by men of discretion, when the scriptures expressly declare, "Christ was also a partaker of flesh and blood, that, through death, he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil."

(Heb. ii, 14.) By the term DEATH in this place must be understood either "the death of the body alone," or "that in conjunction with eternal death. "The Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil." (1 John iii, 8.) And among those works to be destroyed, we must reckon death temporal. For "by the envy of the devil, death entered into the world." In another passage it is said, "For since by man came death, by MAN came also the resurrection of the dead;" this man is Christ. (1 Cor. xv, 21.) "Christ shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto himself." (Phil. iii, 21.) The greatest necessity exists for that man to become conversant with the scriptures, who denies, that "by the death, of Christ we are redeemed from temporal death, and obtain a right and title to a happy resurrection."

The following is an affirmation which I have made: "We are not actually delivered from temporal death, except by the resurrection from the dead, through which our last enemy, death, will be destroyed. These two truths, therefore, are, in my judgment, to be considered and taught, (1.) Christ, by his death, immediately took away from death the authority or right which he had over us, that of detaining us under his power, even as it was not possible that Christ himself should be holden by t]he bonds [pains] of death. (Acts ii, 24.) But (2.) Christ will in his own time deliver us from its actual dominion, according to the administration or appointment of God, whose pleasure it is to concede to the soul an early period of liberation, and to the body one that is later." But, I confess, that I cannot with an unwavering conscience assert, and therefore, dare not do it as if it were an object of certain knowledge, that temporal death, which is imposed or inflicted on the saints, is not a punishment, or has no regard to punishment," when it is styled "an ENEMY

that is to be destroyed" by the Omnipotence of Christ.

The contrary opinion to this is not proved by the argument, that "our corporeal death is a passage into eternal life:" because it is a passage of the soul, and not of the body; the latter of which, while it remains buried in the earth, is held under the dominion of death. Nor is it established by the remark that "the saints long for the death of the body." (Phil. i, 21, 23.) For when they "have a desire to be dissolved [to depart] and be with Christ," that desire is according to the soul; the body in the mean time remaining under the dominion of death its enemy, until it likewise, (after being again united to its own soul,) be glorified with it. The address of Christ to Peter may also be stated in opposition: "When thou shalt be old, thou shalt stretch forth thy hands, and another shall gird thee, and carry thee whither thou wildest not. This spake he, signifying by what death he should glorify God." (John xxi, 19.) The framers of these articles, therefore, have imputed this opinion to me, not only without truth, but without a sufficient sanction from their own discretion.

Of this weakness of their judgment I observe, in this Article, other two tokens: FIRST. They do not distinguish between the magnitude of each error in a proper manner. For he falls into a far greater error who DENIES, that "Christ has rendered satisfaction for corporeal punishments," that is, for the punishment of death temporal, than is his who ASSENTS, that "the death of the body has regard to punishment, since it is inflicted even on holy persons."

But they have placed the latter error as the proposition; and the former one is brought, as a reason, for its confirmation. When they ought to have adopted an opposite mode of stating them, according to the relative estimate of each of these errors thus, "Christ has rendered satisfaction for eternal punishment alone. Therefore, the temporal afflictions of believers are not correctly called chastisements, but are punishments for sins."

SECONDLY. Because they make me employ an argument, which I cannot discover to be possessed of any force towards proving the proposition. For I grant, that Christ has rendered satisfaction even for temporal punishments; and yet I say, "It may likewise be true that temporal death has a reference to PUNISHMENT, even when it is inflicted on believers."

THIRDLY. From these considerations, a third mark of an inconstant and wavering judgment discovers itself. For when they employ this mode of argumentation, "Christ has liberated us from temporal punishments. Therefore our death cannot have any respect to punishment," they do not perceive that I might with equal facility draw from the same premises the following conclusion, "Therefore, it is not equitable that the saints should die a temporal death." My method of reasoning is [direct] a re ad rem, from subject to subject, "Because Christ has borne the death of the body, it is not to be borne by us." Their method is [relative] a re ad respectum rei, from the subject to its relation, thus, "Because Christ has borne the death of the body, it is indeed inflicted on us, but not so as to have any reference to punishment."

God will himself approve and verify this argument a re ad rem, from subject to subject, by the effect which He will give to it at some future period. But the argument will be prepared and stated in a legitimate form, thus, "Christ has borne the death of the body; and, (secondly,) has taken it away, which fact is apparent from his resurrection. Therefore, God will take away death from us in his own good time."

ARTICLE X

It cannot be proved from Scripture, that believers under the Old Testament, before the ascension of Christ, were in Heaven.

ANSWER

I never taught such a doctrine as this in public, and I never asserted it affirmatively in private. I recollect, however, that I said, on one occasion, to a minister of God's word, in reference to a sermon which he had then delivered,

"there are many passages of Scripture which seem to prove, that believers under the Old Testament, before the ascension of Christ, were not in Heaven." I produced some of those passages, against which he had little to object. But I added, that I thought it could not now be propounded with much usefulness to any church that held a contrary opinion; but that, after it has been diligently examined and found to be true, it may be taught with profit to the church and to the glory of Christ, when the minds of men have been duly prepared. I am still of the same opinion. But, about the matter itself, I affirm nothing on either side. I perceive that each of these views of the subject has arguments in its favour, not only in passages of scripture and in conclusions deduced from them, but likewise in the sentiments of divines. Having investigated all of them to the best of my ability, I confess that I hesitate, and declare that neither view seems to me to be very evident [or to have the preponderance.] In this opinion I have the assent of a vast majority of divines, especially those of our own age. Most of the Christian Fathers place the souls of the Patriarchs under the Old Testament beyond or out of Heaven, either in the lower regions, in Purgatory, or in some other place, which yet is situated out of the verge of what is properly called Heaven. With St. Augustine, therefore, "I prefer doubting about secret things, to litigation about those which are uncertain." Nor is there the least necessity. For why should I, in these our days, when Christ, by his ascension into Heaven, having become our Forerunner, hath opened for us a way and entrance into that holy place, why should I now contend about the place in which the souls of the Fathers rested in the times of the Old Testament?

But lest, as is usual in my case, a calumnious report should be raised on the consequences to be deduced from this opinion, as though I was favourable to the Popish dogma of a Purgatory, or as though I approach nearly to those who think that the souls of the dead sleep or have slept, or, which is the worst of all, as though I seem to identify myself with those who say, "the Fathers were like swine that were fed and fattened without any hope of a better life,"

lest such reports as these should be fabricated, I will openly declare what my opinion is about the state of the Fathers prior to Christ's ascension into Heaven. (1.) I believe that human souls are immortal, that is, they will never die. (2.) From this I deduce, that souls do not sleep. (3.) That, after this life, a state of felicity or of misery is opened for all men, into the one or the other of which they enter immediately on their departure out of this world. (4.) That the souls of the Fathers, who passed their days of sojourning on earth in faith and in waiting for the Redeemer, departed into a place of quiet, joy, and blessedness, and began to enjoy the blissful presence of God, as soon as they escaped out of the body. (5.) I dare not venture to determine where that place of quiet is situated, whether in Heaven, properly so called, into which Christ ascended, or somewhere out of it. If any other person be more adventurous on this subject, I think he ought to be required to produce reasons for his opinion, or be enjoined to keep silence. (6.) I add, that, in my opinion, the felicity of those souls was much increased by the ascension of Christ into Heaven, and that it will be fully consummated after the resurrection of the body, and when all the members of the Church universal are introduced into Heaven.

I know certain passages of Scripture which are produced, as proofs that the souls of the Old Testament Saints have been in Heaven. (1.) "The spirit shall return unto God who gave it." (Eccl. xii, 7.) But this expression must either be understood in reference to all the spirits of men of every description, and thus will afford no assistance to this argument; or, if it be understood as relating to the souls of good men alone, it does not even then follow, that, because "the spirit returns unto God," it ascends into Heaven property so called. I prefer, however, the former mode of interpretation, a return to God the Creator and the Preserver of spirits, and the Judge of the deeds done in the body. (2.) Enoch is said to have been taken to God, (Gen. v, 24) and Elijah to have ascended by a whirlwind into Heaven. (2 Kings ii, 11.) But, beside the fact of these examples being out of the common order, it does not follow of course that because Enoch was taken to God, he was translated into the highest heaven. For the word "Heaven" is very wide in its signification. The same observation applies to Elijah. See Peter Martyr and Vatablus on 2 Kings ii, 13.

(3.) "Christ is now become the first fruits of them that slept." (1 Cor. xv, 20.) This would not appear to be correct, if Enoch and Elijah ascended into the highest Heaven, clothed in bodies endued with immortality. (4.) "Lazarus was carried by the angels into Abraham's bosom," where he enjoyed consolation.

(Luke xvi, 22.) But it is not proved, that Heaven itself is described by the term,

"Abraham's bosom." It is intimated, that Lazarus was gathered into the bosom of his father Abraham, in which he might rest in hope of a full beatification in Heaven itself, which was to be procured by Christ. For this reason the Apostle, after the ascension of Christ into Heaven, "had a desire to be with Christ." (Phil. i, 23.) (5.) "Many shall come from the East and the West, and shall sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of Heaven."

(Matt. viii, 11.) But it does not thence follow, that the Fathers have been in Heaven, properly so called, before they, who are to be called from among the Gentiles, sit down with them. (6.) It appears from Matthew 25, that there are only two places, one destined for the pious, the other for the wicked. But it does not hence necessarily follow, that the place destined for the pious has always been Heaven supreme. There have never been more places, because there have never been more states. But it is not necessary, that they should always be the same places without any change. The authority of this declaration is preserved inviolate, provided a third place be never added to the former two. (7.) "The reward" which awaits the pious "in heaven," is said to be "great." (Matt. v, 12.) Let this be granted. Therefore, [will some reasoner say,] they must instantly after death be translated into the supreme heaven."

This does not necessarily follow. For it is well known, that the Scriptures have in these promises a reference to the period which immediately succeeds the last judgment, according to the following expression: "Behold I come quickly, and my reward is with me." The spouse replies, "Even so come, Lord Jesus!"

(Rev. xxii, 12, 20) In the same manner must be understood that passage in Luke, "They may receive you into everlasting habitations;" (Luke xvi, 9;) that is, after the last judgment, at least after [the ascension of] Christ, whose office it was to prepare those mansions for his people. (John xiv, 2.) (8.) "The Fathers are said to have been justified by the same faith as we are." (Acts xiii, 33.) I acknowledge this. "Therefore they have always been in Heaven even before [the ascension of] Christ, and we shall be after Him." This is not a necessary consequence. For there are degrees in glorification. Nor is it at all wonderful, if they be said to be rendered more blessed and glorious after the ascension of Christ into Heaven. (9.) "But Jesus said to the malefactor, to-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise." (.Luke xxiii, 43.) I reply, FIRST, It is not necessary that by "Paradise" should here be understood the third heaven, or the eternal abode of the blessed. For it denotes in general a place of felicity.

SECONDLY, St. Chrysostom says, the crucified thief was the first person whose spirit entered into heaven. Yet he did not ascend there before Christ, nor before the vail of the temple had been rent in twain."

But to these passages is opposed that admirable dispensation or economy of God, which is distinguished according to the times preceding Christ, and those which followed. Of this dispensation the temple at Jerusalem was an illustrious [exemplar] pattern. For its external part, by means of an interposing vail, was separated and divided from that in which the priests daily appeared, and which was called "The Holy of Holies," in contradistinction to that which is called "The Sanctuary," (Heb. ix, 2, 3.) Heaven itself is designated by "The Holy of Holies" in Heb. ix, 24. It was shut as long as the former tabernacle stood, and until Christ entered into it by his own blood. (Heb. ix, 8-12.) It was his province as "our Forerunner" to precede us, that we also might be able to enter into those things which are within the vail. (Heb. vi, 19.) For this purpose it was necessary that liberty should be granted to us of "entering into the Holiest by the blood of Jesus, by that new and living way which he hath consecrated for us through the vail, that is to say, his flesh." (Heb. x, 19, 20.) On this account the ancient worthies, who, "through faith have" most evidently

"gained this testimony that they pleased God," are said, "not to have received or obtained the promise; God having provided some better thing for us," who follow Christ, "that they without us should not be made perfect." (Heb. xi, 40.) These passages of scripture, and a view of the dispensation which they describe, are among the principal reasons why I cannot give my assent to the opinion which affirms, that the Fathers have been in Heaven properly so called.

But, that our brethren may not so highly blame me, I will oppose to them one or two of the approved divines of our church. CALVIN, in his INSTITUTES,"

(lib. iv, c. 1, s. 12,) says: "For what churches would dissent from each other on this account alone -- that one of them, without any of the licentiousness of contention or the obstinacy of assertion, holds the opinion that souls, when they leave their bodies, soar up to Heaven; while another church does not venture to define anything about the place, but only maintains with certainty that they still live in the Lord." Peruse also the following passage in his

"Institutes," (lib. iii, c. 25, s. 6.) "Many persons torment themselves by disputing about the place which departed souls occupy, and whether they be now in the enjoyment of heavenly glory or not. But it is foolish and rash to inquire about things unknown, more deeply than God permits us to know them." Behold, Calvin here says, that it is frivolous to contend whether the souls of the dead already enjoy celestial glory or not; and, in his judgment, it ought not to be made a subject of contention. Yet I am condemned, or at least am accused, because I dare not positively affirm "that the souls of the Fathers before Christ, were in Heaven, properly so called." PETER MARTYR

proceeds still further, and is bold enough to assert, in his observations on 2

Kings ii, 13, "that the souls of the Fathers before Christ, were not in Heaven properly so called." He says, "Now if I be asked, to what place were Enoch and Elijah translated? I will say simply that I do not know, because that circumstance is not delivered in the divine volume. Yet if we might follow a very probable analogy, I would say, they were conducted to the place of the Fathers, or into Abraham's bosom, that they might there pass their time with the blessed Patriarchs in expectation of the resurrection of Christ, and that they might afterwards be elevated above the Heavens with Him when he was raised up again." Where it is to be noted, that Martyr entertains doubts concerning Enoch and Elijah, but speaks decisively about those who are in Abraham's bosom, that is, about the Fathers, "that they were raised up above the heavens with Christ at his resurrection." This likewise appears from what he mentions a little afterwards. With regard to that sublime ascension, we grant that no one enjoyed it before Christ. Enoch, therefore, and Elijah went to the Fathers, and there with them waited for Christ, upon whom, in company with the rest, they were attendants when he entered into heaven." See also BULLINGER on Luke xvi, 23; Heb. ix, 8; 1 Pet. iii, 19.

From the preceding explanation and extracts, I have, I think, rendered it evident, that not only had I just causes for being doubtful concerning this matter, but that I likewise ought not therefore to be blamed, even though I had uttered what they here charge upon me as an error; nay, what is still more, that I ought to be tolerated had I simply asserted, "that the souls of the Fathers were not in Heaven prior to the ascension of Christ to that blissful abode."

ARTICLE XI

It is a matter of doubt, whether believers under the Old Testament understood that the legal ceremonies were types of Christ and of his benefits.

ANSWER

I do not remember to have said this at any time: nay, I am conscious that I have never said it, because I never yet durst utter any such expression. But I have said, that an inquiry not altogether unprofitable might be instituted, "how far the ancient Jews understood the legal ceremonies to be types of Christ?"

At least I feel myself well assured, that they did not understand those ceremonies, as we do to whom the mystery of the Gospel is revealed. Nor do I suppose that any one will venture to deny this. But I wish our brethren would take upon themselves the task of proving, that believers under the Old Testament understood the legal ceremonies to be types of Christ and his benefits. For they not only know that this opinion of theirs is called in question by some persons, but that it is likewise confidently denied. Let them make the experiment, and they will perceive how difficult an enterprise they have undertaken. For the passages which seem to prove their proposition, are taken away from them in such a specious manner by their adversaries, that a man who is accustomed to yield assent to those things alone which are well supported by proofs, may be easily induced to doubt whether the believers under the Old Testament had any knowledge of this matter; especially if he consider, that, according to Gal. iv, 3, the whole of the ancient [Jewish]

Church was in a state of infancy or childhood, and therefore possessed only the understanding of a child. Whether an infant be competent to perceive in these corporal things the spiritual things which are signified by them, let those decide who are acquainted with that passage, "When I was a child, I understood as a child." (1 Cor. xiii, 11.) Let those passages also be inspected which, we will venture to say, have a typical signification, because we have been taught so to view them by Christ and his Apostles; and it will be seen whether they be made so plain and obvious, as, without the previous interpretation of the Messiah, to have enabled us to understand them according to their spiritual meaning. It is said, (John viii, 56,) "Abraham saw the day of Christ, and was glad." Those who are of a contrary sentiment, interpret this passage as if it was to be understood by a metonymy, because, Abraham saw the day of Isaac, who was a type of Christ, and therefore his day was "the day of Christ." It is an undoubted fact, that no mention is made in the scriptures of any other rejoicing than of this. The faith of Abraham and its object occupy nearly the whole of the fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. Let what is there said be compared together; and let it be demonstrated from this comparison, that Abraham saw Christ in those promises which he apprehended by faith. Who would understand "the sign of Jonah," to have been instituted to typify the three days in which Christ remained in the bowels of the earth, unless Christ had himself given that explanation? What injury does this opinion produce, since those who hold it do not deny, that the Fathers were saved by the infantile faith which they possessed? For an infant is as much the heir of his father's property, as an adult son.

Should any one say, it follows as a necessary consequence, that "the Fathers were saved without faith in Christ." I reply, the faith which has respect to the salvation of God that has been promised by him, and "waits for the redemption of Israel," understood under a general notion, is "faith in Christ,"

according to the dispensation of that age. This is easily perceived from the following passages: "I have waited for thy salvation, or thy saving mercy, O

Lord! (Gen. xlix, 18.) "And the same man, (Simeon,) was just and devout, waiting for the consolation of Israel." (Luke ii, 25.) In the same chapter it is said, "Anna, a prophetess, spake of him to all them that looked for redemption in Jerusalem."

But if we consider the "faith in Christ," which is that of the New Testament, and which has regard to Him as a Spiritual and Heavenly King, who bestows upon his followers those celestial benefits which he has procured for them by his passion and death; then a greater difficulty will hence arise. What man ever received more promises concerning the Messiah than David, or who has prophesied more largely about Him? Yet any one may with some show of reason, entertain doubts, whether David really understood that the Messiah would be a Spiritual and Heavenly Monarch; for when he seemed to be pouring out his whole soul before the Lord, (2 Sam. 7,) he did not suffer a single word to escape that might indicate the bent of his understanding to this point, which, nevertheless, would have been of great potency in magnifying Jehovah and in confirming his own confidence.

The knowledge which all Israel had of the Messiah and of his kingdom, in the days when Christ was himself on earth, appears not only from the Pharisees and the whole of the populace, but also from his own disciples after they had for three years and more enjoyed constant opportunities of communication with him, and had heard from his own lips frequent and open mention of the kingdom of Heaven. Nay, what is still more wonderful, immediately after the resurrection of Christ from the dead, they did not even then comprehend his meaning. (Luke xxiv, 21-25.) From this, it seems, we must say, either "that the knowledge which they formerly possessed had gradually died away," or "that the Pharisees, through their hatred against Jesus, had corrupted that knowledge." But neither of these assertions appears to be at all probable. (1.) The former is not; because the nearer those times were to the Messiah, the clearer were the prophecies concerning him, and the more manifest the apprehension of them. And this for a good reason, because it then began to be still more necessary for men to believe that person to be the Messiah, or at least the time was fast approaching in which such a faith would become necessary. (2.) The latter is not probable; because the Pharisees conceived that hatred against him on account of his preaching and miracles. But it was at the very commencement of his office that he called into his service those twelve disciples. There are persons, I am aware, who produce many things from the Rabbinical writers of that age, concerning the spiritual kingdom of Christ; but I leave those passages to the authors of them, because it is out of my power to pronounce a decision on the subject.

While I have been engaged in the contemplation of this topic, and desirous to prove from the preceding prophecies, that the kingdom of Christ the Messiah, was to be spiritual, no small difficulty has arisen, especially after consulting most of those who have written upon it. Let those who on this point do not allow any one to indulge in a single doubt, try an experiment. Let them exhibit a specimen of the arguments by which they suppose their doctrine can be proved, even in this age, which is illuminated with the light of the New Testament. I will engage, that, after this experiment, they will not pass such a sinister judgment on those who confess to feel some hesitation about this point.

These observations have been adduced by me, not with the design of denying that the opinion of the brethren on this matter is true, much less for the purpose of confuting it. But I adduce them, to teach others to bear with the weakness of that man who dares not act the part of a dogmatist on this subject.

ARTICLE XII

Christ has died for all men and for every individual.

ANSWER

This assertion was never made by me, either in public or private, except when it was accompanied by such an explanation as the controversies which are excited on this subject have rendered necessary. For the phrase here used possesses much ambiguity. Thus it may mean either that "the price of the death of Christ was given for all and for every one," or that "the redemption, which was obtained by means of that price, is applied and communicated to all men and to every one." (1.) Of this latter sentiment I entirely disapprove, because God has by a peremptory decree resolved, that believers alone should be made partakers of this redemption. (2.) Let those who reject the former of these opinions consider how they can answer the following scriptures, which declare, that Christ died for all men; that He is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world; (1 John ii, 2;) that He took away the sin of the world; (John i, 29;) that He gave his flesh for the life of the world; (John vi, 51;) that Christ died even for that man who might be destroyed with the meat of another person; (Rom. xiv, 15;) and that false teachers make merchandise even of those who deny the Lord that bought them, and bring upon themselves swift destruction; (2 Pet. ii, 1, 3.) He therefore who speaks thus, speaks with the Scriptures; while he who rejects such phraseology, is a daring man, one who sits in judgment on the Scriptures and is not an interpreter of them. But he who explains those passages agreeably to the analogy of faith, performs the duty of a good interpreter and prophesier [or preacher] in the Church of God.

All the controversy, therefore, lies in the interpretation. The words themselves ought to be simply approved, because they are the words of Scripture. I will now produce a passage or two from Prosper of Aquitain, to prove that this distinction was even in his time employed: "He who says that the saviour was not crucified for the redemption of the whole world, has regard, not to the virtue of the sacrament, but to the case of unbelievers, since the blood of Jesus Christ is the price paid for the whole world. To that precious ransom they are strangers, who, either being delighted with their captivity, have no wish to be redeemed, or, after they have been redeemed, return to the same servitude." (Sent. 4, super cap. Gallorum.) In another passage he says, "With respect both to the magnitude and potency of the price, and with respect to the one general cause of mankind, the blood of Christ is the redemption of the whole world. But those who pass through this life without the faith of Christ, and without the sacrament of regeneration, are utter strangers to redemption."

Such is likewise the concurrent opinion of all antiquity. This is a consideration to which I wish to obtain a little more careful attention from many persons, that they may not so easily fasten the crime of novelty on him who says anything which they had never before heard, or which was previously unknown to them.

ARTICLES XIII AND XIV

Original Sin will condemn no man.

In every nation, all infants who die without [having committed] actual sins, are saved.

ANSWER

These articles are ascribed to Borrius. To augment their number, they have made them two, when one would have been sufficient, from which the other necessarily follows, even according to their own opinion. For if "original sin condemns no one," it is a necessary consequence that "all those will be saved who have not themselves committed actual transgressions." Of this class are all infants without distinction; unless some one will invent a state between salvation and damnation, by a folly similar to that by which, according to St.

Augustine, Pelagius made a distinction between salvation and the kingdom of heaven.

But Borrius denies having ever publicly taught either the one or the other. He conferred indeed in private on this subject, with some candidates for Holy Orders: and he considers that it was not unlawful for him so to do, or to hold such an opinion, under the influence of reasons which he willingly submits to the examination of his brethren; who, when they have confuted them, may teach him more correct doctrine, and induce him to change his opinion. His reasons are the following:

1. Because God has taken the whole human race into the grace of reconciliation, and has entered into a covenant of grace with Adam, and with the whole of his posterity in him. In which he promises the remission of all sins to as many as stand steadfastly, and deal not treacherously, in that covenant.

But God not only entered into it with Adam, but also afterwards renewed it with Noah, and at length confirmed and perfected it through Christ Jesus. And since infants have not transgressed this covenant, they do not seem to be obnoxious to condemnation; unless we maintain, that God is unwilling to treat with infants, who depart out of this life before they arrive at adult age, on that gracious condition under which, notwithstanding, they are also comprehended as parties to the covenant; and therefore that their condition is much worse than that of adults, to whom is tendered the remission of all sins, not only of that which they perpetrated in Adam, but likewise, of those which they have themselves personally committed. The condition of infants, however is, in this case, much worse, by no fault or demerit of their own, but because it was God's pleasure thus to act towards them. From these premises it would follow, that it was the will of God to condemn them for the commission of sin, before He either promised or entered into a covenant of grace; as though they had been excluded and rejected from that covenant by a previous decree of God, and as though the promise concerning the saviour did not at all belong to them.

2. When Adam sinned in his own person and with his free will, God pardoned that transgression. There is no reason then why it was the will of God to impute this sin to infants, who are said to have sinned in Adam, before they had any personal existence, and therefore, before they could possibly sin at their own will and pleasure.

3. Because, in this instance, God would appear to act towards infants with far more severity than towards the very devils. For the rigor of God against the apostate angels was extreme, because he would not pardon the crime which they had perpetrated. There is the same extreme rigor displayed against infants, who are condemned for the sin of Adam. But it is much greater; for all the [evil] angels sinned in their own persons, while infants sinned in the person of their first father Adam. On this account, the angels themselves were in fault, because they committed an offense which it was possible for them to avoid; while infants were not in fault, only so far as they existed in Adam, and were by his will involved in sin and guilt.

These reasons are undoubtedly of such great importance, that I am of opinion those who maintain the contrary are bound to confute them, before they can affix to any other person a mark of heresy. I am aware, that they place antiquity in opposition, because [they say] its judgment was in their favour.

Antiquity, however, cannot be set up in opposition by those who, on this subject, when the salvation of infants is discussed, are themselves unwilling to abide by the judgment of the ancients. But our brethren depart from antiquity, on this very topic, in two ways:

(1.) Antiquity maintains, that all infants who depart out of this life without having been baptized, would be damned; but that such as were baptized and died before they attained to adult age, would be saved. St. Augustine asserts this to be the Catholic doctrine in these words: "If you wish to be a Catholic, be unwilling to believe, declare, or teach, that infants who are prevented by death from being baptized, can attain to the remission of original sins." (De anima et ejus Orig., lib. 3, cap. 9.) To this doctrine our brethren will by no means accede; but they contradict both parts of it.

(2.) Antiquity maintains that the grace of baptism takes away original sin, even from those who have not been predestinated; according to this passage from Prosper of Aquitain: "That man is not a Catholic who says, that the grace of baptism, when received, does not take away original sin from those who have not been predestinated to life." (Ad Cap. Gallorum, Sent. 2.) To this opinion also our brethren strongly object. But it does not appear equitable, that, whenever it is agreeable to themselves, they should be displeased with those who dissent from them, because they dissent from the Fathers; and again, that, whenever it is their good pleasure, the same parties do themselves dissent from the Fathers on this very subject.

But with respect to the sentiments of the ancient Christian Fathers, about the damnation of the unbaptized solely on account of original sin, they and their successors seem to have mitigated, or at least, to have attempted to soften down such a harsh opinion. For some of them have declared, "that the unbaptized would be in the mildest damnation of all;" and others, "that they would be afflicted, not with the punishment of feeling, but only with that of loss." To this last opinion some of them have added, "that this punishment would be inflicted on them without any stings from their own consciences."

Though it is a consequence of not being baptized, that the parties are said to endure only the punishment of loss, and not that of feeling; yet this feeling exists wherever the stings or gnawings of conscience exists, that is, where the gnawing worm never dies. But let our brethren consider what species of damnation that is which is inflicted on account of sin, and from which no gnawing remorse proceeds.

From these observations, thus produced, it is apparent what opinion ought to be formed of the Fourteenth Article. It is at least so dependent on the Thirteenth, that it ought not to have been composed as a separate article, by those who maintain that there is no cause why infants should perish, except original sin which they committed in Adam, or which they received by propagation from Adam. But it is worth the trouble to see, on this subject, what were the sentiments of Dr. Francis Junius, who a few years ago was Professor of Divinity in this our University. He affirms, that "all infants who are of the covenant and of election, are saved;" but he presumes, in charity, that

"those infants whom God calls to himself, and timely removes out of this miserable vale of sins, are rather saved." (De Natura et Gratia, R. 28.) Now, that which this divine either "affirms according to the doctrine of faith," or

"presumes through charity," may not another man be allowed, without the charge of heresy, to hold within his own breast as a matter of opinion, which he is not in the least solicitous to obtrude on others or persuade them to believe? Indeed, "this accepting of men's persons" is far too prevalent, and is utterly unworthy of wise men. And what inconvenience, I pray, results from this doctrine? Is it supposed to follow as a necessary consequence from it, that, if the infants of unbelievers are saved, they are saved without Christ and his intervention?. Borrius, however, denies any such consequence, and has Junius assenting with him on this subject. If the brethren dissent from this opinion, and think that the consequences which they themselves deduce are agreeable to the premises, then all the children of unbelievers must be subject to condemnation, the children of unbelievers, I repeat, who are "strangers from the covenant." For this conclusion no other reason can be rendered, than their being the children of those who are "strangers from the covenant." From which it seems, on the contrary, to be inferred, that all the children of those who are in the covenant are saved, provided they die in the age of infancy.

But since our brethren deny this inference, behold the kind of dogma which is believed by them. "All the infants of those who are strangers from the covenant are damned; and of the offspring of those parents who are in the covenant, some infants that die are damned, while others are saved." I leave it to those who are deeply versed in these matters, to decide, whether such a dogma as this ever obtained in any church of Christ.

ARTICLE XV

If the Heathen, and those who are strangers to the true knowledge of God, do those things which by the powers of nature they are enabled to do, God will not condemn them, but will reward these their works by a more enlarged knowledge, by which they may be bought to salvation.

ANSWER

This was never uttered by me, nor indeed by Borrius, under such a form, and in these expressions. Nay, it is not very probable, that any man, how small soever his skill might be in sacred things, would deliver the apprehensions of his mind in a manner so utterly confused and indigested, as to beget the suspicion of a falsehood in the very words in which he enunciates his opinion.

For what man is there, who, as a stranger to the true knowledge of God, will do a thing that can in any way be acceptable to God? It is necessary that the thing which will please God, be itself good, at least, in a certain respect. It is further necessary, that he who performs it knows it to be good and agreeable to God. "For whatsoever is not of faith, is sin," that is, whatsoever is done without an assured knowledge that it is good and agreeable to God. Thus far, therefore, it is needful for him to have a true knowledge of God, which the Apostle attributes even to the Gentiles. (Rom. i, 18-21, 25, 28; ii, 14, 15.) Without this explanation there will be a contradiction in this enunciation. "He who is entirely destitute of the true knowledge of God, can perform something which God considers to be so grateful to Himself as to remunerate it with some reward." These, our good brethren, either do not perceive this contradiction; or they suppose, that the persons to whom they ascribe this opinion are such egregious simpletons as they would thus make them appear.

Then, what is the nature of this expression, "if they do those things which the powers of nature enable them to perform?" Is "nature," when entirely destitute of grace and of the Spirit of God, furnished with the knowledge of that truth which is said to be "held in unrighteousness," by the knowledge of "that which may be known of God, even his eternal power and Godhead," which may instigate man to glorify God, and which deprives him of all excuse, if he does not glorify God as he knows Him? I do not think, that such properties as these can, without falsehood and injury to Divine Grace, be ascribed to "nature,"

which, when destitute of grace and of the Spirit of God, tends directly downward to those things which are earthly.

If our brethren suppose, that these matters exhibit themselves in this foolish manner, what reason have they for so readily ascribing such an undigested paragraph to men, who, they ought to have known, are not entirely destitute of the knowledge of sacred subjects? But if our brethren really think that man can do some portion of good by the powers of nature, they are themselves not far from Pelagianism, which yet they are solicitous to fasten on others. This Article, enunciated thus in their own style, seems to indicate that they think man capable of doing something good "by the powers of nature;" but that, by such good performance, he will "neither escape condemnation nor obtain a reward." For these attributes are ascribed to the subject in this enunciation; and because these attributes do not in their opinion, agree with this subject, they accuse of heresy the thing thus enunciated. If they believe that "a man, who is a stranger to the true knowledge of God," is capable of doing nothing good, this ought in the first place, to have been charged with heresy. If they think that no one "by the powers of nature," can perform any thing that is pleasing to God, then this ought to be reckoned as an error, if any man durst affirm it. From these remarks, it obviously follows, either that they are themselves very near the Pelagian heresy, or that they are ignorant of what is worthy, in the first instance or in the second, of reprehension, and what ought to be condemned as heretical.

It is apparent, therefore, that it has been their wish to aggravate the error by this addition. But their labour has been in vain; because, by this addition, they have enabled us to deny that we ever employed any such expression or conceived such a thought; they have, at the same time, afforded just grounds for charging them with the heresy of Pelagius. Thus the incautious hunter is caught in the very snare which he had made for another. They would, therefore, have acted with far more caution and with greater safety, if they had omitted their exaggeration, and had charged us with this opinion, which they know to have been employed by the scholastic divines, and which they afterwards inserted in the succeeding Seventeenth Article, but enunciated in a manner somewhat different, "God will do that which is in Him, for the man who does what is in himself." But, even then, the explanation of the schoolmen ought to have been added, "that God will do this, not from (the merit of) condignity, but from (that of) congruity; and not because the act of man merits any such thing, but because it is befitting the great mercy and beneficence of God." Yet this saying of the schoolmen I should myself refuse to employ, except with the addition of these words: "God will bestow more grace upon that man who does what is in him by the power of divine grace which is already granted to him, according to the declaration of Christ, To him that hath shall be given," in which he comprises the cause why it was "given to the apostles to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven," and why "to others it was not given." (Matt. xiii, 11, 12.) In addition to this passage, and the first and second chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, which have already been quoted, peruse what is related in the Acts of the Apostles, (10, 16, 17,) about Cornelius the Centurion, Lydia, the seller of purple, and the Bereans.

ARTICLE XVI

The works of the unregenerate can be pleasing to God, and are (according to Borrius) the occasion, and (according to Arminius) the impulsive cause, by which God will be moved to communicate to them his saving grace.

ANSWER

About two years ago, were circulated Seventeen Articles, which were attributed to me, and of which the fifteenth is thus expressed: "Though the works of the unregenerate cannot possibly be pleasing to God, yet they are the occasion by which God is moved to communicate to them his saving grace." This difference induces me to suspect that the negative, cannot, has been omitted in this sixteenth article, unless, perhaps, since that time, having proceeded from bad to worse, I now positively affirm this, which, as I was a less audacious and more modest heretic, I then denied. However this may be, I assert that these good men neither comprehend our sentiments, know the phrases which we employ, nor, in order to know them, do they understand the meaning of those phrases. In consequence of this, it is no matter of surprise that they err greatly from the truth when they enunciate our sentiments in their words, or when they affix other (that is, their own) significations to our words.

Of this transformation, they afford a manifest specimen in this article.

1. For the word "the unregenerate," may be understood in two senses, (i.) Either as it denotes those who have felt no motion of the regenerating Spirit, or of its tendency or preparation for regeneration, and who are therefore, destitute of the first principle of regeneration. (ii.) Or it may signify those who are in the process of the new birth, and who feel those motions of the Holy Spirit which belong either to preparation or to the very essence of regeneration, but who are not yet regenerate; that is, they are brought by it to confess their sins, to mourn on account of them, to desire deliverance, and to seek out the Deliverer, who has been pointed out to them; but they are not yet furnished with that power of the Spirit by which the flesh, or the old man, is mortified, and by which a man, being transformed to newness of life, is rendered capable of performing works of righteousness.

2. A thing is pleasing to God, either as an initial act, belonging to the commencement of conversion, or as a work perfect in its own essence, and as performed by a man who is converted and born again. Thus the confession, by which any one acknowledges himself to be "a cold, blind and poor creature," is pleasing to God; and the man, therefore, flies to Christ to

"buy of him eye-salve, white raiment, and gold." (Rev. iii, 15-18.) Works which proceed from fervent love are also pleasing to God. See the distinction which Calvin draws between "initial and filial fear;" and that of Beza, who is of opinion that "sorrow and contrition for sin do not belong to the essential parts of regeneration, but only to those which are preparatory;" but he places "the very essence of regeneration in mortification, and in vivification or quickening."

3. "The occasion," and the impulsive cause, by which God is moved," are understood not always in the same sense, but variously. It will answer our purpose if I produce two passages, from a comparison of which a distinction may be collected, at once convenient and sufficient for our design. The king says, (Matt. xviii, 32) "I forgave thee all that debt because thou desiredest me." And God says to Abraham, (Gen. xxii, 16, 17,) "Because thou hast done this thing, and hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, in blessing, I will bless thee." He who does not perceive, in these passages, a difference in the impelling motives, as well as in the pleasure derived, must be very blind with respect to the Scriptures.

4. "The saving grace of God" may be understood either as primary or secondary, as preceding or subsequent, as operating or cooperating, and as that which knocks or opens or enters in. Unless a man properly distinguishes each of these, and uses such words as correspond with these distinctions, he must of necessity stumble, and make others appear to stumble, whose opinions he does not accurately understand. But if a man will diligently consider these remarks, he will perceive that this article is agreeable to the Scriptures, according to one sense in which it may be taken, but that, according to another, it is very different.

Let the word "unregenerate" be taken for a man who is now in the act of the new birth, though he be not yet actually born again; let "the pleasure" which God feels be taken for an initial act; let the impulsive cause be understood to refer to the final reception of the sinner into favour; and let secondary, subsequent, cooperating and entering grace be substituted for "saving grace;"

and it will instantly be manifest, that we speak what is right when we say:

"Serious sorrow on account of sin is so far pleasing to God, that by it, according to the multitude of his mercies, he is moved to bestow grace on a man who is a sinner."

From these observations, I think, it is evident with what caution persons ought to speak on subjects on which the descent into heresy, or into the suspicion of heresy, is so smooth and easy. And our brethren ought in their prudence to have reflected that we are not altogether negligent of this cautiousness, since they cannot be ignorant that we are filly aware how much our words are exposed and obnoxious to injurious interpretations, and even to calumny. But unless they had earnestly searched for a multitude of Articles, they might have embraced this and the preceding, as well as that which succeeds, in the same chapter.

ARTICLE XVII

God will not deny his grace to any one who does what is in him.

ANSWER

This Article is so naturally connected with those which precede it, that he who grants one of the three, may, by the same effort, affirm the remainder; and he who denies one may reject all the others. They might, therefore, have spared some portion of this needless labour, and might, with much greater convenience, have proposed one article of the following description, instead of three: "It is possible for a man to do some good thing without the aid of grace; and if he does it, God will recompense or remunerate that act by more abundant grace." But we could always have fastened the charge of falsehood upon an article of this kind. It was, therefore, a much safer course for them to play with equivocations, that the fraud contained in the calumny might not with equal facility he made known to all persons.

But with respect to this article, I declare that it never came into our minds to employ such confused expressions as these, which, at the very first sight of them, exclude grace from the commencement of conversion; though we always, and on all occasions, make this grace to precede, to accompany, and to follow; and without which, we constantly assert, no good action whatever, can be produced by man. Nay, we carry this principal so far as not to dare to attribute the power here described, even to the nature of Adam himself, without the help of Divine grace, both infused and assisting. It thus becomes evident, that the fabricated opinion is imposed on us through calumny. If our brethren entertain the same sentiments, we are perfectly at agreement. But if they are of opinion that Adam was able by nature, without supernatural aid, to fulfill the law imposed on him, they seem not to recede far from Pelagians, since this saying of Augustine is received by these our brethren:

"Supernatural things were lost, natural things were corrupted." Whence it follows, what remnant soever there was of natural things, just so much power remained to fulfill the law -- what is premised being granted, that Adam was capable by his own nature to obey God without grace, as the latter is usually distinguished in opposition to nature. When they charge us with this doctrine, they undoubtedly declare, that in their judgment, it is such as may fall in with our meaning; and, therefore, that they do not perceive so much absurdity in this article as there is in reality; unless they think that nothing can be devised so absurd that we are not inclined and prepared to believe and publish.

We esteem this article as one of such great absurdity that we would not be soon induced to attribute it to any person of the least skill in sacred matters.

For how can a man, without the assistance of Divine Grace, perform any thing which is acceptable to God, and which he will remunerate with the saving reward either of further grace or of life eternal? But this article excludes primary grace with sufficient explicitness when it says, "To him who does what is in himself." For if this expression be understood in the following sense: "To him who does what he can by the primary grace already conferred upon him,"

then there is no absurdity in this sentence: "God will bestow further grace upon him who profitably uses that which is primary;" and, by the malevolent suppression of what ought to have been added, the brethren openly declare that it was their wish for this calumny to gain credence.

ARTICLE XVIII

God undoubtedly converts, without the external preaching of the Gospel, great numbers of persons to the saving knowledge of Christ, among those who have no outward preaching; and he effects such conversions either by the inward revelation of the Holy Spirit, or by the ministry of angels.

(BORRIUS & ARMINIUS.)

ANSWER

I never uttered such a sentiment as this. Borrius has said something like it, though not exactly the same, in the following words: "It is possible that God, by the inward revelation of the Holy Spirit, or by the ministry of angels, instructed the wise men, who came from the east, concerning Jesus, whom they came to adore." But the words "undoubtedly," and "great numbers of persons," are the additions of calumny, and is of a most audacious character, charging us with that which, it is very probable, we never spoke, and of which we never thought; and we have learned that this audacity of boldly affirming any thing whatsoever, under which the junior pastors generally labour, and those who are ignorant of the small stock of knowledge that they possess, is an evil exceedingly dangerous in the church of Christ.

1. Is it probable, that any prudent man will affirm that "something is undoubtedly done in great numbers of persons," of which he is not able, when required, to produce a single example? We confess, that we cannot bring an instance of what is here imputed to us. For, if it were produced by us, it would become a subject of controversy; as has been the fate of the sentiments of Zwinglius concerning the salvation of Socrates, Aristides, and of others in similar circumstances, who must have been instructed concerning their salvation by the Holy Ghost or by angels. For it is scarcely within the bounds of probability, that they had seen the Sacred Scriptures and had been instructed out of them.

2. Besides, if this saying of Christ had occurred to the recollection of our brethren, "Speak, Paul! and hold not thy peace: For I have much people in this city," (Acts xix, 9, 10,)

they would not so readily have burdened us with this article, who have learned from this saying of Christ, that God sends the external preaching of his word to nations, when it is his good pleasure for great numbers of them to be converted.

3. The following is a saying in very common and frequent use. "The ordinary means and instrument of conversation is the preaching of the Divine word by mortal men, to which therefore all persons are bound; but the Holy Spirit has not so bound himself to this method, as to be unable to operate in an extraordinary way, without the intervention of human aid, when it seemeth good to Himself." Now if our brethren had reflected, that this very common sentence obtains our high approval, they would not have thought of charging this article upon us, at least they would not have accounted it erroneous. For, with regard to the FIRST, what is extraordinary does not obtain among "great numbers of persons;" for if it did, it would immediately begin to be ordinary.

With regard to the SECOND, if "the preaching of the word by mortal men," be

"the ordinary means," by which it is also intimated that some means are extraordinary, and since the whole of our church, nay, in my opinion, since the whole Christian world bears its testimony to this, then indeed it is neither a heresy nor an error to say, "Even without this means [without the preaching of the word] God can convert some persons." To this might likewise be added the word "undoubtedly." For if it be doubtful whether any one be saved by any other means, (that is, by "means extraordinary,") than by human preaching; then it becomes a matter of doubt, whether it be necessary for "the preaching of the Divine word by mortal men," to be called "the ordinary means."

4. What peril or error can there be in any man saying, "God converts great numbers of persons, (that is, very many,) by the internal revelation of the Holy Spirit or by the ministry of angels; "provided it be at the same time stated, that no one is converted except by this very word, and by the meaning of this word, which God sends by men to those communities or nations whom He hath purposed to unite to himself. The objectors will perhaps reply, "It is to be feared, that, if a nation of those who have been outwardly called should believe this, rejecting external preaching, they would expect such an internal revelation or the address of an angel." Truly, this would be as unnatural a subject of fear, as that a man would be unwilling to taste of the bread which was laid before him, because he understands, "Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." But I desist; lest, while instituting an examination into the causes of this fear, I should proceed much further, and arrive at a point to which our brethren might be unwilling for me on this occasion to advance. A word is sufficient for the wise.

ARTICLE XIX

Before his fall, Adam had not the power to believe, because there was no necessity for faith; God, therefore, could not require faith from him after the fall.

ANSWER

Unless I was well acquainted with the disposition of certain persons, I could have taken a solemn oath, that the ascription of this article to me, as the words now stand, is an act which is attributed to them through calumny. Can I be of opinion that "before his fall Adam had not the power to believe; "and, forsooth, on this account, "because there was no necessity for faith." Who is unacquainted with that expression of the apostle? "He who approaches to God must believe that He exists and that He is a rewarder of those who diligently seek him." I do not think, that there is a single Mahometan or Jew who dare make any such assertion as this article contains. The man who will affirm it, must be ignorant of the nature of faith in its universal acceptation. But who is able to love, fear, worship, honour and obey God, without faith, that is the principle and foundation of all those acts which can be performed to God according to his will?

This calumny against me is audacious and foolish. But I think, it was the wish of its inventors to have added the words, "the power to believe in Christ;" and indeed they ought to have made this addition. Yet perhaps some one is insane enough to say, that "all faith in God is faith in Christ." being inclined to such persuasion by the argument "that there is now no true faith in God, which is not faith in Christ." I say therefore, I affirm and assert, I profess and teach, "that, before his fall, Adam had not the power to believe in Christ, because faith in Christ was not then necessary; and that God therefore could not require this faith from him after the fall:" That is to say, God could not require it on this account, "because Adam had lost that power of believing by his own fault," which is the opinion of those who charge me with the doctrine of this article. But God could have required it, because he was prepared, to bestow those gracious aids which were necessary and sufficient for believing in Christ, and therefore to bestow faith itself in Christ.

But since I here confine myself to a simple denial, the proof of these three things is incumbent upon the brethren who affirm them. (1.) The Proposition, (2.) The Reason added, and (3.) The Conclusion deduced from it. The PROPOSITION is this: "Before his fall, Adam had the power to believe in Christ." The REASON is, "because this faith was necessary for him." The CONCLUSION is, "Therefore God could of right demand this faith from him after the fall."

1. A certain learned man endeavours to prove the PROPOSITION, which he thus enunciates. "Before his fall, Adam had an implanted power to believe the Gospel," that is "on the hypothesis of the Gospel;" or, as I interpret it, "If the Gospel had been announced to him." The argument which this learned man employs in proof is, "Because Adam did not labour under blindness of mind, hardness of heart, or perturbation of the passions; (which are the internal causes of an incapacity to believe;) but he possessed a lucid mind, and an upright will and affections, and, if the Gospel of God had been announced to him, he was able clearly to perceive and approve its truth, and with his heart to embrace its benefits."

2. I do not suppose any one will disapprove of the REASON which they assign, and therefore I do not require a proof of it from them; yet I wish the following suggestions to be well considered, if faith, in Christ was not necessary for Adam, to what purpose was the power of believing in Christ conferred upon him?

3. But the necessity of proving the CONCLUSION is incumbent on our brethren, because they express it themselves in those terms, and indeed with a reason added to it, "Because Adam by his own fault through sin lost that power." Out of respect to the person, I will abstain from a confutation of this argument; not because I account it incapable of a satisfactory refutation, which, I hope, will in due time make its appearance.

I will now produce a few arguments in proof of my opinion.

FIRST. With regard to the Proposition, I prove, "that, before his fall, Adam did not possess the power to believe in Christ." (1.) Because such a belief would have been futile. For there was no necessity, no utility in believing in Christ.

But nature makes nothing in vain; much less does God. (2.) Because, prior to his sin, God could not require of him faith in Christ. For Faith in Christ is faith in Him as a saviour from sins; he therefore, who will believe in Christ ought to believe that he is a sinner. But, before Adam had committed any offense, this would have been a false belief. Therefore, in commanding Adam to believe in Christ, God would have commanded him to believe a falsehood. That power, then, was not capable of being produced into an act, and is on the same account useless. (3.) Faith in Christ belongs to a new creation, which is effected by Christ, in his capacity of a Mediator between sinners and God.

This is the reason why He is called "the Second Adam," and "the New Man." It is not, therefore, matter of wonder, that the capability of believing in Christ was not bestowed on man by virtue of the first creation. (4.) Faith in Christ is prescribed in the Gospel. But the Law and the Gospel are so far opposed to each other in the Scriptures, that a man cannot be saved by both of them at the same time; but if he be saved by the Law, he will not require to be saved by the Gospel; if he must be saved by the Gospel, then it would not be possible for him to be saved by the Law. God willed to treat with Adam, and actually did treat with him, in his primeval state, before he had sinned, according to the tenor of the legal covenant. What cause, therefore, can be devised, why God, in addition to the power of believing in Himself according to the Law, should likewise have bestowed on Adam the power of believing the Gospel and in Christ? If our brethren say, "that this power was one and the same," I will grant it, when the word "power" is taken in its most general notion, and according to its most remote application -- that of the power of understanding and volition, and also the knowledge of common things and of all notions impressed on the mind. But I shall deny the correctness of their observation, if the word "power" is received as signifying any other thing than what is here specified. For that wisdom of God which is revealed in the Gospel excels, by many degrees, the wisdom which was manifested by the creation of the world and in the law.

SECONDLY. With regard to the reason, "Because there was no necessity for Adam in his primitive condition to believe in Christ." No one will refute this argument, unless by asserting, that God infused a power into man, which was of no service, and which could be of none whatever, except when man is reduced to that state into which God himself forbids him to fall, and into which he cannot fall but through the transgression of the Divine command. But I must here be understood as always speaking about a power to believe the Gospel and in Christ, as distinct from a power of believing in God according to the legal prescript.

THIRDLY. With regard to what belongs to the Conclusion which is to be deduced from the preceding, I will burden it only with one absurdity. If matters be as they have stated them, "that man in his primeval state possessed a power to believe in Christ," when no necessity existed for the exercise of such faith in Christ; and if this power was withdrawn from him after the fall, when it began to be really necessary for him; such a dispensation of God has been very marvelous, and completely opposed to the Divine wisdom and goodness, the province of which consists in making provision about things necessary for those who live under the government and care of these attributes.

I desist from adding any more; because the absurdity of this dogma will not easily obtain credit with such persons as have learned to form a judgment from the Scriptures, and not from prejudices previously imbibed. I will only subjoin, that this dogma never obtained in the church of Christ, nor has it ever been accounted an article relating to faith.

ARTICLE XX

It cannot possibly be proved from the Sacred Writings, that the angels are now confirmed in their estate.

ANSWER

This article also has been besprinkled with calumny; though I am of opinion, that it was done in ignorance by him from whose narration it is attributed to me. For I did not deny that this fact was incapable of proof from the Scriptures; but I inquired of him, "if it be denied, with what arguments from Scripture will you prove it?" I am not so rash as to say, that no proof can be given from Scripture for a matter, whose contrary I am not able satisfactorily to establish by Scripture, at least if such proof has not produced certainty in my own mind. For I ought to believe, that there are other persons who can prove this, though I am myself incapable; as those persons, in like manner, with whom I occasionally enter into conversation, ought to believe thus concerning themselves because I cannot instantly deny that they are unable to do what, I am sure, they will experience much difficulty in performing. For they must themselves be aware, that from their frequent conversations, and from the sermons which they address to the people, some judgment may be formed of their own progress in the knowledge of the truth and in understanding the Scriptures. I wish them, therefore to undertake the labour of proving that, about which they will not allow me to hesitate.

I know what has been written by St. Augustine, and others of the Fathers, about the estate of the angels, about their blessedness, their confirmation in good, and the certainty by which they know that they will never fall from this condition. I also know, that the schoolmen incline towards this opinion. But when I examine the arguments which they advance in its support, they do not appear to me to possess such strength as may justly entitle it to be prescribed for belief to other persons as an approved article of faith.

The passage generally quoted from St. Matthew, (xxii, 30,) "But they are as angels of God in heaven," treats only on the similitude [between young children and angels,] in neither marrying nor being given in marriage; he does not say, that the angels of God are now happy in heaven.

That in Matt. xviii, 10, "In heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father who is in heaven," does not speak of the beatific vision, but of that vision with which those who stand around the throne of God wait for his commands. This is apparent from the design of Christ, who wished thus to persuade them "not to offend one of these little ones;" their beholding God, helps to confirm this persuasion, not the beatific sight, but such a sight of God as is suited for the reception of the [Divine] commands to keep these little ones.

"But ye are come to the heavenly Jerusalem, and to an innumerable company of angels." (Heb. xii, 22. This does not necessarily prove, that angels are now blessed and confirmed in good; because, even now, those who are neither beatified nor confirmed in good do themselves belong to that celestial city, that is, those who are said to have "come to this heavenly city," who still "walk by faith," and "see through a glass darkly." (1 Cor. xiii, 12.) "Then the angels will be in a more unhappy condition than the souls of pious men, who are now enjoying blessedness with Christ and in his presence." This reason which they adduce is not conclusive. For "the angels are ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of eternal salvation" This service of theirs will endure to the end of the world. In the mean time, "those who have died in the Lord, rest from their labours." (Rev. xiv, 13.)

Neither is that a stronger argument, which says, "It is possible for the angels to fall, if they are not confirmed in good; and therefore they must always of necessity be tormented by a fear of their fall, which may happen; and by a fear which is the greater, on account of the clearer knowledge that they have of the evil into which the apostate angels are fallen." For it is possible for the angels to be assured of their stability, that is, that they shall never fall away, although they be neither blessed, nor so far confirmed in that which is good as not to be capable of falling. They may be assumed, either with such a certainty as excludes all anxious "fear that hath torment," but is consistent with that "fear and trembling," with which we are commanded to "work out our salvation," who are said to have "the full assurance of faith" concerning our salvation.

But what necessity is there to enter into this disputation, which cannot without great difficulty be decided from the Scriptures; and which, when it is decided, will be of small service to us. Let us rather devote our attention to this study.

Doing now the will of God as the angels do in heaven, let us endeavour to be enabled hereafter to become partakers with them of eternal blessedness. This is especially our duty, since the things which have been written for us respecting the state of angels, and which are commanded to be received by faith, are exceedingly few in number.

This, therefore, is my reply to the former twenty of these articles, which have been ascribed partly to me alone, and partly also to Borrius. There is not one of them whose contrary has been believed by the Church Universal and held as an article of faith. Some of them, however, are so artfully constructed, that those which are their opposites savour of novelty and send forth an odour of falsehood. Beside the fact, that the greatest part of them are attributed to us through calumny. I now proceed to the consideration of the eleven which follow that I may see whether the fabricators have acted in a more happy and judicious manner, either in imputing them to me, or in reckoning them as errors or heresies. May God direct my mind and my hand, that I may with a good conscience declare those things which are in unison with the truth, and which may conduce to the peace and tranquillity of our brethren.

ARTICLE XXI (I.)

It is a new, heretical and Sabellian mode of speaking, nay, it is blasphemous, to say "that the Son of God is autoqeon (very God,)" for the Father alone is very God, but not the Son of the Holy Spirit.

ANSWER

Most of those persons who are acquainted with me at all, know with what deep fear, and with what conscientious solicitude, I treat that sublime doctrine of a Trinity of Persons. The whole manner of my teaching demonstrates, that when I am explaining this article I take no delight either in inventing new phrases, that are unknown to Scripture and to orthodox antiquity, or in employing such as have been fabricated by others. All my auditors too will testify, how willingly I bear with those who adopt a different mode of speaking from my own, provided they intend to convey a sound meaning. These things I premise, lest any one should suppose, that I had sought to stir up a controversy about this word, with other persons who had employed it.

But when, in the course of a particular disputation, a certain young man with much pertinacity and assurance defended not only the word itself, but likewise that meaning which I believe and know to be contrary to all antiquity, as well as to the truth of the Scriptures, and was not backward in expressing his serious disapproval of the more orthodox opinions; I was compelled to explain what were my sentiments about the word and its meaning.

I said that the word is not contained in the Scriptures; yet, because it had been used by the orthodox, both by Epiphanius, (Heres. 69,) and by some divines in our days, I do not reject it, provided it be correctly received.

But it may be received in a two fold signification, according to the etymon of the word; and may mean, either one who is truly and in himself God, or one who is God from himself. In the former signification, I said, the word might be tolerated; but in the latter, it was in opposition to the Scriptures and to orthodox antiquity.

When the opponent still urged, that he received the word in this last sense, and that Christ was indeed autoqeon that is,. God from himself, who has in reality an essence in common with the Father, but not communicated by the Father; and when he asserted this with the greater boldness, because he knew that in this opinion he had Trelactrius of pious memory agreeing with him, from whose instructions he appeared to have derived his ideas on the subject; I said that this opinion was a novel one, which was never heard of by the ancients, and unknown both to the Greek and Latin Fathers; and that, when rigidly examined, it would be found to be heretical, and nearly allied to the opinion of Sabellius, which was, that the Father and the Son are not distinct persons, but one person called by different names. I added, that, from this opinion, the entirely opposite heresy might likewise be deduced, which is, that the, Son and the Father are two different persons, and two collateral gods; this is blasphemous. I proved my remarks by the following brief arguments: FIRST. It is the property of the person of the Father, to have his being from himself, or, which is a better phrase, to have his being from no one. But the Son is now said to have his being from himself, or rather, from no one: therefore, the Son is the Father; which is Sabellianism. SECONDLY. If the Son have an essence in common with the Father, but not communicated by the Father, he is collateral with the Father, and, therefore, they are two gods. Whereas, all antiquity defended the unity, the Divine essence in three distinct persons, and placed a salvo on it by this single explanation, "that the Son has the same essence directly, which is communicated to him by the Father; but that the Holy Spirit has the very same essence from the Father and the Son."

This is the explanation which I adduced at that time, and in the maintenance of which I still persist: and I affirm, that in this opinion I have the Scriptures agreeing with me, as well as the whole of antiquity, both of the Greek and the Latin churches. It is therefore most wonderful, that our brethren have dared to charge this upon me as an erroneous sentiment. Yet, in doing this, they do not act with sincerity, since they do not explain the word autoqeon by removing its ambiguity; which they undoubtedly ought to have done, lest any person should suppose that I denied the Son to be in every sense, and therefore that he is not very and true God. This they ought the more particularly to have done, because they know that I have always made a distinction between these significations, and have admitted one of them, but rejected the other.

Since the matter really stands thus, I might simply accuse this article of making a false charge; because in a certain sense I confess the son to be autoqeon also the Holy Spirit, and not the Father alone. But, for the sake of justifying this phrase and opinion, the framers of it declare, "When it is said, the Son is God from himself, then the phrase must be received in this sense, the essence which the Son has, is from himself, that is, from no one. For the Son is to be considered as he is God, and as he is the Son. As God, he has his being from himself. As the Son, he has it from the Father. Or two things are to be subjects of consideration in the Son, his essence and his relation.

According to his essence, the Son is from no one or from himself. According to his relation, he is from the Father."

But I answer, FIRST. This mode of explanation cannot, except by an impropriety of speech, excuse him who says, "the Son has indeed an essence in common with the Father, but not communicated."

SECONDLY. "The essence, which the Son has, is from no one," is not tantamount to the phrase, "the Son, who has an essence, is from no one."

For, "Son" is the name of a person that has relation to a Father, and therefore without that relation it cannot become a subject either of definition or of consideration. But "Essence" is something absolute: and these two are so circumstanced between themselves, that "essence" does not enter into the definition of "Son," except indirectly, thus, "he is the Son, who has the Divine essence communicated to him by the Father;" which amounts to this, "he is the Son, who is begotten of the Father." For, to beget, is to communicate his essence.

THIRDLY. These two respects in which He is God and in which He is the Son, have not the same affection or relation between each other, as these two have, "to exist from himself or from no one," and "to exist from the Father," or

"to have his essence from himself," or "from no one," and "to have it from the Father:" which I demonstrate thus by two most evident arguments. (1.) "God"

and "the Son" are consentaneous and subordinate: for the Son is God. But "to derive his being from no one" and "to derive it from another,"to have his essence from no one," and "to have it from another," are opposites, and cannot be spoken about the same person. In the comparison which they institute, those things which ought to be collated together are not properly compared, nor are they opposed to each of their parallels and classes or affinities. For a double ternary must here come under consideration, which is this:

HE IS GOD: -- HE IS THE FATHER: -- HE IS THE SON:

He has the Divine essence,: He has it from no one,: He has it from the Father: These are affinities and parallels. (1.) "He is God," and "has the Divine essence." (2.) "He is the Father," and, "has the Divine essence from no one."

(3.) "He is the Son," and, "has the Divine essence from the Father."

But, by the comparison which our objectors institute in their explanation, these things will be laid down as parallels. "He is God," and "has his essence from no one." If this comparison be correctly formed, then either the Father alone is God, or there are three collateral Gods. But far be it from me to charge with such a sentiment as this those who say, "the Son is autoqeon that is, God from himself." For I know that they occasionally explain themselves in a modified manner. But their explanation does not agree with the phraseology which they employ. For this reason Beza excuses Calvin, and openly confesses "that he had not with sufficient strictness observed the difference between these particles a se and per se."

I have stated only what follow as consequences from these phrases, and from the opinion which agrees with them; and I have therefore said, that people must refrain from the use of such phraseology. I abstain from proofs, multitudes of which I could bring from the Scriptures and the Fathers; and if necessity require, I will immediately produce them: for I have had them many years in readiness.

GOD is from eternity, having the Divine Essence.

THE FATHER is from no one, having the Divine Essence from no one, which others say is "from himself."

THE SON is from the Father, having the Divine Essence from the Father.

This is a true parallelism, and one which, if in any manner it be inverted or transposed, will be converted into a heresy. So that I wonder much, how our brethren could consider it proper to make any mention of this matter; from which they would with far more correctness and prudence have abstained, if, while meditating upon it, they had weighed it in equal balances.

ARTICLE XXII (II.)

It is the summit of blasphemy to say, that God is freely good.

ANSWER

In this article likewise, our brethren disclose their own disgraceful proceedings, which I would gladly allow to remain buried in oblivion. But, because they recall this affair to my recollection, I will now relate how it occurred.

In a disputation, it was asked, "can necessity and liberty be so far reconciled to each other, that a person may be said necessarily or freely to produce one and the same effect?" These words being used properly according to their respective strict definitions, which are here subjoined. "An agent acts necessarily, who, when all the requisites for action are laid down, cannot do otherwise than act, or cannot suspend his acting. An agent acts freely, who, when all the requisites for action are laid down, can refrain from beginning to act, or can suspend his acting," I declared, "that the two terms could not meet in one subject." Other persons said, "that they could," evidently for the purpose of confirming the dogma which asserts, "Adam sinned freely indeed, and yet necessarily. FREELY, with respect to himself and according to his nature: NECESSARILY, with respect to the decree of God."

Of this their explanation I did not admit, but said necessarily and freely differ not in respects, but in their entire essences, as do necessity and contingency, or what is necessary and what is contingent, which, because they divide the whole amplitude of being, cannot possibly coincide together, more than can finite and infinite. But Liberty appertains to Contingency.

To disprove this my opinion, they brought forward an instance, or example, in which Necessity and Liberty met together; and that was God, who is both necessarily and freely good. This assertion of theirs displeased me so exceedingly, as to cause me to say, that it was not far removed from blasphemy. At this time, I entertain a similar opinion about it; and in a few words I thus prove its falsity, absurdity, and the blasphemy [contained] in the falsity.

(1.) Its falsity. He who by natural necessity, and according to his very essence and the whole of his nature, is good, nay, who is Goodness itself, the Supreme Good, the First Good from whom all good proceeds, through whom every good comes, in whom every good exists, and by a participation of whom what things soever have any portion of good in them are good, and more or less good as they are nearer or more remote from it. He is not FREELY good. For it is a contradiction in an adjunct, or an opposition in an apposition. But God is good by natural necessity, according to his entire nature and essence, and is Goodness itself, the supreme and primary Good, from whom, through whom: and in whom is all good, &c. Therefore, God is not freely good.

(2.) Its absurdity. Liberty is an affection of the Divine Will; not of the Divine Essence, Understanding, or Power; and therefore it is not an affection of the Divine Nature, considered in its totality. It is indeed an effect of the will, according to which it is borne towards an object that is neither primary nor adequate, and that is different from God himself; and this effect of the will, therefore, is posterior in order to that affection of the will according to which God is borne towards a proper, primary and adequate object, which is himself.

But Goodness is an affection of the whole of the Divine Nature, Essence, Life, Understanding, Will, Power, &c. Therefore, God is not freely good; that is, he is not good by the mode of liberty, but by that of natural necessity. I add, that it cannot be affirmed of anything in the nature of things, that it is freely, or that it is this or that freely, not even then when man was made what he is, by actions proceeding from free will: as no man is said to be "freely learned,"

although he has obtained erudition for himself by study which proceeded from free will.

(3.) I prove that blasphemy is contained in this assertion: because, if God be freely good, (that is, not by nature and natural necessity,) he can be or can be made not good. As whatever any one wills freely, he has it in his power not to will; and whatever any one does freely, he can refrain from doing. Consider the dispute between the ancient Fathers and Eunomius and his followers, who endeavoured to prove that the Son was not eternally begotten of the Father, because the Father had neither willingly nor unwillingly begotten the Son. But the answer given to them by Cyril, Basil, and others, was this: "The Father was neither willing nor unwilling; that is, He begat the Son not by will, but by nature. The act of generation is not from the Divine Will, but from the Divine nature." If they say, "God may also be said to be freely good, because He is not good by co-action or force:" I reply, not only is co-action repugnant to liberty, but nature is likewise; and each of them, nature and co-action, constitutes an entire, total and sufficient cause for the exclusion of liberty. Nor does it follow, "co-action does not exclude liberty from this thing; therefore, it is freely that which it actually is. A stone does not fall downwards by co-action; it, therefore, falls by liberty. Man wills not his own salvation by force, therefore, he wills it freely." Such objections as these are unworthy to be produced by MEN; and in the refutation of them shall I expend my time and leisure, Thus, therefore, the Christian Fathers justly attached blasphemy to those who said,

"the Father begat the Son willingly, or by his own will;" because from this it would follow, that the Son had an origin similar to that of the creatures. But with how much greater equity does blasphemy fasten itself upon those who declare, "that God is freely good? For if he be freely good, he likewise freely knows and loves himself, and besides does all things freely, even when He begets the Son and breathes forth the Holy Spirit.

ARTICLE XXIII (III.)

It frequently happens that a creature who is not entirely hardened in evil, is unwilling to perform an action because it is joined with sin; unless when certain arguments and occasions are presented to him, which act as incitements to its commission. The management of this presentation, also, is in the hand of the providence of God, who presents these incitements, that he may accomplish his own work by the act of the creature.

ANSWER

Unless certain persons were under the excitement of a licentious appetite for carping at those things which proceed from me, they would undoubtedly never have persuaded themselves to create any trouble about this matter. Yet, I would pardon them this act of officiousness, as the rigid and severe examiners of truth, provided they would sincerely and without calumny relate those things which I have actually spoken or written; that is, that they would not corrupt or falsify my sayings, either by adding to or diminishing from them, by changing them or giving them a perverted interpretation. But some men seem to have been so long accustomed to slander, that, even when they can be openly convicted of it, still they are not afraid of hurling it against an innocent person. Of this fact, they afford a luminous example in the present article. For those things which I advanced in the Theses, On the Efficacy and Righteousness of the Providence of God concerning evil, and which were disputed in the month of May, 1605, are here quoted, but in a mutilated manner, and with the omission of those things which are capable of powerfully vindicating the whole from the attacks of slander. The following are the words which I employed in the fifteenth thesis of that disputation.

"But since an act, though it be permitted to the ability and the will of the creature, may yet be taken away from his actual power or legislation; and since, therefore, it will very frequently happen, that a creature, who is not entirely hardened in evil, is unwilling to perform an act because it is connected with sin, unless when some arguments and occasions are presented to him, which resemble incitements to its commission. The management of this presenting (of arguments and occasions) is also in the hand of the Providence of God, who presents these incitements, both that He may fully try whether the creature be willing to refrain from sinning, even when urged on, or provoked, by incitements; because the praise of abstaining from sin is very slight, in the absence of such provocatives; and that, if the creature wills to yield to these incitements, God may effect his own work by the act of the creature."

These are my words from which the brethren have extracted what seemed suitable for establishing the slander, but have omitted and quite taken away those things which, in the most manifest manner, betray and confute the calumny. For I laid down two ends of that administration by which God manages the arguments, occasions, incitements, and irritatives to commit that act which is joined with sin. And these two ends were neither collateral, that is, not equally intended; nor were they connected together by a close conjunction. The FIRST of them, which is the exploration or trial of his creature, God primarily, properly, and of himself intends. But the LATTER, which is, that God may effect his own work by the act of the creature, is not intended by God, except after he has foreseen that his Creature will not resist these incitements, but will yield to them, and that of his own free will, in opposition to the command of God, which it was his duty and within his power to follow, after having rejected and refused those allurements and incitements of arguments and occasions. But this article of theirs propounds my words in such a way, as if I had made God to intend this last end only and of itself, omitting entirely the first; and thus omitting the previous condition under which God intends this second end through the act of his creature, that is, when it is the will of the creature to yield to these incitements.

This calumny, therefore, is two-fold, and evidently invented for the purpose of drawing a conclusion from these, my words -- that I have in them represented God as the author of sin. A certain person, having lately quoted my expressions in a public discourse, was not afraid of drawing from them this conclusion. But this was purely through calumny, as I will now prove with the utmost brevity.

The reason by which it can be concluded, from the words that have been quoted in this article from my Thesis, "that God is the author of the sin which is committed by the creature," when God incites him by arguments and occasions, is universally, three-fold:

The FIRST is, that God absolutely intends to effect his own work by the act of the creature, which act cannot be performed by the creature without sin. This is resolvable into two absolute intentions of God, of which the first is that by which he absolutely intends to effect this, his work; and the second, that by which he absolutely intends to effect this work in no other way, than by such an act of a creature as cannot be done by that creature without sin.

The SECOND REASON IS, that the creature being invited by the presenting of these allurements and provocatives to commit that act, cannot do otherwise than commit it; that is, such an excitation being laid down, the creature cannot suspend that act by which God intends to erect his work, otherwise God might be frustrated of his intention: Hence arises

The THIRD REASON which has its origin in these two -- that God intends by these incentives to move the creature to perform an act which is joined to sin, that is, to move him to the commission of sin.

All these things seem, with some semblance of probability, to be drawn as conclusions from the words thus placed, as they are quoted in this their article, because it is represented as the sole and absolute end of this administration and presenting-that God effects his work by the act of the creature. But those words which I have inserted, and which they have omitted, meet these three reasons, and in the most solid manner, confute the whole objection which rests upon them.

1. My own words meet the FIRST of these reasons thus: For they deny that God absolutely intends to effect his own work by the act of the creature; because they say that God did not intend to employ the act of the creature to complete his work, before he foresaw that the creature would yield to those incitements, that is, would not resist them.

2. They meet the SECOND by denying that, after assigning this presentation of incitements, the creature is unable to suspend his act; since they say, likewise, that, if it be the will of the creature to yield to these incitements, then God effects his own work by the act of the creature. What does this mean if it be his will to yield? Is not the freedom of the will openly denoted, by which, when this presenting of arguments and occasions is laid down, the will can yet refuse to yield,

3. They also meet the THIRD: For they deny that God intends by those incitements to move the creature to the commission of an act which is joined to sin, that is, to commit sin, because they say, that God intends the trial of his creature, whether he will obey God even after having been irritated by these incitements. And when God saw that the creature preferred to yield to these incitements, rather than to obey him, then he intended, not the act of the creature, for that is unnecessary; because, his intention being now to try, he obtains the issue of the act performed by the will of the creature. But God intended to effect his own work by an act founded on the will and the culpability of the creature.

It is apparent, therefore, that these words which my brethren have omitted, most manifestly refute the calumny, and in the strongest manner solve the objection. This I will likewise point out in another method, that the whole iniquity of this objection may be rendered quite obvious.

That man who says, "God tries his creature by arguments and occasions of sinning, whether he will obey him even after he has been stirred up by incitements," openly declares that it is in the power of the creature to resist these incitements, and not to sin: otherwise, this [act of God] would be, not a trial of obedience, but a casting down, and an impelling to necessary disobedience. Then, the man who says -- "God, by these provocatives and incitements, tries the obedience of his creature," intimates by these expressions, that those occasions and arguments which are presented by God when he intends to try, are not incitements and irritations to sin, through the end and aim of God. But they are incitements, first, by capability according to the inclination of the creature who can be incited by them to commit an act connected with sin. They are also incitements, secondly, in their issue, because the creature has been induced by them to sin, but by his own fault; for it was his duty, and in his power, to resist this inclination, and to neglect and despise these incitements.

It is wonderful, therefore, and most wonderful indeed, that any man, at all expert in theological matters, should have ventured to fabricate from my words this calumny against me. Against me, I say, who dare not accede to some of the sentiments and dogmas of my brethren, as they well know, for this sole reason -- because I consider it flows from them that God is the author of sin. And I cannot accede to them on this account -- because I think my brethren teach those things from which I can conclude by good and certain consequence, that God absolutely intends the sin of his creature, and thence, that he so administers all things, as, when this administration is laid down, man necessarily sins, and cannot, in the act itself, and in reality, omit the act of sin. If they shew that the things which I say, do not follow from their sentiments, on this account at least, I shall not suffer myself to be moved by their consent in them. Let the entire theses be read, and it will be evident how solicitously I have guarded against saying any thing, from which by the most distant probability, this blasphemy might be deduced; and yet, at the same time, I have been careful to subtract from the providence of God nothing, which, according to the Scriptures, ought to be ascribed to it. But I scarcely think it necessary, for me now to prove at great length, that the fact of God's providential efficacy respecting evil is exactly as I have taught in those words; especially after I have premised this explanation. I will, however, do this in a very brief manner.

Eve was not only "a creature not entirely hardened in evil," but she was not at all evil; and she willed to abstain from eating the forbidden fruit because "it was connected with sin," as is apparent from the answer which she gave to the serpent: "God hath, said, Ye shall not eat of it." Her compliance with this command was easy, in the midst of such an abundance of fruit; and the trial of her obedience would have been very small, if she had been solicited with no other argument by the tempter. It happened, therefore, that, in addition to this, the serpent presented to Eve an argument of persuasion, by which he might stimulate her to eat, saying, "Ye shall not surely die, but ye shall be as gods."

This argument, according to the intention of the serpent, was an incitement to commit sin: Without it, the serpent perceived, she would not be moved to eat, because he had heard her expressing her will to abstain from the act because it was "connected with sin."

I ask now, Is the whole management of this temptation to be ascribed to God, or not? If they say, "It must not be attributed to him," they offend against Providence, the Scriptures, and the opinion of all our divines. If they confess that it should be ascribed to him, they grant what I have said. But what was the end of this management? An experiment, or trial, whether Eve, when solicited by arguments, and stimulated by Satan, would resolve to refrain from an act, that she might obtain from her Lord and Creator, the praise of obedience. The instance of Joseph's brethren, which is quoted in the fifteenth thesis of my ninth public disputation, proves this in the plainest manner, as I have shown in that thesis.

Let the case of Absalom be inspected, who committed incest with his father's concubines. Was not this the occasion of perpetrating that act -- God gave his father's concubines into his hands, that is, he permitted them to his power.

Was not the argument inducing him to commit that act, from which nature is abhorrent, furnished by the advice of Ahithophel, whose counsels were considered as oracles? (2 Sam. xvi, 20- 23.) Without doubt, these are the real facts of the case. But that God himself managed the whole of this affair, appears from the Scripture, which says that God did it. (2 Sam. xii, 11-12.) Examine what God says in Deut. xiii, 1-3, "Thou shalt not obey the words of that prophet, who persuades thee to worship other gods, although he may have given thee a sign or a wonder which may have actually come to pass? Is not the diction of "the sign," [by this false prophet,] when confirmed by the event itself, an argument which may gain credit for him? And is not the credit, thus obtained, an incitement, or an argument to effect a full persuasion of that which this prophet persuaded? And what necessity is there for arguments, incitements and incentives, if a rational creature has such a propensity to the act, which cannot be committed without sin, that he wills to commit it without any argument whatsoever, Under such circumstances, the grand tempter will cease from his useless labour. But because the tempter knows, that the creature is unwilling to commit this act, unless he be incited by arguments, and opportunities be offered, he brings forward all that he can of incentives to allure the creature to sin. God, however, presides over all these things, and by his Providence administers the whole of them, but to an end far different from that to which the temptor directs them. For God manages them, in the first place, for the trial of his creatures, and, afterwards, (if it be the will of the creature to yield,) for Himself to effect something by that act.

If any think, that there is something reprehensible in this view, let them so circumscribe the right and the capability of God, as to suppose Him unable to try the obedience of his creature by any other method, than by creating that in which sin can be committed, and from which He commanded him by a law to abstain. But if He can try the obedience of his creature by some other method than this, let these persons shew us what that method is beside the presenting of arguments and occasions, and why God uses the former method more than the preceding one which I have mentioned. Is it not because he perceives, that the creature will not, by the former, be equally strongly solicited to evil, and that therefore it is a trivial matter to abstain from sin, to the commission of which he is not instigated by any other incentives?

Let the history of Job be well considered, whose patience God tried in such a variety of ways, and to whom were presented so many incitements to sin against God by impatience; and the whole of this matter will very evidently appear. God said to Satan; "Hast thou considered my servant Job, a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God and departeth from evil,." Satan answered the Lord and said: "What wonder is there in this, since thou hast so abundantly blessed him. But try him now by afflictions." And the Lord said unto Satan: "Behold, all that he hath is in thy power. Only upon himself put not forth thine hand." What other meaning have these words than, "Behold, incite him to curse me! I grant thee permission, since thou thinkest small praise is due to that man who abounds with blessings, and yet fears me. Satan did what he was permitted, and produced none of the effects; [which he had prognosticated]; so that God said, "Job still holdeth fast his integrity, although thou movedst me against him." (ii, 3.) This trial being finished, when Satan asked permission to employ against him greater incentives to sin, he obtained his request; and, after all, effected nothing. Therefore God was glorified in the patience of Job, to the confusion of Satan.

I suppose these remarks will be sufficient to free the words of my Theses from all calumny and from sinister and unjust interpretations. When I have ascertained the arguments which our brethren employ to convict these words of error, I will endeavour to confute them; or if I cannot do this, I will field to what may then be deemed the truth.

ARTICLE XXIV (IV.)

The Righteousness of Christ is not imputed to us for Righteousness; but to believe [or the act of believing] justifies us.

ANSWER

I do not know what I can most admire in this article -- the unskillfulness, the malice, or the supine negligence of those who have been its fabricators! (1.) Their NEGLIGENCE is apparent in this, that they do not care how and in what words they enunciate the sentiments which they attribute to me; neither do they give themselves any trouble to know what my sentiments are, which yet they are desirous to reprehend. (2.) Their UNSKILLFULNESS. Because they do not distinguish the things which ought to be distinguished, and they oppose those things which ought not to be opposed. (3.) The MALICE is evident, because they attribute to me those things which I have neither thought nor spoken; or because they involve matters in such a way as to give that which was correctly spoken the appearance of having been uttered in perverseness, that they may discover some grounds for calumny. But, to come to the affair itself.

Though in this article there seem to be only two distinct enunciations, yet in potency they are three, which must also be separated from each other to render the matter intelligible. The FIRST is, "the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us." SECOND, "the righteousness of Christ is imputed for righteousness." THIRD, "the act of believing is imputed for righteousness."

For thus ought they to have spoken, if their purpose was correctly to retain my words; because the expression, "justifies us," is of wider acceptation than, "is imputed for righteousness." For God justifies, and it is not imputed for righteousness. Christ, "the righteous servant of God, justifies many by his knowledge." But that by which He thus does this, is not "imputed for righteousness."

1. With regard to the FIRST. I never said, "the righteousness of Christ is not imputed to us." Nay, I asserted the contrary in my Nineteenth Public Disputation on Justification, Thesis 10. "The righteousness by which we are justified before God may in an accommodated sense be called imputative, as being righteousness either in the gracious estimation of God, since it does not according to the rigor of right or of law merit that appellation, or as being the righteousness of another, that is, of Christ, it is made ours by the gracious imputation of God." I have, it is true, placed these two in alternation. By this very thing I declare, that I do not disapprove of that phrase. "The righteousness of Christ is imputed to us, because it is made ours by the gracious estimation of God," is tantamount to, "it is imputed to us;" for

"imputation" is "a gracious estimation." But lest any one should seize on these expressions as an occasion for calumny, I say, that I acknowledge, "the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us" because I think the same thing is contained in the following words of the Apostle, "God hath made Christ to be sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him." (2 Cor. v, 21.)

2. I have said, that I disapprove of the SECOND enunciation, "the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us for righteousness." And why may not I reject a phrase which does not occur in the Scriptures, provided I do not deny any true signification which can be proved from the Scriptures? But this is the reason of my rejection of that phrase. "Whatever is imputed for righteousness, or to righteousness, or instead of righteousness, it is not righteousness itself strictly and rigidly taken. But the righteousness of Christ, which He hath performed in obeying the Father, is righteousness itself strictly and rigidly taken. THEREFORE, it is not imputed for righteousness." For that is the signification of the word "to impute," as Piscator against Bellarmine, when treating on justification, (from Romans iv, 4,) has well observed and safisfactorily proved.

The matter may be rendered clearer by an example. If a man who owes another a hundred florins, pays this his creditor the hundred which he owes, the creditor will not speak with correctness if he says, "I impute this to you for payment." For the debtor will instantly reply, "I do not care any thing about your imputation;" because he has truly paid the hundred florins, whether the creditor thus esteems it or not. But if the man owe a hundred florins and pay only ten, then the creditor, forgiving him the remainder, may justly say, "I impute this to you for full payment; I will require nothing more from you." This is the gracious reckoning of the creditor, which the debtor ought also to acknowledge with a grateful mind. It is such an estimation as I understand as often as I speak about the imputation of the righteousness which is revealed in the Gospel, whether the obedience of Christ be said to be imputed to us, and to be our righteousness before God, or whether faith be said to be imputed for righteousness. There is, therefore, a crafty design latent in this confusion. For if I deny this, their enunciation, they will say I deny that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us. If I assent to it, I fall into the absurdity of thinking that the righteousness of Christ is not righteousness itself. If they say, that the word "impute" is received in a different acceptation, let them prove their assertion by an example; and when they have given proof of this, (which will be a work of great difficulty to them,) they will have effected nothing. For "the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us by the gracious estimation of God." It is imputed, therefore, either by the gracious estimation of God for righteousness; or it is imputed by his non- gracious estimation. If it be imputed by His gracious estimation for righteousness, (which must be asserted,) and if it be imputed by His nongracious estimation; then it is apparent, in this confusion of these two axioms, that the word "impute" must be understood ambiguously, and that it has two meanings.

3. The THIRD is thus enunciated: "Faith, or the act of believing, is imputed for righteousness" which are my own words. But omitting my expressions, they have substituted for them the phrase, "The act of believing justifies us." I should say, "They have done this in their simplicity," if I thought they had not read the fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, in which this phrase is used eleven times, "Faith, or the act of believing, is imputed for righteousness." Thus it is said in the third verse, "Abraham believed God, and it was imputed unto him for righteousness; that is, his believing was thus imputed. Our brethren, therefore, do not reprehend ME, but the APOSTLE, who has employed this phrase so many times in one chapter, and who does not refrain from the use of the other phrase, "to be justified by faith, and through faith," in the third and fifth chapters of the same epistle. They ought, therefore, to have reprehended, not the phrase itself, but the signification which I attach to it, if I explain it in a perverted manner. Thus incorrectly should I seem to have explained the Apostle's phrase if I had said, "the righteousness of Christ is not imputed to us or does not justify us, but faith, or the act of believing, does." But I have already replied, that this assertion concerning me is untrue, and I have declared that I believe both these expressions to be true, "the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us," and

"faith is imputed for righteousness." When they place these phrases in opposition to each other, they do this, not from the meaning which I affix to them, but from their own; and, therefore, according to the signification which they give to them severally, they fabricate this calumny, which is an act of iniquity. But they will say, that I understand this phrase, "Faith is imputed for righteousness," in its proper acceptation, when it must be figuratively understood. This they ought, therefore, to have said, because this alone is what they were able to say with truth. Such in fact are my real sentiments on this subject; and the words make for the proper acceptation of the phrase. If a figure lies concealed under it, this ought to be proved by those who make the assertion.

ARTICLE XXV (V.)

The whole of that in which we appear before God, justifies us. But we appear before God, not only by Faith, but also by Works. Therefore, we are justified before God, not only by Faith, but likewise by Works.

ANSWER

A man who is ignorant of those things which are here the order of the day, and who reads this article, will undoubtedly think, that, in the point of justification, I favour the party of the Papists, and am their professed defender. Nay, he will suppose, that I have proceeded to such a pitch of impudence, as to have the audacity to maintain a conclusion directly contrary to the words of the Apostle, who says, "We conclude, therefore, that a man is justified by faith, without the works of the law." But when he shall understand the origin of this article, and why it is charged on me, then it will be evident to him that it arises from calumny and from a corruption of my words. I deny, therefore, that I made that syllogism, or ever intended to draw that conclusion, or to propound those things from which such a conclusion might be deduced.

This brief defense would suffice for all upright minds, to give a favourable interpretation, if perchance anything had been spoken which could give occasion to unjust suspicion. But it will be labour well bestowed, for me to transcribe my own words from a certain disputation on JUSTIFICATION, from which this article has been taken; that it may appear with what kind of fidelity they have made their extract. The Ninth Thesis in it is thus expressed:

"From these things, thus laid down according to the Scriptures, we conclude, that JUSTIFICATION, when used for the act of a judge, is either purely the imputation of righteousness, bestowed, through mercy from the throne of grace in Christ the Propitiation, on a sinner, but on one who believes; or that man is justified before God, of debt, according to the rigor of justice, without any forgiveness. Because the Papists deny the latter, they ought to concede the former. And this is so far true, that, how highly soever any one of the saints may be endowed with faith, hope, and charity, and how numerous soever and excellent may be the works of faith, hope, and charity, which he has performed, yet he will not obtain from God, the judge, a sentence of justification, unless He quit the tribunal of His severe justice, and place Himself in the throne of Grace, and out of it pronounce a sentence of absolution in his favour, and unless the Lord of his mercy and pity, graciously account for righteousness the whole of that good with which the saint appears before Him. For woe to a life of the greatest innocence, if it be judged without mercy! This truth even the Papists seem to acknowledge, who assert, that the works of the saints cannot stand before the judgment of God, unless they be sprinkled with the blood of Christ."' (Public Disput. XIX.) Thus far my Thesis. Could any person imagine that the major in this article can, according to my sentiments and design, be deduced from it, "The whole of that in which we appear before God, justifies us;" how can this be deduced, when I say, "that not even this good, which the Papists are able or know how to attribute to the most holy men, can obtain from God a sentence of justification, unless He, through mercy from the throne of grace, reckon this graciously for righteousness." Who does not perceive, that I grant this through sufferance and concession?"God considers and esteems for righteousness all this good in which, the Papists say, the saints appear before God." I yield this, that I may the more firmly confute them; and I thus obtain, "that not even that total can be accounted for righteousness, except graciously and through mercy." This conduct is real malignity, and a violent distortion of my words; on account of which I have indeed no small occasion given to me of complaining before God of this injury. But I contain myself, lest my complaint to God should be detrimental to their souls; I would rather beseech God to be pleased to grant them a better mind.

The matter, with regard to me, stands thus; as if any one should say to a Monk or a Pharisee, who was boasting of his virtues and works of his faith, hope, love, obedience, voluntary chastity and similar excellences: "O man!

unless God were to omit the severity of his justice, and unless from the throne of Grace, He were to pronounce a sentence of absolution concerning thee, unless He were graciously to reckon all that good of thine, however great it may be, and thus to account it for righteousness, thou wouldst not be able to stand before Him, or to be justified." I declare, and before Christ I make the declaration, that this was my meaning. And every man is the best interpreter of his own expressions. But let it be allowed, that I have said these things from my own sentiments; was this proposition [of their fabrication] to be deduced from my words? If it was, they ought to have proceeded thus according to scientific method. They ought to have briefly laid down the enunciation which I employed, and which might be in this form: "Unless God graciously account for righteousness the whole of this good in which a saint appears before Him, that saint cannot be justified before God." From which will be deduced this affirmative proposition, "If God graciously accounts for righteousness this good in which a holy man appears, then this holy man can be justified before God," or "he will then be justified before God" The word

"the whole," has a place in the negative proposition; because it conduces to the exaggeration. But it ought not to have a place in that which is affirmative.

Let this question, however, have a place here: Why have my brethren omitted these words? "The Lord graciously of his mercy, from the throne of his Grace, having omitted the severity of judgment, accounts that good for righteousness." And why have they proposed only these? "The whole of that in which we appear before God, justifies us." This is, indeed, not to deny the fact; but a pretext is thus sought for calumny, under the equivocation of the word "justifies," as justification may be either of grace, or of debt or severe judgment. But I have excluded that which is of debt or severe judgment from my expressions, and have included only the justification which is of grace. Let these remarks suffice for the major proposition.

I now proceed to the assumption that they have subjoined to this proposition, which is theirs and not mine. It reads thus: "But we appear before God, not only by Faith, but also by Works" Then is it your pleasure, my brethren, to appear thus before God? David was not of this opinion, when he said: "Enter not into judgment with thy servant. For in thy sight shall no man living be justified," or "shall justify himself." (Psalm cxliii, 2.) Which is thus rendered by the Apostle Paul, "For by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified." (Gal.

ii, 16.) But perhaps you will say, that you do not appear before God "by the works of the law, but by works produced from faith and love." I wish you to explain to me, what it is to appear by faith, and what to appear by works; and whether it can possibly happen, that a man may appear both by faith and works. I know, the saints who will be placed before the tribunal of the Divine Justice, have had Faith, and through Faith have performed good Works. But, I think, they appear and stand before God with this confidence or trust, "that God has set forth his Son Jesus Christ as a propitiation through Faith in his blood, that they may thus be justified by the Faith of Jesus Christ, through the remission of sins." I do not read, that Christ is constituted a propitiation through Works in his blood, that we may also be justified by Works.

My desire indeed is, to appear before the tribunal of God thus, [with this confidence or trust in Christ, as a propitiation through Faith in his blood] and

"to be graciously judged through mercy from the throne of grace". If I be otherwise judged, I know I shall be condemned; which sore judgment may the Lord, who is full of clemency and pity, avert according to his great mercy, even from you, my brethren, though you thus speak, whether the words which you use convey your own meaning, or whether you attribute this meaning to me. I also might thus draw wonderful conclusions from this assumption, which is laid down, if an accusation were to be set aside by retaliation or a recriminating charge, and not by innocence. But I will not resort to such a course, lest I seem to return evil for evil; though I might do this with a somewhat greater show of reason.

ARTICLE XXVI (VI.)

Faith is not the instrument of Justification.

ANSWER

IN THE enunciation of this article is given another proof of desperate and finished negligence. What man is so utterly senseless as universally to deny, that Faith can be called "an instrument," since it receives and apprehends the promises which God has given, and does also in this way concur to justification, But who, on the other hand, will venture to say, that, in the business of justification, faith has no other relation than that of an instrument?

It should therefore be explained, how faith is an instrument, and how, as an instrument, it concurs to justification.

It is, at least, not the instrument of God; not that which He uses to justify us.

Yet this is the meaning first intended to be conveyed by these words, when rigidly taken. For God is the primary cause of justification. But since justification is an estimate of the mind, although made at the command of the will, it is not performed by an instrument. For it is when God wills and acts by his power, that He employs instruments. Then, in these words, "Believe in Christ, and thy sins shall be forgiven thee," or, which is the same thing, "and thou shalt be justified;" I say, that faith is the requirement of God, and the act of the believer when he answers the requirement. But they will say, "that it is the act of apprehending and accepting, and that therefore, this faith bears relation to an instrument?' I reply, faith as a quality has in that passage relation to the mode of an instrument; but the acceptance or apprehension itself is an act, and indeed one of obedience, yielded to the gospel. Let that phrase likewise which is so often used by the Apostle in Romans 6, be seriously considered, "Faith is imputed for righteousness." Is this faith as an instrument, or as an act? St. Paul resolves the question, by a quotation from the book of Genesis, when he says, "Abraham believed God, and it was imputed to him for righteousness." The thing itself, as it is explained by our brethren, also solves the question. "Faith is imputed for righteousness on account of Christ, the object which it apprehends." Let this be granted. Yet the apprehending of Christ is nearer than the instrument which apprehends, or by which He is apprehended. But apprehending is an act; therefore, faith, not as it is an instrument, but as it is an act, is imputed for righteousness, although such imputation be made on account of Him whom it apprehends. In brief, the capability or the quality by which any thing is apprehended, and the apprehension itself, have each relation to the object which is to be apprehended, the former a mediate relation, the latter an immediate. The latter, therefore, is a more modest metonymy, as being derived from that which is nearer; even when it is granted that this phrase, "it is imputed for righteousness" -- must be explained by a metonymy. The man, then, who says, "the act of faith is imputed for righteousness, does not deny that faith as an instrument concurs to justification. It is evident, therefore, from this answer, that our brethren fabricate and "get up" articles of this kind without the least care or solicitude, and charge me with them. This, I think, will be acknowledged even by themselves, if they examine how they manufactured those nine questions which, two years ago, by the consent of their Lordships the Curators of our University, they endeavoured to offer to the Professors of Divinity, that they might obtain their reply to them. Gravity and sobriety are highly becoming in Divines, and serious solicitude is required to the completion of such great matters as these.

ARTICLE XXVII (VII.)

Faith is not the pure gift of God, but depends partly on the grace of God, and partly on the powers of Free Will; that, if a man will, he may believe or not believe.

I never said this, I never thought of saying it, and, relying on God's grace, I never will enunciate my sentiments on matters of this description in a manner thus desperate and confused. I simply affirm, that this enunciation is false,

"faith is not the pure gift of God;" that this is likewise false, if taken according to the rigor of the words, "faith depends partly on the grace of God, and partly on the powers of free will" and that this is also false when thus enunciated, "If a man will, he can believe or not believe." If they suppose, that I hold some opinions from which these assertions may by good consequence be deduced, why do they not quote my words? It is a species of injustice to attach to any person those consequences, which one may frame out of his words as if they were his sentiments. But the injustice is still more flagrant, if these conclusions cannot by good consequence be deduced from what he has said.

Let my brethren, therefore, make the experiment, whether they can deduce such consectaries as these, from the things which I teach; but let the experiment be made in my company, and not by themselves in their own circle. For that sport will be vain, equally void of profit or of victory; as boys sometimes feel, when they play alone with dice for what already belongs to them.

For the proper explanation of this matter, a discussion on the concurrence and agreement of Divine grace and of free will, or of the human will, would be required; but because this would be a labour much too prolix, I shall not now make the attempt. To explain the matter I will employ a simile, which yet, I confess, is very dissimilar; but its dissimilitude is greatly in favour of my sentiments. A rich man bestows, on a poor and famishing beggar, alms by which he may be able to maintain himself and his family. Does it cease to be a pure gift, because the beggar extends his hand to receive it? Can it be said with propriety, that "the alms depended partly on the liberality of the Donor, and partly on the liberty of the Receiver," though the latter would not have possessed the alms unless he had received it by stretching out his hand? Can it be correctly said, because the beggar is always prepared to receive, that

"he can have the alms, or not have it, just as he pleases?" If these assertions cannot be truly made about a beggar who receives alms, how much less can they be made about the gift of faith, for the receiving of which far more acts of Divine grace are required! This is the question which it will be requisite to discuss, "what acts of Divine grace are required to produce faith in man?" If I omit any act which is necessary, or which concurs, [in the production of faith,]

let it be demonstrated from the Scriptures, and I will add it to the rest.

It is not our wish to do the least injury to Divine grace, by taking from it any thing that belongs to it. But let my brethren take care, that they themselves neither inflict an injury on Divine justice, by attributing that to it which it refuses; nor on Divine grace, by transforming it into something else, which cannot be called GRACE. That I may in one word intimate what they must prove, such a transformation they effect when they represent "the sufficient and efficacious grace, which is necessary to salvation, to be irresistible," or as acting with such potency that it cannot be resisted by any free creature.

ARTICLE XXVIII (VIII.)

The grace sufficient for salvation is conferred on the Elect, and on the Nonelect; that, if they will, they may believe or not believe, may be saved or not saved.

ANSWER

OUR brethren here also manifest the same negligence. They take no pains to know what my sentiments are; they are not careful in examining what truth there is in my opinions; and they exercise no discretion about the words in which they enunciate my sentiments and their own. They know that I use the word "Election" in two senses. (i.) For the decree by which God resolves to justify believers and to condemn unbelievers, and which is called by the Apostle, "the purpose of God according to election." (Rom. ix, 11.) (ii.) And for the decree by which He resolves to elect these or those nations and men with the design of communicating to them the means of faith, but to pass by other nations and men. Yet, without this distinction, they fasten these sentiments on me; when, by its aid, I am enabled to affirm, not only, sufficient grace is conferred on, or rather is offered to, the Elect and the Nonelect;" but also,

"sufficient grace is not offered to any except the Elect." (i.) "It is offered to the Elect and the Non-elect," because it is offered to unbelievers, whether they will afterwards believe or not believe. (ii.) "It is offered to none except the Elect," because, by that very thing which is offered to them, they cease to be of the number of those of whom it is said, "He suffered them to walk in their own ways;" (Acts xiv, 16;) and, "He hath not dealt so with any nation." (Psalm cxlvii, 20.) And who shall compel me to use words of their prescribing, unless proof be brought from scripture that the words are to be thus and in no other way received?

I now proceed to the other words of the article. "That, if they will, they may believe or not believe, be saved or not saved." I say, in two different senses may these words be received, "if they will, they may believe," that is, either by their own powers, or as they are excited and assisted by this grace. "Or they may not believe," while rejecting this grace by their own free will, and resisting it. "They may be saved or not saved," that is, saved by the admission and right use of grace, not saved by their own wickedness, rejecting that without which they cannot be saved.

To the whole together I reply, that nothing is declared in these words, in whatever manner they may be understood, which St. Augustine himself and his followers would not willingly have acknowledged as true. I say, in these words are enunciated the very sentiments of St. Augustine; yet he was the chief champion against the Pelagian heresy, being accounted in that age its most successful combatant. For in his treatise on nature and grace, (c. 67.) St. Augustine speaks thus:, Since He is every where present, who, by many methods through the creature that is subservient to Him as his Lord, can call him who is averse, can teach a believer, can comfort him who hopes, can exhort the diligent man, can aid him who strives, and can lend an attentive ear to him who deprecates; it is not imputed to thee as a fault, that thou art unwillingly ignorant, but that thou neglectest to inquire after that of which thou art ignorant; not that thou dost not collect and bind together the shattered and wounded members, but that thou despisest Him who is willing to heal thee."

The book entitled "The Vocation of the Gentiles," which is attributed with a greater semblance of probability to Prosper, than to St. Ambrose, has the following passage: "On all men has always been bestowed some measure of heavenly doctrine, which, though it was of more sparing and hidden grace, was yet sufficient, as the Lord has judged, to serve some men for a remedy, and all men for a testimony." (Lib. 2. c. 5.) In the commencement of the ninth chapter of the same book, he explains the whole matter by saying: "The Grace of God has indeed the decided pre-eminence in our justifications, persuading us by exhortations, admonishing us by examples, affrighting us by dangers, exciting us by miracles, by giving understanding, by inspiring counsel, and by illuminating the heart itself and imbuing it with the affections of faith. But the will of man is likewise subjoined to it and is united with it, which has been excited to this by the before mentioned succours, that it may co- operate in the Divine work within itself, and may begin to follow after the reward which, by the heavenly seed, it has conceived for the object of its desire, ascribing the failure to its own mutability, and the success (if the issue be prosperous) to the aid of grace. This aid is afforded to all men, by innumerable methods both secret and manifest; and the rejection of this assistance by many persons, is to be ascribed to their negligence; but its reception by many persons, is both of Divine grace and of the human will."

I do not produce these passages, as if I thought that either my brethren or I must abide by the sentiments of the Fathers, but only for the purpose of removing from myself the crime of Pelagianism in this matter.

ARTICLE XXIX (IX.)

Believers can perfectly fulfill the Law, and live in the world without sin.

ANSWER

This is what I never said. But when a certain person once, in a public disputation on the Baptism of Infants, was endeavouring, by a long digression, to bring me to the point -- either to declare that believers could perfectly fulfill the law of God, or that they could not -- I declined an answer, but quoted the opinion of St. Augustine, from the second book of his Treatise On the demerits and remission of sins, against the Pelagians. That passage, I will here transcribe, that I may defend myself against the charge of Pelagianism; because, I perceive that the men with whom I have to do, consider even these sentiments to be Pelagian, though they can on no count whatever, be reckoned such.

St. Augustine says: "We must not instantly with an incautious rashness, oppose those who assert that it is possible for man to be in this life without sin. For if we deny the possibility of this, we shall derogate both from the free will of man, which desires to be in such a perfect state by willing it; and from the power or mercy of God, who effects it by the assistance which He affords.

But it is one question whether it be possible, and another whether such a man actually exists. It is one question, if such a perfect man is not in existence when it is possible, why is he not? And it is another, not only whether there is any one who has never had any sin at all, but likewise, whether there could at any time have been such a man, or that it is now possible? In this fourfold proposal of questions, if I be asked "is it possible for a man to exist in the present life without sin;" I shall confess, that it is possible by the grace of God, and by man's free will." (Cap. 6.)

In another of his works, St. Augustine says: "Pelagius disputes correctly, that they confess it not to be impossible, by the very circumstance of either many or all persons wishing to do it; [perfectly to fulfill the law of God;] but let him confess whence it is possible, and peace is instantly established. For the possibility arises from the grace of God through Christ Jesus," &c. (On Nature and Grace, against the Pelagians, cap. 59, 60.) And in a subsequent passage: "For it may be made a question among true and pious Christians, has there ever been, is there now, or can there be, in this life, any man who lives so justly as to have no sin at all? Whosoever doubts about the possibility of the existence of such a person after this life, he is destitute of understanding. But I am unwilling to enter into a contest, about this possibility even in the present life." See the paragraphs which immediately succeed in the same chapter. And in the 69th chapter of that work, he says: "By the very thing, by which we most firmly believe that a just and good God could not command impossibilities, we are admonished both of what we may do in things easy of accomplishment, and of what we may ask in matters of difficulty; because all things are easy to charity," &c.

I do not oppose this opinion of St. Augustine; but I do not enter into a contest about any part of the whole matter. For I think the time may be far more happily and usefully employed in prayers to obtain what is lacking in each of us, and in serious admonitions that every one endeavour to proceed and to press forward towards the mark of perfection, than when spent in such disputations.

But my brethren will say, that in the 114th question of our Catechism this very subject is treated, and that it is there asked, "Can those persons who are converted to God, perfectly observe the Divine Commands," The answer subjoined is, "By no means." To this observation I reply, that I do not say anything against it; but that the reason of the negative answer [or scriptural proof added] is about the act, when the question itself is about the possibility; and that, therefore, from this, nothing is proved. It is also well known that this answer had been rejected by some persons; and that it was only by the intervention of the brethren, who added an explanation to it, that it afterwards obtained the approbation of the same individuals. But I shall be perfectly willing to enter into a conference with my brethren about this matter, whenever it shall be convenient; and I hope we shall easily agree in opinion.

ARTICLE XXX (X.)

It may admit of discussion, whether Semi-Pelagianism is not real Christianity.

ANSWER

In a certain lecture I said, that it would be easy, under the pretext of Pelagianism, to condemn all those things of which we do not approve, if we may invent half, quarter, three- fourths, four-fifths Pelagianism, and so upwards. And I added, that it might admit of discussion whether Semi-Pelagian is not real Christianity. By these remarks it was not my wish to patronize Pelagian doctrine; but I was desirous to intimate, that something might be accounted as Semi-Pelagianism which does not depart from the truth of Christian doctrine. For as, when a departure is once made from the truth, the descent towards falsehood becomes more and more rapid; so, by receding from falsehood, it is possible for men to arrive at truth, which is often accustomed to stand as the mean between two extremes of falsehood. Such indeed is the state of the matter in Pelagianism and Manicheism. If any man can enter on a middle way between these two heresies, he will be a true Catholic, neither inflicting an injury on Grace, as the Pelagians do, nor on Free Will as do the Manichees. Let the Refutation be perused which St.

Augustine wrote against both these heresies, and it will appear that he makes this very acknowledgement. For this reason it has happened, that, for the sake of confirming their different opinions, St. Augustine's words, when writing against the Manichees, have been frequently quoted by the Pelagians; and those which he wrote against the Pelagians, have been quoted by the Manichees.

This, therefore, is what I intended to convey; and that my brethren may understand my meaning, I declare openly, "that it will be quite as easy a task for me to convict the sentiments of some among them of Manicheism, and even of Stoicism, as they will be really capable of convicting others of Pelagianism, whom they suspect of holding that error." But I wish us all to abstain from odious names of this description, as they are employed without producing any benefit. For he who is accused will either deny that his sentiments are the same as those of Pelagius; or, if he acknowledges the existence of a similarity, he will say that Pelagius was wrongly condemned by the Church. It would be better then to omit these epithets, and to confer solely about the matter itself; unless, approaching to the opinion of the Papists, we hold that what has once been determined by the Church, cannot be drawn into controversy.

ARTICLE XXXI (XI.)

It is not correctly said in the Catechism, that "God is angry with us for birth-sins;" because original sin is a punishment. But whatever is a punishment is not properly a sin.

ANSWER

Nearly two months ago, a certain minister of God's word, came to me, desirous, as he declared, to confer with me about the opinion which I held concerning the Catechism and Dutch Confession being subjected to examination in our National Synod. On this subject we had some conversation together, and I concluded the expression of my opinion with this syllogism:

"Every human writing which is not in itself entitled to implicit credit, not authentic, and not divine, may be examined, and indeed ought to be; when it can be done in order, and after a legitimate manner, that is, in a Synod, to which [the consideration of] these writings belongs. But such productions are the Catechism and our Confession. Therefore, they may and ought to be subjected to examination." When he had wearied himself in opposing a few things to this syllogism, which I soon dispersed by the clearest light of truth, he began to inquire what [objections] they were which I had against the Confession and Catechism; I replied, that I had nothing against those formularies, for that would be an act of prejudging, which I would not take upon myself; but that there were matters in those two productions, about which it was my wish to confer in a legitimate and orderly manner, with my brethren at their own time, in a Synod, whether on every point they be agreeable to the scriptures, or whether they dissent in any respect from them.

For this purpose, that if, after a serious and strict examination, they be found to agree with the scriptures, they may be approved and confirmed by recent and fresh sanctions; or that, if found to dissent from them, they may be corrected as commodiously as possible.

He became urgent with me, therefore, and requested that I would disclose to him those points about which I was desirous to confer; and he declared, that he asked this favour for no other reason than that he might be able himself to think seriously about them. Unwilling positively to deny this his request, I began to produce some parts of the Confession, and especially the fourteenth Article. But he said, "that he made small account of this, because he thought something might easily be discovered in the Confession, which did not perfectly and in every respect correspond with the scriptures, at least with regard to its phraseology, for it was the composition of only a few persons, and in fact was written in the earliest times of the Reformation from Popery; and that he perceived very little danger in the Confession being corrected in some passages, since it was not much in use among the people."

But when he began to be still more urgent concerning the Catechism, desirous in that particular likewise to gratify him, I adduced some passages, and, among others, the answer to the tenth question, in which God is said "by horrid methods to be angry both on account of birth-sins, and on account of those also which we ourselves commit," &c. I said two things, in these words, might admit of discussion. (1.) Whether we could correctly call this universal taint in our nature "birth-sins" in the plural number. I had scarcely made this remark, when he, without waiting for any further explanation, said, "that on one occasion, while he was explaining the Catechism to some students, he had himself begun to think whether it was a good and proper phrase; but that he had defended it by this argument -- The Catechism employs the plural number on account of original sin itself, and on account of the sin committed by Adam which was the cause of that original sin." But as I considered that kind of defense to be unworthy of any confutation, I said, it was better for him at once to own that these words required emendation, than to give such an explanation of them. After this conversation, I added another remark. (2.) It may admit of discussion, whether God could be angry on account of original sin which was born with us, since it seemed to be inflicted on us by God as a punishment of the actual sin which had been committed by Adam and by us in Him. For, in that case, the progress would be infinite, if God, angry on account of the actual sin of Adam, were to punish us with this original sin; were He again to be angry with us for this original sin, and inflict on us another punishment; and, for a similar cause were He a third time to be angry on account of that second punishment which had been inflicted, guilt and punishment thus mutually and frequently succeeding each other, without the intervention of any actual sin. When to this observation he replied, "that still it was sin." I said, I did not deny that it was sin, but it was not actual sin. And I quoted the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the. Romans, in which the Apostle treats on the sin, and says that "it produces in the unregenerate all manner of concupiscence," thus intimating that we must distinguish between actual sin, and that which was the cause of other sins, and which, on this very account might be denominated "sin."

Matters were at that interview discussed between us in this placid manner, and for the purpose which I have just stated; and I know that I never spoke upon this subject in any other place. Yet this our conversation was related to a certain learned man, the very same day on which it occurred, either by the minister himself, or by some one who had heard it from him. I had it from the lips of this learned man himself; who urged it against me as an objection, within a few days after the minister and I had held this discourse: for the minister had resided at this learned man's house, during his stay in Leyden.

Is it equitable that things which are thus discussed among brethren for the sake of conference, should be instantly disseminated, and publicly proclaimed as heretical? I confess that I am devoid of all discernment, if such conduct as this is not the very violation of the law of all familiarity and friendship. Yet these are the persons who complain, that I decline to confer with them; that, when I am calmly asked, I refuse to declare my sentiments; and that I hold their minds in suspense.

To this article, therefore, I briefly reply: It is false that I said, "that this is not correctly expressed in the Catechism." For I told that minister openly, that I would not prejudge the matter; that I was desirous to wait for the judgment of my brethren on matters of this kind, and on others which were comprised in the Catechism and Confession; and that, after things had been thus maturely and accurately weighed, something determinate might be concluded.

But a previous conference of this description seems to be attended with some utility on this account, it prevents any man from offering to the Synod itself for examination and abjudication those matters which, by such a private conversation as this, he might understand to have no difficulties in them. Let the brethren recall to mind what was asked of the Professors of Divinity in our University, by the Synod of South Holland, held at Gorchum, and let them compare it among themselves. We are asked diligently to read through the Confession and Catechism, and, if we find anything in them which merits animadversion, to announce the same seasonably and in order. And this, on my own part, I promised to do. For this purpose, is not a private conference with brethren highly useful, that what can be removed by it may not be proposed to the Synod for discussion, But that minister and I had known each other for many years; I had also long held epistolary correspondence with him, and had conversed with him on the articles of faith. On this account therefore, I thought that I ought to comply with his request, as an experiment whether he could expedite the affair.

CONCLUSION

THIS then is the answer which I have thought proper to make, at present, to the THIRTY-ONE ARTICLES that have been objected against me. If I have not given satisfaction by it to some men, I am prepared to confer in order with any of them upon these subjects and others which pertain to the Christian Religion, for this purpose, that we may either agree in our sentiments; or, if this result cannot be obtained by a conference, that we bear with each other, when it has become evident how far we severally proceed together in the matter of religion, and what things they are of which we approve or disapprove, and that these points of difference are not of such a description as to forbid professors of the same religion to hold different sentiments about them.

Some persons perhaps will reproach me with "appearing sometimes to answer with doubt and desitation, when it is the duty of a Divine and a Professor of Theology to be fully persuaded about those things which he will teach to others, and not to fluctuate in his opinions." To these persons I wish to reply.

1. The most learned man, and he who is most conversant with the Scriptures, is ignorant of many things, and is always but a scholar in the school of Christ and of the Scriptures. But one, who is thus ignorant of many things, cannot, without hesitation, give answer in reference to all things about which an opportunity or necessity for speaking is presented either by adversaries or by those who wish to ask and ascertain his sentiments by private or public conference and disputation. For it is better for him to speak somewhat doubtfully, than dogmatically, about those things of which he has no certain knowledge; and to intimate that he himself requires daily progress, and seeks for instruction as well as they. For I think no one has proceeded to such a pitch of audacity, as to style himself a master that is ignorant of nothing, and that indulges no doubts about any matter whatever.

2. It is not everything which becomes a subject of controversy that is of equal importance. Some things are of such a nature as to render it unlawful for any man to feel a doubt concerning them, if he have any wish to be called by the name of Christian. But there are other things which are not of the same dignity, and about which those who treat on catholic sentiments [such orthodox doctrines as are held by all real Christians,] have dissented from each other, without any breach of truth and Christian peace. Of what description those subjects may be which are discussed in these Articles, and about which I have appeared to answer with hesitation, and whether they be of absolute necessity, may likewise become in due time a topic of discussion.

3. My reply [to these thirty-one articles] is not peremptory: Not that I have in them said anything against conscience, but because I did not consider it requisite to bring forward, in the first instance, all those things which I might be able to say. I accounted my answer sufficient, and more than sufficient, for all those objections, which have not the slightest foundation on any reasons whatsoever; not only because they were untruly charged against me, but because they did not impinge against the truth of the Scriptures. In the greater number of these Articles, I might have discharged the whole of my duty, in simply denying them, and in demanding proof. But I have gone further than this, that I might in some degree give satisfaction, and that I might besides challenge my brethren to a conference, if they should think it necessary. This I will never decline, provided it be lawfully instituted, and in such a manner as to inspire hopes of any benefits to be derived from it. If after that conference it be discovered that, either because I am ignorant of necessary things which ought to be taught in the Church and in the University; or because I hold unsound opinions about articles on which some importance is placed for obtaining salvation and for the illustration of divine glory; or because I doubt concerning such things as ought to be delivered dogmatically and inculcated with seriousness and rigor, if for these reasons it be discovered that, according to this our unhappy [natural] condition, I am unworthy to hold any office in the Church or University, (for who is sufficient for these things,) I will, without reluctance, resign my situation, and give place to a man possessed of greater merit.

But I wish to advise my brethren, particularly those of them who are my juniors, and who have not "their senses so much exercised" in the Scriptures as to be enabled to deliver out of those Scriptures determinate opinions about all things, that they be not too bold in asserting anything, of which when required to give their reasons, they will be able with great difficulty to produce them; and, besides, that they be sedulously on their guard lest, after they have strenuously affirmed anything which I call in doubt without employing the contrary affirmation, and it be discovered that the arguments which I employ in justification of my doubts are stronger than those on which they rely in that their affirmation, they incur the charge of immodesty and arrogance among men of prudence, and from this very circumstance be accounted unworthy of the place which they hold with so much presumption. For it becomes a Bishop and a Teacher of the Church, not only to hold fast the faithful word as he hath been taught, that he may be able by his sound doctrine, both to exhort and to convince the gainsayers, (Tit. i, 9,7,) but likewise not to be given to self-will, arrogance, and boldness. Into which faults novices easily fall, (1 Tim. iii, 6,)who, "by their inexperience, are unacquainted with the vast difficulty with which the eye of the inward man is healed, that it may be enabled to look upon its sun; with the sighs and groans by which we are able in any small degree to attain to an understanding of God; with the labour necessary for the discovery of truth; and with the difficulty of avoiding errors." Let them consider, that nothing is more easy for them, than not only to assert, but also to think, that they have discovered the truth. But they will themselves at length acknowledge the real difficulties with which the discovery is attended, when with seriousness and earnestness they enter into a conference about the matters in controversy, and have after a rigid examination discussed all those things which may have been alleged on both sides.

NINE QUESTIONS

Exhibited, by the Deputies of the Synod, to Their Lordships the Curators of the University of Leyden, for the Purpose of Obtaining an Answer to each of them from the Professors of Divinity; and the Replies which James Arminius Gave to them, in November, 1605. With Other Nine Opposite Questions

THE NINE QUESTIONS...AND NINE OPPOSITE QUESTIONS

I. Which is first, Election, or Faith Truly Foreseen, so that God elected his people according to faith foreseen?

I. Is the decree "for bestowing Faith on any one," previous to that by which is appointed "the Necessity of Faith to salvation?"

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

The equivocation in the word "Election," makes it impossible to answer this question in any other manner, than by distinction. If therefore "Election" denotes "the decree which is according to election concerning the justification and salvation of believers."

I say Election is prior to Faith, as being that by which Faith is appointed as the means of obtaining salvation. But if it signifies "the decree by which God determines to bestow salvation on some one," then Faith foreseen is prior to Election. For as believers alone are saved, so only believers are predestinated to salvation. But the Scriptures know no Election, by which God precisely and absolutely has determined to save anyone without having first considered him as a believer. For such an Election would be at variance with the decree by which he hath determined to save none but believers.

# QUESTION AND..... # QUESTION REVERSED

II. If it be said, "that God, by his eternal decree, has determined and governs all things and every thing, even the depraved wills of men, to appointed good ends," does it follow from this, that God is the author of sin?

II. Is "to determine or direct all things and every thing, even the depraved wills of men, to appointed good ends," the same thing as "to determine that man be made corrupt, by which a way may be opened for executing God's absolute decree concerning damning some men through wrath, and saving others through mercy?"

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

Sin is the transgression of the law; therefore, God will be the author of sin, if He cause any man to transgress the law. This is done by denying or taking away what is necessary for fulfilling the law, or by impelling men to sin. But if this "determination"

be that of a will which is already depraved, since it does not signify the denying or the removing of grace nor a corrupt impelling to sin, it follows, that the consequence of this cannot be that God is the author of sin. But if this "determination" denote the decree of God by which He resolved that the will should become depraved, and that man should commit sin, then it follows from this that God is the author of sin.

# QUESTION AND..... # QUESTION REVERSED

III. Does original sin, of itself, render man obnoxious to eternal death, even without the addition of any actual sin? Or is the guilt of original sin taken away from all and every one by the benefits of Christ the Mediator?

III. If some men are condemned solely on account of the sin committed by Adam, and others on account of their rejection of the Gospel, are there not two peremptory decrees concerning the damnation of men, and two judgments, one Legal, the other Evangelical?

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

Those things which in this question are placed in opposition to each other, easily agree together. For original sin can render man obnoxious to eternal death, and its guilt can be taken away from all men by Christ. Indeed, in order that guilt may be removed, it is necessary that men be previously rendered guilty. But to reply to each part separately: It is perversely said, that "original sin renders a man obnoxious to death," since that sin is the punishment of Adam's actual sin, which punishment is preceded by guilt, that is, an obligation to the punishment denounced by the law. With regard to the second member of the question, it is very easily answered by the distinction of the soliciting, obtaining, and the application of the benefits of Christ.

For as a participation of Christ's benefits consists in faith alone, it follows that, if among these benefits "deliverance from this guilt" be one, believers only are delivered from it, since they are those upon whom the wrath of God does not abide.

# QUESTION AND..... # QUESTION REVERSED

IV. Are the works of the unregenerate, which proceed from the powers of nature, so pleasing to God, as to induce Him on account of them to confer supernatural and saving grace on those who perform them?

IV. Are a serious consciousness of sin, and an initial fear so pleasing to God, that by them He is induced to forgive sins, and to create a filial fear?

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

Christ says, "To him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath." Not, indeed, because such is the worthiness and the excellence of the use of any blessing conferred by God, either according to nature or to grace, that God should be moved by its merits to confer greater benefits; but, because such are the benignity and liberality of God, that, though these works are unworthy, yet He rewards them with a larger blessing. Therefore, as the word

"pleasing" admits of two meanings, we can reply to the question proposed in two ways - - either affirmatively, if that word be viewed as signifying "to please,"to find favour in his eyes," and "to obtain complacency for itself;" or negatively if "placeo"

be received for that which it also signifies, "to please by its own excellence." Yet it might be said, that good works are rewarded, in a moral view, not so much through the powers of nature, as by some operation in them of the Holy Spirit.

# QUESTION AND..... # QUESTION REVERSED

V. Can God now, in his own right, require faith from fallen man in Christ, which he cannot have of himself? But does God bestow on all and every one, to whom the Gospel is preached, sufficient grace by which they may believe, if they will?

V. Can God require that man to believe in Jesus Christ, for whom He has determined by an absolute decree that Christ should not die, and to whom by the same decree He has determined to refuse the grace necessary for believing?

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

The parts of this question are not opposed to each other; on the contrary, they are at the most perfect agreement. So that the latter clause may be considered the rendering of a reason, why God may require from fallen man faith in Christ, which he cannot have of himself. For God may require this, since he has determined to bestow on man sufficient grace by which he may believe. Perhaps, therefore, the question may be thus corrected: "Can God, now, in his own right, demand from fallen man faith in Christ, which he cannot have of himself, though God neither bestows on him, nor is ready to bestow, sufficient grace by which he may believe?" This question will be answered by a direct negative. God cannot by any right demand from fallen man faith in Christ, which he cannot have of himself, except God has either bestowed, or is ready to bestow, sufficient grace by which he may believe if he will. Nor do I perceive what is false in that reply, or to what heresy it has affinity. It has no alliance with the Pelagian heresy: for Pelagius maintained, that with the exception of the preaching of the Gospel, no internal grace is required to produce faith in the minds of men. But what is of more consequence, this reply is not opposed to St. Augustine's doctrine of Predestination; "yet this doctrine of his, we do not account it necessary to establish," as Innocent, the Roman Pontiff, has observed.

# QUESTION AND..... # QUESTION REVERSED

VI. Is justifying faith the effect and the mere gift of God alone, who calls, illuminates, and reforms the will? and is it peculiar to the elect alone from all eternity?

VI. Can that be called a mere gift which, though offered by the pure liberality of Him who makes the offer, is still capable of being rejected by him to whom it is offered?

But does a voluntary acceptance render it unworthy of the name of a gift? It may likewise be asked, "Is faith bestowed on these who are to be saved? Or is salvation bestowed on those who have faith?" Or can both these questions be answered affirmatively in a different respect? If they can, how is it then that there is not in those decrees a circle, in which nothing is first and nothing last?

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

A double question requires a double answer. (1.) To the first I reply, Faith is the effect of God illuminating the mind and sealing the heart, and it is his mere gift. (2.) To the second I answer, by making a distinction in the word Election. If it be understood as signifying Election to salvation; since this, according to the scriptures, is the election of believers, it cannot be said, "Faith is bestowed on the elect, or on those who are to be saved," but that "believers are elected and saved." But if it be received for the decree by which God determines variously to administer the means necessary to salvation; in this sense I say that Faith is the gift of God, which is conferred on those only whom He hath chosen to this, that they may hear the word of God, and be made partakers of the Holy Spirit.

# QUESTION AND..... # QUESTION REVERSED

VII. May every one who is a true believer be assured in this life of his individual salvation; and is it his duty to have this assurance?

VII. Does justifying faith precede, in the order of nature, remission of sins, or does it not? And can any man be bound to any other faith than that which justifies?

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

Since God promises eternal life to all who believe in Christ, it is impossible for him who believes, and who knows that he believes, to doubt of his own salvation, unless he doubts of this willingness of God [to perform his promise.] But God does not require him to be better assured of his individual salvation as a duty which must be performed to himself or to Christ; but it is a consequence of that promise, by which God engages to bestow eternal life on him who believes.

# QUESTION AND..... # QUESTION REVERSED

VIII. May true believers and elect persons entirely lose faith for a season?

VIII. May any man who has faith and retains it, arrive at such a moment, as, if he were then to die, he would be damned?

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

Since Election to salvation comprehends within its limits not only Faith, but likewise perseverance in Faith; and since St. Augustine says, "God has chosen to salvation those who he sees will afterwards believe by the aid of his preventing or preceding grace, and who will persevere by the aid of his subsequent or following grace;

"believers and the elect are not correctly taken for the same persons. Omitting, therefore, all notice of the word "Election," I reply, believers are sometimes so circumstanced, as not to produce, for a season, any effect of true faith, not even the actual apprehension of grace and the promises of God, nor confidence or trust in God and Christ; yet this is the very thing which is necessary to obtain salvation. But the apostle says, concerning faith, in reference to its being a quality and a capability of believing, "some, having cast away a good conscience concerning faith, have made shipwreck."

# QUESTION AND..... # QUESTION REVERSED

IX. Can believers under the grace of the New Covenant, perfectly observe the law of God in this life?

IX. May God, or may He not, require of those who are partakers of the New Covenant, that the flesh do not lust against the Spirit, as a duty corresponding with the grace of that covenant?

ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION

The performance of the law is to be estimated according to the mind of Him who requires it to be observed. The answer will be two-fold, since He either wills it to be rigidly observed in the highest degree of perfection, or only according to epieikeian clemency; that is, if he require this according to clemency, and if the strength or powers which he confers be proportionate to the demand. (1.) Man cannot perfectly perform such a law of God, if it be considered as to be performed according to rigor.

(2.) But if he require it according to clemency, and if the powers conferred be proportionate, (which must be acknowledged, since He requires it according to the evangelical covenant,) the answer is, it can be perfectly observed. But the question about capability is not of such great importance, "provided a man confesses that it is possible to be done by the grace of Christ," as St. Augustine justly observes.

REMARKS ON THE PRECEDING QUESTIONS, AND ON THOSE OPPOSED TO

THEM

In reply to some queries which Uytenbogard had addressed to Arminius, concerning these nine questions and their opposites, the latter gave his friend the following explanation, in a letter dated the 31st of January, 160vi,

"I. In answer to the First Question, this is the order of the decrees. (1.) It is my will to save believers. (2.) On this man I will bestow faith and preserve him in it. (3.) I will save this man. For thus does the first of these decrees prescribe, which must necessarily be placed foremost; because, without this, faith is not necessary to salvation, and therefore no necessity exists to administer the means for faith. But to this is directly opposed the opinion which asserts, that faith is bestowed on him on whom God had previously willed to bestow salvation. For, in this case, it would be his will to save one who did not believe. All that has been said about the difference of the decree and its execution, is futile; as if, in fact, God willed salvation to any one prior to faith, and yet not to bestow salvation on any others than believers. For, beside the consistent agreement of these, [the decree and its execution,] it is certain that God cannot will to bestow that which, on account of his previous decree, He cannot bestow. As therefore faith is, in a general manner, placed before salvation by the first decree; so it must, specially and particularly, be placed before the salvation of this and that man, even in the special decree which has the subsequent execution.

"III. To the Third Question I shall in preference oppose the following: Has God determined peremptorily to act with some men according to the strict rigor of the law, as He did with the fallen angels, and to act with others according to the grace of the Gospel? If they deny this, I have what I wish. But if they affirm it, such a sentiment must be overwhelmed with absurdities; because in such a case God would have acted towards many men with greater severity, than towards the fallen angels, who, as being creatures purely spiritual, each sinned of himself, through his own wickedness without persuasion from any one.

"IV. They will not be able to deny my Fourth opposite Question. For remission is promised to those who confess their sins; and the fear is called initial in reference to the filial fear which follows. If they acknowledge it, but say, 'Yet God is not induced by them;' I will then command them to erase the same word out of their interrogatory, and in a better form to enunciate their own opinion.

"V. They will not consider it their duty entirely to deny my Fifth opposing Question.

If they affirm it, they will declare a falsehood, and will incur the ill opinion of all prudent persons, even of those who are weak. Let them therefore search out what they may place as an intermediate postulate between theirs and mine, and I will then show that it co- incides either with their postulate or with mine.

"VI. I have placed two questions in opposition to the Sixth, because their question is also a double one. On the First of them you require no observation. About the Second I have said, for the sake of explanation, 'that it is a circle, in which nothing is first and nothing last,' but in every part of it a beginning and an end are found -- which cannot, without absurdity, have place in the decrees of God. I ask, has God determined to bestow salvation on those who believe, or to bestow faith on those who are to be saved? If both of these be asserted, I ask, which of them is the first, and which the last? They will reply, neither; and it is then a circle. If they affirm the latter, that God has determined to bestow faith on those who are to be saved; I will prove, that He has determined to bestow salvation on those who believe, and shall then have formed a circle, notwithstanding their unwillingness. If they adduce the different respect, I will endeavour to confute it; which cannot be a work of much difficulty in so very plain a matter.

"VII. In the Seventh opposite Question, I had regard to the expression, is it his duty?

for about its possibility there is no contention. But justifying faith is not that by which I believe that my sins are remitted; for thus the same thing will be the object and the effect of justifying faith. By this [justifying faith] I obtain remission of sins, therefore it precedes the other object; [the remission of sins;] and no one can believe that his sins are remitted, unless he knows that he believes by a justifying faith. For this reason, also, no one can believe that his future sins will likewise be remitted, unless he knows that he will believe to the end. For sins are forgiven to him who believes, and only after they have been committed; wherefore the promise of forgiveness, which is that of the New Testament, must be considered as depending on a condition stipulated by God, that is FAITH, without which there is no covenant.

"VIII. With respect to the Eighth Question, let a distinction be made between Faith as it is a quality or habit, and between the same as it is an art. Actual believing justifies, or the act of believing is imputed for righteousness. Because God requires actual faith; for our capability to perform which, He infuses that which is habitual. Therefore, as actual faith does not consist with moral sin, he who falls into mortal sin may be damned. But it is possible for a believer to fall into mortal sin, of which David is seen as an instance Therefore, he may fall at such a moment as, if he were then to die, he would be damned. 'If our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God.' Therefore, if it does condemn us, we have no confidence, we cannot have any; because 'God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things.' What is said about the impossibility of this event, because, God has determined not to take such persons out of the world at that moment, conduces nothing in favour of their hypothesis. For this is opposed to final destruction, not to temporary, and to their total destruction for a season, which is the subject of their Eighth Question.

"IX. If it be replied to my Ninth opposing Question, that, in the covenant of grace, God requires a duty which is impossible to man; they will be forced to confess, that, in addition to this covenant, another is necessary, according to which God pardons a duty not performed according to that covenant of grace; as it was necessary that there should be another covenant, by which God might pardon a duty not performed according to the legal covenant. And thus shall we proceed on ad infinitum. At length we must arrive at the point from which we can say, God save sinners, of his infinite mercy, which is limited by no conditions prescribed by his equity. This seems to be an expression which will be entirely conformable to the whole doctrine of those who urge absolute predestination, For, since wrath and mercy are opposed to each other, as wrath is infinite, may not mercy too, be infinite? According to their doctrine, whatever they oppose to the contrary, wrath makes men sinners, that it may have those whom it can punish. But they expressly say, mercy makes men believers by an omnipotent force, and preserves them from the possibility of falling, that it may have those whom it can save. But, as Nicasius Van der Schuer says, if God could make a sinner, that He might have one whom He could punish; He could also punish without sin; therefore He could likewise mercifully save without faith. And as Wrath willed to have a just title for damnation, through the intervention of sin, so it became Mercy to save, without the intervention of any duty, that it might be manifest that the whole is of mercy without the semblance of justice. I say, without the semblance of justice; because it begets faith by an irresistible force, and by an irresistible force it causes man to continue in faith to the end, and thus necessarily to be saved, according to the decree, he that believes and perseveres, shall be saved This being laid down, all equity is excluded, as well from the decree of predestination to salvation, as from that of predestination to death. These objections, I am conscientiously of opinion, may, without calumny, be made to their sentiments; and I am prepared to maintain this very thing against any patron whatsoever of those sentiments. For they do not extricate themselves when they say, that man spontaneously sins, and believes by a spontaneous motion. For that which is spontaneous, and that which is natural, are not in opposition. And that which is spontaneous coincides with that which is absolutely necessary; as, a stone is moved downwards; a beast eats, and propagates its species; man loves that which is good for himself. But all excuses terminate in this spontaneous matter."

The passage immediately subsequent to this, is the one which I have quoted in pages 179, 180 of the First Volume of these Works, respecting the two sick persons who were desirous of obtaining an assurance of the Divine Favour, and respecting the very important distinction to be observed between a faith which is merely historical, and that by which a sinner is justified, a distinction, the neglect of which has, in every age of the Church, been a prolific source of error among the professors of our common Christianity.

DISPUTATION 1

ON THE AUTHORITY AND CERTAINTY OF THE SACRED SCRIPTURES

RESPONDENT: BERNARD VESUKIUS

I. The authority of Scripture is nothing else but the worthiness according to which it merits (1.) CREDENCE, as being true in words and true in significations, whether it simply declares anything; or also promises and threatens; and (2.) as a superior, it merits OBEDIENCE through the credence given to it, when it either commands or prohibits anything. Concerning this authority two questions arise, (i.) Whence does it belong to Scripture? (ii.) Whence is it evident, or can be rendered evident to men, that this authority appertains to Scripture? These two questions shall be discussed in their proper order. (1 Tim. i, 15; 2 Pet. i, 19; John v, 39; Heb. vi, 18. Rom. i, 5; 2 Cor. x, 5, 6; xiii, 3; xii, 12; Gal. i, 1, 12, 13, &c.)

II. The authority of any word or writing whatsoever depends upon its author, as the word "authority" indicates; and it is just as great as the veracity and the power, that is, the auqentiauthor. But God is of infallible veracity, and is neither capable of deceiving nor of being deceived; and of irrefragable power, that is, supreme over the creatures. If, therefore, He is the Author of Scripture, its authority is totally dependent on Him alone. (i.) Totally, because He is the all sufficient Author, all-true and all-powerful. (ii.) On Him alone, because He has no associate either in the truth of what he says, or in the power of his right. For all veracity and power in the creature proceed from him; and into his veracity and power are resolved all faith and obedience, as into the First Cause and the Ultimate Boundary. (Gal.. iii, 8, 9; 1 John v, 9; Rom. iii, 4; Tit. i, 2; Psalm i, 1-23; Gal. i, 1, 7, 8; John v, 34, 36; Rom. xi, 34-36; xiii, 1.) III. This is proved by many arguments dispersed throughout the Scripture. (1.) From the inscriptions of most of the prophetical books and of the apostolical epistles, which run thus, "The word of the Lord that came to Hosea, to Joe], to Amos," &c. "Paul, Peter, James, &c., a servant of God and an apostle of Jesus Christ." (Hosea, Joel, Amos; Rom. i, 1; James i, 1; 1 Pet. i, 1.) (2.) From the introductions to many of the prophecies: "Thus saith the Lord,"That which I have received of the Lord, I have also delivered unto you." (Exod. v, 1; 1 Cor. xi, 23.) (3.) From the petitions, on the part of the ambassadors of God and of Christ, for Divine assistance, and from the promise of it which is given by God and Christ, such aid being necessary and sufficient to obtain authority for what was to be spoken. (Exod. iv, 1; Acts iv, 29, 30; Mark xvi, 17, 20.) (4.) From the method used by God himself, who, when about to deliver his law, introduced it thus: "I am the Lord thy God!" And who, when in the act of establishing the authority of his Son, said, "This is my beloved Son, hear ye Him." (Exod. xx, 1; Matt. xvii, 5.) This is acknowledged by the general consent of mankind. Minos, Numa, Lycurgus and Solon, were fully aware of it; for, to give some validity to their laws, they referred them to Gods or Goddesses, as the real authors.

IV. When this authority is once known, it binds the consciences of all those to whom the discourse or the writing is addressed or directed, to accept of it in a becoming manner. But whoever they be that receive it as if delivered by God, that approve of it, publish, preach, interpret and expound it, that also distinguish and discriminate it from words or writings which are supposititious and adulterated; these persons add not a tittle of authority to the sayings or writings, because their entire authority, whether contemplated separately or conjointly, is only that of mortal men; and things Divine neither need confirmation, nor indeed can receive it, from those which are human. But this whole employment of approving, preaching, explaining and discriminating, even when it is discharged by the Church Universal, is only an attestation by which she declares, that she holds and acknowledges these words or writings, and these alone, as Divine. (John xv, 22, 24; viii, 24; Gal. i, 8, 9; Ephes. ii, 20; Rev. xxi, 14; John i, 6, 7; v, 33-36; 1 Thess. ii, 13.)

V. Therefore, not only false, but likewise implying a contradiction, foolish and blasphemous, are such expressions as the following, employed by Popish writers:

"The Church is of greater antiquity than the Scriptures; and they are not authentic except by the authority of the Church." (ECCL Enchir. de Ecclesiastes) "All the authority which is now given to the Scriptures, is necessarily dependent on that of the Church." (PIGHIUS de Hierar. Eecles. lib. 2, c. 2.) "The Scriptures would possess no more validity than the Fables of Aesop, or any other kind of writing whatever, unless we believed the testimony of the Church." (HOSIUS de Author. Script. lib. 3.) But that "the Church is of greater antiquity than the Scriptures," is an argument which labours under a falsity in the antecedent and under a defective inference. For the Scriptures, both with regard to their significations and their expressions, are more ancient than the Church; and this former Church is bound to receive the latter sayings and writings of Isaiah, Jeremiah, &c., of Paul, Peter, &c., as soon as their Divine verity has been demonstrated by sufficient arguments according to the judgment of God. (Matt. xvi, 18; 1 Cor. iii, 9, 10.)

VI. But by the very arguments by which the Scriptures are Divine, they are also

[proved to be] Canonical, from the method and end of their composition, as containing the rule of our faith, charity, hope, and of the whole of our living. For they are given for doctrine, for reproof, for instruction, for correction, and for consolation; that is, that they may be the rule of truth and falsehood to our understanding, of good and evil to our affections, either to do and to omit, or to have and to want. (Deut.

xxvii, 26; Psalm cxix, 105,106; Rom. x, 8, 17; Matt. xxii, 37-40; 2 Tim. iii, 16; Rom.

xv, 4.) For as they are Divine because given by God, not because they are "received from men;" so they are canonical, and are so called in an active sense, because they prescribe a Canon or rule, and not passively, because they are reckoned for a Canon, or because they are taken into the Canon. So far indeed is the Church from rendering them authentic or canonical, that no assemblage or congregation of men can come under the name of a Church, unless they account the Scriptures authentic and canonical with regard to the sum or substance of the Law and Gospel. (Gal. vi, 16; 1

Tim. vi, 3, 4; Rom. xvi, 17; x, 8-10, 14-17.)

VII. The Second Question is, How can a persuasion be wrought in men, that these Scriptures are Divine? For the application of this question some things must be premised, which may free the discussion from equivocations, and may render it more easy. (1.) A distinction must be drawn between Scripture, (which, as a sign, consists of a word and of the writing of that word,) and the sense or meaning of Scripture; because it is not equally important which of the two is necessary to be known and believed, since it is Scripture on account of its meanings, and because there is a difference in the method of proof by which Divinity is ascribed to the writing itself and to its significations. (2.) A distinction must likewise be drawn between the primary cause of Scripture, and the instrumental causes; lest it be thought, that the same necessity exists for believing some book of Scripture to have been written by this or that particular amanuensis, as there is for believing it to have proceeded from God. (3.) The ratio of those meanings is dissimilar, since some of them are simply necessary to salvation, as containing the foundation and sum of religion; while others are connected with the former in no other way, than by a certain relation of explanation, proof, and amplification. (John viii, 24; v, 39, 46, 36; 1 Cor. xii, 3. 2

Corinthians ii, 4, 5; iii, 7-9; Matt. x, 20; 2 Cor. iii, 11, 12; Phil. iii, 15, 16; Col. ii, 16, 19.)

VIII. (4.) The persuasion of faith must be distinguished from the certainty of vision, lest a man, instead of seeking here for faith which is sufficiently powerful to prevail against temptations, should require certainty which is obnoxious to no temptation. (5.) A difference must be made between implicit faith by which this Scripture without any understanding of its significations is believed to be Divine, and explicit faith which consists of some knowledge of the meanings, particularly of those which are necessary. And this historical knowledge, which has only asfaleian mental security,

[or human certainty, Luke i, 4,] comes to be distinguished from saving knowledge, which also contains wlhroforian full assurance and wepoiqhsin confidence, on which the conscience reposes. This distinction must be made, that a correct judgment may be formed of those arguments which are necessary and sufficient for producing each of these kinds of faith. (6.) A difference must also be made between those arguments which are worthy of God, and those which human vanity may require. And such arguments must not here be demanded as cannot fail to persuade every one; since many persons denied all credence to Christ himself, though he bore testimony to his own doctrine by so many signs and wonders, virtues and distributions of the Holy Ghost. (7.) The external light, derived from arguments which are employed to effect suasion, must be distinguished from the internal light of the Holy Spirit bearing his own testimony; lest that which properly belongs to the latter, as the seal and the earnest or pledge of our faith, should be ascribed to the strength of arguments and to the veracity of external testimonies. (1 Cor. xiii, 9, 12; Gen. xv, 6, 8, with Rom. iv, 19-21; Judges vi, 36- 39; Heb. xi, 32, 33; John iii, 2, 10; James ii, 19; John v, 32-36; Matt. xiii, 2; Heb. vi, 11; x, 22; Ephes. iii, 12; Matt. xii, 38, 39; xvi, 1; Luke xvi, 30, 31; Matt. xxvii, 42; John xii, 37; Luke xxiv, 27, 44, 45; 2 Cor. i, 22; Ephes. i, 13, 14; John iv, 42.)

IX. (8.) A distinction must be drawn between (i.) those who heard God or Christ speaking to them Himself, or addressing them through angels, prophets, or apostles, and who first received the sacred books; and (ii.) those who, as their successors, have the Scriptures through their delivery. (Judges ii, 7, 10; Heb. ii, 3; John xx, 29.) For the former of these classes, miracles and the actual fulfillment of predictions, which occurred under their own observations, were capable of imparting credibility to the words and writing. But to the latter class, the narration, both of the doctrine, and of the arguments employed for its confirmation, is proposed in the Scriptures, and must be strengthened by its own arguments. (Isa. xliv, 7, 8; 1 Cor. xiv, XXII. ) (9.) A distinction may indeed be made between the truth of Scripture and its Divinity, that progress may be gradually made through a belief of the former to a belief in the latter.

But these two can never be disparted; because, if the Scriptures be true, they are of necessity Divine. (John iv, 39- 42; 1 Pet. i, 21.) (10.) Lastly. We must here reflect, that the secret things of God, and the doctrine of Christ in reference to its being from God, are revealed to little children, to the humble, to those who fear God, and to those who are desirous to do the will of the Father; (Matt. xi, 25; James iv, 6; Psalm xxv, 14; John vii, 17; 1 Cor. i, 20, 27;) and that, on the contrary, to the wise men of the world, to the proud, to those who reject the counsel of God against themselves and judge themselves unworthy of everlasting life, to foolish and perverse men, and to those who resist the Holy Ghost, the mystery of God and the Gospel of Christ are hidden and continue unrevealed; nay, to such persons they are a stumbling-block and foolishness, while they are in themselves the power and the wisdom of God. (Luke vii, 30; Acts xiii, 46; vii, 51; 2 Cor. iv, 3, 4; 1 Cor. i, 23, 24.) X. These remarks being premised, let us see how we are or can be persuaded into a belief that the Scriptures of the Old and of the New Testament are Divine, at least with regard to their essentials, that is, the sum or substance of the Law and Gospel, without faith in which, salvation can have no existence. Three things principally serve to produce this persuasion. (i.) The external testimony of men. (ii.) The arguments contained in the Scriptures themselves. (iii.) And the internal witness of God. The first of these, by procuring, after the manner of men, esteem and reverence to the Scriptures, prepares [or makes a way for] faith which is resolved into the two latter that are truly Divine, and, through them, is fully completed.

XI. 1. In adverting to human testimony, we shall omit all enemies, also the Mahometans who have embraced the dregs of a religion which is compounded of a corruption of Judaism, Christianity and Paganism. But the testimony of those who acknowledge the Scriptures is twofold. That of the Jews, who testify concerning the doctrine and the books of the Old Testament; and that of Christians who bear witness to those of the whole body of Scripture. (1.) Two circumstances add strength to the testimony of the Jews. (i.) The constancy of their profession in the very depths of misery, when, by the mere denial of it, they might be made partakers of liberty and of worldly possessions. (ii.) Their hatred of the Christian religion, which transcribes its own origin, increase, and establishment from a good part of the Scriptures of the Old Testament, and with so much confidence as to be prepared to stand and fall by their evidence and judgment alone. (Acts xxvi, 22; 9, 2 Pet. i, 19, 20; Acts xvii, 11.) (2.) The testimony of Christians. distinguished by the same mark of constancy, (Rev. vi, 9; xii, 11,) we will consider in three particulars: (i.) That of the Church Universal, which, from her own foundation to the present age, having professed the Christian as a Divine religion, testifies that her religion is contained in these books, and that they have proceeded from God. (ii.) That of each of the primitive Churches, which, being founded by the apostles, first received not only the whole of the Old Testament, but likewise the Epistles which were addressed either to them, to their pastors, or at least to men who were well known, and who delivered them by the same title to their successors and to other Churches. (Col. iv, 16.) (iii.) That of the Representative Church, as it is called, consisting of pastors and teachers, who, possessing skill in languages and in Divine things, pronounce their judgment after having instituted an examination, and confirm it [by arguments] to the flocks that are severally committed to their care. (Ephes. iv, 27.) On reviewing these diviunes, we place the Roman Pontiff below the lowest parochial priest in the Romish Church who may be more learned than his holiness.

XII. 2. The arguments contained in the Scripture are four, and those of the utmost importance. The quality of its doctrines, the majesty of its style, the agreement of its parts, and the efficacy of its doctrine. Each of these, separately considered, possesses much influence; but, when viewed conjointly, they are capable of inducing every one to give credit to them, if he is not blinded by a spirit of obstinacy, and by an opinion preconceived through inveterate habits. The Quality of the Doctrine is proved to be Divine. (1.) By the precepts delivered in these books, which exhibit three marks of Divinity. (i.) The high excellence of the actions prescribed, in self-denial, and in the regulation of the whole life according to godliness. (Matt. xvi, 24, 25; Rom. viii, 12, 13.) (ii.) The wonderful uncommonness of some actions, which amount to folly in the estimation of the natural man; and yet they are prescribed with a fearless confidence.

Such as, "Unless thou believest on Jesus, who is crucified and dead, thou shalt be condemned; if thou wilt believe on him, thou shalt be saved." (1 Cor. i, 18, 24; ii, 2, 14; John viii, 24; Rom. x, 9.) (iii.) The manner in which they are required to be performed, that they be done from conscience and charity; if otherwise, they will be adjudged as hypocritical. (Deut. vi, 5; 1 Cor. xiii, 1; James iv, 12; Rom. viii, 5; 1 Pet.

ii, 19.) In the first of these three is perceived a sanctity, in the second an omnipotence, and in the third an omniscience, each of which is purely Divine. (2.) By the promises and threatenings, which afford two tokens of Divine worth or validity. (i.) The manifest evidence, that they could have been delivered by no one except by God. (ii.) Their excellent accommodation, which is such that these promises and threatenings cannot possibly prove influential upon the conscience of any man, except upon his who considers the precepts, to which they are subjoined, to be Divine. (3.) The admirable attempering of the justice of God by which he loves righteousness and hates iniquity, and of his equity by which he administers all things, with his mercy in Christ our propitiation. In this, the glory of God shines forth with transcendent luster.

(Rom. v, 15.) Three particulars in it are worthy of notice. (i.) That, except through the intervention of a reconciler and mediator, God would not receive into favour the sinner, through love for whom as his own creature he is touched with mercy. (ii.) That his own dearly beloved Son, begotten by Himself and discharging an office of perfect righteousness, God would not admit as a deprecator and intercessor, except when sprinkled with his own blood. (2 Cor. v, 19; Ephes. ii, 12, 16; Heb. viii, 5, 6; ix, 7, 11, 12.) (iii.) That he constituted Christ as a saviour only to those who repent and believe, having excluded the impenitent from all hope of pardon and salvation. (Heb. iii, 8, 19; v, 8, 9; Luke xxiv, 26; Rom. viii, 29.) (4.) A most signal and decisive proof, which serves to demonstrate the necessity and sufficiency of this doctrine, exists in this fact, that Jesus himself did not enter into his glory except through obedience and sufferings, that this was done for believers alone who were to be conformed to him, (Heb. x, 21, 22; iv, 14-16; John xvii, 2, 8,) and that, on being received into Heaven, He was constituted Governor over the house of God, the King of his people, and the dispenser of life eternal.

XIII. The Majesty of Their Style is proved. (1.) By the attributes which the Author of the Scriptures claims for himself; the transcendent elevation of his nature, in his omniscience and omnipotence; (Isa. xliv, 7, 8; xli, 12, 25, 26; Psalm i, 1,) the excellence of his operations, which they claim for Him as the Creator and Governor of all things; the preeminence of power, which they claim for Him as the King of kings and Lord of lords. (2.) By the absence of all "respect of persons" which is not under the influence of favour and hatred, of hope and fear, and by which God declares himself to be the same towards all men, whatever station they may occupy, uttering his commands and prohibitions, his promises and threatenings, to monarchs, (Deut.

xviii, 15, 16; 1 Sam. xii, 25,) as well as to the meanest among the people, to whole nations and to single individuals, and even to the rulers of darkness, the princes of this world, Satan and his angels, and thus to the whole universe of his creatures. (3.) By the method which he employs in making a law and in giving it his sanction. It has no other introduction than, "I Jehovah am thy God;" no other conclusion than, "I Jehovah have spoken."Be strong, for I am with thee; fear not, for I will deliver thee." Either He who speaks, truly claims these attributes for himself, and so his discourse is Divine, (Exod. xx, 2; Josh. i, 9; Isa. xliii, 5; Jer. i, 8; Deut. iv, 5,) or (let no blasphemy adhere to the expression,) it is of all foolish speeches the most foolish. Between these two extremes no medium exists. But in the whole of the Scriptures not a single tittle occurs, which will not remove from them by an invincible argument the charge of folly.

XIV. The Agreement Between Each And Every Part of The Scriptures, prove with sufficient evidence, their Divinity, because such an agreement of its several parts can be ascribed to nothing less than the Divine Spirit. It will be useful for the confirmation of this matter to consider (1.) The immense space of time which was occupied in the inditing of it, from the age of Moses, down to that of St. John, to whom was vouchsafed the last authentic revelation. (Mal. iv, 4; Jer. xxviii, 8; John v, 46.) (2.) The multitude of writers or amanuenses, and of books. (3.) The great distance of the places in which the books were severally written, that tendered it impossible for the authors to confer together. (4.) Lastly and principally, the institution of a comparison between the doctrine of Moses and that of the latter Prophets, as well as between that of the Old and that of the New Testament. The predictions of Moses alone concerning the Messiah, the calling of the Gentiles, and the rejection of the Jews, when compared with the interpretations and with the addition of particular circumstances which are found in the Prophets and the Psalms, will prove that the perfect agreement which exists between the various writers is Divine. (Gen. xlix, 10; Deut. xxxii, 21; Dan. ix, 25, 26; Mal. i, 10, 11; Psalm 2, 22, 110 132; Matt. 1, 2, 24, 27; Luke i, 55, 70; xxiv, 27, 44.) To the Divinity of the agreement between the writings of the Old Testament and those of the New, abundant testimony will be afforded even solely by that sudden, unexpected and miraculously consentaneous accommodation and befitting aptitude of all the predictions respecting the Messiah, the gathering of the Gentiles to Him, the unbelief and rejection of the Jews, and lastly concerning the abrogation which was to be made of the ceremonial law, first by its being fulfilled, and afterwards by its forcible removal. Whether these predictions were foretold in words, or foreshown by types of things, persons, facts and events; their accommodation to the person, the advent, the state, the offices, and the times of Jesus of Nazareth, was consentaneous even to a miracle. (Psalm cxviii, 22, 23; Matt. xxi, 42; Isa. lxv, 1; Acts xi, 18; Psalm xl, 7, 8; Dan. ix, 25, 26.) If the Old Testament alone, or only the New, were now extant, some doubts might be indulged concerning the Divinity of each. But their agreement together excludes all doubt respecting their Divinity, when both of them are thus completely in accordance, since it is impossible for such a perfect agreement to have been the fabrication of an angelic or of a human mind.

XV. Lastly, the Divinity of Scripture is powerfully demonstrated by The Efficacy of Its Doctrine, which we place in two particulars. In the credit or belief which it has obtained in the world, and in the destruction of remaining religions and of the entire kingdom of Satan. Of this destruction two most signal tokens were afforded, in the silencing of the Heathen Oracles, and in the removal of idols. (1 Tim. iii, 15; Zech.

xiii, 2; Zeph. ii, 11; Acts xvi, 16, 17.) This efficacy is recommended, (1.) By the peculiar genius of the doctrine, which, independently of the Divine power which accompanies and assists it, is calculated to repel every one from giving his assent to it, on account of the apparent absurdity in it, and the concupiscence of human passions which is abhorrent to it. For this is the manner in which it speaks: "Unless thou dost believe in Jesus the Crucified, and art prepared to pour out thy life for him, thou shalt lose thy soul." (Isa. liii, 1; 2 Cor. i, 2; 2 Tim. iii, 12.) (2.) By the persons through whom the doctrine was administered, and who, in the estimation of men, were few in number, mean in condition, and full of infirmities; while in God's sight, they were possessed of invincible patience and mildness, which were so conspicuous in Him who was the Prince of all, that He asked some of his familiar disciples who were offended at his doctrine, "Will ye also go away?" (Luke vi, 13; Matt. iv, 18, 19; 2 Cor.

4, xii, 12; 2 Tim. iv, 2; John 6, 67.) (3.) By the multitude, the wisdom, the authority, and the power of the enemies who placed themselves in opposition to this doctrine.

Also by their love for the religion of their own country, and their consequent hatred of this novel doctrine, and by the result of both these, in their infuriated and outrageous eagerness to extirpate the Christians and their doctrine. It was opposed by the Roman empire itself nearly three hundred years, during which the rest of the world lent their assistance. This continued opposition was excited by the Jews, nay by Satan himself, who had fixed his throne in that empire. (1 Cor. ii, 8; Acts iv, 27; ix, 2; Matt. x, l 8-22; John xvi, 2; Ephes. vi, 12; Rev. ii, 10, 13.) (4.) By the infinite multitude of men of every description, nation, age, sex and condition, who have believed this doctrine, and confirmed their belief by enduring intolerable torments even unto death. This cannot be ascribed, except through an ambitious insanity, either to ambition or to fury in such a multitude of persons of various descriptions. (Rev. vi, 9-11.) (5.) By the short time in which, like lightning, it pervaded a great part of the habitable world; so that Paul alone filled all the places between Jerusalem and Illyricum with the Gospel of Christ.

(Col. i, 6; Rom. xv, 19.)

XVI. 3. These suasions are of themselves alone sufficient to produce an historical faith, but not that which is saving. To them, therefore, must be added the internal suasion of God by his Holy Spirit, which has its scope of operations, (1.) In the illumination of the mind, that we may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect will of God; that we may knew the things which are freely given to us of God, and that Jesus Christ is the wisdom and the power of God. (1 Cor. iii, 7; Ephes. i, 17, 18; Rom. xii, 9; 1 Cor. ii, 12; i, 24; xii, 3.) (2.) In inscribing the laws of God upon our hearts, which consists of the infusion of a desire and of strength for their performance.

(Heb. viii, 10.) (3.) In sealing the promises of God on our hearts; under which term, that by which we are sealed to the day of redemption is called a seal, and an earnest.

(2 Cor. i, 22; Ephes. i, 13,14.) In this manner he who inspired the sacred Scriptures into holy men of God, who constituted in the Church, Bishops, Apostles, Prophets, Evangelists, Pastors and Teachers, who put the word of reconciliation into their mouths, is the Author of that faith by which this doctrine is apprehended unto righteousness and eternal salvation. (Acts xx, 28; Ephes. iv, 11; 2 Cor. v, 19; Rom.

viii, 16.) Since his testimony is distinct from that of a man's own spirit, and since it is said to be concerning those things which are necessary to salvation, and not concerning words, letters, or writing, the Papists act most perversely in confounding these testimonies, and in requiring through the witness of the Spirit [of God] the distinction between an apocryphal verse, and one that is canonical, though the former may in reality agree with the canonical Scriptures.

XVII. But, that we may comprise in few words the force of these three proofs, we declare, 1. concerning the force of human testimony which ascribes our Scriptures to God, that the author of no composition which ever was published or is now extant can be proved with such lucid evidence as the author of these Scriptures; and that the importance of all other compositions sinks far beneath the dignity of this, not only with regard to the multitude, the wisdom and the integrity of the witnesses, but likewise with regard to the uninterrupted evenness, the constancy and the duration of the testimony. The reason this is, that the religion contained in these Scriptures has been preached to immense numbers and varieties of people, and for a very long period; which circumstance, in itself, contains no small argument of Divinity. For it is most equitable, that religion, which alone is truly Divine, and which, without any respect of nations, it is God's will that men should receive, ought also to be preached generally to all mankind. (Matt. xxviii, 19, 20; Mark xvi, 15; Rom. x, 12-18.) XVIII. 2. We assert, that the arguments which, contained in the Scriptures, prove the Divinity of the religion prescribed in them, are so full and perfect, that no arguments can be derived for the defense of any religion which are not comprehended in these, and in a more excellent degree. (2 Cor. iv, 2- 6.) They are indeed of such high value that the truth of the Christian religion is established by them as strongly, as it is possible by any other arguments to prove that there is any true religion at all, or that a true one is possible. So that to a man who is desirous of proving, that there is any religion which is true, or that such a religion is possible, no way is more compendious and easy than to do so by these arguments, in preference to any other which can be deduced from general notions. But the most wonderful of all is, that the very thing in the Christian religion which seems to be one of the greatest absurdity, affords the most certain proof of its Divinity, it being allowed to be a very great truth -- that this religion has been introduced into the consciences of men by a mild suasion, and not by the power of the sword. (1 Cor. i, 29-xxiv, ; 2 Cor. v, 11; Luke ix, 54, 55.) Of a similar tendency is the argument formerly used by St. Augustine: "If the Christian religion was established by the miracles which are related in the Scriptures, it is true; but if it was not, the greatest of all miracles is, that it has been able to obtain credit without miracles." For the internal suasion of Him who alone can work miracles, ought to stand in the place of miracles outwardly performed, and to be equally potent.

(Rev. ii, 17.) And thus the very narration, contained in these books, of the miracles which were performed in the early ages in proof of the doctrine, is now, through a most beautiful vicissitude of circumstances, proved to be true by the Divinity of the doctrine when subjected to examination.

XIX. Although the inward witness of the Holy Spirit is known to him alone to whom it is communicated, yet, since there is a mutual relation between the veracity of the Testifier, and the truth of the thing which is proved, an examination may be instituted respecting the testimony itself. This is so far from being injurious or displeasing to the Holy Ghost, that by this method His veracity is rendered in all possible directions more eminently conspicuous, as being the Author not only of the internal testimony and the external word, but likewise of the significations concerning which he bears witness to both; on this account also, he has commanded us to "try the spirits whether they be of God," and has added a specimen of such a "trying." (1 John iv, 1, 2.) It will therefore be as easy to confute the man who falsely boasts of having the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, as to be able to destroy that religion to which he professes himself to be devoted. From this it is apparent, that the inward witness of the Spirit is calculated to impart assurance to him to whom it is communicated, but not to convince any other person. Wherefore those who reckon this among the causes why they account the Scriptures Divine, are foolishly said by the Papists to beg the question, since they never employ it themselves in convincing others.

DISPUTATION 2

ON THE SUFFICIENCY AND PERFECTION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES IN

OPPOSITION TO TRADITIONS RESPONDENT: ABRAHAM VLIET

I. When we ascribe Perfection to the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, we do not mean by that word, the perfection described by the Apostle in 1 Corinthians xiii, 10; for the latter is peculiar to the life to come, in which "God will be all in all." (1

Cor. xv, 28.) Neither do we understand by it a certain absolute quality which is equally dispersed through the whole body of Scripture and each of its parts, and which cannot be withdrawn from the Scriptures by any man who confesses that they have proceeded from God, their most perfect Author. (Psalm xix, 7-9; Rom. vii, 12.) Nor do we mean such a perfection as may embrace all things generally and severally, of what description soever they are, which have at any time been inspired into "holy men," and published by them to the Church. (2 Tim. iii, 16, 17.) But by this expression we understand a relative Perfection, which, for the sake of a particular purpose, agrees with the Scriptures as with an instrument, and according to which they perfectly comprehend all things that have been, are now, or ever will be necessary for the salvation of the Church.

II. We are compelled, both by the truth of the thing itself, of which we shall hereafter treat, and by a kind of necessity, to establish this perfection of Scripture: because, without this, we shall be forced, for the sake of obtaining entire salvation, to have recourse to other revelations of God, already made, or afterwards to be communicated; but our attempt will prove abortive, unless the Divinity of these additional revelations be established by indubitable arguments. Those [new]

revelations which are said to have been already made, have never yet been demonstrated in this manner; and it will be impossible to produce any such demonstrative evidence in support of those which, it is asserted, will afterwards occur.

III. But, that we may be able to establish this perfection of Scripture in a solid manner, and as if from the very foundation, we will take a brief view of the perfection of Divine revelations in general. For, by this means, we shall not only remove the error of those who entertain a different opinion, but shall also expose and shut up the source from which it is derived. We now use the expression, "Divine revelation," for the act of reveling, not for what is revealed; and we say, Divine revelation is internal, which, with the Scriptures themselves, we distinguish by the general term,

"inspiration;" and that it is external by means of the enunciation or the inditing of the words spoken or revealed. Perfection, therefore, is withdrawn from the Scriptures, either in these revelations, or in those which preceded them, in the subjoined order and method.

IV. (1.) The perfect inspiration given to the prophets and apostles, who are the administrators of the Scriptures, is denied; and the necessity and frequent occurrence of new revelations after those holy men, are openly asserted. (2.) Even when this perfection is conceded, the possibility is denied of making a perfect enunciation of the inspired signification or sense by means of the outward word. The reason assigned is, that the ratio of those Divine meanings which are necessary to be known for the perfect consummation of our salvation, is diverse. For while some of them serve for the instruction of the ignorant and of babes in Christ, and for preparing their minds; others are useful for perfecting adults, and for imbuing and filling their minds with the plenary wisdom of the Spirit; and while the former class of Divine meanings [for the ignorant, &c.] may be made manifest and taught by the external word, the latter class can be offered to the minds [of adults,] and impressed upon them, only by the internal address of the Spirit. (3.) When the perfect inspiration and enunciation of all the divine meanings have been granted, it is denied that the Scriptures perfectly contain whatever has been inspired and declared that is necessary to salvation; because, as it is alleged, it was not the intention of the Spirit who inspired them, or of his amanuensis, to consign all those necessary things in writing to posterity.

V. Since these three negatives hold the following order and relation among themselves, when the first two, or when either of them is established, the third may likewise be granted, and when the third is destroyed, its predecessors may be removed, having effected the destruction of the third, we might seem to have given complete satisfaction, if we had not thought proper, according to our promise, to remove the causes of the error, and thus to cut off from the adversaries all occasion for complaining, that we had treated the controversy not according to its nature, but for the convenience of our own design and for the sake of Victoria. Wherefore to these three negatives we oppose affirmatively the following three most veritable enunciations: (1.) All things which have been, are now, or till the consummation of all things, will be necessary to be known for the salvation of the Church, have been perfectly inspired and revealed to the prophets and apostles. (2.) All things thus necessary have been administered and declared by the prophets and apostles, according to this inspiration, by the outward word, to the people who have been committed to them. (3.) All things thus necessary are fully and perfectly comprehended in their books.

VI. From this deduction it is apparent, that the acts of revelation are distinguished from the significations revealed, and yet that the matters or subjects and the significations agree with the different acts of revelation. This distinction meets the objection of the Mystics, who insist that the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit is always necessary. This we concede with respect to the act of revelation, but not with respect to the subjects and new significations. The agreement between the subjects and meanings, and the acts of revelation, refutes the Papists, who affirm, that the Church was before the Scripture, because the inditing of the word which had been previously pronounced, was posterior to the Church." This, however, is not a necessary consequence, if the same meanings be comprehended in the written word and in that which was pronounced.

VII. (1.) Commencing therefore with the proof of the first of our three affirmative propositions, (§ 5,) and, for the sake of brevity, laying aside the perfection of the revelation made under the Old Testament, we will proceed to shew, that all things necessary in the manner which we have described have been inspired into the apostles, and that no new inspiration has since their times been communicated, and that it will not be in the future. We prove this in the following manner: (1.) By express passages of Scripture; (2.) by arguments deduced from them. The first passage is,

"The Holy Ghost shall teach you all things, whatsoever I have said unto you." (John xiv, 26.) From the former part of this passage we obtain the whole of our proposition: for he who "teaches all things" omits nothing that ought to be taught. The same proof is derived from the latter part of it, if it be evident that Christ told "all things" to his disciples, which is demonstrated by these his own words: "All things which I have heard of my Father, I have made known unto you." (John xv, 15.) But he "who is in the bosom of the Father," has heard of all things which ought to be revealed. "For I have given unto them the words which thou gavest me." (John xvii, 8.) VIII. The second passage is, "The spirit of truth will guide you into all truth." (John xvi, 13.) The efficacy of this teaching will shine forth with more splendid evidence, if we suffer ourselves to be instructed by Christ in that truth through which, according to his prayer, not only the apostles, but likewise the whole Church to the end of the world, will be sanctified. (John xvii, 17-20.)

IX. The third is, "But God will reveal it unto us by his Spirit," (1 Cor. ii, 10,) that is, the wisdom which is there specified. But that no one may suppose this wisdom to be partial and serving the Church only for a certain time, let him examine the attributes which are there assigned to it. It is the wisdom which God pre-determined from all eternity, and foreordained "unto the glory" of the Church Universal, for this is meant by the word "our" in the phraseology of the apostles. (v. 7.) It is the wisdom which contains "the things that God hath prepared for ALL them who love him," and not for them only who lived in the apostolic age: (v. 9.) The wisdom which contains "the deep things of God," (v. 10,) all those "things that are freely given to us of God," as his Church, (v. 12,) and that are called, in another passage, (Ephes. iii, 8,) "The unsearchable riches of Christ." It is that wisdom which is called "the mind of the Lord, and the knowledge of which is said to be the knowledge of the mind of Christ."

(1 Cor. ii, 16.) It is the wisdom of which "those alone who are perfect and spiritual"

are said to be capable, (v, 6, 14, 15,) that it might not seem to be serviceable only for the preparatory instruction of the more ignorant sort, and of babes in Christ." [See §

4.] The passages already cited may suffice.

X. From among many others, let the following be received as the reasons: The First is taken from the joint consideration of the glorification of Christ, and the promise of the Holy Spirit, who was bestowed after the glorification of Christ, and who was poured forth by Him. (John vii, 38, 39.) The most copious effusion of the Holy Spirit was deferred to the time when Christ should be glorified. After his glorification, it was necessary, that it should not be any longer delayed; for Christ, "being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received the promised Holy Spirit," (Acts ii, 33,) and that "not by measure," (John iii, 34, 35,) "he shed him forth" in such copious abundance, as it was possible for him to be poured out, and to be received by mankind. So that the event which had been predicted by the prophet Joel (ii, 28,) is said then to have come to pass. (Acts ii, 16, 17.) This Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and of Christ alone; and he will plead the cause of no one except that of Christ, through the entire duration of the present life, as his Advocate against the world.

(John xvi, 7, 8.) "he will not speak of himself" but from Christ; and he will "shew us those things which are Christ's, and which He will receive from him. He will therefore glorify Christ." (13-15.) From these premises it follows, that no new inspiration, after that to the apostles, will be necessary to salvation; and that what is said about the distinct periods of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, with regard to a revelation, is a pure invention of the human brain. By this argument, all new inspirations are refuted, with such soundness and so agreeably to the nature of the thing itself, that the doctrine which maintains the contrary cannot possibly defend itself without inventing another Christ and another Spirit; (which is a notable trait in the conduct of the great masters among the Mystics;) or it must at least substitute for Christ His vicar on earth, who, invested with plenary power, may administer the affairs of the church, as is the practice of the Papists.

XI. The Second reason is taken from the office of the Apostles, for the discharge of which, because they were immediately called by Christ himself, they were undoubtedly furnished with sufficient gifts, and therefore with sufficient knowledge.

But they were constituted "able ministers of the "New Testament;" (2 Cor. iii, 6,) to which as a Testament, nothing can be added; (Gal. iii, 15;) and, as New, it will neither

"wax old" nor be abrogated; (Heb. viii, 13;) after the apostles, therefore, no new inspiration will be given. They were also made ministers of the Spirit;" they were therefore instructed by inspiration in those meanings which agree with the most perfect Christians, and not with those only who are placed under the law and "the oldness of the letter." To them was also committed "the ministration of righteousness;" but this was the last of all, on account of being that which is immediately connected with life eternal, and which is likewise administered by righteousness. The apostles are also called "reapers," with regard to the prophets who were the sowers;" (John iv, 38;) but this last service was to be performed in the field of the Lord. After the apostles, therefore, no new ministration has been given; and, on this account, no new inspiration.

XII. The Third reason is drawn from the circumstance of the period at which this inspiration was communicated to the apostles, and which may be considered in two respects. (1.) It was in the time of the Messiah, which is called the last," being truly the last time with regard to a revelation. "And it shall come to pass in the last days, I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh." (Acts ii, 17.) "When the Messiah is come, he will tell us all things." (John iv, 25.) "God hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son." (Heb. i, 2.) To the same effect Christ is said to have been made, "manifest in these last times." (1 Pet. i, 20.) (2.) That was "the time appointed of the Father," in which "the heir" should be no longer "as a child, under a tutor;" (Gal. iv, 1- 5;) but, having arrived at full age, he might pass his life under the grace and guidance of the Holy Spirit; by whom, as "the Spirit of liberty," being illuminated, he might "with open face behold as in a glass the glory of the Lord, and be transformed into the same image from glory to glory." (2 Cor. iii, 17, 18.) After the apostles, therefore, no new inspiration, no greater perfection has been granted.

XIII. The Fourth reason will exhibit to us the glory and duration of the doctrine inspired and committed to the apostles. For it greatly excels in glory, as being "the gospel of the glory of Christ" (2 Cor. iv, 4,) who is the image of God, "the brightness of the glory, and the express character of the person, of the Father," (Heb. i, 3.) and

"in whom it pleased the Father that all fullness should dwell."(Col. i, 19) indeed "all the fullness of the Godhead bodily." (ii, 9.) The law was not at all glorious, "by reason of this glory which excelled it." (2 Cor. iii, 10.) From these premises it will follow, by parity of reason, that, if the more excellent doctrine shall continue forever, no future doctrine "will have any glory by reason of this which excelleth in glory." Its duration also excludes all others: for it remains without being abolished, (2 Cor. iii, 11,)and will be preached in all the world till the end shall come," (Matt. xxiv, 14;) and Christ promises to those who administer this doctrine, that he "will be with them always, even unto the end of the world." (xxviii, 20.)

XIV. We will distinctly prove the second proposition [§ 5,] thus separated into two members. First. Those things which serve for perfection, as well as those which serve for preparation, can be and really have been declared by Christ and the apostles.

Second. The apostles perfectly taught all things which are and will be necessary for the Church.

XV. Let the subjoined arguments stand in proof of the First member of the proposition. (1.) "The Son who is in the bosom of the Father," that is, who is admitted to the intimate knowledge of his secrets, "hath declared," by the outward word, "what He hath seen and heard" with the Father. (John i, 18; iii, 32.) But it is impious to suppose, that these things relate only to preparation. Nay, "the things which the apostles saw and heard they have declared," that the Church "might have communion with the Father and the Son." But perfection is placed in this communion. (1 John i, 3.) The wisdom which the apostles received through revelation of the Spirit, who

"searcheth the deep things of God," has been declared by them "in words which the same Holy Spirit teacheth." (1 Cor. ii, 18.) But this wisdom belongs to perfect and spiritual men, (1 Cor. ii, 6-15,) as we have already. seen. [§ 9.]

XVI. (3.) The word, through faith in which righteousness and eternal life are obtained, is not only preparative but likewise perfective. Of this kind is "the word of faith which the apostles preached;" and for this reason the gospel is called "the ministration of righteousness,"the word of salvation," and "the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth." (Rom. x, 8-10; 1 Cor. i, 21; 2 Cor. iii, 9; Acts xiii, 26; Rom. i, 16.) (4.) The ministration of the Spirit and of the New Testament is opposed to that of Moses, which acted the part of a school master, yet "made nothing perfect" (Heb. vii, 19,) and to "the letter" of death and of the Old Testament. This ministration of the Spirit does not serve for preparation, but contains perfection; and this is the ministration which the apostles executed, and from which they are called ministers of the New Testament and of the Spirit, (2 Cor. vi, 7,) and are said to present every man perfect in Christ Jesus. (Col. i, 8.) (5.) That word which is called "the incorruptible seed, of which we are born again, and which endureth forever," (1 Pet. i, 23-25,) is not merely preparatory. And such is the word which through the gospel the apostles have declared.

XVII. Let the following arguments establish the Second member. (1.) The whole counsel of God, which is to be "declared unto men," (Luke vii, 30,) contains all things necessary to salvation. But Paul declared to the Ephesians "all the counsel of God."

(Acts xx, 27.) Therefore all things necessary to salvation were declared, &c. (2.) The Corinthians are saved by the gospel which Paul preached, provided they retain it as they received it. (1 Cor. xv, 1, 2.) Therefore, all things necessary to salvation were preached to the Corinthians. (3.) "Salvation at the first began to be spoken by Christ,"

and, after having been perfectly preached by him, "it was confirmed unto us by the apostles that heard him." (Heb. ii, 3.) Therefore the doctrine of the apostles perfectly contained all things which the necessary confirmation of the Church demanded.

XVIII. And lest any one should utter this cavil, "The Apostles, we allow, taught all the things which were necessary at that time, but not all those which are sufficient for the edification of the body of Christ to the end of the world," let the following arguments likewise be added. (4.) Whoever he be that "preaches any other gospel"

than that which the apostles preached, and which the apostolic churches received, "he is accursed." (Gal. i, 7-9.) Therefore it is not lawful to add anything to the gospel preached by the apostles, to the end of the world. Indeed, he who makes an addition,

"has perverted the gospel of Christ." (5.) In Christ Jesus, or "in the mystery of God, and of the Father, and of Christ, are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." (Col. ii, 2 3.)

But Jesus Christ and this mystery were completely preached by the apostles. (i, 25-28.) "Jesus Christ has been made unto us of God, wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption;" (1 Cor. i, 30, 31;)

from which the apostle concludes, that true glorying consists in the knowledge of Christ alone. (Jer. ix, 24.) Therefore the doctrine taught by the apostles contains whatever will, at any time to the end of the world, be necessary, useful and glorious to the church. (6.) The Church Universal is "built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets," (Ephes. ii, 20, 21;) and the apostles are called "the foundations of the celestial Jerusalem," (Rev. xxi, 14,) which is the mother of us all." (Gal. iv, 26.) Therefore, the apostles have declared all things which will be necessary for the whole church to the final consummation. (7.) "There is one body of Christ, the fullness of Him that filleth all in all; one Spirit, one hope of our calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one bread, one God and Father of all, and Jesus Christ the same yesterday, to-day, and forever." (Ephes. iv, 4-6; i, 23; 1 Cor. x, 17; Heb. xiii, 8.) But the apostles perfectly preached this God, this Lord, this Spirit, this faith, hope, baptism and bread, and by their doctrine animate and vivify this whole body to the end of the world. (Col.

i, 24, 25.) Therefore the church ought "not to be carried about with divers and strange doctrines." (Heb. xiii, 9.)

XIX. The last proposition remains to be discussed. It commends to us the perfection of the prophetical and apostolical Scriptures; and for establishing it we produce the following arguments. (1.) This perfection is taught in the express testimonies of Scripture, which prohibit any addition to be made to those things which the Lord has commanded; and the same scriptures teach, in a manner the most convincing, that these testimonies must be understood concerning the written word. (Deut. iv, 2; 12, 28; xxx, 10- 14; xxviii, 58; Josh. i, 7, 8.) The apostle therefore requires, that "no one be wise above what is written," (1 Cor. iv, 6;) and he who tells the Ephesians, "I have not shunned to declare unto you all the counsel of God," (Acts xx, 27,) confesses, that

"he said none other things than those which the prophets and Moses did say should come." (Acts xxvi, 22.)

XX. (2.) This perfection is also established by the very object and matter of the saving doctrine. This is done by various methods. (i.) The entire matter of the saving doctrine consists of "the truth which is after godliness;" (Tit. i, 1.) But the Scripture perfectly delivers this truth, for it is concerning God and Christ, and the manner in which He is to be known, acknowledged and worshipped. (1 Chron. xxviii, 9; John xvii, 3; v, 23.) (ii.) The Scripture perfectly delivers the doctrine of faith, hope, and charity. But in those acts is contained whatsoever God requires of us. (1 John v, 13; Timothy iii, 16; Rom. xv, 4; 1 Thess. i, 3; Tit. ii, 12, 13.) (3.) They are called "the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament," because in them both these parts are completely comprehended. But nothing can be added to a Testament: nay, the testament of a prudent testator fully contains his last will, according to which he wishes the distribution of his property to be made, and his heirs to regulate their conduct. (2 Cor.

iii, 6; Gal. iii, 15; Jer. xxxi, 31-34; xxxii, 38-40; Gal. iv, 1, 2.) But the whole of the saving doctrine consists of a description of the beneficence of God towards us, and of our duty towards God. (4.) The division of all this saving doctrine into the LAW and the GOSPEL, as into parts which draw forth the amplitude of the whole, proves the same thing, since both of them are perfectly contained in the Scriptures. (Luke xvi, 16; Josh i, 8; Luke i, 1-4; Rom. i, 2-6; Acts xxvi, 22, 23.) XXI. (3.) The same perfection is proved from the end and efficacy of the whole of the saving doctrine. If the Scriptures propose this entire end and perfectly accomplish it, there is no reason why we should call a doctrine, in what manner soever it may be proposed, more perfect than the Scriptures. But they entirely intend this end and efficaciously produce it. (Rom. x, 4-10.) "This is his commandment, that we should believe on the name of his Son Jesus Christ, and love one other." (1 John iii, 23.)

"These things are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ," &c. (John xx, 31.) "These things have I written unto you, that ye may know that ye have eternal life, and that ye may believe on the name of the Son of God." (1 John v, 9-13.) "On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." (Matt. xxii, 37-40.) "Search the Scriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life." (John v, 39.) The Scriptures prevent men from going down into the place of the damned; (Luke xvi, 27-30) and they prevent this sad consequence without the addition of any other doctrine whatsoever. For they render a man "wise unto salvation through faith, and perfectly furnished unto all good works." (2 Tim. iii, 15-17.)

XXII. (4.) This is also confirmed by the mode of speaking usually employed by holy men of God, and by the Scriptures themselves; according to which they indiscriminately use the term "Prophets" for the writings of the prophets, "the word of prophecy" for the prophetic Scriptures, and, on the contrary, "the Scriptures" for the prophets and for God himself; by which is signified that the word of God and of the prophets is completely one with the Scriptures; and that this word in its amplitude does not exceed the Scriptures with regard to those things which are necessary. Thus it is said, "King Agrippa, believest thou the prophets?." (Acts xxvi, 27,) that is, the writings of the prophets. (Luke xvi, 29.) "We have a more sure word of prophecy,"

that is, the word which is comprehended in the writings of the prophets: for it is soon afterwards called "prophecy of Scripture." (2 Pet. i, 19, 20.) "Beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he interpreted to them in all the Scriptures what they say concerning Himself." (Luke xxiv, 27.) And, on the contrary, "The Scripture saith unto Pharaoh,"

(Rom. ix, 17,) that is, God said it by Moses. (Exod. ix, 16.) "The Scripture hath concluded all under sin." (Gal. iii, 22.) "For God hath concluded them all in unbelief."

(Rom. xi, 32.) "The Scripture, foreseeing that God, &c., preached before the Gospel unto Abraham." (Gal. iii, 8; Gen. xii, 2, 3.)

XXIII. (5.) In the last place we add the following: No subject can be mentioned, by the sole knowledge or the worship of which the church ought to bedeck herself with increased honour and dignity, and which subject is not comprehended in the Holy Scriptures. Neither can any attribute be produced agreeing with any subject of this kind, which it is necessary for the church to know about that subject, or for her to perform to it, and which the Scriptures do not attribute to that subject: (John v, 39; Rom. i, 3; Luke xxiv, 27.) Whence it follows, that the Scripture contains all things necessary to be known for the salvation of the Church, and for the glory of God. The Papists indeed speak and write many things about Mary, the rest of the saints, and about the Roman Pontiff; but we affirm, that these are not objects either of any knowledge or worship which the church ought to bestow on them. And those things which the Papists attribute to them, are such as, according to the sure judgment of the scriptures, cannot be attributed to them without sacrilege and a perversion of the gospel of Christ.

XXIV. We conclude, then, that all things which have been, are now, or to the final consummation will be necessary for the salvation of the church, have been of old perfectly inspired, declared and written; and that no other revelation or tradition, than those which have been inspired, declared and contained in the scriptures, is necessary to the salvation of the church. (2 Tim. iii, 16; Matt. iv, 3, 4; xxii, 29 Acts xviii, 28.) Indeed we assert, that whatsoever relates to the doctrine of truth is so perfectly comprehended in the scriptures, that all those things which are brought either directly or indirectly against this truth are capable of being refuted, in a manner the clearest and most satisfactory, from the Scriptures themselves alone. This asseveration we take with such solemnity and yet assurance of mind, that as soon as anything has been proved not to be contained in the scriptures, from this very circumstance we infer that thing not to be necessary to salvation; and whenever it is evident, that any sentiment cannot be refuted by the Scriptures, we judge from this that it is not heretical. When, therefore, the Papists sedulously attempt to destroy the whole perfection of Scripture by specimens of articles, which they call necessary, but which are not proved from Scripture, and by those which they consider heretical but which are not confuted from Scripture the sole result of their endeavours is, that we cannot conclude with any certainty the former to be necessary and the latter heretical.

XXV. In the mean time we do not deny, that the apostles delivered to the churches some things which related to the external discipline, order and rites to be observed in them, and which have not been written, or at least are not comprehended in those of their books which we call "Canonical." (1 Cor. xi, 34) But those things do not concern the substance of saving doctrine; and are neither necessary to salvation, perpetual, immutable, nor universal, but accommodated to the existing state and circumstances of the church.

XXVI. We likewise confess, that individual churches, or great numbers, or even all of them, if they can agree together in unity, may frame certain ritual Canons relative to their mutual order and decorum, (1 Cor. xiv, 40,) and to the discharge of those functions which minister to edification; provided those rites be neither contrary to the written word, superstitious, nor difficult of observance in consequence of being numerous and burdensome. (Col. ii, 8; Acts xv, 10, 28.) This proviso is needful to prevent those rites from being considered as a part of Divine worship, or from becoming prejudicial to the liberty of the church, whose equitable "power" in abrogating, changing, or amplifying them, is always subservient to "edification and not to destruction." (1 Cor. xiv, 5, 26; 2 Cor. xiii, 10.) In this sense we admit the distinction of Traditions into Written and Unwritten, Apostolical and Ecclesiastical; and we call those men "violators of order," (2 Thess. iii, 6; 1 Cor. xiv, 32, 33,) who oppose ecclesiastical canons that are constituted in this manner, or exclaim against them by their own private authority.

DISPUTATION 3

ON THE SUFFICIENCY AND PERFECTION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES IN

OPPOSITION TO HUMAN TRADITIONS

RESPONDENT: DE COIGNEE

Because the Papists contend for unwritten traditions, against the entire perfection of Scripture, as if it were for every thing sacred and dear to them. that they may be able to obtrude, on mankind, many dogmas, which, even by their own confession, are not comprised in the Scriptures, and to assume to themselves an irrefragible authority in the church; it seems, that we shall not spend our time unprofitably, if, in a few Theses, we discuss in the fear of God what ought to be maintained on the subject of Divine traditions and on the opinion of the Papists.

I. The word "Tradition," according to its derivation, signifies the act of delivering; but having been enlarged through usage to denote the object about which the act is occupied, it also signifies the doctrine itself that is delivered. We ascribe this epithet, in either or both of its senses, to a Divine acceptation, on account of its cause which is God, to distinguish it from that which is human. (1 Cor. ii, 12, 13.) And we say, "That is excellently Divine which is such at the same time in its act and in its object." We define it, Divine doctrine, manifested by a Divine act, with less excellence, by men; because, however Divine it is in its object, still it is human in the act of tradition. (2

Pet. i, 21.) The apostle Paul had regard to this when he said, "As a wise master-builder, I have laid the foundation, and another buildeth thereon. But let every man take heed how he buildeth thereupon." (1 Cor. iii, 10.) And St. Peter, when he said, "if any man speak, let him speak as the oracles of God." (1 Pet. iv, 11.) II. Divine tradition, both with respect to its object and to its act, is variously distributed. In regard to its object. (1.) According to the actions which it requires to be performed to itself by men, we distinguish it into that which is of Faith, (1 John v, 13,) and to which we add hope, and into that which relates to morals. In the first, it is offered as an object to be believed, in the other as one to be performed. (Luke xxiv, 27; Mark i, 15; Matt. xxi, 22, 23; ix, 13.) (2.) From the adjuncts of the act required, we call one act necessary to righteousness and salvation, while another is supplementary to that which is necessary. (Heb. ix, 10.) (3.) From the duration of time, we call one perpetual and immutable, another temporary and subject to change according to the appointment of its author. (John iv, 21-23.) (4.) According to its extent, we call one universal, which binds all believers either those of all ages of the world, or those who exist at the same time; and another particular, which has reference to certain persons whether they be many or few, such as that which respects the legal ceremonies and the Levitical priesthood. (Rom. 2,:26, 27.) III. Tradition is distinguished, in regard to the act. (1.) From its subject, into internal and external. An internal one is that which is made to the mind by the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. (Isa. lix, 21; with Ephes. i, 17-21.) To this we likewise refer that which is made to the internal senses, by sensible images formed in the inward receptacle of images. (1 Cor. ii, 10.) An external tradition is that which is made by means of signs presented to the external senses; among these the principal place is occupied by the word, in the delivery of which, two methods are employed, an enunciation made by oral speech and writing. (Rom. x, 17; 1 Cor. i, 28; 2 Thess. ii, 13-14; Gen. iii, 9- 19; xii, 1-3; Ezek. ii, 5; v, 1-3. (2.) From its causes, into immediate and mediate. An immediate one is that which proceeds from God, without the intervention of man. Let permission also be granted, to us, for the sake of greater convenience of doctrine, to reckon under immediate tradition that which is made by angels, lest we be compelled to introduce many mediate traditions subordinate to each other. A mediate act of tradition is that which is performed by God, as the chief author, through the hands of a man peculiarly sanctified for its execution. (3.) According to its dignity and authority, it may be distributed into primary and secondary; so that the primary may be one, transacted indeed by man, but by a man so instructed and governed by the inspiration and direction of the Holy Spirit, (2 Sam.

xxiii, 2, 3,) that "it may not be he himself that speaks, but the Spirit of the Father that is in him;" (Matt. x, 20;) that he may not himself be the crier, but the voice of God crying;" not himself the Scribe, but the amanuensis of the Holy Spirit. (2 Tim. iii, 16; 2 Pet. i, 21.) The secondary is that which is indeed according to the appointment of God, but by the will of man who administers the act of tradition at his own option. (1

Pet. iv, 11.)

IV. Internal tradition is always and absolutely necessary to the salvation of men. For in no way, except by a revelation and an inward sealing of the Holy Spirit, (2 Cor. i, 20-22) can any man perceive, and by an assured faith apprehend the mind of God, however it may be manifested and confirmed by external signs. (1 Cor. ii, 10-16.) External tradition is necessary through the pleasure of the Divine will, whether we consider that will universally; for without it he can abundantly instruct the mind of man. (1 Cor. 3,:7-10; 2 Cor. iv, 6.) Or whether we consider it according to special modes; for it is sometimes delivered by the pronunciation of lively sounds, and at other times by writing, and at times by both methods, according to his own good pleasure, and which of them soever he has seen proper to employ. (1 Cor. v, 9; Exod.

24,:7; 2 Thess. ii, 13, 14; Luke xvi, 27-31.) It is, from this very circumstance, necessary to men; and from it the inconclusiveness of this argument is apparent,

"Because God formerly instructed his own church without the Scriptures by the words which he spoke himself, therefore, the Scriptures are now unnecessary."

V. Though all the doctrines delivered by God, either from his own lips or in writing, possess Divine authority; yet we may distinguish between them, and may, according to certain respects, claim a greater authority for one than for another. (1.) The efficient cause makes the principal difference. For whatever doctrine it wills more, [than any other,] it makes that doctrine be of greater authority. Thus it is said, "I will have mercy, and not sacrifice." (Matt. ix, 13.) (2.) The condition of him who administers the doctrine, obtains for it a greater or a less degree of authority. "For if the word spoken by angels, was steadfast," etc, how much more is the doctrine which is announced to us by the Son? (Heb. ii, 2-5.) (3.) The object of the doctrine produces the same effect. For, according to it, some precepts are called "the weightier matters of the law," (Matt. xxiii, 23,) while others are called "the least commandments" (Matt.

v, 19;) and thus the precepts of the second table yield to those of the first. (Luke xiv, 26.) In this view the Apostle said, "This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation," in which expression let the emphatic word be observed, "that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners; of whom I am chief." (1 Tim. i, 15.) (4.) The nearer and more leading tendency which any doctrine has to the end proposed by the whole, the greater prevalence and authority does it possess. "If the ministration of death and of condemnation is glorious, how much more doth the ministration of life and righteousness exceed in glory!" (2 Cor. iii, 9.) (5.) The very mode of delivery adds weight to the authority. For, lest that should escape which had before been delivered only in words, the author himself commits it to writing, and thus, when by a double act, it is entrusted to the memory of others, he points it out in a manner far more excellent, than if he had been content to recommend it solely by pronouncing it in words. (2 Pet. iii, 1, 2.) And here let the hypothesis be observed, in which it is presupposed that the matter had been delivered partly by speaking and by writing, and partly by speaking alone. The more frequent and solicitous recommendation of the written doctrine serves to strengthen this argument. (Deut. xvii, 19; 1 Tim. iv, 13; 2

Pet. i, 19.)

VI. Having given this exposition of the subject, let us proceed with the controversy which we have with the Papists, and pass upon it a few brief animadversions. It seems to be comprehended in these three questions. (1.) Is every doctrine already delivered, which has been, is now, or ever will be necessary to the salvation of the church? Does any thing of this kind yet remain to be delivered? And if it has been really delivered, when was that done? (2.) In what are those doctrines contained which it is necessary for the church to believe and practice in order to be saved? Are they in the Scriptures alone; or partly in the Scriptures, and partly in unwritten traditions from their first author? (3.) How can it be made evident with certainty to the consciences of believers, that any particular doctrine is Divine?

VII. With regard to the First question, our opinion is, that all the doctrines necessary for the salvation of the Church Universal, have been already delivered, above fifteen hundred years ago; and that no tradition has been made of any new doctrine that is necessary for the salvation of believers, since the days of the apostles. We establish our opinion by the following arguments: (1.) Because in Christ, and in his Gospel,

"are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge." (Col. ii, 3.) But the apostles have perfectly announced Christ and his Gospel; (Acts xx, 26, 27;) so that an anathema is pronounced on him who preaches any other gospel than that which the apostles have preached and the churches have received. (Gal. i, 8, 9.) But that man preaches another gospel, who adds any thing to it as being necessary to the salvation of believers. (2.) Because the whole "church has been built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets." (Ephes. ii, 20; Rev. xxi, 14.) This is not true, if there be a doctrine necessary to the salvation of any church, which has not been revealed through the prophets and apostles. (3.) Because the whole Catholic Church is one body, consisting of particular churches that possess the same nature and principles as the whole; and this Church is animated by one spirit, and led into all truth, and being called into one hope of the same inheritance, it has "one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all" (Ephes. iv, 4, 6,) and sealed into "the communion of the same body and blood of the Lord," by a participation of one cup and bread. (1 Cor. x, 16, 17.) (4.) Because "Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, and to-day, and forever."

Whence the apostle infers, that it is wrong for the Church to be "carried about with divers and strange doctrines." (Heb. xiii, 8,-9.)

VIII. Though some of the Popish divines profess to assent to this truth, yet indications sufficiently manifest of their dissent from it are extant in their writings, especially in those of the Canonists. In the first place, the epithets of Universal Bishop, Supreme Pastor, Prime Head, Bridegroom, the Perfecter and Illuminator of the Catholic Church his Bride, which are ascribed to the Roman Pontiff, do not admit of this limitation of tradition. Then, the authority of governing, commanding and forbidding, of establishing and abrogating laws, of judging and condemning, and of loosing and binding, an immense and infinite authority, which is not merely attributed to him, but is actually assumed and exercised by him, excludes the same kind of circumscription.

To which may be added the Decree, by which it is decided to be necessary for salvation, that every human creature be placed in subjection to the Roman Pontiff; and that, by which authentic authority is ascribed to the ancient Latin translation of the Scriptures. But, not to multiply instances, we hold it for a general argument of this dissension, that they dare not enter into an exact enumeration of unwritten traditions, and fix the number of them; they avoid this, that they may reserve to themselves the power of producing tradition in any controversy. Some of them, therefore, assert, that other doctrines are necessary according to the different states of the Church.

IX. But we most willingly confess, that the tradition which we call secondary will continue in the Church to the end of the world; for by it the doctrines which have, through the prophets and apostles, been committed to her, are by her, further dispensed to her children. For this reason, the Church is called "the pillar and ground of the truth," (1 Tim. iii, 15,) but only secondarily after the apostles, who, on account of the primary tradition, are distinguished by the title of "pillars," (Gal. ii, 9,) and

"foundations," (Rev. xxi, 14,) before those epithets were bestowed on the church.

X. With regard to the Second question, [§ 6,] we say that the canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament perfectly contain all doctrines which are necessary to the salvation of believers and the glory of God. This is manifest, (1.) From express testimonies of Scripture, [see Disputation 2, Thesis 19,] forbidding any addition to be made to those things which have been commanded, and commanding that "no man be wise above what is written," (1 Cor. iv, 6,) though in the former of these, it is evident from the text that Moses is speaking about those precepts which were comprised in writing. (2.) From the very substance of the doctrines; and this in various ways. The scriptures contain in a complete form the doctrine of the Law and of the Gospel; they also perfectly embrace the doctrine of faith, hope and charity. They deliver the full knowledge of God and of Christ, in which is placed life eternal. They are called, and truly so, "the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament;" but to a testament nothing ought to be added. (3.) From the end at which they aim and which they attain. "These things are written, that ye may believe; and that, believing, ye may have life." (John xx, 31.) "Search the Scriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life." (v, 39.) (4.) From their efficacy; because, without [the aid of] any other doctrine, they sufficiently hinder any man from going into the place of torment, (Luke xvi, 28, 29;) and they render "the man of God wise unto salvation through faith, and thoroughly furnished unto all good works." (2 Tim. iii, 15-17.) (5.) From the manner of speech usually employed in the Scriptures, by which "the prophets" are understood to mean the writings of the prophets, "the prophets" and "the word of prophecy" signify the prophecies of Scripture. (2 Pet. i, 19-21.) What God said and did is ascribed to the Scriptures: thus, For the Scriptures saith unto Pharaoh;" (Rom. ix, 17;) "the Scripture, foreseeing, &c., preached before the gospel unto Abraham;' (Gal. iii, 8;) "the Scripture hath concluded all under sin." (iii, 22.)

XI. The Papists assert, on the contrary, that all things necessary to salvation are not contained in the Scriptures; but partly in the Scriptures, and partly in unwritten traditions. This their opinion they endeavour to establish, not only by the Scriptures themselves, but by the testimonies of Popes, Councils, and Fathers, nay, by certain examples which they produce of necessary doctrines which are not comprehended within the limits of Scripture. As we shall examine the strength of each of these arguments separately in the discussion which we have now commenced, we may remark by way of anticipation, that the passages of Scripture which they usually quote for this purpose, are either forcibly wrested from their correct signification, or do not determine the proposition; that the testimonies of Popes, Councils, and Fathers, being those of mere men, do not operate to our prejudice; that the instances which they adduce are either confirmed from the Scriptures, or are not necessary to salvation.

This separation we consider of such necessity, that when it is once granted that they are necessary to salvation, it follows that they can and that they must be confirmed by the Scriptures; and when it is granted that they cannot be confirmed by the Scriptures, it follows that they are not necessary to salvation. So immovable and certain is this truth to our minds, that all doctrines necessary to salvation are contained in the Scriptures.

XII. To the Third question, [§ 5,] we reply: As one Delivery of Divine doctrine is primary, and another secondary; so likewise one Attestation [witnessing] respecting the divinity of the doctrine is primary, while another is secondary. (John v, 36, 37; 1

John v, 7.) The Primary attestation is that of God himself, to whom it appertains properly, originally, and per se to bear witness to his own doctrine. But he employs a two-fold mode of bearing witness: one external, which is presented to the senses of those to whom the doctrine is proposed, (John iii, 2; Heb. ii, 4; 1 Cor. i, 6-8,) and is a preparative for creating faith in the doctrine, even when this doctrine is not understood. Another internal, which impresses on the mind a true understanding of the doctrine, and an undoubted approval of it, which is the necessary, proper and immediate cause of that faith which God requires to be given to his word, and which alone is saving. The Secondary attestation is that of the Church. For having been herself certified, by means of the primary attestation, (which is that of God,) of the divinity of this doctrine, she both gives her hand and seal as a witness that God is true, (John iii, 33,) and she bears her testimony to the doctrine received from the God of truth. This testimony is pleasing to God, due to the doctrine, honourable to the church, and useful to men. (1 John v, 9; John v, 34-36.) But it is to be observed, that this testimony of the church is human and not Divine, and is less than the preceding, which is potent only in preparing the hearts, by a sort of reverence that it obtains for the doctrine, that the hearts so prepared may with sincerity, by the internal witnessing of God, yield their assent to it. (John xv, 26, 27.) Under that part of the Primary testimony which is external, we comprise the testimony of prophets, apostles, evangelists, pastors, and teachers, who are "workers together with God," provided they have been immediately called [by God himself.] But we refer it to the Secondary testimony, if they have been called mediately by the church. The Papists, who ascribe less to the internal attestation, and more to that which is secondary, than what we have explained, are deservedly rejected by us.

XIII. Having explained these matters, we grant, that the apostles delivered to the churches some things relating to order, decency, and the rights to be observed in them, which they did not commit to writing, (1 Cor. xi, 34;) but those things do not concern the substance either of the Law or the Gospel, are not necessary to salvation, are neither immutable, perpetual, nor universal, but are accommodated to the existing condition of the church, and the circumstances in which she is placed. We further grant, that either single churches, or many by mutual consent, or that all churches provided they could so agree, may frame certain ritual canons for their good order and decency, and for such direction in those duties which must of necessity be performed in them, as may contribute to their present edification. (1 Cor. xiv, 40.) But these conditions must be observed respecting them: (1.) That these rites be not repugnant to the Written Word. (Col. ii, 18-23.) (2.) That they neither have superstition intermixed with them, nor encourage it. (3.) That they neither be accounted as divine worship, nor cast a snare upon consciences. (4.) That they be neither more numerous, nor more burdensome in practice, than may render them easy of observance. (Acts xv, 10, 28.) (5.) That the church do not deprive herself of the liberty of changing, adding, or taking away, as she shall consider her present edification to require. Such rites as these being usefully established in a church, it is unlawful for any one, of his own private authority, to gainsay or attack them, unless he be ambitious of having his name emblazoned in the list of disorderly persons, and among the disturbers of the peace of church. (1 Cor. xiv, 32, 33; 2 Thess. iii, 6.)

DISPUTATION 4

ON THE NATURE OF GOD

RESPONDENT: JAMES ARMINIUS -- WHEN HE STOOD FOR HIS DEGREE OF

D. D.

I. The very nature of things and the Scriptures of God, as well as the general consent of all wise men and nations, testify that a nature is correctly ascribed to God. (Gal. iv, 8; 2 Pet. i, 4; Aristot. De Repub. 1. 7, c. 1; Cicero De Nat. Deor.) II. This nature cannot be known a priori: for it is the first of all things, and was alone, for infinite ages, before all things. It is adequately known only by God, and God by it; because God is the same as it is. It is in some slight measure known by us, but in a degree infinitely below what it is [in] itself; because we are from it by an external emanation. (Isa. xliv, 6; Rev. i, 8; 1 Cor. ii, 11; 1 Tim. vi, 16; 1 Cor. xiii, 9.) III. But this nature is known by us, either immediately through the unclouded vision of it as it is. This is called "face to face," (1 Cor. xiii, 12,) and is peculiar to the blessed in heaven: (1 John iii, 2.) Or mediately through analogical images and signs, which are not only the external acts of God and his works through them, (Psalm xix, 1-8; Rom. i, 20,) but likewise his word, (Rom. x, 14-17,) which, in that part in which it proposes Christ, "who is the Image of the Invisible God," (Col. i, 15,) as "the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person," (Heb. i, 3,) gives such a further increase to our knowledge, that "we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory." (2 Cor.

iii, 18.) This is called "through a glass in an enigma," or "darkly," and applies exclusively to travelers and pilgrims who "are absent from the Lord." (2 Cor. v, 6; Exod. xxxiii, 20.)

IV. But there are two modes of this second perception from the works and the word of God. The First is that of Affirmation, (which is also styled by Thomas Aquinas, "the mode of Causality and by the habitude of the principle,") according to which the simple perfections which are in the creatures, as being the productions of God, are attributed analogically to God according to some similitude. (Psalm xciv, 9, 10; Matt.

vii, 11; Isa. xlix, 15.) The Second is that of Negation or Removal, according to which the relative perfections and all the imperfections which appertain to the creatures, as having been produced out of nothing, are removed from God. (Isa. iv, 8, 9; 1 Cor. i, 25.) To the mode of Affirmation, (because it is through the habitude of the cause and principle, to the excellence of which no effect ever rises,) that of Pre-eminence must be added, according to which the perfections that are predicated of the creatures are understood [to be] infinitely more perfect in God. (Isa. xl, 15, 17, 22, 25.) Though this mode be affirmative and positive in itself, (for as the nature of God necessarily exists, so it is necessarily known,) in positively and not in negation; yet it cannot be enunciated or expressed by us, except through a Negation of those modes according to which the creatures are partakers of their own perfections, or the perfections in creatures are circumscribed. Those modes, being added to the perfections of the creatures, produce this effect, that those which, considered without them, were simple perfections, are relative perfections, and by that very circumstance are to be removed from God. Hence it appears, that the mode of Pre-eminence does not differ in species from the mode of Affirmation and Negation.

V. Besides, in the entire nature of things and in the Scriptures themselves, only two substances are found, in which is contained every perfection of things. They are Essence and Life, the former of them constituting the perfection of all existing creatures; the latter, that of only some them, and those the most perfect. (Gen. 1; Psalm civ, 29, 148; Acts xvii, 28.) Beyond these two the human mind cannot possibly comprehend any substance, indeed, it cannot raise its conceptions to any other: for it is itself circumscribed within the limits of created nature, of which it forms a part; it is therefore incapable of passing beyond the circle which encloses the whole. (Rev. i, 8; iv, 8; Dan. vi, 46.) Wherefore in the nature of God himself, only these two causes of motion, Essence and Life, can become objects of our consideration.

LET THE FOLLOWING BE OUR PROBLEMS

Have a corporeal Essence, and a vegetative and sensitive Life, any analogy to the Essence and Life of God, though such analogy be less than a spiritual Essence and an intellectual Life?

If they have this analogy, how are body and senses removed simply from God?

If they have not this analogy, how has God been able to produce this kind of Essence and Life?

VI. But in God both these are to be considered in the mode of Pre-eminence, that is, in excellence far surpassing the Essence and Life of all the creatures. (Psalm cii, 27; 1

Tim. vi, 16.)

THE ESSENCE OF GOD

VII. The Essence of God is that by which God exists; or it is the first cause of motion of the Divine Nature by which God is understood to exist.

VIII. Because every Essence, which is either in the superior or in the inferior nature of things, is distributed into spiritual and corporeal, (Col. i, 16;) of which, the former notes simply perfection, the latter a defection or defect from this perfection. On this account we separate corporeal Essence from God according to the mode of removal, and at the same time all those things which belong to a corporeal Essence as such, whether it be simple or compound -- such as magnitude, figure, place, or parts, whether sensible or imaginable. Whence also He cannot be perceived by the corporeal senses, either by those which are external or by the internal, since he is invisible, intactable, and incapable of being represented. (Deut. iv, 14; 1 Kings viii, 1 Luke xxiv, 39; John iv, 24; 1 Tim. i, 17.) But we ascribe to Him a spiritual Essence, and that in the mode of preeminence, as "the Father of Spirits." (Heb. xii, 9.) Therefore, (1.) We reject the dogma of the Anthropo-morphites, [those who maintained that "the uncorruptable God" had a form or body "like to corruptible man,"] and the intolerable custom of the Papists, which they constantly practice, in fashioning a [supposed]

likeness of God's Essence. (Deut. iv, 15, 16; Rom. i, 23; Isa. xl, 18; Acts xvii, 29.) (2.) When bodily members are attributed in the Scriptures to God, that is done on account of the simplicity of those effects, which the creatures themselves usually produce only by the aid and operation of those members.

IX. As we ought to enunciate negatively the mode by which the Essence of God pre-eminetly both is and is spiritual, above the excellence of all Essences, even of those which are spiritual; so this may be done first and immediately in a single phrase, "he is, anarcov kai anaitiov without beginning and without cause either external or internal." (Isa. xliii, 10; xliv, 8, xxiv, ; xlvi, 9; Rev. i, 8; Rom. xi, 35, 36; 1 Cor. viii, 4-6; Rom. ix, 5.) For since there cannot be any advancement in infinitum, (for if there could, there would be no Essence, no Knowledge,) there must be one Essence, above and before which no other can exist: but such an Essence must that of God be; for, to whatsoever this Essence may be attributed, it will by that very act of ascription be God himself.

X. Because the Essence of God is devoid of all cause, from this circumstance arise, in the first place, Simplicity and Infinity of Being in the Essence of God.

XI. Simplicity is a preeminent mode of the Essence of God, by which he is void of all composition, and of component parts whether they belong to the senses or to the understanding. He is without composition, because without external cause; and He is without component parts, because without internal cause. (Rom. xi, 35, 36; Heb.

2,:10; Isa. xl, 12, 22.) The Essence of God, therefore, neither consists of material, integral and quantitive parts, of matter and form, of kind and difference, of subject and accident, nor of form and the thing formed, (for it is to itself a form, existing by itself and its own individuality,) neither hypothetically and through nature, through capability and actuality, nor through essence and being. Hence God is his own Essence and his own Being, and is the same in that which is, and that by which it is.

He is all eye, ear, hand and foot, because he entirely sees, hears, works, and is in every place. (Psalm cxxxix, 8- 12.) THEREFORE,

Whatever is absolutely predicated about God, it is understood essentially and not accidentally; and those things, (whether many or diverse,) which are predicated concerning God, are, in God, not many but one: (James i, 17.) It is only in our mode of considering them, which is a compound mode, that they are distinguished as being many and diverse; though this may, not inappropriately, be said, because they are likewise distinguished by a formal reason.

XII. Infinity of Being is a preeminent mode of the Essence of God, by which it is devoid of all limitation and boundary, (Psalm cxlv, 3; Isa. xliii, 10,) whether from something above it or below it, from something before it or after it. It is not bounded by anything above it, because it has received its being from no one. Nor by anything below it, because the form, which is itself, is not limited to the capacity of any matter whatsoever that may be its recipient. Neither by any thing before it, because it is from nothing efficient: nor after it, because it does not exist for the sake of another end.

But, His Essence is terminated inwardly by its own property, according to which it is what it is and nothing else. Yet by this no limits are prescribed to its Infinity; for by the very circumstance, that it is its own being, subsisting through itself, neither received from another nor in another, it is distinguished, from all others, and others are removed from it. (Isa. xliv, 9; Rom. xi, 36; Prov. xvi, 4.) THEREFORE, Whatsoever is predicated absolutely about God, is predicated concerning Him immediately, primarily, and without [respect to] cause.

XIII. From the Simplicity and Infinity of the Divine sense, arise Infinity with regard to time, which is called "Eternity;" and with regard to place, which is called

"Immensity;" Impassability, Immutability, and Incorruptibility.

XIV. Eternity is a pre-eminent mode of the Essence of God, by which it is devoid of time with regard to the term or limits of beginning and end, because it is of infinite being; it is also devoid of time with regard to the succession of former and latter, of past and future, because it is of simple being, which is never in capability, but always in act, (Gen. xxi, 33; Psalm xc, 9; Isa. xliv, 6; 2 Tim. i, 9.) According to this mode, therefore, the Being of God is always the universal, the whole, the plentitude of his essence, closely, fixedly, and at every instant present with it, resembling a moment which is also devoid of intelligible parts, and never flows onward progressively, but always continues within itself. It will be lawful, therefore, for us, with Boetius, to define Eternity in the following manner, after changing, by his good leave, the word Life into that of Essence: "It is an interminable, entire and at the same time, a perfect possession of Essence. But it seems that I may by some sort of right require this change to be made, because Essence comes to be considered in the first moving cause of the Divine Nature, before Life; and because Eternity does not belong to Essence through Life, but to Life through Essence. THEREFORE,

Whatsoever things are predicated absolutely concerning God, they belong to Him from all eternity and all together. It is certain that those things which do not from all eternity belong to Him, are predicated about Him not absolutely, but in reference to the creatures, such as, "He is the Creator, the Lord, the Judge of all men."

XV. Immensity is a pre-eminent mode of the Essence of God, by which it is void of place according to space and limits: being co-extended space, because it belongs to simple entity, not having part and part, therefore not having part beyond part. Being also its own encircling limits, or beyond which it has no existence, because it is of infinite entity: and, before all things, God alone was both the world, and place, and all things to himself; but He was alone, because there was nothing outwardly beyond, except himself. (l Kings viii, 27; Job xi, 8, 9.)

XVI. After creatures, and places in which creatures are contained, have been granted to have an existence, from this Immensity follows the Omnipresence or Ubiquity of the Essence of God, according to which it is entirely wheresoever any creature or any place is, and this in exact similarity to a [mathematical] point, which is totally present to the entire circumference, and to each of its parts, and yet without circumscription.

If there be any difference, it arises, from the Will, the Ability and the Act of God.

(Psalm cxxxix, 8- 12; Isa. lxvi, 1; Jer. xxiii, 24; Acts xvii, 27, 28.) XVII. Impassability is a pre-eminent mode of the Essence of God, according to which it is devoid of all suffering or feeling; not only because nothing can act against this Essence, for it is of infinite Being and devoid of an external cause; but likewise because it cannot receive the act of anything, for it is of simple Entity. THEREFORE, Christ has not suffered according to the Essence of his Deity.

XVIII. Immutability is a pre-eminent mode of the Essence of God, by which it is void of all change; of being transferred from place to place, because it is itself its own end and good, and because it is immense; of generation and corruption; of alteration; of increase and decrease; for the same reason as that by which it is incapable of suffering. (Psalm cii, 27; Mal. iii, 6; James i, 17.) Whence likewise, in the Scriptures, Incorruptibility is attributed to God. Nay, even motion cannot happen to Him through operation; for it appertains to God, and to Him alone, to be at rest in operation. (Rom.

i, 23; Isa. xl, 28.)

XIX. These modes of the Essence of God belong so peculiarly to Him, as to render them incapable of being communicated to any other thing; and of whatever kind these modes may be, they are, according to themselves, as proper to God as His Essence itself, without which they cannot be communicated, unless we wish to destroy it after despoiling it of its peculiar modes of being; and according to analogy, they are more peculiar to Him than his Essence, because they are pre- eminent, for nothing can be analogous to them. THEREFORE, Christ, according to his humanity, is not in every place.

XX. Since Unity and Good are the general affections of Being, the same are also to be attributed to God, but with the mode of pre-eminence, according to the measure of the Simplicity and Infinity of his Essence. (Gen. i, 31; Matt. xix, 17.) XXI. The Unity of the Essence of God is that according to which it is in every possible way so at one in itself, as to be altogether indivisible with regard to number, species, genus, parts, modes, &c. (Deut. iv, 35; 1 Cor. viii) XXII. It appertains also to the Essence of God, to be divided from every other thing: and to be incapable of entering into the composition of any other thing: while some persons ascribe this property to the Simplicity and others to the Unity of God's Essence, several attribute it to both. But on reading the Scriptures, we find that Holiness is frequently ascribed to God, which usually designates a separation or setting apart; on this account, perhaps, that very thing by which God is thus divided from others, may, without any impropriety, be called by the name of Holiness. (Josh.

xxiv, 19; Isa. vi, 3; Gen. ii, 3; Exod. xiii, 2; 1 Pet. ii, 2-9; 1 Thess. v, 23.) THEREFORE,

God is neither the soul of the world, nor the form of the universe; He is neither an inherent form, nor a bodily one.

XXIII. The Goodness of the Essence of God is that according to which it is, essentially in itself, the Supreme and very Good; from a participation in which all other things have an existence and are good; and to which all other things are to be referred as to their supreme end: for this reason it is called communicable. (Matt. xix, 17; Jas. i, 17; 1 Cor. x, 31.)

XXIV. These modes and affections are so primarily attributed to the Essence of God, that they ought to be deduced through all the rest of those things which come under our consideration in the latter momentum of the Divine Nature. If this deduction be made, especially through those things which appertain to the operation of God, then the most abundant utility will redound to us from them and from our knowledge of them. This benefit, however, they will not perform for us, if they be made subjects of consideration only in this momentum in the Divine Nature. (Mal. iii, 6; Num. xxiii, 19; Lament. iii, 22; Hosea xi, 9.)

ON THE LIFE OF GOD

XXV. The Life of God, which comes to be considered under the second [momentum]

cause of motion in the Divine Nature, is an act flowing from the Essence of God, by which his Essence is signified to be in action within itself. (Psalm xlii, 2; Heb. iii, 12; Num. xiv, 21.)

XXVI. We call it "an act flowing from his essence;" because, as our understanding forms a conception of essence and life in the nature of God under distinct forms, and of the essence as having precedence of the life; we must beware lest the life be conceived as an act approaching to the essence similar to unity, which, when added to unity, makes it binary or two-fold. But it must be conceived as an act flowing from the essence, which advances itself to its own perfection, in the same manner as a

[mathematical] point by its flowing moves itself forward in length, [§ 14.] It is our wish, that these things be understood only by the confined capacity of our consideration, who are compelled to use the words of our darkness, in order in any degree to adumbrate or represent that light to which no mortal can approach.

XXVII. We say "that the Divine Essence is in action by means of the life;" because the acts of God, the internal as well as the external, those which are directed inwards and those directed outwards, must all be ascribed to His life as to their proximate and immediate principle. (Heb. iv, 12.) For it is in reference to his life, that God the Father produces out of his own essence his Word and his Spirit; and in reference to his life, God understands, wills, is able to do, and does, all those things which He understands, wills, is able to do, and actually does. Hence, since blessedness consists in action, it is with propriety ascribed to life. (1 Tim. i, 11; Rom. vi, 23.) This also seems to be the cause why it was the will of God, that his oath should be expressed in these words,

"THE LORD LIVETH." (Jer. iv, 2.)

XXVIII. The life of God is his essence itself, and his very being; because the Divine Essence is in every respect simple, as well as infinite, and therefore, eternal and immutable. On this account, to it, and indeed to it alone, is attributed immortality, which, therefore, cannot be communicated to any creature. (1 Tim. i, 17; vi, 16.) It is immense, without increase and decrease; it is one and undivided, holy and set apart from all things; it is good, and therefore communicable, and actually communicative of itself, both by creation and preservation, and by habitation commenced in this life, to be consummated in the life to come. (Gen. ii, 7; Acts xvii, 28; Rom. viii, 10, 11; 1

Cor. xv, 28.)

XXIX. But the life of God is active in three faculties, in the understanding, the will, and the power or capability properly so called. In the Understanding, inwardly considering its object of what kind soever, whether it be one [with it] or united to it in the act of understanding. In the Will, inwardly willing its first, chief, and proper object; and extrinsically willing the rest. In the Power, or capability operating only extrinsically, which may be the cause of its being called by the particular name of capability, as being that which is capable of operating on all its objects, before it actually operates.

ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF GOD

XXX. The understanding of God is a faculty of his life, which is the first in nature as well as in order, and by which He distinctly understands all things and every thing which now have, will have, have had, can have, or might hypothetically have, any kind of being; by which He likewise distinctly understands the order which all and each of them hold among themselves, the connections and the various relations which they have or can have; not excluding even that entity which belongs to reason, and which exists, or can exist, only in the mind, imagination, and enunciation. (Rom. xi, 33.)

XXXI. God, therefore, understands himself. He knows all things possible, whether they be in the capability of God or of the creature; in active or passive capability; in the capability of operation, imagination, or enunciation. He knows all things that could have an existence, on laying down any hypothesis. He knows other things than himself, those which are necessary and contingent, good and bad, universal and particular, future, present and past, excellent and vile. He knows things substantial and accidental of every kind; the actions and passions, the modes and circumstances of all things; external words and deeds, internal thoughts, deliberations, counsels, and determinations, and the entities of reason, whether complex or simple. All these things, being jointly attributed to the understanding of God, seem to conduce to the conclusion, that God may deservedly be said to know things infinite. (Acts xv, 18; Heb. iv, 13; Matt. xi, 27; Psalm cxlvii, 4; Isa. li, 32, 33; liv, 7; Matt. x, 30; Psalm cxxxv, 1 John iii, 20; 1 Sam. xvi, 7; 1 Kings viii, 39; Psalm xciv, 11; Isa. xl, 28; Psalm cxlvii, 5; 139; xciv, 9, 10; x, 13, 14.)

XXXII. All the things which God knows, he knows neither by intelligible images, nor by similitude, (for it is not necessary for Him to use abstraction and application for the purpose of understanding;) but He knows them by his own essence, and by this alone, with the exception of evil things which he knows indirectly by the opposite good things; as, through means of the habitude, privation is discovered. Therefore, (1.) God knows himself entirely and adequately. For He is all being, light and eye. He also knows other things entirely; but excellently, as they are in Himself and in his understanding; adequately, as they are in their proper natures. (1 Cor. ii, 11; Psalm xciv, 9, 10.)

(2.) He knows himself primarily; and it is impossible for that which God understands first and by itself, to be any other thing than his own essence.

(3.) The act of understanding in God is his own being and essence.

XXXIII. The mode by which God understands, is not that which is successive, and which is either through composition and division, or through deductive argumentation; but it is simple, and through infinite intuition. (Heb. iv, 13.) THEREFORE,

(1.) God knows all things from eternity; nothing recently. For this new perfection would add something to His essence by which He understands all things; or his understanding would exceed His essence, if he now understood what he did not formerly understand. But this cannot happen, since he understands all things through his essence. (Acts xv, 18; Ephes. i, 4.)

(2.) He knows all things immeasurably, without the augmentation and decrease of the things known and of the knowledge itself. (Psalm cxlvii, 5.) (3.) He knows all things immutably, his knowledge not being varied to the infinite changes of the things known. (James i, 17)

(4.) By a single and undivided act, not being diverted towards many things but collected into himself, He knows all things. Yet he does not know them confusedly, or only universally and in general; but also in a distinct and most special manner He knows himself in himself, things in their causes, in themselves, in his own essence, in themselves as being present, in their causes antecedently, and in himself most preeminently. (Heb. iv, 13; 1 Kings viii, 39; Psalm cxxxix, 16, 17.) (5.) And therefore when sleep, drowsiness and oblivion are attributed to God, by these expressions is meant only a deferring of the punishment to be inflicted on his enemies, and a delay in affording solace and aid to his friends. (Psalm xiii, 1, 2.) XXXIV. Although by one, and that a simple act, God understands all things, yet a certain order in the objects of his knowledge may be assigned to Him without impropriety, indeed, it ought to be for the sake of ourselves. (1.) He knows himself.

(2.) He knows all things possible, which may be referred to three general classes. (i.) Let the first be of those things to which the capability of God can immediately extend itself, or which may exist by his mere and sole act. (ii.) Let the second consist of those things which, by God's preservation, motion, aid, concurrence and permission, may have an existence from the creatures, whether these creatures will themselves exist or not, and whether they might be placed in this or in that order, or in infinite orders of things; let it even consist of those things which might have an existence from the creatures, if this or that hypothesis were admitted. (1 Sam. xxiii, 11, 12; Matt. xi, 21.) (iii.) Let the third class be of those things which God can do from the acts of the creatures, in accordance either with himself or with his acts. (3.) He knows all beings, whether they be considered as future, as past, or as present; (Jer. xviii, 6; Isa. xliv, 7;) and of these there is also a threefold order. The first order is of those beings which by his own mere act shall exist, do exist, or have existed. (Acts xv, 18.) The second is of those which will exist, do exist, or have existed, by the intervention of the Creatures, either by themselves, or through them by God's preservation, motion, aid, concurrence and permission. (Psalm cxxxix, 4) The third order consists of those which God will himself do or make, does make, or hath made, from the acts of the creatures, in accordance either with himself or with his acts. (Deut. 28). This consideration is of infinite utility in various heads of theological doctrine.

XXXV. God understands all things in a holy manner, regarding things as they are, without any admixture. (Psalm ix, 8; 1 Thess. ii, 4.) On this account He is said to judge, not according to the person or appearance and the face, but according to truth.

(Rom. ii, 2.)

XXXVI. The understanding of God is certain, and never can be deceived, so that He certainly and infallibly sees even future contingencies, whether He sees them in their causes or in themselves. (1 Sam. xxiii, 11, 12; Matt. xi, 21.) But, this certainty rests upon the infinity of the essence of God, by which in a manner the most present He understands all things.

XXXVII. The understanding of God is derived from no external cause, not even from an object; though if there should not afterwards be an object, there would not likewise be the understanding of God about it. (Isa. xl, 13, 14; Rom. xi, 33, 34.) XXXVIII. Though the understanding of God be certain and infallible, yet it does not impose any necessity on things, nay, it rather establishes in them a contingency. For since it is an understanding not only of the thing itself, but likewise of its mode, it must know the thing and its mode such as they both are; and therefore if the mode of the thing be contingent, it will know it to be contingent; which cannot be done, if this mode of the thing be changed into a necessary one, even solely by reason of the Divine understanding. (Acts xxvii, 22-25, 31; xxiii, 11, in connection with verses 17, 18, &c., with xxv, 10, 12; and with xxvi, 32; Rom. xi, 33; Psalm cxlvii, 5.) XXXIX. Since God distinctly understands such a variety of things by one infinite intuition, Omniscience or All-Wisdom is by a most deserved right attributed to Him.

Yet this omniscience is not to be considered in God according to the mode of the habitude, but according to that of a most pure act.

XL. But the single and most simple knowledge of God may be distinguished by some modes, according to various objects and the relations to those objects, into theoretical and practical knowledge, into that of vision and of simple intelligence.

XLI. Theoretical knowledge is that by which things are understood under the relation of being and of truth. Practical knowledge is that by which things are considered under the relation of good, and as objects of the will and of the power of God. (Isa.

xlviii, 8; xxxvii, 28, xvi, 5.)

XLII. The knowledge of vision is that by which God knows himself and all other beings, which are, will be, or have been. The knowledge of simple intelligence is that by which He knows things possible. Some persons call the former "definite" or

"determinate," and the latter "indefinite" or "indeterminate" knowledge.

XLIII. The schoolmen say besides, that one kind of God's knowledge is natural and necessary, another free, and a third kind middle. (1.) Natural or necessary knowledge is that by which God understands himself and all things possible. (2.) Free knowledge is that by which he knows, all other beings. (3.) Middle knowledge is that by which he knows that "if This thing happens, That will take place." The first precedes every free act of the Divine will; the second follows the free act of God's will; and the last precedes indeed the free act of the Divine will, but hypothetically from this act it sees that some particular thing will occur. But, in strictness of speech, every kind of God's knowledge is necessary. For the free understanding of God does not arise from this circumstance, that a free act of His will exhibits or offers an object to the understanding; but when any object whatsoever is laid down, the Divine understanding knows it necessarily on account of the infinity of its own essence. In like manner, any object whatsoever being laid down hypothetically, God understands necessarily what will arise from that object.

XLIV. Free knowledge is also called "foreknowledge," as is likewise that of vision by which other beings are known; and since it follows a free act of the will, it is not the cause of things; it is, therefore, affirmed with truth concerning it, that things do not exist because God knows them as about to come into existence, but that He knows future things because they are future.

XLV. That kind of God's knowledge which is called "practical,"of simple intelligence," and "natural or necessary," is the cause of all things through the mode of prescribing and directing, to which is added the action of the will and power; (Psalm civ, 24;) although that "middle" kind of knowledge must intervene in things which depend on the liberty of a created will.

XLVI. God's knowledge is so peculiarly his own, as to be impossible to be communicated to any thing created, not even to the soul of Christ; though we gladly confess, that Christ knows all those things which are required for the discharge of his office and for his perfect blessedness. (1 Kings viii, 39; Matt. xxiv, 36.) ON THE WILL OF GOD

XLVII. By the expression "will of God" is signified properly "the faculty itself of willing," but figuratively sometimes "the act of willing," and at other times "the object willed." (John vi, 39; Psalm cxv, 3.)

XLVIII. Not only a consideration of the essence and of the understanding of God, but also the Scriptures and the universal agreement of mankind, testify that a will is correctly attributed to God.

XLIX. This is the second faculty in the life of God, [§ 29,] which follows the Divine understanding and is produced from it, and by which God is borne towards a known good. Towards a good, because it is an adequate object of his will. And towards a known good, because the Divine understanding is previously borne towards it as a being, not only by knowing it as it is a being, but likewise by judging it to be good.

Hence the act of the understanding is to offer it as a good, to the will which is of the same nature as the understanding, or rather, which is its own offspring, that it may also discharge its office and act concerning this known good. But God does not will the evil which is called that of "culpability;" because He does not more will any good connected with this evil than He wills the good to which the malignity of sin is opposed, and which is the Divine good itself. All the precepts of God demonstrate this in the most convincing manner. (Psalm v, 4, 5.)

L. But Good is of two kinds -- the Chief Good itself, and that which is different from it. (Matt. xix, 17; Gen. i, 31.) The order which subsists between them is this: the latter does not exist with the Chief Good, but has its existence from it by the Understanding and the Will of God. (Rom. xi, 36.) Wherefore the Supreme Good is the primary, the choicest, and the direct object of the Divine Will; that is, its own infinite Essence, which was alone from all eternity, infinite ages prior to the existence of another good; and therefore it is the only good. (Prov. viii, 22-24.) On this account it may also be denominated, without impropriety, the peculiar and adequate object of the Divine Will. Since the Understanding and the Will of God were, each by its own act, borne towards this [Essence] they found such a plenitude of Being and Goodness in it, that the Understanding gave its judgment for commencing the communication of it outwards: and the Will approved of this kind of communication, after that method; whence the existence of a good, of what kind soever it was, which was different from the Chief Good. It cannot, therefore, be called an object of the Divine Will, except an indirect one, which God wills on account of that Chief Good, or rather He wills it to be on account of the Chief Good. (Prov. xvi, 4,.) Therefore, The Will of God is the very Essence of God, yet distinguished from it according to the formal reason.

LI. The act by which the Will of God advances towards its objects, is (1.) most simple: for as the Understanding of God by a most simple act understands its own Essence, and, through it, all other things; so the Will of God, by a single and simple act, wills its own goodness, and all things in its goodness. (Prov. xvi, 4.) Therefore, the multitude of things willed is not repugnant to the simplicity of the Divine Will.

(Isa. xliii, 7; Ephes. i, 5-9.) (2.) This act is Infinite: for it is moved to will, neither by an external cause, by any other efficient, nor by an end, which is out of itself; it is not moved even by any object which is not itself. (Deut. vii, 7; Matt. xi, 26.) Nay, the willing of the end is not the cause of willing those things which are for the end; though it wills those things which are for the end to be put in order to that end. (Acts xvii, 25, 26; Psalm xvi, 9.) It is no valid objection to this truth, that God would not will or do some things unless some act of the creature intervened. (1 Sam. ii, 30.) (3.) It is Eternal; because nothing can de novo either be or appear good to God. (4.) It is Immutable; because that which has once either been or seemed good to Him, both is and appears such to Him perpetually; and that by which God is known to will any thing, is nothing else but this, his immutable entity. (Mal. iii, 6; Rom. xi, 1.) (5.) This act is likewise Holy: because God advances towards his object only on account of its being good, not on account of any other thing which is added to it; and only because his Understanding accounts it good, not because feeling inclines [him] towards it without right reason. (2 Tim. ii, 19; Rom. ix, 11; 12, 4; Psalm cxix, 137.) LII. As the simple and external act by which the Divine Understanding knows all its objects, has not excluded order from them; so likewise may we be allowed to assign a certain order, according to which the simple and sole act of the will of God is borne towards its objects: (1.) God wills his own Essence and Goodness, that is, himself.

(2.) He wills all those things which, by the extreme judgment of his wisdom, He hath determined to be made out of infinite beings possible to himself. (Prov. xvi, 4.) And, First, He wills to make them. Then, when they are made, He is affected towards them by his Will, as they have some similitude to his nature. (Gen. i, 31; John xiv, 23.) (3.) The third object of the Divine Will are those things which God judges it to be right that they should be done by creatures endowed with understanding and free-will: and his act of willing concerning these things is signified by a precept, in which we likewise include the prohibition of that which He wills not to be done by the same creature. (Exod. xx, 1, 2, &c.; Micah vi, 8.) We allow it to remain a matter of discussion, whether counsels can have a place here, provided those things about which the consultations are held be not considered as [things] of supererogation. (4.) The fourth object of the Divine Will is the Divine permission, by which God permits a rational creature to do what He forbade, and to omit what he commanded; and which consists of the suspension of an efficacious impediment, not of one that is due and sufficient. (Acts xiv, 16, 17; Psalm lxxxi, 13; Isa. v, 4) (5.) The fifth object of the Divine Will are those things which, according to his own infinite wisdom, God judges to be done from the acts of rational creatures. (Isa. v, 5; 1 Sam. ii, 30; Gen. xxii, 16, 17.)

LIII. But though nothing from without be the cause of God's volition, yet, since he wills that there should be order in things, (which order is placed principally in this, that some things be the causes of others,) just so far as God's volition is borne towards those objects, it is as if it were the cause of itself as it is borne towards others: (Hosea ii, 21, 22.) Thus the cause why He wills the condemnation of any one, this, because he wills the order of his justice to be observed throughout the universe. (John vi, 40; Deut. vii, 8.) Neither do we therefore deny, but that an act of a creature, or the omission of an act, may be thus far the occasion or primary cause of a certain Divine volition, that, without any consideration of that act or its omission, God might set it aside by such a volition. (1 Sam. ii, 30; Jer. xviii, 7, 8.) LIV. Through his own Will, and by means of his Power, God is the cause of all other things; (Lam. iii, 37, 38;) yet so that when he acts through second causes, either with them or in them, he does not take away their own peculiar mode of acting with which they have been divinely endued but he suffers them according to their own mode to produce their own effects, necessary things necessarily, contingent things contingently, free things freely: and this contingency and freedom of second causes does not prevent that from being certainly done, or coming to pass, which God in this manner works by them; and therefore, the certain futurition of an event does not include its necessity. (Isa. x, 5, 6, 7; Gen. xlv, 5, 28; Acts xxvii, 29, 31.) LV. Though God by a single and undivided act wills all the things which he wills; yet his Will, or rather his Volition, may be distinguished from the objects, by a consideration of the mode and order according to which it is borne towards its objects.

LVI. The Divine Will is borne towards its object, either according to the mode of Nature, or according to the mode of Liberty. According to the mode of Nature, it tends towards a primary and proper object, one that is suitable and adequate to its nature. According to the mode of Liberty, it tends towards all other things. Thus, God by a natural necessity wills himself; but He wills freely all other things; (2 Tim. ii, 13; Rev. iv, 11;) though the act which is posterior in order may be bound by a free act which is prior in order. This may be called "hypothetical necessity," having its origin partly from the free volition and act of God, partly from the immutability of his nature. "For God is not unrighteous," says the Apostle, "to forget the work and labour of love" of the pious; because he hath promised them a remuneration, and the immutability of his nature does not suffer him to rescind his promises. (Heb. vi, 10, 18.)

LVII. To this must be subjoined another distinction, according to which God wills something as an end, and other things as the means to that end. His Will tends towards the end by a natural affection or desire; and towards the means by a free choice.

(Prov. xvi, 4)

LVIII. The will of God is also distinguished into that by which he wills to do or to prevent something, and which is called "the will of his good pleasure," or rather "of his pleasure;" (Psalm cxv, 3;) and into that by which he wills something to be done, or to be omitted, by creatures endued with understanding, and which is called "the will which is signified." The latter is revealed; the former is partly revealed, and partly hidden. (Mark iii, 35; 1 Thess. iv, 3; Deut. xxix, 29; 1 Cor. ii, 11, 12.) The former is efficacious, for it uses power, either so much as cannot be resisted, or such a kind as He certainly knows nothing will withstand: (Psalm xxxiii, 9; Rom. ix, 19.) The latter is called "inefficacious," and resistance is frequently made to it; yet so that, when the creature transgresses the order of this revealed Will, the creature by it may be reduced to order, and that the Will of God may be done on those by whom his Will has not been performed. (2 Sam. xvii, 14; Isa. v, 4, 5; Matt. xxi, 39-41; Acts v, 4; 1 Cor. vii, 28.) To this two- fold Will is opposed the Remission of the Will, which is called

"Permission," and which is also two-fold. The one, which permits something to the power of a rational creature, by not circumscribing its act with a law; and this is opposed to "the revealed Will." The other is that by which God permits something to the capability and will of the creature, by not interposing an efficacious hindrance; and this is opposed to "the Will of God's pleasure" that is efficacious. (Acts xiv, 16; Psalm lxxxi, 13.)

LIX. The things which God wills to do he wills (1.) either from himself, not on account of any cause placed out of himself, whether this be without the consideration of any act which proceeds from the creature, or solely on occasion of the act of the creature: (Deut. vii, 7, 8; Rom. xi, 35; John iii, 16.) Or (2.) He does it on account of some other previous cause laid down on the part of the creature. (Exod. xxxii, 32, 33; 1 Sam. xv, 17, 23.) In regard to this distinction, some work is said to be proper to God, and some foreign to Him and his "strange work." (Lam. iii, 33; Isa. xxviii, 21.) This is also signified by the church in the following words: "O God! whose property is, ever to have mercy and to forgive," &c.

LX. Some persons also distinguish the will of God into that which is antecedent, and that which is consequent. This distinction has reference to one and the same volition or act of the rational creature, which if the act of the Divine will precedes, it is called the "antecedent will of God;" (1 Tim. ii, 4;) but if it follows, it is called his

"consequent will:" (Acts i, 25; Matt. xxiii, 37, 38.) But the antecedent will, it appears, ought to be called velleity, rather than will.

LXI. There is not much distance between this distinction, and another, according to which God is said to will some things "so far as they are good when absolutely considered according to their nature;" but to will other things "so far as, after an inspection, of all the circumstances, they are understood to be desirable."

LXII. God also wills some things in their antecedent causes; that is He wills their causes as relatively, and places those causes in such order, that effects may follow from them; and, if they do follow, that they may of themselves be pleasing to him.

(Ezek. xxxiii, 11; Gen. iv, 7.) He wills other things not only in their causes, but also in themselves. (John vi, 40; Matt. xi, 25, 26.) incident with this, is the distinction of the Divine Will into Conditional and Absolute.

LXIII. Lastly. God wills some things per se or accidentally. He wills per se, those things which are simply and relatively good; (2 Pet. iii, 9; accidentally, those which are in some respect evil, but which have such good things united with them as He wills in preference to the respective good things which are opposed to those evil ones: thus, He wills the evils of punishment, because he would rather have the order of justice preserved in punishment, than suffer an offending creature to go unpunished.

(Jer. ix, 9 Psalm i, 21; Jer. xv, 6.)

LET THE FOLLOWING BE PROBLEMS TO US

(1.) Is it possible for two affirmatively contrary volitions of God to tend towards one and the same uniform object?

(2.) Is it possible for one volition of God to tend towards contrary objects?

lxiv. In this momentum of the Divine Nature, come under consideration those attributes which are ascribed to him in the Scriptures, either properly or figuratively, according to a certain analogy of affections and moral virtues in us; such as are love, hatred, goodness, mercy, desire, anger, justice, &c.

LXV. Those things which have the analogy of affections may be commodiously referred to two principal kinds. So the first can embrace those which we may call primary or principal; the second, those which are derived from the primary.

LXVI. 1The first or principal are Love, (whose opposition is Hatred,) and Goodness; and with these are connected Grace, Benignity and Mercy.

LXVII. Love is an affection of union in God, the objects of which are God himself and the good of justice or righteousness, the creature and its felicity. (Prov. xvi, 4; Psalm. xi, 7; John iii, 16; Wisdom xi, 24-26.) HATRED is an affection of separation in God, the object of which are the unrighteousness and misery of the creature. (Psalm v, 5; Ezek. xxv, 11; Deut. xxv, 15, 16, &c.; Isa. i, 24) But since God primarily loves himself and the good of justice, and at the same moment hates iniquity; and since He loves the creature and its happiness only secondarily, and at the same moment dislikes the misery of the creature; (Psalm xi, 5; Deut. xxviii, 63;) hence it comes to pass, that he hates a creature that pertinaciously perseveres in unrighteousness, and He loves its misery. (Isa. lxvi, 4.)

LXVIII. Goodness in God is an affection of communicating his own good. (Rev. iv, 11; Gen. i, 31.) Its first object outwards is nothing; and thus necessarily the first, that, on its removal, there can be no outward communication. The First advance of this goodness is towards the creature as it is a creature; the Second is towards the creature as it performs its duty, to communicate good to it beyond the remuneration promised.

Both these procedures of the Divine goodness may appropriately receive the appellation of "Benignity." The Third advance is towards a creature that has sinned, and that has by such transgression rendered itself liable to misery. This advance is called Mercy, that is, an affection for affording succour to a person in misery, sin itself presenting no obstacle to its exercise. (Rom. v, 8; Ezek. xvi, 6.) We attribute these advances to the Divine Goodness in such a manner, that in the mean time we concede to the love of God towards his creatures its portion in these advances.

LXIX. Grace seems to stand as a proper adjunct to Goodness, and to Love towards the creatures. According to it, God is disposed to communicate his own good, and to love the creatures, not of merit or of debt, nor that it may add anything to God himself; (Psalm xvi, 2;) but that it may be well with him on whom the good is bestowed, and who is beloved. (Exod. xxxiv, 6; Rom. v, 8; 1 John iv, 7.) LXX. The affections which arise from the primary ones, [§ 65,] are special, as being those which are not occupied about Good and Evil in common, but specially about Good as it is present or absent. We distinguish these affections according to the confined capacity of our consideration, as they have some analogy either in Concupiscibility or in Irascibility.

LXXI. In the Concupiscible we consider, first, Desire and that which is opposed to it; and, afterwards, Joy and Grief. We describe Desire, in God, as an affection for obtaining the works of righteousness which have been prescribed to creatures endued with understanding, and for bestowing on them "the recompense of reward:" (Psalm lxxxi, 13-16; v, 3-5; Isa. xlviii, 18, 19.) To this is opposed that affection according to which God abhors the works of unrighteousness, and the omission of a remuneration.

(Jer. v, 7, 9.) Joy is an affection arising from the presence of a thing that is suitable: such as the fruition of himself, the obedience of the creature, the communication of his own goodness, and the destruction of his rebels and enemies. (Isa. lxii, 5; Psalm lxxxi, 13; Prov. i, 24-26.) Grief, which is its opposite, has its origin in the disobedience and the misery of the creature, and in the occasion given by his people for blaspheming the name of God among the Gentiles. Nearly allied to this is Repentance, which, in God, is nothing more than a change of the thing willed or done, on account of the act of a rational creature. (Gen. xv, 6; Jer. xviii, 8-10.) LXXII. In the Irascible we place Hope, and its opposite, Despair, Confidence and Anger, and we do not exclude even Fear, which, by an Anthropo-pathy, we read, as attributed to God. (Deut. xxxii, 27.) Hope is an attentive expectation of a good work due from the creature, and by the grace of God capable of being performed. It may easily be reconciled with the certain fore-knowledge of God. (Isa. v, 4; Luke xiii, 6, 7.) Despair arises from the pertinacious wickedness of the creature, who is "alienated from the life of God," and hardened in evil, and who, after "he is past feeling," his conscience having been "seared with a hot iron," has "given himself over unto lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness." (Jer. xiii, 23; Ephes. iv, 18, 19.) What in God we call Confidence or Courage, is that by which He with great animation prosecutes a good that is beloved and desired, and puts away and repulses an evil that is hated. Anger is an affection of depulsion in God, through the punishment of the creature who has transgressed his law; by which He brings upon the creature the evil of misery for his unrighteousness, and takes the vengeance which is due to Himself, as an indication of his love of righteousness and his hatred of sin.

When this is vehement, it is called "Fury." (Isa. lxiii, 3-5; Ezek. xiii, 13, 14; Isa. xxvii, 4; Jer. ix, 9; Deut. xxxii, 35; Jer. x, 24; 12, 13; Isa. lxiii, 6.) LXXIII. We attribute these affections to God, on account of some of his own which are analogous to them, without any passion, as He is simple and immutable; and without any inordinateness, disorder and repugnance to right reason; for He exercises himself in a holy manner about all things which are the objects of his will. But we subject the use and exercise of them to the infinite wisdom of God, whose office it is previously to affix to each its object, mode, end, and circumstances, and to determine to which of them, in preference to the rest, is to be conceded the province of acting.

(Exod. xxxii, 10-14; Deut. xxxii, 26, 27.)

LXXIV. Those things in God which have an analogy to moral virtues, as moderators of these affections, are partly general to all the affections, as Righteousness; and partly concern some of them in a special manner, as Patience, and those which are moderators of Anger and of the punishments which proceed from Anger.

LXXV. Righteousness or Justice in God, is an eternal and constant will to render to every one his own: (Psalm xi, 7) To God himself that which is his, and to the creature what belongs to it. We consider this righteousness in its Words and in its Acts. In all its Words are found veracity and constancy; and in its Promises, fidelity. (2 Tim. ii, 13; Num. xxiii, 19; Rom. iii, 4; 1 Thess. v, 24) With regard to its Acts, it is two-fold, Disposing and Remunerative. The former is that according to which God disposes all the things in his actions through his own wisdom, according to the rule of equity which has either been prescribed or pointed out by his wisdom. The latter,

[remunerative righteousness,] is that by which God renders to his creatures that which belongs to it, according to his work through an agreement into which He has entered with it. (Heb. vi, 10, 17, 18; Psalm cxlv, 17; 2 Thess. i, 6; Rev. ii, 23.) LXXVI. Patience is that by which God patiently endures the absence of a good that is loved, desired, and hoped for, and the presence of an evil that is hated; and which spares sinners, not only that He may through them execute the judicial acts of his mercy and justice, but that he may likewise lead them to repentance; or may punish with the greater equity and more grievously, the contumacious. (Isa. v, 4; Ezek. xviii, 23; Matt. xxi, 33- 41; Luke xiii, 6-9; Rom. ii, 4, 5; 2 Pet. iii, 9.) LXXVII. Long-suffering, gentleness, readiness to pardon, and clemency, are the moderators of Anger and Punishments. Long- Suffering suspends anger, lest it should hasten to drive away the evil as soon as ever such an act was required by the demerits of the creature. (Exod. xxxiv, 6; Isa. xlviii, 8, 9; Psalm ciii, 9.) We call that Gentleness, or Lenity, which attempers Anger, lest it should be of too great a magnitude; nay, lest its severity should correspond with the magnitude of the wickedness committed. (Psalm ciii, 10.) We call that Readiness To Pardon, which moderates Anger, so that it may not continue forever, agreeably to the deserts of sinners. (Psalm xxx, 5; Jer. iii, 5; Joel ii, 13.) Clemency is that by which God attempers the deserved punishments, that by their severity and continuance they may be far inferior to the demerits of sin, and may not exceed the strength of the creature.

(2 Sam. vii, 14; Psalm ciii, 13, 14.)

ON THE POWER OF GOD

LXXVIII. By the term "The Power Of God," is meant not a passive power, which cannot happen to God who is a pure act; nor the act, by which God is always acting in himself through necessity of nature; but it signifies an active power, by which He can operate extrinsically, and by which he does so operate when it seems good to himself.

LXXIX. We describe it thus: "It is a faculty of the Life of God, posterior in order to the Understanding and the Will, by which God can, from the liberty of his own Will, operate extrinsically all things whatsoever that He can freely will, and by which he does whatsoever He freely wills." Hence it appears, that Power resembles a principle which executes what the will commands under the direction of knowledge. But we wish Impeding or Obstruction to be comprehended under the operation. (Psalm cxv, 3; Lament. iii, 37, 38; Psalm xxxiii, 9; Jer. xviii, 6.) Therefore, From this we exclude the power or capability of generating and breathing forth, because it acts in a natural manner and intrinsically.

LXXX. The measure of the Divine Capability is the Free Will of God, and indeed this is an adequate measure. (Psalm cxv, 3; Matt. xi, 25-27) For whatsoever God can will freely, He can likewise do it; and whatsoever it is possible for Him to do, He can freely will it; and whatever it is impossible for Him to will, He cannot do it; and that which He cannot do, He also cannot will. But He does, because He wills; and He does not do, because He does not will. Therefore, He does the things which He does, because He wills so to do. He does them not, because He wills them not; not, on the contrary. Hence the objects of the Divine Capability may be most commodiously, and indeed ought to be, circumscribed through the object of the Free Will of God.

LXXXI. The following is the manner: Since the Free Will [of God] rests upon a Will conducting itself according to the mode of [his] nature, and both of them have an Understanding which precedes them, and which, in conjunction with the Will, has the very Essence of God for its foundation; and since God can freely will those things alone which are not contrary to his Essence and Natural Will, and which can be comprehended in his Understanding as entities and true things: it follows, that He can do these things alone; nay, that He can likewise do all things, since the Free Will of God, and therefore, his Power also, are bound by those alone. And since things of this kind are the only things which are simply and absolutely possible, all other things being impossible, God is deservedly said to be capable of doing all things that are possible. (Luke i, 37; xviii, 27; Mark xiv, 36.) For how can there be an entity, a truth, or a good, which is contrary to His Essence and Natural Will, and incomprehensible to his Understanding?

LXXXII. The things thus laid down [as described in the last clause of the preceding Thesis] are indeed confessed by all men; and they are generally described in the schools as things impossible, which imply a contradiction. But it is asked in species,

"What are those things?" We will here recount some of them. God cannot make another God; is incapable of being changed; (James i, 17;) he cannot sin; (Psalm v, 5;) cannot lie; (Num. xxiii, 19; 2 Tim. ii, 13;) cannot cause a thing at the same time to be and not to be, to have been and not to have been, to be hereafter and not hereafter to be, to be this and not to be this, to be this and its contrary. He cannot cause an accident to be without its subject, a substance to be changed into a pre-existing substance, bread into the body of Christ, and He cannot cause a body to be in every place. When we make such assertions as these, we do not inflict an injury on the power of God; but we must beware that things unworthy of Him be not attributed to his Essence, his Understanding, and his Will.

LXXXIII. The Power of God is infinite; because it can do not only all things possible; (which are innumerable, so that they cannot be reckoned to be such a number, without a possibility of their being still more;) but likewise because nothing can resist it. For all created things depend upon the Divine Power, as upon their efficient principle, as the. phrase is, both in their being and in their preservation; whence Omnipotence is deservedly attributed to Him. (Rev. i, 8; Ephes. iii, 20; Matt. iii, 9; xxvi, 53; Rom. ix, 19; Phil. iii, 21.)

LXXXIV. Since the measure of God's Power is his own Free Will, and since therefore God does anything because he wills to do it; it cannot be concluded from the Omnipotence of God that anything will come to pass, [or will afterwards be,] unless it be evident from the Divine Will. (Dan. iii, 17, 18; Rom. iv, 20, 21; Matt. viii, 2.) But if this be evident from the will of God, what He hath willed to do is certain to be done, although, to the mind of the creature, it may not seem possible. (Luke i, 19, 20, 34-37.) And that the mind must be "brought into captivity to the obedience of faith,"

is a truth which here finds abundant scope for exercise.

LXXXV. The distinction of Power into absolute, and ordinary or actual, has not reference to God's Power so much as to his Will, which uses his Power to do some things when it wills to use it, and which does not use it when it does not will; though it would be possible for it to use the Power if it would; and if it did use it, the Divine Will would, through it, do far more things than it does. (Matt. iii, 9.) LXXXVI. The Omnipotence of God cannot be communicated to any creature. (1 Tim.

vi, 15; Jude. 4.)

ON THE PERFECTION OF GOD

LXXXVII. From the simple and infinite combination of all these things, when they are considered with the mode of pre- eminence, the Perfection of God has its existence. Not that by which He has every single thing in a manner the most perfect; for this is effected by Simplicity and Infinity: but it is that by which, in the most perfect manner, he has all things which denote any perfection. And it may fitly be described thus: "It is the interminable, the entire, and, at the same time, the perfect possession of Essence and Life." (Matt. v, 48; Gen. xvii, 1; Exod. vi, 3; Psalm l:10; Acts xvii, 25; James i, 17.)

LXXXVIII. This Perfection of God infinitely exceeds the perfection of all the creatures, on a three-fold account. For it possesses all things in a mode the most perfect, and does not derive them from another. But the perfection which the creatures possess, they derive from God, and it is faintly shadowed forth after its archetype.

Some creatures have a larger portion [of this derived perfection] than others; and the more of it they possess, the nearer they are to God and have the greater likeness to Him. (Rom. xi, 35, 36; 1 Cor. iv, 7; Acts xvii, 28, 29; 2 Cor. iii, 18; 2 Pet. i, 4; Matt.

v, 48.)

LXXXIX. From this Perfection, by means of some internal act of God, his Blessedness has its existence; and his Glory exists, by means of some relation of it extrinsically. (1 Tim. i, 11; vi, 15; Exod. xxxiii, 18.)

ON THE BLESSEDNESS OF GOD

XC. Blessedness is through an act of the understanding: is it not also through an act of the will? Such is our opinion; and we delineate it thus. It is an act of the life of God, by which he enjoys his own perfection, that is fully known by his Understanding and supremely loved by his Will; and by which He complacently reposes in this Perfection with satisfaction. (Gen. xvii, 1; Psalm xvi, 11; 1 Cor. ii, 9, 10.) XCI. The Blessedness of God is so peculiar to himself, that it cannot be communicated to a creature. (1 Cor. xv, 28.) Yet, in relation to the object, he is the beautifying good of all creatures endued with understanding, and is the Effector of the act which tends to this object, and which reposes with satisfaction in it. In these consists the blessedness of the creature.

THE GLORY OF GOD

XCII. The Glory of God is from his Perfection, regarded extrinsically, and may in some degree be described thus: It is the excellence of God above all things. God makes this glory manifest by external acts in various ways. (Rom. i, 23; ix, 4; Psalm viii, 1.)

XCIII. But the modes of manifestation, which are declared to us in the scriptures, are chiefly two: the one, by an effulgence of light and of unusual splendour, or by its opposite, a dense darkness or obscurity. (Matt. xvii, 2-5; Luke ii, 9; Exod. xvi, 10; 1

Kings viii, 11.) The other, by the production of works which agree with his Perfection and Excellence. (Psalm xix, 1; John ii, 11.)

But ceasing from any more prolix discussion of this subject, let us with ardent prayers suppliantly beseech the God of Glory, that, since He has formed us for his Glory, He would vouchsafe to make us yet more and more the instruments of illustrating his Glory among men, through Jesus Christ our Lord, the brightness of his Glory, and the express image of his Person.

DISPUTATION 5

ON THE PERSON OF THE FATHER AND THE SON

RESPONDENT: PETER DE LA FITE

I. WE do not here receive the name of "Father," as it is sometimes taken in the Scriptures in regard to the adoption, according to which God hath adopted believers to himself as sons: (Gal. iv, 6) Nor with respect to the creation of things, according to which even the Gentiles themselves knew God the Father, and gave Him that appellation: (Acts xvii, 28.) But by this name we signify God according to the relation which He has to his only-begotten and proper Son, who is our Lord Jesus Christ: (Ephes. i, 3) And we thus describe Him: "He is the First Person in the Sacred Trinity, who from all eternity of himself begat his Word, which is his Son, by communicating to Him his own Divinity."

II. We call Him "a Person," not in reference to the use of that word in personating,

[appearing in a mask,] which denotes the representation of another; but in reference to its being defined an undivided and communicable subsistence, of a nature that is living, intelligent, willing, powerful, and active. Each of these properties is attributed, in the Holy Scriptures, to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Substitence: "Him which is, and which was, and which is to come." (Rev. i, 4) Life: "As the living Father hath sent me," &c. (John vi, 53, 57.) Intelligence: "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God (Rom. xi, 33.) Will: "And this is the Father's will,"

&c. (John vi, 39.) Power: "Thine, O Fath er, is the Power." (Matt. vi, 13.) Action:

"My Father worketh hitherto." (John v, 17.) We do not contend about words. Under the term "Person," we comprehend such things as we have now described; and since they agree with the Father, the title of "Person" cannot be justly denied to him.

III. We call Him "a Person in the Holy Trinity," that is, a Divine Person, which with us possesses just as much force as if we were to call Him God. For though the Deity of the Father has been acknowledged by most of those persons who have called in question that of the Son; yet it is denied by those who have declared, that the God of the Old Testament is different from that of the New, and who have affirmed that the Father of Jesus Christ is a different Being from the Creator of heaven and earth. To the former class we oppose the word of Christ: "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth," &c. (Matt. xi, 25.) To the latter we oppose another saying of the same Christ: "It is my Father that honoureth me; of whom ye say, that He is your God." (John viii, 54.) To both of these classes together we oppose that joint declaration of the whole church at Jerusalem: "Thou art God, which hast made heaven, and earth, and the sea, and all that in them is: Who by the mouth of thy servant David hast said," &c. And in a subsequent verse, "For of a truth against thy holy Son Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, etc, were gathered together." (Acts iv, 24- 27.)

IV. We place Him "first" in the Holy Trinity: for so hath Christ taught us, by commanding us to "baptize in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." (Matt. xxviii, 19.) "The First" not in relation of time but of order; which order has its foundation in this: The Father is the fountain and origin of the whole Divinity, and the principle and the cause of the Son himself, which the word the" implies. (John v, 26, 27.) Pious Antiquity attempted to illustrate this [mystery] by the similitude of a fountain and its stream, of the sun and its beam, of the mind and its reason, of a root and its stalk, and by similar comparisons. On this account the Father is called

"unbegotten" and the Christian Fathers ascribe to Him supreme and pre-eminent authority. It is on this account also that the name of God is often attributed in the Scriptures peculiarly and by way of eminence to the Father.

V. We attribute to Him "active generation," which likewise comprised under the word

"Father;" but of its mode and ratio, we willingly confess ourselves to be ignorant. But yet, since all generation, properly so called, is made by the communication of the same nature which He possesses who begets, we say with correctness that "the Father of himself begat the Son," by communicating to him his Deity, which is his own nature. The principle, therefore, which begets, is the Father; but the principle by which generation is effected is his nature. Whence the Person is said to beget and to be begotten. But the nature is said neither to beget nor to be begotten, but to be communicated. This communication, when rightly understood, renders vain the objection of the Anti- Trinitarians, who accuse the members of the church universal of holding a quaternity (of Divine Persons in the Godhead.)

VI. We say "that from all eternity He begat," because neither was he the God of Jesus Christ, before he was his father, nor was he simply God before he was his Father. For as we cannot imagine a mind that is devoid of reason, so we say that it is impious to form a conception in our minds of a God who is without his word. (John i, 1, 2.) Besides, according to the sentiments of sacred antiquity, and of the church universal, since this generation is an internal operation and it is likewise from all eternity. For all such operations are eternal, unless we wish to maintain that God is liable to change.

VII. We have hitherto treated of the Father. The Son is the second person in the Holy Trinity, the Word of the Father, begotten of the Father from all eternity, and proceeding from Him by the communication of the same Deity which the Father possesses without origination. (Matt. xxviii, 19; John i, 1; Micah v, 2.) We say, "that he is not the Son by creation." For what things soever they were that have been created, they were all created by him. (John i, 3.) And "that he was not made the Son by adoption:" for we are all adopted in him. (John i, 12; Ephes. i, 5, 6.) But "that he proceeded from the Father by generation." He is the Son, not by creation out of nonentities, or from uncreated elements -- not by adoption, as though he had previously been some other thing than the Son; for this is his primitive name, and significant of his inmost nature; but He is by generation, and, as the Son, he is by nature a partaker of the whole divinity of his Father.

VIII. We call the Son "a person," with the same meaning attached to the word as that by which we have already (§ 2) predicated the Father. For he is an undivided and incommunicable subsistence. John says, (i, 1,) "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God." Of a living nature: "As I live by the Father." (John vi, 57.) Intelligent: "The Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, has declared him." (John i, 18.) Willing: "To whomsoever the Son will reveal him." (Matt. xi, 27.) "Even so the Son quickeneth whom he will." (John v, 21.) Powerful: "According to the efficacy whereby He is able even to subdue all things unto him." (Phil. iii, 21.) Active: "And I work." (John v, 17.)

IX. We call the Son "a person in the Sacred Trinity," that is, a Divine person and God.

And, with orthodox antiquity, we prove our affirmation by four distinct classes or arguments. (1.) From the names by which he is called in the Scriptures. (2.) From the divine attributes which the Scriptures ascribe to him. (3.) From the works which the Scriptures relate to have been produced by him. (4.) From a collation of those passages of Scripture, which, having been uttered in the Old Testament concerning the Father, are in the New appropriated to the Son.

X. The divinity of the person of the Son is evident, from the names which are attributed to him in the scriptures. (1.) Because he is called God, and this not only attributively, as "the Word was God," (John i, 1.) "Who is over all, God blessed forever;" (Rom. ix, 5;) but likewise subjectively: "God manifested in the flesh." (1

Tim. iii, 16.) "O God, thy God hath anointed Thee with the oil of gladness." (Heb. i, 9.) Nay, he is likewise called "the great God." (Tit. ii, 13.) (2.) The word "Son" stands in proof of the same truth, especially so far as this name belongs to him properly and solely, according to which he is called "God's own Son," (Rom. viii, 32,) and "his only begotten Son," (John i, 18,) which expressions, we affirm, are tantamount to his being called by nature, the Son of God. (3.) Because he is called "King of kings and Lord of lords;" (Rev. xvii, 14; xix, 16;) and "the Lord of glory." (1 Cor. ii, 8.) These appellations prove much more strongly what we wish to establish, if they be compared with the scriptures of the Old Testament, in which the same names are ascribed to him who is called Jehovah. (Psalm xcv, 3; xxiv, 8-10.) (4.) Pious antiquitity established the same truth from the name, of Logov, "the Word;" which cannot signify the outward word that is devoid of a proper subsistence, on account of those things which are attributed to it in the Scriptures. For it is said to have been "in the beginning, to have been with God, and to be God," and to have "created all things," &c.

XI. The essential attributes of the Deity which are in the Scriptures ascribed to the Son of God, likewise declare this in the plainest manner. (1.) Immensity: "My Father and I will come unto him, and make our abode with him." (John xiv, 23.) "That Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith." (Ephes. iii, 17.) "I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." (Matt. xxviii, 20.) (2.) Eternity: "In the beginning was the Word." (John i, 1.) "I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last." (Rev. i, 11; ii, 8.) (3.) Immutability: "But thou, O Lord, remainest; thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail." (Heb. i, 11, 12.) (4.) Omniscience is also attributed to him: For he searches the reins and hearts;" (Rev. ii, 93.) He "knows all things." (John xxi, 17.) And he perceived the thoughts of the Pharisees. (Matt. xii, 25.) (5.) Omnipotence: "According to the efficacy whereby the Lord Jesus Christ is able even to subdue all things unto himself" (Phil. iii, 21.) But the Divine nature cannot, without a contradiction, be taken away from him to whom the proper essentials of God are ascribed. (6.) Lastly.

Majesty and glory belong to Him equally with the Father: "That all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father." (John v, 23.) "Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power, be unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, forever and ever." (Rev. v, 13.)

XII. The divine works which are attributed to Him, establish the same truth. (1.) The creation of all things: "A2 things were made by Him." (John i, 3.) "By whom also, he made the worlds," or the ages. (Heb. i, 2.) "One Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things." (1 Cor. viii, 6.) But what are these "all things?" Exactly the same as those which are said, in the same verse, to be "of the Father." (2.) The preservation of all things: all things by the word of his power." (Heb. i, 3.) "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." (John v, 17.) (3.) The performing of miracles: "Which He works by the Holy Spirit, who is said to "have received of the things of Christ, by which he will glorify Christ." (John xvi, 14.) "By which, also, he went and preached unto the spirits in prison." (1 Pet. iii, 19.) This Spirit is so peculiar to Christ, that the Apostles are said to perform miracles in the name and power of Christ. (4.) To these let the works which relate to the salvation of the church be added; which cannot be performed by one who is a mere man.

XIII. A comparison of those passages which in the Old Testament, are ascribed to God, who claims for himself the appellation of Jehovah, with the same passages which in the New, are attributed to the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ -- supplies to us the fourth class of arguments. But because the number of them is immense, we will refrain from a prolix recital of the whole, and produce only a few out of the many. In Numbers, xxi, 5-7, it is said, "The people spoke against God, and the Load sent fiery serpents among them, and they bit the people," many of whom "died." In 1

Corinthians x, 9, the apostle says, "Neither let us tempt Christ, as some of them also tempted, and were destroyed of serpents." The passage in the 68th Psalm, (18,) which describes God as "ascending on high and leading captivity captive," is interpreted by the apostle, (Ephes. iv, 8,) and applied to Christ. What is spoken in Psalm cii, 25, 26, about the true God, ["Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth," &c.] is, in Heb. i, 10-12, expressly applied to Christ. St. John, in his gospel, (xii, 40, 41,) interprets the vision described by Isaiah, (vi, 9, 10,) and declares that "Esaias said these things when he saw the glory of Christ." In Isai. viii, 14, Jehovah, it is said,

"shall be a rock of offense, and a snare to the houses of Israel," &c. Yet Simeon, (in Luke ii, 34,) St. Paul, (in Romans ix, 33,) and St. Peter, (1 Epis. ii, 8,) severally declare that Christ was "set for the rising and falling of many," for "a stumbling block, and rock of offense" to unbelievers, and to "the disobedient."

XIV. We call Christ "the second person," according to the order which has been pointed out to us by Himself in Matt. xxviii, 19. For the Son is of the Father, as from one from whom he is said to have come forth. The Son lives by the Father, (John vi, 57,) and the Father hath given to the Son to have life in himself." (v, 26.) The Son understands by the Father, because "the Father sheweth the Son all things that himself doeth," (v, 20,) and what things the Son saw while "He was in the bosom of the Father, he testifies and declares to us." (i, 18; iii, 32.) The son works from the Father, because "the Son can do nothing of himself: But what he seeth the Father do." (v, 19.) Thus "the Son does not speak of himself, but the Father, that dwelleth in him, doeth the works." (xiv, 10.) This is the reason why the Son, by a just right, refers all things to the Father, as to Him from whom he received all that he had. (xix, 11; xvii, 7.)

"When he was in the form of God, he thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, &c. and became obedient" to the Father, "even unto the death of the cross." (Phil. ii, 6-8.) XV. We say "that the Son was begotten of the Father from all eternity." (1.) Because

"his goings-forth have been from of old, from everlasting," and "these goings-forth"

are from the Father. (Micah v, 2, 3.) If any one be desirous to give them any other interpretation than "the goings-forth" of generation, he must make them subsequent to the "goings- forth" of generation; and thus likewise he establishes the eternity of generation. (2.) Because, since the Son is eternal, as we have previously shewn, [§ 7,]

and since he had no existence at all before he existed as the Son, (but it is proper to a son to be begotten,) we correctly assert on these grounds, that "he was eternally begotten." (3.) Since Logov, "the Word," was "in the beginning with the Father,"

(John i, 1, 9,) he must of necessity have been in the beginning from the Father; (unless we wish to maintain that the Word is collateral with the Father;) in truth, according to the order of nature he must have been from the Father, before he was with the Father.

But he is not from the Father, except according to the mode of generation; for if it be otherwise, "the Word" will be from the Father in one mode, and "the Son" in another, which contradicts the eternity of the Son that we have already established. Therefore,

"the Word" is eternally begotten.

XVI. From these positions we perceive, that an agreement and a distinction subsists between the Father and the Son. (l.) An Agreement in reference to One and the same nature and essence, according to which the Son is said to be "in the form of God," and

"equal with the Father;" (Phil. ii, 6,) and according to the decree of the Nicene Council to be omoousiov ["of the same substance,"] "consubstantial with the Father,"

not omoiousiov "of like substance;" because the comparison of things in essence must be referred not to similitude or dissimilitude, but to Equality or Inequality, according to the very nature of things and to truth itself: (2.) A Distinction according to the mode of existence or subsistence, by which both of them have their divinity: for the Father has it from no one, the Son has it communicated to him by the Father.

According to the former, the Son is said to be one with the Father; (John x, 30;) according to the latter, He is said to be "another" than the Father; (v, 32;) but according to both of them, the Son and the Father are said to "come to those whom they love, and to make their abode with them," (xiv, 23,) by the Spirit of both Father and Son "who dwelleth in believers," (Rom. viii, 9-11,) and "whom the Son sends to them from the Father." (John xv, 26.) May the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of all consolation, deign to bestow upon us the communion of this Spirit, through the Son of his love. Amen!

DISPUTATION 6

ON THE HOLY SPIRIT

RESPONDENT: JAMES MAHOT

As the preceding Disputation treated of God the Father and God the Son, order requires us now to enter on the subject of the Holy Ghost.

I. The word Spirit signifies primarily, properly, and adequately, a thing which in its first act and essence is most subtle and simple, but which in its second act and efficacy is exceedingly active, that is, powerful and energetic. Hence it has come to pass, that this word is received, by way of distinction and opposition, sometimes for a personal and self-existing energy and power, and sometimes for an energy inhering to some other thing according to the mode of quality or property: but this word belongs primarily and properly to a self-existing power; and to an inhering power or energy, only secondarily and by a metaphorical communication. (John iii, 8; Psalm civ, 4; Luke i, 35; Kings ii, 9.)

II. But it is, in the first place, and with the greatest truth, ascribed to God, (John iv, 24,) both because He according to Essence is a pure and most simple act; and because according to Efficacy he is most active, and most prompt and powerful to perform, that is, because He is the first and Supreme Being, as well as the first and Supreme Agent. But it is with singular propriety attributed to the hypostatical energy which exists in God, and which is frequently marked with an addition, thus, "The Spirit of Elohim," (Gen. i, 9,) "The Spirit of Jehovah," (Isa. xi, 2,) and "His Holy Spirit." (lxiii, 10.) By these expressions is signified, that He is the person by whom God the Father and the Son perform all things in heaven and earth, (Matt. xii, 28; Luke xi, 20,) and that He is not only Holy in himself, but likewise the Sanctifier of all things which are in any way holy and so called. Our present discourse is concerning the Holy Spirit understood according to this last signification.

III. We may not attempt to define the Holy Spirit, (for such an attempt is unlawful,) but we may be allowed in some degree to describe Him according to the Scriptures, after the following manner: He is the person subsisting in the Sacred and undivided Trinity, who is the Third in order, emanates from the Father and is sent by the Son; and therefore He is the Spirit proceeding from both, and, according to his Person, distinct from both; an infinite, eternal illimitable Spirit, and of the same Divinity with God the Father and the Son. This description we will now consider in order, according to its several parts. (Matt. xxviii, 19; John i, 26; and Luke iii, 16; John xiv, 16; 1 Cor.

ii, 10, 11; Gen. i, 2; Psalm cxxxix, 7-12.)

IV. On this subject four things come under our consideration and must be established by valid arguments. (1.) That the Holy Spirit ufisamenon is subsistent and a Person; not something after the manner of a quality and property, (suppose that of goodness, mercy, or patience,) which exists within the Deity. (2.) That He is a Person proceeding from the Father and the Son, and therefore is in order the Third in the Trinity. (3.) That according to his Person He is distinct from the Father and the Son.

(4.) That He is infinite, eternal, immeasurable, and of the same Divinity with the Father and the Son, that is, not a creature, but God.

V. The first is proved by those attributes which the whole of mankind are accustomed to ascribe to a thing that has an existence, and which they conceive under the notion of "a Person:" for we assert, that all those things belong to the Holy Spirit, whether they agree with a person in the first Act or in the second. (1.) From those things which agree in the first Act with a thing that has an existence and is a Person, we draw the following conclusion: That to which belongs Essence or Existence, Life, Understanding, Will and Power, is justly called "a Person," or nothing whatever in the nature of things can receive that appellation. But to the Holy Spirit belong: (i.) Essence or Existence: for He is in God, (1 Cor. ii, 11,) emanates from God and is sent by the Son. (John xv, 26.) (ii.) Life: for He "brooded over the waters," (Gen. i, 2,) as a hen covers her chickens with her wings; and He is the Author of animal and of spiritual life to all things living. (Job xxxiii, 4; John iii, 5; Rom. viii, 2, 11.) (iii.) Understanding: "The Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God." (1 Cor.

ii, 10.) (iv.) Will: for He "distributes his gifts to every man severally as He will." (1

Cor. xii, 11.) (v.) Lastly, Power: with which, the prophets, and other holy persons, and in particular the Messiah himself, were furnished and strengthened. (Micah iii, 8; Ephes. iii, 16; Isa. xi, 2.)

VI. The same thing is proved (2.) from those things which are usually attributed to a Person in the second Act. For of this description are the actions which are ascribed to the Holy Spirit, and which usually belong to nothing except a subsistence and a person. Such are to create, (Job xxxiii, 4; Psalm civ, 30,) to preserve, to vivify or quicken, to instruct or furnish them with knowledge, faith, charity, hope, the fear of the Lord, fortitude, patience, and other virtues; to "rush mightily upon Sampson;"

(Judges xiv, 6;) to "depart from Saul;" (1 Sam. xvi, 14;) to "rest upon the Messiah;"

(Isa. xi, 2;) to "come upon and overshadow Mary;" (Luke i, 35;) to send the prophets; (Isa. lxi, 1;) to appoint bishops; (Acts xx, 28;) to descend in a bodily appearance like a dove upon Christ, (Luke iii, 22,) and similar operations. To these may also be added those metaphorical expressions which attributes such passions to Him as agree with no other thing than a subsistence and a person, and as are signified in the following passages: "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh." (Joel ii, 28.) "Jesus breathed on them, and said, receive ye the Holy Ghost." (John xx, 22.) "They vexed his Holy Spirit. (Isa. lxiii, 10.) "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God." Ephes. iv, 30.) To blaspheme and speak a word against the Holy Ghost. (Matt. xii, 31, 32.) "He hath done despite to the Spirit of Grace," (Heb. x, 29.)

VII. A similar bearing have those passages of Scripture which reckon the Holy Spirit in the same series with the Father and the Son. Of which class is that commanding men "to be baptized in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost;"

(Matt. xxviii, 19;) that which says, "There are three that bear record in Heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost." (1 John v, 7;) that which declares, "The same Spirit, the same Lord, and the same God, effect the diversities of operations, institute the differences of administrations, and pour out the diversities of gifts; (1 Cor. xii, 4 --6;) and that which beseeches, "that the grace of' the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost may be with all believers." (2 Cor. xiii, 13.) For it would be absurd to number an inly- existent quality, or property, in the same series with two subsistences or persons.

VIII. The second topic of consideration [§ 15,] contains three members: (i.) of which the first, that is, the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, is proved by those passages of Scripture in which he receives the appellation of "the Spirit of God and of the Father," and of "the Spirit who is of God;" and by those in which the Spirit is said to proceed and go forth from, to be given, poured out, and sent forth by the Father, and by whom the Father acts and operates. (John xiv, 16, 26; xv, 26; Joel ii, 28; Gal.

iv, 6.) (ii.) The second member, that is, the procession from the Son, is proved by similar passages, which style Him "the Spirit of the Son," (Gal. iv, 6,) and which declare, that He is given and sent by the Son, (John xv, 26,) and that He therefore receives from the Son and glorifies Him. (xvi, 14.) To which must likewise be added, from another passage, (xx, 22,) a mode of giving, which is called "breathing," or inspiration. (iii.) The third member, that is, His being the third person in the Holy Trinity in order, but not in time and degree, appears principally from the fact, that the Spirit of the Father and the Son is said to be sent and given by the Father and the Son, and that the Father and the Son are said to work by Him. It is also manifest from the order which was observed in the institution of Baptism, "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." (Matt. xxviii, 19.) IX. All those passages of Scripture which have been produced in the preceding Theses for another purpose, prove "that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Father and the Son, not only according to name, but likewise according to person," which is the third part of the description which we have given. [§ 4.] Among other passages, the following expressly affirm this distinction: "I will pray the Father, and He shall give you another Comforter." (John xiv, 16.) "That Comforter, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name." (xiv, 26.) "When that Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father." (xv, 26.) "The Spirit of the Lord Jehovah is upon me; because Jehovah hath annointed me," &c. (Isa. lxi, 1.) There are numerous other passages in confirmation of this distinction: so that the blindness of Sabellius was most wonderful, who could possibly be in darkness amidst such a splendour of daylight.

X. Lastly. The fourth part comes now to be considered. (1.) The Infinity of the Holy Spirit is proved, both by his Omniscience, by which he is said to "search all things, yea, the deep things of God," and to know all the things which are in God; (1 Cor. ii, 10, 11; John xvi, 13;) and by his Omnipotence, by which He hath created and still preserves all things, (Job. xxxiii, 4) and according to both of which He is styled "the Spirit of wisdom and of knowledge," and "the power of the Highest." (Luke i, 35.) (2.) His Eternity is established, (Isa. xi, 2) both by the creation of all things; for whatsoever is before all things which have been made, that is eternal; and by the titles with which He is signalized, for he is called "the power of the Highest," and the finger of God." (Luke xi, 20.) These titles cannot apply to a thing that has its beginning in time. (3.) A most luminous argument for His Immensity lies in this. It is said, that "no one can flee from the Spirit of God; (Psalm cxxxix, 7;) and that the Spirit of the Lord dwells in all his saints, as in a temple. (1 Cor. vi, 19.) XI. From all these particulars it clearly appears, that the Holy Ghost is of the same Divinity with the Father and the Son, and is truly distinguished by the name of God.

For He who is not a creature, and yet has a real subsistence, must be God; and He who is from God, and who proceeds from the Father, not by an external emanation, nor by a creation performed through the intervention of any other Divine power, but by an internal emanation, He, being the power of God, by what right shall He be despoiled of the name of "God?" For when He is said to be given, poured out, and sent; this does not betoken any diminution of his Divinity, but is an intimation of his origin from God, of his procession from the Father and the Son, and of his mission to his office. A clear indication of his Deity is also apparent from its being said, that He also with plenary power distributes Divine gifts according to his own will, (1 Cor. xii, 11,) and he bestows his gifts with an authority equal to that with which "God" the Father is said to "work his operations," (4.) and to that with which the Son, who is called "the Lord," is said to "institute administrations."

XII. This doctrine of the sacred and undivided Trinity contains a mystery which far surpasses every human and angelical understanding, if it be considered according to the internal union which subsists between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and according to the relation among them of origin and procession. But if regard be had to that economy and dispensation by which the Father and the Son, and both of them through the Holy Spirit, accomplish our salvation; the contemplation is one of admirable sweetness, and produces in the hearts of believers the most exhuberant fruits of faith, hope, charity, confidence, fear, and obedience, to the praise of God the Creator, the Son the Redeemer, and of the Holy Ghost the Sanctifier. May "the Love of God the Father, the Grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the Communion of the Holy Ghost, be with us," and with all saints. Amen! (2 Cor. xiii, 14.)

"If the Spirit be third in dignity and order, what necessity is there for his being also the third in nature? Indeed the doctrine of piety has perhaps taught that He is third in dignity. But to employ the expression 'the third in nature,' we have neither learned out of the Holy Scriptures, nor is it possible to collect it as a consequence from what precedes. For as the Son is in truth Second in order, because He is from the Father, and Second in dignity, because the Father exists that He may be himself the principle and the cause, and because through the Son there is a procession and an access to God the Father; (but He is no more second in nature, because the Deity is one in both of them.) So, undoubtedly, is likewise the Holy Spirit, though He follows the Son both in order and dignity, as we completely grant, yet He is not at all resembling one who exists in the nature of another. Basilius Eversor 3.

"In brief, in things to be distinguished, the Deity is incapable of being divided; and resembles one vast attempered mass of effulgence proceeding from three suns which mutually embrace each other. Wherefore when we have had regard to the Deity itself, or to the first cause, or to the monarchy, we have formed in our minds a conception of some one thing. Again, when I apply my mind to these things in which Deity consists, and which exist from the first cause itself, flowing from it with equal glory and without any relation to time, I discover three things as the objects of my adoration."

Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. 3 De Theolog.

DISPUTATION 7

ON THE FIRST SIN OF THE FIRST MAN

RESPONDENT: ABRAHAM APPART

THE USE OF THE DOCTRINE

I. When an inquiry is instituted concerning this first evil, we do not agitate the question for the purpose of unworthily exposing to disgrace the nakedness of the first formed pair, which had been closely covered up, as impious Ham did in reference to his father. (Gen. ix, 22.) But we enter on this subject, that, after it is accurately known, as when the cause of a mortal disease is discovered, we may with the greater earnestness implore the hand which heals and cures. (Gal. ii, 16.) In this discussion four things seem to be principally entitled to a consideration. (1.) The sin itself. (2.) Its causes. (3.) Its heinousness. (4.) Its effects.

THE SIN ITSELF

II. This sin is most appropriately called by the Apostle, "disobedience," and "offense"

or fall. (Rom. v, 18, 19. (1.). Disobedience; for, since the law against which the sin was committed, was symbolical, having been given to testify that man was under a law to God, and to prove his obedience, and since the subsequent performance of it was to be a confession of devoted submission and due obedience; the transgression of it cannot, in fact, be denoted by a more commodious name than that of

"disobedience," which contains within itself the denial of subjection and the renunciation of obedience. (2.) Offense, or fall. Because as man, having been previously placed in a state of integrity, walked with unstumbling feet in the way of God's commandments; by this foul deed he impinged or offended against the law itself, and fell from his state of innocence. (Rom. v, 15-18.) III. This sin, therefore, is a transgression of the law which was delivered by God, to the first human beings, about not eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; perpetrated by the free will of man, from a desire to be like God, and through the persuasion of Satan that assumed the shape of a serpent. On account of this transgression, man fell under the displeasure and the wrath of God, rendered himself subject to a double death, and deserving to be deprived of the primeval righteousness and holiness, in which a great part of the image of God consisted. (Gen.

ii, 17; Rom. v, 19; Gen. iii, 3-6, 23, 24; Rom. v, 12, 16; Luke xix, 26.) THE CAUSE OF THIS SIN

IV. The efficient cause of this sin is two fold. The one immediate and near. The other remote and mediate. (1.) The former is Man himself, who, of his own free will and without any necessity either internal or external, (Gen. iii, 6,) transgressed the law which had been proposed to him, (Rom. v, 19,) which had been sanctioned by a threatening and a promise, (Gen. ii, 16, 17,) and which it was possible for him to have observed (ii, 9; iii, 23, 24.) (2.) The remote and mediate efficient cause is the Devil, who, envying the Divine glory and the salvation of mankind, solicited man to a transgression of that law. (John viii, 44.) The instrumental cause is the Serpent, whose tongue Satan abused, for proposing to man these arguments which he considered suitable to persuade him. (Gen. iii, 1; 2 Cor. xi, 3.) It is not improbable, that the grand deceiver made a conjecture from his own case; as he might himself have been enticed to the commission of sin by the same arguments. (Gen. iii, 4, 5.) V. Those arguments which may be called "both the inwardly moving" and "the outwardly-working causes," were two. (1.) The one, directly persuading, was deduced from a view of the advantage which man would obtain from it, that is, a likeness to God. (Gen. iii, 5, 6.) (2.) The other was a removing argument, one of dissuasion, taken from God's threatening; lest the fear of punishment, prevailing over the desire of a similitude to God, should hinder man from eating. (iii, 4.) Though the first of these two arguments occupies the first station, with regard to order, in the proposition; yet, we think, it obtained the last place with regard to efficiency. To these arguments may be added two qualities imparted by the Creator to the fruit of the tree, calculated blandly to affect and allure the senses of a human being; these qualities are intimated in the words, "that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes."

(iii, 6.) But there is this difference between the two principal arguments and these qualities. The former were proposed by the Devil to persuade to the commission of sin, as such; while the two qualities implanted by God were proposed only for the purpose of persuading [the woman] to eat, if that could have been done without sinning.

VI. The inwardly-moving causes, but which became such by accident, were two. (1.) Such an affection, or desire, for a likeness to God, as had been implanted in man by God himself; but it was to be exercised in a certain order and method. For the gracious image and likeness of God, according to which man was created, tended towards his glorious image and likeness. (2 Cor. iii, 18.) (2.) A natural affection for the fruit which was good in its taste, pleasant in its aspect, and well adapted for preserving and recruiting animal life.

VII. But as it was the duty of man to resist the efficacy of all and each of these several causes, so was it likewise in power; for he had been "created after the image of God,"

and therefore, in "the knowledge of God," (Gen. i, 27; Col. iii, 10,) and endued with righteousness and true holiness. (Ephes. iv, 24.) This resistance might have been effected by his repelling and rejecting the causes which operated outwardly, and by reducing into order and subjecting to the Law and to the Spirit of God those which, impelled inwardly. If he had acted thus, the temptation, out of which he would have departed victorious, would not have been imputed to him as an offense against the violated law. (Gen. iii, 7-12.)

VIII. But the guilt of this sin can by no means be transferred to God, either as an efficient or as a deficient cause. (1.) Not as an efficient cause. For He neither perpetrated this crime through man, nor employed against man any action, either internal or external, by which he might incite him to sin. (Psalm v, 5; James i, 13.) (2.) Not as a deficient cause. For He neither denied nor withdrew any thing that was necessary for avoiding this sin and fulfilling the law; but He had endowed Him sufficiently with all things requisite for that purpose, and preserved him after he was thus endued.

IX. But the Divine permission intervened; not as having permitted that act to man's legitimate right and power, that he might commit it without sin, for such a permission as this is contrary to legislation; (Gen. ii, 17;) but as having permitted it to the free will and capability of man. This Divine permission is not the denial or the withdrawing of the grace necessary and sufficient for fulfilling the law; (Isa. v, 4;) for if a permission of this kind were joined to legislation, it would ascribe the efficiency of sin to God. But it is the suspension of some efficiency, which is possible to God both according to right and to capability, and which, if exerted, would prevent sin in its actual commission. This is commonly called "an efficacious hindrance." But God was not bound to employ this impediment, when He had already laid down those hindrances to sin which might and ought to have withheld and deterred man from sinning, and which consisted in the communication of his own image, in the appointment of his law, in the threat of punishments, and in the promise of rewards.

X. Though the cause of this permission may be reckoned in the number of those things which, such is the will of God, are hidden from us, (Deut. xxix, 29) yet, while with modesty and reverence we inspect the acts of God, it appears to us that a twofold cause may be maintained, the one a priori, the other a posteriori. (1.) We will enunciate the former in the words of Tertullian. "If God had once allowed to man the free exercise of his own will and had duly granted this permission, He undoubtedly had permitted the enjoyment of these things through the very authority of the institution. But they were to be enjoyed as in Him, and according to Him; that is, according to God, that is, for good. For who will permit any thing against himself?

But as in man [they were to be enjoyed] according to the motions of his liberty." (2.) The cause a posteriori shall be given in the words of St. Augustine. "A good being would not suffer evil to be done, unless He was likewise Omnipotent, and capable of bringing good out of that evil."

XI. The material cause of this sin is the tasting of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which is an act in its own nature indifferent, and easily avoidable by man in the midst of such abundant plenty of good and various fruits.

From this shine forth the admirable benignity and kindness of God; whose will it was to have experience of the obedience of his creature, in an act which that creature could with the utmost facility omit, without injury to his nature, and even without any detriment to his pleasure. This seems to have been intimated by God himself when he propounded the precept in this manner. "Of every tree of the garden thou shalt freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat." (Gen. ii, 16, 17.)

XII. But the form of this sin is anomia "the transgression of the law," (1 John iii, 4,) which belongs to this act in reference to its having been forbidden by the law. And because this relation adhered to the act from the time when God circumscribed it by a law, the effect of it was that the act ought to be omitted. (Dan. iii, 18.) For the moral evil, which adhered to it through the prohibition of God, was greater, than the natural good which was in the act by nature. There was also in man the image of God, according to which he ought to have been more abhorrent of that act because sin adhered to it, than to be inclined by a natural affection to the act itself, because some good was joined with it.

XIII. No end can be assigned to this sin. For evil, of itself, has not an end, since an end has always reference to a good. But the acts of the end were, that man might obtain a likeness to God in the knowledge of good and evil, and that he might satisfy his senses of taste and seeing. (Gen. iii, 5, 6.) But he did not suppose, that he would gain this similitude by sin as such, but by an act as it was a natural one. It had the boundary which the Divine determination placed round about it, and which was twofold. The one, agreeing with the nature of sin, according to the severity of God. The other, transcending sin, nay, contravening it, according to the grace and mercy of God. (Rom. ix, 22, 23.)

THE HEINOUSNESS OF THIS SIN

XIV. From the particulars already discussed, some judgment may be formed of the heinousness of this sin, which seems principally to consist of these four things. (1) That it is the transgression of a law that is not peculiar [to one person, or only to a few,] but of a law which universally bears witness to the obligation of man towards God, and which is a test of his obedience. A contempt of this law has in it a renunciation of the covenant into which God has entered with man, and of the obedience which from that covenant is due to God. (Gen. xvii, 14.) (2.) That man perpetrated this crime, after he had been placed in a state of innocence and adorned by God with such excellent endowments as those of "the knowledge of God," and

"righteousness and true holiness." (Gen. i, 26, 27; Col. iii, 10; Ephes. iv, 24.) (3.) That when so many facilities existed for not sinning, especially in the act itself, yet man did not abstain from this sin. (Gen. ii, 16, 17,) (4.) That he committed this sin in a place that was sanctified as a type of the celestial Paradise. (ii, 15, 16; iii, 6, 23; Rev. ii, 7.) There are some other things which may aggravate this sin; but since it has them in common with most other offenses, we shall not at present enter into a discussion of them.

THE EFFECTS OF THIS SIN

XV. The proper and immediate effect of this sin was the offending of the Deity. For since the form of sin is "the transgression of the law," (1 John iii, 4,) it primarily and immediately strikes against the legislator himself, (Gen. iii, 11,) and this with the offending of one whose express will it was that his law should not be offended. From this violation of his law, God conceives just displeasure, which is the second effect of sin. (iii, 16-19, 23, 24.) But to anger succeeds infliction of punishment, which was in this instance two-fold. (1.) A liability to two deaths. (ii, 17; Rom. vi, 23.) (2.) The withdrawing of that primitive righteousness and holiness, which, because they are the effects of the Holy Spirit dwelling in man, ought not to have remained in him after he had fallen from the favour of God, and had incurred the Divine displeasure. (Luke xix, 26.) For this Spirit is a seal of God's favour and good will. (Rom. viii, 14, 15; 1

Cor. ii, 12.)

XVI. The whole of this sin, however, is not peculiar to our first parents, but is common to the entire race and to all their posterity, who, at the time when this sin was committed, were in their loins, and who have since descended from them by the natural mode of propagation, according to the primitive benediction. For in Adam "all have sinned." (Rom. v, 12.) Wherefore, whatever punishment was brought down upon our first parents, has likewise pervaded and yet pursues all their posterity. So that all men "are by nature the children of wrath," (Ephes. ii, 3,) obnoxious to condemnation, and to temporal as well as to eternal death; they are also devoid of that original righteousness and holiness. (Rom. v, 12, 18, 19.) With these evils they would remain oppressed forever, unless they were liberated by Christ Jesus; to whom be glory forever.

DISPUTATION 8

ON ACTUAL SINS

RESPONDENT, CASPER WILTENS

I. As divines and philosophers are often compelled, on account of a penury of words, to distinguish those which are synonymous, and to receive others in a stricter or more ample signification than their nature and etymology will allow; so in this matter of actual sin, although the term applies also to the first sin of Adam, yet, for the sake of a more accurate distinction, they commonly take it for that sin which man commits, through the corruption of his nature, from the time where he knows how to use reason; and they define it thus: "Something thought, spoken or done against the law of God; or the omission of something which has been commanded by that law to be thought, spoken or done." Or, with more brevity, "Sin is the transgression of the law;"

which St. John has explained in this compound word anomia "anomy." (1 John iii, 4.) II. For as the law is perceptive of good and prohibitory of evil, it is necessary not only that an action, but that the neglect of an action, be accounted a sin. Hence arises the first distinction of sin into that of commission, when a prohibited act is perpetrated, as theft, murder, adultery, &c. And into that of omission, when a man abstains from [the performance of] an act that has been commanded; as if any one does not render due honour to a magistrate, or bestows on the poor nothing in proportion to the amplitude of his means. And since the Law is two-fold, one "the Law of works," properly called,

"the Law," the other "the Law of faith," (Rom. iii, 27,) which is the gospel of the grace of God; therefore sin is either that which is committed against the Law, or against the gospel of Christ. (Heb. ii, 2, 3.) That which is committed against the Law, provokes the wrath of God against sinners; that against the gospel, causes the wrath of God to abide upon us; the former, by deserving punishment; the latter, by preventing the remission of punishment.

III. One is a sin per se, "of itself;" another, per accidens, "accidentally." (1.) A sin per se is every external or internal action which is prohibited by the law, or every neglect of an action commanded by the law. (2.) A sin is per accidens either in things necessary and restricted by law, or in things indifferent. In things necessary, either when an act prescribed by law is performed without its due circumstances, such as to bestow alms that you obtain praise from men; (Matt. vi, 2;) or when an act prohibited by law is omitted, not from a due cause and for a just end; as when any one represses his anger at the moment, that he may afterwards exact more cruel vengeance. In things indifferent, when any one uses them to the offense of the weak. (Rom. xiv, 15, 21.)

IV. Sin is likewise divided in reference to the personal object against whom the offense is committed; and it is either against God, against our neighbour, or against ourselves, according to what the Apostle says: "The grace of God that bringeth salvation, hath appeared to all men, teaching us, that denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously and godly, in this present world." (Tit. ii, 11.) Where soberness is appropriately referred to the man himself; righteousness to our neighbour; and godliness to God: These, we affirm, are likewise contained in the two grand precepts, "Love God above all things," and "Love thy neighbour as thyself." For howsoever it may seem, that the ten commandments prescribe only what is due to God and to our neighbour; yet this very requirement is of such a nature that it cannot be performed by a man without fulfilling at the same time his duty to himself.

V. It is further distinguished, from its cause, into sins of ignorance, infirmity, malignity and negligence. (1.) A sin of ignorance is, when a man does any thing which he does not know to be a sin; thus, Paul persecuted Christ in his Church. (1

Tim. i, 13.) (2.) A sin of infirmity is, when, through fear, which may befall even a brave man, or through any other more vehement passion and perturbation of mind, he commits any offense; thus, Peter denied Christ, (Matt. xxvi, 70,) and thus David, being offended by Nabal, was proceeding to destroy him and his domestics. (1 Sam.

xxv, 13, 21.) (3.) A sin of dignity or malice, when any thing is committed with a determined purpose of mind, and with deliberate counsel; thus Judas denied Christ, (Matt. xxvi, 14, 15.) and thus David caused Uriah to be killed. (2 Sam. xi, 15.) (4.) A sin of negligence is, when a man is overtaken by a sin, (Gal. vi, l.) which encircles and besets him before he can reflect within himself about the deed. (Heb. xii, 1.) In this description will be classed that of St. Paul against Ananias the High Priest, if indeed he may be said to have sinned in that matter. (Acts xxiii, 3.) VI. Nearly allied to this is the distribution of sin into that which is contrary to conscience, and that which is not contrary to conscience. (1.) A sin against conscience is one that is perpetrated through malice and deliberate purpose, laying waste the conscience, and (if committed by holy persons) grieving the Holy Spirit so much as to cause Him to desist from his usual functions of leading them into the right way, and of making them glad in their consciences by his inward testimony. (Psalm li, 10, 13.) This is called, by way of eminence, "a sin against conscience;" though, when this phrase is taken in a wide acceptation, a sin which is committed through infirmity, but which has a previous sure knowledge that is applied to the deed, might also be said to be against conscience. (2.) A sin not against conscience is either that which is by no means such, and which is not committed through a willful and wished-for ignorance of the law, as the man who neglects to know what he is capable of knowing: or it is that which at least is not such in a primary degree, but is precipitated through precipitancy, the cause of which is a vehement and unforeseen temptation. Of this kind, was the too hasty judgment of David against Mephibosheth, produced by the grievous accusation of Ziba, which happened at the very time when David fled. This bore a strong resemblance to a falsehood. (2 Sam. xvi, 3, 4.) Yet that which, when once committed, is not contrary to conscience, becomes contrary to it when more frequently repeated, and when the man neglects self-correction.

VII. To this may be added, the division of sin from its causes, with regard to the real object about which the sin is perpetrated. This object is either "the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, or the pride of life," that is, either pleasure specially so called, or avarice, or arrogant haughtiness; all of which, proceeding from the single fountain of self love or inordinate affection, tend distinctly towards the good things of the present life, haughtiness towards its honours, avarice towards its riches, and pleasure towards those things by which the external senses may experience self-gratification. From these arise those works of the flesh which are enumerated by the apostle in Gal. v, 19-21, perhaps with the exception of idolatry. Yet it may be made a legitimate subject of discussion, whether idolatry may not be referred to one of these three causes.

VIII. Sin is also divided into venial and mortal: but this distribution is not deduced from the nature of sin itself, but accidentally from the gracious estimation of God. For every sin is in its own nature mortal, that is, it is that which merits death; because it is declared universally concerning sin, that "its wages is death," (Rom. vi, 23,) which might in truth be brought instantly down upon the offenders, were God wishful to enter into judgment with his servants. But that which denominates sin venial, or capable of being forgiven, is this circumstance, God is not willing to impute sin to believers, or to place sin against them, but is desirous to pardon it; although with this difference, that it requires express penitence from some, while concerning others it is content with this expression: "Who can understand his errors? Cleanse thou me, O

Lord, from secret faults." (Psalm xix, 12.) In this case, the ground of fear is not so much, lest, from the aggravation of sin, men should fall into despair, as, lest, from its extenuation, they should relapse into negligence and security; not only because man has a greater propensity to the latter than to the former, but likewise because that declaration is always at hand: have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth," that is, of the sinner who has merited death by his transgressions, "but that he be converted and live." (Ezek. xviii, 32.)

IX. Because we say that the wages of every sin is death," we do not, on this account, with the Stoics, make them all equal. For, beside the refutation of such an opinion by many passages of Scripture, it is likewise opposed to the diversity of objects against which sin is perpetrated, to the causes from which it arises, and to the law against which the offense is committed. Besides, the disparity of punishments in the death that is eternal, proves the falsehood of this sentiment: For a crime against God is more grievous than one against man; (1 Sam. ii, 25;) one that is perpetrated with a high hand, than one through error; one against a prohibitory law, than one against a mandatory law. And far more severe will be the punishment inflicted on the inhabitants of Chorazin and Bethsaida, than on those of Tyre and Sidon. (Matt. xi, 23.) By means of this dogma, the Stoics have endeavoured to turn men aside from the commission of crimes; but their attempt has not only been fruitless, but also injurious, as will be seen when we institute a serious deliberation about bringing man back from sin into the way of righteousness.

X. Mention is likewise made, in the Scriptures, of "a sin unto death;" (1 John v, 16;) which is specially so called, because it in fact, brings certain death on all by whom it has been committed. Mention is made in the same passage of "a sin which is not unto death," and which is opposed to the former. In a parallel column with these, marches the division of sin into pardonable and unpardonable. (1.) A sin which is "not unto death" and pardonable, is so called, because it is capable of having subsequent repentance, and thus of being pardoned, and because to many persons it is actually pardoned through succeeding penitence-such as that which is said to be committed against "the Son of Man." (2.) The "sin unto death" or unpardonable, is that which never has subsequent repentance, or the author of which cannot be recalled to penitence -- such as that which is called "the sin" or "blasphemy against the Holy Ghost," (Matt. xii, 32; Luke xii, 10,) of which it is said, "it shall not be forgiven, either in this world, or in the world to come." For this reason, St. John says, we must not pray for that sin.

XI. But, though the proper meaning and nature of the sin against the Holy Ghost are with the utmost difficulty to be ascertained, yet we prefer to follow those who have furnished the most weighty and grievous definition of it, rather than those who, in maintaining six species of it, have been compelled to explain "unpardonable" in some of those species, for that which is with difficulty or is rarely remitted, or which of itself deserves not to be pardoned. With the former class of persons, therefore, we say that the sin against the Holy Ghost is committed when any man, with determined malice, resists divine, and in fact, evangelical truth, for the sake of resistance, though he is so overpowered with the refulgence of it, as to be rendered incapable of pleading ignorance in excuse. This is therefore called "the sin against the Holy Ghost, not because it is not perpetrated against the Father and the Son; (for how can it be that he does not sin against the Father and the Son, who sins against the Spirit of both?) but because it is committed against the operation of the Holy Spirit, that is, against the conviction of the truth through miracles, and against the illumination of the mind.

XII. But the cause why this sin is called "irremissible," and why he who has committed it, cannot be renewed to repentance, is not the impotency of God, as though by his most absolute omnipotence, he cannot grant to this man repentance unto life, and thus cannot pardon this blasphemy; but since it is necessary, that the mercy of God should stop at some point, being circumscribed by the limits of his justice and equity according to the prescript of his wisdom, this sin is said to be "unpardonable,"

because God accounts the man who has perpetrated so horrid a crime, and has done despite to the Spirit of grace, to be altogether unworthy of having the divine benignity and the operation of the Holy Spirit occupied in his conversion, lest he should himself appear to esteem this sacred operation and kindness at a low rate, and to stand in need of a sinful man, especially of one who is such a monstrous sinner!

XIII. The efficient cause of actual sins is, man through his own free will. The inwardly working cause is the original propensity of our nature towards that which is contrary to the divine law, which propensity we have contracted from our first parents, through carnal generation. The outwardly working causes are the objects and occasions which solicit men to sin. The substance or material cause, is an act which, according to its nature, has reference to good. The form or formal cause of it is a transgression of the law, or an anomy. It is destitute of an end; because sin is amartia a transgression which wanders from its aim. The object of it is a variable good; to which, when man is inclined, after having deserted the unchangeable good, he commits an offense.

XIV. The effect of actual sins are all the calamities and miseries of the present life, then death temporal, and afterwards death eternal. But in those who are hardened and blinded, even the effects of preceding sins become cousequent sins themselves.

DISPUTATION 9

ON THE RIGHTEOUSNESS AND EFFICACY OF THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

CONCERNING EVIL

RESPONDENT: RALPH DE ZYLL

I. Among the causes and pretenses by which human ignorance has been induced, and which human perverseness has abused, to deny the providence of God, the entrance of evil (that is, of sin) into the world, and its most wonderful and fertile exuberance, do not by any means occupy the lowest stations. For since, with Scripture as our guide and Nature as our witness, we must maintain that God is good, omniscient, and of unbounded power; (Mark x, 18; Psalm cxlvii, 5; Rev. iv, 8; Rom. i, 20;) and since this is a truth of which every one is fully persuaded who has formed in his mind any notion of the Deity; men have concluded from this that evil could not have occurred under the three preceding conditions of the divine Majesty, if God managed all things by his providence, and if it was his will to make provision respecting evil, according to these properties of his own nature. And therefore, since, after all, evil has occurred, they have concluded that the providence of God must be entirely denied. For they thought it better to set up a God that was at repose, and negligent of mundane affairs, especially of those in which a rational creature's freedom of will intervened, than to deprive Him of the honour of his goodness, wisdom and power. But it is not necessary to adopt either of these methods; and that it is possible to preserve to God, without disparagement, these three ornaments of Supreme Majesty, as well as His providence, will be shewn by a temperate explanation of the efficacy of God concerning evil.

II. A few things must be premised about this evil itself, as a basis for our explanation.

(1.) What is properly sin? (2.) Was it possible for it to be perpetrated by a rational creature, and how? (3.) That a chief evil cannot be granted, which may contend on an equality with the chief Good, as the Manichees asserted; otherwise, of all the evils which can be devised, sin, of which we are now treating, is, in reality, the chief; and, if we may speak with strictness, sin is the only and sole evil; for all other things are not evils, in themselves, but are injurious to some one.

III. 1. Sin is properly an aberration from a rule. This rule is the equity which is preconceived in the mind of God, which is expressed to the mind of a rational creature by legislation, and, according to which it is proper for such a creature to regulate his life. It is therefore defined by St. John in one compound word, anomia "the transgression of the law;" (1 John iii, 4;) whether such a law be preceptive of Good, or prohibitory of evil, (Psalm xxxiv, 14,) hence the evil of commission is perpetrated against the prohibitory part, and that of omission against the preceptive. But in sin, two things come under consideration: (1.) The act itself, which has reference to natural good; but under the act, we comprehend likewise the cessation from action.

(2.) Anomy, or "the transgression of the law," which obtains the place of a moral evil.

The act may be called the substance or material cause of sin; and the transgression of the law, its form or formal cause.

IV. II. But it was possible for sin to be perpetrated by a rational creature; for, as a creature, he was capable of declining or revolting from the chief Good, and of being inclined towards an inferior good, and towards the acts by which he might possess this minor good. As rational, he was capable of understanding that he was required to live in a godly manner, and what that equity was according to which his life and actions were to be specially regulated. As a rational creature, a law could be imposed on him by God, nay, according to equity and justice, it ought to be imposed, by which he might be forbidden to forsake the chief good, and to commit that act, though it was naturally good. The mode is placed in the freedom of the will, bestowed by God on a rational creature, according to which he was capable of performing the obedience which is due to the law, or could by his own strength exceed or transgress its limits.

V. III. But since a chief evil cannot be allowed, it follows from this, that, though evil be contrary to good, yet it cannot pass beyond the universal order of that good which is chief, but can be reduced to order by this chief good, and evil can thus be directed to good, on account of the infinite wisdom of this chief good, by which he knows what is possible to be made from evil; and on account of this power, by which he can make from this evil what he knows may be made from it. Granting, therefore, that sin has exceeded the order of every thing created, yet it is circumscribed within the order of the Creator himself and of the chief good. Since it is apparent from all these premises, that the providence of God ought not to intervene, or come between, to prevent the perpetration of evil by a free creature; it also follows, from the entrance of evil into the world, and it has entered so far "that the whole world lieth in wickedness," (1 John v, 19,) -- that the Providence of God cannot be destroyed. This truth we will demonstrate at greater length, when we treat upon the efficacy of the providence of God concerning evil.

VI. We have already said, that, in sin, the act or the cessation from action, and "the transgression of the law," come under consideration: But the efficiency of God about evil, concerns both the act itself and its viciousness, and it does this, whether we have regard to the beginning of sin, to its progress, or to its end and consummation. The consideration of the efficiency which is concerned about the Beginning of sin, embraces either a hindrance or a permission; to which we add, the administration of arguments and occasions inciting to sin; that which regards its Progress, has direction and determination; and that concerning The End and Termination, punishment and remission. We will refrain from treating upon the concurrence of God, since it is only in reference to the act, considered, also, as naturally good.

VII. The First efficiency of God concerning evil, is a hindrance or the placing of an impediment, whether such hindrance be sufficient or efficacious. (Jer. xxxi, 32, 33.) For it belongs to a good, to hinder an evil as far as the good knows it to be lawful to do so. But a hindrance is placed either on the power, on the capability, or on the will, of a rational creature. These three things must also be considered in that which hinders. (1.) On the power an impediment is placed, by which some act is taken away from the power of a rational creature, to the performance of which it has an inclination and sufficient powers. By being thus circumscribed, it comes to pass, that the creature cannot perform that act without sin, and this circumscription is made by legislation. The tasting of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was thus circumscribed, when leave was granted to eat of all others: (Gen. ii, 17) and this is the hindrance of sin as such; and it is placed by God before a rational creature as he has the right and power over that creature.

VIII. (2.) On the capability also an impediment is placed. The effect of this is, that the rational creature cannot perform the act, for the performance of which he has an inclination, and powers that, without this impediment, would be sufficient. But this hindrance is placed before a rational creature by four methods: (1.) By depriving the creature of essence and life, which are the foundation of capability. Thus was the attack upon Jerusalem hindered, (2 Kings 19,) as was also the forcible abduction of Elijah to Ahaziah, (2 Kings 1,) when, in the former instance, "an hundred fourscore and five thousand men were slain by the angel of the Lord," and, in the latter, two different companies, each containing fifty men, were consumed by fire. (2.) The second method is by the taking away or the diminution of capability. Thus Jeroboam was prevented from apprehending the prophet of the Lord, by "the drying up of his own hand." (1 Kings 13, 4.) Thus, sin is hindered, so as not to exercise dominion over a man, when the body of sin is weakened and destroyed. (Rom. vi, 6.) (3.) The third is by the opposition of a greater capability, or at least of one that is equal. Thus was Uzziah prevented from burning incense unto Jehovah, when the priests resisted his attempt. (2 Chron. xxvi, 18, 21.) Thus also is "the flesh" hindered from "doing what it would,"because the Spirit lusteth against the flesh," (Gal. v, 17,) and because "greater is He that is in us, than he that is in the world." (1 John iv, 4.) (4.) The fourth method is by the withdrawing of the object. Thus the Jews were frequently hindered from hurting Christ, because He withdrew himself from the midst of them. (John viii, 59.) Thus was Paul taken away, by the Chief Captain, from the Jews, who had conspired together for his destruction. (Acts xxiii, 10.)

IX. (3.) An impediment is placed on the will, when by some argument it is persuaded not to will to commit a sin. But we refer the arguments by which the will is moved, to the following three classes. For they are taken, (i.) either from the impossibility or the difficulty of the thing, (ii.) from its unpleasantness or inconvenience, its usefulness or injuriousness, (iii.) or from its being dishonourable, unjust and indecorous. (i.) By the first of these, the Pharisees and Scribes were frequently prevented from laying violent hands on Christ: (Matt. xxi, 46) for they were of opinion, that he would be defended by the people, "who took him for a prophet." In the same manner were the Israelites hindered from departing to their lovers, to false gods; for God "hedged up their way with thorns, and made a wall, so that they could not find their customary paths."

(Hosea ii, 6, 7.) Thus the saints are deterred from sinning, when they see wicked men

"wearied in the ways of iniquity and perdition." (Wisdom v, 7.) (ii.) By the second argument, the brethren of Joseph were hindered from killing him, since they could obtain their end by selling him. (Gen. xxxvii, 26, 27.) Thus Job was prevented from sinning "with his eyes" because he knew what was "the portion of God from above, and what the inheritance of the Almighty from on high," for those who have their eyes full of adultery. (Job xxxi, 1, 2.) (iii.) By the third, Joseph was hindered from defiling himself by shameful adultery, (Gen. xxxix, 8, 9,) and David was prevented from

"stretching forth his hand against the Lord's anointed." (1 Sam. xxiv, 7.) X. The permission of sin succeeds, which is opposed to hindering. Yet it is not opposed to hindering, as the latter is an act which is taken away from the power of a rational creature by legislation; for, in that case, the same act would be a sin, and not a sin. It would be a sin in reference to its being a forbidden act; and it would be no sin in reference to its being permitted in this manner, that is, not forbidden. But permission is opposed to hindrance, in reference to the latter being an impediment placed on the capability and will of an intelligent creature. But permission is the suspension, not of one impediment or two, which may be presented to the capability or the will, but of all impediments at once, which, God knows, if they were all employed, would effectually hinder sin. Such necessarily would be the result, because sin might be hindered by a single impediment of that kind. (1.) Sin therefore is permitted to the capability of the creature, when God employs none of those hindrances of which we have already made mention in the 8th Thesis: for this reason, this permission consists of the following acts of God who permits, the continuation of life and essence to the creature, the conservation of his capability, a cautiousness against its being opposed by a greater capability, or at least by one that is equal, and the exhibition of an object on which sin is committed. (2.) Sin is also permitted to the will; not because no such impediments are presented by God to the will, as are calculated to deter the will from sinning; but because God, seeing that these hindrances which are propounded will produce no effect, does not employ others which He possesses in the treasures of his wisdom and power. (John xviii, 6; Mark xiv, 56.) This appears most evidently in the passion of Christ, with regard not only to the power but also to the will of those who demanded his death. (John xix, 6.) Nor does it follow from these premises, that those impediments are employed in vain: for though such results do not follow as are in accordance with these hindrances, yet God in a manner the most powerful gains his own purposes, because the results are not such as ought to have followed. (Rom. x, 20, 21.)

XI. The foundation of this permission is (1.) The liberty of choosing, with which God formed his rational creature, and which his constancy does not suffer to be abolished, lest he should be accused of mutability. (2.) The infinite wisdom and power of God, by which he knows and is able out of darkness to bring light, and to produce good out of evil. (Gen. i, 2, 3; 2 Cor. iv, 6.) God therefore permits that which He does permit, not in ignorance of the powers and the inclination of rational creatures, for he knows them all, not with reluctance, for he could have refrained from producing a creature that might possess freedom of choice, not as being incapable of hindering, for we have already seen by how many methods he is able to hinder both the capability and the will of a rational creature; not as if at ease, indifferent, or negligent of that which is transacted, because before anything is done he already ["has gone through"] has looked over the various actions which concern it, and, as we shall subsequently see, [§

15-22,] he presents arguments and occasions, determines, directs, punishes and pardons sin. But whatever God permits, He permits it designedly and willingly, His will being immediately occupied about its permission, but His permission itself is occupied about sin; and this order cannot be inverted without great peril.

XII. Let us now explain a little more distinctly, by some of the differences of sin, those things which we have in this place spoken in a general manner concerning hindering and permission. (i.) From its causes, sin is distinguished into that of ignorance, infirmity, malignity and negligence. (1.) An impediment is placed on a sin of ignorance, by the revelation of the divine will. (Psalm cxix, 105.) (ii.) On a sin of infirmity, by the strengthening influence of the Holy Spirit against the machinations or the world and Satan, and also against the weakness of our flesh. (Ephes. iii, 16; vi, 11-13.) (iii.) On a sin of malignity, by "taking away the stony heart, and bestowing a heart of flesh," (Ezek. xi, 19,) and inscribing upon it the law of God: (Jer. xxxi, 33.) (iv.) And on a sin of negligence, by exciting in the hearts of believers a holy solicitude and a godly fear. (Mark xiv, 38; Jer. xxxii, 40.) From these remarks those acts will easily be manifest, in the suspension of which consists the permission of sins of every kind. God permitted Saul of Tarsus, a preposterous zealot for the law, to persecute Christ through ignorance, until "he revealed his Son in him," by which act out of a persecutor was formed a pastor. (Gal. i, 13-15.) Thus, he permitted Peter, who loved Christ, though he was somewhat too self-confident, to deny Him through infirmity; but, when afterwards endued with a greater energy of the Holy Spirit, he confessed him with intrepidity even unto death. (Matt. xxvi, 70; Acts v, 41; John xxi, 19.) God permitted Saul, whom "in his anger he had given to the Israelites as their king" (Hosea xiii, 11; 1 Sam. ix, 1,) through malignity to persecute David, of whose integrity he had been convinced, (1 Sam. xxiv, 17-19,) while his own son Jonathan resisted [his father's attempts against David] in vain. And God permitted David, after having enjoyed many victories and obtained leisure and retirement, to defile himself with the foul crime of adultery at a moment when he was acting with negligence. (2 Sam. 11.) XIII. (2.) Sin, in the next place, is distinguished with respect to the two parts of the law -- that which is perceptive of good, and that which is prohibitory of evil. [§ 3.]

Against the latter of these an offense may be committed, either by performing an act, or by omitting its performance from an undue cause and end. Against the former, either by omitting an act, or by performing it in an undue manner, and from an undue cause and end. To these distinctions the hindering and the permission of God may likewise be adapted. God hindered Joseph's brethren from killing him; while he permitted them to spare his life, from an undue cause and end; for since it was in their power to sell him, the opportunity for which was divinely offered to them, they considered it unprofitable or useless to kill him. (Gen. xxxvii, 26, 27.) Thus Absalom was hindered from following the counsel of Ahithophel, though it was useful to himself and injurious to David; not because he considered it to be unjust, but because of its supposed injury to David; for he persisted in the purpose of persecuting his father, which he also completed in fact. (2 Sam. 17.) God hindered Balaam from cursing the children of Israel, and caused him to bless them; but so that he abstained from the former act, and performed the latter, with a perverse mind. (Num. 23.) We shall in some degree understand the reasons of this hindering and permission, if, while distinctly considering in sin the act and the anomy or "transgression of the law," we apply to each of them divine hindrance and permission.

XIV. But though the act, and "the transgression of the law," are inseparably united in one sin, and therefore neither of them can be hindered or permitted without the other; yet they may be distinguished in the mind; and hindrance as well as permission may be effected by God, sometimes chiefly with regard to the act, and at other times chiefly with regard to "the transgression of the law," and, when so done, they may be considered by us in these relations not without high commendation of the wisdom of God and to our own profit. God hindered Joseph's brethren from killing him, not as it was a sin, (because He permitted them, while remaining in the same mind to sell him,) but as it was an act. For they would have deprived Joseph of life, when it was the will of God that he should be spared. God permitted his vendition, not chiefly as it was a sin, but as an act; because by the sale of Joseph as it was an act, God obtained his own end. (Gen. xxxvii, 27.) God hindered Elijah from being forcibly brought to Ahaziah to be slain, not as that was a sin, but as it was an act. This is apparent from the end, and from the mode of hindering. From the end; because it was His will that the life of his prophet should be spared, not lest Ahaziah should sin against God. From the mode of hindering; because he destroyed two companies, of fifty men each, who had been sent to seize him; which was a token of divine anger against Ahaziah and the men, by which sin as such is not usually hindered, but as it is an act which will prove injurious to another; yet, through grace, sin is hindered as such. (2 Kings 1.) God permitted Satan and the Chaldeans to bring many evils on Job, not as that was a sin, but as it was an act: for it was the will of God to try the patience of his servant, and to make that virtue conspicuous to the confusion of Satan. But this was done by an act, by which, as such, injuries were inflicted on Job. (Job 1, 2.) David was hindered from laying violent hands on Saul, not as it was an act, but as it was a sin: this is manifest from the argument by which being hindered he abstained [from completing the deed.]

"The Lord forbid," said he, "that I should stretch forth mine hand against the Lord's anointed." This argument deterred him from the sin as such. The same is also evident from the end of the hindrance: for it was the will of God for David to come to [the possession of] the kingdom through the endurance of afflictions, as a type of Christ the true David. (1 Sam. xxiv, 7.) God permitted Ahab to kill Naboth, not as that foul deed was an act, but as it was a sin: for God could have translated Naboth, or taken him to himself, by some other method; but it was the divine will, that Ahab should fill up the measure of his iniquities, and should accelerate his own destruction and that of his family. (1 Kings 21.) Abimelech was hindered from violating the chastity of Sarah, the wife of Abraham, both as it was an act, and as it was a sin. For it was not the will of God, that Abimelech should defile himself with this crime, because "in the integrity of his heart" he would then have done it. It was also His will to spare his servant Abraham, in whom indelible sorrow would have been produced by the deflowering of his wife, as by an act. (Gen. xx, 6.) God permitted Judah to know Tamar his daughter-in-law, both as it was an act, and as it was a sin: because it was the will of God, to have his own Son as a direct descendant from Judah; and at the same time to declare, that nothing is so polluted as to be incapable of being sanctified in Christ Jesus. (Gen. xxxviii, 18.) For it is not without reason that St. Matthew says,

"Judas begat Phares and Zara of Thamar;" and "David the king begat Solomon of her who had been the wife of Urias;" (i, 3, 6;) and from whom in an uninterrupted line Christ was born.

XV. But since an act, though permitted to the capability and the will of the creature, may have been taken away from its power by legislation; [§ 7;] and since, therefore, it will very often happen, that a rational creature not altogether hardened in evil is unwilling to perform an act which is connected with sin, unless when some arguments and opportunities are presented to him, which are like incentives to commit that act; the management of this presenting of arguments and opportunities, is also in the hands of the Providence of God, who presents these excitements. (1.) Both to try whether it be the will of the creature to abstain from sinning, even when it is excited by these incentives; since small praise is due to abstaining in cases in which such excitements are absent. (S. of Syrach xx, 21-,3; xxxi, 8-10.) (2.) And then, if it be the will of the creature to yield to these incentives, to effect His own work by the act of the creature; not impelled by necessity, as if God was unable to produce his own work without the intervention of the act of his creature; but moved to this by the will to illustrate his own manifold wisdom. Thus the arguments by which Joseph's brethren were incited through their own malice to wish to kill him, and the opportunities by which it was in their power to send him out of their way, were offered by Divine dispensation, partly in an intervening manner by the mediate act of men, and partly by the immediate act of God himself. The arguments for this malignity were, Joseph's accusation, by which he revealed to his father the wicked actions of his brethren, the peculiar regard which Jacob entertained for Joseph, the sending of a dream, and the relation of the dream after it had occurred. By these, the minds of his brethren were inflamed with envy and hatred against him. The opportunities were, the sending of Joseph to his brethren by his father, and the presenting of the Ishmaelites journeying into Egypt, at the very moment of time in which they were in deliberation about murdering their brother.

(Gen. 37.) The preceding considerations have related only to the Beginning of sin; to its Progress belong direction and determination. [§ 6.]

XVI. The Direction of sin is an act of Divine Providence, by which God in a manner the wisest and most potent directs sin wherever he wills, "reaching from one end to another mightily, and sweetly ordering all things." (Wisd. viii, 1.) We must consider in this direction the point at which it has its origin and that at which it terminates. For when God directs sin wherever he wills, it is understood that he leads it away from the point to which it is not His will that it should proceed. But this direction is two-fold, unto an Object, and unto an End. Direction unto an Object is when God allows the sin which He permits, to be borne, not at the option of the creature, towards an object which in any way whatsoever is exposed and liable to the injury of sin; but which he directs to a particular object, which on some occasions has either been no part of the sinner's aim or desire, or which at least he has not absolutely desired. The Scriptures enunciate this kind of direction, generally, in the following words: "A man's heart deviseth his way; but the Lord directeth his steps." (Prov. xvi, 9.) But, Specially, concerning the heart of a King: "As the rivers of water are in the hand of the Lord, he turneth the heart of the king whithersoever he will." (Prov. xxi, 1.) Of which we have a signal example in Nebuchadnezzar, who, after he had determined in his own mind to subjugate the nations, and hesitated whether he should move against the Ammonites, or against the Jews, God managed the king's divinations so, that he resolved to march against the Jews, and to abstain from an attack upon the Ammonites. (Ezek. xxi, 19-22.)

XVII. Direction unto an End is, when God does not allow the sin (which he permits,) to be subservient to the end of any thing which the creature intends; but he employs it to that end which he himself wills, whether the creature intend the same end, (which if he were to do, yet he would not be excused from sin,) or whether he intend another, and one quite contrary. For God knows how to educe the light of his own glory, and the advantage of his creatures, out of the darkness and mischief of sin. Thus "the thoughts of evil," which Joseph's brethren entertained against him, were converted by God into a benefit, not only to Joseph, but also to the whole of Jacob's family, and to all the kingdom of Egypt. (Gen. i, 20, 21.) By the afflictions which were sent to Job, Satan endeavoured to drive him to blasphemy. But by them, God tried the patience of his servant, and through it triumphed over Satan. (Job i, 11, 12, 22; ii, 9, 10.) The king of Assyria had determined "in his heart to destroy and cut off all nations not a few."

But God executed his own work by him, whom "he sent against an hypocritical nation and the people of his wrath." (Isa. x, 5-12.) Nor is it at all wonderful, that God employs acts, which his creatures do not perform without sin, for ends that are pleasing to himself; because he does this most justly, for three reasons: (i.) For He is the Lord of his creature, though that creature be a sinner; because he has no more power to exempt or deliver himself from the dominion of God, than he has to reduce himself into nothing. (ii.) Because, as a creature endowed by God with inclination and capability, he performs those acts, though not without sin, as they have been forbidden. (iii.) Because the creature is a saw, in the hands of the Creator; and instrumental causes do not reach to the intention of the first agent. (Isa. x, 15.) XVIII. Determination is an act of Divine Providence, by which God places a limit on his permission, and a boundary on sin that it may not wander and stray in infinitum at the option of the creature. The limit and boundary are placed by the prescribing of the time, and the determination of the magnitude. The prescribing of the time, is the prescribing of the very point or moment when it may be done, or the length of its duration. (i.) God determines the moment of time, when he permits a sin, to the commission of which his creature is inclined, to be perpetrated, not indeed at the time when it was the will of the creature to commit it; but He wisely and powerfully contrives for it to be done at another time. "The Jews sought to take Jesus: but no man laid hands on him, because his hour was not yet come." (John vii, 30.) "Yet when the time before appointed of the Father" approached, Christ said to them, "This is your hour, and the power of darkness." (Luke xxii, 53.) (2.) A limit is placed on the duration, when the space of time in which the permitted sin could endure, is diminished and circumscribed so as to stop itself. Thus Christ says, "Except those days should be shortened, there should no flesh be saved," &c. (Matt. xxiv, 22.) But in this part of the discussion also, regard must be had to the act as such, and to the sin as such. (i.) A limit is placed on the duration of the act, in the following passages: "The rod of the wicked shall not rest upon the lot of the righteous, lest the righteous put forth their hands unto iniquity." (Psalm cxxv, 3.) "The Lord knoweth how to deliver the godly out of temptations," &c. (2 Pet. ii, 9.) (ii.) A limit is placed on the duration of the sin, in these passages: "Therefore I will hedge up thy way with thorns, &c. And she shall not find her lovers: then shall she say, I will go and return to my first husband." (Hosea ii, 6.) "In times past God suffered all nations to walk in their own ways: but now he commandeth all men every where to repent." (Acts xiv, 16; xvii, 30.)

XIX. A limit is placed on the magnitude of sin, when God does not permit sin to increase beyond bounds and to assume greater strength. But this also is done, with regard to it both as an act, and as a sin. (i.) With respect to it as an act, in the following passages of Scripture: God permitted "the wrath of their enemies to be kindled against" the Israelites, but "he did not suffer them to swallow them up."

(Psalm cxxiv, 2, 3.) "There hath no temptation taken you, but such as is common to man." (1 Cor. x, 13.) "We are perplexed, but not in despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed." (2 Cor. iv, 8, 9.) God permitted Satan, first,

"To put forth his hand upon all that Job had," but not to touch him; (Job i, 12;) and, secondly, "To touch his bone and his flesh, but to save his life." (ii, 6.) "I will not destroy them by the hand of Shishak; nevertheless, they shall be his servants." (2

Chron. xii, 7, 8.) (ii.) With respect to it as a sin, God permitted David to resolve in his mind to destroy with the sword, Nabal and all his domestics, and to go instantly to him; but he did not permit him to shed innocent blood, and to save himself by his own hand. (1 Sam. xxv, 22, 26, 31.) God permitted David to flee to Achish, and to "feign himself mad;" (1 Sam. xxi, 13;) but he did not permit him to fight, in company with the army of Achish, against the Israelites, or by the exercise of fraud to prove injurious to the army of Achish. (xxvii, 2; xxix, 6, 7.) For he could have done neither of these deeds without committing a most flagrant wickedness: though both of them might have been determined [by David] as acts, by which great injury could be inflicted on those against whom it was the will of God that no mischief should be done.

XX. On account of this Presenting of incitements and opportunities, and this Direction and Determination of God, added to the Permission of sin, God is said himself to do those evils which are perpetrated by bad men and by Satan. For instance, Joseph says to his brethren, "It was not you that sent me hither, but God:" (Gen. xlv, 8;) because, after having completed the sale of their brother, they were unconcerned about the place to which he was to be conducted, and about his future lot in life: but God caused him to be led down into Egypt and there to be sold, and he raised him to an eminent station in that country by the interpretation of some dreams. (xxxvii, 25, 28; xl, 12, 13; xli, 28-42.) Job says, "The Lord hath taken away" what was taken away at the instigation and by the aid of Satan; (Job 1 & 2;) both because that evil spirit was of his own malice instigated against Job by God's commendation of him; and because, after having obtained power to do him harm, he produced no further effect than that which God had determined. Thus God is also said to have done what Absalom did; (2 Sam.

xii, 11, 12; 15, 16;) because the principal parts, in the various actions employed for producing this consummation, belonged to God. To these we must add the remark, that since the wisdom of God knows that if he administers the whole affair by such a presenting, direction, and determination, that will certainly and infallibly come to pass which cannot be done by the creature without criminality; and since His will decrees this administration, it will more clearly appear why a deed of this kind may be attributed to God.

XXI. Last in the discussion follow the punishment and the pardon of sin, by which acts Divine Providence is occupied about sin already perpetrated, as it is such, not as it is an act: for sin is punished and pardoned as it is an evil, and because it is an evil.

(1.) The Punishment of sin is an act of the Providence of God, by which sin is recompensed with the chastisement that is due to it according to the righteousness of God. This punishment either concerns the life to come, or takes place in the ages of the present life: the former is an eternal separation of the whole man from God; the other, which is usually inflicted in this life, is two-fold: corporal and spiritual. The punishments which relate to the body, are various; but it is not necessary for our purpose to enumerate them at present. But spiritual punishment deserves to be diligently considered: for it is such a chastisement of sin, as to be also a cause of other

[sins] which follow on account of the wickedness of him on whom it is inflicted. It is a privation of grace, and a delivering up to the power of evil [or the evil one]. (i.) Privation of Grace is two-fold according to the two kinds of grace, that which is Habitual and that which is Assisting. The former is the taking away of grace, by blinding the mind and hardening the heart. (Isa. vi, 9, 10.) The other, is the withdrawing of the assistance of the Holy Spirit, who is wont inwardly "to help our infirmities," (Rom. viii, 26,) and outwardly to restrain the furious rage of Satan and the world, by employing also the ministration and care of good angels. (Heb. i, 14; Psalm xci, 11.) (ii.) A delivering up to the power of evil is, either "giving sinners over to a reprobate mind," and to the efficacy of error, (Rom. i, 28; 2 Thess. ii, 9-11,) or to the desires of the flesh and to sinful lusts, (Rom. i, 24,) or to the power of Satan, "the god of this world," (2 Cor. 4,) "who worketh powerfully in the children of disobedience." (Ephes. ii, 2.) But because from this punishment arise many other sins, and this not only according to the certain knowledge of God, by which he knows that if he thus punishes they will thence arise, but likewise according to his purpose, by which he resolves so to punish as, on account of more heinous sins thence committed, to punish with still greater severity; therefore these expressions occur in the scriptures: "But I will harden the heart of Pharaoh, that he shall not let the people go; he shall not hearken unto you, that I may lay my hand upon Egypt." (Exod. iv, 21; vii, 4.) "Notwithstanding, the sons of Eli hearkened not unto the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them." (1 Sam. ii, 25.) "But Amaziah would not hearken to the answer of Joash king of Israel; for it came of God, that he might deliver them into the hand of their enemies, because they sought after the gods of Edom." (2

Chron. xxv, 20.) This consideration distinguishes the governance of God concerning sins, so far as it is concerned about those sinners who are hardened, or those who are not hardened.

XXII. The Pardon or remission of sin is an act of the Providence of God, by which the guilt of sin is forgiven, and the chastisement due to sin according to its guilt is taken away. As this remission restores, to the favour of God, the man who had before been an enemy; so it likewise causes the Divine administration concerning him to be afterwards entirely gracious so far as equity and justice require: that is, through this pardon, he is free from those spiritual punishments which have been enumerated in the preceding paragraph; (Psalm ii, 10-12;) and though not exempt from corporal chastisements, yet he is not visited with them through the anger of God as the punisher of sin, but only through the desire of God thus to declare that he hates sin, and besides so to chastise as to deter him from falling again into it. (2 Sam. xii, 11-13.) For which reason, the government of Providence with regard to this man is entirely different from that under which he remained before he obtained remission.

(Psalm cxix, 67; 1 Cor. xi, 32; Psalm xxxii, 1-6.)

XXIII. From those topics on which we have already treated, it is clearly evident, we think, that, because evils have entered into the world, neither Providence itself, nor its government respecting evil, ought to be denied. Neither can God be accused as being guilty of injustice on account of this his governance; not only because he hath administered all things to the best ends; that is, to the chastisment, trial, and manifestation of the godly -- to the punishment and exposure of the wicked, and to the illustration of his own glory; (for ends, alone, do not justify an action;) but, much more, because he has employed that form of administration which allows intelligent creatures not only of their own choice or spontaneously. but likewise freely, to perform and accomplish their own motions and actions.

DISPUTATION 10

ON THE RIGHTEOUSNESS AND EFFICACY OF THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

CONCERNING EVIL

RESPONDENT: GERARD ADRIANS

I. The consideration of evil, which is called "the evil of culpability" or "of delinquency," has induced many persons to deny the providence of God concerning creatures endowed with understanding and freedom of will, and concerning their actions. These persons have denied it for two reasons: (1.) They have thought that, because God is good and just, omniscient and omnipotent, he would have entirely prevented sin from being committed, if in reality he cared by his providence for his rational creatures and there actions. (Mark x, 18; Psalm cxlvii, 5; Rev. iv, 8; Mal. ii, 17; iii, 14.) (2.) Because they can conceive in their minds no other administration of Divine Providence concerning evil, than such as would involve God himself in the culpability, and would exempt from all criminality the creature, as if he had been impelled to sin by an irresistible act of God's efficiency. For this reason, then, since a belief in the Providence of God is absolutely necessary, (Luke xii, 28,) from whom a considerable part of his government is taken away if it be denied that he exercises any care over rational creatures and their actions; we will endeavour briefly to explain the Efficiency of Divine Providence concerning evil; and at the same time to demonstrate from this efficiency, that God cannot possibly be aspersed with the charge of injustice, and that no stain of sin can attach to him, on the contrary, that this efficiency is highly conducive to the commendation of God's righteousness.

II. But in sin are to be considered not only the act, (under which we likewise comprise the omission of the act,) but also "the transgression of the law." The act has regard to a natural good, and is called the material cause of sin; the transgression is a moral evil, and is called the formal cause of sin. An investigation into both of them is necessary, when we treat upon the efficiency of God concerning sin: for it is occupied about the act as it is an act, and as it is done against the law which prohibits its commission; about the omission of the act as such, and as it is against the law which commands its performance. But this efficiency is to be considered: (1.) With regard to the beginning of sin, and its first conception in the heart of a rational creature; (2.) its attempt, and, through this attempt, its perpetration; and, (3.) with regard to sin when finished. The efficiency of God concerning the beginning of sin is either its hindrance or permission; and, added to permission, the administration both of arguments and occasions inciting to sin; as well as an immediate concurrence to produce the act. The Divine efficiency concerning the progress of sin comprises its direction and determination; and concerning the completion of sin, it is occupied in punishing or pardoning.

III. The First efficiency of God concerning sin, is Hindrance or the placing of a hindrance, which, both with regard of the efficiency and of the object, is three-fold.

With respect to efficiency: For (i.) the impediment is either of sufficient efficacy, but such as does not hinder sin in the act. (Matt. xi, 21, 23; John xviii, 6.) (ii.) Or it is of such great efficacy as to render it impossible to be resisted. (iii.) Or it is of an efficacy administered in such a way by the wisdom of God, as in reality to hinder sin with regard to the event, and with certainty according to the foreknowledge of God, although not necessarily and inevitably. (Gen. xx, 6.) With respect to the object, it is likewise three-fold: for a hindrance is placed either on the power, the capability, or the will of a rational creature. (i.) The impediment placed on the power, is that by which some act is taken away from the power of a rational creature, for the performance of which it has an inclination and sufficient powers. This is done by legislation, through which it comes to pass that the creature cannot perform that act without sin. (Gen. ii, 16, 17.) (ii.) The impediment placed on the capability, is that by which this effect is produced, that the creature cannot commit the deed, for the performance of which it possesses an inclination, and powers which, without this hindrance, would be sufficient. But this hindrance is placed on the capability in four ways: First. By depriving the creature of the essence and life, which are the foundation of capability.

(1 Kings 19; 2 Kings 1.) Secondly. By the ablation or diminution of capability. (1

Kings xiii, 4; Rom. vi, 6.) Thirdly. By the opposition of a greater capability, or at least of one that is equal. (2 Chron. xxvi, 18-21; Gal. v, 17.) Fourthly. By the withdrawing of the object towards which the act tends. (John viii, 59.) (iii.) An impediment is placed on the will when, by some argument, it is persuaded not to will the perpetration of a sin, whether this argument be taken from the impossibility or the difficulty of the thing; (Matt. xxi, 46; Hosea ii, 6, 7;) from its unpleasantness or inconvenience, its uselessness or injuriousness; (Gen. xxxvii, 26, 27;) and, lastly, from its injustice, dishonour, and indecency. (Gen. xxxix, 8, 9.) IV. The Permission of sin is contrary to the hindering of it. Yet it is not opposed to hindrance as the latter is an act which is taken away from the power of a creature by legislation; for, in this case, the same act would be a sin, and not a sin -- a sin as it was an act forbidden to the power of the creature, and not a sin as being permitted, that is not forbidden. But permission is opposed to this hindrance, by which an impediment is placed on the power and the will of the creature. This permission is a suspension of all impediments, that, God knows, if they were employed, would in fact, hinder the sin; and it is a necessary result, because sin might be hindered by a single impediment of this description. (1.) Sin, therefore, is permitted to the power of the creature, when God employs none of those impediments which have been mentioned in the third thesis of this disputation: on which account, this permission has the following, either as conjoint or preceding acts of God. The continuance of essence and life to the creature, the preservation of his power, a care that it be not opposed by a greater power, or at least by one equal to it, and, lastly, the exhibition of the object on which sin is committed. (Exod. ix, 16; John xviii, 6; 1 Sam. xx, 31, 32; Matt. xxvi, 2, 53.) (2.) Sin is permitted also to the will, not by the suspension of every impediment suitable to deter the will from sinning, but by not employing those which in reality would hinder, of which kind God must have an immense number in the treasures of his wisdom and power.

V. The foundation of this permission is, (1.) The liberty of choice, which God, the Creator, has implanted in his rational creature, and the use of which the constancy of the Donor does not suffer to be taken away from this creature. (2.) The infinite wisdom and power of God, by which He knows and is able to produce good out of evil. (Gen. i, 2, 3; 2 Cor. iv, 6.) And therefore, God permits that which he does permit, not in ignorance of the powers and the inclination of rational creatures, for he knows all things; (1 Sam. xxiii, 11, 12;) - - not with reluctance, for it was in his power, not to have produced a creature who possessed freedom of will, and to have destroyed him after he was produced; (Rev. iv, 11;) -- not as being incapable of hindering, for how can this be attributed to Him who is both omniscient and omnipotent? (Jer. xviii, 6; Psalm xciv, 9, 10;) not as an unconcerned spectator, or negligent of that which is transacted, because even before any thing is done, he has already gone through the various actions concerning it, and has, besides, an attentive eye upon it to direct and determine to punish or to pardon it. (Psalm lxxxi, 12, 13.) But whatever God permits, he permits it designedly and voluntarily, His will being immediately concerned about its permission, which permission itself is immediately occupied about sin, which order cannot be inverted without injury to divine justice and truth. (Psalm v, 4, 5.) VI. We must now, with more distinctness, explain, by some of the differences of sin, those things which we have spoken thus generally about hindering and permitting. (1.) The distinction of sin, from its causes, into those of ignorance, infirmity, malignity, and negligence, will serve our purpose. For an impediment is placed on a sin of ignorance, by the revelation of the divine will; (Psalm cxix, 105;) on a sin of infirmity, by the strengthening of the Holy Spirit; (Ephes. iii, 16;) on a sin of malignity, by "taking away the stony heart, and by bestowing a heart of flesh," (Ezek.

xi, 19,) and inscribing on it the law of God; (Jer. xxxi, 33;) and on a sin of negligence, by a holy solicitude excited in the hearts of believers. (Jer. xxxii, 40.) From these, it will be easily evident, in the suspension of which of these acts consists the permission of sins under each of the preceding classes. (2.) The distinction of sin according to the relation of the law which commands the performance of good, and of that which prohibits the commission of evil, has also a place in this explanation. For, against the prohibitory part, an offense is committed, either by performing an act, or from an undue cause and end, omitting its performance -- against the perceptive part, either by omitting an act, or by performing it in an undue manner, and from an undue cause and end. To these distinctions also, God's hindering and permitting may be adapted. For Joseph's brethren were hindered from killing him; but they were induced to omit that act from an undue cause and end. (Gen. xxxvii, 26, 27.) Absalom was hindered from following the counsel of Ahithophel, which was useful to himself, and hurtful to David; but he did not abstain from it through a just cause, and from a good end. (2

Sam. 17.) God hindered Balaam from cursing the children of Israel, and caused him to bless them; but it was in such a manner that he abstained from the former act, and performed the latter with an insincere and knavish mind. (Num. 23.) VII. We shall more correctly understand the reasons and causes both of hindering and permitting, if, while distinctly considering in sin the act, and the transgression of the law, we apply to each of them the divine hindrance and permission. But though, in sin, the act and the transgression of the law are inseparably connected, and therefore neither can be hindered or permitted without the other; yet they may be distinguished in the mind, and God may hinder and permit sometimes with regard to the act or to the transgression alone; at other times, principally with regard to the one of them or to both, and these his acts may become objects of consideration to us. God hindered Elijah from being forcibly brought to Ahaziah to be killed, not as that was a sin, but as it was an act. This is apparent from the end and the mode of hindering. From the end, because it was His will that the life of His prophet should be spared, not lest Ahaziah should sin against God. From the mode of hindering, because he destroyed two companies, of fifty men each, who had been sent to seize him, which was a token of divine anger against Ahaziah and the men, by which sin is not usually hindered as such, but as it is an act which will prove injurious to another: but through Grace, sin is hindered as such. (2 Kings 1.) God permitted Joseph to be sold, when he hindered his murder. He permitted his vendition, not more as it was a sin than as it was an act; for by the sale of Joseph, as it was an act, God obtained his end. (Gen. xxxvii, 1, 20; Psalm cv, 17.) But God hindered David from laying violent hands on Saul, not so much as it was an act, as in reference to its being a sin. This appears from the argument by which David was induced to refrain. "The Lord forbid," said he, "that I should stretch forth mine hand against the Lord's anointed." (1 Sam. xxiv, 7.) God permitted Ahab to kill Naboth, rather as it was a sin than as it was an act; for thus Ahab filled up the measure of his iniquities, and accelerated the infliction of punishment on himself; for, by some other way than this, God could have taken Naboth to himself. (1 Kings 21.) But Abimelech was hindered from violating the chastity of Sarah -- both as it was an act by which indelible grief would have been brought down upon Abraham, whom He greatly loved, and as it was a sin; for God was unwilling that Abimelech should defile himself with this crime, because "in the integrity of his heart," he would have done it. (Gen. xx, 6.) On the contrary, God permitted Judah to know Tamar, his daughter-in-law -- both as an act because God willed to have Christ born in direct descent from Judah, and as it was a sin, for it was the will of God thus to declare: Nothing is so polluted that it cannot be sanctified in Christ Jesus. (Gen. xxxviii, 18.) For it is not in vain that Matthew has informed us, that Christ was the Son of Judah by Tamar, as he was also the Son of David by the wife of Uriah. (Matt. 1.) This matter when diligently considered by us, conduces both to illustrate the wisdom of God, and to promote our own profit, if in our consciences, we solicitously observe from what acts and in what respect we are hindered, and what acts are permitted to us.

VIII. Beside this permission, there is another efficiency of the providence of God concerning the Beginning of Sin, that is, the Administration or management of arguments and occasions, which incite to an act that cannot be committed by the creature without sin, if not through the intention of God, at least according to the inclination of the creature, and not seldom according to the events which thence arise.

(2 Sam. xii, 11, 12; xvi, 21-23.) But these arguments are presented either to the mind, (2 Sam. xxiv, 1; 1 Chron. xxi, 1; Psalm cv, 25,) or to the senses, both external and internal; (Job 1 & 2; Isa. x, 5-7;) and this indeed, either by means of the service or intervention of creatures, or by the immediate act of God himself. The end of God in this administration is -- to try whether it be the will of the creature to abstain from sinning, even when it is excited by these incentives; (for small praise is due to the act of abstaining, in those cases in which such excitements are absent,) and, if it be the will of the creature to yield to these alluring attractions, to effect his own work by the act of the creature; not impelled by necessity, as if He was unable to complete his own work without the aid of the creature; but through a desire to demonstrate his manifold wisdom. Consider the Arguments by which the brethren of Joseph, through their own malice, were incited to will his murder: these were -- Joseph's accusation, by which he disclosed to his father the deeds of his brethren, the peculiar affection which Jacob cherished for Joseph, the sending of a dream, and the relation of it. Consider also the Occasions or opportunities, the mission of Joseph to his brethren at his father's request, and the opportune appearance of the Ishmaelites who were traveling into Egypt, (Gen. 37.)

IX. The last efficiency of God concerning the Beginnings of sin, is the divine concurrence, which is necessary to produce every act; because nothing whatever can have an entity except from the first and chief Being, who immediately produces that entity. The concurrence of God is not his in, mediate influx into a second or inferior cause, but it is an action of God immediately flowing into the effect of the creature, so that the same effect in one and the same entire action may be produced simultaneously by God and the creature. Though this concurrence is placed in the mere pleasure or will of God, and in his free dispensation, yet he never denies it to a rational and free creature, when he has permitted an act to his power and will. For these two phrases are contradictory, "to grant permission to the power and the will of a creature to commit an act," and "to deny the divine concurrence without which the act cannot be done." But this concurrence is to the act as such, not as it is a sin: And therefore God is at once the effector and the permittor of the same act, and the permittor before he is the effector. For if it had not been the will of the creature to perform such an act, the influx of God would not have been upon that act by concurrence. And because the creature cannot perform that act without sin, God ought not, on that account, to deny the divine concurrence to the creature who is inclined to its performance. For it is right and proper that the obedience of the creature should be tried, and that he should abstain from an unlawful act and from the desire of obeying his own inclinations, not through a deficiency of the requisite divine concurrence; because, in this respect, he abstains from an act as it is a natural good, but it is the will of God that he should refrain from it as it is a moral evil.

X. The preceding considerations relate to the Beginnings of sin. In reference to the Progress of sin, a two-fold efficiency of divine providence occurs, direction and determination. The direction of sin is an act of divine providence, by which God wisely, justly, and powerfully directs sin wherever he wills, "reaching from one end to another mightily, and sweetly ordering all things." (Wisdom viii, 1.) In the divine direction is likewise contained a leading away from that point whither it is not the will of God to direct it. This direction is two-fold, unto an object, and unto an end.

Direction unto an object is when God allows the sin, which he permits, to be borne, not at the option of the creature, towards an object which, in any way whatsoever, is exposed and liable to the injury of sin; but which he directs to a particular object that sometimes has been no part of the sinner's aim or intention, or that he has at least not absolutely intended. (Prov. xvi, 9; xxi, 1.) Of this we have a signal example in Nebuchadnezzar, who, when he had prepared himself to subjugate nations, preferred to march against the Jews rather than the Ammonites, through the divine administration of his divinations. (Ezek. xxi, 19-22.) Direction unto an end is, when God does not allow the sin, which he permits, to be conducive to any end which the creature intends; but he uses it for that end which he himself wills, whether the creature intend the same end, (by which he would not still be excused from sin,) or whether he has another purpose which is directly contrary. The vendition of Joseph into Egypt, the temptation of Job, and the expedition of the king of Assyria against the Jews, afford illustrations of these remarks. (Gen. i, 20, 21; Job 1 & 2; Isa. x, 5-12.) XI. The determination of sin is an act of divine providence by which God places a measure or check on his permission, and a boundary on sin, that it may not, at the option and will of the creature, wander in infinitum. This mode and boundary are placed by the circumscription of the time, and the determination of the magnitude.

The circumscription of the time is, when the space of time, in which the permitted sin could continue, is diminished and circumscribed so as to stop itself. (Matt. xxiv, 22.) In this part also, regard must be had to the act as such, and to the sin as such. (i.) God places a boundary to the duration of the act, when he takes the rod of iniquity from the righteous, lest they commit any act unworthy of themselves; (Psalm cxxv, 3;) and when "he delivers the godly out of temptation." (2 Pet. ii, 9.) (ii.) God places a boundary to the duration of the sin when he "hedges up the way of the Israelites with thorns," that they may no longer commit idolatry; (Hosea ii, 6, 7;) when "He commands all men every where to repent," among "all nations, whom he suffered, in times past, to walk in their own ways." (Acts xiv, 16; xvii, 30.) A boundary is fixed to the magnitude of sin, when God does not permit sin to increase to excess and assume greater strength. This also is done with respect to it as an act, or as a sin. (i.) In the former respect, as an act, God hindered "the wrath of their enemies from swallowing up" the children of Israel, though he had permitted it to rise up against them; (Psalm cxxiv, 2, 3;) He permitted "no temptation to seize upon" the Corinthians "but such as is common to man;" (1 Cor. x, 13;) He hindered the devil from putting forth his hand against the life of Job; (1 & 2;) He prevented Shishadk, the king of Egypt, from

"destroying" the Jews, and permitted him only to subject them to servitude. (2 Chron.

xii, 7-9.) (ii.) In respect to it as a sin, God hindered David from contaminating himself with the blood of Nabal and his domestics. which he had sworn to shed, and with whom he was then in a state of contention. (1 Sam. xxv, 22, 26.) He also prevented David from going forth to battle in company with the army of Achish, (xxvii, 2; xxix, 6, 7,) to whom he had fled, and "before whom he had reigned himself mad," (xxi, 13,) thus, at the same time he hindered him from destroying his own countrymen, the Israelites, and from bringing disasters on the army of Achish. For he could have done neither of these things without the most flagrant wickedness; though the sin, also, as an act, seems thus to have been hindered.

XII. On account of this divine permission, the offering of arguments and opportunities in addition to permission, also on account of this direction, determination, and divine concurrence, God is said himself to do those evils which are perpetrated by men and by Satan: To have sent Joseph down into Egypt, (Gen. xlv, 8,) -- to have taken the property of Job, (1 & 2,) -- to have done openly "and before the sun" what David had perpetrated "secretly" against Uriah. (2 Sam. xii, 11, 12; 16.) This mode of speech is adopted for the following reasons: (i.) Because the principal parts, in the actions which are employed to produce such effects, belong to God himself. (ii.) Because the effects and issues, which result from all these, even from actions performed by the creature, are not so much in accordance with the intention of the creatures themselves, as with the purpose of God. (Isa. x, 5-7.) (iii.) Because the wisdom of God knows, if an administration of this kind be employed by him, that will certainly arise, or ensue, which cannot be perpetuated by the creature without wickedness; and because His will decrees to employ this administration. (1 Sam. xxiii, 11-13.) (iv.) A fourth reason may be added -- Because God, who is the universal cause, moves into the effect with a stronger influence than the creature does, whose entire efficacy depends upon God.

XIII. Lastly, follows the efficiency of divine providence concerning sin already perpetrated; which consists in its punishment and remission. This efficiency is occupied about sin as it is such: For sin is punished and pardoned as it is an evil, and because it is an evil. (1.) The Punishment of sin is an act of the providence of God, by which sin is repaid with the punishment that is due to it according to the justice of God. This punishment either belongs to the present life, or to that which is to come.

(i.) The latter is the eternal separation of the whole man from God, and his anguish and torture in the lake of fire. (Matt. xxv, 41; Rev. xx, 15.) (ii.) The punishment inflicted in this life, is either corporal or spiritual. Those chastisements which relate to the body, and to the state of the animal life, are various; but the enumeration of them is not necessary for our purpose. But spiritual punishment must be diligently considered; which is such a punishment of a previous sin, as to be also the cause of other subsequent sins, through the malice of him on whom it is inflicted. It is a privation of grace, and a delivering up to the power of evil. But Privation is either that of habitual grace, or that of assisting grace. The former is through the blinding of the mind, and the hardening of the heart. (Isa. vi, 9, 10.) The latter is the withdrawing of the assistance of the Holy Spirit, who is wont, inwardly "to help our infirmities,"

(Rom. viii, 26,) and outwardly to repress the temptations of Satan and the world both on the right hand and on the left; in this holy service, he also engages the ministry and the care of good angels. (Heb. i, 14; Psalm xci, 11.) A Delivering Up to the power of evil is, either "giving sinners over to a reprobate mind" and to the efficacy of error, (Rom. i, 28; 2 Thess. ii, 9-11,) or to the desires of the flesh and to the lusts of sin, (Rom. i, 24,) or lastly to the power of Satan, "the god of this world," (2 Cor. iv, 4,)

"who worketh powerfully in the children of disobedience." (Ephes. ii, 2.) But because from this punishment arise many other sins, and this not only according to the certain knowledge of God, by which He knows that if He thus punishes, they will thence arise, but likewise according to his purpose by which He resolves thus to punish -hence occur the following expressions: "I will harden the heart of Pharaoh," &c.

(Exod. iv, 21; vii, 4.) "Notwithstanding, the sons of Eli harkened not unto the voice of their father, because it was the will of the Lord to slay them." (1 Sam. ii, 25.) "But Amaziah would not hearken to the answer of Joash, king of Israel; for it came of God, that he might deliver them into the hand of their enemies, because they sought after the gods of Edom." (2 Chron. xxv, 20.) This consideration distinguishes the governance of God concerning sins, so far as it is occupied concerning either those sinners who are hardened, or those who are not hardened.

XIV. (2.) The Pardon or remission of sin is an act of the Providence of God, by which the guilt of sin is forgiven, and the punishment due to sin on account of its guilt is taken away. As this remission restores, to the favour of God, the man who had previously been an enemy; so it also causes the Divine administration respecting him to be afterwards entirely gracious, so far as equity and justice require. That is, through this pardon, he is free from those spiritual punishments which have been enumerated in the preceding Thesis; (Psalm ii, 10-12;) and though not exempt from corporal chastisements, yet he is not visited with them through the anger of God as the punisher of sin, but only through the desire of God thus to declare that He hates sin, and besides so to chastise as to deter the sinner from again falling into it. (2 Sam. xii, 11-13.) For which reason, the government of Providence with regard to this man is entirely different from that under which he remained before he obtained remission.

(Psalm cxix, 67; 1 Cor. xi, 32; Psalm xxxii, 1, 6.) This consideration is exceedingly useful for producing in man a solicitous care and a diligent endeavour to obtain grace from God, which may not only be sufficient to preserve him in future from sinning but which may likewise be so administered by the gracious Providence of God, as God knows to be best fitted to keep him in the very act from sin.

XV. This is the efficiency of Divine Providence concerning sin, which cannot be accused of the least injustice. (1.) For with respect to the Hindering Of Sin, that which is employed by God is sufficient in its own nature to hinder, and by which it is the duty of the creature to be hindered from sin, by which also he might actually be hindered unless he offered resistance and failed of the proffered grace. But God is not bound to employ all the methods which are possible to Him for the hindrance of sin.

(Rom. 1 and 2; Isa. v, 4; Matt. xi, 21- 23.) (2.) But the cause of sin cannot be ascribed to the Divine Permission. Not the efficient cause; for it is a suspension of the Divine efficiency. Not the deficient cause; for it pre-supposed, that man had a capability not to commit sin, by the aid of Divine grace, which is either near and ready; or if it be wanting, it is removed to a distance by the fault of the man himself. (3.) The Presenting of Arguments and Occasions does not cause sin, unless, per accidens, accidentally. For it is administered in such a manner, as to allow the creature not only the spontaneous but also the free use of his own motions and actions. But God is perfectly at liberty in this manner to try the obedience of his creature. (3.) Neither can injustice be ascribed with any propriety to The Divine Concurrence. For there is no reason in existence why God ought to deny his concurrence to that act which, on account of the precept imposed, cannot be committed by the creature without sin; (Gen. ii, 16, 17;) which concurrence God would grant to the same act of the creature, if a law had not been made. (5.) Direction and Determination have no difficulty. (6.) Punishment and Pardon have in them manifest equity, even that punishment which contains blinding and hardening; since God is not wont to inflict it except for the deep demerit and the almost desperate contumacy of his intelligent creature. (Isa. vi, 7; Rom. 1; 2 Thess. 2, 9-12.)

DISPUTATION 11

ON THE FREE WILL OF MAN AND ITS POWERS

RESPONDENT: PAUL LEONARDS

I. The word, arbitrium, "choice," or "free will," properly signifies both the faculty of the mind or understanding, by which the mind is enabled to judge about any thing proposed to it, and the judgment itself which the mind forms according to that faculty.

But it is transferred from the Mind to the Will on account of the very close connection which subsists between them. Liberty, when attributed to the will, is properly an affection of the will, though it has its root in the understanding and reason. Generally considered, it is various. (1.) It is a Freedom from the control or jurisdiction of one who commands, and from an obligation to render obedience. (2.) From the inspection, care, and government of a superior. (3.) It is also a freedom from necessity, whether this proceeds from an external cause compelling, or from a nature inwardly determining absolutely to one thing. (4.) It is a freedom from sin and its dominion.

(5.) And a freedom from misery.

II. Of these five modes of liberty, the first two appertain to God alone; to whom also on this account, autexousia perfect independence, or complete freedom of action, is attributed. But the remaining three modes may belong to man, nay in a certain respect they do pertain to him. And, indeed, the former, namely, freedom from necessity always pertains to him because it exists naturally in the will, as its proper attribute, so that there cannot be any will if it be not free. The freedom from misery, which pertains to man when recently created and not then fallen into sin, will again pertain to him when he shall be translated in body and soul into celestial blessedness. But about these two modes also, of freedom from necessity and from misery, we have here no dispute. It remains, therefore, for us, to discuss that which is a freedom from sin and its dominion, and which is the principal controversy of these times.

III. It is therefore asked, is there within man a freedom of will from sin and its dominion, and how far does it extend? Or rather, what are the powers of the whole man to understand, to will, and to do that which is good? To return an appropriate answer to this question, the distinction of a good object, and the diversity of men's conditions, must both enter into our consideration. The Good Things presented to man are three, natural, which he has in common with many other creatures; animal, which belong to him as a man; and spiritual, which are also deservedly called Celestial or Divine, and which are consentaneous to him as being a partaker of the Divine Nature.

The States, or Conditions are likewise three, that of primitive innocence, in which God placed him by creation; that of subsequent corruption, into which he fell through sin when destitute of primitive innocence; and, lastly, that of renewed righteousness, to which state he is restored by the grace of Christ.

IV. But because it is of little importance to our present purpose to investigate what may be the powers of free will to understand, to will, and to do natural and animal good things; we will omit them, and enter on the consideration of spiritual good, that concerns the spiritual life of man, which he is bound to live according to godliness, inquiring from the Scriptures what powers man possesses, while he is in the way of this animal life, to understand, to will, and to do spiritual good things, which alone are truly good and pleasing to God. In this inquiry the office of a Director will be performed by a consideration of the three states, of which we have already treated, [§

3,] varied as such consideration must be in the relation of these powers to the change of each state.

V. In the state of Primitive Innocence, man had a mind endued with a clear understanding of heavenly light and truth concerning God, and his works and will, as far as was sufficient for the salvation of man and the glory of God; he had a heart imbued with "righteousness and true holiness," and with a true and saving love of good; and powers abundantly qualified or furnished perfectly to fulfill the law which God had imposed on him. This admits easily of proof, from the description of the image of God, after which man is said to have been created, (Gen. i, 26, 27,) from the law divinely imposed on him, which had a promise and a threat appended to it, (ii, 17,) and lastly from the analogous restoration of the same image in Christ Jesus.

(Ephes. iv, 24, Col. iii, 10.)

VI. But man was not so confirmed in this state of innocence, as to be incapable of being moved, by the representation presented to him of some good, (whether it was of an inferior kind and relating to this animal life, or of a superior-kind and relating to spiritual life,) inordinately and unlawfully to look upon it and to desire it, and of his own spontaneous as well as free motion, and through a preposterous desire for that good, to decline from the obedience which had been prescribed to him. Nay, having turned away from the light of his own mind and his chief good, which is God, or, at least, having turned towards that chief good not in the manner in which he ought to have done, and besides having turned in mind and heart towards an inferior good, he transgressed the command given to him for life. By this foul deed, he precipitated himself from that noble and elevated condition into a state of the deepest infelicity, which is Under The Dominion of Sin. For "to whom any one yields himself a servant to obey," (Rom. vi, 16,) and "of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage," and is his regularly assigned slave. (2 Pet. ii, 19.) VII. In this state, the free will of man towards the true good is not only wounded, maimed, infirm, bent, and weakened; but it is also imprisoned, destroyed, and lost.

And its powers are not only debilitated and useless unless they be assisted by grace, but it has no powers whatever except such as are excited by Divine grace. For Christ has said, "Without me ye can do nothing." St. Augustine, after having diligently meditated upon each word in this passage, speaks thus: "Christ does not say, without me ye can do but Little; neither does He say, without me ye can do any Arduous Thing, nor without me ye can do it with difficulty. But he says, without me ye can do Nothing! Nor does he say, without me ye cannot complete any thing; but without me ye can do Nothing." That this may be made more manifestly to appear, we will separately consider the mind, the affections or will, and the capability, as contra-distinguished from them, as well as the life itself of an unregenerate man.

VIII. The mind of man, in this state, is dark, destitute of the saving knowledge of God, and, according to the Apostle, incapable of those things which belong to the Spirit of God. For "the animal man has no perception of the things of the Spirit of God;" (1 Cor. ii, 14;)

in which passage man is called "animal," not from the animal body, but from anima, the soul itself, which is the most noble part of man, but which is so encompassed about with the clouds of ignorance, as to be distinguished by the epithets of "vain"

and "foolish;" and men themselves, thus darkened in their minds, are denominated

"mad" or foolish, "fools," and even "darkness" itself. (Rom. i, 21, 22; Ephes. iv, 17, 18; Tit. iii, 3; Ephes. v, 8.) This is true, not only when, from the truth of the law which has in some measure been inscribed on the mind, it is preparing to form conclusions by the understanding; but likewise when, by simple apprehension, it would receive the truth of the gospel externally offered to it. For the human mind judges that to be

"foolishness" which is the most excellent "wisdom" of God. (1 Cor. i, 18, 24.) On this account, what is here said must be understood not only of practical understanding and the judgment of particular approbation, but also of theoretical understanding and the judgment of general estimation.

IX. To the darkness of the mind succeeds the perverseness of the affections and of the heart, according to which it hates and has an aversion to that which is truly good and pleasing to God; but it loves and pursues what is evil. The Apostle was unable to afford a more luminous description of this perverseness, than he has given in the following words: "The carnal mind is enmity against God. For it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then, they that are in the flesh cannot please God." (Rom. viii, 7.) For this reason, the human heart itself is very often called deceitful and perverse, uncircumcised, hard and stony." (Jer. xiii, 10; xvii, 9; Ezek.

xxxvi, 26.) Its imagination is said to be "only evil from his very youth;" (Gen. vi, 5; viii, 21;) and "out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries," &c. (Matt.

xv, 19.)

X. Exactly correspondent to this darkness of the mind, and perverseness of the heart, is the utter weakness of all the powers to perform that which is truly good, and to omit the perpetration of that which is evil, in a due mode and from a due end and cause.

The subjoined sayings of Christ serve to describe this impotence. "A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit." (Matt. vii, 18.) "How can ye, being evil, speak good things?" (xii, 34.) The following relates to the good which is properly prescribed in the gospel: "No man can come to me, except the Father draw him." (John vi, 44.) As do likewise the following words of the Apostle: "The carnal mind is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be;" (Rom. viii, 7;)

therefore, that man over whom it has dominion, cannot perform what the law commands. The same Apostle says, "When we were in the flesh, the motions of sins wrought in us," or flourished energetically. (vii, 5.) To the same purpose are all those passages in which the man existing in this state is said to be under the power of sin and Satan, reduced to the condition of a slave, and "taken captive by the Devil."

(Rom. vi, 20; 2 Tim. ii, 26.)

XI. To these let the consideration of the whole of the life of man who is placed under sin, be added, of which the Scriptures exhibit to us the most luminous descriptions; and it will be evident, that nothing can be spoken more truly concerning man in this state, than that he is altogether dead in sin. (Rom. iii, 10-19.) To these let the testimonies of Scripture be joined, in which are described the benefits of Christ, which are conferred by his Spirit on the human mind and will, and thus on the whole man. (1 Cor. vi, 9-11; Gal. v, 19-25; Ephes. ii, 2-7; iv, 17-20; Tit. iii, 3-7.) For, the blessings of which man has been deprived by sin, cannot be rendered more obviously apparent, than by the immense mass of benefits which accrue to believers through the Holy Spirit; when, in truth, nature is understood to be devoid of all that which, as the Scriptures testify, is performed in man and communicated by the operation of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, if "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty;" (2 Cor. iii, 17;) and if those alone be free indeed whom the Son hath made free;" (John viii, 36;) it follows, that our will is not free from the first fall; that is, it is not free to good, unless it be made free by the Son through his Spirit.

XII. But far different from this is the consideration of the free will of man, as constituted in the third state of Renewed Righteousness. For when a new light and knowledge of God and Christ, and of the Divine will, have been kindled in his mind; and when new affections, inclinations and motions agreeing with the law of God, have been excited in his heart, and new powers have been produced in him; it comes to pass, that, being liberated from the kingdom of darkness, and being now made

"light in the Lord," (Ephes. v, 8,) he understands the true and saving good; that, after the hardness of his stony heart has been changed into the softness of flesh, and the law of God according to the covenant of grace has been inscribed on it, (Jer. 31, 32-35,) he loves and embraces that which is good, just, and holy; and that, being made capable in Christ, co-operating now with God, he prosecutes the good which he knows and loves, and he begins himself to perform it in deed. But this, whatever it may be of knowledge, holiness and power, is all begotten within him by the Holy Spirit; who is, on this account, called "the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, of counsel and might, of knowledge and the fear of Jehovah," (Isa. xi, 2,) "the Spirit of grace," (Zech. xii, 10,) "of faith," (2 Cor. iv, 13,) "the Spirit of adoption" into sons, (Rom. viii, 16,) and "the Spirit of holiness;" and to whom the acts of illumination, regeneration, renovation, and confirmation, are attributed in the Scriptures.

XIII. But two things must be here observed. The First that this work of regeneration and illumination is not completed in one moment; but that it is advanced and promoted, from time to time, by daily increase. For "our old man is crucified, that the body of sin might be destroyed," (Rom. vi, 6,) and "that the inward man may be renewed day by day." (2 Cor. iv, 16.) For this reason, in regenerate persons, as long as they inhabit these mortal bodies, "the flesh lusteth against the Spirit." (Gal. v, 17.) Hence it arises, that they can neither perform any good thing without great resistance and violent struggles, nor abstain from the commission of evil. Nay, it also happens, that, either through ignorance or infirmity, and sometimes through perverseness, they sin, as we may see in the cases of Moses, Aaron, Barnabas, Peter and David. Neither is such an occurrence only accidental; but, even in those who are the most perfect, the following Scriptures have their fulfillment: "In many things we all offend;" (James iii, 9;) and "There is no man that sinneth not." (1 Kings viii, 46.) XIV. The Second thing to be observed is, that as the very first commencement of every good thing, so likewise the progress, continuance and confirmation, nay, even the perseverance in good, are not from ourselves, but from God through the Holy Spirit. For "he who hath begun a good work in you, will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ;" (Phil. i, 6;) and "we are kept by the power of God through faith." (1 Pet.

i, 5.) "The God of all grace makes us perfect, stablishes, strengthens and settles us." (i, 10.) But if it happens that persons fall into sin who have been born again, they neither repent nor rise again unless they be raised up again by God through the power of his Spirit, and be renewed to repentance. This is proved in the most satisfactory manner, by the example of David and of Peter. "Every good and perfect gift, therefore, is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights," (James i, 17,) by whose power the dead are animated that they may live, the fallen are raised up that they may recover themselves, the blind are illuminated that they may see, the unwilling are incited that they may become willing, the weak are confirmed that they may stand, the willing are assisted that they may work and may co-operate with God. "To whom be praise and glory in the church, by Christ Jesus, throughout all ages, world without end. Amen!"

"Subsequent or following grace does indeed assist the good purpose of man; but this good purpose would have no existence unless through preceding or preventing grace.

And though the desire of man, which is called good, be assisted by grace when it begins to be; yet it does not begin without grace, but is inspired by Him, concerning whom the Apostle writes thus, thanks be to God, who put the same earnest care into the heart of Titus for you. If God incites any one to have 'an earnest care' for others, He will 'put it into the heart' of some other person to have 'an earnest care' for him."

Augustinus, Contra. 2 Epist. Pelag. l. 2. c. 9.

"What then, you ask, does free will do? I reply with brevity, it saves. Take away FREE WILL, and nothing will be left to be saved. Take away GRACE, and nothing will be left as the source of salvation. This work [of salvation] cannot be effected without two parties -- one, from whom it may come: the other, to whom or in whom it may be wrought. God is the author of salvation. Free will is only capable of being saved. No one, except God, is able to bestow salvation; and nothing, except free will, is capable of receiving it." Bernardus, De Libero Arbit. et Gratia.

DISPUTATION 12

THE LAW OF GOD

RESPONDENT: DIONYSIUS SPRANCKHUYSEN

I. Law in general is defined, either from its End, "an ordinance of right reason for the common and particular good of all and of each of those who are subordinate to it, enacted by Him who has the care of the whole community, and, in it, that of each individual." Or from its Form and its Efficacy, "an ordinance commanding what must be done, and what omitted; it is enacted by Him, who possesses the right of requiring obedience; and it binds to obedience a creature who abounds in the use of reason and the exercise of liberty, by the sacred promise of a reward and by the denunciation of a punishment." It is likewise distinguished into Human and Divine. A Divine law has God for its author, a Human law has man for its author; not that any law enacted by man is choice and good, which may not be referred to God, the author of every good; but because men deduce from the Divine law such precepts as are accommodated to the state of which they have the charge and oversight, according to its particular condition and circumstances. At present we will treat upon the Divine law.

II. The Divine law may be considered, either as it is impressed on the minds of men by the engrafted word; (Rom. ii, 14, 15;) as it is communicated by words audibly pronounced, (Gal. ii, 17,) or as it is comprised in writing. (Exod. xxxiv, 1.) These modes of legislation do not differ in their entire objects: but they may admit of discrimination in this way, the first seems to serve as a kind of foundation to the rest; but the two others extend themselves further, even to those things which are commanded and forbidden. We will now treat upon the law of God which is comprised in writing; and which is also called "the law of Moses;" because God used him as a mediator to deliver it to the children of Israel. (Mal. iv, 4; Gal. iii, 19.) But it is three-fold according to the variety of the object, that is, of the works to be performed. The first is called the Ethical, or Moral Law: (Exod. 20.) The second, the Sacred or Ceremonial. The third the Political, Judicial or Forensic Law.

III. The Moral Law is distributed through the whole of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, and is summarily contained in the Decalogue. It is an ordinance that commands those things which God accounts grateful of themselves, and which it is his will to be performed by all men at all times and in all places; and that forbids the contrary things. (1 Sam. xv, 22; Amos v, 21-24; Micah vi, 6-8.) It is therefore the perpetual and immutable rule of living, the express image of the internal Divine conception; according to which, God, the great lawgiver, judges it right and equitable that a rational creature should always and in every place order and direct the whole of his life. It is briefly contained in the love God and of our neighbour; (Matt. xxii, 36-39;) whether partly consisting of those services which relate to the love, honour, fear, and worship of God; (Mal. i, 6;) or partly consisting of those duties which we owe to our neighbours, superiors, inferiors, and equals: (Rom. 12,13, & 14;) in the wide circle of which are also comprehended those things which every man is bound to perform to himself. (Tit. ii, 11, 12.)

IV. The uses of the moral law are various, according to the different conditions of man. (1.) The primary use, and that which was of itself intended by God according to his love for righteousness and for his creatures, was, that man by it might be quickened or made alive, that is, that he might perform it, and by its performance might be justified, and might "of debt" receive the reward which was promised through it. (Rom. ii, 13; x, 5; iv, 4.) And this use was accommodated to the primitive state of man, when sin had not yet entered into the world. (2.) The first use in order of the moral law, under a state of sin, is AGAINST man as a sinner, not only that it may accuse him of transgression and guilt, and may subject him to the wrath of God and condemnation; (Rom. iii, 19, 20;) but that it may likewise convince him of his utter inability to resist sin and to subject himself to the law. (Rom. 7.) Since God has been pleased mercifully and graciously to treat with sinful man, the next use of the law TOWARDS the sinner is, that it may compel him who is thus convicted and subjected to condemnation, to desire and seek the grace of God, and that it may force him to flee to Christ either as the promised or as the imparted deliverer. (Gal. ii, 16, 17.) Besides, in this state of sin, the moral law is serviceable, not only to God, that, by the dread of punishment and the promise of temporal rewards, he may restrain men under its guidance at least from the outward work of sin and from flagrant crimes; (1 Tim. i, 9, 10;) but it is also serviceable to Sin, when dwelling and reigning in a carnal man who is under the law, that it may inflame the desire of sin, may increase sin, and may

"work within him all manner of concupiscence." (Rom. vi, 12-14; vii, 5, 8, 11, 13.) In the former case, God employs the law through his goodness and his love for civil and social intercourse among mankind. In the latter case, it is employed through the malice of sin which reigns and has the dominion.

V. (3.) The third use of the moral law is towards a man, as now born again by the Spirit of God and of Christ, and is agreeable to the state of grace, that it may be a perpetual rule for directing his life in a godly and spiritual manner: (Tit. iii, 8; James ii, 8.) Not that man may be justified; because for this purpose it is rendered "weak through the flesh" and useless, even if man had committed only a single sin: (Rom.

viii, 3.) But that he may render thanks to God for his gracious redemption and sanctification, (Psalm cxvi, 12, 13,) that he may preserve a good conscience, (1 Tim.

i, 19,) that he may make his calling and election sure, (2 Pet. i, 10,) that he may by his example win over other persons to Christ, (1 Pet. iii, 1,) that he may confound the devil, (Job 1 & 2,) that he may condemn the ungodly world, (Heb. xi, 7,) and that through the path of good works he may march towards the heavenly inheritance and glory, (Rom. ii, 7,) and that he may not only himself glorify God, (1 Cor. vi, 20,) but may also furnish occasion and matter to others for glorifying his Father who is in Heaven. (Matt. v, 16.)

VI. From these uses it is easy to collect how far the moral law obtains among believers and those who are placed under the grace of Christ, and how far it is abrogated. (1.) It is abrogated with regard to its power and use in justifying: "For if there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by that law." (Gal. iii, 21.) The reason why "it cannot give life," is,

"because it is weak through the flesh:" (Rom. viii, 3) God, therefore, willing to deal graciously with men, gave the promise and Christ himself, that the inheritance through the promise and by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe.

But the law which came after the promise, could neither "make the latter of none effect," (for it was sanctioned by authority,) nor could it be joined or super- added to the promise, that out of this union righteousness and life might be given. (Gal. iii, 16-18, 22.) (2.) It is abrogated with regard to the curse and condemnation: For "Christ, being made a curse for us, hath redeemed us from the curse of the law;" (Gal. iii, 10-13;) and thus the law is taken away from sin, lest its "strength" should be to condemn.

(1 Cor. xv, 55, 56.) (3.) The law is abrogated and taken away from sin, so far as "sin, having taken occasion by the law, works all manner of concupiscence" in the carnal man, over whom sin exercises dominion. (Rom. vii, 4-8.) (4.) It is abrogated, with regard to the guidance by which it urged man to do good and to refrain from evil, through a fear of punishment and a hope of temporal reward. (1 Tim. i, 9, 10; Gal. iv, 18.) For believers and regenerate persons "are become dead to the law by the body of Christ," that they may be the property of another, even of Christ; by whose Spirit they are led and excited in newness of life, according to love and the royal law of liberty.

(1 John v, 3, 4; James ii, 8.) Whence it appears, that the law is not abrogated with respect to the obedience which must be rendered to God; for though obedience be required under the grace of Christ and of the Gospel, it is required according to clemency, and not according to strict [legal] rigor. (1 John iii, 1, 2.) VII. The Ceremonial Law is that which contains the precepts concerning the outward worship of God; which was delivered to the Jewish church, and was accommodated to the times in which the church of God was "as a child" under "the promise" and the Old Testament. (Gal. iv, 1-3.) It was instituted not only to typify, to prefigure and to bear witness by sealing; (Heb. viii, 5; x, 1;) but likewise for the discipline, or good order which was to be observed in ecclesiastical meetings and acts. (Col. ii, 14; Psalm xxvii, 4.) Subservient to the former purpose were circumcision, the Pascal Lamb, sacrifices, sabbaths, sprinklings, washings, purifications, consecrations and dedications of living creatures. (Col. ii, 11; 1 Cor. v, 7.) To the latter purpose, [that of church discipline,] were the distinct functions of the Priests, the Levites, the Singers, and the porters, or door-keepers, the courses or changes in their several duties, and the circumstances of the places and times in which these sacred acts were to be severally performed. (1 Chron. 24, 25, & 26.)

VIII. The use of this ceremonial law was, (1.) That it might retain that ancient people under the hope and expectation of the good things which had been promised. (Heb. x, 1- 3.) This use it fulfilled by various types, figures and shadows of persons, things, actions, and events; (7, 9, & 10;) by which not only were sins testified as in "a handwriting which was against them," (Col. ii, 14,) that the necessity of the promise which had been given might be understood; but likewise the expiation and promised good things were shewn at a distance, that they might believe the promise would assuredly be fulfilled. (Heb. ix, 8-10; Col. ii, 17; Heb. x, 1.) And in this respect, since the body and express form of those types and shadows relate to Christ, the ceremonial law is deservedly called "a school-master [to bring the Jews] unto Christ." (Gal. iii, 24.) (2.) That it might distinguish from other nations the Children of Israel, as a people sanctified to God on a peculiar account, and that it might separate them as "a middle wall of partition;" (Ephes. ii, 14, 15;) yet so as that even strangers might be admitted to a participation in it by circumcision. (Exod. xii, 44; Acts ii, 10.) (3.) That while occupied in this course of operas religious services, they might not invent and fabricate other modes of worship, nor assume such as were in use among other nations; and thus they were preserved pure from idolatry and superstition, to which they had the greatest propensity, and for which occasions were offered on every side by those nations who were contiguous, as well as by those who dwelt amongst them.

(Deut. 12; xxxi, 16, 27-29.)

IX. The ceremonial law was abrogated by the cross, the death and the resurrection of Christ, by his ascension into heaven and the mission of the Holy Ghost, by the sun's dispersion of the shadows, and by the entrance of "the body which is of Christ" into their place, (Col. ii, 11, 12, 14, 17,) which is the full completion of all the types. (Heb.

viii, 1-6.) But the gradations to be observed in its abrogation must come under our consideration: In the first moment it was abrogated with regard to the necessity and utility of its observance, every obligatory right being at once and together taken from it: in that instant it ceased to live, and became dead. (Gal. iv, 9, 10; 1 Cor. vii, 19; ix, 19, 20; 2 Cor. iii, 13- 16.) Afterwards it was actually to be abolished. This was ejected partly, by the teaching of the Apostles among believers, who by degrees understood

"Christ to be the end of the law," and of that which was then abolished; they abstained therefore voluntarily from the use of that law. Its abolition was also ejected in part, by the power of God, in the destruction of Jerusalem and of the temple, in which was the seat of religion, and the place appointed for performing those religious observances, against the contumacy of the unbelieving Jews. From this period the legal ceremonies began to be mortiferous, though in the intermediate space [which had elapsed between the death of Christ and the destruction of Jerusalem,] these rites, even in the judgment of the apostles themselves, might be tolerated, but only among the Jews, and with a proviso, that they should not be imposed on the Gentiles: (Acts xvi, 3; xv, 28; xxi, 21-26; Gal. ii, 3, 11, 12;) which toleration must itself be considered as being tantamount to a new institution.

X. The Judicial Law is that which God prescribed by Moses to the Children of Israel, of whom He was in a peculiar manner the king. (Exod. 21, 22, 23, &c.) It contained precepts about the form of the political government to be exercised in civil society, for procuring the benefit both of natural and spiritual life, by the preservation and exaction of the outward worship and of the external discipline commanded in moral and ceremonial law, such as concerned magistrates, contracts, division of property, judgments, punishments, &c. (Deut. xvii, 15.) These laws may appropriately be referred to two kinds: (1.) Some of them, with regard to their substance are of general obligation, though with regard to some circumstances they are peculiar to the Jewish commonwealth. (2.) Others belong simply to a particular right or authority. (Deut. xv, 1, 2; vi, 19.)

XI. The uses of this judicial law also were three: (1.) That the whole community of the Children of Israel might be regulated by a certain rule of public equity and justice; that it might be "as a city that is compact together," (Psalm cxxii, 3,) [or as a body]

"which is knit together" according to all and each of its parts,"by the joints and sinews" of the precepts prescribed in this law. (2.) That the Israelites might, by this law, be distinguished from other nations who had their own laws. Thus was it the will of God, that this his people should have nothing in common with other nations, wherever this was possible according to the nature of things and of man himself.

These two uses related to the existing condition of the Jewish commonwealth. (3.) It had reference to future things, and was typical of them For all that state, and the whole kingdom and its administration, the chiefs of administration, the judges and kings, prefigured Christ and his kingdom, and its spiritual administration. Psalm 2; Ezek. xxxiv, 23, 24.) In this respect also the judicial law may be called "a schoolmaster [to bring the Jews] to Christ."

XII. This law, so far as it had regard to Christ, was universally abrogated. No kingdom, no nation, no administration, serves now typically to figure Christ and his kingdom or administration. For his kingdom, which is the kingdom of heaven and not of this world, has already come, and he has come into his kingdom. (Matt. iii, 2;xvi, 28; John xviii, 36; Matt. xi, 11.) But with respect to its simple observance, this Judicial Law is neither forbidden nor prescribed to any people, nor is it of absolute necessity to be either observed or omitted. Those matters are accepted which are of universal obligation, and founded in natural equity. For it is necessary, that they be strictly observed, in every place and by all persons. And those things [in the judicial law] which relate to Christ as it respects the very substance and principal end, cannot be lawfully used by any nation.

COROLLARY

The doctrine of the Papists respecting Councils and of Works of Supererogation, derogates from the perfection of the Divine commands.

DISPUTATION 13

ON THE COMPARISON OF THE LAW AND THE GOSPEL

RESPONDENT: PETER CUNÆUS

I. Since the law ought to be considered in two respects, not only as it was originally delivered to men constituted in primitive innocence, but also as it was given to Moses and imposed on sinners, (on which account it has in the Scriptures obtained the name of "the Old Testament," or "the Old Covenant,") it may very properly, according to this two- fold respect, be compared with the Gospel, which has received the appellation of "the New Testament" as it is opposed to the Old. This may be done in reference both to their agreement and their difference; indeed, it would-be inconvenient for us to take their agreement generally into consideration without their difference, lest we should be compelled twice to repeat the same thing.

II. The law, therefore, both as it was first delivered to Adam and as it was given by Moses, agrees with the Gospel, (1.) In the general consideration of having one Author. For one and the same God is the author of both, who delivered the law as a legislator; (Gen. ii, 17; Exod. xx, 2;) but he promulgated the Gospel as the Father of mercies and the God of all grace: whence the former is frequently denominated "the law of God," and the latter "the Gospel of God." (Rom. i, 1.) (2.) In the general relation of their matter. For the doctrine of each consists of a command to obedience, and of the promise of a reward. On this account each of them has the name of hrwt

"the law," which is also commonly ascribed to both in the Scriptures. (Isa. ii, 3.) (3.) In the general consideration of their end, which is the glory of the wisdom, goodness and justice of God. (4.) In their common subject, as not being distinguished by special respects. For the law was imposed on men, and to men also was the gospel manifested.

III. There is, besides, a certain proper agreement of the law, as it was delivered to Adam, with the Gospel; from which agreement the law, as given through Moses, is excluded: it is placed in the possibility of its performance. For Adam was able, with the aid of God, to fulfill the law by those powers which he had received in creation: otherwise, transgression could not have been imputed to him for a crime. The gospel also is inscribed in the hearts of those who are in covenant with God, that they may be able to fulfill the condition which it prescribes.

IV. But the difference between the law, as it was first delivered, and the gospel, consists principally in the following particulars. (1.) In the special respect of the Author. For, in the exercise of benevolence to his innocent creature, God delivered the law without regard to Christ, yet of strict justice requiring obedience, with the promise of a reward and the denunciation of a punishment. But in the exercise of grace and mercy, and having respect to Christ his anointed one, God revealed the Gospel; and, through justice attempered with mercy, promulgated his demands and his promises. (2.) In the particular relation of its matter. For the law says, "Do this, and thou shalt live." (Rom. x, 5.) But the Gospel says, "If thou wilt BELIEVE, thou shalt be saved." And this difference lies not only in the postulate, from which the former is called "the law of works," but the Gospel "the law of faith," (Rom. iii, 27,) but also in the promise: for though in each of them eternal life was promised, yet by the Gospel it was to be conferred as from death and ignominy, but by the law as from natural felicity. (2 Tim. i, 10.) Besides, in the Gospel is announced remission of sins, as preparatory to life eternal; of which no mention is made in the [Adamic] law; because neither was this remission necessary to one who was not a sinner, nor would its announcement have [then] been useful to him, although he might afterwards have become a sinner.

V. (3.) They likewise differ in the mode of remuneration. For according to the

[primeval] law, "To him that WORKED, the reward would be of debt;" (Rom. iv, 4;) and to him that transgressed, the punishment inflicted would be of the severity of strict justice. But to him that BELIEVETH, the reward is bestowed of grace; and to him that believeth not, condemnation is due according to justice tempered with clemency in Christ Jesus. (John iii, 16, 19; xi, 41.) They are discriminated in the special consideration of their subject. For the law was delivered to man while innocent, and already constituted in the favour of God. (Gen. ii, 17.) But the Gospel was bestowed upon man as a sinner, and one who was to be brought back into the favour of God, because it is "the word of reconciliation." (2 Cor. v, 19.) (5.) They differ in the peculiar respect of their end. For by the law are illustrated the wisdom, goodness, and strict justice of God: but by the Gospel is manifested a far more illustrious display of the wisdom of God, of his goodness united with gracious mercy, and of justice mildly attempered in Christ Jesus. (1 Cor. i, 20-24; Ephes. i, 8; Rom. iii, 24-26.)

THE LAW OF MOSES

VI. But the difference between the law, as it was given by Moses, and is styled "the Old Testament," and the gospel as it comes under the appellation of "the New Testament," lies according to the Scriptures in the following particulars. (1.) In the distinct property of God who instituted them. For He made the old covenant, as one who was angry at the sins which remained without expiation under the preceding

[Adamic] covenant. (Heb. ix, 5, 15.) But He instituted the new, as being reconciled, or, at least as about to accomplish reconciliation by that covenant, in the Son of his love, and by the word of his grace. (2 Cor. v, 17-21; Ephes. ii, 16, 17.) (2.) In the mode of institution, which corresponds in each of them to the condition of the things to be instituted. For the law of Moses was delivered with the most obvious signs of the Divine displeasure and of God's dreadful judgment against sins and sinners. But the gospel was given with assured tokens of benevolence, good pleasure and love in Christ. Hence the Apostle says: "For ye are not come unto the mount which might be touched and that burned with fire, nor unto blackness and darkness, and tempest," &c.

"But ye are come unto Mount Sion," &c. (Heb. xii, 18-24.) (3.) In the substance of the commands and promises. For the commands of the law were chiefly carnal, (Heb. vii, 16,) and contained "the handwriting of ordinances which was contrary to us:" (Col. ii, 14.) Most of the promises were likewise corporal, and stipulated engagements for an earthly inheritance, which suited "the old man." (Heb. x, 1.) But the gospel is spiritual, (John iv, 21, 23,) containing spiritual commands and the promise of a heavenly inheritance agreeing with "the new man;" (Heb. viii, 6; Ephes. i, 3,) though it promises earthly blessings, as additions, to those who "seek first the kingdom God and his righteousness." (Matt. vi, 33.)

VII. (4.) We place the fourth difference in the Mediator or Intercessor. For Moses is the mediator of the Old Testament, Jesus Christ of the, New. (Gal. iii, 19; Heb. ix, 15.) The law was given by a servant, but the gospel was given by the Lord himself revealed. (Heb. iii, 5, 6.) "The law was given by Moses; Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (John 1, 17.) The law was given by the hands of a mediator, (Gal. iii, 19,) agreeably to what is mentioned in other passages; (Lev. xxvi, 46; Deut. v, 26-31;) and Christ is styled "the Mediator of the New Testament." (Heb. ix, 16.) (5.) They also differ in the blood employed for the confirmation of each Testament. The old covenant was ratified by the blood of animals; (Exod. xxiv, 5, 6; Heb. ix, 18-20;) but the new one was confirmed by the precious blood of the Son of God, (Heb. ix, 14,) which is likewise on this account called "the blood of the New Testament." (Matt.

xxvi, 28.) (6.) They differ in the place of their promulgation. For the Old Covenant was promulgated from Mount Sinai; (Exod. xix, 18;) But the New one "went forth out of Zion and from Jerusalem." (Isa. ii, 3; Micah iv, 2.) This difference is likewise pointed out in the plainest manner by the Apostle Paul. (Gal. iv, 24-31; Heb. xii, 18-21.)

VIII. (7.) The seventh difference shall be taken from the subject, both those to whom each was given, and on whom each was inscribed. The old law was given to the "old man." The New Testament was instituted for "the new man." From this circumstance, St. Augustine supposes that these two Testaments have obtained the appellation of

"the Old" and of "the New Testament." The old law was inscribed on "tables of stone"

(Exod. xxx, 1, 18.) But the gospel is "written in fleshly tables" (Jer. xxxi, 33; 2 Cor.

iii, 3.) (8.) The eighth difference is in their adjuncts: and this in two ways: (i.) The old law was "weak and beggarly," and incapable of giving life. (Gal. iv, 9; iii, 21.) But the gospel contains the unsearchable riches of Christ," (Ephes. iii, 8,) and "is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth." (Rom. i, 16.) (ii.) The old law was an insupportable burden, which "neither the Jews nor their fathers were able to bear."

(Acts xv, 10.) But the gospel contains "the yoke" of Jesus Christ, which is "easy," and

"his burden," which is "light" (Matt. xi, 29, 30.) IX. (9.) The ninth difference shall be taken from the versity of their effects. For the Old Testament is "the letter which killeth,"the administration of death and of condemnation." But the New Testament is "the Spirit that giveth life,"the ministration of the Spirit of righteousness, and of life" (2 Cor. iii, 6-11.) The Old Covenant resembled Agar, and "gendered to bondage;" the New like Sarah, begets unto liberty.

(Gal. iv, 23, 24.) "The law entered, that the offense might abound," (Rom. v, 20,) and it "worketh wrath" (iv, 15.) But "the blood of the New Testament," exhibited in the gospel, (Matt. xxvi, 28,) expiates sin, (Heb. ix, 14, 15,) and "speaketh better things than that of Abel" (12, 24.) The Old Testament is the bond on which sins are written: (Col. ii, 14) but the gospel is the proclamation of liberty, and the doctrine of the cross, to which was nailed the bond, or "hand-writing against us," and was by this very act,

"taken out of the way." (10.) The tenth difference shall be placed in the time, both of the promulgation of each, and of their duration. The Old Testament was promulgated when God brought the children of Israel out of Egypt. (Jer. xxxi, 32.) But the New, at a later age, and in these last times. (Heb. viii, 8, 9.) It was designed that the Old Testament should endure down to the advent of Christ, and afterwards be abolished.

(Gal. iii, 19; Heb. vii, 18; 2 Cor. iii, 10.) But the New Testament continueth forever, being confirmed by the blood of the great High Priest, "who was made a priest after the power of an endless life" by the word of an oath, (Heb. vii, 16-20,) and "through the eternal Spirit, offered himself to God." (ix, 14.) From this last difference, it is probable, the appellations of "the Old Testament" and "the New," derived their origin.

THE SAINTS UNDER THE OLD TESTAMENT

X. But, lest any one should suppose that the Fathers who lived under the law and the Old Testament, were entirely destitute of grace, faith and eternal life; it is to be recollected that even at that period, the promise was in existence which had been made to Adam concerning "the Seed of the woman," (Gen. iii, 15,) which also concerned the seed of Abraham, to whom "the promises were made," (Gal. iii, 16,) and in whom "all the kindreds of the earth were to be blessed;" (Acts iii, 25;) and that these promises were received in faith by the holy fathers. As this promise is comprehended by divines under the name of "the Old Testament," taken in a wide acceptation, and is called by the apostle, diaqhkh "the covenant," (Gal. iii, 17,) as well as, in the plural, "the covenants of promise;" (Ephes. ii, 12;) let us also consider how far "this covenant of promise," and the New Testament, and the gospel so called, by way of excellence, as being the completion of the promises, (Gal. iii, 16, 17,) and as being the promise," (Heb. ix, 15,) agree with and differ from each other.

XI. We place the Agreement in those things which concern the substance of each. For, (1.) With regard to the Efficient Cause, both of them were confirmed through the mere grace and mercy of God who had respect unto Christ. (2.) The matter of each was one and the same: that is, "the obedience of faith" was required in both, (Gen. xv, 6; Rom. 4; Heb. 11,) and the inheritance of eternal life was promised through the imputation of the righteousness of faith, and through gracious adoption in Christ.

(Rom. ix, 4; Heb. xi, 8.) (3.) One object, that is Christ, who was promised to the fathers in the prophetical scriptures, and whom God has exhibited in the Gospel. (Acts iii, 19, 20; xiii, 32.) (4.) One end, the praise of the glorious Grace of God in Christ.

(Rom. iv, 2, 3.) (5.) Both these covenants were entered into with men invested in the same formal relation, that is, with men as sinners, and to those "who work not, but who believe on Him that justifies the ungodly." (Rom. ix, 8, xi, 30-33.) (6.) Both of them have the same Spirit witnessing, or sealing the truth of each in the minds of those who are parties to the covenant. (2 Cor. iv, 13.) For since "the adoption" and

"the inheritance" pertain likewise to the fathers in the Old Testament, (Rom. ix, 4; Gal. iii, 18,) "the Spirit of adoption," who is "the earnest of the inheritance," cannot be denied to them. (Rom. viii, 15; Ephes. i, 14) (7.) They agree in their effects. For both the covenants beget children to liberty: "In Isaac shall thy seed be called." (Rom. ix, 7.) "So then, brethren, we are not the children of the bondwoman, but of the free; and are, as Isaac was, the children of promise." (Gal. iv, 31, 28.) Both of them administer the righteousness of faith, and the inheritance through it. (Rom. iv, 13.) Both excite spiritual joy in the hearts of believers. (John viii, 56; Luke ii, 10.) (8.) Lastly, they agree in this particular -- that both of them were confirmed by the oath of God.

Neither of them, therefore, was to be abolished, but the former was to be fulfilled by the latter. (Heb. vi, 13, 14, 17; vii, 20, 21.)

XII. But there is a Difference in some accidental circumstances which derogate nothing from their substantial unity. (1.) Respecting the accident of their object: For when the advent of Christ drew near, He was offered by promise. (Mal. iii, 1.) But He is now manifested in the Gospel. (1 John i, 1, 2; iv, 14) (2.) Hence also arises the second difference, respecting the accident of the faith required on their object. For as present and past things are more clearly known than future things, so the faith in Christ to come was more obscure, than the faith which beholds a present Christ. (Heb.

xi, 13; Num. xiv, 17.) (3.) To these let the third difference be added -- that Christ with his benefits was formerly proposed to the Israelites under types and shadows: (Heb.

12; Gal. iii, 16) But He is now offered in the Gospel "to be beheld with open face,"

and the reality of the things themselves and "the body" are exhibited. (2 Cor. iii, 18; John i, 17; Col. ii, 17; Gal. iii, 13, 25.) (4.) This diversity of administrations displays the fourth difference in the heir himself. For the apostle compares the children of Israel to the heir, who is "a child," and who required the superintendance of "tutors and governors:" but he compares believers under the New Testament to an adult heir.

(Gal. iv, 1-5.) (5.) Hence is deduced a fifth difference-that the infant heir, as "differing nothing from a servant" was held in bondage under the economy of the ceremonial law; from which servitude are liberated those persons who have believed in Christ after the expiration of "the time of tutelage before appointed of the Father." (6.) To this condition the Spirit of the infant heir is also accommodated, and will afford us the sixth difference that the heir was in truth under the influence of "the Spirit of adoption," but, because he was then only an infant, this Spirit was intermixed with that of fear; but the adult heir is under the complete influence of "the Spirit of adoption," to the entire exclusion of that of fear. (Rom. viii, 15; Gal. iv, 6.) (7.) The seventh difference consists in the number of those who are called to the communion of each of these covenants. The promise was confined within the boundaries of "the commonwealth of Israel," from which the Gentiles were "aliens," being also

"strangers from the covenants of promise." (Ephes. ii, 11-13, 17.) But the Gospel is announced to every creature that is under heaven, and the mound of separation is completely removed. (Matt. xxviii, 19; Mark xvi, 15; Col. i, 13.) XIII. But these three, the Law, the Promise, and the Gospel, may become subjects of consideration in another order, either as opposed among themselves, or as subordinate to each other. The condition of the law, therefore, as it was delivered to Adam, excludes the necessity of making the promise and announcing the Gospel; and, on the other hand, the necessity of making the promise and announcing the Gospel, declares, that man has not obeyed the law which was given to him. For justification cannot be at once both "of grace" and "of debt;" nor can it, at the same time, admit and exclude

"boasting." (Gal. ii, 17; Rom. iv, 4, 5; iii, 27.) It was also proper that the promise should precede the Gospel, and should in return be fulfilled by the Gospel: for, as it was not befitting that such a great blessing should be bestowed unless it were ardently desired, so it was improper that the desire of the earnest expectants should be frustrated. (1 Pet. i, 10-12; Hag. ii, 7; Mal. iii, 1.) Nor was it less equitable, that, after the promise had been made, the law should be economically repeated, by which might be rendered apparent the necessity of the grace of the promise, (Gal. iii, 19-24; Acts xiii, 38, 39,) and that, being convinced of this necessity, they might be compelled to flee to its shelter. (Gal. ii, 15, 16.) The use of the law was also serviceable to the Gospel which was to be received by faith. (Col. ii, 14, 17.) While the promise was in existence, it was also the will of God to add other precepts, and especially such as were ceremonial, by which sin might be ["sealed home,"] or testified against, and a previous intimation might be given of the completion of the promise. And when the promise was fulfilled, it was the will of God that these additional precepts should be abrogated, as having completed their functions. (Heb. x, 9, 10.) Lastly, the moral law ought to serve both to the promise and to the Gospel, which have now been received by faith, as a rule according to which believers ought to conform their lives. (Psalm cxix, 105; Tit. iii, 8.) But may God grant, that from his word we may be enabled still more clearly to understand this glorious economy of his, to his glory, and for gathering together in Christ!"

DISPUTATION 14

ON THE OFFICES OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST

RESPONDENT: PETER FAVERIUS

I. Since all offices are instituted and imposed for the sake of a certain end, and on this account bear some resemblance to means for obtaining that end; the most convenient method of treating on the offices of Christ will be for us to enter into an examination of this subject according to the acceptation of the name by which He is denominated.

For he is called Jesus Christ, in words which belong to a person according to the signification conveyed by them, as well as by way of excellence. In the first of those words is comprehended the relation of the end of his offices; and, in the second, that of the duties which conduce to such end.

II. The word "Jesus" signifies the saviour, who is called Swthr by the Greeks. But "to save" is to render a man secure from evils, either by taking care that they do not assail him, or, if they have attacked him, by removing them, and of consequence by conferring the opposite blessings. But among the evils, two are of the very worst description: they are sin, and its wages, eternal death. Among the blessings also, two are of the greatest importance, righteousness and eternal life. He, therefore, is a saviour in an eminent degree who liberates men from sin and death eternal, the two greatest evils with which they are now surrounded and oppressed; and who confers upon them righteousness and life. On account of this method of saving, the name Jesus agrees well with this our saviour, according to the interpretation of it, which the angel gave in Matt. i, 21. For such a method of salvation was highly befitting the excellence of this exalted person, who is the proper, natural and only-begotten Son of God; especially when other salvations were capable of being accomplished by his servants, Moses, Joshua, Othniel, Gideon, Jephtha and David.

III. The word "Christ," denotes an anointed person, who is called h y m "the Messiah," by the Hebrews. Under the Old Testament, oil was anciently used in anointing; because, according to its natural efficacy, it rendered bodies not only fragrant but agile, and was therefore well fitted for typifying two supernatural things.

The First is, the sanctification and consecration of a person to undertake and discharge some divine office. The Second is, adoption, or the conferring of gifts necessary for that purpose. But each of these acts belongs properly and per se to the Holy Spirit, the author and donor of Holiness and of all endowments. (Isa. xi, 2.) Wherefore it was proper, that he who was eminently styled "the Messiah, should be anointed with the Holy Spirit, indeed "above all his fellows," (or those who were partakers of the same blessings,) (Psalm xlv, 7,) that is, that He might be made the Holy of holies, and might be endued not only with some gifts of the Holy Spirit, but with the whole of the Holy Spirit without measure. (John 3, xxxiv, ;1, 14.) But when he is called "the saviour" by anointing, it appears to us that he must for this reason be here considered as a Mediatorial saviour, who has been constituted by God the Father, and [as Mediator] is subordinate to Him. He is therefore the nearer to us, not only according to the nature of his humanity, of which we have already treated, but also according to the mode of saving, which reflection conduces greatly to confirm us in faith and hope against temptations.

IV. Two distinct and subordinate acts appertain to the salvation which is signified by the name Jesus; and they are not only necessarily required for it, but also suffciently embrace its entire power. The First is, the asking and obtaining of redemption from sin and death eternal, and of righteousness and life. The Second is, the communication or distribution of the salvation thus obtained. According to the former of these acts, Christ is called "our saviour by merit;" according to the latter he is called "our saviour by efficacy." According to the first, he is constituted the Mediator "for men, in those things which pertain to God." (Heb. v, 1.) According to the second, he is appointed the Mediator or vicegerent of God, in those things which are to be transacted with men. From this it is apparent, that two offices are necessary for effecting salvation-the priestly and the regal; the former office being designed for the acquisition of salvation, and the latter for its communication: on which account this saviour is both a royal priest and a priestly king, our Melchisedec, that is, "king of Salem, which is king of peace and priest of the Most High God." (Heb. vii, 2.) His people also are a royal priesthood and a sacerdotal kingdom or nation. (1 Pet. ii, 5, 9.) V. But since it has seemed good to the wise and just God, to save none except believers; nor, in truth, is it right that any one should be made partaker of the salvation procured by the priesthood of Christ, and dispensed by His kingly office, except the man who acknowledges Him for his priest and king; and since the knowledge of Christ, and faith in him, are produced in the hearts of men by the power of the Holy Ghost, through the preaching of the word as the means appointed by God; for these reasons the prophetical office is likewise necessary for effecting salvation, and a perfect saviour must be a prophet, priest and king, that is, by every reason according to which this ample title can be deservedly attributed to any one. We nave Jesus therefore, that is, the saviour, by a most excellent and perfect notion called Christ, because he has been anointed by God as a prophet, priest and king. (Matt. xvii, 5; Psalm cx, 4; 2, 6; John xviii, 37.) On each of these four offices we shall treat in order, and shew, (1.) That all and each of these offices belong to our Christ. (2.) The quality of these offices. (3.) The functions pertaining to each of them. (4.) The events or consequences.

VI. The Messiah was the future prophet promised to the fathers under the Old Testament. Moses said, "The Lord thy God will raise up unto you a prophet like unto me; unto him shall ye hearken." (Deut. xviii, 15.) Isaiah also says "I will give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles, to open the blind eyes," &c. (xlii, 6.) "Jehovah hath called me from the womb, and he hath made my mouth like a sharp sword," &c. (xlix, 1, 2.) The attestation, by anointing, of his call to the prophetical office, was likewise predicted: "The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me; because the Lord hath anointed me to preach good tidings," &c. (xli, 1.) So was his being furnished with the necessary gifts when he was thus called and sealed: "The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the Spirit of wisdom and understanding," &c. (xi, 2.) Lastly, Divine assistance was promised: "In the shadow of his hand hath He hid me, and made me a polished shaft; in his quiver hath he hid me." (xlix, 2.) And this thing was publicly know, not only to the Jews, but likewise to the Samaritans, as is apparent from what the woman of Samaria said, "When Messias is come, He will tell us all things." (John iv, 25.) But our Jesus himself testifies, that these predictions were fulfilled in him, and that he was the prophet sent into the world from God. After having read a passage out of Isaiah's prophecy, he spake thus, "This day is this Scripture fulfilled in your ears." (Luke iv, 21.) "To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth." (John xviii, 37.) God himself also bore his testimony from heaven, when he "opened the heavens unto Christ" immediately after he had been baptized by John, sent down upon Him the Holy Spirit, and in inaugural strains of the highest commendation seemed to consecrate him to this office. (Matt. iii, 16.)

VII. In the Quality of the prophetic office, we take into our consideration the excellence not only of the vocation, instruction and divine assistance afforded, but likewise that of the doctrine proposed by Him, according to each of which it far exceeds the entire dignity of all the prophets. (Luke 4.) For God's approval of his mission was expressed by three peculiar signs. the opening of the heavens, the descent of the Holy Ghost in a bodily shape upon Him, and the voice of his Father conveyed to him. The instruction, or furnishing, by which He learned what things he ought to teach, was not "by dreams and visions," nor by inward or outward discourse with an angel, neither was it by a communication of "mouth to mouth," which yet [in the case of Moses] was without the actual sight of the glory and the face of God; (Num. 12;) but it was by the clear vision of God and by an intimate intuition into the secrets of the Father: "For the only- begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, hath declared him to us;" (John i, 18;) "He that cometh from heaven testified what he hath seen and heard." (iii, 32.) The aid of the Holy Spirit to Him, was so ready and every moment intimately near, that He, like one who was lord by possession and use, employed the Holy Spirit at pleasure, and as frequently as it seemed good to himself.

But the excellence of the doctrine lies in this, that it did not announce the law, neither as being the power of God unto salvation "to him who worked and that of debt,"

(Rom. iv, 4,) nor as being the seal of sin and of condemnation; (Col. ii, 14;) neither did it announce the promise, by which righteousness and salvation were promised OF

GRACE to him that believed; (Gal. iii, 17- 19;) but it announced the Gospel, according to this expression, "He hath sent me to preach good tidings to the meek,"

(Isa. lxi, 1,) or, "the gospel to the poor;" (Matt. xi, 5;) because it exhibited GRACE

and TRUTH, as it contained "the end of the law," and the accomplishment of the promise. (Rom. x, 4; i, 1, 2.)

VIII. The Functions which appertain to the prophetic office of Christ, are, the proposing of his doctrine, its confirmation and prayers for its felicitous success; all of which were executed by Christ in a manner which evinced the utmost power and fidelity. (1.) He proposed his doctrine, with the greatest wisdom, which his adversaries could not resist; with the most ardent zeal for the glory of God his Father, and for the salvation of men; without respect of persons; and with an authority which was never exercised by other teachers, not even by the prophets. (2.) His confirmation was added to the doctrine, not only by the Scriptures of the Old Testament, but likewise by signs of every kind by which it is possible to establish the divinity of any doctrine. (i.) By the declaration of the knowledge which is peculiar to God, such as the inspection of the heart, the revelation of the secrets of others, and the prediction of future events. (ii.) By a power which belongs to God alone, and which was demonstrated "in signs and wonders, and mighty deeds." (iii.) By the deepest patience, by which He willingly suffered the death of the cross for the truth of God, that he might confirm the promises made to the fathers, "having witnessed before Pontius Pilate a good confession." (3.) Lastly. He employed very frequent and earnest prayers, with the most devout thanksgiving; on which account he often retired into solitary places, which he spent whole nights in prayer.

IX. The Issue or consequence of the prophetic office of Christ, so far as he executed it in his own person while he remained on earth, was not only the instruction of a few persons, but likewise the rejection [of Himself and his doctrine] by great numbers, and even by their rulers. The former of these consequences occurred according to the nature and merit of the doctrine itself. The latter, accidentally and by the malice of men. Christ himself mentions both of these issues in Isaiah's prophecy, when he says, not without complaining, "Behold, I and the children whom the Lord hath given me, are for signs and for wonders in Israel from the Lord of hosts." (viii, 18.) "I have laboured in vain, I have spent my strength for naught and in vain." (xlix, 4.) But because this repulse of Christ's doctrine could not occur without proving a stumbling block to the weak, it was the good pleasure of God to obviate it in a manner at once the wisest and the most powerful, (i.) By a prophecy which foretold that this rejection would actually take place: "The stone which the builders refused, is becoming the head-stone of the corner:" (Psalm cxviii, 22.) (ii.) And by the fulfillment of that prediction, which was completed by the resurrection of Christ from the dead, and by his being placed at the right hand of God; by which Christ became the head and foundation of the angle, or corner, uniting the two walls, that of the Jews and that of the Gentiles, in accordance with these words of the prophet Isaiah, "It is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant, to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I have also given thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth." (xlix, 6.) These words contain an intimation of the fruit of Christ's prophesying as administered by his ambassadors.

X. Topics, similar to the preceding, come under our consideration in the Priestly Office of Christ. (1.) The Messiah, promised of old, was to be a Priest, and Jesus of Nazareth was a Priest. This is proved (i.) by express passages from the Scriptures of the Old Testament; and which attribute to the Messiah the Name of "Priest," and the Thing signified by the name. With regard to the Name: "Thou an a Priest for ever after the order of Melchizedec." (Psalm cx, 4.) With regard to the Thing signified,

"Surely He hath borne our griefs: He was wounded for our transgressions: And the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all. When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, He shall see his seed, &c. He bore the sins of many, and made intercession for the transgressor" (Isa. liii, 4-6, 10-12; Rom. iv, 15.) (2.) By arguments taken from a comparison of the dignity of his person and priesthood. For the Messiah is the first-begotten Son of God, the principal dignity of the priesthood, and governor over the house of his Father. (Psalm ii, 7; lxxxix, 27; Gen. xlix, 3.) Therefore, to Him appertains the excellence of administering the priesthood in the house of God, which is Heaven. (Heb. iii, 6; x, 21.) For that is properly typified by a temple, the place of the priesthood; and principally by the innermost part of it, which is called "the holy of holies." (ix, 24.) Also, by arguments deduced from the nature of the people over whom He is placed. This people is "a kingdom of priests" (Exod. xix, 6,) and "a royal priesthood" (1 Pet. ii, 9.) But the Christian Faith holds it, an indisputable axiom, that

"Jesus of Nazareth is a priest," by the most explicit Scriptures of the New Testament, in which the title and all things pertaining to the sacerdotal office are attributed to him. (Heb. ii, 5.) For the Father conferred that honour upon Him, sanctified and consecrated Him; (ii, 10;) and "He was made perfect through sufferings," "that He might be a merciful and faithful High Priest, and be able to sympathize with, or to succour them that are tempted." (ii, 18.) The Father also "opened his ears," (Psalm xl, 6,) or "prepared a body for Him," (Heb. x, 5,) "that He might have somewhat also to offer," (viii, 3,) and hath placed Him, after his resurrection from the dead, at his own right hand in heaven, that He may there perpetually "make intercession for us." (Rom.

viii, 34.)

XI. But the Scriptures of the Old Testament speak of the Nature and Quality peculiar to Messiah the Priest, and assert that his priesthood is not according to the order of Levi. (Psalm cx, 4; Heb. v, 5, 6.) For David speaks thus, in the person of the Messiah,

"Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire. Mine ears thou hast opened. Burnt-offering and sin- offering hast thou not required. Then said I, Lo, I come. In the volume of the book it is written of me, to do thy will, O my God! Yea, I have willed; and thy law is within my heart." (Psalm xl, 6-8.) That is, "Thou hadst no pleasure in the sacrifices which are offered by the law" according to the Levitical ritual. (Heb. x, 6-9.) They also assert, that "He is a Priest for ever after the order of Melchizedec."

(Psalm cx, 4.) But the entire nature of that priesthood is more distinctly explained in the New Testament, especially in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the excellence and superiority of the Messiah's priesthood above the Levitical having been previously established. (Heb. x, 5.) This pre-eminence is shewn by the contrast between them.

(1.) The Levitical priesthood was typical and shadowy; but that of the Messiah is real and true, and contains the very body and express pattern of the things. (2.) In the Levitical priesthood, the Priest and the victim differed in the subject. For the Priest after the order of Levi offered the sacrifices of other men. But the Messiah is both the Priest and the victim. For "He offered himself," (Heb. ix, 14,) and "by his own blood has entered into heaven," (ix, 12,) and all this as it is an expiatory priesthood. But as it is eucharistical, (for it embraces the entire amplitude of the priesthood,) the Messiah offers sacrifices which are distinguished by him according to the person; yet they are such as, being born again of his Spirit from above, are flesh of his flesh and bone of his bones. (x, 14; ix, 26; Ephes. v, 30; 1 Pet. ii, 5.) (3.) They differ in the mode of their institution and confirmation. The Levitical priesthood was "instituted after the law of a carnal commandment;" but that of the Messiah, after the law of a spiritual commandment, and "the power of an endless life." (Heb. vii, 16.) The Levitical was instituted "without an oath;" but Christ's "with an oath," by which it was corroborated beyond the other. (vii, 20, 21, 28.) (4.) The fourth difference is in the time of their institution. The Levitical priesthood was instituted first; that of Christ, afterwards. The first, in the times of the Old Testament: the other, in those of the New. The former, when the church was in its infancy; the latter, when it had arrived at maturity. The former, in the time of slavery; the latter, in that of liberty.

XII. (5.) The fifth distinction lies in the persons discharging the functions of the priesthood. In the former, the Priests were of the tribe of Levi, "men who had infirmities," who were mortal and sinful, and who, therefore, accounted it "needful to offer up sacrifice for their own sins and for the people's." (Heb. vii, 28; v, 3.) But the Messiah was of the tribe of Judah, (vii, 14,) weak indeed "in the days of his flesh," (5, 7,) but now when raised immortal from the dead and endued with "the power of an endless life," He is "holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners, and therefore needeth not to offer up sacrifice for himself." (7, 26, 27) (6.) We may denote a sixth difference in the end of the institution. The Levitical priesthood was instituted to ratify the old covenant; but that of the Messiah, for confirming the New. He is on this account called both "the Mediator of the New Testament," (ix, 15,) and "the surety of a better covenant, which was established upon better promises." (viii, 6.) (7.) They differ in their efficacy. For the Levitical is useless and inefficacious, "not being able to take away sins, (x, 11,) (for they remained under the old covenant,) nor could it sanctify or perfect the worshippers in their consciences, for "it sanctifieth only to the purifying of the flesh." (ix, 9, 10, 13.) But the priesthood of the Messiah is efficacious. For He hath destroyed sin and obtained eternal redemption, (ix, 12, 14.) He consecrates priests and sanctifies the worshipers in their consciences, and "saves them to the uttermost that come to God by Him." (vii, 25.) (8.) With the Apostle we place the eighth difference in the duration of each. It was necessary that the Levitical priesthood should be abrogated, and it was accordingly abrogated; (viii, 13;) but that of the Messiah endures for ever. For this difference between them we have as many reasons as for the differences which we have already enumerated.

XIII. (9.) The ninth quality by which the Messiah's priesthood is distinguished from the Levitical, is this, "Now once in the end of the world, the Messiah hath appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself; (Heb. vii, 26;) and thus "by one offering hath He perfected for ever them that are sanctified." (x, 14.) But the Priests after the order of Levi "offered oftentimes the same sacrifices, "through each succeeding day, and month, and year. (x, 11; ix, 25.) (10.) The tenth property of the Messiah's priesthood is that of its nature. It does not pass from one person to another. For the Messiah has neither a predecessor nor a successor. (vii, 24, 25, 3.) But the Levitical priesthood was transmitted down from father to son. (11.) To this we add the eleventh difference, the Messiah was the only person of his order. For Melchizadeck was a type of Him, "like unto Him," but by no means equal with Him. (vii, 3.) But the Levitical Priests "truly were many, because they were not suffered to continue by reason of death;" (vii, 23;) and among them, some were of superior, some of inferior, and others of equal dignity.

(12.) We deduce the twelfth and last distinction from the place in which each of them was administered. For the Levitical priesthood was administered on earth, and in fact in a certain spot peculiarly assigned to it; but though that of the Messiah commenced on earth, yet it consummated in heaven. (ix, 24.)

XIV. The Actions which appertain to the priestly office of Christ, are those of oblation and intercession, according to the following passages: "Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins: (Heb. v, 1.) And "He ever liveth to make intercession for them." (1.) Of the Messiah's Oblation two acts are described to us: the first of which is performed on earth; the delivering of his own body unto death, and the shedding of his blood. By this act He was consecrated or perfected, and opened heaven to himself: (ix, 12; x, 29, 10; ix, 24 -- xxvi, ) For it was a part of his office to enter into heaven by his own blood, and "through the veil, which is his flesh," (x, 22,) flesh indeed, destitute of blood, that is, destitute of life, and delivered up to death "for the life of the world," (John vi, 51,) although it was afterwards raised up again from death to life. The second act is, the presenting of himself, thus sprinkled with his own blood, before the face of his Father in heaven; and the offering of the same blood. To which we must add, the sprinkling of this blood on the consciences of believers, that they, "being purged from dead works, might serve the living God." (ix, 14.) (2.) Intercession is the second act of the priesthood of Christ, which also contains the prayer of Christ for us, and his advocacy or defense of us against the accusation with which we are charged by the grand adversary. (vii, 25; Rom. viii, 34; 1 John ii, 1, 2.) Because the force of this intercession is partly placed in the blood by which, not only Christ himself, but also our consciences, are sprinkled; the blood of Christ is said "to speak better things than that of Abel," (Heb. xii, 24,) which cried unto God for vengeance against the fratricide.

XV. The fourth part of the priesthood of Christ lies in the Results or Consequences.

That the sacerdotal office concurs to the general effect of salvation, is apparent from this -- that He is called Christ by consecration, which was effected "through sufferings," through which He is said "to have been made perfect," (Heb. ii, 10,) and thus to have "become the author of eternal salvation," (v, 9, 10,) being denominated

"an High Priest forever after the order of Melchisedec."But Christ, because he continueth ever, hath an unchangeable priesthood: wherefore he is able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by Him." (vii, 24, 25.) But the particular results which flow from the sacerdotal functions, when considered according to the two-fold act of oblation and intercession, are chiefly these: From Oblation, accrue the reconciling of us unto God the Father, (2 Cor. v, 19,) the obtaining of the remission of sins, (Rom. iii, 24-25,) of eternal redemption, (Heb. ix, 12,) and of the Spirit of grace, (Zech. xii, 10,) the laying open of the vein for the expiation of sin, and the disclosing of the fountain for sprinkling, (Zech. xiii, 1,) the removal of the curse, (Gal. iii, 13,) and the acquisition of everlasting righteousness and of life eternal, (Dan. ix, 24,) as well as a supreme power over all things in heaven and earth, (Phil. ii, 6-10,) for his church, to whom all these blessings are communicated: (Acts xx, 28) And, to sum up all in one expression, the procuring of the entire right to eternal life, and to all things whatsoever that are necessary either for its being given, or for its reception.

Intercession obtains, that we, being reconciled to God, are saved from future wrath.

(Rom. v, 9.) Christ as our intercessor offers to God, perfumed with the fragrant odour of his own sacrifice, the prayers and thanksgivings, and thus the whole rational worship which justified persons perform to God; (1 Pet. i, 5;) and he receives and turns aside the darts of accusation which Satan hurls against believers. (Rom. viii, 34.) All these blessings really flow from the sacerdotal functions of Christ; because he hath offered to God the true price of redemption for us, by which He has satisfied Divine justice, and interposed himself between us and the Father, who was justly angry on account of our sins; and has rendered Him placable to us. (1 Tim. ii, 6; Matt.

xx, 28.) But the results per accidens is a greater pollution and the demerits of "a much sorer punishment" from having "trodden under foot the Son of God, and counted the blood of the covenant an unholy thing." (Heb. x, 29.) XVI. Nor is it at all repugnant to the merits and satisfaction of Christ, which belong to him as a priest and a victim, that God is himself said to have "loved the world and given his only begotten Son," (John iii, 16,) to have delivered him unto death, (Rom.

iv, 25,) to have reconciled the world unto himself in Christ, (2 Cor. v, 19,) to have redeemed us, (Luke i, 68,) and to have freely forgiven us our sins. (Rom. iii, 25.) For we must consider the affection of love to be two-fold in God. The first is a love for the creature -- The other, a love for justice, united to which is a hatred against sin. It was the will of God that each of these kinds of love should be satisfied. He gave satisfaction to his love for the creature who was a sinner, when he gave up his Son who might act the part of Mediator. But he rendered satisfaction to his love for justice and to his hatred against sin, when he imposed on his Son the office of Mediator by the shedding of his blood and by the suffering of death; (Heb. ii, 10; v, 8, 9;) and he was unwilling to admit him as the Intercessor for sinners except when sprinkled with his own blood, in which he might be made the propitiation for sins. (ix, 12.) Again, he satisfies his love for the creature when he pardons sins, and that freely, because he pardons them through his love for the Creature; although by inflicting stripes upon his Son, in which he was "our peace," he had already rendered satisfaction to his love for justice. For it was not the effect of those stripes that God might love his creature, but that, while love for justice presented no hindrance, through his love for the creature he could remit sins and bestow life eternal. In this respect also it may with propriety be said that God rendered satisfaction to himself, and appeased himself in the Son of his love."

XVII. It remains for us to discuss the Kingly Office of Christ. We must first consider, that the Messiah, according to the promise, was to be a King, and that Jesus of Nazareth is a King: "I will raise unto David a righteous branch, and a King shall reign and prosper." (Jer. xxiii, 5.) "David my servant, shall be king over them." (Ezek.

xxxvii, 24.) But he was constituted king by unction: "Yet have I anointed my King upon my holy hill of Zion." (Psalm ii, 6.) On this account, the title of "the Messiah"

belongs to him for a certain peculiar reason. Nor should He be merely a King, but the most eminent and famous among kings: "Thy God hath anointed thee with the oil of joy above thy fellows." (Psalm xlv, 7.) "I will make him my First-born, higher than the kings of the earth." (lxxxix, 27.) Nay, he is the Lord and Master of all kings: therefore, O ye kings and judges of the earth, kiss the Son." (ii, 12.) "All kings shall fall down before Him." (lxxii, 11.) He was also to be instructed in all things necessary for the administration of his kingdom: "Give the King thy judgments, O God!" (lxxii, 1.) "The Lord shall send the rod of thy strength out of Zion." (cx, 2.) "Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron" (ii, 9.) "The Spirit of Jehovah shall rest upon him."

(Isa. xi, 2.) God will likewise perpetually stand near Him: "With him shall my hand be established, mine arm also shall strengthen him." (Psalm lxxxix, 21.) But God hath made Jesus of Nazareth Lord and Christ, (Matt. ii, 2, 6,) "King of kings, and Lord of lords," (Rev. xvii, 14,) "all power being given unto Him in heaven and in earth,"

(Matt. xxviii, 19; Acts ii, 33,) and "authority over all flesh," (John xvii, 2,) that "unto Him every knee may bow." God also furnished or supplied Him with his Word and Spirit, as necessary means for the administration of his kingdom. He hath made angels also his servants to execute his commands. (Heb. i, 6, 14.) He stands constantly nigh to Him, "being placed at his right hand till he has made his enemies his footstool." (1

Cor. xv, ,5; Psalm cx, 1.)

XVIII. We say, in one expression, concerning the Quality of the Messiah's kingdom, that it is a spiritual kingdom, not of this world, but of that which is to come, not earthly, but heavenly. For it was predicted, that such would be the kingdom of the Messiah; and such also, we assert, is the kingdom of Jesus of Nazareth. We prove the First, (1.) Because David and Solomon, and the reign of each, were types of the Messiah and his kingdom; for the Messiah is called David; (Ezek. xxxvii, 25;) and all the things spoken about Solomon which are high and excellent, belong with far more justness to the Messiah, and some of them to him alone. (2 Sam. vii, 12-16.) But earthly and carnal things are types of spiritual and heavenly things, not being homogeneous with them. (Psalm 1, 2.) (2.) It was predicted of the Messiah, that he should die and rise again, (Psalm xvi, 10,) that "he should see his seed," (Isa. liii, 10,) and that he should rise again into a spiritual life. (Psalm cx, 3.) Therefore, that he should be a spiritual King, and that his kingdom also should be spiritual. (Psalm lxxxix, 5-8; xcvi, 6-9.) (3.) It was predicted that the priesthood of the Messiah should be spiritual, a real priesthood, and not a typical one. Therefore, his kingdom also is of the same description; for there is a mutual analogy between them, according to that expression -" Ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests," &c. (Exod. xix, 6.) (4.) Because the law of Moses was to be abrogated on account of its being carnal. But the administration of the priesthood and of the kingdom of Israel was conducted according to that law. Therefore the kingdom of the Messiah ought to be administered according to another law, which was more excellent, and therefore spiritual. (Jer.

xxxi, 31-34.) But such as was the law, such were the King and his kingdom. (5.) Because the gentiles were to be called to a participation of the kingdom of the Messiah, and all of them were to be added to it with their kings, who should still continue as kings, and yet voluntarily serve the Messiah, (Psalm ii, 10, 11; cx, 3,) who should glory in him, and in him place all their blessedness. Nothing of this kind can be done, unless the kingdom of the Messiah be spiritual. (6.) Because the Jews were to be rejected by the Messiah, for their rebellion, who was unwilling to have them for his people, not to the prejudice of the Messiah himself, but to the injury of the Jews alone. (Mal. i, 10, 11; Isa. lxv, 2, 3.) This is a strong indication of a King and of a kingdom that are spiritual. (7.) The same conclusion may be drawn from the excellence, amplitude, duration, and mode of administration, of the Messiah's kingdom. But the kingdom of Jesus of Nazareth is spiritual and heavenly. For he said,

"Repent, because the kingdom of heaven is at hand." (Matt. iv, 17.) "My kingdom is not of this world." (John xviii, 36.) This may also be shown in all those things which relate to that kingdom. For the King is no more known after the flesh, because he is become spiritual by his resurrection, and is "the Lord from heaven." (Rom. viii, 1

Corinthians 15.) His Subjects are those who are already born again, in their souls, of his Spirit, and who shall likewise hereafter be spiritual in their bodies, and conformed unto him. The Law of the kingdom is spiritual: for it is the gospel of God, and the prescription of a rational and spiritual worship. (Rom. xii, 8; John iv, 23, 24.) Its Blessings are likewise spiritual -- remission of sins, the Spirit of grace and life eternal.

The Mode of Administration, and all its Means, are spiritual; for though all temporal things are subjected to Christ, yet he administers them in such a way as he knows will be conducive to the life that is spiritual and supernatural.

XIX. The Acts which belong to the regal office of Christ are generally comprehended in vocation and judgment. If we be desirous to consider these two acts more distinctly, we may divide them into the four parts following: vocation, legislation, the communication of blessings and the removal of evils, and the final and universal judgment. (1.) Vocation is the first function by which Christ, the King, calls men out of a state of animal life and of sin, to the participation of the covenant of grace which he has confirmed by his own blood. For he did not find subjects in the nature of things; (Isa. lxiii, 10;) but as it was his office by the priesthood to acquire them for himself, so likewise as King, it is his province to call them to him by his word, and to draw them by his Spirit. (Psalm cx, 1-3; Ephes. iii, 17.) This vocation has two parts --a command to repent and believe, (Mark i, 14, 15,) and a promise, (Matt. xxviii, 19, 20,) to which is also subjoined a threatening. (Tit. iii, 8; Mark xvi, 16.) (2.) Legislation, which we consider in a distinct form, is the second function of the regal office of Christ, by which he fully prescribes, to those who have been previously called and drawn to a participation of the covenant of grace, a rule by which they may live godly, righteously and soberly, and to which are also annexed promises and threatenings. To this must be added the act of the Holy Spirit by which believers are rendered fit to perform their duty. (3.) The third act is the communication of blessings, whether they be necessary or conducible to this animal life or to that which is spiritual, and the removal of the opposite evils, not through strict justice, but according to a certain dispensation, which is suited to the period of the present life. It is according to this that God equally "sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust,"

(Matt. v, 45,) and his "judgment often begins at his own house." (1 Pet. iv, 17.) (4.) The fourth and last act is the final and universal judgment, by which Christ, having been appointed by God to be the judge of all men, will pronounce a sentence of justification on his elect, and will bestow on them everlasting life; but after the sentence of condemnation has been uttered against the reprobates, they will be tormented with everlasting punishments. (Matt. 25.)

XX. To these functions it is easy to subjoin their Results or Consequences, which exist from the functions themselves, according to their nature; and, at the same time, the Events which flow from the malice of men who reject Christ as their King.

Among the former are repentance, faith, and thus the church herself, and her association with Christ her head, obedience performed to Christ's commands, the participation of blessings which are bestowed on men in the course of the present life, immunity from evils, and lastly, life eternal. Among the latter, are blinding, hardening, the giving over to a reprobate mind, the delivering unto the power of Satan, the imputation of sin, the gnawings of conscience in this life, and the feeling endurance of many evils, and, lastly, eternal death itself. All these evils Christ inflicts as an omniscient, omnipotent, and inflexible judge, who loves goodness and hates sin, from whose eyes we cannot hide ourselves, whose power we cannot avoid, and whose strictness and rigor we are unable to bend. May God grant, through his Son, Jesus Christ, in the power and efficacy of the Holy Spirit, that these considerations may serve to beget within us a filial and serious fear of God and Christ our Judge. AMEN!

DISPUTATION 15

ON DIVINE PREDESTINATION

RESPONDENT: WILLIAM BASTINGIUS

I. We call this decree "Predestination," in Greek, Proorismon from the verb Proorizein which signifies determine, appoint, or decree any thing before you enter on its execution. According to this general notion, predestination, when attributed to God, will be his decree for the governance of all things, to which divines usually give the appellation of PROVIDENCE. (Acts ii, 28; xvii, 26.) It is customary to consider in a less general notion, so far as it has reference to rational creatures who are to be saved or damned, for instance, angels and men. It is taken in a stricter sense about the predestination of men, and then it is usually employed in two ways; for it is sometimes accommodated to both the elect and the reprobate. At other times, it is restricted to the elect alone, and then it has reprobation as its opposite. According to this last signification, in which it is almost constantly used in Scripture, (Rom. viii, 29,) we will treat on predestination.

II. Predestination, therefore, as it regards the thing itself, is the decree of the good pleasure of God in Christ, by which he resolved within himself from all eternity, to justify, adopt and endow with everlasting life, to the praise of his own glorious grace, believers on whom he had decreed to bestow faith. (Ephes. 1; Rom. 9.) III. The genus of predestination we lay down as a decree which is called in Scripture Proqesiv "the purpose of God," (Rom. ix, 11,) and Boulhn tou qelhmatov Qeou "the counsel of God's own will." (Ephes. i, 11.) And this decree is not legal, according to what is said, "The man who doeth those things shall live by them;" (Rom. x, 5;) but it is evangelical, and this is the language which it holds: "This is the will of God, that every one who seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life." (John vi, 40; Rom. x, 9.) This decree, therefore, is peremptory and irrevocable; because the final manifestation of "the whole counsel of God" concerning our salvation, is contained in the gospel. (Acts xx, 27; Heb. i, 2; ii, 2, 3.) IV. The Cause of this decree is God, "according to the good pleasure" or the benevolent affection "of his own will." (Ephes. i, 5.) And God indeed is the cause, as possessing the right of determining as he wills both about men as his creatures, and especially as sinners, and about his blessings, (Jer. xviii, 6; Matt. xx, 14, 15,)

"according to the good pleasure of his own will," by which, being moved with and in himself, he made that decree. This "good pleasure" not only excludes every cause which it could take from man, or which it could be imagined to take from him; but it likewise removes whatever was in or from man, that could justly move God not to make that gracious decree. (Rom. xi, 34, 35.)

V. As the foundation of this decree, we place Jesus Christ, the mediator between God and men, (Ephes. i, 4.) "in whom the Father is well pleased;" (Matt. iii, 17; Luke iii, 22;) "in whom God reconciled the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them" and "whom God made to be sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." (2 Cor. v, 19, 21.) Through Him "everlasting righteousness was to be brought in," (Dan. ix, 24,) adoption to be acquired, the spirit of grace and of faith was to be obtained, (Gal. iv, 5, 19, 6,) eternal life procured, (John vi, 51,) and all the plenitude of spiritual blessings prepared, the communication of which must be decreed by predestination. He is also constituted by God the Head of all those persons who will, by divine predestination, accept of the equal enjoyment of these blessings. (Ephes. i, 22; v, 23; Heb. v, 9.)

VI. We attribute Eternity to this decree; because God does nothing in time, which He has not decreed to do from all eternity. For "known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world:" (Acts xv, 18) and "He hath chosen us in Christ before the foundation of the world." (Ephes. i, 4.) If it were otherwise, God might be charged with mutability.

VII. We say that the object or matter of predestination is two-fold -- Divine things, and Persons to whom the communication of those Divine things has been predestinated by this decree. (1.) These Divine Things receive from the Apostle the general appellation of "spiritual blessings:" (Ephes. i, 3.) Such are, in the present life, justification, adoption as sons, (Rom. viii, 29, 30,) and the spirit of grace and adoption. (Ephes. i, 5; John i, 12; Gal. iv, 6, 7.) Lastly, after this life, eternal life.

(John iii, 15, 16.) The whole of these things are usually comprised and enunciated, in the Divinity schools, by the names of Grace and Glory. (2.) We circumscribe the Persons within the limits of the word "believers," which presupposes sin: for no one believes on Christ except a sinner, and the man who acknowledges himself to be that sinner. (Matt. ix, 13; xi, 28.) Therefore, the plenitude of those blessings, and the preparation of them which has been made in Christ, were necessary for none but sinners. But we give the name of "believers," not to those who would be such by their own merits or strength, but to those who by the gratuitous and peculiar kindness of God would believe in Christ. (Rom. ix, 32; Gal. ii, 20; Matt. xi, 25; xiii, 11; John vi, 44; Phil. i, 29.)

VIII. The form is the decreed communication itself of these blessings to believers, and in the mind of God the pre- existent and pre-ordained relation and ordination of believers to Christ their Head: the fruit of which they receive through a real and actual union with Christ their Head. In the present life, this fruit is gracious, through the commencement and increase of the union; and in the life to come, it is glorious, through the complete consummation of this union. (2 Tim. i, 9, 10; John i, 16, 17; xvii, 11, 12, 22-24; Ephes. iv, 13, 15.)

IX. The end of predestination is the praise of the glorious grace of God: for since grace, or the gratuitous love of God in Christ, is the cause of predestination, it is equitable that to the same grace the entire glory of this act should be ceded. (Ephes. i, 6; Rom. xi, 36.)

X. But this decree of predestination is "according to election," as the Apostle says: (Rom. ix, 6, xi, ) This election necessarily infers reprobation. Reprobation therefore is opposed to predestination, as its contrary; and is likewise called "a casting away,"

(Rom. ix, 1,) "an ordination to condemnation," (Jude 4,) and "an appointment unto wrath." (1 Thess. v, 9.)

XI. From the law of contraries, we define reprobation to be a decree of the wrath, or of the severe will, of God; by which he resolved from all eternity to condemn to eternal death unbelievers, who, by their own fault and the just judgment of God, would not believe, for the declaration of his wrath and power. (John iii, 18; Luke vii, 30; John xii, 37 40; 2 Thess. ii, 10, 11; Rom. ix, 22.)

XII. Though by faith in Jesus Christ the remission of all sins is obtained, and sins are not imputed to them who believe; (Rom. iv, 2-11;) yet the reprobate will be compelled to endure the punishment, not only of their unbelief, (by the contrary of which they might avoid the chastisement due to the rest of their sins,) but likewise of the sins which they have committed against the law, being "everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power." (John viii, 24; ix, 41; 2 Thess.

i, 9.)

XIII. To each of these decrees, that of predestination and that of reprobation, is subjoined its execution; the acts of which are performed in that order in which they have been appointed in and by the decree itself; and the objects both of the decree and of its execution are the same, and entirely uniform, or invested with the same formal relation. (Psalm cxv, 3; xxxiii, 9, 11.)

XIV. Great is the use of this doctrine, as thus delivered from the Scriptures. For it serves to establish the glory of the grace of God, to console afflicted consciences, to terrify the wicked and to drive away their security. (1.) But it establishes the grace of God, when it ascribes the whole praise of our vocation, justification, adoption, and glorification, to the mercy of God alone, and takes it entirely away from our own strength, works and merits. (Rom. viii, 29, 30; Ephes. 1.) (2.) It comforts afflicted consciences that are struggling with temptation, when it renders them assured of the gracious good will of God in Christ, which was from all eternity decreed to them, performed in time, and which will endure forever. (Isa. liv, 8.) It also shews, that the purpose of God according to election stands firm, not of works, but of Him that calleth. (1 Cor. i, 9; Rom. ix, 11.) (3.) It is capable of terrifying the ungodly; because it teaches, that the decree of God concerning unbelievers is irrevocable; (Heb. iii, 11, 17- 19;) and that "they who do not obey the truth, but believe a lie," are to be adjudged to eternal destruction. (2 Thess. ii, 12.)

XV. This doctrine therefore ought to resound, not only within private walls and in schools, but also in the assemblies of the saints and in the church of God. Yet one caution ought to be strictly observed, that nothing be taught concerning it beyond what the Scriptures say, that it be propounded in the manner which the Scriptures have adopted, and that it be referred to the same end as that which the Scriptures propose when they deliver it. This, by the gracious assistance of God, we think, we have done. "Unto Him be glory in the church by Christ Jesus throughout all ages, world without end. Amen!"

"The power of God is great, but it obtains glory from the humble. Do not inconsiderately seek out the things that are too hard for thee; neither foolishly search for things which surpass thy powers. But meditate with reverence upon those things which God has commanded thee: for it is not requisite for thee to see with thine eyes those things which are secret. Do not curiously handle those matters which are unprofitable and unnecessary to thy discourse: for more things are shewn unto thee, than the human understanding can comprehend. Ecclesiasticus iii, 20-23.

DISPUTATION 16

ON THE VOCATION OF MEN TO SALVATION

RESPONDENT: JAMES BONTEBAL

I. The title contains three terms -- vocation, men, salvation, (1.) The word Vocation denotes a total and entire act, consisting of all its parts, whether essential or integral, what parts soever are necessary for the purpose of men being enabled to answer the Divine Vocation. (Prov. i, 24; Matt. xi, 20, 21; xxiii, 37.) (2.) Men may be considered in a two-fold respect, either as placed in the state of animal life without sin, or as obnoxious to sin. We consider them here in this last respect. (Gen. ii, 16, 17; Matt. ix, 13.) (3.) Salvation, by a Synecdoche, in addition to vocation itself by which we are called to salvation, contains also whatsoever is necessary, through the appointment of God, for obtaining salvation or life eternal (Luke xix, 9; 2 Cor. vi, 2.) II. We define Vocation, a gracious act of God in Christ, by which, through his word and Spirit, He calls forth sinful men, who are liable to condemnation and placed under the dominion of sin, from the condition of the animal life, and from the pollutions and corruptions of this world, (2 Tim. i, 9; Matt. xi, 28; 1 Pet. ii, 9, 10; Gal. i, 4; 2 Pet. ii, 20; Rom. x, 13-15; 1 Pet. iii, 19; Gen. vi, 3,) unto "the fellowship of Jesus Christ,"

and of his kingdom and its benefits; that, being united unto Him as their Head, they may derive from him life, sensation, motion, and a plenitude of every spiritual blessing, to the glory of God and their own salvation. (1 Cor. i, 9; Gal. ii, 20; Ephes. i, 3, 6; 2 Thess. ii, 13, 14.)

III. The efficient cause of this vocation is God the Father in the Son. The Son himself, as appointed by the Father to be the Mediator and the king of his church, calls men by the Holy Spirit; as He is the Spirit of God given to the Mediator; and as He is the Spirit of Christ the king and the head of his church, by whom both "the Father and the Son hitherto work" (1 Thess. ii, 12; Ephes. ii, 17; iv, 11, 12; Rev. iii, 20; John v, 17.) But this vocation is so administered by the Spirit, that the Holy Spirit is himself its effector: for He appoints bishops, sends forth teachers, endues them with gifts, grants them his assistance, and obtains authority for the word and bestows efficacy upon it.

(Heb. iii, 7; Acts xiii, 2; xx, 28; 1 Cor. xii, 4, 7, 9, 11; Heb. ii, 4.) IV. The Inly-moving cause is the grace, mercy and (philanthropy) "love of God our saviour toward man;" (Tit. iii, 4, 5;) by which He is inclined to relieve the misery of sinful man, and to impart unto him eternal felicity. (2 Tim. i, 9, 10.) But the disposing cause is the wisdom and justice of God; by which he knows how it is proper for this vocation to be administered, and wills it to be dispensed as it is lawful and befitting; and from which is formed the decree of his will concerning the administration and its mode. (1 Cor. i, 17, 18.)

V. The external cause, which outwardly moves God, is Jesus Christ by his obedience and intercession. (2 Tim. i, 9.) But the instrumental cause is the word of God, administered by means of men, either through preaching or writing, which is the ordinary method; (1 Cor. xii, 28-30; 2 Thess. ii, 14;) or without human assistance, when the word is immediately proposed by God inwardly to the mind and the will, which is extraordinary. And this is in fact both the word of the law and that of the Gospel, which are subordinate in the operations apportioned to each other.

VI. The matter or subject of vocation is mankind constituted in the animal life; men worldly, natural, animal, carnal, sinful, alienated from the life of God, and dead in sins; and therefore Unworthy to be called, and Unfit to answer to the call, unless by the gracious estimation of God they be accounted worthy, and by his powerful operation they be rendered Fit to comply with the vocation. (Matt. ix, 13; Tit. ii, 12; Ephes. ii, 11, 12; iv, 17, 18; v, 14; John v, 25; vi, 44; Matt. x, 11-13; Acts xvi, 14.) VII. The form of vocation is placed in the very administration of the word and of the Holy Spirit. God hath instituted this administration so, as He knows to be suitable and becoming to himself, and to his justice tempered with mercy in Christ; always reserving to himself the fall and free power of not employing, for the conversion of men, all the methods which are possible to himself according to the treasures of his wisdom and power, and of bestowing unequal grace on those who are [in every respect,] equals, and equal grace on those who are unequal, nay, of employing greater grace on those who are more wicked. (Rom. ix, 21-26; x, 17- 21; xi, 25, 29-33; Ezek.

iii, 6; Matt. xi, 21, 23.)

VIII. But in every vocation the point of commencement, and that of termination, come to be considered. The point of commencement, whence men are called by divine vocation, is not only the state of this animal life, but likewise that of sin and of misery on account of sin, that is, out of guilt and condemnation. (1 Pet. ii, 9; 2 Pet. i, 4; Ephes. ii, 1-6; Rom. vi, 17, 18.) The point of termination is, First, the state of grace, or a participation of supernatural good and of every spiritual blessing, during the present life, in Christ, in whom resides a plenitude of grace and truth; and, Afterwards, the state of glory, and the perfect fruition of God himself. (Ephes. i, 3, 4,; John i, 14, 16; Rom. viii, 28- 30.)

IX. The proximate end of vocation is, that they who have been called answer by faith to God and to Christ who give the call, and that they thus become the covenanted people of God through Christ the Mediator of the New Covenant; and, after having become believers and parties to the covenant, that they love, fear, honour, and worship God and Christ, render in all things obedience to the divine precepts "in righteousness and true holiness," and that by this means they "make their calling and election sure." (Prov. i, 24,; Heb. iii, 7; Rev. iii, 20; Ephes. ii, 11-16; Tit. iii, 8; Deut.

vi, 4, 5; Jer. xxxii, 38, 39; Luke i, 74, 75; 2 Pet. i, 1, 10.) X. The remote end is the salvation of the elect and the glory of God, in regard to which the very vocation to grace is a means ordained by God, yet through the appointment of God it is necessary to the communication of salvation. (Phil. i, 6; Ephes. i, 14.) But the answer by which obedience is yielded to this call, is the condition which, through the appointment of God, is also requisite and necessary for obtaining this end. (Prov. i, 24-26; Acts xiii, 46; Luke vii, 30.) The glory of God, who is supremely wise, good, merciful, just and powerful, is so luminously displayed in this communication both of his grace and glory, as deservedly to raise into rapturous admiration the minds of angels and men, and to employ their loosened tongues in celebrating the praises of Jehovah. (Rev. iv, 8-11; v, 8-10.) XI. Vocation is partly external, partly internal. External vocation is by the ministry of men, who propound the word of the law and of the gospel, and who are on this account called "workers together with God, planters, waterers, builders, and ministers by whom the [members of the] church believe." (1 Cor. i, 5-9; iii, 3-6.) Internal vocation is by the operation of the Holy Spirit illuminating the mind and affecting the heart, that serious attention may be given to those things which are spoken, and that faith or credence may be given to the word. The efficacy consists in the concurrence of both the internal and external vocation. (Acts xvi, 14; 2 Cor. iii, 3; 1 Pet. i, 22.) XII. But that distribution is not of a genus into its species, but of a whole into its parts, or of the entire vocation into partial acts which concur to produce one conclusion --which is, obedience yielded to the call. Hence an assemblage, or congregation of those who are called, and of those who answer to the call, is denominated "the Church;" (1 Cor. iii, 5, 6; Rom. i, 5;) which is itself, in the same manner, distinguished into the visible and the invisible -- the visible, that "maketh confession with the mouth," and the invisible, "that believeth with the heart." (Rom. x, 10.) As man himself is likewise distinguished into "the outward" and "the inward." (2 Cor. iv, 16.)

XIII. But we must be cautious, lest with the mystics and the enthusiasts, we consider the word which is propounded by the ministry of men as only preparatory; and believe that another word is inwardly employed, which is perfective, or, (which is the same thing,) lest we suppose, that the Spirit by his internal act illuminates the mind into another knowledge of God and Christ, than that which is contained in the word outwardly propounded, or that he affects the heart and the soul with other meanings, than those which are proposed from the very same word. (1 Pet. i, 23, 25; Rom. x, 14-17; 2 Cor. iii, 3-6; 1 Cor. xv, 1-4.)

XIV. The accidental result of vocation, and that which is not of itself intended by God, is the rejection of the word of grace, the contemning of the divine counsel, the resistance offered to the Holy Spirit. The proper and per se cause of this result is, the malice and hardness of the human heart. But this result is, not seldom, succeeded by another, the just judgment of God, avenging the contempt shewn to his word and call, and the injury done to his Holy Spirit; and from this judgment arise the blinding of the mind, the hardening of the heart, "the giving over to a reprobate mind," and "the delivering unto the power of Satan." (Acts xiii, 46; Luke vii, 30; Acts vii, 51; 2 Thess.

iii, 2; 2 Cor. iv, 4; Psalm lxxxi, 11-14; Isa. lxiii, 10; vi, 9, 10; John xii, 37-40.) XV. But, because "known unto our God are all his works from the beginning of the world," (Acts xv, 18,) and as God does nothing in time which He has not decreed from all eternity to do, this vocation is likewise instituted and administered according to God's eternal decree. So that what man soever is called in time, was from all eternity predestinated to be called, and to be called in that state, time, place, mode, and with that efficacy, in and with which he was predestinated. Otherwise, the execution will vary from the decree; which charge of mutability and change cannot be preferred against God without producing mischievous effects. (Ephes. iii, 5, 6, 9-11; James i, 17, 18; 2 Tim. i, 9.)

DISPUTATION 17

ON REPENTANCE

RESPONDENT: HENRY NIELLUIS

As in succeeding Disputations are discussed Faith, and Justification through Faith, the order which has hitherto been observed requires us now to treat on Repentance without which we can neither have fellowship with Christ, nor be made partakers of his righteousness.

I. The matter on which we are at present treating, is usually enunciated in the three Latin words, resipiscentia, pænitentia, and conversio, repentance, penitence and conversion. The Greek word, Metanoia "change of mind after reflection," answers to the first of these, terms; Metameleia, "regret on account of misdeeds," to the second; and Ewisrofh "a turning about, a return," to the third. On this subject the Hebrews frequently employ the word h b w t "a returning," as corresponding with the third of the preceding terms; and the word µ j n or h m j n which expresses the sense of the second. But though these words are, according to the essence and nature of the thing, synonymous, yet each of them signifies a particular formal conception. The First, repentance, is a conception of the understanding; the Second, penitence, a conception of the affections or passions; and the Third, conversion, is a conception of an action resulting from both the others. The general term, therefore, comprises the understanding, the affections, and an ulterior act resulting from both the preceding.

The First signifies a change of mind after any thing has been done; and, after the commission of evil, a change of mind to a better state. The Second expresses grief or sorrow of mind after a deed; and, after an evil deed, "sorrow after a godly sort," and not "the sorrow of the world," although the word is sometimes thus used even in the Scriptures. The Third denotes conversion to some thing, from which aversion had been previously formed. And, in this discussion, it is that conversion which is from evil to good; from sin, Satan and the world, to God. The First comprehends a disapproval of evil and an approval of the opposite good. The Second comprises grief for a past evil, and an affection of desire towards a contrary good. The Third shews an aversion from the evil to which it adhered, and a conversion to the good from which it had been alienated. But these three conceptions, according to the nature of things and the command of God, are so intimately connected with each other, that there cannot be either true and right repentance, penitence, or conversion, unless each of these has the other two united with it, either as preceding it, or as succeeding.

II. According to this distinction of the various conceptions, have been invented different definitions of one and the same thing as to its essence. For instance,

"repentance is a change of mind and heart from evil to good, proceeding from godly sorrow." It is also "sorrow after the commission of sin on account of God being offended, and through this sorrow a change of the whole heart from evil to good."

And "It is a true conversion of our life to God, proceeding from a sincere and serious fear of God, which consists in the mortification of our flesh and of the old man, and in the quickening of the Spirit." We disapprove of none of these three definitions, because in substance and essence they agree among themselves, and, sufficiently for

[the purposes of] true piety, declare the nature of the thing. But a more copious definition may be given, such as the following: "Repentance, penitence, or conversion is an act of the entire man, by which in his understanding he disapproves of sin universally considered, in his affections he hates it, and as perpetrated by himself is sorry for it and in the whole of his life avoids it. By which he also in his understanding approves of righteousness, in affections loves it, and in the whole of his life follows after it. And thus he turns himself away from Satan and the world, and returns unto God and adheres to Him, that God may abide in him, and that he may abide in God."

III. We call repentance "the act of man," that we may distinguish it from Regeneration which is "the act of God." These two have some things in common, are on certain points in affinity; yet, in reality, according to the peculiar nature which each of them possesses, they are distinct; though, according to their subjects, they are not separated.

We add that it is "the act of the entire man:" for it is his act with regard to the entire mind or soul, and all its faculties; and with regard to the body as it is united to the soul, and is an organ or instrument subjected to the pleasure and command of the soul.

(1 Kings xviii, 37; Rom. xii, 1, 2.) It is an act which concerns the whole life of man as it is rational, and as it was born with an aptitude to tend towards sin and towards God, and to turn aside from either of them. It consists of the understanding, the affections, the senses, and motion, and concurs with all these conjointly, though subordinately, to

[the production of] repentance, penitence or conversion. (1.) In this act, the Understanding performs its office both by a general appreciation of its value and by its particular approbation and disapprobation. (2.) The Affections or passions perform theirs, as they are ewiqumhtikov concupiscible, by loving, hating, mourning and rejoicing; and as they are qumoeidhv, irascible, by being angry, zealous, indignant, fearful, and hopeful. (Ephes. 3 & 4.) (3.) The Senses, both internal and external, perform their office by their aversion from unbecoming objects, and by their conversion to those which are suitable and proper. (Rom. vi, 13, 19.) (4.) Lastly, the Motions of the tongue, hands, feet, and of the other members of the body, perform their office by removal from things unlawful and inexpedient, and by their application to those which are lawful and expedient.

IV. The object of repentance is the evil of unrighteousness or sin, (considered both universally, and as committed by the penitent himself,) and the good of righteousness.

(Psalm xxxiv, 15; Ezek. xviii, 28.) The evil of unrighteousness is first in order, the good of righteousness is first in dignity. From the former, repentance has its commencement; in the latter, it terminates and rests. The object may be considered in a manner somewhat different; for, since we are commanded to return to God, from whom we had turned away, God is also the object of conversion and repentance, as he is the hater of sin and of evil men, the lover of righteousness and of righteous men, good to those who repent, and their chief good, and, on the contrary, the severe avenger and the certain destruction of those who persevere in sin. (Mal. v, 7; Zech. i, 3; Deut. vi, 5.) To this object, may be directly opposed another personal object, the devil, from whom by repentance we must take our departure. (Ephes. iv, 27; James iv, 7.) To the devil may be added an object which is an accessory to him, and that is, the world, of which he is called "the prince," (John xii, 31; xiv, 30,) both as it contains within it arguments suitable for Satan to employ in seduction, such as riches, honours and pleasures, (Luke iv, 5, 6; 1 John ii, 15, 16,) and as it renders to the devil something that resembles personal service. (Rom. vi, 9, 7.) In both these methods, the world attracts men to itself, and detains them after they are united to it. From it, also, we are commanded to turn away. Nay, man himself may obtain the province of an object opposed to God; and he is commanded to separate himself from himself, that he may live not according to man, but according to God. (Ephes. iv, 22; Col. iii, 9- 17; Rom. vi, 10-23.)

V. The primary efficient cause of repentance is God, and Christ as he is through the Spirit mediator between God and man. (Jer. xxxi, 18; Ezek. xxxvi, 25, 26; Acts v, 31; xvii, 30.) The inly moving cause is the goodness, grace, and philanthropy of God our creator and redeemer, who loves the salvation of his creature, and desires to manifest the riches of his mercy in the salvation of his miserable creature. (Rom. xi, 5.) The outwardly moving cause, through the mode of merit, is the obedience, the death and the intercession of Christ; (Isa. liii, 5; 1 Cor. i, 30, 31; 2 Cor. v, 21;) and, through the mode of moving to mercy, it is the unhappy condition of sinners, whom the devil holds captive in the snares of iniquity, and who will perish by their own demerits according to the condition of the law, and necessarily according to the will of God manifested in the gospel, unless they repent (John iii, 16; Ezek. xvi, 3-63; Luke xiii, 3, 5; Isa. xxxi, 6; Jer. iii, 14; Psalm cxix, 71; in the prophets passim; Rom. vii, 6, 7.) VI. The proximate, yet less principal cause, is man himself, converted and converting himself by the power and efficacy of the grace of God and the Spirit of Christ. The external cause inciting to repent is the miserable state of the sinners who do not repent, and the felicitous and blessed state of those who repent -- whether such state be known from the law of Moses or from that of nature, from the gospel or from personal experience, or from the examples of other persons who have been visited with the most grievous plagues through impenitence, or who, through repentance, have been made partakers of many blessings. (Rom. ii, 5; Acts ii, 37.) The internal and inly moving cause is, not only a consciousness of sin and a sense of misery through fear of the Deity, who has been offended, with a desire to be delivered from both, but it is likewise [an incipient] faith and hope of the gracious mercy and pardon of God.

VII. The instrumental causes which God ordinarily uses for our conversion, and by which we are solicited and led to repentance, are the law and the gospel. Yet the office of each in this matter is quite distinct, so that the more excellent province in it is assigned to the gospel, and the law acts the part of its servant or attendant. For, in the first place, the very command to repent is evangelical; and the promise of pardon, and the peremptory threat of eternal destruction, unless the man repents, which are added to it, belong peculiarly to the gospel. (Matt. iii, 1; Mark i, 4; Luke xxiv, 47.) But the law proves the necessity of repentance, by convincing man of sin and of the anger of the offended Deity, from which conviction arise a certain sorrow and a fear of punishment, which, in its commencement is servile or slavish solely through a regard to the law, but which, in its progress, becomes a filial fear through a view of the gospel. (Rom. iii, 13, 20; vii, 7.) From these, also, proceed, by the direction of an inducement to remove, or repent, a certain external abstinence from evil works, and such a performance of some righteousness as is not hypocritical. (Matt. iii, 8; vii, 17; James ii, 14-26.) But as the law does not proceed beyond "the ministration of death and of the letter," the services of the gospel here again become necessary, which administers the Spirit, by whose illumination, inspiration and gracious and efficacious strengthening, repentance itself, in its essential and integral parts is completed and perfected. Nay the very conviction of sin belongs in some measure to the gospel, since sin itself has been committed against the command both concerning faith and repentance. (Mark xvi, 16; John xvi, 8- 15.)

VIII. There are likewise other causes aiding or auxiliary to repentance, some of which are usually employed by God himself, and others of them by those who are penitent.

(1.) For God sometimes sends the cross and afflictions, by which, as with goads, he excites and invites to repentance. At other times, he visits them with the contrary blessings, that he may lead them, after having been invited, by goodness and lenity to repentance. (1 Cor. xi, 32; Jer. xxxi, 18; Psalm 80 & 85.) (2.) The causes employed by penitents themselves are watching, fasting, and other corporeal chastisements, as well as prayers, which are of the greatest efficacy in obtaining and performing repentance.

The other causes employed by men are likewise serviceable in exciting the ardour of these prayers. (Psalm 119; Rom. ii, 4; v, 3, 4; xii, 11, 12.) It is possible for this relation to exist between these auxiliary and the preceding instrumental causes, (§ 7,) that the auxiliary causes are subservient to the instrumental, since they excite men to a serious and assiduous meditation on the law and the gospel, and by the grace of God obtain yet more and more a right understanding of both.

IX. The form of repentance is the uprightness of the turning away from evil, and of the return to God and to righteousness. It is conformed to the rule of the divine command, and is produced by an assured faith and hope of the divine mercy, and by a sincere intention to turn away and to return. As the penitence of Saul, Ahab and Judas was destitute of this uprightness, it is unworthy to be reckoned under this title. (1

Sam. xv, 24, 25; 1. Kings, xxi, 27; Matt. xxvii, 3.) But since the mind of the penitent is conscious to itself of this rectitude, or uprightness, no necessity exists for such a man anxiously and solicitously to examine whether it be so great, either intensively, extensively, or appreciatively, as the rigor of justice might demand.

X. The fruits of repentance, which may also have the relation of ends, are, (1.) On the part of God, the remission of sin according to the condition of the covenant of grace in Christ, and on account of his obedience, and through faith in him. (Luke xxiv, 47; Acts v, 31; Rom. iii, 24) (2.) On our part, the fruits are good works, which are "meet for repentance," (Matt. iii, 8; Luke iii, 8,) and "which God foreordained," that believers and penitents, who are "created in Christ Jesus unto good works, should walk in them." (Ephes. ii, 10.) The ultimate end is the glory of God the Redeemer, who is at once just and merciful in Jesus Christ our Lord. (Rev. xvi, 9.) It results not only from the gracious and efficacious act of God, who bestows repentance, and converts us to himself; but likewise from the act of the penitents themselves, by which turning themselves away from sins, and returning to God, they "walk in newness of living" all the days of their life. It also results from the very intention of repentance itself.

XI. The parts of repentance, as is abundantly evident from the preceding Theses, according to its two boundaries, (both that from which it commences, and that towards which it proceeds and in which it terminates,) are two, an aversion, or turning away from the Devil and sin, and a conversion or returning to God and righteousness.

(Psalm xxxiv, 14; Jer. iv, 1.) They are united together by an indissoluble connection; but the former is preparatory to the latter, while the latter is perfective of the former.

The Papists, however, make penitence to consist of three parts; and seem to derive greater pleasure from employing the word penitence about this matter, than in the use of the terms repentance and conversion. Their three parts are, the contrition of the heart, the confession of the mouth, and the satisfaction of the work; about which we make two brief affirmations. (1.) If these be received as parts of the penitence which is necessary before God, then no contrition can be so great, either intensively or appreciatively, as to be in any wise either meritorious or capable of obtaining remission of sins. No confession of the mouth, not even that which is made to God, (provided the confession of the heart only be present,) is necessary to receive remission; much less is the confession which is made to any man, even though he be a priest. And there is no satisfaction, except the obedience of the passion of our Lord Jesus Christ, by which the justice of God can be satisfied either for sin or for its punishment, even for the very least of either. (Acts iv, 12; Heb. x, 10, 14; 1 Cor. i, 30.) (2.) If these be received as part of the penitence to which, before the church, that man submits who has injured her by scandal, that he may render her satisfaction and may contribute to her edification; then indeed those words, [contrition, confession and satisfaction,] may bear an accommodated sense, and such a distribution of them may be useful to the church.

XII. The contrary to repentance is impenitence, and a pertinacious perseverance in sinning: of which there are two degrees, one the delay of penitence, the other final impenitence unto death. The latter of them has a certain expectation of eternal destruction, even according to the most merciful will of God revealed in Christ and in the Gospel; lest any one should persuade himself, that the devils themselves, and men who have passed their lives in impiety, will at length experience the mercy of God.

The former of them, the delay of penitence, is marvelously dangerous, for three reasons: (1.) Because it is in the power and hand of God to make even the delay of a single hour to be a final impenitence, since to Him belongs the dominion and lordship over our life and death. (2.) Because after a habit of sinning has been introduced by daily exercise, a man is rendered anaisqhtov, incapable of feeling, and his conscience becomes "seared with a hot iron." (1 Tim. iv, 2.) (3.) Because, after the gate of grace has by the just judgment of God been closed on account of a malicious continuance in sins, no passage is open for the Spirit, who is necessarily the author of repentance.

Therefore let these words always resound in our ears, "Today if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts." (Heb. iii, 7, 8; Psalm xcv, 7, 8.) And this exhortation of the Apostle, "Workout your own salvation with fear and trembling: for it is God who worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure," (Phil. ii, 12, 13.) May this be graciously granted to us by God the Father of mercies, in the Son of his love, by the Holy Spirit of both of them. To whom be praise and glory forever. Amen.

COROLLARIES

It is not a correct saying, that "to those who relapse after having been baptized, penitence is a second plank [for their escape] after shipwreck."

Those persons act harshly who, from the example of God not pardoning sins except to him that is penitent, refuse to forgive their brother unless he confesses his fault, and earnestly begs pardon.

DISPUTATION 18

ON THE CHURCH AND ITS HEAD

RESPONDENT: GERARD, THE SON OF HELMICHIUS

As it is of the greatest utility to hold a right belief about the church of God and its Head, and as there is at present a great controversy between the Orthodox and the Papists respecting this matter, it appears to us that we shall not be profitably occupied

, if we treat of the Church and of its Head in a few Theses.

I. The Church, ecclesia, is a word of Greek origin, used in the Greek version of the Old Testament for the Hebrew word l h q , "the assembly;" (Deut. xxiii, 2; Judges xx, 2) and properly signifies a "congregation of persons called out," from the very etymology of the word and from the most frequent usage of the Sacred writings, without any distinction of the small or the great number of those who belong to such an assemblage. For sometimes it signifies the universal assembly of all those who have been called out; (Acts xx, 28; Ephes. i, 22;) at other times, an extraordinary multitude; (Acts ii, 41, 47;) and at other times, only a few persons, comprised in a single family. (Rom. xvi, 5.) This diversity in its application is made on account of one essential reason in all of them; and as this reason belongs equally to an assembly of few persons, of many, and of all, these several assemblages equally partake of the name of "the church," with this difference alone, that a congregation consisting of numerous members is called a greater church, but not more a church, according to the axiom of the Logicians, "A substance does not receive more and less."

II. According to this very general notion the church of God is defined, "A congregation of men called forth by God, out of their own nature, into the supernatural dignity of adoption as sons of God to his glory, and of those who answer this call of God." For the act of vocation, as proceeding from God who calls, and as properly received by those who are called, completes his church. Under this definition are likewise comprehended those angels who are called in Scripture "the elect;" (1

Tim. v, 21;) whether they be considered as an assembly separated from men, or as belonging to one church with men. (Psalm lxviii, 17; Jude. 14; Rev. v, 11; Heb. xii, 22.) According to this notion, the church, embracing all, is especially called

"Catholic." But omitting any further mention of angels, about whose vocation the Scriptures speak sparingly, we will contemplate the church as consisting of human beings. We must here consider men in two respects -- according to the primeval state in which they were created after the image of God, and in reference to their fall from that state into corruption and misery.

III. Because, when men are considered in their primitive state, they were created to be not only what they actually were, but likewise to be elevated to a state of higher felicity, agreeing with the image of God; bearing the impress of which, as children they resembled their Heavenly Father; (Gen. i, 27; Luke iii, 38;) therefore, in this state, theirs was the calling forth, by which they were called out from nature and natural felicity to partake of the fruit of Divine adoption, by the observance of the law which had been imposed on them, and which had been sanctioned by the promise of a life of blessedness assured to them through the sacrament of the tree of life, (Gen. ii, 9, 10,) and by a threat of death. They were therefore the church of God, neither redeemed by the blood of Christ, nor formed anew by regeneration of the Spirit, nor by a new creation, but they were instituted as a church by the primitive creation of God, and formed by a vocation according to the legal covenant.

IV. Before the fall, this church in reality consisted only of our first parents, Adam and Eve; but in capacity it embraced the whole of the human race that were included in their loins, and that were afterwards to proceed from them by natural propagation.

This was done by God's constant and perpetual ordinance, according to which he included all their posterity in the covenant into which He had entered with the parents, provided the parents continued in this covenant. (Gen. xvii, 7; Rom. v, 12, 14.) And in this respect, the church before the fall may take to itself the epithet of "Catholic." But, as a promise of the remission of sins was not annexed to this covenant, when our first parents transgressed this law, which had been imposed as a trial of obedience, they fell from the covenant and ceased to be the church of God, (Jer. xi, 3,) they were expelled from the tree of life and out of Paradise, the symbols of life eternal and of the place in which it was to be enjoyed, and were thus by nature rendered "children of wrath." (Gen. 3.)

V. Wherefore, if a church was to be again collected from among men, it was to be called out from that state of sin and misery; but it was to be collected through the decree of the gracious mercy of God. He therefore employed such a mode of calling the members forth as was agreeable to that state, that is, the institution of a new and gracious covenant, as the word is used in the writings of the evangelism. (Jer. xxxi, 33; Matt. xxvi, 28.) This covenant exhibits remission of sins ratified by the blood of the Mediator, Christ the only begotten Son of God, and the Spirit of grace through faith in Him. (Heb. ix, 15; Gal. iii, 2, 5; iv, 19.) To a participation in this covenant men have been called "in divers manners," according to the economy of time most wisely arranged by God. First, by the declaration or solemn promise of the blessed seed, (Gen. iii, 15; Rom. i, 2,) when the heir was by appointment constituted an infant: wherefore He was also to be detained for a time under the preparatory discipline of the law economically repeated. Afterwards, by that full manifestation in the Gospel, when, according to "the time appointed of God the Father," the heir had arrived at maturity. (Gal. iv, 1-4; Matt. xi, 11-13.)

VI. But this economic distinction, and this diversity in the method of calling forth, do not make a double and in substance a different church. For it is one and the same person that is an infant and afterwards a full-grown man, not distinguished except with regard to age and advancement according to increased age. But the whole church, both before and after Christ, is called one heir. (Gal. 4.) The whole church, collected together from among the Jews and the Gentiles, is also called "one new man;" and not from those Jews only who lived after the advent of Christ, but likewise from those who lived prior to his coming, when the Gentiles were without Christ,"

being then aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise." (Ephes. ii, 12-15.) The church is one city, the heavenly Jerusalem, "the mother of all" those who are blessed with faithful Abraham, and who, "as Isaac was, are the children of promise." (Gal. iv, 26-28.) It is also one house of God founded upon Christ the chief corner-stone, which has been laid in a foundation the most firm and stable, through the preaching not only of the apostles, but likewise of the prophets, (Ephes. ii, 20-22,) to the latter of whom also belong Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, as well as Moses himself, who according to the authority of the promise was a son, (Heb. xi, 24-26,) although a servant in the house with regard to the economical legislation which was administered by his hands. (iii, 4.) VII. This assembly being distinguished in the manner already described, by the names of "the one heir" and "the one new man," of "the one city" and "the one house of God," is in the most ample signification and in the widest latitude called "the Catholic Church," collected together from among men of every period and age from the first promise of the seed of the woman to the end of the world, and of all places; men who have been called forth to the participation of the grace of God, and to the service of his glory; and who are obedient to this Divine calling. (Heb. 11; xii, 22- 24.) It is distributed into two integral members, each of which is homogeneous and similar to the whole; that is, into the church before Christ, and that after Him: (Gal. iv, 1-4; Heb.

xi, 40.) But as a discussion upon their agreement and difference will be a labour rather too prolix, we will not enter into it on this occasion: omitting therefore the peculiar consideration of that which was before Christ, our further attention shall be directed to that which is specially called "Christian," yet not to the entire exclusion of the other.

VIII. We may be permitted, therefore, to define the Christian church, "A congregation of believers, who have been called by the saving vocation of God from the state of corruption to the dignity of the sons of God through the gospel, and are by a true faith engrafted into Christ, as living members are to the Head, to the praise of the glorious grace of God. (Matt. v, 15, 16; Acts iv, 31; 1 Pet. ii, 9; v, 10; Rom. viii, 28- 30; vi, 5; Ephes. iii, 17; v, 30.) This, as a general definition, belongs to every congregation of believers, whether it be small or large; it also appertains to the Catholic church, which contains the entire number of believers from the time when Christ came into his kingdom unto the consummation of all things: which universal company we properly describe, if we add these few words to the previous description, "Of all the believers who have been called out from every tongue, tribe, people, nation and vocation," &c.

From this it is apparent, that the Catholic or universal church differs from particular churches in nothing which relates to the substance of the church, but solely in its amplitude: an argument which ought to be diligently observed in our controversy with the Papists.

IX. The efficient cause of the church, that both produces her by regeneration and preserves her by daily education, and that perfects her by an immediate union of her to himself, is God the Father, in his well beloved Son Jesus Christ, by the Spirit of Christ who is the Redeemer and the Head of the church. (2 Tim. i, 9; 1 Pet. i, 12.) We view the gospel as the instrument, that is, "the incorruptible seed by which the church is born again." (1 Pet. i, 23, 25.) Hence those persons also whom God appointed to be ministers of the Gospel, were the instrumental causes, and are called "co- operators,"

or "workers together with God," of whom some are employed in laying the foundation, others in raising the superstructure. (1 Cor. iii, 5, 10; Rev. xv, 18-21; Ephes. ii, 20.) They are indeed the founders of many particular churches, by their oral preaching; but by their writings which have been delivered down to us, they are the founders of all churches and of the whole Catholic church; on this account the entire church of Christ is called Apostolical.

X. We call the act of this cause that produces the church, and preserves her, "a calling forth." This word includes, First, the point from which a commencement is made to that in which it terminates, and, then, the means by which men proceed from the one to the other. (1.) The point of commencement is the state of sin and misery, in which state, a sinner without the law is at ease and flatters himself; but to which a sinner is averse who is under the law through the vocation previously administered by the legal spirit, that is, the spirit of bondage, and from which he desires to be delivered. (Matt.

ix, 13; xi, 28; Rom. 7.) The point of termination is the dignity of being adopted as the sons of God, which, also, with respect to the desire of those who have been called forth, may be fitly denominated their end. (2.) The means by which men proceed from the one point to the other, is faith in Christ, by which we obtain this dignity, and are

"translated from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of light" and of the Son of God, through the decree of divine predestination. (Jer. i, 12; Col. i, 13; Acts xvi, 17.) XI. Hence it will easily appear what it is that we have laid down as the matter or substance of this calling forth, about which it is conversant, and in which it exercises its operation. Sinners are the remote matter; for to them alone is an entrance into this way necessary. The still nearer matter are sinners through the law acknowledging their sins, deploring their state, and expecting redemption. (Gal. ii, 15, 16, 21; Matt.

ix, 13; xi, 28; Rom. viii, 28-30.) Believers are the proximate matter, who, alone, are called to the fellowship of Jesus Christ, and to a participation of the inheritance which he has purchased for his children with his own blood, and of which he is constituted the dispenser to those who obey him. (Heb. v, 9.) For however perfect in the act, vocation is, when it has proceeded from Him who calls us, yet a relative effect is required for this purpose, that they who are called may be numbered in the name of the church. (Acts ii, 41.) Wherefore we exclude from the church, unbelievers, apostates, hypocrites, and those heretics who do not hold Christ as the head. (Ephes. i, 22.) We make a distinction between those who have not been baptized with the external baptism of water, those who have been excommunicated by the sentence of the church, and schismatics; and according to the varying distinction in each case, we affirm either that they belong to the church, or that they do not belong to her.

XII. As the form of the church is of the genus of relatives, we place it as relatively necessary, and in reality in the relation of disquiparancy, as we are enjoined to do by the relative names by which the church is called. For she is called "the body," (Ephes.

i, 23,) "the bride" (John iii, 29,) "the city of the kingdom," (Heb. i, 8,) and "the house"

(1 Tim. iii, 15,) in relation to "the Head," (Ephes. i, 22; Col. i, 18,) to "the Bridegroom" to "the King," and "the Master," or the Father of the family. But the relation between these things which are thus relatively placed, consists of three points or degrees, union, appointment and communication. (1.) The form therefore of the church in union is with her Head, Husband, King and Master of the house or family; which is formed by his Spirit, and by the faith of the church. (Gal. ii, 30; Rom. viii, 9-11.) (2.) In her subordination under her Head, Husband and King, which is required by the perfection and virtue of her Head, and by the necessity and usefulness of the church herself. (Ephes. v, 23.) (3.) In the influence of life, sensation and motion, which influence benevolently proceeds from the Head, and is happily apprehended by the church.

XIII. The chief end of the church is the glory of Him by whose gracious evocation the church is what she is; the glory which He completes in His gracious acts towards the church, by creating, preserving, increasing and perfecting her. (Ephes. i, 12.) To this glory is justly subordinate, that which the church is commanded to ascribe to Him, and which she will ascribe as the perfecting of her "throughout all ages, world without end." (Rom. xi, 36; 1 Pet.. ii, 9; Ephes. iii, 21; v, 20.) As the salvation of the church is the gift of her Head and King, it cannot be the end of his church, though it may be the end which she intends by her faith, and which she strives to obtain, that she may be blessed before God.

XIV. But the church is herself now distinguished according to the acts of God towards her, so far as she perceives all or some of them. (1.) She that has a perception only of the act of creation and preservation, is said to be in the way or course, and is called militant, because she must still contend with sin, the flesh, the world and Satan.

(Ephes. vi, 11, 12; Heb. xii, 1-4. (2.) But she that is made partaker besides, of the consummation, is said to be in her own land, and is called triumphant. After conquering her enemies, she rests from her labours, and reigns with Christ in heaven.

(Rev. iii, 21; xiv, 13.) To that part of the church which is militant on earth, the title of Catholic or universal is likewise ascribed, as embracing within her pale every particular combatant or soldier. We place neither any church, nor anything belonging to her, in purgatory, for that is a real utopia, and of great notoriety among all men.

XV. Hence, since the calling forth of the church is made inwardly by the spirit, and outwardly by the word preached (Acts xvi, 14,) and since those who are called answer inwardly by faith, and outwardly by the profession of their faith, as they who are called have an inward man and an outward; (2 Cor. iv, 16;) therefore, in reference to those who are called, the church is distinguished into the visible and the invisible from an external adjunct and accident. She is invisible, as "believing with the heart unto righteousness;" and she is visible, as "making confession with the mouth unto salvation." (Rom. x, 9, 10.) This visibility and invisibility belong neither less nor more to the whole catholic church than to each particular church. For that which is called "the catholic invisible church" does not appertain to this subject, because it can not come together into one place, and thus be exposed to view. But as more persons

"are called" than "are chosen" or elected. (Matt. xx, 16.) And as many of the called profess with their mouths "that they know God, while in works they deny him;" (Tit.

i, 16;) and since of the hearts of these men, God is the sole judge, who alone

"knoweth them that are his;" (2 Tim. ii, 19;) therefore such persons are judged, on account of the promise, to belong to the visible church, although equivocally, since they do not belong to the invisible church, and have none of that inward communion with the Head, which is the Form of the church.

XVI. Then, since the church is collected out of "the world that lieth wholly in wickedness," (John xv, 19; Matt. xv, 9,) and as this office is frequently performed by ministers who preach another doctrine than that which the word of God contains; (2

Cor. xi, 15; Gal. iii, 1-3;) and since the church is composed of men who are exposed to deception and to falling -- nay, of such as are actually deceived and fallen; on this account, the church is distinguished, with respect to the doctrine of faith, into "the orthodox" and "the heretical;" with respect to divine worship, into "the idolatrous,"

and that which retains the "right worship of God and of Christ;" and with respect to the moral virtues prescribed in the second table of the law into "a purer church, or into

"one that is more impure." In all these respects, degrees are also to be observed, according to which one church is more heretical, idolatrous and impure, than another.

But concerning all these things, a right judgment must be formed according to the Scriptures. In this relation, too, the word "catholic" is used respecting those churches which are neither oppressed with destructive heresy nor are idolatrous.

XVII. Wherefore, that question is confused and preposterous which asks, "Can the Catholic church err?" when the inquiry ought rather to be, "Can the assembly that errs be the church?" For as faith is prior to the church, and as the church obtains this appellation on account of her believing, so the name of "the church" is taken away from any church so far as she errs from the faith. Yet if this question be pressed by any one, we say that by it nothing more is asked than this, "Can it happen that at any one time there can be no assemblage or congregation of men in the whole world who have not a right faith in Christ and God," To which an answer is readily made by a negation; because the church on earth will never totally fail, but must continue to be collected together without interruption to the end of the world, although not always from the same places and nations. (Matt. xxviii, 20; Rev. ii, 5.) Otherwise, Christ will not have any kingdom on earth, and will not rule in the midst of his enemies until they be made his footstool. (Psalm cx, 1, 2.)

We have hitherto treated of the church herself, let us now briefly consider her head.

XVIII. The conditions of the Head of the church are, that it should contain within itself, in a manner the most perfect, all things necessary to the life and salvation of the church, that it should have a due proportion to the church, should be fitly united to her and placed in order with her, and that by its own virtue it may supply to her life, sensation and motion. But these conditions agree with Christ alone. For "in Him all fullness dwells;" (Col. i, 19;) "and of his fullness have all we received." (John i, 16.) Him hath the Father constituted "the Head over all things to the church;" and he bestows salvation on his body, which is the church. (Ephes. i, 22; v, 25.) By his spirit, the church is animated, perceives and moves. (Rom. viii, 9-12.) Nor is this to be understood only about internal communication, but likewise concerning external administration; for it is He who sends forth his word and his Spirit, (Matt. xxviii, 19; Acts ii, 33,) who institutes a ministry in the church, who appoints, as presidents over this ministry, apostles, evangelists, pastors and teachers. (Ephes. iv, 11, 12.) On this account, He is called "the chief Pastor or Shepherd," (1 Pet. v, 4,) who assists and

"works with" his ministers, "both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost;" (Mark xvi, 20; Acts iv, 30;) and who defends his church against her enemies, and procures likewise her temporal good, so far as He considers it to be requisite for her inward and eternal benefit.

XIX. This name therefore, "the Head of the Church," cannot be adapted, according to any consideration, either to the apostle Peter or to the Roman pontiff. The papists, themselves, grant that it cannot be according to internal communication; and we prove that it cannot be according to external administration, in the following manner: (1.) St.

Peter was himself constituted an apostle by Christ, after the same constitution as that by which Christ is said to have appointed apostles. (Ephes. iv, 7, 11; 1 Pet. i, 1.) Therefore, the rest of the apostles were not constituted by St. Peter, which appointment St. Paul expressly denies respecting himself, when he says that he obtained his apostleship "neither of men nor by man;" (Gal. i, 1.) (2.) St. Peter is a fellow-elder. Therefore, he is not the chief of the elders. (1 Pet. v, 1.) (3.) To St. Peter

"was committed the gospel of the circumcision," as that of the uncircumcision was by equal right and authority committed to St. Paul. Therefore "they gave to each other the right hand of fellowship." (Gal. ii, 7-9.) (4.) St. Peter was reprehended by St. Paul,

"because he did not walk uprightly, according to the truth of the gospel;" Therefore, he was not a suitable person to receive in charge the administration of the whole church. (5.) St. James, Cephas and John, are all placed by the apostle Paul as equal in degree; nay, as being accounted columns by the churches, with no difference among them. (6.) On the twelve foundations of the new Jerusalem are inscribed "the names of the twelve apostles of the Lamb," each name on each foundation without the preeminence of any single one apart. (7.) St. Paul says that "in nothing was he behind the very chief apostles." (2 Cor. xii, 11.) Therefore, he was not inferior to St. Peter, who was one of them. (8.) St. Paul says that he "laboured more abundantly than all the rest." (1 Cor. xv, 10.) But he could not have spoken this with truth, if the care of managing the whole church lay upon St. Peter, and if he administered its concerns through St. Paul and other persons. The objections which the papists urge in favour of the primacy or pre-eminence of St. Peter, will be examined in the disputation itself.

XX. Hence it follows that neither does this title of "the Head of the church" belong to the Roman pontiff. For whatever portion of right and dignity belongs to him, the papists say, it is derived from St. Peter, because he has succeeded to the chair and to the functions of that apostle. But let it be allowed for the sake of argument, though by no means conceded, that the primacy of administration over the whole church was granted to Peter; yet it does not follow from this that the same right has devolved on the Roman pontiff; for, before this inference can be deduced from such a supposition, the following propositions must be previously proved: (1.) That this right was not personal but successive. (2.) That this succession was inseparably connected with a certain chair; that he who succeeded to it enjoyed this right; and that he had in fact, by some means or other, irrefragibly gained possession of this chair. (3.) That St. Peter was bishop of Rome, and that he died in Rome while discharging the duties of that bishopric. (4.) That, from the period of St. Peter's death in the discharge of his episcopal functions at Rome, this primacy has been inseparably connected with the papal chair. All these things, therefore, they must prove by undoubted arguments, since they teach it to be of the necessity of salvation that every man be subject to the Roman pontiff.

To that God in whom, by whom, and for whom all things subsist, be praise and glory forever and ever!

DISPUTATION 19

ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF MAN BEFORE GOD

RESPONDENT: ALARD DE VRIES

As frequent mention is made in Scripture of Justification, and since this doctrine is of great importance to salvation, and is in these days, not a little controverted, it seems that we shall not be acting unprofitably if we institute a disquisition on this subject from the Scriptures.

I. Since the word "justification" is deduced from justice, from this notion its signification will be appropriately derived. justice or righteousness, when properly considered, signifies rectitude or an agreement with right reason. (Psalm xi, 7; Ephes.

vi, 14; Phil. i, 11; 1 John, iii, 7.) And it is contemplated either as a quality or as an act

-- a quality inhering in a subject, an act produced by an efficient cause. The word

"justification" denotes an act that is occupied either in infusing the quality of righteousness into some person or in acquiring it for him, or in forming a judgment on a person and his acts, and in pronouncing sentence on them.

II. If, therefore, according to its quality, justification be the acquisition of righteousness, it is the act of one who by repeated acts acquires a habit of righteousness, that is, the act of a rational creature. (Ephes. iv, 24.) If it be the infusion of righteousness, it is the act of Him who infuses the habit of righteousness into a rational creature, that is, the act of God either as creator or regenerator. (Isa. v, 23.) The justification which is occupied about a person and his acts, is the act of a Judge making an estimate in his own mind of the deed, and of the author of it, and according to that estimate, forming a judgment and pronouncing sentence, that is, the act of a man justifying the wisdom and the justice of God. (Matt. xi, 19; Psalm 81,) of a Prince justifying the cause of his subject, of a Pharisee justifying himself, (Luke xvi, 15,) of God justifying the deed of Phinehas, (Psalm cvi, 31,) and our Lord's justification of the conduct of the publican. (Luke xviii, 14.) III. From this necessary distinction of the words it appears that Bellarmine both admits an equivocation, and feigns an adversary for himself that is not adverse to him, when he proposes the state of the controversy which exists between him and us on this doctrine in these words: "Is the righteousness by which we are formally justified, inherent or imputative?" (1.) The equivocation lies in this -- that the word

"justification," when it is occupied about inherent righteousness, signifies the infusion of righteousness; but when it is employed respecting imputative righteousness, it signifies the estimate of the mind, the judgment, and the pronouncing of the sentence.

(3.) He invents an adversary; because no one denies that the form by which any man is intrinsically righteous, and is declared to be so, is the habit or inherent quality of righteousness. But we deny that the word "justification" is received in this sense in St.

Paul's disputation against the gentiles and the Jews, (Rom. 2, 3, 4, 5,) and against the false brethren, (Gal. 2, 3, 5,) or even by St. James in his epistle. Wherefore, we must maintain, either that the controversy between the papists and us, is respecting justification when received as the act of a judge, or that our controversy has nothing in common with that of St. Paul. (James 2.)

IV. The justification, therefore, of a man before God is that by which, when he is placed before the tribunal of God, he is considered and pronounced, by God as a judge, righteous and worthy of the reward of righteousness; whence also the recompense of reward itself follows by necessity of consequence. (Rom. 2, 3; Luke xviii, 14.) But since three things come under consideration in this place -- man who is to be judged, God the judge, and the law according to which judgment must be passed. Each of them may be variously considered, and it is also necessary, according to these three to vary justification itself. (1.) For man may be considered either as having discharged the works of righteousness without sin, (Rom. ii, 16,) or as a sinner. (iii, 23.) (2.) God may be viewed as seated on a throne of rigid and severe justice, (Psalm cxliii, 2,) or on a throne of grace and mercy. (Heb. iv, 16.) (3.) The law is either that of works, or that of faith; (Rom. iii, 27;) and since each of these has a natural correspondence together and mutually agree with each other, justification may be reduced to two opposite species or forms; of which the one is called that "of the law, in the law, or through the law, of the works of the law, of him that worketh and performs the law, of debt and not of grace." (Rom. 2, 3, 4, 9, 11,) But the other is styled that "of faith, from faith, through faith, of a sinner who believes, freely bestowed, of grace and not of debt, and without the works of the law." (Gal. 2, 3, 5.) V. But since the law is two-fold, of which mention is made in the question of justification, that is, the moral and the ceremonial, (for the judicial part of the law does not in this place come under discussion,) we must see how and in what sense justification is either attributed to each of them or taken away from it. (1.) Justification is ascribed to the MORAL LAW because the works prescribed are of and in themselves pleasing to God, and are righteousness itself strictly and rigidly taken, so that he who does them is on that very account righteous, without absolution or gratuitous imputation. For this reason justification cannot be taken away from it, unless for its non-performance. (1 Sam. xv, 21, 22; Amos v, 21-,3; Rom. x, 5.) Hence justification by the moral law may be defined: "It is that by which a man, having performed the duties of the moral law without transgression, and being placed before the tribunal of the severe justice of God, is accounted and declared by God to be righteous and worthy of the reward of eternal life, in himself, of debt, according to the law, and without grace, to his own salvation, and to the glory both of divine and human righteousness." (Rom. iv, 4; iii, 27; Ephes. ii, 8, 9.) VI. (2.) But the rule of the Ceremonial law is widely different. For its works are neither of themselves pleasing to God, to enable them to come under the name of righteousness; nor have they such a consideration that absolution from sins committed against the moral law can be obtained through them, or that they can be graciously imputed for righteousness. (Micah vi, 6-8; Col. ii, 16, 20, 21.) For this reason, in the Scriptures, justification is taken away from it, not because it was not performed, but simply on account of the weakness of itself, and not of the flesh which sinned. (Acts xiii, 39; Heb. ix, 10.) Yet its use for justification is two-fold according to its double reference to the moral law and the offenses committed against it, and to Christ and faith in Him. According to the former, it is the hand-writing recording debts and sins.

(Col. ii, 14 -- 17.) According to the latter, it contains a shadow and type of Christ, and of "good things to come," that is, of righteousness and life. (Heb. x, 1.) According to the latter, it shewed Christ typically; (Gal. ii, 16;) according to the former, it compelled men to flee to Him, through faith in him. (Gal. iii, 21-24.) VII. And this is the cause why the Apostle Paul takes away justification together and at once from the whole law, though for different causes which it is not always necessary to enumerate. (Rom. iii, 20, 28; Gal. ii, 16; John v, 24; Psalm cxliii, 2; Rom. 3, 4.) But justification is attributed to faith, not because it is that very righteousness which can be opposed to the rigid and severe judgment of God, though it is pleasing to God; but because, through the judgment of mercy triumphing over justice, it obtains absolution from sins, and is graciously imputed for righteousness.

(Acts xiii, 39.) The cause of this is, not only God who is both just and merciful, but also Christ by his obedience, offering, and intercession according to God through his good pleasure and command. But it may be thus defined, "it is a justification by which a man, who is a sinner, yet a believer, being placed before the throne of grace which is erected in Christ Jesus the Propitiation, is accounted and pronounced by God, the just and merciful Judge, righteous and worthy of the reward of righteousness, not in himself but in Christ, of grace, according to the gospel, to the praise of the righteousness and grace of God, and to the salvation of the justified person himself."

(Rom. iii, 24-26; 3, 4, 5, 10, 11.)

VIII. It belongs to these two forms of justification, when considered in union and in opposition. First. To be so adverse as to render it impossible for both of them at once to meet together in one subject. For he who is justified by the law, neither is capable nor requires to be justified by faith; (Rom. iv, 14, 15;) and it is evident that the man who is justified by faith could not have been justified by the law. (xi, 6.) Thus the law previously excludes faith by the cause, and faith excludes the law by the consequence of conclusion. Secondly. They cannot be reconciled with each other, either by an unconfused union, or by admixture. For they are perfect simple forms, and separated in an individual point, so that by the addition of a single atom, a transition is made from the one to the other. (Rom. iv, 4, 5; ix, 30- 32.) Thirdly. Because a man must be justified by the one or the other of them, otherwise he will fall from righteousness and therefore from life. (Rom. x, 3-6, Gal. iii, 10; James ii, 10.) Because the gospel is the last revelation; "for therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith;"

and, after this, no other revelation must be expected. (Heb. i, 1.) IX. From the premises thus laid down according to the Scriptures, we conclude, that justification, when used for the act of a Judge, is either purely the imputation of righteousness through mercy from the throne of grace in Christ the propitiation made to a sinner, but who is a believer; (Rom. i, 16, 17; Gal. iii, 6, 7;) or that man is justified before God, of debt, according to the rigor of justice without any forgiveness.

(Rom. 3, 4.) Because the Papists deny the latter, they ought to concede the former.

And this is such a truth, that, how high soever may be the endowments of any one of the Saints in faith, hope and charity, and however numerous and excellent the works of faith, hope and charity may be which he has performed, he will receive no sentence of justification from God the Judge, unless He quit the tribunal of his severe justice and ascend the throne of grace, and from it pronounce a sentence of absolution in his favour, and unless the Lord of his mercy and pity graciously account for righteousness the whole of that good with which the saint appears before Him. For, woe to a life of the utmost innocency, if it be judged without mercy. (Psalm xxxii, 1, 2, 5, 6; cxliii, 2; 1 John i, 7-10; 1 Cor. iv, 4.) This is a confession which even the Papists seem to make when they assert, that the works of the Saints cannot stand before the judgment of God unless they be sprinkled with the blood of Christ.

X. Hence we likewise deduce: That if the righteousness by which we are justified before God, the Judge, can be called formal, or that by which we are formally justified, (for the latter is Bellarmine's phraseology,) then the formal righteousness, and that by which we are formally justified, can on no account be called "inherent;"

but that, according to the phrase of the Apostle, it may in an accommodated sense be denominated "imputed," as either being that which is righteousness in God's gracious account, since it does not merit this name according to the rigor of justice or of the law, or as being the righteousness of another, that is, of Christ, which is made ours by God's gracious imputation. Nor is there any reason why they should be so abhorrent from the use of this word, "imputed," since the apostle employs the same word eleven times in the fourth chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, where the seat of this point or argument lies, and since the efficacy to salvation of God's gracious estimation is the same, as that of His severe and rigid estimation would be if man had perfectly fulfilled the law without any transgression. (2 Cor. v, 19, 21.) XI. And though Bellarmine, by confounding the word "justification," by distinguishing faith into that which is formed and unformed, by making a difference between the works of the law, and those performed by renewed persons through the virtue of the Holy Spirit, and by not ascribing a reward even to these works, unless because it has been promised gratuitously, and promised to those who are already placed in a state of grace and of the adoption of sons, by which he confesses they have likewise a right to the heavenly inheritance, by granting besides, that the reward itself exceeds the worthiness of the work, and by bringing down to a rigid examination the whole life of the man who is to be judged, though by these methods Bellarmine endeavours to explain the sentiments of the Romish Church so as to make them appear in unison with those of the apostle; (or, at least that they may not openly clash with those of St. Paul;) yet, since the Church of Rome asserts, that the good works of the Saints fully satisfy the law of God according to the state of this life, and really merit eternal life; that when we suffer for sins by rendering satisfaction, we are made conformable to Christ Jesus who gave satisfaction for sins; and that the works of the Saints, prayer, fasting, alms- giving, and others, are satisfactory [to divine justice] for temporal punishment, indeed for every punishment, and, what is more, for guilt itself, and are thus expiatory for sins; since she declares that the sacrifice of the mass is a propitiation for the sins and punishments both of the living and the dead; and since she says that the works of some men are super-erogatory, and extols them so much as to affirm that they are useful to others for salvation; since these are the assertions of the Church of Rome, we declare that her doctrine stands directly opposed to that of the apostle.

DISPUTATION 20

ON CHRISTIAN LIBERTY

RESPONDENT: ENGELBERT SIBELIUS

I. Liberty, generally, is a state according to which every one is at his own disposal, and not bound to another person. Bondage or slavery is opposed to it, according to which a man is not his own master, but is subject to another, either to do what he commands, to omit what he forbids, or to endure what he inflicts. Christian Liberty is so called chiefly from Christ the Author, who procured it; it has received this appellation also from its subjects, because it belongs to Christians, that is, to believers in Christ. But it pre- supposes servitude; because Christ was not necessary for any, except for "those who, through fear of death, were all their life-time subject to bondage." (Heb. ii, 15.)

II. Christian Liberty is that state of the fullness of grace and truth in which believers are placed by God through Christ, and are sealed by the Holy Spirit. It consists partly of a deliverance from both the real and the economic bondage of sin and the law, and partly of adoption into the right of the sons of God, and of the mission of the Spirit of the Son into their hearts. Its end is the praise of the glorious grace of God in Christ, and the eternal salvation of believers.

III. The efficient cause of Christian Liberty is God the Father, who offers it; (Col. i, 12, 13;) the Son, who, as Mediator, confers it; (John viii, 36; Gal. v, 1;) and the Holy Spirit, who inwardly seals it. (2 Cor. iii, 17, 18.) The internal cause is the grace of God, and his love for man in Christ Jesus. (Luke i, 78.) The external cause is the ransom, or the price of redemption, and the satisfaction, which Christ has paid. (Rom.

v, 6-21; vii, 2, 3.) The sealing and preserving cause is the Holy Spirit, who is both the earnest and the witness in the hearts of believers. (Rom. viii, 15, 16; Ephes. i, 13, 14.) The instrument is two-fold. One on the part of God, who exhibits this liberty; the other on the part of man, who receives it. (1.) On the part of God, the instrument is the saving doctrine concerning the mercy of God in Christ, which is therefore called "the ministry of reconciliation." (2 Cor. v, 19.) (2.) On the part of man, it is faith in Christ.

(John i, 12; Rom. v, 2; Gal. iii, 26.) The matter about which it is exercised is not only sin, and the law "which is the strength of sin;" but also the power or privilege of the sons of God, and the Spirit of Christ.

IV. The form consists in deliverance from the spiritual bondage of sin and the law, both real and economical, in the donation of the right to be the sons of God, (Col. i, 13,) and in the sending forth of the Holy Spirit into the hearts of believers. (Gal. iv, 6.) Its subjects are all believers, who are freed from the tyranny of sin and of the law, and received by God on account of Christ as sons, through the grace of adoption. (Gal. iii, 26.) The chief end is the praise of the glorious grace of God; (Ephes. i, 14;) the subordinate end is the salvation of believers. (Rom. vi, 22.) The effects or fruits are two: The first serves for consolation. (Heb. vi, 18- 20.) The other, for admonition, that

"being made free from sin, we may become the servants of righteousness." (Rom. vi, 18-22; 1 Pet. ii, 16.)

V. But because this liberty is opposed to the bondage which preceded it, we must on this account treat in the first place about that bondage, that the design of this liberty may be the more easily rendered evident. We must know, that the first man was created free by God; but that, having abused his liberty, he lost it, and was made the slave of him to whom he yielded obedience, that is, to sin, both as it respects the guilt of condemnation and its dominion; which is real bondage and consummate misery. To this succeeded the economical bondage, [or that of the dispensation of Moses,] which God introduced by the repetition of the Moral Law, and by the imposition of the Ceremonial. The bondage under the Moral Law was its rigid demands, by which man, being reduced to despair of fulfilling it, might acknowledge the tyranny of sin which reigned or held dominion over him. The bondage under the Ceremonial Law was its testifying to condemnation; by which man might be convinced of guilt, and thus through both these kinds of bondage might flee to Christ, who could deliver him from the guilt of sin and from its dominion.

VI. Let us now see how believers are delivered from this bondage by Christian liberty.

We will restrict this consideration to the church of the New Testament, to which the whole of this liberty belongs, omitting the believers under the Old Testament. Though to these likewise belonged, through the promise of the blessed seed and through faith in Him, (Gen. iii, 15; xv, 6,) a deliverance from real bondage, the privilege of the sons of God, and the Spirit of adoption, which was intermixed with the spirit of economical bondage. (Gal. iv, 1-3.)

VII. We circumscribe Christian liberty within four ranks or degrees. The First degree consists in a freedom from the guilt and condemnation of sin, which has been expiated by the blood of Christ, by faith in which we obtain remission of sins, and justification from those things from which we could not be absolved by the law of Moses. The Second degree consists in the deliverance from the dominion and tyranny of indwelling sin; because its power is mortified and weakened by the Spirit of Christ dwelling in us, that it may no longer have dominion over those who are under grace.

(Rom. vi, 14.) But both these degrees of Christian Liberty have their origin in this -that sin was condemned in the flesh of Christ, and it therefore does not possess the power either to condemn or to command. (Rom. viii, 3.)

VIII. We place the Third degree in the attempering of that rigor by which God demanded the observance of the Moral Law in the primeval state, and could afterwards have demanded it, if it had been his pleasure still to act towards men in the same manner. Indeed, God did actually demand it, but in an economical way, from the people of the Old Testament; of which he gave manifest indications in that terrific legislation on Mount Sinai. (Exod. xx, 18; Gal. iv, 24, 25.) "But we are come unto Mount Sion, and to Jesus the Mediator of the new covenant," whose "yoke is easy and his burden light;" (Isa. ii, 3; Micah iv, 2; Heb. xii, 18-24; Matt. xi, 30;) because Christ has broken the yoke of exaction, and it has been the good pleasure of God to treat with man according to clemency in the compact of the New Testament.

IX. We place the Fourth degree in a freedom from the economical bondage of the ceremonial law, which had a fourfold respect under the Old Testament. (1.) For it was the seal of condemnation, and the hand-writing, or bond of our debt. (Gal. iii, 21; Heb. x, 3, 4.) (2.) It was a symbol and token, by which the Jews might be distinguished from all other nations till the advent of Christ. (Gen. xvii, 13. 14.) (3.) It was a typical shadowing forth of Christ, and a prefiguration of his benefits. (Heb. ix, 9, 10; x, 1.) (4.) Lastly, it resembled a sentinel or guard, a schoolmaster and tutor, by whom the church might be safely kept, in its state of infancy, under the elements of the world, in hopes of the promised and approaching Messiah, and might be led to faith in Him, and be conducted to Him, as St. Paul teaches at the conclusion of the third chapter of his Epistle to the Galatians, and at the commencement of the fourth.

X. The First of these respects of the Ceremonial Law must have been removed, after the condemnation of sin was taken away, of which it was the seal. But we have already shewn in the seventh Thesis, that this condemnation has been abolished by Christ. The consequence, therefore is, that it has also obtained its end or purpose; as St. Paul teaches us in Col. ii, 14, where he says, Christ has blotted out the handwriting of ordinances that was against us, which was contrary to us, and took it out of the way, nailing it to his cross." He sprinkled it over with his own blood and obliterated it. For the Second also of these respects, a place can no longer be found, since the Gentiles, "who were formerly far off, have been made nigh by the blood of Christ. For he is our peace, who hath made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us. Having abolished in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in ordinances; for to make in himself, of twain, One New Man, so making peace," &c. (Ephes. ii, 13-15.) The Third respect consisted of types and shadows which prefigured Christ with his benefits. This can on no account continue after the body or substance itself has been already displayed. (Col.

ii, 17.) And, lastly, the Fourth respect, since the advent of Christ, is useless. For when the heir has arrived at the age of maturity, he no longer requires a governor, tutor and schoolmaster, but is himself capable of managing his inheritance, of being his own adviser, and of consulting his own judgment in the things to be possessed. Thus, after the church has passed through the years of infancy, and has entered on the age of maturity in Christ, it is no longer held under the Mosaic worship, under the beggarly elements of this world," but is subject to the guidance of the Spirit of Christ. (Rom.

viii, 15; Gal. iv, 4-7.)

Grievous, therefore, is the error of the Pharisees and the Ebionites, in which they maintained, that the observance of the ceremonial law must be joined to the gospel, even by those Christians who had previously been Gentiles.

XI. To this Fourth degree of Christian Liberty we add, the free use and exercise of things indifferent. Yet it has been the will of God, that this liberty should be circumscribed by two laws, that of charity and that of faith, (Rom. xiv, 5, 14; 13,) thus consulting his own glory and the salvation of his church. The law of faith prescribes that you be rightly instructed concerning the legitimate use of things indifferent; and sufficiently confirmed [or "fully persuaded in your own mind."] The law of charity commands you to procure the edification of your neighbour, whether he be a weak brother or one who is confirmed. You have examples in Romans 14; 1 Cor. 8; 9; x, 27-33; Acts xvi, 3. It is a part of the same law, that you should abide by the ceremonies which are received in the church, lest by an outrageous and unseasonable change you produce a schism in the church, or be the cause of much trouble.

I. Those persons, therefore, err greatly who, in abstaining from this liberty, prefer their own private advantage and happiness to the edification of their neighbour.

II. They err still more grievously who abuse this liberty to satiate the lusts of the flesh, (Gal. v, 13,) or by an unseasonable zeal to despise and offend their weak brethren.

(Rom. xiv, 3, 10.)

III. But those err the most grievously of all who either affix the observance of necessity to things indifferent, or suppose those things to be indifferent which are by no means such.

XII. To these, perhaps not without profit, we shall add a Fifth degree of liberty, that is, an immunity from the judicial laws of the Jewish courts. On this subject we must hold, that the political laws of Moses contain, (1.) The political common law of nature. (2.) A particular law suited to the Jewish nation. The common law of nature embraces the universal notions of justice, equity and honesty. The particular law, as it was peculiar to the Jewish nation, was so far defined by certain determinations, according to the persons for whose benefit it was confirmed, according to the affairs and transactions concerning which it was confirmed, and the circumstances with which it was confirmed. Hence a judgment ought to be formed of the immutability and mutability of these laws. Whatever has been appointed for the general good, according to the universal principles of nature and the common design of the moral law, either by commanding or forbidding, by rewarding or punishing, it is immutable.

Therefore, to such a thing Christian Liberty does not extend itself. What portion soever of the particular law has a particular respect, it is changeable. Christians, therefore, are not bound by these laws, so far as they are determined by a particular law after the manner of the Jewish Commonwealth, that is, of particular persons, actions, and of a particular end or good. But with regard to those portions of these laws which are of a mixed kind, we must distinguish in them that which is moral from that which is political. Whatever is moral, is binding, and remains either by common reason or by analogy. Whatever is political, is not binding with regard to particular determinations.

Therefore, we disapprove of the ridiculous imitation adopted by Monetarius and Carolastadius, who obliged Christian magistrates to the necessity of observing the peculiar forensic laws of Moses in their administration of justice.

XIII. The privilege or right of the sons of God, and the sending of the spirit of adoption into the hearts of believers follow this liberty from the bondage of sin and the law, to which is annexed peace of conscience. (Rom. viii, 15; Gal. iv, 5, 6.) That right consists in their being constituted heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ; and to this privilege belongs not only the blessed immortality of their souls, but likewise the deliverance of their bodies from vanity, and from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God; which also comes under the name of adoption, and is called "the redemption of our bodies." (Rom. viii, 15-23.) Hence, likewise those who shall be "the children of the resurrection," are called "the children of God."

(Luke xx, 36.) But the Spirit of adoption is sent into the hearts of the sons of God, as being the Spirit of the Son, that He may be the earnest, the seal, and the first-fruits of this inheritance; (Gal. iv, 6; 2 Cor. i, 22; Ephes. i, 14;) by which we are assured, that, as "our life is hidden with Christ in God, when Christ shall gloriously appear we shall also be manifested with him in glory." (Col. iii, 4.) And thus the liberty of glory, that will endure forever, will succeed to this liberty of grace, which we obtain in this world by Christ Jesus our Lord, through faith in his blood: To whom be praise forever!

In the place of a conclusion it is inquired,

I. Whether freedom from the bondage of sin, and from economical bondage, be effected by one and the same act, or by two acts? We affirm the former.

II. Whether it is lawful to eat those things which are offered in sacrifice to idols? We make a distinction.

DISPUTATION 21

ON THE ROMAN PONTIFF, AND THE PRINCIPAL TITLES WHICH ARE

ATTRIBUTED TO HIM

RESPONDENT: JOHN MARTINIUS

I. For many ages past, all who have had any knowledge of the Pope of Rome, have held no low or moderate sentiments about him, but have entertained exaggerated notions about him and uttered the most lofty and excessive eulogies. This was required by that sublime degree of dignity to which he has been elevated. Yet the things which have been spoken concerning him are so diverse, as well as adverse, as to render it matter of wonder that such various and contrary judgments and eulogies about one and the same person, can be found among men who are Christians, at least so far as their own profession is concerned. For some persons not only adorn, but literally load him with titles the most honourable, when they give him the appellation of the spouse, the head, the foundation of the Catholic Church, the vicar of God and Christ on earth, the absolute lord of the whole Christian world with regard to spiritual things, in temporal things likewise, so far as they are ordained for spiritual things, and the Prince of Pastors and of Bishops. Others disparage him with titles quite contrary, such as, the adulterer and pimp of the Church, the false prophet, the destroyer and subverter of the Church, the enemy of God and the Antichrist, the wicked and perverse servant, who neither discharges the duties of a Bishop, nor is worthy to bear the name. Uniting ourselves with the band of those who bestow on the Roman Pontiff the epithets last cited, we assert that he is unworthy of the honourable titles which precede them, and that the latter disparaging epithets are attributed to Him through his just deserts, which we now proceed to prove in a few Theses.

II. The Spouse and Husband of the church universal is one by a most particular unity, otherwise the church would be an adulteress. His properties are these: He has loved the church, has exposed or given himself for her, has purchased her for himself, with his own blood, has formed her of his own flesh and bones by the Spirit of regeneration, hath sanctified and cleansed her by his own blood and by his Spirit, that he might present her holy, unblamable and glorious. (Ephes. v, 25-27; Acts xx, 28.) He has sealed her for an espoused wife to himself by the earnest of his Spirit, as with a nuptial ring, (2 Cor. i, 21, 22; Rom. viii, 9, 15, 16,) and imparts to her his own blessings necessary and sufficient for life and salvation. (Ephes. v, 23.) To Him the church has respect, and asks, expects and receives all good things from Him alone.

(Acts iv, 12; Rev. xxii, 17.) And to Him the apostles [and their successors] are preparing to present her as a chaste virgin to one husband." (2 Cor. xi, 2.) These properties belong to Christ alone: But the Roman Pontiff is not Christ. Therefore, he is neither the spouse nor the husband of the church universal. Nor can any greater affinity be framed between Christ and the Roman Pontiff, even when conducting himself in the best manner, than that which is signified by the word "the friend of the bridegroom," and "the brideman." (John iii, 29.) III. The Head of the church is but one; otherwise the church would be a monster. His properties are these: He is united to the church by the internal bond of the Spirit and of faith (John xvii, 15-17; 1 Cor. vi, 17, 19; Ephes. iii, 17.) The church is subject and subordinate to Him. (Ephes. v, 24, 25.) He perfectly contains within himself all things necessary for the life and salvation of the church. He inspires life, sensation and motion into the church by the efficacy of the Spirit. (Gal. ii, 20.) He is affected with the evils which afflict the whole church and the members in general and in particular.

(Heb. iv, 15.) He suffers the persecutions and afflictions which are endured by the church, feeling them as much as if they were inflicted on his own body, and He relieves them. (Acts ix, 4, 5.) In his person the church is raised up together, and seated together in heavenly places in Him. (Ephes. ii, 6.) And therefore, she has her woliteuma "the administration of her public affairs," in heaven. (Phil. iii, 20.) All these properties agree with Christ only. But the Roman Pontiff is not Christ; and therefore, he is neither the head of the church, nor can any affinity be established between Christ, and the Roman Pontiff, which is not signified in the name of some particular member of the body, or of a duty belonging to some member. (Rom. xii, 4-8.) And no greater dignity can belong to the Pope of Rome, under Christ the head, than that which is comprehended under the words, an apostle, prophet, evangelist, teacher, pastor, bishop, [one who can exercise] the power [of working mirades,] the gift of healing, help and government. (1 Cor. xii, 4, 6-31.) All these dignities are ascribed to the members of the body of the church. Therefore, on account of none of them does the title of "head" appertain to this Pontiff.

IV. The Foundation of the church universal is only one, because there is but one house of God and Christ. Its properties are these: It stands by its own power, and does not rest on any extrinsic foundation. (1 Tim. iii, 15.) The whole house, consisting of two people, the Jews and the Gentiles, is built upon this foundation, as upon a chief corner-stone, and is sustained, by the power implanted in it, against all things which can assail it from without, whether from above or from below, on its sides, on the right hand and on the left; it continues immovable, does not totter, is not sunk or overwhelmed, and does not fall. (Heb. iii, 6; Ephes. ii, 20-22; Matt. xvi, 18.) This foundation is the immediate fulcrum or prop and firm support to all the lively stones that are built upon it; "they who believe on Him shall not be ashamed;" but it is a stone of stumbling and a rock of offense to those who do not believe and are disobedient; it dashes them in pieces, and they perish. (Isa. xxviii, 16; 1 Pet. ii, 4-6.) All these properties, both generally and severally, belong to Christ alone. But the Roman Pontiff is not Christ. Therefore, neither is he the foundation of the church. But the metonymy, by which the Prophets and Apostles are called "the foundations of the church," (Rev. xxi, 14,) and by which the saints are said to be "built upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets," (Ephes. ii, 20,) attributes nothing more to them, than their being "labourers together with God" in laying down Christ as this foundation, and in building up the whole house on Him. (1 Cor. iii, 5- 12.) But St.

Peter was also among these; yet he excelled none of the other Apostles in any prerogative, but was inferior to St. Paul, not indeed in power, but in "the more abundant labour" of the latter in building up the church. (1 Cor. xv, 10.) V. God's Vicar-General, or Universal, is one who administers all things in heaven and on earth in the name, at the command, and by the authority of God. To this individual must necessarily appertain, (1.) A Power, inferior indeed, by reason of the dispensation, to his who appointed him, yet most closely approaching to it, and dependent on no other power than that of God. (John v, 22, 26, 27.) So that this power may, not undeservedly, be called autocratorical, possessing within itself absolute sovereignty, and pantocratorical, omnipotent or having power over all things. (John xvii, 2, 24.) (2.) The Knowledge, as well as the Power necessary to administer all things. It cannot be less than divine; for it must be extended to all things generally, and to every thing in particular, and this in an immediate manner if we consider the internal efficacy of government. (1 Cor. xv, 27; Rev. 2 and 3; Phil. iii, 21; Gal. ii, 20.) And this Vicar of God is only Christ, to whom alone these properties belong. But the Roman Pontiff is not Christ. Therefore, he is not God's Universal Vicar, not even in the church, because the same considerations, apply to her as to the whole universe. In the same way, the Universal Vicar of Christ will be one who pleads the cause of Christ, and who, with a power and wisdom purely divine administers all things in His name and by his authority. (John i, 6-8, 13-15.) And this is the Spirit of Christ, his advocate, the Spirit of wisdom and of the power of God, who, in the name of Christ, appoints apostles, prophets, teachers, and bishops; who leads and governs believers, but who convinces and condemns unbelievers. (Acts xx, 28; xiii, 2; Rom. viii, 14.) The Roman Pontiff is not that Spirit, nor hath he received the Spirit without measure.

(Rom. xii, 3.) Neither can the Roman Pontiff, even when his conduct is most exemplary, have any other delegated power under Christ, than that which is particular; because he is not endued with the Spirit, except "according to the measure of the gift of Christ." (Ephes. iv, 7.) And this is bestowed [on the pontiff] not with regard to Christ as a priest, (for that office does not admit of a vicar, or substitute,) but as he is king and prophet supreme, and only so far as concerns the external administration of some part of Christ's kingdom and people, either by doctrine or by government, the internal administration in the mean time remaining entirely vested in Christ, as does also his Spirit. (1 Cor. iii, 5-23.)

VI. The Dominion Over Heaven And Earth, or over the whole church, (for these cannot be separated,) appertains by divine gift to Him alone who has said, "All things are delivered unto me of my Father." (Matt. xi, 27.) "All things which the Father hath, are mine." (John xvii, 10.) "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth: Go ye therefore, and teach all nations." (Matt. xxviii, 18.) "As thou hast given Him power over all flesh, that He should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given Him."

(John xvii, 2.) "Whom God hath set at his own right hand in the heavens, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come." (Ephes. i, 21.) Who is called the beginning," or the principle, "the first-born from the dead; that in all things He might have the preeminence." (Col. i, 18.) In whom the church is "complete; who is the head of all principality and power." (Col. ii, 10.) "On whose vesture and thigh a name is written KING of Kings, and LORD of Lords." (Rev. xix, 16.) Christ alone is thus described. But the Roman Pontiff is not Christ. The distinction of plenary power, with regard to spiritual, and temporals, is contrary both to plenitude of power and to the subordination of things spiritual and temporal; and has been fabricated on account of the defect of the capability of which the pontiff is destitute, to subject temporal things to himself, even among those nations over whom he has obtained the power in spiritual matters.

VII. The Prince of bishops, apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers, is one. (1 Cor. xii, 4, 5, &c.) If it were otherwise, there would be more than a single monarch and dictator in the church, when only one is requisite in a monarchical state and government; but then Duumviri, two governors, would hold the pre-eminence.

His properties are these: To institute, sanctify, and set apart to the work of the ministry, apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, teachers, and all bishops in the church. (Ephes. iv, 5, 6, 11-13.) To prescribe to them what they must say and do.

(Matt. xxviii, 18-20.) To furnish them with necessary and sufficient gifts. (Rom. xii, 3; 2 Cor. iii, 5, 6.) To be present with them, in the power of his Spirit and grace, while engaged in the discharge of their functions. (Matt. xxviii, 20.) To give efficacy to their ministrations. (Mark xvi, 20; 1 Cor. iii, 6.) To compel them to render an account. To make a distinction between the acts and omissions of each; and, according to the different mode of their administrations, to adjudge rewards or punishments. (1 Pet. v, 4; Matt. xxv, 19-30.) And these properties belong to Christ alone. But the Roman Pontiff is not Christ. Therefore, he is not the Prince of bishops; but if he have any claim to this office, even when he behaves himself in his best manner, he cannot be called by any other name than that of a bishop, pastor, or teacher, who ought to acknowledge all bishops as his fellow elders, without any disparity of the power which belongs to the essence of the office. (1 Pet. v, 1.) VIII. Since, therefore, the Roman Pontiff either attributes these most honourable titles of Christ to himself, or willingly suffers them to be ascribed to him; and since he evinces no horror at the blasphemy contained in these titles, and gives no tokens of his displeasure at this ascription of them; it follows, that he puts himself in the place of Christ, and is supremely opposed to Him. There is no excuse in the explanation which is given, that "the head and foundation is ministerial, and that he attributes all these things to himself under Christ, as having been elevated by the grace or favour of God and Christ to that dignity." For the protestation is directly contrary to the fact; and he is so much the more the bitter enemy of God and Christ, as he the more confidently boasts of being defended by the authority of God and Christ. Such conduct is, in fact, under the semblance of friendship to exercise the deepest enmity, and, under the disguised pretext of a minister of light and of righteousness, to promote the interests of the kingdom of darkness and of unrighteousness. On this very account, therefore, we assert that the disparaging epithets which we laid down in our first Thesis, most justly belong to him; and this we now proceed to show by descending to particulars.

IX. First. The name of the Adulterer and The Pimp of the Church is his. (1.) He is the Adulterer of the church, both by the public and mutual profession of each other; because he calls the [Roman Catholic] church his and she neither disowns the arrogance of this title nor is afraid of the odium [attached to such assumption,] and he is the adulterer in reality. For he practices spiritual adultery with the church, and she in return with him. He commands the apocryphal writings to be accounted divine and canonical; the ancient Latin version of the Scriptures, [commonly called] the vulgate, to be every where received as the true original, and under no pretense whatever to be rejected; his own interpretations of the Scriptures to be embraced with the most undoubting faith; and unwritten traditions to be honoured with an affection and reverence equal to that evinced for the written word of God. He enacts and rescinds laws that pertain to faith and morals, and binds them as fetters on consciences. He promises and offers plenary indulgences, and the remission of all sins, through the plenitude of his power. "He exalteth himself above all that is worshipped," and offers himself as some god to be adored with religious worship. In all these acts the church, deceived by his artifices, complies with his wishes. He is, therefore, the Adulterer of the church. (2.) But he is also the Pimp or Pander of the church, because he acts towards her as the author, persuader, impelling exciter and procurer of various spiritual adulteries committed, or to be hereafter committed, with different husbands, with angels, Mary and other deceased saints, with images of God, of Christ, of the Holy Ghost, of the cross, of angels, of Mary, and of saints; with the bread in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper; and with other inanimate objects.

X. To him likewise belongs the name of The False Prophet, whom the Scripture calls

"the tail," in opposition to "the head;" (Isa. ix, 15;) and this, whether it be received in a general acceptation, or in a particular sense and restricted to a certain and determinate person. (1.) In its general meaning, whether it signifies him who teaches falsehood without arrogating to himself the name of a prophet, or him who falsely boasts of being a prophet, the latter of which seems to be the proper signification of the word. (2 Pet. ii, 1; Acts xiii, 6.) For, first, he partly introduced into the church many false dogmas; and partly those which were introduced when such a great mystery of iniquity was finished, he defends, maintains and propagates. Of this kind, the dogmas concerning the insufficiency of the scriptures without traditions, to prove and confirm ever necessary truth, and to confute all errors; that it is of the last necessity unto salvation for every human creature to be under subjection to the Roman pontiff; that the bread in the Lord's supper is transubstantiated, or changed in substance, into the body of Christ; that in the mass Christ is daily offered by the priest as a propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of the living and of the dead; that man is justified before God, partly by faith, and partly by works; that there is a purgatory, into which the souls of those enter who are not yet sufficiently purified, and that they are released from it by prayers, intercessions, watchings, alms-deeds, indulgences,

&c. In the Second sense, this epithet is due to him, because he says that he is a prophet, who, on account of the perpetual assistance of the Holy Spirit, which is attached to that chair, cannot possibly err in things which pertain to faith and morals.

(2.) But it also belongs to him in the restricted meaning of the word; because the Roman pontiff is "the false prophet who works miracles before the beast, (Rev. xix, 20,) "out of whose mouth comes out three unclean spirits like frogs," (xvi, 13,) and who is not improperly understood to be "the tail of the great red dragon, that drew the third part of the stars of heaven." (xii, 4.)

XI. He is also deservedly called The Destroyer And Subverter Of The Church. For since the superstructure of the church "is built by the faith of the doctrine of the apostles and prophets, which rests on Jesus Christ himself, the chief Corner-stone,"

since it likewise increases more and more through the obedience of faith in the right worship of the Deity and in the pursuit after holiness; and since it is built up in the Lord, being fitly framed together into one body through the bond of peace and concord; (Ephes. ii, 20, 21; iv, 3; 2 Pet. ii, 5, 6;) the Roman pontiff demonstrates himself to be, in a four-fold manner, the subverter of this edifice: First, by perverting the faith. This he effects, (1.) By adding the books of the apocrypha and unwritten traditions to the prophetical and apostolical scriptures. (2.) By joining himself, as another foundation, with Christ who is the only foundation. (3.) By mixing numerous false dogmas with those which are true. (4.) By taking away some things that are true, or corrupting them by false interpretations. Secondly, by adulterating the integrity of divine worship. This he does, (1.) By an addition to the persons who alone, according to God and his command, are to be objects of worship. (2.) By the introduction of a method which is expressly forbidden by God. (3.) By introducing vain, ridiculous and old wives' superstitions. (4.) By the institution of various peculiar societies of devotees, separate fraternities, and newly fabricated religious orders of Francis, Dominic, &c. Thirdly, by vitiating the purity or soundness of holiness and morals.

This he accomplishes chiefly by the following acts: (1.) By inventing easy methods of obtaining remission of sins and plenary indulgences. (2.) By declaring certain precepts in the name of councils. (3.) By absolving many persons from the obligation of their duties. (4.) By binding men to [the performance of] those things, which no one whatever is capable of understanding or accomplishing. (5.) By bringing into the Christian world the worst examples of all wickedness. Fourthly, by breaking the bond of concord and unity. This he effects chiefly by these acts and artifices, (1.) When he arrogates to himself a power over others, which by no right belongs to him. (2.) When he obtrudes many false dogmas to be believed as true, and unnecessary things as absolutely necessary. (3.) By excommunications and senseless fulminations, by which he madly rages against those who have not deserved such treatment, and who are not subject to his diocese. (4.) When he excites dissensions between princes, republics and magistrates and their subjects; or when he foments, increases and perpetuates such dissensions, after they have been raised in other quarters.

XII. It is demonstrable by the most evident arguments that the name of Antichrist and of The Adversary of God belongs to him. For the apostle ascribes the second of these epithets to him when he calls him "the man of sin, the son of perdition, who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; so that he, as God, sitteth in the temple of God, shewing himself that he is God." (2 Thess. ii, 3-8.) It was he who should arise out of the ruins of the Roman empire, and should occupy its vacant digaity. These expressions, we assert, must be understood, and can be understood, solely respecting the Roman pontiff. But the name of "The Antichrist"

belongs to him pre-eminently, whether the particle anti signifies opposition, or the substitution of one thing for another; not indeed such a substitution as is lawfully and legitimately made by Him who has the power of placing things in subordination, but it signifies one by which any man is substituted, either by himself or by another person through force and fraud. For he is both a rival to Christ, and his adversary, when he boasts of himself as the spouse, the head, and the foundation of the church, endowed with plenitude of power; and yet he professes himself to be the vicegerent of Christ, and to perform his functions on earth, for the sake of his own private advantage, but to the manifest injury of the church of Christ. He has, however, considered it necessary to employ the name of Christ as a pretext, that under this sacred name he may obtain that reverence for himself among Christians, which he would be unable to procure if he were openly to profess himself to be either the Christ, or the adversary of Christ.

XIII. Although the Roman pontiff calls himself "the servant of the servants of God,"

yet we further assert that he is by way of eminence, That Wicked And Perverse Servant, who, when he saw that his Lord delayed his coming, "began to smite his fellow-servants." (Matt. 24, 48.) For the Roman pontiff has usurped domination and tyranny, not only over his fellow- servants, the bishops of the church of God, but likewise over emperors and kings themselves, whose authority and dignity he had himself previously acknowledged. To acquire this domination for himself, and still further to augment and establish it, he has employed all kinds of satanic instruments --sophistical hypocrisy, lies, equivocations, perfidy, perjury, violence, poison, and armed forces -- so that he may most justly be said to have succeeded that formidable beast which "was like unto a leopard, a bear and a lion," and by which the Roman empire was prefigured -- and to have "had power to give life unto the image of the beast, and to cause that as many as would not worship the image of the beast, should be killed."

XIV. Lastly, though from all these remarks it will readily appear that the Roman pontiff is unworthy of the name of apostle, prophet, evangelist, pastor, teacher, and of universal bishop; (1 Cor. iii, 5; xii, 28; Ephes. iv, 11;) yet, by this single argument, which is deduced from their peculiar attributes and duties, the very same satisfactory conclusions may be rendered evident to all who search the scriptures of the Old and the New Testament, and especially the epistles of St. Paul to Timothy and Titus. (1

Tim. 3; Tit. 1.) Nor will this evasion avail any thing, "that whatever a man does through another who is his vicar or substitute, he seems to do it himself;" for it is Christ alone who makes use of the vicarious aid of these persons as ministers; and the duties which they perform, are such as ought to be discharged by those who are distinguished by those titles. (Gal. i, 7-9.) Therefore, that rightly appertains to the Roman pontiff which God threatens through the prophet Zechariah, that he will raise up a foolish shepherd, and an idol shepherd, who shall devote no attention to the sheep, but who "shall eat the flesh of the fat, and tear their claws in pieces." (Zech. xi, 15-17.) God grant that the church, being delivered from the frauds and tyranny of Antichrist, may obtain shepherds that may feed her in truth, charity and prudence, to the salvation of the sheep themselves, and to the glory of the chief Shepherd. Amen.

COROLLARIES

I. It is a part of religious wisdom to separate the Court of Rome from the church, in which the pontiff sits. II. The Roman pontiff, even when conducting himself with the greatest propriety, must not be acknowledged by any human or positive right as the head of the church, or the universal bishop; and such acknowledgment of him has hitherto contributed, and does in its very nature contribute, not so much to preserve unity in the church, and to restrain the license of thinking, speaking and teaching differently on the chief articles of religion, as to take away necessary liberty, and that which is agreeable to the word of God, and to introduce a real tyranny.

DISPUTATION 22

THE CASE OF ALL THE PROTESTANT OR REFORMED CHURCHES, WITH

RESPECT TO THEIR ALLEGED SECESSION

RESPONDENT: JAMES CUSINE

We assert that the Reformed Churches have not seceded from the church of Rome; and that they have acted properly in refusing to hold and profess a communion of faith and of divine worship with her.

I. I feel disposed to prove, in few words, for the glory of God, for the tranquillity of weak consciences, and for the direction of erring minds -- that those congregations who take upon themselves the title of "Reformed or Protestant Churches," have not made a secession from the church of Rome, and that they have acted aright, that is, wisely, piously, justly, and moderately, in refusing to hold and profess communion of faith and worship with the Romish church.

II. By the term, "the Church of Rome," we understand, not that congregation of men, who, confined within the walls of the city of Rome, profess the Christian faith, (although this is the only proper interpretation of that term;) not the court of Rome, which consists of the pope and of the cardinals united with him -- not the representative church, assembled together in council, and having the Roman pontiff as president, nor the pope of Rome himself, who, under the cover of that title, extols and makes merchandise of his power. But by "the church of Rome" we understand a congregation of Christian, which was formerly dispersed through nearly the whole of Europe, but which is now become more contracted, and in which the Roman pontiff sits, either as the head of the church under Christ, but placed above a general council, or as the principal bishop inferior to a general council, the inspector and guardian of the whole church. This congregation professes, according to the canons contained in the council of Trent, that it believes in God and Christ, and performs acts of worship to them; and it approves of those canons, either because they were composed by the council of Trent, which could not err -- or because it thinks that they are agreeable to the holy Scriptures and to the doctrine of the ancient fathers, without any regard to that council.

III. We call "Reformed churches" those congregations professing the Christian faith which disavow every species of presidency whatever, assumed by the Roman pontiff, and profess to believe in and to perform acts of worship to God and Christ, according to the canons which each of them has comprised in its own confession or catechism; and they approve of such canons, therefore, only because they consider them to be agreeable to the Holy Scriptures, though they yield to the primitive church and the ancient fathers severally their proper places, but always in subordination to the Scriptures.

IV. It cannot be said, that every church makes a secession, which separates from another, neither does the church that is in any manner whatever severed from another, to which it had been united; but a church is said to make a secession from another church to which it was formerly united, when it first and willingly makes a separation in that matter about which they were previously at unity. On this account it is necessary, that these four conditions concur together in the church which can justly be said to have made a secession. One of them is a prerequisite, as if necessarily precedent; the other three are requisites, as if natural to the secession and grounded upon it. The First is that it was formerly in union with the other; to which must be added, an explanation of the matter in which this union consists. The Second is, that a separation has been effected, and indeed in that thing about which it was formerly at unity with the other. The Third is, that it was the first to make the secession. And the Fourth is, that it voluntarily seceded. The whole of these conditions will come under our diligent consideration in the disputation on the present controversy about the dissension between the church of Rome and Reformed churches.

V. But the explanation of another matter must be given, prior to the discussion of this question according to the circumstances now premised; and this is, "In what generally, do the union and the separation of churches consist?" So far as they are the churches of God and of Christ, their Union consists in the following particulars: they have one God and Father, one Lord Jesus Christ, one faith, (or one doctrine of faith,) one hope of their calling, (that is, an inheritance which has been promised and for which they hope,) one baptism, (Ephes. iv, 3-6,) one bread and wine, (1 Cor. x, 16, 17,) and have been joined together in one Spirit with God and Christ, by the bond of faith and charity. (Ephes. iv, 15; Phil. ii, 2.) That is, that by agreement of faith according to truth, and by concord of the will according to charity, they may be one among themselves. This is in no other manner, than as many members of the same body are one among themselves, because all of them have been united with their head, from which, by the bond of the Spirit, life, sensation and motion are derived to each; (Rom. xii, 4; 1 Cor. xii, 12, 13; Ephes. i, 22;) and as many children in the same family are one among themselves, because all of them are connected with their parents by the bond of consanguinity and love. (1 Cor. xiv, 33; Rev. ii, 23.) For all particular churches, whether in amplitude they be greater or less, are large or small members of that great body which is called "the Catholic church;" and in this great family, which is called "the house of God," they are all sisters, according to that passage in Solomon's Song, "We have a little sister." (viii, 8.) No church on earth is the mother of any other church, (Gal. iv, 26,) not even that church from which proceeded the teachers who founded other churches. (Acts viii, 1, 4; xiii, 1, 2.) For no church on earth is the whole body, that is united to Christ the Head. (Heb. xii, 22, 23.) VI. From this description of union among churches, and by an explanation made through similar things according to the Scriptures, it is evident, that, for the purpose of binding churches together, the intervention of two means is necessary. The First is, the bond itself by which they are united. The Second is, God and Christ, with whom being immediately united, they are mediately further united with each other. For the first and immediate relation is between each particular church and Christ. The second and mediate is between a particular church and another of its own kindred. (1 Cor. xii, 12, 13; Ephes. iv, 3; Rom. xii, 5; John xvii, 21; Ephes. ii, 11 13; iv, 16.) From these a two-fold order may be laid down, according to which this conjunction may be considered. (1.) One is, if it take its commencement from Christ, and if that bond intervene, which, issuing from Him, proceeds to every church and [adunat, makes it one,] unites it with Him. Where (i.) Christ must be constituted the Head and the very center of union. (ii.) The Spirit, which, issuing from Christ, proceeds hither and thither. (Ephes. ii, 18; v, 23; Rom. viii, 9.) (iii.) The church of Corinth, at Rome, at Philippi, &c., each of which is united to Christ, by the Spirit that goes forth from Him and proceeds towards the churches, and that abides in them. (1 John iii, 24; iv, 13.) (2.) The other order is, if it take its commencement from the churches, and if that bond intervene which, issuing from them, proceeds to Christ, and binds them to Him.

Where (i.) must be placed the churches of Corinth, of Rome, of Philippi, &c. (ii.) Then may be laid down the faith proceeding from each of them. (iii.) Christ, to whom the faith of all these churches tends and connects each of them with Him. (1 John ii, 24; Ephes. iii, 17.) Because the bond of charity is mutual, it proceeds from Christ to each church, and from every church to Christ. (Ephes. v, 25.) It does not, however, remain there, but goes on to each kindred church; yet so that every church loves her sister church in Christ and for his sake, otherwise it is a confederacy without Christ, or rather against Christ. (1 Cor. xvi, 1, 2, 19.)

VII. From the relation of this union, must be estimated the Separation which is opposed to it, and which cannot be made or explained except by an analysis and resolution of their uniting together. Every particular church therefore must be separated from God and Christ before it can be separated from the church which is allied to it and of the same body; (Ephes. ii, 10, 19-22;) and the bond of faith and charity must be broken before any church can be separated from God and Christ, and thus from any other church. (Rom. xi, 17-24.) But since the Spirit of Christ, the faith by which we believe, and charity, are invisible things which belong to the very inward union and communion of Christ and the churches, it is impossible for men to form any estimate or judgment from them, respecting the union or separation of churches. On this account it is necessary, that certain external things, which are objects of the senses, and which by a certain analogy answer to those inward things, should be placed before men, that we may be able to form a judgment concerning the union of the churches with Christ and among each other, and about their opposite separation.

Those external things are the word, and the visible signs annexed to the word, by which Christ has communication with his church; the profession of faith and of worship, and the exercise of charity by outward works, by which each church testifies its individual union and communion with Christ and with any other church. (Isa. xxx, 21; Rom. x, 15, 17, 10, 13; John xiii, 35.) To this is opposed its separation, consisting in this, that Christ "removes its candlestick out of his place," and the churches vary among themselves in the profession of the faith, omit the requisite duties of charity, and evince and practice hatred towards each other. (Rev.s ii, 5; 2 Chron. xiii, 8, 2, 10.) VIII. But the churches of God and Christ, even those which were instituted by prophets and apostles, may decline by degrees, and sometimes do decline, from the truth of the faith, from the integrity of divine worship, and from their first love, (2

Cor. xi, 3; Gal. i, 6; Rev. ii, 4,) either by adding to the doctrines of faith, to that which is the object of worship, and to the modes and rites with which it is worshipped; or by taking away or by perverting the right meaning of faith, by not considering in a lawful manner that which is worshipped, and by changing the legitimate mode of worship into another form; and yet they are still acknowledged, by God and Christ, as God's churches and people, even at the very time when they worship Jehovah in calves, when they pay divine honours both to Jehovah and to Baal, when they offer to Moloch through the fire the children whom they had borne and reared for Jehovah, (Jer. ii, 11-13; 2 Kings xvi, 3; 1 Kings xviii, 21; Ezek. xvi, 20,) and when they suffer legal ceremonies to be appended to the faith of Christ, and the resurrection to be called in question: (Gal. iii, 1-3; 6; 1 Cor. xv, ) even under these circumstances they are acknowledged as the churches and the people of God, according to external communion by the word and the sacramental signs or tokens, because God does not yet remove the candlestick out of its place, or send them a bill of divorcement. (Rev.

ii, 5; Isa. i, 1.) Hence it arises that the Union between such churches, as have something still left of God and Christ and something of the spirit of lies and idolatry, is two-fold: the One, in regard to those things which they have yet remaining from the first institution which was made by the prophets and apostles: the Other, with respect to those things which have been afterwards introduced by false teachers and false prophets, and especially by that notorious false prophet, "the man of sin, the son of perdition." For though "their word eats as doth a canker," (2 Tim. ii, 17,) yet the goodness and grace of God have prevented it from consuming the whole pure doctrine of the Christian faith. On the other side, its corresponding Separation is as fully opposed to this last mentioned union, as the former union is opposed to its separation.

When therefore the discourse turns on the separation of churches, we ought diligently to consider what thing it is about which the separation has been made.

IX. These things having been thus affirmatively premised, let us now come to the hypothesis of our question, according to the conditions which we said must necessarily be ascribed to the church that may justly be said to have made a secession from another. With regard to the First, which we have said was required as necessarily precedent, we own, that the churches which are now distinguished by the title of

"there formed," were, prior to that reformation, one with the church of Rome, and had with her communion of faith and of worship, and of the offices of charity; nay, that they constituted a part of that church, as she has been defined in the second thesis of this disputation. But we distinctly and expressly add two particulars. (1.) That this union and communion is as that between equals, collaterals, sisters and members; (Sol. Song viii, 8; 1 Cor. xii, 12, 13, 17;) and not as the union which subsists between inferiors and a superior, between sons and their mother, between members and their head: that is, as they speak in the schools of philosophy, the relation between them was that of equiparancy, in which one of the things related is not more the foundation than the other, and therefore the obligation on both sides is equal; yet the Roman pontiff, seated in the chair which he calls apostolical, and which he says is at Rome, affirms the church of Rome to be the mother and head of the rest of the churches. (2.) That this union and communion is partly according to those things which belong to God and Christ, and partly according to those things which appertain to the defection or "falling away" predicted by the apostle as about to come: for "the son of perdition"

is said to be "sitting in the temple of God." (2 Thess. ii, 2-4.) As far therefore as the doctrine of the true faith sounded in these churches, and as far as God and Christ were worshipped, and the offices of charity were legitimately exercised, so far were they One Church of Christ, who patiently bore with them and invited them to repentance.

(Rev. ii, 20, 21.) But as far as the faith has been interpolated with various additions and distorted interpretations, and as far as the divine worship has been depraved by different idolatries and superstitions, and the tokens of benevolence have been exhibited in partaking of the parts offered to idols, so far has the union been according to the spirit of defection and the communion of iniquity. (Rev. ii, 14, 20.) X. With regard to what belongs to the separation of the reformed churches from that of Rome, we must discuss it in two ways; because, as we have already seen, (Thesis 8,) the separation of churches is usually made both with respect to faith and worship, and with respect to charity. These separations are considered to be thus far distinguished, by the churches themselves; so that the church which is separated in reference to faith and worship, is called heretical and idolatrous; and that which is separated in reference to charity, is called schismatical. The first part of the question therefore will be this: "Have the churches which are now called the reformed, made a secession with regard to faith and worship?" Respect being had to the Second condition, (Thesis 4,) we reply, we confess that a secession has been made with regard to faith and worship. For the fact itself testifies, that they differ [from the church of Rome] in many doctrines relating to faith, and that they differ in divine worship. But the reformed deny, that they differ from the Romish church according to those articles of faith which she yet holds through apostolical tradition, or according to [that part of] worship which, being divinely prescribed, the church of Rome yet uses. Of this, proof is afforded in the following brief manner. (1.) For in addition to her laying down the word of God as the only rule of the truth, she professes to approve, in the true and correct sense, of the articles of belief contained in the apostles' creed, as those articles have been explained by the first four general councils; she likewise professes to esteem as certain and ratified those things which the ancient church decreed against Pelagius. (2.) Because she worships God and Christ in spirit and truth, by that method, and with those rites, which have been prescribed in the word of God. She, therefore, confesses that the separation has been made in those things which the church of Rome holds, not as she is the church of Christ, but as she is the Romish and popish church; but that the union remains in those things of Christ which she still retains.

XI. With regard to the Third condition, (Thesis 4,) the reformed churches deny, that they were the first to make the secession. That this may be properly understood, since a separation consists in a variation of faith and worship, they say that the commencement of such variation may be dated from two periods. (1.) Either from the time nearest to the apostles, nay at a period which came within the age of the apostles, when the mystery anomiav, that is. of iniquity, or rather, (if leave may be granted to invent a word still more significant,) when "the mystery of lawlessness began to work," which mystery was subsequently revealed, and which lawlessness was afterwards openly produced by "that man of sin, the son of perdition," who is on this very account called "that wicked," or "that lawless one," and is said to be "revealed."

(2 Thess. ii, 3-8.) The reformed say, that the personage thus described is the Roman pontiff. (2.) Or the commencement of this variation may be dated from the days of Wickliffe, Huss, Luther, Melancthon, Zuinglius, Œcolampadius, Bucer and Calvin, when many congregations of men in various parts of Europe began, at first secretly, but afterwards openly, to recede from the Roman pontiff. The reformed say, that the commencement of the detection and secession must be dated from the former of these two periods; and they confess and lament, that they were themselves, in conjunction with the modern church of Rome, guilty of a defection from the purity of the apostolic and the Roman faith, which the apostle Paul commended in the ancient church of Rome that existed in his days. The papists say that the commencement of the defection and secession must be dated from the latter period, [the days of Huss, Luther, etc,] and affirm that they are not to be accounted guilty of any defection.

XII. This is the hinge of the entire controversy. Here, therefore, we must make our stand. If the reformed churches place the beginning of the defection at the true point, then their separation from the modern church of Rome is not a secession from the church of Christ, but it is the termination and completion of a separation formerly made, and merely a return and conversion to the true and pure faith, and to the sincere worship of God -- that is, a return to God and Christ, and to the primitive and truly apostolical church, nay to the ancient church of Rome itself: But, on the other hand, if the beginning of the defection be correctly placed by the papists, then the reformed churches have really made a secession from the Romish church, and indeed from that church which still continues in the purity of the Christian religion. But the difference consists principally in this, that the Romish church is said to have added falsehoods to the truth, and the reformed churches are said, by the opposite party, to have detracted from the truth: this controversy, therefore, is of such a nature, that the burden of proof lies with the church of Rome as affirming, that those things of her own which she has added are true. Yet the reformed churches will not decline the province of proof, if the Romish church will permit the matter to be discussed and decided from the pure Scriptures alone. Because the church of Rome does not consent to this, but produces another unwritten word of God, she thus again imposes on herself the necessity of proving, not only that there is some unwritten word of God, but also that what she produces is the real word of God.

XIII. Lastly, the reformed churches say, what is contained in the fourth condition, (Thesis 4,) that they did not secede voluntarily, that is, they did not secede at their own instigation, motion, or choice, but with lingering sorrow and regret; and they ascribe the cause [of this secession] to God, and throw the blame of it upon the church of Rome herself, or first on the court of Rome and the pontiff, and then on the Romish church so far as she listens to the pontiff and the court of Rome, and is ready to perform any services for them. 1. They attribute the cause of this secession to God; because he has commanded his people to depart out of Babylon, the mother of fornications, and to keep themselves from idols. (Rev. xviii, 4; 1 John v, 21.) 2. They throw the blame of it on the Court or Church of Rome, which in three ways drove away the protestant churches from her communion. (1.) By her mixture of deadly poison in the cup of religion, (Rev. xvii, 4,) from which she administered those dogmas that relate to faith and to the worship of God. This mixture was accompanied by a double command. The first, a prohibitive command, that no person should draw any of the waters of the saviour from the pure fountains of Israel; the second, a preceptive, that all men should drink out of this her cup of abominations. (Rev. xiii, 15-17.) (2.) By excommunication and anathemas; by the former she excluded from her communion as many persons as refused to drink the deadly poison out of the cup which she had filled with this mixture. By the latter, she devoted them to all kinds of curses and execrations, and exposed them for plunder and destruction to the madening fury of her own satellites. (3.) Not only by instituting tyranny and various persecutions, but also by exercising them against those who were unwilling to defile their consciences by that shameful abomination. (Rev. xvii, 6.) But with what lingering sorrow and regret they have departed, or, rather, have suffered themselves to be driven away, they say, they have declared by three most manifest tokens: (1.) By serious admonitions proposed both verbally and in writing, in which they have shewn the necessity of the reformation, and the method and means of it to be a free ecclesiastical council. (2.) By prayers and supplications, which they have employed in earnest intreaties for such an assembly, for this purpose at least -- that a serious and general inquiry should be made, whether some kind of abuses and of corruption had not crept into the church, and whether they might not be corrected wherever they were discovered. (3.) By the continued patience with which they have endured every description of tyranny, that has been exercised against them. After all this, the only result has been that the existing corruptions and abuses are confirmed and fully established by the plenary authority of the pope and of the court of Rome.

XIV. We have hitherto discussed this separation in reference to faith and worship.

(Thesis 10.) But the reformed churches say, that they have by no means made a separation from the church of Rome in reference to charity. They invoke Christ as a witness in their consciences to the truth of this their declaration, and they think they have hitherto given sufficient proofs of it. (1.) By the exposition of their doctrine to the whole world, both verbally and by their writings, which disclose from the word of God the errors of the Romish church, and solicitously invite to conversion, the people who remain in error. (2.) By the prayers and groans with which they do not cease to importune the divine Majesty to deliver his miserable people from the deception and tyranny of Antichrist, and firmly to subject them to his Son, Jesus Christ. (3.) By the friendly and mild behaviour which they use towards the adherents of the popish religion, even in many of those places in which they have, themselves, the supremacy, while they neither employ force against their consciences, nor drive them by menaces to the profession of another faith or to the exercise of a different worship, but permit them, privately, at least, to offer that fealty and worship to God of which they mentally approve. Protestants use only the spiritual sword, that, after all heresy and idolatry have been destroyed, men, being saved, even in this life, with regard to their bodies, may be eternally saved to the day of the Lord. The prevention of the public assemblies of the Roman Catholics, and the compelling of them by pecuniary mulct or fines to hear the sermons of the reformed, may be managed in such a manner as will enable the latter to prove these to be offices of true charity. The reformed also say, that those things of which the papists complain, as being perpetrated with too much severity, and even with cruelty, against themselves and their children, were brought upon them either through the tumultuous and licentious conduct of the military, of which deeds they have themselves most commonly been the authors, partly by their demerits, and partly by their previous example; or they were brought upon them on account of crimes which they committed against the state or commonwealth, and not on account of religion. We conclude, therefore, that neither with respect to faith and worship, nor with respect to charity, have the reformed churches made a secession from that of Rome, so far as the Romish church retains any thing which is Christ's; but they rejoice and glory in the separation, so far as she is averse from Christ.

XV. The second part of our proposition remains now to be considered, which stands thus: "The reformed churches have acted properly in refusing to hold and profess a communion of faith and of divine worship with the church of Rome." This may indeed be generally collected from the preceding arguments; but it must be here more specially deduced, that it may evidently appear in what things the corruption of faith and of divine worship principally consists in the church of Rome, according to the judgment of the reformed churches. The causes of this their refusal are three. (1.) The various heresies. (2.) The multifarious idolatry, and (3.) The immense tyranny, which has been approved and exercised by the church of Rome.

First. We will treat of heresies, but with much brevity; because it would be a work of too much prolixity to enumerate all. The first, and one which does not dash with any single article, but which is directly opposed to the very principle of faith, is this, in which it is maintained, "That there is another word of God beside that which is recorded in the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments, and is of the same force and necessity with it, for the establishment of truth and the refutation of error."

To this is added "that the word of God must be understood according to the sense of our holy mother, the church," that is, of the church of Rome. But this sense is that which the Romish church has explained, and will hereafter explain, by her old Vulgate Latin translation, by her confessions, catechisms and canons, in a way the best accommodated, for the time being, to the existing necessity or prevailing opinion.

This is the first foundation of the kingdom of Antichrist, directly opposed to the first foundation of the kingdom of Christ, which is the immovable truth and perfection of the doctrine comprised, first, in the prophetical writings, and then, in those of the apostles.

XVI. To this we next add another heresy, which is also adverse to the principle of faith. By it the Roman pontiff is constituted the prince, the head, the husband, the universal bishop and shepherd of the whole church on earth -- a personage who possesses, in the cabinet of his breast, all the knowledge of truth; and who has the perpetual assistance of the Holy Spirit, so that he cannot err in prescribing those things which concern faith and divine worship -- that "spiritual man who judgeth all men and all things, yet he himself is judged of no man," (1 Cor. ii, 15,) to whom all the faithful in Christ must, from the necessity of salvation, be subject, and to whose decrees and commands, no less than to those of God and Christ himself, every Christian must assent and yield obedience, with simple faith and blind submission. This is the second foundation of the kingdom of Antichrist, directly opposed to the second foundation of the kingdom of Christ, which God laid down when he constituted Christ his Son, the King, the Husband, the Head, the Chief Shepherd, and the sole Master of his church.

XVII. Particular heresies, and such as contravene some article of faith, have reference either to the grace of God which has been bestowed upon us in Christ, or to our duty to God and Christ. Those which relate to Grace are opposed either to Christ himself and his offices, to the benefits, or to the sealing tokens of grace. (1.) To Christ himself are opposed the transubstantiation of bread and wine into his body and blood, with which is connected the presence of the same person in many places. (2.) To the Priestly office of Christ with respect to his Oblation, is opposed, in the first place, the sacrifice of the mass, which is erected on the same dogma of transubstantiation, and in which lies an accumulation of heresies, (i.) That the body and blood of our Lord are said to be there offered for a sacrifice, (ii.) To be truly and properly propitiatory, (iii.) And yet to be bloodless, for the sins, punishments, and satisfactions not only of the living, but likewise of the dead. United with this, or standing as a foundation to it, are a purgatory, and whatever is dependent upon it, (iv.) In the sacrifice of the mass, the body and blood of our Lord are also said to be daily offered, ten, or a hundred, or a thousand times, (v.) By a priest, himself a sinful man, (vi.) Who by his prayers procures for it, from God, the grace of acceptance. Heresies are likewise opposed to the priestly office of Christ with respect to his Intercession, when Mary, angels, and deceased saints are constituted mediators and intercessors, who can obtain something important, not only by their prayers, but also by their merits. The Roman Catholics sin against the kingly office of Christ, when they believe these intercessors of theirs to be the dispensers and donors of blessings. (3.) Those heresies relating to Grace oppose themselves to the benefits of justification and sanctification. (i.) To justification, when it is attributed at once to both faith and works. The following have the same tendency:

"The good works of saints fully satisfy the law of God for the circumstances of the present life, truly merit life eternal, are a real satisfaction for temporal punishment, for every penalty, for guilt itself, and are an expiation for sins and offenses. Nay, the good works of some saints are so far supererogatory, as, when they perform more than they are bound to do, those [extra] good works are meritorious for the salvation of others. Lastly, when men by suffering render satisfaction for sins, they are made conformable to Christ Jesus, who satisfied for sins." (ii.) They are opposed to sanctification, when they attribute to the natural man without the grace of God, preparatory works, which are grateful to God, and through congruity are meritorious of greater gifts. (4.) They are opposed to the signs or tokens of grace in several ways: by multiplying them, by contaminating baptism with various additions, by mutilating the Lord's supper of its second part, [the cup,] and by changing it into a private mass.

Those heresies which infringe upon our Duty to God and Christ as they principally relate to divine worship, and have idolatry united with them, may be appropriately referred to the second cause of the refusal of the reformed churches. (Thesis. 15.) XVIII. The Second Cause, we have said, is the multifarious idolatry which flourishes in the church of Rome -- both that of the first kind against the first command, when that which ought not to be worshipped is made the object of worship, adoration, and invocation; and that of the second kind against the second command, when the object of worship is worshipped in an image, whether that object ought or ought not to be worshipped. (1.) The church of Rome commits idolatry of The First, with things animate and inanimate. (i.) With animate things -- with angels, the virgin Mary, and departed saints; by founding churches to them; by erecting altars; by instituting certain religious services and rites of worship, and appointing societies of men and women by whom they may be performed, and the festival days on which they may be observed; by invoking them in their necessities; by offering to them gifts and sacrifices; by making them preside [as tutelary beings] over provinces, cities, villages, streets, and houses, also over the dispensing of certain gifts, the healing of diseases, and the removal as well as the infliction of evils; and, lastly, by swearing by their name. She also commits idolatry with the Roman pontiff himself; by ascribing to him those titles, powers, and acts which belong to Christ alone; and by asking of him those things which belong to Christ and his Spirit. (ii.) With inanimate things -- with the cross and the bread of our Lord, and with the relics of saints, whether such relics be real, or false and fictitious. (2.) Idolatry of The Second Kind is when the papists worship God, Christ, angels, the virgin Mary and the rest of the saints in an image; and when they pay to such images honour and worship by adorning them with fine garments, gold, silver and jewels; by assigning them more elevated situations in churches and placing them upon the altars; by parading them on their shoulders through the streets; by uncovering their heads to them; by kissing them; by kneeling to them, and lastly, by invoking them, or at least by addressing invocations to them, as the power or deity who is there more immediately present. We assert that the distinction of worship into latria, supreme religious adoration, and douleia inferior worship, and uperdouleia an intermediate adoration between LATRIA and DULIA --of power, into that which is superior, and that which is subordinate, or ministerial -- of the representation of any thing, into that by which any thing is performed to some kind of an image and a carved shape as unto God and Christ, and that by which it is performed to an image but not as unto God and Christ. These distinctions, and the dogma of transubstantiation, we assert to be mere figments, which are either not understood by the greatest portion of the worshipers, or about which they do not think when they are in the act of worship; and to contain protestations which are directly contrary to facts. This second cause is, of itself, quite sufficient to prove our thesis.

XIX. The Third Cause is the tyranny which the church of Rome has usurped and exercised against those who could not conscientiously assent to these heresies and approve these idolatries; and which that church will continue to exercise so long as she listens to the Roman pontiff and his court. The reformed churches very properly refuse to profess communion of faith and worship with that of Rome, because they are afraid to involve or entangle themselves in the guilt of such great wickedness, lest they should bring down upon their heads the blood of so many thousands of the saints and of the faithful martyrs of Christ, who have borne testimony to the word of the Lord, "and have washed their robes in the blood of the Lamb." (Rev. vii, 14.) For, beside the fact that such a profession would convey a sufficiently open approbation of that persecution, (especially if they did not previously deliver a protestation against it, which, however, the Roman pontiff would never admit,) even the papistical doctrine itself, with the assent of the people, establishes the punishment, by the secular arm, of those whom the church of Rome accounts as heretics; so that those who, on other points, are adherents to the doctrine of popery, if they are not zealous in their conduct against heretics, are slandered as men governed by policy, lukewarm creatures, and even receive the infamous name of atheists. I wish all kings, princes, and commonwealths, seriously to consider this, that, on this point at least, they may protest that they have seceded from the communion of the pontiff and of the court of Rome. Besides, this exercise of tyranny is, in itself, equal to an evident token, that the Roman pontiff is that wicked servant who says in his heart, "My Lord delayeth his coming," and begins to eat and drink, and to be drunken, and to beat his fellow-servants. (Luke xii, 45.)

DISPUTATION 23

ON IDOLATRY

RESPONDENT: JAPHET VIGERIUS

I. It always has been, and is now, the chief design of diabolical perverseness, -- that even the devil himself, should be considered and worshipped as a deity -- than which nothing can be more reproachful and insulting to the true God; or that all thought and mention of a Deity being removed, pure atheism might obtain, and, after conscience was taken away, men might be hurried along into every kind of flagitious wickedness.

But since he could not effect this, on account of the notion of a Deity, and indeed of a good one, which is deeply impressed on the minds of men; and since he knew it to be the will of the true God that he should himself alone be considered and worshipped as God, without any image; (Exod. xx, 3-5; Deut. xxxii, 17; 1 Cor. x, 20;) the devil has been trying to persuade men to consider and worship as God some figment of their own brain or some kind of creature, or, at least, to worship the true God in an image.

In former days he had great success in these, his attempts; and would to God that in our times they were utterly fruitless! We might then be emboldened to enter on this discussion, merely for the purpose of knowing what idolatry is, and the description of it which anciently prevailed among Jews and gentiles, without being solicitous to deliver any admonition or caution respecting it. But since, alas, this evil holds domination far and wide in Christendom itself, we will, by divine aid, briefly treat upon it in these theses, both for the purpose of knowing what it is, and of giving some cautions and dehortations against it.

II. Commencing, therefore, with the etymology of the word, we say, Eidwlon an idol, generally, signifies some representation and image, whether it be conceived only in the mind or framed by the hands, and whether it be that of a thing which never had an existence, or of something which does exist. But, according to Scripture usage, and that of the sacred writers, it signifies, (1.) An image fashioned for the purpose of representing and honouring a deity, whether true or false. (2.) Every false divinity, whether it be the pure figment of the human brain, or any thing existing among the creatures of God, and thus real, according to its absolute essence, because it is something; but false with regard to its relative essence, because it is not a Divinity, which yet it is feigned to be, and for which it is accounted. (Exod. xx, 4; Acts vii, 41; Psalm cxv, 4-8; 1 John v, 21; 1 Cor. viii, 4; 1 Thess. i, 9; Col. iii, 5; Deut. vi, 13; [xiii, 6;] Matt. iv, 10; Deut. v, 6-9.) Latreuein (idolatry) signifies, in its general acceptation

"to render service, or worship,"to wait upon;" in Hebrew, db[ : But in the Scriptures, and among ecclesiastical writers, it is peculiarly employed about [acts of] religious worship and service; such as these -- to render love, honour, and fear to God -- to repose hope and confidence in him -- to invoke him -- to give him thanks for benefits received -- to obey his commands without exception -- and to swear by his name.

(Mal. i, 6; Psalm xxxvii, 3; 1, 15; Deut. vi, 13.)

III. Idolatry, therefore, according to the etymology of the word, is "service rendered to an idol;" but, with regard to fact, it is when divine worship is paid to any other than the true God, whether that be done by an erroneous judgment of the mind, by which that is esteemed as a God which is no God, or it be done solely by the performance of such worship, though he who renders it be aware that the idol is not God, and though he protest that he does not esteem it as a God, since his protestation is contrary to fact.

(Isa. xlii, 8; Gal. iv, 8; Exod. xxxii, 4, 5.) In proof of this, the belly, covetousness, and idolatry, are severally said to be the god of some people, and covetous men are called

"idolaters." (Phil. iii, 19; Col. iii, 5; Ephes. v, 5.) But so far is that opinion or knowledge (by which he does not esteem the idol as a god) from acquitting him of idolatry, who adores, invokes, and kneels to it, that from the very circumstance of his thus invoking, adoring, and kneeling to an idol, he may rather be said to esteem that as a god, which, according to his own opinion, he does not consider to be a god. (1

Cor. x, 19, 20.) This is to say to the wood, with one portion of which he has kindled the fire of his hearth and of his oven, and from another has fashioned to himself a god,

"Deliver me; for thou art my god," (Isa. xliv, 15, 17,) and to a stone, "Thou hast begotten me." (Jer. ii, 27.)

IV. Idolatry is also of two kinds. The First is, when that which is not God is accounted and worshipped as God. (Exod. xx, 3-5.) The Second is, when that which is either truly or falsely accounted for God is fashioned into a corporeal image, and is worshipped in an image, or according to an image. The former of these is prohibited in the first commandment: "Thou shalt not have other gods," or "another god, before me," or "beside me." The latter, in the second command, "Thou shalt not make unto thyself any likeness; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them." (Exod.

xx, 3-5; 1 Cor. x, 7.) From this, it appears, that idolatry may also be considered in another view, and in three different ways. The First mode is, when the true God is worshipped in an image. The Second is, when a false god is worshipped. The Third, which partakes of both, is when a false god is worshipped in an image. The first mode is of a more venial description than the second, according to that passage, "And it came to pass, as if it had been a light thing, for Ahab to walk in the sins of Jeroboam,"

who had worshipped Jehovah in calves, and had taught others to do the same, "that he went and served Baal, and bowed himself down before him." (1 Kings xvi, 31.) The third mode is the worst of all; for it consists of a double falsehood, of a feigned divinity, to whom such worship does not belong, and of an assimilated divinity, when of The One to whom it is an assimilation, it is not a likeness. (Isa. xl, 19, 20; Jer. x, 14) Varro has observed that, by the last of these modes, all fear of God has been taken away, and error has been added to mortals.

V. In the prohibition, that the children of Israel should have no God except Jehovah, the Scriptures employ three words to express "another God." The first is r j a (Exod.

xx, 3) The second, d z and the third, r k r (Psalm lxxxi, 9.) The first signifies, generally, "any other god;" the second, "a strange god;, and the third, "a strange and foreign god." But though these words are not so opposed to each other, as not occasionally to coincide, and to be indiscriminately used about a god that is not the TRUE ONE; yet, from a collation of them as they are used in the Scriptures, it is easy to collect that "another god" may be conceived under a three- fold difference; for they were either invented by their first worshipers; or they were received from their ancestors, or they were taken from other nations. (Deut. xxxi, 16, 17.) The last of these occurs, (1.) Either by some necessity, of which David complains, when he says,

"They have driven me out this day from abiding in the inheritance of Jehovah, saying, Go, serve other gods.(1 Sam. xxvi, 19.) (2.) Or by persuasion; as the heart of Solomon was inclined by his wives to worship other gods. (1 Kings xi, 4, 5.) (3.) Or by the mere choice of the will; as Amaziah took the gods of the children of Seir, after he had come from the slaughter of the Edomites. (2 Chron. xxv, 14.) In these degrees the Scriptures present to us a difference between a greater and a less offense. For since Jeroboam is frequently accused of having made Israel to sin and of increasing the crime of idolatry; (1 Kings xii, 30; xiv, 16;) and since the children of Israel are often said to have "provoked God to jealousy with strange gods, whom they knew not and whom their fathers did not fear," (Deut. xxxii, 16,) it appears that the invention or fabrication of a new god is a more grievous crime, than the adoration of "another god"

whom they received from their ancestry. And since it greatly contributes to the dishonour and reproach of Jehovah, to take the gods of foreign nations as objects of worship, by which, those gods plainly seem to be preferred to Jehovah, and the religion of those nations, to the law of Jehovah, this crime, therefore, is, of all others, by far the most grievous. (Jer. ii, 11, 13.)

VI. In the prescription of the second command, that nothing which is esteemed as a god be worshipped in an image, the Scriptures most solicitously guard against the possibility of the human mind finding out any evasion or lurking place. For, with regard to the matter, they forbade images to be made of gold and silver, the most precious of the metals, and therefore, of any metal whatever, or of wood or stone.

(Exod. xx, 23; Isa. xliv, 12 13; Jer. ii, 27.) It prohibits every form, whether the image represent a living creature, any thing in the heavens, the sun, the moon, or the stars; any thing on the earth or under the earth, a man, a quadruped, a flying creature, a fish or a serpent, or a thing that has no existence, but by the madness and vanity of the human brain is compounded of different shapes, such as a monster, the upper parts of which are human, and the lower parts those of an ox; or one whose upper parts are those of an ox, and the lower, those of a man; or one, the higher parts of which are those of a beautiful woman, and the lower those of a fish, terminating in a tail. It prohibits every mode of making them, whether they be formed by fusion, by sculpture, or by painting; (Jer. x, 3, 9, 14; Ezek. viii, 10, 11;) because it says uinversally, "Thou shalt not make unto thee any likeness." And it adds a reason which excludes generally every kind of material and every method of fabrication: "For ye saw no manner of similitude, on the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb out of the midst of the fire. Take ye, therefore, good heed unto your souls, lest ye corrupt yourselves, and make you a graven image, the similitude of any figure," &c. (Deut. iv, 15-19.)

VII. But with regard to the mode of worship, and to the actions pertaining to it, scarcely any thing can be devised or invented, and can be performed to idols, (that is, both to false deities themselves and to the images of false divinities, and to those of the true God,) which is not expressly said in the Scriptures to be hateful to God, that no one may have the least pretext for his ignorance. For the Scriptures take away all honour and service from them, whatever may be the manner in which they are performed, whether by building temples, high places or groves by erecting altars, and by placing images upon altars; or by offering sacrifices, burning incense, by eating that which is offered in sacrifice to idols, by bending the knees to them, by bestowing kisses on them, and by carrying them on their shoulders. (Exod. xx, 5; 1 Kings xi, 7; xii, 31-33; 2 Kings xvii, 35; Ezek. viii, 11; Num. xxv, 2; 1 Kings xix, 18; Isa. xlv, 20; Jer. x, 5.) The Scriptures also prohibit men from placing hope and trust in idols, forbid invocation, prayers and thanksgivings to be directed to them, and will not suffer men to fear them and to swear by them; because idols are as unable to save as to inflict injury. (Psalm cxv, 8; Jer. v, 7.) The Scriptures do not permit men to yield obedience to idols, because a graven image is a teacher of lies and vanity; (Jer. ii, 5-8, 20; xi, 8-13;) and false gods often require of their worshipers those things from which all nature, created and uncreated, that of God and of man, is most abhorrent. (Lev. xviii, 21.)

VIII. But, because the human mind is both inclined and fitted to excogitate and invent excuses, nay even justifications, for sins, particularly for the sin of idolatry, and because the pretext of a good intention to honour the Deity serves the more readily as a plea for it, [this propensity of mind,] on account of conscience not equally accusing a man either for the worship which he offers to a false divinity, or for that which he presents to the true God in an image, as it does for the total omission of worship, and for a sin committed against the rules of equity and goodness which prevail among mankind; our attention will be profitably called to the consideration of what is the judgment of God concerning this matter, by whose judgment we must stand or fall.

Let us take our commencement at that species by which the true Deity is worshipped in an image, as Jehovah was in the calf which Aaron fashioned, and in those which were made by Jeroboam. (Exod. xxxii, 4; 1 Kings xii, 28.) God has manifested this, his judgment, by his word and by his acts. (1.) First, by his word of declaration, God has shewn what are his sentiments both concerning the fabrication of an image and the worship offered to it. The Fabrication, he says, is "a changing of the glory of the incorruptible God into the similitude of an ox that eateth grass, into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and to four- footed beasts, and creeping things."

(Psalm civ, 20; Rom. i, 23.) But the Worship, he says, is offered, not to God, whom they wished to represent by an image, but to the calf itself, and to the image which they had fabricated. (1 Kings xii, 32.) For these are his words: "They have made them a molten calf, and have worshipped it, and have sacrificed thereunto." (Exod. xxxii, 8.) And St. Stephen says, "They made a calf in those days, and offered sacrifice unto the idol." (Acts vii, 41.) On this account also he calls them, "gods of gold and silver,"other gods and molten images." (Exod. xxxii, 31; 1 Kings xiv, 9.) Secondly, by His word of threatening, by which he denounces destruction to those who worshipped the calf that Aaron formed, and to Jeroboam and his posterity. (Exod. xxxii, 9, 10; 1

Kings xiv, 10, 11.) (2.) God has also displayed his judgment about idolatry by his acts. He not only fulfilled this, his word of threatening, by cutting off Jeroboam and his posterity, (2 Chron. xiii, 15-20,) and by destroying many thousands of the Israelites; (Exod. xxxii, 28;) but likewise by chastising similar sinners by another horrible punishment, that of blindness, and of being delivered over to a reprobate mind." (Rom. i, 24-28.)

IX. Such, then, is the judgment of God concerning that species of idolatry which is committed with the intention of worshipping that God who is truly God. Let us now see how severe this judgment is against that species in which the intention is to offer worship to that which is not the true God, to another god, to Moloch, Baal, Chemosh, Baal-peor, and to similar false gods, though they were esteemed as gods by their worshipers. (Deut. xxix, 17; xxxii, 14-17.) Of this, his judgment, God has afforded most convincing indications, both by his word and his acts. In this word of declaration two things occur, which are most signal indications of this. First is, that he interprets this act as a desertion of God, a defection from the true God, a perfidious dissolution of the conjugal bond by spiritual adultery with another, and a provoking of God himself to jealousy. The Second is, that he says this adultery is committed with demons and devils. For these are some of the strains of Moses in his very celebrated song: "They sacrificed unto devils, not to God; to gods whom they knew not," &c.

(Deut. xxxii, 17.) And the royal psalmist sings thus: "They sacrificed their sons and their daughters unto devils, unto the idols of Canaan," (Psalm civ, 37, 38,) which they did when they compelled any of their offspring to pass through the fire to Moloch.

(Lev. xviii, 21.) The apostle Paul agrees with this when he says, "The things which the gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils and not to God;" (1 Cor. x, 20;) whether this signifies, that some demon lay concealed in those images; or that those sacred rites were performed according to the will and prescription of demons, either openly, by oracles, responses, and the verses of prophesying poets, or secretly by the institutes or maxims of the world, (Arnob. lib. 6; Aug. de Civ. Del. lib. 8, 23,) that is, of wicked people, of whom Satan is called "the prince," and among whom he is said to have his throne. (1 Pet. iv, 3; 2 Cor. iv, 4; Rev. ii, 13.) The denunciations of punishments for this crime, and the execution of these threats, are described generally throughout the whole of the sacred Scriptures.

X. If the things, thus explained from the Scriptures, be applied to Latriav, the divine adorations, and to Qrhskeiav, the religious ceremonies or superstitions which are employed in the popish church; it will clearly appear, that she is guilty of the crime of the two-fold idolatry which has now been described. (Thesis 4.) Of the First Kind she renders herself guilty, because she presents divine worship to the bread in the Lord's supper, to the virgin Mary, to angels and departed saints, to the relics of Christ's cross and of the saints, and to things consecrated. Of the Second Kind she renders herself guilty, because her members worship, in an image, God, Christ, the cross of Christ, the virgin Mary, angels and saints. Each of these charges shall be demonstrated; and, we will confirm them in as brief a manner as possible, after having closed up all the evasions, through which the worshipers of idols try to creep out when they are held fast bound.

XI. 1. First. Concerning the sacrament of the Lord's supper, to which "all the faithful in Christ, according to the method always received in the [Roman] Catholic church, present in veneration the worship of latria, or supreme adoration, [which is due to the true God.] Nor is this most holy sacrament to be the less adored because it was instituted by Christ our Lord, that it might be received, as the Council of Trent says, (Session 13, 5,) when it frees us from one part of the sacrament. To this we subjoin, in the discharge of another part of the duty we have undertaken: But the worship of latria or supreme adoration, cannot be paid to the sacrament of the eucharist without idolatry. (1.) It cannot be paid even in the use of the eucharist, because bread continues to be bread still, with regard to its substance, and it is not transubstantiated or changed into the body of Christ by consecration. For the eucharist would thus cease to be a sacrament, of whose essence it is to consist of an external thing; and the body of Christ would thus begin to exist anew; for nothing can be changed into that which had no previous existence. (2.) Much less can this worship be paid to the sacrament in its abuse. Because, though a legitimate consecration might [be supposed to] have the power of transubstantiating, yet an illegitimate consecration cannot effect a transubstantiation. For all right of consecration depends on the divine institution: but a consecration to adore, and not to receive, is foreign to the design of the institution, and therefore inefficacious. (Matt. xxvi, 26;1 Corinthians x, 16; xi, 25.) Therefore, the Roman Catholic church commits idolatry, as she presents to the sacrament of the eucharist the service of latria, or supreme adoration, which is due to the true God alone.

XII. Secondly. In the worship which the papists perform to the virgin Mary, angels and departed saints, we say they commit idolatry in two ways -- in reference to the act of adoring them, and to that of invoking them. (1 Kings xix, 18; 2 Kings xvii, 11,16, 35.) (1.) In adoring them, when they do reverence to all and to each of them by altars, masses, festivals or holy days, vigils, fasts, images, candles, offerings, by burning incense, by vows, pilgrimages, and genuflections. All these acts relate to latria or supreme adoration, and to divine worship, when presented to the true God according to his will, or to false gods through the superstition of men. (2.) In invoking them, when the papists "betake themselves to the prayers, and to the help and assistance, afforded by the saints," as the Council of Trent says, (Session 25,) and when they return thanks to them for the benefits which they receive. (Lombard. lib. 4, dist. 25.) But they have this recourse to the Prayers of angels and saints, as their intercessors, mediators, patrons and advocates, who intercede. (1.) With a pious affection, by which they desire the wishes of those who pray to them, to be fulfilled. (2.) With their glorious and most holy merits, which are presented in favour of those who, with suppliant intreaties, require their prayers. They have this recourse, also, to the Help and Assistance of angels and saints, as to auxiliaries or helpers, preservers and the guardians of grace and glory; that is, the liberal dispensers of all blessings, their deliverers in necessities, whom they also denominate their life, salvation, safety, hope, defense, refuse, solace, yea, their only hope, and their safe fortress. But these are titles which belong to God and Christ alone, as the decorations of the highest excellence, wisdom, benevolence and power; than which nothing can be conceived more illustrious, as is manifest from the Scriptures, in which these titles are read as attributed to God and Christ; (Psalm xlvi, 1, 2; xviii, 1, 2; xxxvi, 7, 10; lxii, 2, 3, 6; Isa. xlv, 20; Acts iv, 12;) when the supreme honour of invocation and adoration is offered to them by holy men. And though the turpitude of this idolatry be exceedingly foul and disgusting, yet how immensely is it aggravated by rendering the reason which serves as a pretext to them for that deed; than which reason nothing can be imagined to be more injurious to God and Christ. (1.) To God, when the papists say that our heavenly Father has given half of his kingdom to the blessed virgin, the queen of heaven, whom they also denominate "the mistress of the world,"the star of the sea,"the haven or port of salvation," and "God;" (Gul. Biel. in Can. Miss. Lect. 80;) and when they say that since God has both justice and mercy, he retains the former of these himself, but has granted the exercise of mercy to his virgin mother, and therefore, that we must appeal from the court of the justice of God to the court of the mercy of his mother. (2.) To Christ, nothing can be more injurious than this; because the papists say that Christ is not only an advocate, but that he is a judge, and as such, will discuss all things, so that nothing will remain unpunished; and therefore, that God has provided for us a female advocate, who is full of mildness and suavity, and in whom is found nothing that is harsh or unpleasant, who is, also, on this account, called "the throne of Christ," on which he reposed. (Anton. page 4, tit. 15, cap. 14.) XIII. Thirdly. That the papists defile themselves with idolatry in paying reverence to the relics of the cross of Christ and of the saints, by performing unto them acts both of adoration and of invocation, is proved, partly from their own confession, and partly from the very exercise of those religious acts which they offer to them. (1.) The Council of Trent publishes the confession, when it says, (Session 25,) "Those persons are to be wholly condemned, who affirm that honour and veneration are not due to the relics of saints; or that those relics, and other sacred monuments, are unprofitably honoured by the faithful; and that resort is vainly made to the sepulchers of saints, for the purpose of obtaining their assistance." The next confessor on this subject is "the angelical doctor," who is believed to have written all things well concerning Christ.

For he says, (Sum. p. 3, Qu, 25,) that the adoration of latria, or supreme worship, must be given to the cross of Christ on account of the contract [into which it came] with the members of the body of Christ. This is a reason quite sufficient to Antoninus to affirm (Anton. p. 3, tit. 12, c. 5) that not only is the cross of Christ to be adored, but likewise all things belonging to it -- the nails, the spear, the vestments, and even the sacred tabernacles. In accordance with these confessions, the Roman Catholic church sings,

"Behold the wood of the Cross! We adore thy cross, O Lord." (2.) Another method the papists have of declaring their idolatry by various acts -- when they adorn the relics of the cross of Christ and of the saints, with gold, silver, and jewels; when they wrap them in fine lawn napkins and in pieces of silk or velvet; when they carry them about with great pomp, in processions instituted for the purpose of returning thanks and making requests; when they place them on altars; when they suspend before these relics gifts and curses; when they present them to be viewed, kissed, and adored by kneeling, and thus themselves adore them; when they light wax candles before them, burn incense to them; when they consecrate churches and altars by their presence, and consider them as rendered holy; when they institute festivals to them; when they celebrate masses to their honour, under this idea, that masses celebrated upon an altar on which relics are placed, become more holy and efficacious; when they undertake pilgrimages to them; when they carry them about as amulets and preservatives; when they put them upon sick people; when they sanctify their own napkins or handkerchiefs, their garlands, and other things of the same kind, by touching them with these relics, that they may serve for the same purposes; because they think that grace and a divine virtue exist in them, which they seek to obtain from them by invocations, and other services performed before them; they use them for driving away and expelling devils and bad spirits; and they do all these things which the heathen did to the relics of their idolatry. To all these particulars, must be added that most shameful illusion -- the multiplication of relics, and the substitution of such as belong to other persons than to those whose names they bear. Hence, the origin of that witty saving, "The bodies of many persons are honoured on earth, whose souls are burning in everlasting torments." (Cal. de relig.)

XIV. The Fourth specimen, partly of the same idolatry, and partly of a superstition much worse than that of the heathens, the papists afford not only in the dedications and consecrations of churches, alters, vases, and ornaments which belong to them, such as the cross, the chalice and its covers, linen clothes, the vestments of priests, and of censers; also in the consecration of easter wax candles, holy water, salt, oil for extreme unction, bells, small waxen figures like dolls, each of which they call "Agnus Dei," and of cemeteries or burial grounds, and things of a similar kind, but likewise in the use of things thus consecrated, for the papists pray in these consecrations, that God would furnish or inspire the things now enumerated, with grace, virtue and power to drive away and expel bodily and spiritual evils, and to bestow the contrary blessings; they use them as actually possessed of such grace and virtue; and perform to them religious worship. We will here produce the following few instances of this matter: They have ascribed remission of Sins to visitations of churches thus consecrated. They use the following words, among others, in their formularies of consecrations, on the cross to be consecrated: "Deign, O Lord, to bless this wood of the cross, that it may be a saving remedy to mankind, that it may be the solidity of faith, the advancement of good works, the redemption of souls, and a safeguard against the fierce darts of enemies." In the formularies on holy water, these words occur: "I exorcise or adjure thee, O creature of water, that thou become exorcised water to put to flight all the power of the enemy, to root him out, and to displant friendly greetings with his apostate angels," &c. This is part of the formulary in the consecration of salt: "I exorcise or adjure thee, O creature of salt, that thou be made exorcised salt for the salvation of believers, that thou mayest be healthful soundness of soul and body to those who receive thee," &c. Also, the following words: "Deign, O Lord, to bless and sanctity this creature of salt, that it may be, to all who take it, health of mind and body; and that what thing soever shall be sprinkled with it, may be devoid of all filth or uncleanliness, and of every attack of spiritual wickedness." But they attribute to the consecrated small wax figures, which they call "Agni Dei," the virtue of breaking and removing every sin, as the blood of Christ does; and, according to this opinion, they use the same things, reposing their hope and confidence in them, as if they were actually endued with any such power.

XV. But that the papists commit the second species of idolatry in the worshipping of images, (Theses 4, 6, & 10,) is abundantly proved from their own confession, the forms of consecration, and their daily practice. (1.) Their own confession may be found in the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent, in which it is affirmed, (Session 25,) "The images of Christ, of the blessed virgin, and of other saints, are to be held and retained, especially in churches; and due honour and veneration are to be exhibited to them; so that by the images which we kiss, and before which we uncover our heads, and prostrate ourselves, we adore Christ, and venerate the saints whose likenesses those images bear; this is what was sanctioned by the second Nicene Council." Let the acts of that Council be inspected, and it will appear that the adoration and invocation which were established by it, are mere idolatry. To these, let Thomas, and the multitude of their divines, be added, who are of opinion that images must receive the same services of adoration, as those with which the prototypes which they represent are worshipped. (2.) The formularies of their consecrations make a similar declaration; for the image of the virgin Mary is consecrated in the following form: "O God, sanctify this image of the blessed virgin, that it may bring the help of saving aid to thy faithful people, if thunder and lightning prevail; that hurtful things may be the more speedily expelled; that inundations caused by rains, the commotions of civil wars, or the devastations committed by pagans, may be repressed and appeased at its presence. (1 Kings 8.) In the consecration of the image of John the Baptist, the following words occur: "Let this sacred image be the expeller of devils, the invoker of angels, the protector of the faithful, and let its intercession powerfully flourish in this place." (3.) In the daily practice of the papist, most of those acts, both of adoration and invocation, are performed to images, which we have already mentioned as having been exhibited to the saints themselves; and they usually perform those acts [which they think due] to the saints, to their images, or in their images, but seldom indeed do they by a pure [mental] glance look up to the saints themselves, being under the influence of this opinion -- that the honours [which they thus pay to images] belong to the prototypes themselves, and therefore that the prayers which they address to them will by this means be the more readily and speedily heard and answered.

XVI. The papists do not indeed deny, that they present this worship, these services, and acts both of adoration and invocation, to the sacrament of the eucharist, to the virgin Mary, to angels and departed saints, to relics and things consecrated, and to these images: at least they are unable to deny this, except by an evident untruth. Yet they excuse themselves under the pretense of certain exceptions and distinctions, which they consider to be of such value and power, as to exempt from idolatry those acts which are performed by themselves with such an intention of mind, but which, when performed by others, are really idolatrous. These exceptions are, First.

According to the three-fold excellence of divine, human and intermediate, there is a three-fold honour. And here the distinction is produced of Latreia "latria" or divine worship, douleia "dulia" or human worship, and uperdouleia "hyperdulia" or intermediate, or between both. To this may be added what they say, that most of the acts which relate to this worship are analogous. The Second exception is from the intention of those who offer those religious services. The Third is in the difference between intercession and bestowing, that is, between the office of mediator as discharged by the [popish] saints, and as discharged by Christ Jesus. The Fourth is in the distinction between an image and an idol.

XVII. The First subterfuge has three members. To the first of these we reply, (1.) The Scriptures do not acknowledge any excellence that is called "hyperdulia or intermediate," or that is different from divine excellence except what is according to the functions, graces and dignities through which some rational creatures, by divine command, preside over others and minister to them -- men as long as they remain in this mortal life -- and angels to the end of the world. Therefore, no homage paid to a creature is pure from idolatry, except that which is offered to superiors who live in this world, and which is approved by the Scriptures. (Psalm lxxxii, 1, 6; John x, 35.) (2.) That intermediate excellence, and the worship which is accommodated to it, are rejected by the Scriptures, since they condemn the "worship paid to angels" (Col. ii, 18,) and commend Hezekiah for having "broken in pieces the brazen serpent that Moses had made; for unto those days the children of Israel did burn incense to it." (2

Kings xviii, 4) To the second monster of this subterfuge we reply, the distinction of worship into latria and dulia is vain in this case; for the apostle claims the worship of dulia [which the papists call an inferior or human adoration] for the true God alone, when he blames the gentiles for having "done service to those which by nature are no gods." (Gal. iv, 8.) And this word, in its general acceptation, signifies the service which ought to be performed, or which lawfully can be, to those only with whom we have to do according to godliness, and this according to the law which is either common to mutual charity, (Gal. v, 13,) or that which has a more particular reference to such persons as have constant transactions with each other. (Ephes. vi, 5, 6.) But with those persons to whom the present discussion relates, (placing the angels as an exception,) we have according to godliness no transactions, neither are we bound, by any law, to them for service. To the third member our answer is, (1.) To offer sacrifice, to burn incense, to erect churches and altars, to make vows, to institute festivals, fasts and pilgrimages, [to angels or saints,] and to swear by their names, and not analogical or relative services, but univocal or having one purpose, and such as are due only to the true God. (2.) Though prostration itself is law fitly given to men on account of their analogical similitude to God, yet, when it is an act of religion, it is considered as so peculiarly due to God, that the whole of divine worship is designated by it alone. (1 Kings xix, 18; Matt. ix, 18.) Christ likewise denies prostration to the devil, (Matt. iv, 8,) and the angel in the Apocalypse refuses it when offered to himself.

(Rev. xix, 10.)

XVIII. The distinct intention of the worshipers, is the Second subterfuge that they use to remove from themselves the idolatries of every kind of which they have been accused. In the first of these intentions they say, concerning the adoration of the sacrament of the Lord's supper, that their intention is to honour, not the bread, but the true body of Christ. In the second, that the adoration, even divine adoration itself, which they perform to a creature, is not offered to it as to God; that is, they perform the acts of worship with the design of procuring for the creature such esteem and veneration as in reality belongs only to the divine Majesty. In the third, that by giving honour to a creature, they do not stop there, but that God may be glorified in and through the creature. (Greg. de Val. lib. 2, c. 1 & 3.) In the fourth, that they do not honour the image itself, but its prototype. To all these distinctions we reply, (1.) The deed is in every case contrary to the intention; and they in reality do the very thing which, in their intention, they profess themselves desirous to avoid. (2.) The judgment of God is adverse to their intention; for he does not interpret the deed from the intention, but forms his judgment of the intention from the deed. God himself has exposed an intention that is in accordance with such a deed, although the man who does it puts in his protestation about his contrary intention. This intention is evident from the following passages: "They have made them a molten calf and have worshipped it, and have sacrificed thereunto, and said, these be thy gods, O Israel, which have brought thee up out of the land of Egypt." (Exod. xxxii, 8.) "He falleth down unto it and worshippeth it, and prayeth unto it, and saith, Deliver me, for thou art my god." (Isa. xliv, 17.) "They sacrificed unto devils, not to God," &c. (Deut.

xxxii, 17.) (3.) We add, if these distinctions possess any validity, neither Jews nor heathens could at any time have been accused of having committed idolatry; for, by the same distinctions as these, they would be able to justify all their acts of worship, whether offered to a true or to a false deity, to the supreme God, to inferior divinities, or to an image. For [on these principles] their intention never feared the works of their own fingers, but those persons after whose image such works were formed, and to whose names they were consecrated. Their intention never honoured angels, demons, or the minor gods, except that such services should redound to the honour of the supreme Deity; (Lactan. Inst. 1. ii c. 2;) it never wished to procure such esteem and veneration for them as belongs solely to the majesty of God supreme; and it never worshipped a false deity.

XIX. The Third exception has a special tendency to justify the invocation of the virgin Mary and the saints; (Thesis 16;) for the papists say that they invoke them, not as the prime authors and donors of blessings; nor as Christ, whom God the Father hath constituted the high priest, and to whom he has given all power in heaven and on earth; but that they invoke them, in truth, as friends, intercessors and donors, yet in subordination to Christ. To this we reply, First, from the premises which they grant, they may themselves be convicted of idolo-dulia, or inferior worship offered to idols; for they confess that the invocation which they practice to the virgin Mary and to saints is the adoration of dulia. But they fabricate idols of the virgin Mary and of saints before they invoke them by heresy, both by falsely attributing to them the faculty of understanding their prayers, of interceding for sinners, not only feelingly, but also meritoriously, and of granting the things requested, and by presenting to them, as possessed of these qualifications, the worship of invocation; for this is the mode by which an idol is fabricated of a thing that has had a real existence. To this argument strength is added from the circumstance that, although these saints might know the things for which the papists pray, might intercede for them with a pious feeling, and, as spirits," might bestow what they have requested; yet as they could not bestow them, "with power" they ought not to be invoked. Secondly. By the words,

"insubordination to Christ," they in reality destroy such a subordination and introduce a collaterally. If this be true, then on that very account they are likewise idolaters; because the worship, which God the Father wishes to be given to his Son, is that of latria, or divine adoration. For it is the will of the Father, "that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father." (John v, 23.) But subordination is removed, and collaterally is introduced, (1.) Universally, when all these saints are said, by their own merits, to intercede for and to obtain blessings, and to dispense the blessings thus obtained, which are two tokens of the eversion of subordination and of the introduction of collaterally. (2.) Specially, this collaterally exists [from their own showing] between Christ and the virgin Mary; as is evident, (1.) the names under which they invoke her, when they denominate her "the queen of heaven,"the mistress of the world,"our salvation, harbor, defense, refuge and solace," who is able to command our Redeemer in virtue of her authority as his mother. These expressions place Christ in subordination to her. (2.) But this is likewise evident, from the cause on account of which they say she ought to be invoked. As a Female Advocate, because, since Christ is not only a man and an advocate, but likewise God and a Judge, "who will suffer nothing to pass unpunished; the virgin Mary, as having in her nothing that is harsh and unpleasant, but being all mildness and suavity," (Thesis 12,) ought to act as intercessor between him and sinners. And as a Female Dispenser of Blessings; because "God the Father has given half of his kingdom to her, (that is, to administer his mercy while he reserves the exercise of justice to himself,") and has conferred upon her a plenitude of all grace, that out of her fullness all men may receive. This is nothing less than to hurl Christ from his throne, and to exalt the virgin Mary in his place.

XX. The Fourth subterfuge is the distinction between an image and an idol. The papists say, an image is the likeness of something real; an idol, that of something false. When Bellarmine explains this definition, he commits a fallacy; for, in interpreting "something false," he says, since it is a being, it is not that which it is feigned to be, that is, God. But that the difference which he here makes is a false one, many passages of Scripture prove. The image which Rachael purloined from her father, is called "anidol;" but it was the image of a man. (Gen. xxxi, 34.) Stephen calls the molten calf "anidol," and it was made to represent the true God. (Acts. vii, 41.) The calves of Jeroboam were representations or images of Jehovah, yet they are called

"idols" by the Greek and Latin translators. (1 Kings xii, 28.) Micah's image is also called "an idol" and yet it was "set up" to Jehovah. (Judges xvii, 4; xviii, 31.) Among the "dumb idols" unto which, the apostle says, the Corinthians "were carried away,"

were statues of men, and probably images of "four-footed beasts, of creeping things, and of birds." (Rom. i, 23.) Yet Bellarmine would with difficulty prove that these are things, which have no existence. Wherefore if an idol be that which is nothing, that is, a sound without reality and meaning, this very distinction, which is purely an invention of the human brain, is itself the vainest idol, nay one of the veriest of idols.

Such likewise are those distinctions and intentions which have been invented, for the establishment of idols and of the impious and unlawful adoration of idols, by the church of the malignants, by the mother of fornications, who resembles the

"adulterous woman" mentioned in Prov. xxx, 20: "She eateth and wipeth her mouth, and saith, I have done no harm," or "I have not wrought iniquity."

COROLLARY

It can be proved by strong arguments from the Scriptures, that the Roman pontiff is himself an idol; and that they who esteem him as the personage that he and his followers boastingly depict him to be, and who present to him the honour which he demands, by those very acts shew themselves to be idolaters.

DISPUTATION 24

ON THE INVOCATION OF SAINTS

RESPONDENT: JAMES A. PORT

I. From the hypothesis of the papists, we denominate those persons "saints," whom the Roman pontiff has by his canonization transferred into the book of saints.

(Bellarm. de Beat. Sanct. lib. 1, c. 8.) From the truth of the matter, we also call those persons "saints," who being sprinkled with the blood of Jesus Christ, (1 Pet. i, 2,) and sealed with the characters of the Holy Spirit, the sacred fountain of all holiness, have been illustrious in this world by the sanctity of their lives, which flows from their spiritual union with Christ; but who, as it regards the body, being now dead, still live in heaven with Christ as it regards the soul. (Rev. xiv, 13.) Of this description were the patriarchs of old, the prophets, the apostles, the martyrs, and others like them. The invocation of saints is that by which men have recourse to their intercessions, interest, patronage and assistance, for the sake of imploring, intreating, and obtaining their aid.

II. But the papists assert, that the saints are invoked for three reasons: (1.) That they may vouchsafe to intercede by their prayers and their suffrages. (2.) That, through their merits, and on account of them, they may obtain by their petitions the things which are asked of them. (3.) That they may themselves bestow the benefits which are required. For the papists have invested departed saints with these three qualities; that, being nearer to God, they have greater freedom of access to him and to Christ, than the faithful who are yet their survivors in the present life; that, by works of supererogation performed in this life, they have obtained by their merits [the privilege] that God shall hear and grant their prayers; and that they have been constituted by God the administrators of those blessings which are asked of them: And thus are they appointed mediators, both by merit and efficacy, between God, nay between Christ and living believers.

III. Yet upon all these things the papists have not had the hardihood to erect, as a superstructure, the necessity of invoking the saints: They only say that "It is good and useful suppliantly to invoke them;" and that "those persons hold an impious opinion who deny that the saints ought to be invoked." (Can. and Dec. Coun. of Trent, Sess.

25, c. 2.) But perhaps by these last words, which have an ambiguous meaning, they wished to intimate the existence of this necessity. For not only does he deny that saints ought to be invoked, who says that it is not necessary to invoke them, but likewise he who says that it is not lawful: The words, when strictly taken, bear the former signification, that invocation is not necessary; but the latter meaning of its unlawfulness, when they are understood as opposed to the words which preceded.

Even Bellarmine, when he had affixed this title, "The saints ought to be invoked,"

immediately subjoined the following thesis: "The saints are piously and usefully invoked by the living." (De Beat. Sanct. lib. 1, c. 19.) But that most subtle and evasive council often trifled with ambiguous expressions, being either compelled into such a course on account of the dissensions among its chief members, or else being perversely ingenious on account of its adversaries, whose blows it would not otherwise have been able, with any degree of speciousness, to avoid. We will, therefore, inquire concerning the invocation of saints, Is it necessary? Is it lawful and useful?

IV. With regard to the First of these questions, we say, (whether the papists assent to our affirmation or dissent from it,) that it is not necessary for believers in the present state of existence to invoke the saints who are engaged with Christ in heaven. And since this necessity is -- either according to the duty which surviving believers are bound to perform to the saints who have departed out of this life, and who are living with Christ; or according to the end for the sake of obtaining which, invocation is laid down as a necessary means; we affirm that, by neither of these methods is the invocation of saints necessary.

V. (1.) It is not necessary in reference to duty; because the invocation of saints has neither been commanded by God, nor is it sanctioned with any promise or threatening, which it would of necessity have been if it had to be performed as a duty by the faithful during their continuance in the world. (2.) It is not necessary in reference to the means; because neither the merits nor the intervening administration of the saints is necessary to solicit and to obtain the blessings which the faithful in the present life make the subject of their prayers; for otherwise, the mediation and administration of Christ either are not sufficient, or they cannot be obtained except through the intercession of departed saints, both of which are false; and that man who was the first of the saints to enter heaven, neither required nor employed any saint as a previous intercessor.

VI. Since, therefore, it is not necessary, that believers now living upon earth should invoke the saints who reign with Christ, if the papists take any pleasure in the approval of a good conscience, they ought to employ the utmost circumspection in ascertaining, whether it is not the better course to omit this invocation than to perform it, even though it might be made a subject of disputation whether or not it be lawful, about which we shall afterwards inquire. We affirm that it is preferable to omit all such invocation, and we support this assertion by two arguments, (1.) Since "whatever is not of faith," that is, whatsoever does not proceed from a conscience which is fully persuaded that the thing performed is pleasing to God, "is sin;" and since that may, therefore, be omitted without sin, about which even the smallest doubt may be entertained respecting its lawfulness, since it is found that it is not necessary; it follows from these premises, that it is better to omit than to perform invocation. (2.) Since the papists themselves confess, "that the difference between the worship of latria and that of dulia, or between divine and human adoration, is so great, that the man who presents that of latria to any object to which no more than dulia is due, is guilty of idolatry;" and since it is a matter of the greatest difficulty for the common people, who are ignorant and illiterate yet full of devotion to the saints, to observe this difference at all times and without any error; there is much danger lest those who invoke saints should fall into idolatry. This is a reason which also militates against the invocation of saints, even though it were proved that such invocation is lawful.

VII. The next inquiry is, "Is the invocation of saints lawful and useful?" Or, as the Council of Trent has expressed it, "Is it good and useful to invoke the saints?" Or, according to Bellarmine's phraseology, "Are the saints piously and usefully invoked?"

(De Beat. Sanct. lib. 1, cap, 19.) We who hold the negative, say, that it is neither pious nor useful to invoke the saints. We prove this assertion, first, generally; secondly, specially, according to the particular respects in which the papists invoke the saints, and maintain that they may be invoked.

VIII. First. We prove generally, that it is not pious, thus: Since no action can, of itself and properly, come under the appellation of piety or godliness, except that which has been prescribed by God, by whose word and institution alone every action is sanctified, otherwise it will be common; and since it is certain, that the invocation of saints has not been commanded by God, it follows that such an action cannot be called "pious." Some action may, however, be called "pious" by a metalepsis, because it has been undertaken for the sake of performing a pious action. But such a case as this does not here occur. By the same argument, we demonstrate that it is not useful; because all religious worship, not prescribed by God, is useless, (Lev. x, 1,) according to the express declaration of God, (Isa. xxix, 13,) and of Christ: "But in vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men." (Matt. xv, 9.) But the papists say, that the invocation of saints is religious worship.

IX. Secondly. We prove the same thing, specially, according to the relations in which the papists invest the saints when they invoke them. (1.) We say, the saints cannot be piously and usefully invoked as the donors of benefits; because God has not constituted the saints dispensers of blessings either celestial or terrestrial; for this is the office bestowed on Christ, to whom the angels are under subjection as his servants in this ministration. Besides, if even, in imitation of angels, the saints did, in this world, perform their subordinate service to Christ at the command of God; yet they ought not on this account to be invoked; for, before this can be done, a full power of dispensing is required, which may distribute blessings as it pleases; but the angels render in this world only a ministerial and instrumental service to Christ, for which reason neither is it lawful to invoke them as the donors of blessings. But the saints cannot, in imitation of the angels, perform a service to Christ ministerially and instrumentally, unless we assert that they all ascend and descend after the manner of angels. Since, therefore, they possess neither the power nor the capability of bestowing blessings, it follows that they cannot be either piously or usefully invoked as the donors of benefits. 10. (2.) The saints cannot be piously and usefully invoked as those who by their own merits have obtained the privilege of being heard and answered by God; because the saints have not been able to merit any thing for themselves or for others. For they have accounted it needful to exclaim, with David,

"Our goodness extendeth not to thee." (Psalm xvi, 2.) And "when they had done all those things which were commanded them," they felt the necessity of confessing, not only with humility but with the greatest truth, "We are unprofitable servants;" (Luke xvii, 10;) and truly to intreat God "to forgive the iniquity of their sins," and "not to enter into judgment with his servants." (Psalm xxxii, 5; cxliii, 2.) Therefore, we cannot piously plead, in our own behalf, that which is falsely attributed to the saints; and that cannot be usefully bestowed upon others, of which the saints themselves had not a sufficiency.

XI. (3.) Lastly, they cannot be piously and usefully invoked in the capacity of those who, as our friends, unite their prayers with ours, or who intercede before God by their prayers in our behalf; because the saints in heaven are ignorant of our particular necessities, and of the prayers of the faithful who are dwellers upon earth. (Isa. lxii, 16; 1 Kings viii, 36; 2 Kings xxii, 20.) For the assertions about the mirror or glass of the trinity, is a very vain fable, and receives its refutation from this very circumstance, that those angels who always behold the face of God the Father, (Matt. xviii, 20,) are said to be ignorant of the day of judgment. (Mark xiii, 32.) Those assertions about a divine revelation [to the saints and angels] have a foolish and ridiculous circle; and those about the explanation which may be given by means of angels, or of the spirits of persons recently deceased, are equally vain; because the Scriptures make no mention of those tokens or indications, even in a single word: without such mention, we feel scrupulous, in matters of such vast importance, about receiving any thing as true, or about undertaking to do any thing as pious and useful.

XII. We add, finally, that by the invocation of saints, the papists are injurious towards Christ, and, therefore, cannot engage in such invocation without sacrilege. They are unjust to Christ in two ways: (1.) Because they communicate to the saints the office of our Mediator and Advocate, which has been committed by the Father to Christ alone; and the power conferred [on that office]. (1 Tim. ii, 5; Rom. viii, 34; 1 John ii, 1.) Neither are they excused by what they say about the saints being subordinate to Christ; for by the circumstance of their alleging the merits of saints, and of their invoking them as the dispensers of blessings, they destroy this subordination and establish a collaterally. (2.) Because they detract greatly from that benevolent affection of Christ towards his people, from his most merciful inclination, and from that most prompt and ready desire to commiserate, which he manifests. These properties are proposed to us in the Scriptures in a manner the most lucid and plain, that, not being terrified with the consideration of our own unworthiness, we may approach, with confidence and freedom, to the throne of grace, "that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need." (Heb. iv, 16.) XIII. When we say that the saints must not be invoked, we do not take away all veneration from them, as the papists calumniously assert. For we confess that their memory is to be venerated with a grateful celebration. But we circumscribe our veneration within these bounds: First. We commemorate with thanksgiving the eminent gifts which have been conferred on them, and commend them for having faithfully used those gifts in the exercises of faith, hope and charity. Secondly. As much as in us lies, we imitate their examples, and endeavour to demonstrate, by our works, that the holy conversation which they had in this world is grateful to us who aspire to be like them. Lastly. We congratulate them on the felicity which they enjoy with Christ in the presence of God; and with devotion of soul we earnestly pray for the same felicity for ourselves, while we hope and trust that we shall enjoy it through the all-sufficient intercession of Christ, through which, alone, they also themselves have been made partakers of eternal happiness.

COROLLARY

In the invocation of saints, do the papists commit idolatry? We decide in the affirmative.

DISPUTATION 25

ON MAGISTRACY

RESPONDENT: JOHN LE CHANTRE

I. Not feeling much anxiety about the origin and etymology of the word, we say that from the manner in which it is used, it has two meanings: for it either signifies in the abstract, the power and the function itself; or, in the concrete, the person who is constituted the administrator of this function with power. But, because the abstract consideration is more simple, and lays down the law to the concrete, therefore we will occupy ourselves first and chiefly in the description of it. (John xix, 10, 11; Ephes. i, 21; Rom. xiii, 1.)

II. We therefore define magistracy, in the abstract, a power pre-eminent and administrative, or a function with a preeminent power, instituted and preserved by God for this purpose, that men may, in the society of their fellow-men, "lead a quiet and peaceable life, in all godliness and honesty," in true piety and righteousness, for their own salvation and to the glory of God. (Rom. xiii, 1-3; 1 Tim. ii, 2; 1 Pet. ii, 13; Prov. xxix, 4; Psalm 62; Isa. xlv, 22, 23.) For the more extensive explanation of this definition, we will consider the object -- the efficient and the end, which are the external causes of this function, and the matter and the form, which are the internal causes, from which we will derive all the rest.

III. The object of this function is the multitude of man kind, who are sociable animals, and bound to each other by many ties of indigence and communication according both to nature and grace, and who live together in common society. This object, likewise, comprehends the end for which, that is, those for whose benefit magistracy has been instituted. Hence, likewise, this power deservedly obtains the name of public authority," as it is, first, immediately and principally occupied concerning the condition and conduct of all the people and the whole society; but, secondarily, concerning the state and benefit of each member, though it intends, of itself, both the good of the whole, and that of each individual in the entire society. (Num. xi, 12; 2

Chron. i, 9, 10; Rom. xii, 4, 5; 1 Cor. xii, 12-27; Ezek. xxxiv, 2.) IV. The efficient cause which not only institutes magistracy, but also maintains it, is God himself. In him must be considered power purely free and independent, the best will, and the greatest capability, as the principles of its institution and preservation.

(1.) Power rests on creation, and through that, upon the right of the dominion which God has over all created things, but especially over men. (Rom. xiii, 1, 2; John xix, 10, 11; Psalm xxiv, 1 Jeremiah xxvii, 2, 6.) (2.) The will of God, in its institution, is through four kinds of his love: (i.) His love of order among all created things; (1 Cor.

xiv, 33;) (ii.) His love towards men themselves, both towards those who are placed in authority, above others, and especially towards those who are put in subjection; (2

Cor. ix, 8; 2 Kings xi, 17;) (iii.) His love of obedience to his own law; (Judges ii, 16, 17; 2 Chron. xxxiv, 31 32;) (iv.) His love of that submission which those who are equals by nature, render to others who are their superiors, merely through the will or good pleasure of God. (Psalm ii, 9, 12.) (3.) But Capability, and that of the highest kind, was likewise necessary for this purpose, both on account of that ambition of being eminent with which men are infected, and on account of the power or capability of an infinite multitude; and it is employed by God through an internal impression upon the hearts of men, of the necessity of this order, (1 Sam. x, 26; xi, 7,) and through the external defense of it. (Josh. i, 5-9.)

V. The end of the institution of magistracy, is the good of the whole, and of each individual of which it is composed, both an animal [or natural] good, "that they may lead quiet and peaceable lives;" (1 Tim. ii, 2;) and a spiritual good, that they may live in this world, to God, and may in heaven enjoy that good, to the glory of God who is its author. (Rom. xiii, 4.) For since man, according to his two-fold life, (that is, the animal and the spiritual,) stands in need of each kind of good, (Num. xi, 12, 13,) and is, by nature of the image of God, capable of both kinds; (Gen. i, 26; Col. iii, 10;) since two collateral powers cannot stand, (Matt. vi, 24; 1 Cor. xiv, 33,) and since animal good is directed to that which is spiritual, (Matt. vi, 33,) and animal life is subordinate to that which is spiritual, (Gal. ii, 20; 1 Cor. xv, 32,) it is unlawful to divide those two benefits, and to separate their joint superintendence, either in reality or by the administration of the supreme authority; for, if the animal life and its good become the only objects of solicitude, such an administration is that of cattle. But if human society be brought to such a condition that the spiritual life, only, prevails, then this power [of magistracy] is no longer necessary. (1 Cor. xv, 24.) VI. The matter, of which this administration consists, are the acts necessary to produce that end. These actions, we comprehend in the three following classes: (1.) The first is Legislation, under which we also comprise the care of the moral law, according to both tables, and the enacting of subordinate laws with respect to places, times and persons, by which laws, provision may be the better made for the observance of that immovable law, and the various societies, being restricted to certain relations, may be the more correctly governed; that is, ecclesiastical, civil, scholastic and domestic associations. (Exod. xviii, 18-20; 2 Chron. xix, 6-8; 2 Kings xiii, 4, 5.) (2.) The second contains the vocation to delegated offices or duties, and the oversight of all actions and things which are necessary to the whole society. (Deut. i, 13, 15, 16; Exod. xviii, 21, 22; 1 Pet. ii, 14; 2 Chron. xix, 2, 8-11, Num. xi, 13-17.) (3.) The third is either the eradication of all evils out of the society, if they be internal, or the warding of them off, if they be external, even with war, if that be necessary, and the safety of society should require it. (Prov. xx, 26, 28; Psalm ci, 8; 1 Tim. ii, 2.) VII. The form is the power itself, according to which these functions themselves are discharged, with an authority that is subject to God alone, and pre-eminently above whatever is human; (Rom. xiii, 1; Psalm lxxxii, 1, 6; Lament. iv, 20;) for this inspires spirit and life, and gives efficacy to these functions. It is enunciated "power by right of the sword," by which the good may be defended, and the bad terrified, restrained and punished, and all men compelled to perform their prescribed duties. (Rom. xiii, 4, 5.) To this power, as supreme, belongs the authority of demanding, from those under subjection, tribute, custom, and other burdens. These resemble the sinews, by which the authority and power necessary for these functions, are held together and established. (Rom. xiii, 6.)

VIII. But though there was no employment for this power before the introduction of sin into the world, because there were then only two human beings, both of whom were comprised in one family; yet we are of opinion, that it would also have had a place in the primitive integrity of mankind, and that it had not its origin from the entrance of sin; for we think this can be proved from the nature of man, who is a social animal, and was capable of deviating from his duty -- from the limits of this power -- from the causes which induced God to institute it -- from the natural and moral law itself, and from the impression of this power on the hearts of men, provided any great number of men had been propagated prior to the commission of the first sin.

(Gen. iii, 6; 1 Tim. ii, 1- iv, ; 1 Kings x, 9; Exod. xx, 12-17.) IX. But this power is always the same according to the nature of its function and the prerogative of its authority; and it suffers no variation, either from the difference in number of those to whom this power is confided in a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a democracy, or from the difference of the manner in which this power is given, whether it be derived immediately from God, or it be obtained by human right and custom through succession, inheritance and election. Under all these circumstances, it remains the same, unless a limitation, restricted to certain conditions, be added by God, or by those who possess the right of conferring such a power. (Josh. xxii, 12; 1

Tim. ii, 2; 1 Pet. ii, 13; Judges 20; 1 Sam. xvi, 12; 2 Sam. 1; 1 Kings xi, 11, 12; xiv, 8-10.) And this limitation is equally binding on both parties; nor is it lawful for him who has accepted of this authority, by rescinding the conditions, to assume a greater power to himself, under the pretext that those conditions are opposed to his conscience or to his condition, and that they are even injurious to the society itself.

X. Since the end of this power is the good of the whole, or of the entire association of men, who belong to the same country or state, it follows that the prince of this state is less than the state itself, and that its benefit is not only to be preferred to his own, but that it is also to be purchased with his detriment, nay, at the expense of life itself.

(Ezek. xxxiv, 2-4; 1 Sam. xii, 2, 3; viii, 20.) Though, in return, every member of the state is bound to defend, with all his powers, yet in a lawful manner, the life, safety and dignity of the prince, as the father of his country. (2 Sam. xvi, 3.) XI. From the circumstance, also, of this power having been instituted by God and restricted within certain laws, we conclude that it is not lawful for him who possesses it, to lift up himself against God, to enact laws contrary to the divine laws, and either to compel the people who are committed to his care to the perpetration of acts which are forbidden by God, or to prevent them from performing such acts as he has commanded. If he acts thus, let him assuredly know, that he must render an account to God, and that the people are bound to obey the Almighty in preference to him. (Deut.

xvii, 18, 19; 1 Kings xii, 28-30; xiii, 2; 1 Kings xxii, 5.) Yet, on this point, the people ought to observe two cautions: (1.) To distinguish actions which are to be performed, from burdens which are to be borne. (2.) To be perfectly sure that the orders of the prince are in opposition to the divine commands. Without a due observance of these cautions, they will, by a precipitate judgment, commit an act of disobedience against the prince, to whom, in that matter, they are able, in an orderly manner, under God, to be obedient.

XII. The functions which we have described as essential to this power, are not subject to the arbitrary will of the prince, whether he may neglect either the whole of them, or one of the three. If he act thus, he renders himself unworthy of the name of "prince;"

and it would be a better course for him to resign the dignity of his office, than to be a trifling loiterer in the discharge of its functions. (Psalm lxxxii, 1-8; Ezek. xi, 1-13.) But here, also, a two-fold distinction must be used: (1.) Between a degree of idleness accruing from the function, and vice coming into it. (2.) Between loitering, and hindering these duties from being performed in the commonwealth; for the latter of these faults (hindrance) would bring speedy destruction to the society, while the commonwealth can consist with the former, (laziness,) provided other persons be permitted to perform those duties.

XIII. We conclude further, from the author of the institution -- from the end and the use of the office -- from the functions which pertain to it, and from the pre-eminent power itself, when they are all compared with the nature of Christianity, that a Christian man can, with a good conscience, accept of the office and perform the duties of magistracy; nay, that no one is more suitable than he for discharging the duties of this office, and, which is still more, that no person can legitimately and perfectly fulfill all its duties except a Christian. Yet, by this affirmation, we do not mean to deny that a legitimate magistracy exists among other nations than those which are Christian. (Acts x, 31, 48; Exod. xviii, 20-23.)

XIV. Lastly. Because this power is pre eminent, we assert that every soul is subject to it by divine right, whether he be a layman or a clergyman, a deacon, priest, or bishop, an archbishop, cardinal, or patriarch, or even the Roman pontiff himself; so that it is the duty of every one to obey the commands of the magistrate, to acknowledge his tribunal, to await the sentence, and to submit to the punishment which he may award.

From such obedience and subjection the prince himself cannot grant any man immunity and exemption; although in apportioning those burdens which are to be borne, he can yield his prerogative to some persons. (Rom. xiii, 1; 1 Pet. ii, 13; v, 1; John xix, 10, 11; Acts xxv, 1, 10; 1 Kings i, 26, 27; Rom. xiii, 5.) END OF THE PUBLIC DISPUTATIONS.

PRIVATE DISPUTATIONS

DISPUTATION I

ON THEOLOGY

I. As we are about again to commence our course of theological disputations under the auspices of our gracious God, we will previously treat a little on theology itself.

II. By the word "theology" we do not understand a conception or a discourse of God himself, of which meaning it would properly admit; but we understand by it, "a conception" or "a discourse about God and things divine," according to its common use.

III. It may be defined, the doctrine or science of the truth which is according to godliness, and which God has revealed to man that he may know God and divine things, may believe on him and may through faith perform to him the acts of love, fear, honour, worship and obedience, and obtain blessedness from him through union with him, to the divine glory.

IV. The proximate and immediate object of this doctrine or science is, not God himself, but the duty and act of man which he is bound to perform to God. In theology, therefore, God himself must be considered as the object of this duty.

V. On this account, theology is not a theoretical science or doctrine, but a practical one, requiring the action of the whole man, according to all and each of its parts -- an action of the most transcendent description, answerable to the excellence of the object as far as the human capacity will permit.

VI. From these premises, it follows that this doctrine is not expressed after the example of natural science, by which God knows himself, but after the example of that notion which God has willingly conceived within himself from all eternity, about the prescribing of that duty and of all things required for it.

DISPUTATION II

ON THE MANNER IN WHICH THEOLOGY MUST BE TAUGHT

I. It has long been a maxim with those philosophers who are the masters of method and order, that the theoretical sciences ought to be delivered in a synthetical order, but the practical in an analytical order, on which account, and because theology is a practical science, it follows that it must be treated according to the analytical method.

II. Our discussion of this doctrine must therefore commence with its end, about which we must previously treat, with much brevity, both on its nature or what it is, and its qualities; we must then teach, throughout the entire discourse, the means for attaining the end, to which the obtaining of the end must be subjoined, and, at this, the whole discussion must terminate.

III. For, according to this order, not only the whole doctrine itself, but likewise all its parts, will be treated from its principal end, and each article will obtain that place which belongs to it according to the principal relation which it has to its total and to the end of the whole.

IV. But though we are easily satisfied with all treatises in which the body of divinity is explained, provided they agree according to the truth, at least in the chief and fundamental things, with the Scripture itself; and though we willingly give to all of them praise and commendation; yet, if on account only of inquiry into the order, and for the sake of treating the subject with greater accuracy, we may be allowed to explain what are our views and wishes.

V. In the first place, the order in which the theology ascribed to God, and to the actions of God, is treated, seems to be inconvenient. Neither are we pleased with the division of theology into the pathological, and the therapeutic after a preface of the doctrine about the principles, the end and the efficient; nor with that, how accommodating soever it may be, in appearance, in which, after premising as its principles the word of God, and God himself, as the causes of our salvation, and therefore the works and effects of God, and man who is its subject is placed as a part of it. So neither do we receive satisfaction from the partition of theological science into the knowledge of God and of man; nor from that by which theology is said to exercise itself about God and the church; nor that by which it is previously determined that we must treat about God, the motion of a rational creature to him, and about Christ; nor does that which prescribes us to a discourse about God, the creatures, and principally about man and his fall, about his reparation through Christ, and about the sacraments and a future life.

DISPUTATION III

ON BLESSEDNESS, THE END OF THEOLOGY

I. The end of theology is the blessedness of man; and that, not animal or natural, but spiritual and supernatural.

II. It consists in fruition, the object of which is a perfect, chief, and sufficient good, which is God.

III. The foundation of this fruition is life, endowed with understanding and with intellectual feeling.

IV. The connective or coherent cause of fruition is union with God, by which that life is so greatly perfected, that they who obtain this union are said to be "partakers of the divine nature and of life eternal."

V. The medium of fruition is understanding and emotion or feeling -- understanding, not by species or image, but by clear vision, which is called that of face to face; and feeling, corresponding with this vision.

VI. The cause of blessedness is God himself, uniting himself with man; that is, giving himself to be seen, loved, possessed, and thus to be enjoyed by man.

VII. The antecedent or only moving cause is the goodness and the remunerative justice of God, which have the wisdom of God as their precursor.

VIII. The executive cause is the power of God, by which the soul is enlarged after the capacity of God, and the animal body is transformed and transfigured into a spiritual body.

IX. The end, event, or consequence is two-fold, (1.) a demonstration of the glorious wisdom, goodness, justice, power, and likewise the universal perfection of God; and (2.) his glorification by the beatified.

X. Its adjunct properties are, that it is eternal, and is known to be so by him who possesses it; and that it at once both satisfies every desire, and is an object of continued desire.

DISPUTATION IV

ON RELIGION

I. Omitting all dispute about the question, "whether it be possible for God to render man happy by a union with himself without the intervening act of man," we affirm that it has pleased God not to bless man except by some duty performed according to the will of God, which God has determined to reward with eternal blessedness.

II. And this most equitable will of God rests on the foundation of the justice and equity according to which it seems lawful and proper, that the Creator should require from his creature, endowed with reason, an act tending to God, by which, in return, a rational creature is bound to tend towards God, its author and beneficent lord and master.

III. This act must be one of the entire man, according to each of his parts -- according to his soul, and that entirely, and each of his faculties, and according to his body, so far as it is the mute instrument of the soul, yet itself possessing a capacity for happiness by means of the soul. This act must likewise be the most excellent of all those things which can proceed from man, and like a continuous act; so that whatever other acts those may he which are performed by man through some intervention of the will, they ought to be performed according to this act and its rule.

IV. Though this duty, according to its entire essence and all its parts, can scarcely be designated by one name, yet we do not improperly denominate it when we give it the name of Religion This word, in its most enlarged acceptation, embraces three things -the act itself, the obligation of the act, and the obligation with regard to God, on account of whom that act must be performed. Thus, we are bound to honour our parents on account of God.

V. Religion, then, is that act which our theology places in order; and it is for this reason justly called "the object of theological doctrine."

VI. Its method is defined by the command of God, and not by human choice; for the word of God is its rule and measure. And as in these days we have this word in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament alone, we say that these Scriptures are the canon according to which religion is to be conformed. We shall soon treat more fully about the Scriptures how far it is required that we should consider them as the canon of religion.

VII. The opposites to religion are, impiety, that is, the neglect and contempt of God, and eqeloqrhskeia will-worship, or superstition, that is, a mode of religion invented by man. Hypocrisy is not opposed to the whole of religion, but to its integrity or purity; because that in which the entire man ought to be engaged, is performed only by his body.

DISPUTATION V

ON THE RULE OF RELIGION, THE WORD OF GOD, AND THE SCRIPTURES

IN PARTICULAR

I. As religion is the duty of man towards God, it is necessary that it should be so prescribed by God in his sure word as to render it evident to man that he is bound by this prescript as it proceeds from God; or, at least, it may and ought to be evident to man.

II. This word is either endiaqeton, [an inward or mental reasoning,] or wroforikon, [a spoken or delivered discourse] the former of them being engrafted in the mind of man by an internal inscription, whether it be an increation or a superinfusion; the latter being openly pronounced.

III. By the engrafted word, God has prescribed religion to man, first by inwardly persuading him that God ought, and that it was his will, to be worshipped by man; then, by universally disclosing to the mind of man the worship that is pleasing to himself, and that consists of the love of God and of one's neighbour; and, lastly, by writing or sealing a remuneration on his heart. This inward manifestation is the foundation of all external revelation.

IV. God has employed the outward word, First, that he might repeat what had been engrafted -- might recall it to remembrance, and might urge its exercise. Secondly, that he might prescribe to him other things besides, which seem to be placed in a fourfold difference. (1.) For they are either such things as are homogeneous to the law of nature, which might easily be raised up on the things engrafted, or which man could not with equal ease deduce from them. (2.) Or they may appear to be such things as these, yet such as it has pleased God to circumscribe, lest, from the things engrafted, conclusions should be drawn that were universally, or at least for that time, repugnant to the will of God. (3.) Or they are merely positive, having no communion with these engrafted things, although they rest on the general duty of religion. (4.) Or, lastly, according, to some state of man, they are suitable to him, particularly for that into which man was brought by the fall from his primeval condition.

V. God communicates this external word to man, either orally, or by writing. For, neither with respect to the whole of religion, nor with respect to its parts, is God confined to either of these modes of communication; but he sometimes uses one and sometimes another, and at other times both of them, according to his own choice and pleasure. He first employed oral enunciation in its delivery, and afterwards, writing, as a more certain means against corruption and oblivion. He has also completed it in writing; so that we now have the infallible word of God in no other place than in the Scriptures, which are therefore appropriately denominated "the instrument of religion."

VI. These Scriptures are contained in those books of the Old and the New Testament which are called "canonical:" They consist of the five books of Moses; the books of Joshua, Judges, and of Ruth; the First and Second of Samuel; the First and Second of Kings; the First and Second of Chronicles; the books of Ezra and of Nehemiah, and the first ten chapters of that of Esther; fifteen books of the prophets, that is, the three Major and the twelve Minor Prophets; the books of Job, the Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, the Canticles, Daniel, and of the Lamentations of Jeremiah: All these books are contained in the Old Testament. Those of the New Testament are the following: The four Evangelists; one book of the Acts of the Apostles; thirteen of St.

Paul's Epistles; the Epistle to the Hebrews; that of St. James; the two of St. Peter; the three of St. John; that of St. Jude; and the Apocalypse by St. John. Some of these are without hesitation accounted authentic; but about others of them doubts have been occasionally entertained. Yet the number is quite sufficient of those about which no doubts were ever indulged.

VII. The primary cause of these books is God, in his Son, through the Holy Spirit. The instrumental causes are holy men of God, who, not at their own will and pleasure, but as they were actuated and inspired by the Holy Spirit, wrote these books, whether the words were inspired into them, dictated to them, or administered by them under the divine direction.

VIII. The matter or object of the Scriptures is religion, as has already been mentioned.

The essential and internal form is the true intimation or signification of the will of God respecting religion. The external is the form or character of the word, which is attempered to the dignity of the speaker, and accommodated to the nature of things and to the capacity of men.

IX. The end is the instruction of man, to his own salvation and the glory of God. The parts of the whole instruction are doctrine, reproof, institution or instruction, correction, consolation, and threatening.

DISPUTATION VI

ON THE AUTHORITY AND CERTAINTY OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES

I. The authority of the word of God, which is comprised in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, lies both in the veracity of the whole narration, and of all the declarations, whether they be those about things past, about things present, or about those which are to come, and in the power of the commands and prohibitions, which are contained in the divine word.

II. Both of these kinds of authority can depend on no other than on God, who is the principal author of this word, both because he is truth without suspicion of falsehood, and because he is of power invincible.

III. On this account, the knowledge alone that this word is divine, is obligatory on our belief and obedience; and so strongly is it binding, that this obligation can be augmented by no external authority.

IV. In what manner or respect soever the church may be contemplated, she can do nothing to confirm this authority; for she, also, is indebted to this word for all her own authority; and she is not a church unless she have previously exercised faith in this word as being divine, and have engaged to obey it. Wherefore, in any way to suspend the authority of the Scriptures on the church, is to deny that God is of sufficient veracity and supreme power, and that the church herself is a church.

V. But it is proved by various methods, that this word has a divine origin, either by signs employed for the enunciation or declaration of the word, such as miracles, predictions and divine appearances -- by arguments engrafted on the word itself, such as the matters which it contains, the style and character of the discourse, the agreements between all the parts and each of them, and the efficacy of the word itself; and by the inward testification or witness of God himself by his Holy Spirit. To all these, we add a secondary proof -- the testimony of those persons who have received this word as divine.

VI. The force and efficacy of this last testimony is entirely human, and is of importance equal to the quantum of wisdom, probity and constancy possessed by the witnesses. And on this account the authority of the church can make no other kind of faith than that which is human, but which may be preparatory to the production of faith divine. The testimony of the church, therefore, is not the only thing by which the certainty of the Scriptures is confirmed to us; indeed it is not the principle thing; nay, it is the weakest of all those which are adduced in confirmation.

VII. No arguments can be invented for establishing the divinity of any word, which do not belong by most equitable reason to this word; and, on the other hand, it is impossible any arguments can be devised which may conduce even by a probable reason to destroy the divinity of this word.

VIII. Though it be not absolutely necessary to salvation to believe that this or that book is the work of the author whose title it bears; yet this fact may be established by surer arguments than are those which claim the authorship of any other work for the writer.

IX. The Scriptures are canonical in the same way as they are divine; because they contain the rule of faith, charity, hope, and of all our inward and outward actions.

They do not, therefore, require human authority in order to their being received into the canon, or considered as canonical. Nay, the relation between God and his creatures, requires that his word should be the rule of life to his creatures.

X. We assert that, for the establishment of the divinity of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, this disjunctive proposition is of irrefutable validity: Either the Scriptures are divine, or (far be blasphemy from the expression!) they are the most foolish of all writings, whether they be said to have proceeded from man, or from the evil spirit.

COROLLARIES

I. To affirm "that the authority of the Scriptures depends upon the church, because the church is more ancient than the Scriptures," is a falsehood, a foolish speech, an implication of manifold contradictions and blasphemy.

II. The authority of the Roman pontiff to bear witness to the divinity of the Scriptures, is less than that of any bishop who is wiser and better than he, and possessed of greater constancy.

DISPUTATION VII

ON THE PERFECTION OF THE SCRIPTURES

I. We denominate that which comprehends all things necessary for the church to know, to believe, to do and to hope, in order to salvation, "THE PERFECTION OF

THE SACRED SCRIPTURES."

II. As we are about to engage in the defense of this perfection, against inspirations, visions, dreams and other novel enthusiastic things, we assert, that, since the time when Christ and his apostles sojourned on earth, no inspiration of any thing necessary for the salvation of any individual man, or of the church, has been given to any single person or to any congregation of men whatsoever, which thing is not in a full and most perfect manner comprised in the sacred Scriptures.

III. We likewise affirm, that in the latter ages no doctrine necessary to salvation has been deduced from these Scriptures which was not explicitly known and believed from the very commencement of the Christian church. For, from the time of Christ's ascent into heaven, the church of God was in an adult state, being capable indeed of increasing in the knowledge and belief of things necessary to salvation, but not capable of receiving accessions of new articles; that is, she was capable of increase in that faith by which the articles of religion are believed, but not in that faith which is the subject of belief.

IV. Whatever additions have since been made, they obtain only the rank of interpretations and proofs, which ought themselves not to be at variance with the Scriptures, but to be deduced from them; otherwise, no authority is due to them, but they should rather be considered as allied to error; for the perfection, not only of the propositions, but likewise of the explanations and proofs which are comprised in the Scriptures, is very great.

V. But the most compendious way of forming a judgment about any enunciation or proposition, is, to discern whether its subject and predicate be either expressly or with equal force contained in them, that proposition may be rejected at least as not necessary to salvation, without any detriment to one's salvation. But the predicate may be of such a kind, that, when ascribed to this subject, it cannot be received without detriment to the salvation. For instance, "The Roman pontiff is the head of the church."The virgin Mary is the mediatrix of grace."

DISPUTATION VIII

ON THE PERSPICUITY OF THE SCRIPTURES

I. The perspicuity of the Scriptures is a quality agreeing with them as with a sign, according. to which quality they are adapted clearly to reveal the conceptions, whose signs are the words comprised in the Scriptures, to those persons to whom the Scriptures are administered according to the benevolent providence of God.

II. That perspicuity is a quality which agrees with the Scriptures, is proved from its cause and its end. (1.) In cause, we consider the wisdom and goodness of the author, who, according to his wisdom knew, and according to his goodness willed, clearly and well to enunciate or declare the meanings of his own mind. (2.) In the end is the duty of those to whom the Scriptures are directed, and who, through the decree of God, cannot attain to salvation without this knowledge.

III. This perspicuity comes distinctly to be considered both with regard to its object and its subject. For all things [in the Scriptures] are not equally perspicuous, nor is every thing alike perspicuous to all persons; but in the epistle of St. Paul, some things occur which "are hard to be understood;" and "the gospel is hid, or concealed, to them who are lost, in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them who believe not"

IV. But those senses or meanings, the knowledge and belief of which are simply necessary to salvation, are revealed in the Scriptures with such plainness, that they can be perceived even by the most simple of mankind, provided they be able duly to exercise their reason.

V. But they are perspicuous to those alone who, being illuminated by the light of the Holy Spirit, have eyes to see, and a mind to understand and discern. For any colour whatever, though sufficiently illuminated by the light, is not seen except by the eye which is endued with the power of seeing, as with an inward light.

VI. But even in those things which are necessary to be known and believed in order to salvation, the law must be distinguished from the gospel, especially in that part which relates to Jesus Christ crucified and raised up again. For even the gentiles, who are aliens from Christ, have "the work of the law written in their hearts," though this is not saving, except by the addition of the internal illumination and inspiration of God; but "the doctrine of the cross, which is foolishness and a stumbling block to the natural man," is not perceived without the revelation of the Spirit.

VII. In the Scriptures, some things may be found so difficult to be understood, that men of the quickest and most perspicacious genius may, in attaining to an understanding of those things, have a subject on which to bestow their labours during the whole course of their lives. But God has so finely attempered the Scripture, that they can neither be read without profit, nor, after having been perused and reperused innumerable times, can they be put aside through aversion or disgust.

DISPUTATION IX

ON THE MEANINGS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES

I. The legitimate and genuine sense of the holy Scriptures is, that which the Holy Ghost, the author of them, intended, and which is collected from the words themselves, whether they be received in their proper or in their figurative signification; that is, it is the grammatical sense, as it is called.

II. From this sense, alone, efficacious arguments may be sought for the proof of doctrines.

III. But, on account of the analogical similitude of corporeal, carnal, natural, and earthly things, and those belonging to the present life, to things spiritual, heavenly, future and eternal, it happens that a double meaning, each of them certain and intended by the author, lies under the very same words in the Scriptures, of which the one is called "the typical," the other "the meaning prefigured in the type" or "the allegorical." To this allegorical meaning, we also refer the analogical, as opposed in a similar manner to that which is typical.

IV. From these meanings, that which is called "the ethiological" and "the tropological" do not differ, since the former of them renders the cause of the grammatical sense, and the latter contains an accommodation of it to the circumstances of persons, place, time, &c.

V. The interpretation of Scripture has respect both to its words and to its sense or meaning.

VI. The interpretation of its words is either that of single words, or of many words combined; and both of these methods constitute either a translation of the words into another language, or an explanation [or paraphrase] through other words of the same language.

VII. Let translation be so restricted, that, if the original word has any ambiguity, the word into which it is translated may retain it: or, if that cannot be done, let it have something equivalent by being noted in the margin.

VIII. In the explanation [or paraphrase] which shall be made by other words, endeavours must be used that explanatory words be sought from the Scriptures themselves. For this purpose, attention to the synonymy and phraseology will be exceedingly useful.

IX. In the interpretation of the meanings of the words, it must be sedulously attempted both to make the sense agree with the rule or "form of sound words," and to accommodate it to the scope or intention of the author in that passage. To this end, in addition to a clear conception of the words, a comparison of other passages of Scripture, whether they be similar, is conducive, as is likewise a diligent search or institution into its context. In this labour, the occasion [of the words] and their end, the connection of those things which precede and which follow, and the circumstances, also, of persons, times and places, will be principally observed.

X. As "the Scriptures are not of private or peculiar explanation," an interpreter of them will strive to "have his senses exercised" in them; that the interpretation of the Scriptures, which, in those sacred writings, comes under the denomination of

"prophecy," may proceed from the same Spirit as that which primarily inspired the prophecy of the Scriptures.

XI. But the authority of no one is so great, whether it be that of an individual or of a church, as to be able to obtrude his own interpretation on the people as the authentic one. From this affirmation however, by way of eminence, we except the prophets and the apostles. For such interpretation is always subjected to the judgment of him to whom it is proposed, to this extent -- that he is bound to receive it, only so far as it is confirmed by strength of arguments.

XII. For this reason, neither the agreement of the fathers, which can, with difficulty, be demonstrated, nor the authority of the Roman pontiff, ought to be received as the rule of interpretation.

XIII. We do not wish to introduce unbounded license, by which it may be allowable to any person, whether a public interpreter of Scripture or a private individual, to reject, without cause, any interpretations whatsoever, whether made by one prophet, or by more; but we desire the liberty of prophesying [or public expounding] to be preserved entire and unimpaired in the church. This liberty, itself, however, we subject to the judgment of God, as possessing the power of life and death, and to that of the church, or of her prelates who are endowed with the power of binding and loosing.

DISPUTATION X

ON THE EFFICACY OF THE SCRIPTURES

I. When we treat on the force and efficacy of the word of God, whether spoken or written, we always append to it the principal and concurrent efficacy of the Holy Spirit.

II. The object of this efficacy is man, but he must be considered either as the subject in whom the efficacy operates, or as the object about whom this efficacy exercises itself.

III. The subject of this efficacy in whom it operates, is man according to his understanding and his passions, and as being endowed with a capacity, either active or passive. (1.) According to his understanding, by which he is able to understand the meanings of the word, and to apprehend them as true and good for himself: (2.) According to his passions, by which he is capable of being carried by his appetites to something true and good which is pointed out, to embrace it, and to repose in it.

IV. This efficacy is not only preparatory, by which the understanding and the passions are prepared to apprehend something else that is yet more true and good, and that is not comprised in the external word; but it is likewise perfective, by which the human understanding and affections are so perfected, that man cannot attain to an ulterior perfection in the present life. Therefore, we reject [the doctrine of] those who affirm that the Scriptures are a dead letter, and serve only to prepare a man, and to render him capable of receiving another inward word.

V. This efficacy is beautifully circumscribed in the Scriptures by three acts, each of which is two-fold. (1.) That of teaching what is true, and of confuting what is false.

(2.) That of exhorting to what is good, dissuading from what is evil, and of reproving if any thing has been done beyond or contrary to one's duty. (3.) That of administering consolation to a contrite spirit, and of denouncing threats against a lofty spirit.

VI. The object of this efficacy, about which it exercises itself, is the same man, placed before the tribunal of divine justice, that, according to this word, he [reporter] may bear away from it a sentence either of justification or of condemnation.

DISPUTATION XI

ON RELIGION IN A STRICTER SENSE

We have treated on religion generally, and on its principles as they are comprehended in the scriptures of the Old and New Testament. We must now treat upon it in a stricter signification.

I. As religion contains the duty of man towards God, it must necessarily be founded in the mutual relation which subsists between God and man. If it happen that this relation is varied, the mode of religion must also be varied, the acts pertaining to the substance of every religion always remaining, which are knowledge, faith, love, fear, trust, dread and obedience.

II. The first relation between God and man is that which flows from the creation of man in the divine image, according to which religion was prescribed to him by the comprehensive law that has been impressed on the minds of men, and that was afterwards repeated by Moses in the ten commandments. For the sake of proving man's obedience, God added to this a symbolical law, about not eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

III. Through the sin of man, another relation was introduced between him and God, according to which, man, being liable to the condemnation of God, needs the grace of restoration. If God bestow this grace on man, the religion which is to be prescribed to man must now be also founded on that act, in addition to creation. Since this act [on the part of God] requires from man an acknowledgment of sin and thanksgiving for deliverance, it is apparent that, in this new relation, the mode of religion ought likewise to be varied, as, through the appointment of God, it has in reality been varied.

IV. It was the pleasure of God so to administer this variation, that it should not immediately exhibit this grace in a complete manner, but that it should retain man for a season under the sealed dominion of guilt, yet with the addition of a promise of grace to be exhibited in his own time. Hence, arises the difference of the religion which was prescribed by Moses to the children of Israel, and that which was delivered by Christ to his followers -- of which the former is called "the religion of the Old Testament and of the promise," and the latter," that of the New Testament and of the gospel;" the former is also called the Jewish religion; the latter, the Christian.

V. The use of the ceremonial law under Moses, and its abrogation under Christ, teach most clearly that this religion or mode of religion differs in many acts. But as the Christian religion prevails at this time, and as [its obligations are] to be performed by us, we will treat further about it, yet so as to intersperse, in their proper places, some mention, both of the primitive religion and of that of the Jews, so Jar as they are capable, and ought to serve to explain the Christian religion.

VI. But it is not our wish for this difference to be extended so far as to have the attainment of salvation, without the intervention of Christ, ascribed to those who served God under the pedagogy of the Old Testament and by faith in the promise; for the subjoined affirmation has always obtained from the time when the first promise was promulgated: "There is none other name under heaven, given among men, than that of our Lord Jesus Christ, by which men must be saved."

VII. It appears, from this, that the following assertion, which was used by one of the ancients, is false and untheological: "Men were saved at first by the law of nature, afterwards, by that of Moses, and at length, by that of grace." This, also, is further apparent, that such a confusion of the Jewish and Christian religions as was introduced by it, is completely opposed to the dispensation or economy of God.

DISPUTATION XII

ON THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, ITS NAME AND RELATION

I. Beginning now to treat further on the Christian religion, we will first declare what is the meaning of this term, and we will afterwards consider the matter of this religion, each in its order.

II. The Christian religion, which the Jews called "the heresy of the Nazarenes,"

obtained its name from Jesus of Nazareth, whom God hath appointed as our only master, and hath made him both Christ and Lord.

III. But this name agrees with him in two ways -- from the cause and from the object.

(1.) From the cause; because Jesus Christ, as "the Teacher sent from God," prescribed this religion, both by his own voice, when he dwelt on earth, and by his apostles, whom he sent forth into all the world. (2.) From the object; because the same Jesus Christ, the object of this religion, according to godliness, is now exhibited, and fully or perfectly manifested; whereas, he was formerly promised and foretold by Moses and the prophets, only as being about to come.

IV. He was, indeed, a teacher far transcending all other teachers -- Moses, the prophets, and even the angels themselves -- both in the mode of his perception, and in the excellence of his doctrine. In the mode of his perception; because, existing in the bosom of the Father, admitted intimately to behold all the secrets of the Father, and endued with the plenitude of the Spirit, he saw and heard those things which he speaks and testifies. But other teachers, being endued, according to a certain measure with the Spirit, have perceived either by a vision, by dreams, by conversing "face to face," or by the intervention of an angel, those things which it was their duty to declare to others; and this Spirit itself is called "the Spirit of Christ."

V. In the excellence of his doctrine, also, Christ was superior to all other teachers, because he revealed to mankind, together and at once, the fullness of the very Godhead, and the complete and latest will of his Father respecting the salvation of men; so that, either as it regards the matter or the dearness of the exposition, no addition can be made to it, nor is it necessary that it should.

VI. From their belief in this religion, and their profession of it, the professors were called Christians. (Acts xi, 26; 1 Pet. iv, 16.) That the excellence of this name may really belong to a person, it is not sufficient for him to acknowledge Christ as a teacher and prophet divinely called. But he must likewise religiously own and worship him as the object of this doctrine, though the former knowledge and faith precede this, and though from it, alone, certain persons are sometimes said to have believed in Christ.

DISPUTATION XIII

ON THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, WITH REGARD TO THE MATTER

GENERALLY

I. Since God is the object of all religion, in its various modifications, he must likewise be the object of this religion. But Christ, in reference to God, is also an object of it, as having been appointed by God the Father, King and Lord of the universe, and the Head of his church.

II. For this reason, in a treatise on the Christian religion, the following subjects come, in due order, under our consideration: (1.) The object itself, towards which faith and religious worship ought to tend. (2.) The cause, on account of which, faith and worship may and ought to be performed to the object. (3.) The very act of faith and worship, and the method of each, according to the command of God and Christ. (4.) Salvation itself, which, as being promised and desired, has the power of an impelling cause, which, when obtained, is the reward of the observance of religion, and from which arises the everlasting glory of God in Christ.

III. But man, by whom [the duties of] this religion must be executed, is a sinner, yet one for whom remission of sins and reconciliation have now been obtained. By this mark, it is intended to be distinguished from the religion of the Jews, which God also prescribed to sinners; but it was at a time when remission of sins had not been obtained, on which account, the mode of religion was likewise different, particularly with regard to ceremonies.

IV. This religion, with regard to all those things which we have mentioned as coming under consideration in it, is, of all religions, the most excellent; or, rather, it is the most excellent mode of religion. Because, in it, the object is proposed in a manner the most excellent; so that there is nothing about this object which the human mind is capable of perceiving, that is not exhibited in the doctrine of the Christian religion.

For God has with it disclosed all his own goodness, and has given it to be viewed in Christ.

V. The cause, on account of which, religion may and ought to be performed to this object, is, in every way, the most efficacious; so that nothing can be imagined, why religion may and ought to be performed to any other deity. that is not comprehended in the efficacy of this cause, in a pre-eminent manner.

VI. The very act of faith and worship is required, and must be performed, in a manner the most signal and particular; and the salvation which arises from this act, is the greatest and most glorious, both because God will afford a fuller and more perfect sight of himself, than if salvation had been obtained through another form of religion, and because those who will become partakers of this salvation, will have Christ eternally as their head, who is the brother of men, and they will always behold him.

On this account, in the attainment and possession of salvation, we shall hereafter become, in some measure, superior to the angels themselves.

DISPUTATION XIV

ON THE OBJECT OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION: AND, FIRST, ABOUT GOD, ITS PRIMARY OBJECT, AND WHAT GOD IS

I. The object of the Christian religion is that towards which the faith and worship of a religious man ought to tend. This object is God and his Christ -- God principally, Christ subordinately under God -- God per se, Christ as God has constituted him the object of this religion.

II. In God, who is the primary object of the Christian religion, three things come in order under our consideration: (1.) The nature of God, of which the excellence and goodness is such that religion can honourably and usefully be performed to it. (2.) The acts of God, on account of which religion ought to be performed to him. (3.) The will of God, by which he wills religion to be performed to himself, and that he who performs it be rewarded; and, on the contrary, that the neglecter of it be punished.

III. To every treatise on the nature of God, must be prefixed this primary and chief axiom of all religion: "There is a God." Without this, vain is every inquiry into the nature of God; for, if the divine nature had no existence, religion would be a mere phantasm of man's conception.

IV. Though the existence of God has been intimated to every rational creature that perceives his voice, and though this truth is known to every one who reflects on such an intimation; yet, "that there is a God," may be demonstrated by various arguments.

First, by certain theoretical axioms; and because when the terms in which these are expressed have been once understood, they are known to be true, they deserve to receive the name of "implanted ideas."

V. The first axiom is, "Nothing is or can be from itself? For thus it would at one and the same time, be and not be, it would be both prior and posterior to itself, and would be both the cause and effect of itself. Therefore, some one being must necessarily be pre-existent, from whom, as from the primary and supreme cause, all other things derive their origin. But this being is God.

VI. The second axiom is, "Every efficient primary cause is better or more excellent than its effect." From this, it follows that, as all created minds are in the order of effects, some one mind is supreme and most wise, from which the rest have their origin. But this mind is God.

VII. The third axiom is, "No finite force can make something out of nothing; and the first nature has been made out of nothing." For, if it were otherwise, it neither could nor ought to be changed by an efficient or a former; and thus, nothing could be made from it. From this, it follows, either that all things which exist have been from eternity and are primary being, or that there is one primary being. But this being is God.

VIII. The same truth is proved by the practical axiom, or the conscience, which has its seat in all rational creatures. It excuses and exhilarates a man in good actions; and, in these which are evil, it accuses and torments -- even in those things [of both kinds]

which have not come, and which never will come, to the knowledge of any creature.

This stands as a manifest indication that there is some supreme judge, who will institute a strict inquiry, and will pass judgment. But this judge is God.

IX. The magnitude, the perfection, the multitude, the variety, and the agreement, of all things that exist, supply us with the fifth argument, which loudly proclaims that all these things proceed from one and the same being and not from many beings. But this being is God.

X. The sixth argument is from the order perceptible in things, and from the orderly disposition and direction of all of them to an end, even of those things which, devoid of reason, themselves, cannot act on account of an end, or at least, cannot intend an end. But all order is from one being, and direction to an end is from a wise and good being. But this being is God.

XI. The preservation of political, ecclesiastical and economical society among mankind, furnishes our seventh argument. Amidst such great perversity and madness of Satan and of evil men, human society could never attain to any stability or firmness, except it were preserved safe and unimpaired by One who is supremely powerful. But this is God.

XII. We take our eighth argument from the miracles which we believe to have been done, and which we perceive to be done, the magnitude of which is so great as to cause them far to exceed the entire force and power of the created universe.

Therefore, a cause must exist which transcends the universe and its power or capability. But this cause is God.

XIII. The predictions of future and contingent things, and their accurate and strict completion, supply the ninth argument as being things which could proceed from no one except from God.

XIV. In the last place, is added, the perpetual and universal agreement of all nations, which general consent must be accounted as equivalent to a law, nay to a divine oracle.

COROLLARY

On account of the dissensions of very learned men, we allow this question to be discussed, "from the motion which is apparent in the world, and from the fact, that whatever is moved is moved by another, can it be concluded that there is a God?

DISPUTATION XV

ON THE NATURE OF GOD

I. Concerning God, the primary object of theology, two things must be known, (1.) His nature, or what God is, or rather what qualities does he possess? (2.) Who God is, or to whom this nature must be attributed. These must be known, lest any thing foolish or unbecoming be ascribed to God, or lest another, or a strange one, be considered as the true God. On the first of these we will now treat in a few disputations.

II. As we are not able to know the nature of God, in itself, we can, in a measure, attain to some knowledge from the analogy of the nature which is in created things, and principally that which is in ourselves, who are created after the image of God; while we always add a mode of eminence to this analogy, according to which mode God is understood to exceed, infinitely, the perfections of things created.

III. As in the whole nature of things, and in man, who is the compendium or abridgment of it, only two things can be considered as essential, whether they be disparted in their subjects, or, in a certain order, connected with each other and subordinate in the same subject, which two things are Essence and Life; we will also contemplate the nature of God according to these two impulses of his nature. For the four degrees, which are proposed by several divines -- to be, to live, to. feel, and to understand -- are restricted to these two causes of motion; because the word "to live,"

embraces within itself both feeling and understanding.

IV. We say the essence of God is the first impulse of the divine nature, by which God is purely and simply understood to be.

V. As the whole nature of things is distributed according to their essence, into body and spirit, we affirm that the divine essence is spiritual, and from this, that God is a Spirit, because it could not possibly come to pass that the first and chief being should be corporeal. From this, one cannot do otherwise than justly admire the transcendent force and plenitude of God, by which he is capable of creating even things corporeal that have nothing analogous to himself.

VI. To the essence of God no attribute can be added, whether distinguished from it in reality, by relation, or by a mere conception of the mind; but only a mode of preeminence can be attributed to it, according to which it is understood to comprise within itself and to exceed all the perfections of all things. This mode may be declared in this one expression: "The divine essence is uncaused and without commencement."

VII. Hence, it follows that this essence is simple and infinite; from this, that it is eternal and immeasurable; and, lastly, that it is unchangeable, impassable and incorruptible, in the manner in which it has been proved by us in our public theses on this subject.

VIII. And since unity and goodness reciprocate with being, and as the affections or passions of every being are general, we also affirm that the essence of God is one, and that God is one according to it, and is, therefore, good -- nay, the chief good, from the participation of which all things have both their being, and their well being.

IX. As this essence is itself pure from all composition, so it cannot enter into the composition of any thing. We permit it to become a subject of discussion, whether this be designated in the Scriptures by the name of "holiness," which denotes separation or a being separated.

X. These modes of pre-eminence are not communicable to any thing, from the very circumstance of their being such. And when these modes are contemplated in the life of God, and in the faculties of his life, they are of infinite usefulness in theology, and are not among the smallest foundations of true religion.

DISPUTATION XVI

ON THE LIFE OF GOD

I. Life is that which comes under our consideration, in the second impulse of the divine nature; and that it belongs to God, is not only evident from its own nature, but is likewise known, per se, to all those who have any conception of God. For it is much more incredible that God is something senseless and dead, than that there is no God.

And the life of God is easily proved. For, as whatever is beside God is from him, we must also attribute life to him, because among his creatures are many things which have life; and we affirm that God is a living substance, and that life belongs to him, not only eminently but also formally, since life is simply perfection.

II. But, as life is taken, either in the second act, and is called "operation," or in the first, principal and radical act, and thus is the very nature and form of a living thing, we attribute this, of itself, primarily and adequately to God; so that he Is the life of himself, not having it from His union with another thing; (for that is the part of imperfection,) but existing the same as it does -- he being life itself, and living by the first act, but bestowing life by the second act.

III. The life of God, therefore, is most simple, so that it is not, in reality, distinguished from his essence; and according to the confined capacity of our conception, by which it is distinguished from his essence, it may, in some degree, be described as being "an act that flows from the essence of God," by which is intimated that it is active in itself; first, by a reflex act on God himself, and then on other objects, on account of the most abundant copiousness, and the most perfect activity of life in God.

IV. The life of God is the foundation and the proximate and adequate principle not only of ad intra et ad extra, an inward and an outward act, but likewise of all fruition by which God is said to be blessed in himself. This seems to be the cause why God wished himself, principally in reference to life, to be distinguished from false gods and dead idols, and why he wished men to swear by his name, in a form composed thus: "The Lord liveth."

V. As the essence of God is infinite and most simple, eternal, impassable, unchangeable and incorruptible, we ought likewise to consider His life with these modes of being and life; on which account we attribute to him per se immortality, and a most prompt, powerful, indefatigable and insatiable desire, strength and delight to act and to enjoy, and in action and enjoyment, if it be lawful, thus to express ourselves.

VI. By two faculties, the understanding and the will, this life is active towards God himself; but towards other things it is active by three faculties, power, or capability, being added to the two preceding. But the faculties of the understanding and the will are accommodated to fruition, and this chiefly as they tend towards God himself; secondarily, and because it thus pleases him of his abundant goodness, as they tend towards the creatures.

DISPUTATION XVII

ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF GOD

I. The understanding of God is that faculty of his life which is first in nature and order, and by which the living God distinctly understands all things and every one, which, in what manner soever, either have, will have, have had, can have, or might hypothetically have, a being of any kind, by which he also distinctly understands the order, connection, and relation of all and each of them between each other, and the entities of reason, those beings which exist, or which can exist, in the mind, imagination, and enunciation.

II. God knows all things, neither by intelligible representations, nor by similitude, but by his own and sole essence; with the exception of evil things, which he knows indirectly by the good things opposed to them, as privation is known by means of our having been accustomed to any thing.

III. The mode by which God understands, is, not by composition and division, not by gradual argumentation, but by simple and infinite intuition, according to the succession of order and not of time.

IV. The succession of order, in the objects of the divine knowledge, is in this manner: First. God knows himself entirely and adequately, and this understanding is his own essence or being. Secondly. He knows all possible things, in the perfection of his own essence, and, therefore, all things impossible. In the understanding of possible things, this is the order: (1.) He knows what things can exist by his own primary and sole act.

(2.) He knows what things, from the creatures, whether they will come into existence or will not, can exist by his conservation, motion, assistance, concurrence, and permission. (3.) He knows what things he can do about the acts of the creatures consistently with himself or with these acts. Thirdly. He knows all entities, even according to the same order as that which we have just shown in his knowledge of things possible.

V. The understanding of God is certain and infallible; so that he sees certainly and infallibly, even, things future and contingent, whether he sees them in their causes, or in themselves. But this infallibility depends on the infinity of the essence of God, and not on his unchangeable will.

VI. The act of understanding of God is occasioned by no external cause, not even by its object; though if there be not afterwards an object, neither will there be any act of God's understanding about it.

VII. How certain soever the acts of God's understanding may themselves be, this does not impose any necessity on things, but rather establishes contingency in them. For, as he knows the thing itself and its mode, if the mode of the thing be contingent, he must know it as such, and, therefore, it remains contingent with respect to the divine knowledge.

VIII. The knowledge of God may be distinguished according to its objects. And, First, into the theoretical, by which he understands things under the relation of entity and truth; and into the practical, by which he considers things under the relation of good, and as objects of his will and power.

IX. Secondly. One [quality of the] knowledge of God is that of simple intelligence, by which he understands, himself, all possible things, and the nature and essence of all entities; another is that of vision, by which he beholds his own existence and that of all other entities or beings.

X. The knowledge by which God knows his own essence and existence, all things possible, and the nature and essence of all entities, is simply necessary, as pertaining to the perfection of his own knowledge. But that by which he knows the existence of other entities, is hypothetically necessary, that is, if they now have, have already had, or shall afterwards have, any existence. For when any object, whatsoever, is laid down, it must, of necessity, fall within the knowledge of God. The former of these precedes every free act of the divine will; the latter follows every free act. The schoolmen; therefore, denominate the first "natural," and the second "free knowledge."

XI. The knowledge by which God knows any thing if it be or exist, is intermediate between the two [kinds] described in theses 9 & 10; In fact it precedes the free act of the will with regard to intelligence. But it knows something future according to vision, only through its hypothesis.

XII. Free knowledge, or that of vision, which is also called "prescience," is not the cause of things; but the knowledge which is practical and of simple intelligence, and which is denominated "natural," or "necessary," is the cause of all things by the mode of prescribing and directing to which is added the action of the will and of the capability. The middle or intermediate [kind of] knowledge ought to intervene in things which depend on the liberty of created choice or pleasure.

XIII. From the variety and multitude of objects, and from the means and mode of intelligence and vision, it is apparent that infinite knowledge and omniscience are justly attributed to God; and that they are so proper or peculiar to God according to their objects, means and mode, as not to be capable of appertaining to any created thing.

DISPUTATION XVIII

ON THE WILL OF GOD

I. The will of God is spoken of in three ways: First, the faculty itself of willing.

Secondly, the act of willing. Thirdly, the object willed. The first signification is the principal and proper one, the two others are secondary and figurative.

II. It may be thus described: It is the second faculty of the life of God, flowing through the understanding from the life that has an ulterior tendency; by which faculty God is borne towards a known good -- towards a good, because this is an adequate object of every will -- towards a known good, not only with regard to it as a being, but likewise as a good, whether in reality or only in the act of the divine understanding.

Both, however, are shown by the understanding. But the evil which is called that of culpability, God does not simply and absolutely will.

III. The good is two-fold. The chief good, and that which is from the chief. The first of these is the primary, immediate, principal, direct, peculiar and adequate object of the divine will; the latter is secondary and indirect, towards which the divine will does not tend, except by means of the chief good.

IV. The will of God is borne towards its objects in the following order: (1.) He wills himself. (2.) He wills all those things which, out of infinite things possible to himself he has, by the last judgment of his wisdom, determined to be made. And first, he wills to make them to be; then he is affected towards them by his will, according as they possess some likeness with his nature, or some vestige of it. (3.) The third object of the will of God is those things which he judges fit and equitable to be done by creatures who are endowed with understanding and with free will, in which is included a prohibition of that which he wills not to be done. (4.) The fourth object of the divine will is his permission, that chiefly by which he permits a rational creature to do what he has prohibited, and to omit what he has commanded. (5.) He wills those things which, according to his own wisdom, he judges to be done concerning the acts of his rational creatures.

V. There is out of God no inwardly moving cause of his will; nor out of him is there any end. But the creature, and its action or passion, may be the outwardly moving cause, without which God would supersede or omit that volition or act of willing.

VI. But the cause of all other things is God, by His understanding and will, by means of His power or capability; yet so, that when he acts either through his creatures, with them or in them, he does not take away the peculiar mode of acting, or of suffering, which he has divinely placed within them; and that he suffers them, according to their peculiar mode, to produce their own effects, and to receive in themselves the acts of God, either necessarily, contingently, or freely. As this contingency and liberty do not make the prescience of God to be uncertain, so they are destroyed by the volition of God, and by the certain futurition of events with regard to the understanding of God.

DISPUTATION XIX

ON THE VARIOUS DISTINCTIONS OF THE WILL OF GOD

I. Though the will of God be one and simple, yet it may be variously distinguished, from its objects, in reference to the mode and order according to which it is borne towards its objects. Of these distinctions the use is important in the whole of the Scriptures, and in explaining many passages in them.

II. The will of God is borne towards its object either according to the mode of nature, or that of liberty. In reference to the former, God tends towards his own primary, proper and adequate object, that is, towards himself. But, according to the mode of liberty, he tends towards other things -- and towards all other things by the liberty of exercise, and towards many by the liberty of specification; because he cannot hate things, so far as they have some likeness of God, that is, so far as they are good; though he is not necessarily bound to love them, since he might reduce them to nothing whenever it seemed good to himself.

III. The will of God is distinguished into that by which he absolutely wills to do any thing or to prevent it; and into that by which he wills something to be done or omitted by his rational creatures. The former of these is called "the will of his good pleasure,"

or rather "of his pleasure;" and the latter, "that of his open intimation." The latter is revealed, for this is required by the use to which it is applied. The former is partly revealed, partly secret, or hidden. The former employs a power that is either irresistible, or that is so accommodated to the object and subject as to obtain or insure its success, though it was possible for it to happen otherwise. To these two kinds of the divine will, is opposed the remission of the will, that is, a two-fold permission, the one opposed to the will of open intimation, the other to that of good pleasure. The former is that by which God permits something to the power of a rational creature by not circumscribing some act by a law; the latter is that by which God permits something to the will and capability of the creature, by not placing an impediment in its way, by which the act may in reality be hindered.

IV. Whatever things God wills to do, he wills them (1.) either from himself, not on account of any other cause placed beyond him, (whether that be without the consideration of any act perpetrated by the creature, or solely from the occasion of the act of the creature,) (2.) or on account of a preceding cause afforded by the creature.

In reference to this distinction, some work is said to be "proper to God," some other

"extraneous, strange and foreign." But there is a two-fold difference in those things which he wills to be done; for they are pleasing and acceptable to God, either in themselves, as in the case of moral works; or they please accidentally and on account of some other thing, as in the case of things ceremonial.

V. The will of God is either peremptory, or with a condition. (1.) His peremptory will is that which strictly and rigidly obtains, such as the words of the gospel which contain the last revelation of God: "The wrath of God abides on him who does not believe;"He that believes shall be saved;" also the words of Samuel to Saul: "The Lord hath rejected thee from being king over Israel." (2.) His will, with a condition, is that which has a condition annexed, whether it be a tacit one, such as, "Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown."Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them," that is, unless he be delivered from this curse as it is expressed in Gal. iii, 13. See also Jer. xviii, 7-10.

VI. One will of God is absolute, another respective. His absolute will is that by which he wills any thing simply, without regard to the volition or act of the creature, such as is that about the salvation of believers. His respective will is that by which he wills something with respect to the volition or the act of the creature. It is also either antecedent or consequent. (1.) The antecedent is that by which he wills something with respect to the subsequent will or act of the creature, as, "God wills all men to be saved if they believe." (2.) The consequent is that by which he wills something with respect to the antecedent volition or act of the creature, as, "Woe to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed! Better would it have been for that man if he had never been born! Both depend on the absolute will, and according to it each of them is regulated.

VII. God wills some things, so far as they are good, when absolutely considered according to their nature. Thus he wills alms-giving, and to do good to man so far as he is his creature. He also wills some other things, so far as, all circumstances considered, they are understood to be good. According to this will, he says to the wicked man, "What hast thou to do, that thou shouldst take my covenant in thy mouth?" And he speaks thus to Eli: "Be it far from me that thy house, and the house of thy father, should walk before me for ever; for them that honour me I will honour, and they that despise me shall be lightly esteemed." This distinction does not differ greatly from the antecedent will of God, which has been already mentioned.

VIII. God wills some things per se or per accidens. Of themselves, he wills those things which are simply relatively good. Thus He wills salvation to that man who is obedient. Accidentally, those things which, in some respect are evil, but have a good joined with them, which God wills more than the respective good things that are opposed to those evil. Thus he wills the evils of punishment, because he chooses that the order of justice be preserved in punishment, rather than that a sinning creature should escape punishment, though this impunity might be for the good of the creature.

IX. God wills some things in their antecedent causes, that is, he wills their causes relatively, and places them in such order that effects may follow from them; and if they do follow, he wills that they, of themselves, be pleasing to him. God wills other things in themselves. This distinction does not substantially differ from that by which the divine will is distinguished into absolute and selective.

COROLLARIES

I. Is it possible for two affirmatively contrary volitions of God to tend towards one object which is the same and uniform? We answer in the negative.

II. Can one volition of God, that is, one formally, tend towards contrary objects? We reply, It can tend towards objects physically contrary, but not towards objects morally contrary.

III. Does God will, as an end, something which is beyond himself, and which does not proceed from his free will? We reply in the negative.

DISPUTATION XX

ON THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD WHICH COME TO BE CONSIDERED UNDER

HIS WILL AND, FIRST, ON THOSE WHICH HAVE AN ANALOGY TO THE

AFFECTIONS OR PASSIONS IN RATIONAL CREATURES

I. Those attributes of God ought to be considered, which are either properly or figuratively attributed to him in the Scriptures, according to a certain analogy of the affections and virtues in rational creatures.

II. Those divine attributes which have the analogy of affections, may be referred to two principal kinds, so that the first class may contain those affections which are simply conversant about good or evil, and which may be denominated primitive affections; and the second may comprehend those which are exercised about good and evil in reference to their absence or presence, and which may be called affections derived from the primitive.

III. The primitive affections are love, (the opposite to which is hatred,) and goodness; and with these are connected grace, benignity and mercy. Love is prior to goodness towards the object, which is God himself; goodness is prior to love towards that object which is some other than God.

IV. Love is an affection of union in God, whose objects are not only God himself and the good of justice, but also the creature, imitating or related to God either according to likeness, or only according to impress, and the felicity of the creature. But this affection is borne onwards either to enjoy and to have, or to do good; the former is called "the love of complacency;" the latter, "the love of friendship," which falls into goodness, God loves himself with complacency in the perfection of His own nature, wherefore he likewise enjoys himself. He also loves himself with the love of complacency in his effects produced externally; both in acts and works, which are specimens and evident, infallible indications of that perfection. Wherefore he may be said, in some degree, likewise to enjoy these acts and works. Even the justice or righteousness performed by the creature, is pleasing to him; wherefore his affection is extended to secure it.

V. Hatred is an affection of separation in God, whose many object is injustice or unrighteousness; and the secondary, the misery of the creature. The former is from

"the love of complacency;" the latter, from "the love of friendship." But since God properly loves himself and the good of justice, and by the same impulse holds iniquity in detestation; and since he secondarily loves the creature and his blessedness, and in that impulse hates the misery of the creature, that is, he wills it to be taken away from the creature; hence, it comes to pass, that he hates the creature who perseveres in unrighteousness, and he loves his misery.

VI. Hatred, however, is not collateral to love, but necessarily flowing from it; since love neither does nor can tend towards all those things which become objects to the understanding of God. It belongs to him, therefore, in the first act, and must be placed in him prior to any existence of a thing worthy of hatred, which existence being laid down, the act of hatred arises from it by a natural necessity, not by liberty of the will.

VII. But since love does not perfectly fill the whole will of God, it has goodness united with it; which also is an affection in God of communicating his good. Its first object externally is nothing; and this is so necessarily first, that, when it is removed, no communication can be made externally. Its act is creation. Its second object is the creature as a creature; and its act is called conservation, or sustentation, as if it was a continuance of creation. Its third object is the creature performing his duty according to the command of God; and its act is the elevation to a more worthy and felicitous condition, that is, the communication of a greater good than that which the creature obtained by creation. Both these advances of goodness may also be appropriately denominated "benignity," or "kindness." Its fourth object is the creature not performing his duty, or sinful, and on this account liable to misery according to the just judgment of God; and its act is a deliverance from sin through the remission and the mortification of sin. And this progress of goodness is denominated mercy, which is an affection for giving succour to a man in misery, sin presenting no obstacle.

VIII. Grace is a certain adjunct of goodness and love, by which is signified that God is affected to communicate his own good and to love the creatures, not through merit or of debt, not by any cause impelling from without, nor that something may be added to God himself, but that it may be well with him on whom the good is bestowed and who is beloved, which may also receive the name of "liberality." According to this, God is said to be "rich in goodness, mercy," &c.

IX. The affections which spring from these, and which are exercised about good or evil as each is present or absent, are considered as having an analogy either in those things which are in the concupiscible part of our souls, or in that which is irascible.

X. In the concupiscible part are, first, desire and that which is opposed to it; secondly, joy and grief. (1.) Desire is an affection of obtaining the works of righteousness from rational creatures, and of bestowing a remunerative reward, as well as of inflicting punishment if they be contumacious. To this is opposed the affection according to which God execrates the works of unrighteousness, and the omission of a remuneration. (2.). Joy is an affection from the presence of a thing that is suitable or agreeable -- such as the fruition of himself, the obedience of the creature, the communication of his own goodness, and the destruction of His rebels and enemies.

Grief, which is opposed to it, arises from the disobedience and the misery of the creature, and in the occasion thus given by his people for blaspheming the name of God among the gentiles. To this, repentance has some affinity; which is nothing more than a change of the thing willed or done, on account of the act of a rational creature, or, rather, a desire for such change.

XI. In the irascible part are hope and its opposite, despair, confidence and anger, also fear, which is affirmatively opposed to hope. (1.) Hope is an earnest expectation of a good, due from the creature, and performable by the grace of God. It cannot easily be reconciled with the certain foreknowledge of God. (2.) Despair arises from the pertinacious wickedness of the creature, opposing himself to the grace of God, and resisting the Holy Spirit. (3.) Confidence is that by which God with great animation prosecutes a desired good, and repels an evil that is hated. (4.) Anger is an affection of depulsion in God, through the punishment of the creature that has transgressed his law, by which he inflicts on the creature the evil of misery for his unrighteousness, and takes the vengeance which is due to him, as an indication of his love towards justice, and of his hatred to sin. When this affection is vehement, it is called "fury."

(5.) Fear is from an impending evil to which God is averse.

XII. Of the second class of these derivative affections, (See Thesis 11) some belong to God per se, as they simply contain in themselves perfection; others, which seem to have something of imperfection, are attributed to him after the manner of the feelings of men, on account of some effects which he produces analogous to the effects of the creatures, yet without any passion, as he is simple and immutable and without any disorder and repugnance to right reason. But we subject the use and exercise of the first class of those affections (See Thesis 10) to the infinite wisdom of God, whose property it is to prefix to each of them its object, means, end and circumstances, and to decree to which, in preference to the rest, is to be conceded the province of acting.

DISPUTATION XXI

ON THOSE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD WHICH HAVE SOME ANALOGY TO THE

MORAL VIRTUES, AND WHICH ACT LIKE MODERATORS OF THE

AFFECTIONS, CONSIDERED IN THE PRECEDING DISPUTATION.

I. But these attributes preside generally over all the affections, or specially relate to some of them. The general is justice, or righteousness, which is called "universal" or

"legal," and concerning which it was said by the ancients, that it contains, in itself, all the virtues. The special are, particular justice, patience, and those which are the moderators of anger, and of chastisements and punishments.

II. The justice of God, considered universally, is a virtue of God, according to which he administers all things correctly and in a suitable manner, according to that which his wisdom dictates as befitting himself. In conjunction with wisdom, it presides over all his acts, decrees and deeds; and according to it, God is said to be "just and right,"

his way "equal," and himself to be "just in all his ways."

III. The particular justice of God is that by which he consistently renders to every one his own -- to God himself that which is his, and to the creature that which belongs to itself. We consider it both in the words of God and in his deeds. In this, the method of the decrees is not different; because, whatever God does or says, he does or says it according to his own eternal decree. This justice likewise contains a moderator partly of his love for the good of obedience, and partly of his love for the creature, and of his goodness.

IV. Justice In deeds may be considered in the following order: That the first may be in the communication of good, either according to the first creation, or according to regeneration. The second is in the prescribing of duty, or in legislation, which consists in the requisition of a deed, and in the promise of a reward, and the threat of a punishment. The third is in the judging about deeds, which is retributive, being both communicative of a reward and vindicative. In all these, the magnanimity of God is to be considered. In communication, in promise, and in remuneration, his liberality and magnificence are also to come under consideration; and they may be appropriately referred partly to distributive, and partly to commutative justice.

V. Justice in words is also three-fold. (1.) Truth, by which he always enunciates or declares exactly as the thing is, to which is opposed falsehood. (2.) Sincerity and simplicity, by which he always declares as he inwardly conceives, according to the meaning and purpose of his mind, to which are opposed hypocrisy and duplicity of heart. And (3.) Fidelity, by which he is constant in keeping promises and in communicating privileges, to which are opposed inconstancy and perfidy.

VI. Patience is that by which he patiently endures the absence of that Good, that is, of the prescribed obedience which he loves, desires, and for which he hopes, and the presence of that evil which he forbids, sparing sinners, not only that he may execute the judicial acts of His mercy and severity through them, but that he may also lead them to repentance, or that he may punish the contumacious with greater equity and severity. And this attribute seems to attemper the love [which God entertains] for the good of justice.

VII. Long suffering, gentleness or lenity, clemency and readiness to pardon, are the moderators of anger, chastisements and punishments.

VIII. Long suffering is a virtue by which God suspends his anger, lest it should instantly hasten to the depulsion of the evil, as soon as the creature has by his sins deserved it.

IX. Gentleness or lenity is a virtue, by which God preserves moderation concerning anger in taking vengeance, lest it should be too vehement -- lest the seventy of the anger should certainly correspond with the magnitude of the wickedness perpetrated.

X. Clemency is a virtue by which God so attempers the chastisements and punishments of the creature, even at the very time when he inflicts them, that, by their weight and continuance, they may not equal the magnitude of the sins committed; indeed, that they may not exceed the strength of the creature.

XI. Readiness to forgive is a virtue by which God shows himself to be exorable to his creature, and which fixes a measure to the limits of anger, lest it should endure for ever, agreeably to the demerit of the sins committed.

COROLLARIES

Does the justice of God permit him to destine to death eternal, a rational creature who has never sinned? We reply in the negative.

Does the justice of God allow that a creature should be saved who perseveres in his sins? We reply in the negative.

Cannot justice and mercy, in some accommodated sense, be considered, as, in a certain respect, opposed? We reply in the affirmative.

DISPUTATION XXII

ON THE POWER OR CAPABILITY OF GOD

I. When entering on the consideration of the power or capability of God, as we deny the passive power which cannot belong to God who is a pure act, so we likewise omit that which is occupied with internal acts through necessity of nature; and at present we exhibit for examination that power alone which consists in the capacity of external actions, and by which God not only is capable of operating beyond himself, but actually does operate whenever it is his own good pleasure.

II. And it is a faculty of the divine life, by which, (subsequently to the understanding of God that shows and directs, and to his will that commands,) he is capable of operating externally what things soever he can freely will, and by which he does operate whatever he freely wills.

III. The measure of the divine capability is the free will of God, and that is truly an adequate measure; so that the object of the capability may be, and, indeed, ought to be, circumscribed and limited most appropriately from the object of the free will of God. For, whatever cannot fall under his will, cannot fall under his capability; and whatever is subject to the former, is likewise subject to the latter.

IV. But the will of God can only will that which is not opposed to the divine essence, (which is the foundation both of His understanding and of his will,) that is, it can will nothing but that which exists, is true and good. Hence, neither can his capability do any other. Again, since, under the phrase "what is not opposed to the divine essence,"

is comprehended whatsoever is simply and absolutely possible, and since God can will the whole of this, it follows that God is capable of every thing which is possible.

V. Those things are impossible to God which involve a contradiction, as, to make another God, to be mutable, to sin, to lie, to cause some thing at once to be and not to be, to have been and not to have been, &c., that this thing should be and not be, that it and its contrary should be, that an accident should be without its subject, that a substance should be changed into a pre-existing substance, bread into the body of Christ, that a body should possess ubiquity, &c. These things partly belong to a want of power to be capable of doing them, and partly to a want of will to do them.

VI. But the capability of God is infinite -- and this not only because it can do all things possible, which, indeed, are innumerable, so that as many cannot be enumerated as it is capable of doing, [or after all that can be numbered, it is capable of doing still more]; nor can such great things be calculated without its being able to produce far greater, but likewise because nothing can resist it. For all created things depend upon him, as upon the efficient principle, both in their being and in their preservation. Hence, omnipotence is justly ascribed to him.

VII. This can be communicated to no creature.

DISPUTATION XXIII

ON THE PERFECTION, BLESSEDNESS AND GLORY OF GOD

I. Next in order, follows the perfection of God, resulting from the simple and infinite circuit of all those things which we have already attributed to God, and considered with the mode of pre-eminence -- not that perfection by which he has every individual thing most perfectly, (for this is the office of simplicity and infinity,) but that by which he has all things simply denoting some perfection in the most perfect manner.

And it may be appropriately described thus: It is the interminable, and, at the same time, the entire and perfect possession of essence and life.

II. And this perfection of God infinitely transcends every created perfection, in three several ways: (1.) Because it has all things. (2.) It has them in a manner the most perfect. And (3.) It does not derive them from any other source. But as the creatures have, through participation, a perfection from God, faintly shadowed forth after its archetype, so, of consequence, they neither have every perfection, nor in a manner the most perfect; yet some creatures have a greater perfection than others; and the more of it they possess, the nearer are they to God, and the more like him.

III. From this perfection of God, by means of some internal act, his blessedness has its existence; and by means of some relation of it ad extra, his glory exists.

IV. Blessedness is an act of God, by which he enjoys his own perfection, that is fully known by his understanding, and supremely loved by his will, with a delightful satisfaction in it. It is, therefore, through the act of the understanding, and of the will; of the understanding, indeed, reaching to the essence of the object, but the act of which would not be an act of felicity, unless it had this, its being an act of felicicity[sic.], from the will which perpetually desires to behold the beatified object, and is delightfully satisfied in it.

V. But this blessedness is so peculiar to God that it cannot be communicated to any creature. Yet he is, himself, with respect to the object, the beatified good of creatures endowed with understanding, and the effector of the act which tends to the effect, and which is delightfully satisfied in it. Of these, consists the blessedness of the creature.

VI. Glory is the divine excellence above all things, which he makes manifest by external acts, in various ways.

VII. But the modes of manifestation, which are declared to us in the Scriptures, are principally two -- the one, by an effulgence of unusual light and splendour, or by the opposite to it, a dense darkness and obscurity; the other, by the production of works which agree with his perfection and excellence.

VIII. This description of the divine nature is the first foundation of all religion. For it is concluded, from this perfection and blessedness of God, that the act of religion can be worthily and usefully exhibited to God, to the knowledge of which matter, we are brought, through the manifestation of the divine glory.

The candid reader will be able, in this place, to supply from the preceding public disputations, the theses on the Father and the Son, and those on the Holy Spirit, the Holy and undivided Trinity.

DISPUTATION XXIV

ON CREATION

I. We have treated on God, who is the first object of the Christian religion. And we would now treat on Christ, who, next to God, is another object of the same religion; but we must premise some things, without which, Christ would neither be an object of religion, nor would the necessity of the Christian religion be understood. Indeed, the cause must be First explained, on account of which God has a right to require any religion from man; THEN the religion, also, that is prescribed in virtue of this cause and right, and, LASTLY, the event ensuing, from which has arisen the necessity of constituting Christ our saviour, and the Christian religion, employed by God, through his own will, who hath not, by the sin of man, lost His right which he obtains over him by creation, nor has he entirely laid aside his affection for man, though a sinner, and miserable.

II. And since God is the object of the Christian religion, not only as the Creator, but likewise as the Creator anew, (in which latter respect, Christ, also, as constituted by God to be the saviour, is the object of the Christian religion,) it is necessary for us first to treat about the primitive creation, and those things which are joined to it according to nature, and, after that, about those which resulted from the conduct of man, before we begin to treat on the new creation, in which the primary consideration is that of Christ as Mediator.

III. Creation is an external act of God, by which he produced all things out of nothing, for himself, by his Word and Spirit.

IV. The primary efficient cause is God the Father, by his Word and Spirit. The impelling cause, which we have indicated in the definition by the particle "for," is the goodness of God, according to which he is inclined to communicate his good. The ordainer is the divine wisdom; and the executrix, or performer, is the divine power, which the will of God employs through an inclination of goodness, according to the most equitable prescript of his wisdom.

V. The matter from which God created all things, must be considered in three forms: (1.) The first of all is that from which all things in general were produced, into which, also, they may all, on this account, relapse and be reduced; it is nothing itself, that our mind, by the removal of all entity, considers as the first matter; for, that, alone, is capable of the first communication of God ad extra; because, God would neither have the right to introduce his own form into matter coeval [with himself], nor would he be capable of acting, as it would then be eternal matter, and, therefore, obnoxious to no change. (2.) The second matter is that from which all things corporeal are now distinguished, according to their own separate forms; and this is the rude chaos and undigested mass created at the beginning. (3.) The third consists both of these simple and secret elements, and of certain compound bodies, from which all the rest have been produced, as from the waters have proceeded creeping and flying things, and fishes -- from the earth, all other living things, trees, herbs and shrubs -- from the rib of. Adam, the woman, and from seeds, the perpetuation of the species.

VI. The form is the production itself of all things out of nothing, which form pre existed ready framed, according to the archetype in the mind of God, without any proper entity, lest any one should feign an ideal world.

VII. From an inspection of the matter and form, it is evident, First, that creation is the immediate act of God, alone, both because a creature, who is of a finite power is incapable of operating on nothing, and because such a creature cannot shape matter in substantial forms. Secondly. The creation was freely produced, not necessarily, because God was neither bound to nothing, nor destitute of forms.

VIII. The end -- not that which moved God to create, for God is not moved by any thing external, but that which incessantly and immediately results from the very act of creation, and which is, in fact, contained in the essence of this act -- this end is the demonstration of the divine wisdom, goodness and power. For those divine properties which concur to act, shine forth and show themselves in their own nature action --goodness, in the very communication -- wisdom, in the mode, order and variety -- and power, in this circumstance, that so many and such great things are produced out of nothing.

IX. The end, which is called "to what purpose," is the good of the Creatures themselves, and especially of man, to whom are referred most other creatures, as being useful to him, according to the institution of the divine creation.

X. The effect of creation is this universal world, which, in the Scriptures, obtains the names of the heaven and the earth, sometimes, also, of the sea, as being the extremities within which all things are embraced. This world is an entire something, which is perfect and complete, having no defect of any form, that can bear relation to the whole or to its parts; nor is redundant in any form which has no relation to the whole and its parts. It is, also, a single, or a united something, not by an indivisible unity, but according to connection and co-ordination, and the affection of mutual relation, consisting of parts distinguished, not only according to place and situation, but likewise according to nature, essence and peculiar existence. This was necessary, not only to adumbrate, in some measure, the perfection of God in variety and multitude, but also to demonstrate that the Lord omnipotent did not create the world by a natural necessity, but by the freedom of his will.

XI. But this entire universe is, according to the Scriptures, distributed in the best manner possible into three classes of objects, (1.) Into creatures purely spiritual and invisible; of this class are the angels. (2.) Into creatures merely corporeal. And (3.) Into natures that are, in one part of them, corporeal and visible, and in another part, spiritual and invisible; men are of this last class.

XII. We think this was the order observed in creation: Spiritual creatures, that is, the angels, were first created. Corporeal creatures were next created, according to the series of six days, not together and in a single moment. Lastly, man was created, consisting both of body and spirit; his body was, indeed, first formed; and afterwards his soul was inspired by creating, and created by inspiring; that as God commenced the creation in a spirit, so he might finish it on a spirit, being himself the immeasurable and eternal Spirit.

XIII. This creation is the foundation of that right by which God can require religion from man, which is a matter that will be more certainly and fully understood, when we come more specially to treat on the primeval creation of man; for he who is not the creator of all things, and who, therefore, has not all things under his command, cannot be believed, neither can any sure hope and confidence be placed in him, nor can he alone be feared. Yet all these are acts which belong to religion.

COROLLARIES

I. The world was neither created from all eternity, nor could it be so created; though God was, from eternity, furnished with that capability by which he could create the world, and afterwards did create it; and though no moment of time can be conceived by us, in which the world could not have been created.

II. He who forms an accurate conception, in his mind, of creation, must, in addition to the plenitude of divine wisdom, goodness and power, or capability, conceive that there was a two-fold privation or vacuity -- the First, according to essence or form, which will bear some resemblance to an infinite nothing that is capable of infinite forms; the SECOND, according to place, which will be like an infinite vacuum that is capable of being the receptacle of numerous worlds.

III. Hence, this, also, follows, that time and place are not Separate Creatures, but are created with things themselves, or, rather, that they exist together at the creation of things, not by an absolute but a relative entity, without which no created thing can be thought upon or conceived.

IV. This creation is the first of all the divine external acts, both in the intention of the Creator, and actually or in reality; and it is an act perfect in itself, not serving another more primary one, as its medium; though God has made some creatures, which, in addition to the fact of their having been made by the act of creation, are fitted to be advanced still further, and to be elevated to a condition yet more excellent.

V. If any thing be represented as the object of creation, it seems that nothing can be laid down more suitably than those things which, out of all things possible, have, by the act of creation, been produced from non-existence into existence.

DISPUTATION XXV

ON ANGELS IN GENERAL AND IN PARTICULAR

I. Angels are substances merely spiritual, created after the image of God, not only that they might acknowledge, love and worship their Creator, and might live in a state of happiness with him, but that they might likewise perform certain duties concerning the rest of the creatures according to the command of God.

II. We call them "substances," against the Sadducees and others, who contend that angels are nothing more than the good or the evil motions of spirits, or else exercises of power to aid or to injure. But this is completely at variance with the whole Scripture, as the actions, (which are those of supposititious beings,) the appearances, and the names which they ascribe to them, more than sufficiently demonstrate.

III. We add that they are "merely spiritual," that we may separate them from men, the species opposite to them, and may intimate their nature. And though composition out of matter and form does not belong to angels, yet, we affirm that they are absolutely compound substances, and that they are composed, (1.) Of being and essence. (2.) Of act and power, or capability. (3.) Lastly, of subject and inhering accident.

IV. But because they are creatures, they are finite, and we measure them by place, time, and number. (1.) By PLACE, not that they are in it corporeally, that is, not that they occupy and fill up a certain local space, commensurate with their substance; but they are in it intellectually, that is, they exist in a place without the occupying and repletion of any local space, which the schoolmen denominate by way of definition,

"to be in a place." But, as they cannot be in several places at once, but are sometimes in one place, and sometimes in another, so they are not moved without time, though it is scarcely perceptible. (2.) We measure them by TIME, or by duration or age, because they have a commencement of being, and the whole age in which they continue they have in succession, by parts of past, present and future; but the whole of it is not present to them at the same moment and without any distance. (3.) Lastly. We measure them by NUMBER, though this number is not defined in the pages of the sacred volume, and, therefore, is unknown to us, but known to God; yet it is very great, for it is neither diminished nor increased, because the angels are neither begotten nor die.

V. We say that they were "created after the image of God;" for they are denominated

"the sons of God." This image, we say, consists partly in those things which belong to their natures, and partly in those things which are of supernatural endowment. (1.) To their nature, belong both their spiritual essence, and the faculty of understanding, of willing, and of powerfully acting. (2.) To supernatural endowment, belong the light of knowledge in the understanding, and, following it, the rectitude or holiness of the will. Immortality itself, is of supernatural endowment; but it is that which God has determined to preserve to them, in what manner soever they may conduct themselves towards him.

VI. The end subjoined is two-fold -- that, standing around the throne of God as his apparitors or messengers, for the glory of the divine Majesty, the angels may perpetually laud and celebrate [the praises of] God, and that they may, with the utmost swiftness, execute, at the beck of God, the offices of ministration which he enjoins upon them.

VII. We are informed in the Scriptures themselves, that there is a certain order among angels; for they mention angels and archangels,-and attribute even to the devil his angels. But we are willingly ignorant of that distinction into orders and various degrees, and what it is which constitutes such distinction. We also think that if [the existence of] certain orders of angels be granted, it is more probable that God employs angels of different orders for the same duties, than that he appoints distinct orders to each separate ministry; though we allow that those who hold other sentiments, think so with some reason.

VIII. For the performance of the ministries enjoined on them, angels have frequently appeared clothed in bodies, which bodies they have not formed and assumed to themselves out of nothing, but out of pre-existing matter, by a union neither essential nor personal, but local, (because they were not then beyond those bodies,) and, according to an instrumental purpose, that they might use them for the due performance of the acts enjoined.

IX. These bodies, therefore, have neither been alive, nor have the angels, through them, seen, heard, tasted, smelled, touched, conceived phantasms or imaginations, &c.

through the organs of these bodies, they produced only such acts as could be performed by an angel inhabiting them, or, rather, existing in them, as the mover according to place. On this account, perhaps, it is not improperly affirmed, that bodies, truly human, which are inhabited by a living and directing spirit, can be discerned, by human judgment, from these assumed bodies.

X. God likewise prescribed a certain law to angels, by which they might order their life according to God, and not according to themselves, and by the observance of which they might be blessed, or, by transgressing it, might be eternally miserable, without any hope of pardon. For it was the good pleasure of God to act towards angels according to strict justice, and not to display all his goodness in bringing them to salvation.

XI. But we do not decide whether a single act of obedience was sufficient to obtain eternal blessedness, as one act of disobedience was deserving of eternal destruction.

XII. Some of the angels transgressed the law under which they were placed; and this they did by their own fault, because by that grace with which they were furnished, and by which God assisted them, and was prepared to assist them, they were enabled to obey the law, and to remain in their integrity.

XIII. Hence, is the division made of angels into the good and the evil. The former are so denominated, because they continued steadfast in the truth, and preserved "their own habitation." But the latter are called "evil angels," because they did not continue in the truth, and "deserted their own habitation."

XIV. But the former are called "good angels," not only according to an infused habit, but likewise according to the act which they performed, and according to their confirmation in habitual goodness, the cause of which we place in the increase of grace, and in their holy purpose, which they conceived partly through beholding the punishment which was inflicted on the apostate angels, and partly through the perception of increased grace. [If it be asked,] Did they not also do this, through perfect blessedness, to which nothing could be added?, we do not deny it, on account of the agreement of learned men, though it seems possible to produce reasons to the contrary.

XV. The latter (Thesis 13) are called "evil angels," First, by actual wickedness, and then by habitual wickedness and pertinacious obstinacy in it; hence, they take a delight in doing whatever they suppose can tend to the reproach of God and the destruction of their neighbour. But this fixed obstinacy in evil seems to derive its origin partly from an intuition of the wrath of God and from an evil conscience which springs out of that, and partly from their own wickedness.

XVI. But, concerning the species of sin which the angels perpetrated, we dare not assert what it was. Yet we say, it may with some probability be affirmed, that it was the crime of pride, from that argument which solicited man to sin through the desire of excellence.

XVII. When it is the will of God to employ the assistance of good angels, he may be said to employ not only those powers and faculties which he has conferred on them, but likewise those which are augmented by himself. But we think it is contradictory to truth, if God be said to furnish the devils, whose service he uses, with greater knowledge and power than they have through creation and their own experience.

COROLLARIES

I. We allow this to become a subject of discussion: Can good angels be said sometimes to contend among themselves, with a reservation of that charity which they owe to God, to each other, and to men?

II. Do angels need a mediator? and is Christ the mediator of angels? We reply in the negative.

III. Are all angels of one species? We think this to be more probable than its contrary.

DISPUTATION XXVI

ON THE CREATION OF MAN AFTER THE IMAGE OF GOD

I. Man is a creature of God; consisting of a body and a soul, rational, good, and created after the divine image -- according to his body, created from pre-existing matter, that is, earth mixed and besprinkled with aqueous and ethereal moisture, --according to his soul, created out of nothing, by the breathing of breath into his nostrils.

II. But that body would have been incorruptible, and, by the grace of God, would not have been liable to death, if men had not sinned, and had not, by that deed, procured for himself the necessity of dying. And because it was to be the future receptacle of the soul, it was furnished by the wise Creator with various and excellent organs.

III. But the soul is entirely of an admirable nature, if you consider its origin, substance, faculties, and habits. (1.) Its origin; for it is from nothing, created by infusion, and infused by creation, a body being duly prepared for its reception, that it might fashion matter as with form, and, being united to the body by a native bond, might, with it, compose one ufisamenon, production. Created, I say, by God in time, as he still daily creates a new soul in each body.

IV. Its substance, which is simple, immaterial, and immortal. Simple, I say, not with respect to God; for it consists of act and power or capability, of being and essence, of subject and accidents; but it is simple with respect to material and compound things. It is immaterial, because it can subsist by itself, and, when separated from the body, can operate alone. It is immortal, not indeed from itself, but by the sustaining grace of God.

V. Its faculties, which are two, the understanding and the will, as in fact the object of the soul is two-fold. For the understanding apprehends eternity and truth both universal and particular, by a natural and necessary, and therefore by a uniform act.

But the will has an inclination to good. Yet this is either, according to the mode of its nature, to universal good and to that which is the chief good; or, according to the mode of liberty, to all other [kinds of] good.

VI. Lastly. In its habits, which are, First, wisdom, by which the intellect clearly and sufficiently understood the supernatural truth and goodness both of felicity and of righteousness. Secondly. Righteousness and the holiness of truth, by which the will was fitted and ready to follow what this wisdom commanded to be done, and what it showed to be desired. This righteousness and wisdom are called "original," both because man had them from his very origin, and because, if man had continued in his integrity, they would also have been communicated to his posterity.

VII. In all these things, the image of God most wonderfully shone forth. We say that this is the likeness by which man resembled his Creator, and expressed it according to the mode of his capacity -- in his soul, according to its substance, faculties and habits

-- in this body, though this cannot be properly said to have been created after the image of God who is pure spirit, yet it is something divine, both from the circumstance that, if man had not sinned, his body would never have died, and because it is capable of special incorruptibility and glory, of which the apostle treats in 1 Corinthians 15, because it displays some excellence and majesty beyond the bodies of other living creatures, and, lastly, because it is an instrument well fitted for admirable actions and operations -- in his whole person, according to the excellence, integrity, and the dominion over the rest of the creatures, which were conferred upon him.

VIII. The parts of this image may be thus distinguished: Some of them may be called natural to man, and others supernatural; some, essential to him, and others accidental.

It is natural and essential to the soul to be a spirit, and to be endowed with the power of understanding and of willing, both according to nature and the mode of liberty. But the knowledge of God, and of things pertaining to eternal salvation, is supernatural and accidental, as are likewise the rectitude and holiness of the will, according to that knowledge. Immortality is so far essential to the soul, that it cannot die unless it cease to be; but it is on this account supernatural and accidental, because it is through grace and the aid of preservation, which God is not bound to bestow on the soul.

IX. But the immortality of the body is entirely supernatural and accidental; for it can be taken away from the body, and the body can return to the dust, from which it was taken. Its excellence above other living creatures, and its peculiar fitness to produce various effects, are natural to it, and essential. Its dominion over the creatures which belongs to the whole man as consisting of body and soul, may he partly considered as belonging to it according to the excellence of nature, and partly as conferred upon it by gracious gift, of which dominion this seems to be an evidence, that it is never taken wholly away from the soul, although it be varied, and be augmented and diminished according to degrees and parts.

X. Thus was man created, that he might know, love and worship his Creator, and might live with him for ever in a state of blessedness. By this act of creation, God most manifestly displayed the glory of his wisdom, goodness and power.

XI. From this description of man, it appears, that he is both fitted to perform the act of religion to God, since such an act is required from him -- that he is capable of the reward which may be properly adjudged to those who perform [acts of] religion to God, and of the punishment which may be justly inflicted on those who neglect religion; and therefore that religion may, by a deserved right, be required from man according to this relation; and this is the principal relation, according to which we must, in sacred theology, treat about the creation of man after the image of God.

XII. In addition to this image of God, and this reference to supernatural and spiritual things, comes under our consideration the state of the natural life, in which the first man was created and constituted, according to the apostle Paul, "that which is natural was first, and afterwards, that which is spiritual." (1 Cor. xv, 46.) This state is founded in the natural union of body and soul, and in the life which the soul naturally lives in the body; from which union and life it is that the soul procures for its body, things which are good for it; and, on the other hand, the body is ready for offices which are congruous to its nature and desires. According to this state or condition, there is a mutual relation between man and the good things of this world, the effect of which is, that man can desire them, and, in procuring them for himself, can bestow that labour which he deems to be necessary and convenient.

DISPUTATION XXVII

ON THE LORDSHIP OR DOMINION OF GOD

I. Through creation, dominion over all things which have been created by himself, belongs to the Creator. It is, therefore, primary, being dependent on no other dominion or on that of no other person; and it is, on this account, chief because there is none greater; and it is absolute, because it is over the entire creature, according to the whole, and according to all and each of its parts, and to all the relations which subsist between the Creator and the creature. It is, consequently, perpetual, that is, so long as the creature itself exists.

II. But the dominion of God is the right of the Creator, and his power over the creatures; according to which he has them as his own property, and can command and use them, and do about them, whatever the relation of creation and the equity which rests upon it, permit.

III. For the right cannot extend further than is allowed by that cause from which the whole of it arises, and on which it is dependent. For this reason, it is not agreeable to this right of God, either that he delivers up his creature to another who may domineer over such creature, at his arbitrary pleasure, so that he be not compelled to render to God an account of the exercise of his sovereignty, and be able, without any demerit on the part of the creature, to inflict every evil on a creature capable of injury, or, at least, not for any good of this creature; or that he [God] command an act to be done by the creature, for the performance of which he neither has, nor can have, sufficient and necessary powers; or that he employ the creature to introduce sin into the world, that he may, by punishing or by forgiving it, promote his own glory; or, lastly, to do concerning the creature whatever he is able, according to his absolute power, to do concerning him, that is eternally to punish or to afflict him, without [his having committed] sin.

IV. As this is a power over rational creatures, (in reference to whom chiefly we treat on the dominion and power of God,) it may be considered in two views, either as despotic, or as kingly, or patriarchal. The former is that which he employs without any intention of good which may be useful or saving to the creature; that latter is that which he employs when he also intends the good of the creature itself. And this last is used by God through the abundance of his own goodness and sufficiency, until he considers the creature to be unworthy, on account of his perverseness, to have God presiding over him in his kingly and paternal authority.

V. Hence, it is, that, when God is about to command some thing to his rational creature, he does not exact every thing which he justly might do, and he employs persuasions through arguments which have regard to the utility and necessity of those persuasions.

VI. In addition to this, God enters into a contract or covenant with his creature; and he does this for the purpose that the creature may serve him, not so much "of debt," as from a spontaneous, free and liberal obedience, according to the nature of confederations which consist of stipulations and promises. On this account, God frequently distinguishes his law by the title of a COVENANT.

VII. Yet this condition is always annexed to the confederation, that if man be unmindful of the covenant and a contemner of its pleasant rule, he may always be impelled or governed by that domination which is really lordly, strict and rigid, and into which, he who refuses to obey the other [species of rule], justly falls.

VIII. Hence, arises a two-fold right of God over his rational creature. The First, which belongs to him through creation; the Second, through contract. The former rests on the good which the creature has received from his Creator; the latter rests on the still greater benefit which the creature will receive from God, his preserver, promoter and glorifier.

IX. If the creature happen to sin against this two-fold right, by that very act, he gives to God, his Lord, King and Father, the right of treating him as a sinning creature, and of inflicting on him due punishment; and this is a THIRD right, which rests on the wicked act of the creature against God.

DISPUTATION XXVIII

ON THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

I. Not only does the very nature of God, and of things themselves, but likewise the Scriptures and experience do, evidently, show that providence belongs to God.

II. But providence denotes some property of God, not a quality, or a capability, or a habit; but it is an act, which is not ad intra nor internal, but which is ad extra and external, and which is about an object different from God, and that is not united to him from all eternity, in his understanding, but as separate and really existing.

III. And it is an act of the practical understanding, or of the will employing the understanding, not completed in a single moment, but continued through the moments of the duration of things.

IV. And it may be defined the solicitous, everywhere powerful, and continued inspection and oversight of God, according to which he exercises a general care over the whole world, and over each of the creatures and their actions and passions, in a manner that is befitting himself, and suitable for his creatures, for their benefit, especially for that of pious men, and for a declaration of the divine perfection.

V. We have represented the object of it to be both the whole world as it is a single thing consisting of many parts which have a certain relation among themselves, and possessing order between each other, and each our the creatures, with its actions and passions. We preserve the distinction of the goodness which is in them, (1.) According to their nature, through creation; (2.) According to grace, through the communication of supernatural gifts, and elevation to dignities; (3.) According to the right use both of nature and grace; yet we ascribe the last two, also, to the act of providence.

VI. The rule of providence, according to which it produces its acts, is the wisdom of God, demonstrating what is worthy of God, according to his goodness, His severity, or his love for justice or for the creature, but always according to equity.

VII. The acts of providence which belong to its execution, are -- preservation, which appears to be occupied about essences, qualities and quantities -- and government, which presides over actions and passions, and of which the principal acts are motion, assistance, concurrence and permission. The three former of these acts extend themselves to good, whether natural or moral; and the last of them appertains to evil alone.

VIII. The power of God serves universally, and at all times, to execute these acts, with the exception of permission; specially, and sometimes, these acts are executed by the creatures themselves. Hence, an act of providence is called either immediate or mediate. When it employs [the agency of] the creatures, then it permits them to conduct their motions agreeably to their own nature, unless it be his pleasure to do any thing out of the ordinary way.

IX. Then, those acts which are performed according to some certain course of nature or of grace, are called ordinary; those which are employed either beyond, above, or also contrary to this order, are styled extraordinary; yet they are always concluded by the terms due fitness and suitableness, of which we have treated in the definition.

(Thesis 4.)

X. Degrees are laid down in providence, not according to intuition or oversight itself, neither according to presence or continuity, but according to solicitude and care, which yet are free from anxiety, but which are greater concerning a man than concerning bullocks, also greater concerning believers and pious persons, than concerning those who are impious.

XI. The end of providence and of all its acts, is the declaration of the divine perfections, of wisdom, goodness, justice, severity and power, and the good of the whole, especially of those men who are chosen or elected.

XII. But since God does nothing, or permits it to be done in time, which he has not decreed from all eternity, either to do or to permit that decree, therefore, is placed before providence and its acts as an internal act is before one that is external.

XIII. The effect, or, rather, the consequence, which belongs to God himself, is his prescience; and it is partly called natural and necessary, and partly free -- FREE, because it follows the act of the divine free will, without which it would not be the object of it -- Natural and Necessary, so far as, (when this object is laid down by the act of the divine will,) it cannot be unknown by the divine understanding.

XIV. Prediction sometimes follows this prescience, when it pleases God to give intimations to his creatures of the issues of things, before they come to pass. But neither prediction nor any prescience induces a necessity of any thing that is afterwards to be, since they are [in the divine mind.] posterior in nature and order to the thing that is future. For a thing does not come to pass because it has been foreknown or foretold; but it is foreknown and foretold because it is yet to come to pass.

XV. Neither does the decree itself, by which the Lord administers providence and its acts, induce any necessity on things future; for, since it, the decree, (§ 12) is an internal act of God, it lays down nothing in the thing itself. But things come to pass and happen either necessarily or contingently, according to the mode of power, which it has pleased God. to employ in the administration of affairs.

DISPUTATION XXIX

ON THE COVENANT INTO WHICH GOD ENTERED WITH OUR FIRST

PARENTS

I. Though, according to His right and power over man, whom he had created after his own image, God could prescribe obedience to him in all things for the performance of which he possessed suitable powers, or would, by the grace of God, have them in that state; yet, that he might elicit from man voluntary and free obedience, which, alone, is grateful to him, it was his will to enter into a contract and covenant with him, by which God required obedience, and, on the other hand, promised a reward, to which he added the denunciation of a punishment, that the transaction might not seem to be entirely one between equals, and as if man was not completely bound to God.

II. On this account, the law of God is very often called a Covenant, because it consists of those two parts, that is, a work commanded, and a reward promised, to which is subjoined the denunciation of a punishment, to signify the right which God had over man and which he has not altogether surrendered, and to incite man to greater obedience.

III. God prescribed this obedience, first, by a law placed in and imprinted on the mind of man, in which is contained his natural duty towards God and his neighbour, and, therefore, towards himself also; and it is that of love, with fear, honour and worship towards a superior. For, as true virtue consists in the government or right ordering of the affections, (of which the first, the chief, and that on which the rest depend, is Love,) the whole law is contained in the right ordering of love. And, as no obedience seems to be yielded in the case of a man who executes the whole of his own will without any, even the least resistance, therefore, to try his obedience, that thing was to be prescribed, to which, by a certain feeling, man had an abhorrence; and that was to be forbidden, towards which he was drawn by a certain inclination. Therefore the love of ourselves was to be regulated or rightly ordered, which is the first and proximate cause that man should live in society with his species, or according to humanity.

IV. To this law, it was the pleasure of God to add another, which was a symbolical one. A symbolical law is one that prescribes or forbids some act, which, in itself, is neither agreeable nor disagreeable to God, that is, one that is indifferent; and it serves for this purpose that God may try whether man is willing to yield obedience to him, solely on this account, because it has been the pleasure of God to require such obedience, and though it were impossible to devise any other reason why God imposed that law.

V. That symbolical law was, in this instance, prohibitive of some act, to which man was inclined by some natural propensity, (that is, to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and of evil,) though "it was pleasant to the eyes and good for food." By the commanding of an indifferent act, it does not seem to have been possible to try the obedience of man with equal advantage.

VI. This seems to be the difference between each [of these kinds of] obedience, that the first (Thesis I) is true obedience and, in itself, pleasing to God; and the man who performs it is said truly to live according to godliness; but that the latter (Theses 4 and 5) is not so much obedience, itself, as the external profession of willingly yielding obedience; and it is therefore an acknowledgment, or the token of an acknowledgment, by which man professes himself to be subject to God, and declares that he is willingly subject. Exactly in the same manner, a vassal yields obedience to his lord, for having fought against his enemies, which obedience he confesses that he cheerfully performs to him, by presenting him annually with a gift of small value.

VII. From this comparison, it appears that the obedience which is yielded to a symbolical law is far inferior to that which is yielded to a natural law, but that the disobedience manifested to a symbolical law is not the less serious, or that it is even more grievous; because, by this very act, man professes that he is unwilling to submit himself, and indeed not to yield obedience in other matters, and those of greater importance, and of more difficult labour.

VIII. The reward that corresponds with obedience to this chief law, the performance of which is, of itself, pleasing to God, (the analogy and difference which exist between God and man being faithfully observed,) is life eternal, the complete satisfying of the whole of our will and desire. But the reward which answers to the observance of the symbolical law, is the free enjoyment of the fruits of Paradise, and the power to eat of the tree of life, by the eating of which man was always restored to his pristine strength. But this tree of life was a symbol of eternal life, which man would have enjoyed, if, by abstaining from eating the fruit, he had professed obedience, and had truly performed such obedience to the moral law.

IX. We are of opinion that, if our first parents had remained in their integrity by obedience performed to both these laws, God would have acted with their posterity by the same compact, that is, by their yielding obedience to the moral law inscribed on their hearts, and to some symbolical or ceremonial law; though we dare not specially make a similar affirmation, respecting the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

X. So, likewise, if they had persisted in their obedience to both laws, we think it very probable that, at certain periods, men would have been translated from this natural life, by the intermediate change of the natural, mortal and corruptible body, into a body spiritual, immortal, and incorruptible, to pass a life of immortality and bliss in heaven.

COROLLARY

We allow this to be made a subject of discussion: Did Eve receive this symbolical command about the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, immediately from God, or through Adam?

DISPUTATION XXX

THE MANNER IN WHICH MAN CONDUCTED HIMSELF FOR FULFILLING

THE FIRST COVENANT, OR ON THE SIN OF OUR FIRST PARENTS

I. When God had entered into this covenant with men, it was the part of man perpetually to form and direct his life according to the conditions and laws prescribed by this covenant, because he would then have obtained the rewards promised through the performance of both those conditions, and would not have incurred the punishment due and denounced to disobedience. We are ignorant of the length of time in which man fulfilled his part; but the Holy Scriptures testify that he did not persevere in this obedience.

II. But we say the violation of this covenant was a transgression of the symbolical law imposed concerning his not eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

III. The efficient cause of that transgression was man, determining his will to that forbidden object, and applying his power or capability to do it. But the external, moving, per se, and principal cause was the devil, who, having accosted the woman, (whom he considered weaker than the man, and who when persuaded herself, would easily persuade him,) employed false arguments for persuasion. One of his arguments was deduced from the usefulness of the good which would ensue from this act; another was deduced from the setting aside of Him who had prohibited it, that is, by a denial of the punishment which would follow. The instrumental cause was the serpent, whose tongue the devil abused to propose what arguments he chose. The accidental cause was the fruit itself, which seemed good for food, pleasant in its flavor, and desirable to the eyes. The occasional cause was the law of God, that circumscribed by its interdict an act which was indifferent in its nature, and for which man possessed inclination and powers, that it might be impossible for this offense to be perpetrated without sin.

IV. The only moving or antecedent cause was a two-fold inclination in man, a superior one for the likeness of God, and an inferior one for the desirable fruit,

"pleasant to the sight, and good for food." Both of them were implanted by God through creation; but they were to be used in a certain method, order and time. The immediate and proximate cause was the will of man, which applied itself to the act, the understanding preceding and showing the way; and these are the causes which concurred to effect this sin, and all of which, as, through the image of God, he was able to resist, so was it his duty, through the imposing of that law, to have resisted.

Not one of these, therefore, nor others, if such be granted in the genus of causes, imposed any necessity on man [to commit that sin]. It was not an external cause, whether you consider God, or something from God, the devil, or man.

5.(1.) It was not God; for since he is the chief good, he does nothing but what is good; and, therefore, he can be called neither the efficient cause of sin, nor the deficient cause, since he has employed whatever things were sufficient and necessary to avoid this sin. (2.) Neither was it something in God; it was neither His understanding nor his will, which commands those things which are just, performs those which are good, and permits those which are evil; and this permission is only a cessation from such an act as would in reality have hindered the act of man, by effecting nothing beyond itself, but by suspending some efficiency. This, therefore, cannot be the cause. (3.) Nor was the devil the cause; for he only infused counsel; he did not impel, or force by necessity. (4.) Eve was not the cause; for she was only able to precede by her example, and to entice by some argument, but not to compel.

VI. It was not an internal cause -- whether you consider the common or general nature of man, which was inclined only to one good, or his particular nature, which exactly corresponded with that which is general; nor was it any thing in his particular nature, for this would have been the understanding; but it could act by persuasion and advice, not by necessity. Man, therefore, sinned by his free will, his own proper motion being allowed by God, and himself persuaded by the devil.

VII. The matter of that sin was the eating of the fruit of the tree -- an act indifferent, indeed, in its nature, but forbidden by the imposing of a law, and withdrawn from the power of man. lie could also have easily abstained from it without any loss of pleasure. In this, is apparent the admirable goodness of God, who tries whether man be willing to submit to the divine command in a matter which could so easily be avoided.

VIII. The form was the transgression of the law imposed, or the act of eating as having been forbidden; for as it had been forbidden, it had gone beyond the order of lawful and good acts, and had been taken away from the [allowable] power of man, that it might not be exercised without sin.

IX. There was no end for this sin; for it always assumed the shape or habit of good.

An end, however, was proposed by man, (but it was not obtained, that he might satisfy both his superior propensity towards the image of God, and his inferior one towards the fruit of the tree. But the end of the devil was the aversion of man from his God, and, through this, his further seduction into exile, and the society of the evil one.

But the permission of God had respect to the antecedent condition of creation, which had made men possessed of free will, and for [the performance of] acts glorious to God, which might arise from it.

X. The serious enormity of that sin is principally manifest from the following particulars: (1.) Because it was a transgression of such a law as had been imposed to try whether man was willing to be subject to the law of God, and it carried with it numbers of other grievous sins. (2.) Because, after God had loaded man with such signal gifts, he had the audacity to perpetrate this sin. (3.) Because, when there was such great facility to abstain from sin, he suffered himself to be so easily induced, and did not satisfy his inclination in such a copious abundance of things. (4.) Became he committed that sin in a sanctified place which was a type of the heavenly Paradise, almost under the eyes of God himself, who convened with him in a familiar manner.

DISPUTATION XXXI

ON THE EFFECTS OF THE SIN OF OUR FIRST PARENTS

I. The first and immediate effect of the sin which Adam and Eve committed in eating of the forbidden fruit, was the offending of the Deity, and guilt -- Offense, which arose from the prohibition imposed -- Guilt, from the sanction added to it, through the denunciation of punishment, if they neglected the prohibition.

II. From the offending of the Deity, arose his wrath on account of the violated commandment. In this violation, occur three causes of just anger: (1.) The disparagement of his power or right. (2.) A denial of that towards which God had an inclination. (3.) A contempt of the divine will intimated by the command.

III. Punishment was consequent on guilt and the divine wrath; the equity of this punishment is from guilt, the infliction of it is by wrath. But it is preceded both by the wounding of the conscience, and by the fear of an angry God and the dread of punishment. Of these, man gave a token by his subsequent flight, and by "hiding himself from the presence of the Lord God, when he heard him walking in the garden in the cool of the day and calling unto Adam."

IV. The assistant cause of this flight and hiding [of our first parents] was a consciousness of their own nakedness, and shame on account of that of which they had not been previously ashamed. This seems to have served for racking the conscience, and for exciting or augmenting that fear and dread.

V. The Spirit of grace, whose abode was within man, could not consist with a consciousness of having offended God; and, therefore, on the perpetration of sin and the condemnation of their own hearts, the Holy Spirit departed. Wherefore, the Spirit of God likewise ceased to lead and direct man, and to bear inward testimony to his heart of the favour of God. This circumstance must be considered in the place of a heavy punishment, when the law, with a depraved conscience, accused, bore its testimony [against them], convicted and condemned them.

VI. Beside this punishment, which was instantly inflicted, they rendered themselves liable to two other punishments; that is, to temporal death, which is the separation of the soul from the body; and to death eternal, which is the separation of the entire man from God, his chief good.

VII. The indication of both these punishments was the ejectment of our first parents out of Paradise. It was a token of death temporal; because Paradise was a type and figure of the celestial abode, in which consummate and perfect bliss ever flourishes, with the translucent splendour of the divine Majesty. It was also a token of death eternal, because, in that garden was planted the tree of life, the fruit of which, when eaten, was suitable for continuing natural life to man without the intervention of death. This tree was both a symbol of the heavenly life of which man was bereft, and of death eternal, which was to follow.

VIII. To these may be added the punishment peculiarly inflicted on the man and the woman -- on the former, that he must eat bread through "the sweat of his face," and that "the ground, cursed for his sake, should bring forth to him thorns and thistles;" on the latter, that she should be liable to various pains in conception and child-bearing.

The punishment inflicted on the man had regard to his care to preserve the individuals of the species, and that on the woman, to the perpetuation of the species.

IX. But because the condition of the covenant into which God entered with our first parents was this, that, if they continued in the favour and grace of God by an observance of this command and of others, the gifts conferred on them should be transmitted to their posterity, by the same divine grace which they had, themselves, received; but that, if by disobedience they rendered themselves unworthy of those blessings, their posterity, likewise, should not possess them, and should be liable to the contrary evils. This was the reason why all men, who were to be propagated from them in a natural way, became obnoxious to death temporal and death eternal, and devoid of this gift of the Holy Spirit or original righteousness. This punishment usually receives the appellation of "a privation of the image of God," and "original sin."

X. But we permit this question to be made a subject of discussion: Must some contrary quality, beside the absence of original righteousness, be constituted as another part of original sin? though we think it much more probable, that this absence of original righteousness, only, is original sin, itself, as being that which alone is sufficient to commit and produce any actual sins whatsoever.

XI. The discussion, whether original sin be propagated by the soul or by the body, appears to us to be useless; and therefore the other, whether or not the soul be through traduction, seems also scarcely to be necessary to this matter.

DISPUTATION XXXII

ON THE NECESSITY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

I. Without religion, man can have no union with God; and without the command and institution of God, no religion can subsist, which, since it appertains to himself, either by the right of creation, or by the additional right of restoration, he can vary it according to his own pleasure; so that, in whatever manner he may appoint religion,.

he always obligates man to observe it, and through this obligation, imposes on him the necessity of observing it.

II. But the mode of religion is not changed, except with a change of the relation between God and man, who must be united to him; and when this relation is changed, religion is varied, that is, on the previous supposition that man is yet to be united to God; for, as to its substance, (which consists in the knowledge of God, faith, love,

&c.,) religion is always the same, except it seem to be referred to the substance, that Christ enters into the Christian religion as its object.

III. The first relation, and that which was the first foundation of the primitive religion, was the relation between God and man -- between God as the Creator, and man as created after the image and in a state of innocency; wherefore the religion built upon that relation was that of rigid and strict righteousness and legal obedience. But that relation was changed, through the sin of man, who after this was no longer innocent and acceptable to God, but a transgressor and doomed to damnation. Therefore, after

[the commission of] sin, either man could have had no hope of access to God and to a union with him, since he had violated and abrogated the divine worship; or a new relation of man to his Creator was to be founded by God, through his gracious restoration of man, and a new religion was to be instituted on that relation. This is that which God has done, to the praise of his own glorious grace.

IV. But, as God is not the restorer of a sinner, except in a mediator, who expiates sins, appeases God, and sanctifies the sinner, I repeat it, except in that "one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus," it was not the will of our most glorious and most gracious God, alone and without this Mediator, either that there should be any foundation between him and the sinner restored by him, or that there should be an object to the religion, which, to the honour of the restorer and to the eternal felicity of the restored, he would construct upon that relation. For it pleased the Father, through Christ, to reconcile all things to himself, and by him to restore both those things which are in heaven, and those on earth. It also pleased the Father "that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father;" so that whosoever does not honour the Son, does not honour the Father.

V. Wherefore, after the entrance of sin, there has been no salvation of men by God, except through Christ, and no saving worship of God, except in the name of Christ, and with regard to him who is the Anointed One for sinners, but the saviour of them who believe on him; so that whosoever is without God is without Christ; and he that is without Christ, is without the faith, the worship and the religion of Christ; and without the faith and hope of this Christ, either promised and shadowed forth in types, or exhibited and clearly announced, neither were the ancient patriarchs saved, nor can we be saved.

VI. On this account, as the transgression of the first covenant contains the necessity of constituting another religion, and as this would not have occurred if that first covenant had not been made, it appears that. those things upon which the Scriptures treat, concerning the first covenant, and its transgression on the part of the first human beings, contain the occasion of the restoration which God was to make through Christ, and that they were, therefore, to be thus treated in the Christian religion. This conclusion is easily drawn from the very form of the narration given by Moses.

VII. God is also the object of the Christian religion, both as Creator, and as Restorer in Christ, the Son of his love; and these titles contain the reason why God can demand religion from man, who has been formed by his CREATOR a creature, and by his Restorer a new creature. In this object, also, must be considered what is the will of the Glorifier of man, who leads him out from the demerit of sin, and from misery, to eternal felicity. These three names, Creator, Restorer, and Glorifier, contain the most powerful arguments by which man is persuaded to religion.

VIII. But because it was the good pleasure of God to make this restoration through his Son, Jesus Christ, the Mediator, therefore, the Son of God, as constituted by the Father Christ and Lord, is likewise an object of the Christian religion subordinate to God; though he on earth, as the Word of his Father, both may be and ought to be considered as existing in the Father from all eternity.

DISPUTATION XXXIII

ON THE RESTORATION OF MAN

I. Since God is the object of the Christian religion, not only as the Creator, but also and properly as the Restorer, of the human race, and as we have finished our treatise on the creation, we will now proceed to treat on the restoration of mankind, because it is that which contains, in itself, another cause why God by deserved right can require religion from a man and a sinner.

II. This restoration is the restitution, and the new or the second creation, of sinful man, obnoxious through sin to death temporal and eternal, and to the dominion of sin.

III. The antecedent or only moving cause is the gracious mercy of God, by which it was his pleasure to pardon sin and to succour the misery of his creature.

IV. The matter about which [it is exercised] is man, a sinner, and, on account of sin, obnoxious to the wrath of God and the servitude of sin. This matter contains in itself the outwardly moving cause of his gracious mercy, but accidentally, through this circumstance, that God delights in mercy; for in every other respect sin is per se and properly the external and meritorious cause of wrath and damnation.

V. We may indeed conceive the form, under the general notion of restitution, reparation, or redemption; but we do not venture to give an explanation of it, except under two particular acts, the first of which is the remission of sins, or the being received into favour; the other is the renewal or sanctification of sinful man after the image of God, in which is contained his adoption into a son of God.

VI. The first end is the praise of the glorious grace of God, which springs from, and exists at the same time with, the very act of restitution or redemption; the other end is, that, after men have been thus repaired, they "should live soberly, righteously and godly, in this present world," and should attain to a blissful felicity in the world to come.

VII. But it has pleased God not to exercise this mercy in restoring man, without the declaration of his justice, by which he loves righteousness and hates sin; and he has, therefore, appointed that the mode of transacting this restoration should be through a mediator intervening between him and sinful man, and that this restoration should be so performed as to make it certain and evident that God hates sin and loves righteousness, and that it is his will to remit nothing of his own right, except after his justice had been satisfied.

VIII. For the fulfilling of this mediation, God has constituted his only begotten Son the mediator between him and men, and indeed a mediator through his own blood and death; for it was not the will of God that, without the shedding of blood and the intervention of the death of the Testator himself, there should be any remission, or a confirmation of the New Testament, which promises remission and the inscribing of the law of God in the hearts [of believers].

IX. This is the reason why the second object of the Christian religion, in subordination to God, is Jesus Christ, the Mediator of this restoration, after the Father had made him Christ [the Anointed One] and had constituted him the Lord and the Head of the church, so that we must, through him, approach to God for the purpose of performing

[acts of] religion to him; and the duty of religion must be rendered to him, with God the Father, from which duty we by no means exclude the Spirit of the Father and the Son.

DISPUTATION XXXIV

ON THE PERSON OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST

I. Because our Lord Jesus Christ is the secondary object of the Christian religion, we must further treat on him, as such, in a few disputations. But we account it necessary, in the first place, to consider the person, of what kind he is, in himself.

II. We say that this person is the Son of God and the son of man, consisting of two natures, the divine and the human, inseparably united without mixture or confusion, not only according to habitude or indwelling, but likewise by that union which the ancients have correctly denominated hypostatical.

III. He has the same nature with the Father, by internal and external communication.

IV. He has his human nature from the virgin Mary through the operation of the Holy Spirit, who came upon her and overshadowed her by fecundating her seed, so that from it the promised Messiah should, in a supernatural manner, be born.

V. But, according to his human nature, he consists of a body truly organic, and of a soul truly human which quickened or animated his body. In this, he is similar to other persons or human beings, as well as in all the essential and natural properties both of body and soul.

VI. From this personal union arises a communication of forms or properties; such communication, however, was not real, as though some things which are proper to the divine nature were effused into the human nature; but it was verbal, yet it rested on the truth of this union, and intimated the closest conjunction of both the natures.

COROLLARY

The word autoqeov "very God," so far as it signifies that the Son of God has the divine essence from himself, cannot be ascribed to the Son of God, according to the Scriptures and the sentiments of the Greek and Latin churches.

DISPUTATION XXXV

ON THE PRIESTLY OFFICE OF CHRIST

I. Though the person of Christ is, on account of its excellence, most worthy to be honoured and worshipped, yet, that he might be, according to God, the object of the Christian religion, two other things, through the will of God, were necessary: (1.) That he should undertake some offices for the sake of men, to obtain eternal salvation for them. (2.) That God should bestow on him dominion or lordship over all things, and full power to save and to damn, with an express command, "that all men should honour the Son even as they honour the Father," and that "every knee should bow to him, to the glory of God the Father."

II. Both these things are comprehended together under the title of saviour and Mediator. He is a saviour, so far as that comprises the end of both, and a Mediator, as it denotes the method of performing the end of both. For the act of saving, so far as it is ascribed to Christ, denotes the acquisition and communication of salvation. But Christ is the Mediator of men before God in soliciting and obtaining salvation, and the Mediator of God with men in imparting it. We will now treat on the former of these.

III. The Mediator of men before God, and their saviour through the soliciting and the acquisition of salvation, (which is also called, by the orthodox, "through the mode of merit,") has been constituted a priest, by God, not according to the order of Levi, but according to that of Melchisedec, who was "priest of the most high God," and at the same time "king of Salem."

IV. Through the nature of a true and not of a typical priest was at once both priest and victim in one person, which [duty], therefore, he could not perform except through true and substantial obedience towards God who imposed the office on him.

V. In the priesthood of Christ, must be considered the preparation for the office, and the discharge of it. (1.) The Preparation is that of the priest and of the victim; the Priest was prepared by vocation or the imposition of the office, by the sanctification and consecration of his person through the Holy Spirit, and through his obedience and sufferings, and even in some respect by his resuscitation from the dead. The victim was also prepared by separation, by obedience, (for it was necessary that the victim should likewise be holy,) and by being slain.

6.(2.) The Discharge of this office consists in the offering or presentation of the sacrifice of his body and blood, and in his intercession before God. Benediction or blessing, which, also, belonged to the sacerdotal office in the Old Testament, will, in this case, be more appropriately referred to the very communication of salvation, as we read in the Old Testament that kings, also, dispensed benedictions.

VII. The results of the fulfillment of the sacerdotal office are, reconciliation with God, the obtaining of eternal redemption, the remission of sins, the Spirit of grace, and life eternal.

VIII. Indeed, in this respect, the priesthood of Christ was propitiatory. But, because we, also, by his beneficence have been constituted priests to offer thanksgivings to God through Christ, therefore, he is also a eucharistical priest, so far as he offers our sacrifices to God the Father, that, when they are offered by his hands, the Father may receive them with acceptance.

IX. It is evident, from those things which have been now advanced, that Christ, in his sacerdotal office, has neither any successor, vicar, nor associate, whether we consider the oblation, both of his propitiatory sacrifice which he offered of those things which were his own, and of his eucharistical sacrifice which he offered of those also, which belonged to us, or whether we consider his intercession.

COROLLARIES

I. We deny that the comparison between the priesthood of Christ and that of Melchisedec, consisted either principally or in any manner in this, that Melchisedec offered bread and wine when he met Abraham returning from the slaughter of the kings.

II. That the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ is bloodless, implies a contradiction, according to the Scriptures.

III. The living Christ is presented to the Father in no other place than in heaven.

Therefore, he is not offered in the mass.

DISPUTATION XXXVI

ON THE PROPHETICAL OFFICE OF CHRIST

I. The prophetical office of Christ comes under consideration in two views -- either as he executed it in his own person while he was a sojourner on earth, or as he administered it when seated in heaven, at the right hand of the Father. In the present disputation, we shall treat upon it according to the former of these relations.

II. The proper object of the prophetical office of Christ was not the law, though [he explained or] fulfilled that, and freed it from depraved corruptions; neither was it epaggelia the promise, though he confirmed that which had been made to the fathers; but it was the gospel and the New Testament itself, or "the kingdom of heaven and its righteousness.

III. In this prophetical office of Christ are to be considered both the imposition of the office, and the discharge of it. 1. The imposition has sanctification, instruction or furnishing, inauguration, and the promise of assistance.

IV. Sanctification is that by which the Father sanctified him to his office, from the very moment of his conception by the Holy Spirit, (whence, he says, "To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth,") and, indeed, in a manner far more excellent than that by which Jeremiah and John are said to have been sanctified.

V. Instruction, or furnishing, is a conferring of those gifts which are necessary for discharging the duties of the prophetical office; and it consists in a most copious effusion of the Holy Spirit upon him, and in its abiding in him -- "the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, of counsel and might, of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord;" by which Spirit it came to pass that it was his will to teach according to godliness all those things which were to be taught, and that he had the courage to teach them -- his mind and affections, both concupiscible and irascible, having been sufficiently and abundantly instructed or furnished against all impediments.

VI. But the instruction in things necessary to be known is said, in the Scriptures, to be imparted by vision and hearing, by a familiar knowledge of the secrets of the Father, which is intimated in the phrase in which he is said to be in the bosom of the Father, and in heaven.

VII. His inauguration was made by the baptism which John conferred on him, when a voice came from the Father in heaven, and the Spirit, "in a bodily shape, like a dove, descended upon him." These were like credential letters, by which the power of teaching was asserted and claimed for him as the ambassador of the Father.

VIII. To this, must be subjoined the promised perpetual assistance of the Holy Spirit, resting and remaining upon him in this very token of a dove, that he might administer with spirit an office so arduous.

IX. In the Discharge of this office, are to be considered the propounding of the doctrine, its confirmation and the result.

X. The propounding of the doctrine was made in a manner suitable, both to the things themselves, and to persons -- to his own person, and to the persons of those whom he taught with grace and authority, by accepting the person of no man, of whatsoever state or condition he might be.

XI. The confirmation was given both by the holiness which exactly answers to the doctrine, and by miracles, predictions of future things, the revealing of the thoughts of men and of other secrets, and by his most bitter and contumelious death.

XII. The result was two-fold: The First was one that agreed with the nature of the doctrine itself -- the conversion of a few men to him, but without such a knowledge of him as the doctrine required; for their thoughts were engaged with the notion of restoring the external kingdom. The Second, which arose from the depraved wickedness of his auditors, was the rejection of the doctrine, and of him who taught it, his crucifixion and murder. Wherefore, he complains concerning himself, in Isa. xlix, 4 "I have laboured in vain, I have spent my strength for nought."

XIII. As God foreknew that this would happen, it is certain that he willed this prophetical office to serve, for the consecration of Christ, through sufferings, to undertake and administer the sacerdotal and regal office. And thus the prophetical office of Christ, so far as it was administered by him through his apostles and others of his servants, was the means by which his church was brought to the faith, and was saved.

COROLLARY

We allow this question to become a subject of discussion: Did the soul of Christ receive any knowledge immediately from the Logos operating on it, without the intervention of the Holy Spirit, which is called the knowledge of union?

DISPUTATION XXXVII

ON THE REGAL OFFICE OF CHRIST

I. As Christ, when consecrated by his sufferings, was made the author of salvation to all who obey him; and as for this end, not only the solicitation and the obtaining of blessings were required, (to which the sacerdotal office was devoted,) but also the communication of them, it was necessary for him to be invested with the regal dignity, and to be constituted Lord over. all things, with full power to bestow salvation, and whatever things are necessary for that purpose.

II. The kingly office of Christ is a mediatorial function, by which, the Father having constituted him Lord over all things which are in heaven and in earth, and peculiarly the King and the head of his church, he governs all things and the church, to her salvation and the glory of God. We will view this office in accommodation to the church, because we are principally concerned in this consideration.

III. The functions belonging to this office seem to be the following: Vocation to a participation in the kingdom of Christ, legislation, the conferring of the blessings in this life necessary to salvation, the averting of the evils opposed to them, and the last judgment and the circumstances connected with it.

IV. Vocation is the first function of the regal office of Christ, by which he calls sinful men to repent and believe the gospel -- a reward being proposed concerning a participation of the kingdom, and a threatening added of eternal destruction from the presence of the Lord.

V. Legislation is the second function of the regal office of Christ, by which he prescribes to believers their duty, that, as his subjects, they are bound to perform to him, as their Head and Prince -- a sanction being added through rewards and punishments, which properly agree with the state of this spiritual kingdom.

VI. Among the blessings which the third function of the regal office of Christ serves to communicate, we number not only the remission of sins and the Spirit of grace inwardly witnessing with our hearts that we are the children of God, but likewise all those blessings which are necessary for the discharge of the office; as illumination, the inspiring of good thoughts and desires, strength against temptations, and, in brief, the inscribing of the law of God in our hearts, In addition to these, as many of the blessings of this natural life, as Christ knows will contribute to the salvation of those who believe in him. But the evils over the averting of which this function presides, must be understood as being contrary to these blessings.

VII. Judgment is the last act of the regal office of Christ, by which, justly, and without respect of persons, he pronounces sentence concerning all the thoughts, words, deeds and omissions of all men, who have been previously summoned and placed before his tribunal; and by which he irresistibly executes that sentence through a just and gracious rendering of rewards, and through the due retribution of punishments, which consist in the bestowing of life eternal, and in the infliction of death eternal.

VIII. The results or consequences which correspond with these functions, are, (1.) The collection or gathering together of the church, or the building of the temple of Jehovah; this gathering together consists of the calling of the gentiles, and the bringing back or the restoration of the Jews, through the faith which answers to the divine vocation. (2.) Obedience performed to the commands of Christ by those who have believed in the Lord, and who have, through faith, been made citizens of the kingdom of heaven. (3.) The obtaining of the remission of sins, and of the Holy Spirit, and of other blessings which conduce to salvation, as well as a deliverance from the evils which molest [believers] in the present life. (4.) Lastly. The resurrection from the dead, and a participation of life eternal.

IX. The means by which Christ administers his kingdom, and which principally come under our observation in considering the church, are the word, and the Holy Spirit, which ought never to be separated from each other. For this Spirit ordinarily employs the word, or the meaning of the word, in its external preaching; and the word alone, without the illumination and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, is insufficient. But Christ never separates these two things, except through the fault of those who reject the word and resist the Holy Spirit.

X. The opposite results to these consequences are, the casting away of the yoke [of Christ], the imputation of sin, the denial or the withdrawing of the Holy Spirit, and the delivering over to the power of Satan to a reprobate mind, and to hardness of heart, with other temporal evils, and, lastly, death eternal.

XI. From these things, it appears that the prophetical office, by which a church is collected through the word, ought to be a reserve or accessory to the regal office; and, therefore, that the administrators of it are rightly denominated "the apostles and the servants of Christ," as of him who sends them forth into the whole world, over which he has the power, and who puts words into their mouths, whose continued assistance is likewise necessary, that the word may produce such fruit as agrees with its nature.

XII. This regal office is so peculiar to Christ, under God the Father, that he admits no man, even subordinately, into a participation of it, as if he would employ such an one for a ministerial head. For this reason, we say, that the Roman pontiff, who calls himself the head and spouse, though under Christ, is Antichrist.

DISPUTATION XXXVIII

ON THE STATES OF CHRIST'S HUMILIATION AND EXALTATION

I. Respecting the imposition and the execution of the offices which belong to Christ, two states of his usually come under consideration, both of them being required for this purpose - - that he may be able to bear the name of saviour according to the will of God, and, in reality, to perform the thing signified under this name. One of these states is that of his humiliation, and is, according to the flesh, natural; the other is that of glory, according to the Spirit, and is spiritual.

II. To the first state, that of his humiliation, belong the following articles of our belief:

"He suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried; he descended into hell." To the latter state, that of his exaltation, belong these articles: "He arose again from the dead; he ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty; from thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead."

III. The sufferings of Christ contain every kind of reproaches and torments, both of soul and body, which were inflicted on him partly by the fury of his enemies, and partly by the immediate chastisement of his Father. We say that these last are not contrary to the good of the natural life, but to that of the spiritual life. But we deduce the commencement of these sufferings from the time when he was taken into custody; for we consider those things which previously befell him, rather to have been forerunners of his sufferings, by which it might be put to the test, whether, with the prescience of those things which were to be endured, and, indeed, through an experimental knowledge, he would still be ready by voluntary obedience to endure other sufferings.

IV. The crucifixion has the mode of murder, by which mode we are taught, that Christ was made a curse for us, that we, through his cross, might be delivered from the curse of the law; for this seems to have been the entire reason why God pronounced him accursed who hung on a tree or cross, that we might understand that Christ, having been crucified rather by divine appointment, than by human means, was reckoned accursed for our sake, by God himself.

V. The death of Christ was a true separation of his soul from the body, both according to its effects and according to place. It would indeed have ensued from crucifixion, and especially from the breaking of his legs; on which account, he is justly said to have been killed by the Jews; but death was anticipated, or previously undertaken, by Christ himself, that he might declare himself to have received power from God the Father to lay down his soul and life, and that he died a voluntary death. The former of these seems to relate to the confirmation of the truth which had been announced by him as a prophet, and the latter, to the circumstances of his priestly office.

VI. The burial of Christ has relation to his certain death; and his remaining in the grave signifies, that he was under the dominion of death till the hour of his resurrection. This state, we think, was denoted by the existence of Christ among the dead, of which his descent into hell [or hades] was the commencement, as his interment was that of his remaining in the tomb. This interpretation is confirmed, both by the second chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, and by the consent of the ancient church, who, in the symbol of her belief, had only the one or the other of these expressions, either "He descended into hell," or "He was buried." Yet if any man thinks the meaning of this article -- "He descended into hell" -- to be different from that which we have given, we will not contradict his opinion, provided it be agreeable to the Scriptures and to the analogy of faith.

VII. This state [of humiliation] was necessary, both that he might yield obedience to his Father, and that, having been tempted in all things without sin, he might be able to sympathize with those who are tempted, and, lastly, that he might, by suffering, be consecrated as priest and king, and might enter into his own glory.

VIII. But this state of glory and exhaltation contains three degrees -- his resurrection, ascension into heaven, and sitting at the right hand of the Father.

IX. The commencement of his glory was his deliverance from the bonds of the grave, and his rising again from the dead, by which his body, that was dead and had been laid in the sepulcher, after the effects of death had been destroyed in it, was reunited to his soul, and brought back again to life, not to this natural, but to a spiritual life; though, from the overflowing force of natural life, he was able to perform its functions as long as it was necessary for him to remain with his disciples in the present life, after having "arisen again from the dead," to impart credibility to his resurrection. We ascribe this resurrection, not only to the Father through the Holy Spirit, but likewise to Christ himself, who had the power of taking up his life again.

X. The assumption of Christ into heaven contains the progress of his exaltation. For, as he had finished, on earth, the office enjoined, and had received a body -- not a natural, earthly, corruptible, fleshly and ignominious body, but one spiritual, heavenly, incorruptible and glorious, and as other duties, necessary for procuring the salvation of men, were to be performed in and concerning heaven, it was right and proper that he should rise and be exalted to heaven, and should remain there until he comes to judgment.

From these premises, the dogma of the papists concerning transubstantiation, and that of the Ubiguitarians concerning consubstantiation, or the bodily presence of Christ in, with and, under the bread, are refuted.

XI. The exaltation of Christ to the right hand of the Father is the supreme degree of his exaltation; for it contains the consummate glory and power which have been communicated to Christ himself by the Father -- glory, in his being seated with the Father in the throne of majesty, both because the regal office has been conferred on him, with full command, and on earth above all and over all created things, and because the dignity was conferred on him of further discharging [the duties of] the sacerdotal office, in that action which was to be performed in heaven by a more sublime High Priest constituted in heaven itself.

XII. In relation to the priesthood, the state of humiliation was necessary; because it was the part of Christ to appear in heaven before the face of his Father, sprinkled with his own blood, and to intercede for believers. It was also necessary, in relation to his regal office; because, (and in this behold the administration of the prophetical office placed in subordination to the regal!) because it was his duty to send the word and the Spirit from heaven, and to administer from the throne of his majesty all things in the name of his Father, and especially his church, by conferring on those who obey him, the blessings promised in his word and sealed by his Spirit, and by inflicting evils on the disobedient after they have abused the patience of God as long as his justice could bear it. Of this administration, the last act will be the universal judgment, for which we are now waiting. "Come, Lord Jesus!"

DISPUTATION XXXIX

ON THE WILL, AND COMMAND OF GOD THE FATHER AND OF CHRIST, BY

WHICH THEY WILL AND COMMAND THAT RELIGION BE PERFORMED TO

THEM BY SINFUL MAN

I. In addition to the things that God has done in Christ, and Christ has done through the command of the Father, for the redemption of mankind, who were lost through sin, by which both of them have merited that religious homage should be performed to them by sinful man -- and in addition to the fact that the Father has constituted Christ the saviour and Head, with full power and capability of saving through the administration of his priestly and regal offices, on account of which power, Christ is worthy to be worshipped with religious honours, and able to reward his worshipers, that he may not be worshipped in vain, it was requisite that the will of God the Father and of Christ should be subjoined, by which they willed and commanded that religious worship should be offered to them, lest the performance of religion should be "will-worship," or superstition.

II. It was the will of God that this command should be proposed through the mode of a covenant, that is, through the mutual stipulation and promise of the contracting parties -- of a covenant, indeed, which is never to be disannulled or to perish, which is, therefore, denominated "the new covenant," and is ratified by the blood of Jesus Christ as Mediator.

III. On this account, and because Christ has been constituted by the Father, a prince and Lord, with the full possession of all the blessings necessary to salvation, it is also called "a Testament" or "Will;" therefore, he, also, as the Testator, is dead, and by his death, has confirmed the testamentary promise which had previously been made, concerning the obtaining of the eternal inheritance by the remission of sins.

IV. The stipulation on the part of God and Christ is, that God shall be God and Father in Christ [to a believer] if in the name, and by the command of God, he acknowledges Christ as his Lord and saviour, that is, if he believe in God through Christ, and in Christ, and if he yield to both of them love, worship, honour, fear, and complete obedience as prescribed.

V. The promise, on the part of God the Father, and of Christ, is, that God will be the God and Father, and that Christ will be the saviour, (through the administration of his sacerdotal and regal offices,) of those who have faith in God the Father, and in Christ, and who, through faith, yield obedience to them; that is, God the Father, and Christ, will account the performance of religious duty to be grateful, and will crown it with a reward.

VI. On the other hand, the promise of sinful man is that he will believe in God and in Christ, and through faith will yield compliance or render obedience. But the stipulation is that God be willing to be mindful of his compact and holy declaration.

VII. Christ intervenes between the two parties; on the part of God, he proposes the stipulation, and confirms the promise with his blood; he likewise works a persuasion in the hearts of believers, and affixes to it his attesting seal, that the promise will be ratified. But, on the part of sinful man, he promises [to the Father] that, by the efficacy of his Spirit he will cause man to perform the things which he has promised to his God; and, on the other hand, he requires of the Father, that, mindful of his own promise, he will deign to bestow on those who answer this description, or believers, the forgiveness of all their sins, and life eternal. He likewise intervenes, by presenting to God the service performed by man, and by rendering it grateful and acceptable to God through the odour of his own fragrance.

VIII. External seals or tokens are also employed to which the ancient Latin fathers have given the appellation of "Sacraments," and which, on the part of God, seal the promise that has been made by himself; but, on the part of men, they are "the handwriting," or bond of that obligation by which they had bound themselves that nothing may in any respect be wanting which seems to be at all capable of contributing to the nature and relation of the covenant and compact into which the parties have mutually entered.

IX. From all these things, are apparent the most sufficient perfection of the Christian religion and its unparalleled excellence above all other religions, though they also be supposed to be true. Its sufficiency consists in this -- both that it demonstrates the necessity of that duty which is to be performed by sinful man, to be completely absolute, and on no account to be remissible, by which the way is closed against carnal security -- and that it most strongly fortifies against despair, not only sinners, that they may be led to repentance, but also those who perform the duty, that they may, through the certain hope of future blessings, persevere in the course of faith and of good works upon which they have entered. These two [despair and carnal security]

are the greatest evils which are to be avoided in the whole of religion.

X. This is the excellence of the Christian religion above every other, that all these things are transacted by the intervention of Christ our mediator, priest and king, in which, numerous arguments are proposed to us, both for the establishment of the necessity of its performance, and for the confirmation of hope, and for the removal of despair, that cannot be shown in any other religion. On this account, therefore, it is not wonderful that Christ is said to be the wisdom of God and the power of God, manifested in the gospel for the salvation of believers.

COROLLARY

No prayers and no duty, performed by a sinner, are grateful to God, except with reference to Christ; and yet, people have acted properly in desiring and in beseeching God, that he would be pleased to bless King Messiah and the progress of his kingdom.

DISPUTATION XL

ON THE PREDESTINATION OF BELIEVERS

I. As we have hitherto treated on the object of the Christian religion, that is, on Christ and God, and on the formal reasons why religion may be usefully performed to them, and ought to be, among which reasons, the last is the will of God and his command that prescribes religion by the conditions of a covenant; and as it will be necessary now to subjoin to this a discourse on the vocation of men to a participation in that covenant, it will not be improper for us, in this place, to insert one on the Predestination, by which God determined to treat with men according to that prescript, and by which he decreed to administer that vocation, and the means to it.

First, concerning the former of these.

II. That predestination is the decree of the good pleasure of God, in Christ, by which he determined, within himself, from all eternity, to justify believers, to adopt them, and to endow them with eternal life, "to the praise of the glory of his grace," and even for the declaration of his justice.

III. This predestination is evangelical, and, therefore, per- emptory and irrevocable; and, as the gospel is purely gracious, this predestination is also gracious, according to the benevolent inclination of God in Christ. But that grace excludes every cause which can possibly be imagined to be capable of having proceeded from man, and by which God may be moved to make this decree.

IV. But we place Christ as the foundation of this predestination, and as the meritorious cause of those blessings which have been destined to believers by that decree. For the love with which God loves men absolutely to salvation, and according to which he absolutely intends to bestow on them eternal life, this love has no existence except in Jesus Christ, the Son of his love, who, both by his efficacious communication, and by his most worthy merits, is the cause of salvation, and not only the dispenser of recovered salvation, but likewise the solicitor, obtainer, and restorer of that salvation which was lost. Therefore, sufficient is not attributed to Christ, when he is called executor of the decree which had been previously made, and without the consideration of him as [the person] on whom that decree is founded.

V. We lay down a two-fold matter for this predestination -- divine things, and the persons to whom the communication of them has been predestinated. (1.) Those divine things are the spiritual blessings which usually receive the appellations of grace and glory. (2.) The persons are the faithful, or believers; that is, they believe in God who justifies the ungodly, and in Christ raised from the dead. But faith, that is, the faith which is on Christ, the mediator between God and men, presupposes sin, and likewise the knowledge or acknowledgment of it.

VI. We place the form of this predestination in the internal act itself of God, who foreordains to believers this union with Christ their Head, and a participation in his benefits. But we place the end in "the praise of the glory of the grace of God;" and as this grace is the cause of that decree, it is equitable that it should be celebrated by glory, though God, by using it, has rendered it illustrious and glorious. In this place, too, occurs the mention of justice itself, as that by the intervention of which Christ was given as mediator, and faith in him was required; because, without this mediator, God has neither willed to shew mercy, nor to save men without faith in him.

VII. But, as this decree of predestination is according to election, which necessarily includes reprobation, we must likewise advert to it. As opposed to election, therefore, we define reprobation to be the decree of God's anger or of his severe will, by which, from all eternity, he determined to condemn to eternal death all unbelievers and impenitent persons, for the declaration of his power and anger; yet so, that unbelievers are visited with this punishment, not only on account of unbelief, but likewise on account of other sins from which they might have been delivered through faith in Christ.

VIII. To both these is severally subjoined the execution of each; the acts of which are performed in that order in which they have been ordained by God in the decree itself; and the objects, both of the decree and of its execution, are completely the same and uniform, or they are invested with the same formal reason, though they are considered in the decree, as in the mind of God, through the understanding, but, in the execution of it, as such, actually in existence.

IX. This predestination is the foundation of Christianity, of salvation, and of the certainty of salvation; and St. Paul treats upon it in his epistle to the Romans, (viii, 28-30) in the ninth and following chapters of the same epistle, and in the first chapter of that to the Ephesians.

DISPUTATION XLI

ON THE PREDESTINATION OF THE MEANS TO THE END

I. After we have finished our discussion on the predestination by which God has determined the necessity of faith in himself and in Christ, for the obtaining of salvation, according to which faith is prescribed to be performed as the bounden duty of man to God and Christ; it follows, that we treat on the predestination by which God determines to administer the means to faith.

II. For, as that act of faith is not in the power of a natural, carnal, sensual, and sinful man, and as no one can perform this act except through the grace of God, but as all the grace of God is administered according to the will of God -- that will which he has had within himself from all eternity -- for it is an internal act, therefore, some certain predestination must be preconceived in the mind and will of God, according to which he dispenses that grace, or the means to it.

III. But we can define this predestination, that it is the eternal decree of God, by which he has wisely and justly resolved, within himself, to administer those means which are necessary and sufficient to produce faith in [the hearts of] sinful men, in such a manner as he knows to be comportable with his mercy and with his severity, to the glory of his name and to the salvation of believers.

IV. The object of this predestination is, both the means of producing this faith, and the sinful men to whom he has creed either to give or not to give this faith, as the object of the predestination discussed in the preceding disputation was faith itself, existing in the preconception of the mind of God.

V. The antecedent, or only moving cause, impelling to make the decree, is not only the mercy of God, but also his severity. But his wisdom prescribes the mode which his justice administers, that what is justly due to mercy may be attributed to it, and that, in the mean time, regard may be had to severity, according to which God threatens that he will send a famine of the word on the earth.

VI. The matter is the conceded or the denied dispensation of the means. The form is the ordained dispensation itself, according to which it is granted to some men and denied to others, or it is granted or denied on this and not on that condition.

VII. The end for the sake of which, and the end which, are conjoined to the administration itself at the very same moment, and are the declaration of the mercy of God, and of his severity, wisdom and justice. The end for which it was intended, and which follows from the administration, is the salvation of believers. The results are, the condemnation of unbelievers, and the still more grievous condemnation of some men.

VIII. But the proper and peculiar means destined, are the word and Spirit; to which, also, may be joined the good and the evil things of this natural life, which God employs for the same end, and of the nature and efficacy of which we shall treat in the disputation on Vocation, where they are used.

IX. To these means, we attribute two epithets, "necessity" and "sufficiency," (§ 3,) which belong to them according to the will and nature of God, and which we also join together. (1.) Necessity is in them; because, without them, a sinner cannot conceive faith. (2.) Sufficiency also is in them; because they are employed in vain, if they be not sufficient; yet we do not account it necessary to place this sufficiency in the first moment in which they begin to be used, but in the entire progress and completion.

X. God destines these means to no persons on account of, or according to, their own merits, but through mere grace alone; and he denies them to no one, except justly, on account of previous transgressions.

DISPUTATION XLII

ON THE VOCATION OF SINFUL MEN TO CHRIST, AND TO A

PARTICIPATION OF SALVATION IN HIM

I. The vocation or calling to the communion of Christ and its benefits, is the gracious act of God, by which, through the word and His Spirit, he calls forth sinful men, subject to condemnation and placed under the dominion of sin, from the condition of natural life, and out of the defilements and corruptions of this world, to obtain a supernatural life in Christ through repentance and faith, that they may be united in him, as their head destined and ordained by God, and may enjoy the participation of his benefits, to the glory of God and to their own salvation.

II. The efficient cause of this vocation is God and the Father in the Son; the Son, also, himself, as constituted Mediator and King by God the Father, calls men by the Holy Spirit, as he is the Spirit of God given to the mediator, and the Spirit of Christ, the King and the Head of His church, by whom the Father and the Son both "work hitherto." But this vocation is so administered by the Spirit, that he also, is properly denominated the author of it. For he appoints bishops in the church, he sends teachers, he furnishes them with gifts, he grants them divine aid, and imparts force and authority to the word.

III. The antecedent or only moving cause is the grace, mercy and philanthropy of God, by which he is inclined to succour the misery of sinful men, and to bestow blessedness upon him. But the disposing cause is, the wisdom and the justice of God, by which he knows the method by which it is proper for this vocation to be administered, and by which he wills to dispense it as it is proper and fight. From this, arises the decree of his will concerning its administration and mode.

IV. The instrumental cause of vocation is the word of God administered by the aid of man, either by preaching or by writing; and this is the ordinary instrument; or it is the divine word immediately proposed by God, inwardly to the mind and will, without human aid or endeavour; and this is extraordinary. The word employed, in both these cases, is that both of the law and of the gospel, subordinate to each other in their separate services.

V. The matter of vocation is men constituted in their sensual life, as worldly, natural, sensual, and sinful.

VI. The boundary from which they are called, is, both the state of sensual or natural life, and that of sin and of misery on account of sin; that is, from condemnation and guilt, and afterwards from the bondage and dominion of sin.

VII. The boundary to which they are called, is, the communication of grace, or of supernatural good, and of every spiritual blessing, the plenitude of which resides in Christ -- also their power and force, as well as the inclination to communicate them.

VIII. The proximate end of vocation is, that men may love, fear, honour and worship God and Christ -- may in righteousness and true holiness, according to the command of the word of God, render obedience to God who calls them, and may, by this means, make their calling and election sure.

IX. The remote end is the salvation of those who are called, and the glory of God and of Christ who calls; both of which are placed in the union of God and man. For as God unites himself to man, and declares himself to be prepared to unite himself to him, he makes his own glory illustrious; and, as man is united to God, he obtains salvation.

X. This vocation is both external and internal. The external vocation is by the ministry of men propounding the word. The internal vocation is through the operation of the Holy Spirit illuminating and affecting the heart, that attention may be paid to those things which are spoken, and that credence may be given to the word. From the concurrence of both these, arises the efficacy of vocation.

XI. But that distribution is not of a genus into its species, but of a whole into its parts; that is, the distribution of the whole vocation into partial acts concurring together to one result, which is obedience yielded to the vocation. Hence, the company of those who are called and who answer to the call, is denominated "a Church."

XII. The accidental issue of vocation is, the rejection of the doctrine of grace, contempt of the divine counsel, and resistance manifested against the Holy Spirit, of which the proper and per se cause is, the wickedness and hardness of the human heart; and to this not unfrequently is added the just judgment of God, avenging the contempt shown to his word, from which arise blindness of mind, hardening of the heart, and a delivering up to a reprobate mind, and to the power of Satan.

DISPUTATION XLIII

ON THE REPENTANCE BY WHICH MEN ANSWER TO THE DIVINE

VOCATION

I. As, in the matter of salvation, it has pleased God to treat with man by the method of a covenant, that is, by a stipulation, or a demand and a promise, and as even vocation has regard to a participation in the covenant; it is instituted on both sides and separately, that man may perform the requisition or command of God, by which he may obtain [the fulfillment of] his promise. But this is the mutual relation between these two -- the promise is tantamount to an argument, which God employs, that he may obtain from man that which he demands; and the compliance with the demand, on the other hand, is the condition, without which man cannot obtain what has been promised by God, and through [the performance of] which he most assuredly obtains the promise.

II. Hence, it is apparent that the first of all which accepts this vocation is the faith, by which a man believes that, if he complies with the requisition, he will enjoy the promise, but that if he does not comply with it, he will not be put in possession of the things promised, nay, that the contrary evils will be inflicted on him, according to the nature of the divine covenant, in which there is no promise without a punishment opposed to it. This faith is the foundation on which rests the obedience that is to be yielded to God; and it is, therefore, the foundation of religion.

III. But divines generally place three parts in this obedience. The first is repentance, for it is the calling of sinners to righteousness. The second is faith in Christ, and in God through Christ; for vocation is made through the gospel, which is the word of faith. The third is the observance of God's commands, in which consists holiness of life, to which believers are called, and without which no man shall see God.

IV. Repentance is grief or sorrow on account of sins known and acknowledged, the debt of death contracted by sin, and on account of the slavery of sin, with a desire to be delivered. Hence, it is evident, that three things concur in penitence - - the first as an antecedent, the second as a consequence, and the third as properly and most fully comprising its nature.

V. That which is tantamount to an antecedent is the knowledge or acknowledgment of sin. This consists of a two-fold knowledge: (1.) A general knowledge by which is known what is sin universally and according to the prescript of the law. (2.) A particular knowledge, by which it is acknowledged that sin had been committed, both from a recollection of the bad deeds perpetrated and of the good omitted, and from the examination of them according to the law. This acknowledgment, has, united with it, a consciousness of a two-fold demerit, of damnation or death, and of the slavery of sin; "for the wages of sin is death;" and "he who sins is the slave of sin." This acknowledgment is either internal, and made in the mind, or it is external, and receives the appellation of "confession."

VI. That which intimately comprises the nature of repentance is, sorrow on account of sin committed, and of its demerit, which is so much the deeper, as the acknowledgment of sin is clearer, and more copious. It is also produced from this acknowledgment by means of a two-fold fear of punishment: (1.) A fear not only of bodily and temporal punishment, but likewise of that which is spiritual and eternal.

(2.) The fear of God, by which men are afraid of the judgment of such a good and just being, whom they have offended by their sins. This fear may be correctly called

"initial;" and we believe that it has some hope annexed to it.

VII. That which follows as a consequence, is the desire of deliverance from sin, that is, from the condemnation of sin and from its dominion, which desire is so much the more intense, by how much the greater is the acknowledgment of misery and sorrow on account of sin.

VIII. The cause of this repentance is, God by his word and Spirit in Christ. For it is a repentance tending not to despair, but to salvation; but such it cannot be, except with respect to Christ, in whom, alone, the sinner can obtain deliverance from the condemnation and dominion of sin. But the word which he uses at the beginning is the word of the law, yet not under the legal condition peculiar to the law, but under that which is annexed to the preaching of the gospel, of which the first word is, that deliverance is declared to penitents. The Spirit of God may, not improperly, be denominated "the Spirit of Christ," as he is Mediator; and it first urges a man by the word of the law, and then shows him the grace of the gospel. The connection of the word of the law and that of the gospel, which is thus skillfully made, removes all self-security, and forbids despair, which are the two pests of religion and of souls.

IX. We do not acknowledge satisfaction, which the papists make to be the third part of repentance, though we do not deny that the man who is a real penitent will endeavour to make satisfaction to his neighbour against whom he owns that he has sinned, and to the church that he has injured by the offense. But satisfaction can by no means be rendered to God, on the part of man, by repentance, sorrow, contrition, almsgiving, or by the voluntary susception and infliction of punishments. If such a course were prescribed by God, the consciences of men must necessarily be tormented with the continual anguish of a threatening hell, not less than if no promise of grace had been made to sinners. But God considers this repentance, which we have described, if it be true, to be worthy of a gracious deliverance from sin and misery; and it has faith as a consequence, on which we will treat in the subsequent disputation.

COROLLARY

Repentance is not a sacrament, either with regard to itself, or with regard to its external tokens.

DISPUTATION XLIV

ON FAITH IN GOD AND CHRIST

I. In the preceding disputation, we have treated on the first part of that obedience which is yielded to the vocation of God. The second part now follows, which is called

"the obedience of faith."

II. Faith, generally, is the assent given to truth; and divine faith is that which is given to truth divinely revealed. The foundation on which divine faith rests is two- fold -the one external and out of or beyond the mind -- the other internal and in the mind.

(1.) The external foundation of faith is the very veracity of God who makes the declaration, and who can declare nothing that is false. (2.) The internal foundation of faith is two-fold -- both the general idea by which we know that God is true -- and the knowledge by which we know that it is the word of God. Faith is also two-fold, according to the mode of revelation, being both legal and evangelical, of which the latter comes under our present consideration, and tends to God and Christ.

III. Evangelical faith is an assent of the mind, produced by the Holy Spirit, through the gospel, in sinners, who, through the law, know and acknowledge their sins, and are penitent on account of them, by which they are not only fully persuaded within themselves that Jesus Christ has been constituted by God the author of salvation to those who obey him, and that he is their own saviour if they have believed in him, and by which they also believe in him as such, and through him on God as the benevolent Father in him, to the salvation of believers and to the glory of Christ and God.

IV. The object of faith is not only the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, but likewise Christ himself who is here constituted by God the author of salvation to those that obey him.

V. The form is the assent that is given to an object of this description; which assent is not acquired by a course of reasoning from principles known by nature; but it is an assent infused above the order of nature, which, yet, is confirmed and increased by the daily exercises of prayers and mortification of the flesh, and by the practice of good works. Knowledge is antecedent to faith; for the Son of God is beheld before a sinner believes on him. But trust or confidence is consequent to it; for, through faith, confidence is placed in Christ, and through him in God.

VI. The author of faith is the Holy Spirit, whom the Son sends from the Father, as his advocate and substitute, who may manage his cause in the world and against it. The instrument is the gospel, or the word of faith, containing the meaning concerning God and Christ which the Spirit proposes to the understanding, and of which he there works a persuasion.

VII. The subject in which it resides, is the mind, not only as it acknowledges this object to be true, but likewise to be good, which the word of the gospel declares.

Wherefore, it belongs not only to the theoretical understanding, but likewise to that of the affections, which is practical.

VIII. The subject to which [it is directed], or the object about which [it is occupied], is sinful man, acknowledging his sins, and penitent on account of them. For this faith is necessary for salvation to him who believes; but it is unnecessary to one who is not a sinner; and, therefore, no one except a sinner, can know or acknowledge Christ for his saviour, for he is the saviour of sinners. The end, which we intend for our own benefit, is salvation in its nature. But the chief end is the glory of God through Jesus Christ.

COROLLARY

"Was the faith of the patriarchs under the covenants of promise, the same as ours under the New Testament, with regard to its substance?" We answer in the affirmative.

DISPUTATION XLV

ON THE UNION OF BELIEVERS WITH CHRIST

I. As Christ is constituted by the Father the saviour of those that believe, who, being exalted. in heaven to the right hand of the Father, communicates to believers all those blessings which he has solicited from the Father, and which he has obtained by his obedience and pleading, but as the participation of blessings cannot be through communication, unless where there has previously been an orderly and suitable union between him who communicates and those to whom such communications are made, it is, therefore, necessary for us to treat, in the first place, upon the union of Christ with us, on account of its being the primary and immediate effect of that faith by which men believe in him as the only saviour.

II. The truth of this thing, and the necessity of this union, are intimated by the names with which Christ is signally distinguished in a certain relation to believers. Such are the appellations of head, spouse, foundation, vine, and others of a similar kind; from which, on the other hand, believers are called members in his body, which is the entire church of believers, the spouse of Christ, lively stones built on him, and young shoots or branches. By these epithets, is signified the closest and most intimate union between Christ and believers.

III. We may define or describe it to be that spiritual and most strict and therefore mystically essential conjunction, by which believers, being immediately connected, by God the Father and Jesus Christ through the Spirit of Christ and of God, with Christ himself, and through Christ with God, become one with him and with the Father, and are made partakers of all his blessings, to their own salvation and the glory of Christ and of God.

IV. The author of this union is not only God the Father, who has constituted his Son the head of the church, endued him with the Spirit without measure, and unites believers to his Son; but also Christ, who communicates to believers that Spirit whom he obtained from the Father, that, cleaving to him by faith, they may be one Spirit.

The administrators are prophets, apostles and other dispensers of the mysteries of God, who lay Christ as the foundation, and bring his spouse to him.

V. The parties to be united are, (1.) Christ, whom God the Father has constituted the head, the spouse, the foundation, the vine, etc, and to whom he has given all perfection, with a plenary power and command to communicate it; (2.) And sinful man, and therefore destitute of the glory of God, yet a believer, and owning Christ for his saviour.

VI. The bond of union must be considered both on the part of believers, and on the part of God and Christ. (1.) On the part of believers, it is faith in Christ and God, by which Christ is given to dwell in our hearts. (2.) On the part of God and Christ, it is the Spirit of both, who flows from Christ as the constituted head, into believers, that he may unite them to him as members.

VII. The form of union is a compacting and joining together, which is orderly, harmonious, and in every part agreeing with itself by joints fitly supplied, according to the measure of the gifts of Christ. This conjunction receives various appellations, according to the various similitudes which we have already adduced. With respect to a foundation and a house built upon it, it is a being built up into [a spiritual house].

With respect to a husband and wife, it is a participation of flesh and bones; or, it is flesh of the flesh of Christ, and bone of his bones. With respect to a vine and its branches, or to an olive tree and its boughs, it is an engrafting and implanting.

VIII. The proximate and immediate end is the communion of the parts united among themselves; this, also, is an effect consequent upon that union, but actively understood, as it flows from Christ, and positively, as it flows into believers, and is received by them. The cause of this is, that the relation is that of disquiparency, where the foundation is Christ, who possesses all things, and stands in need of nothing; the term, or boundary, is the believer in want of all things. The remote end is the external salvation of believers, and the glory of God and Christ.

IX. But not only does Christ communicate his blessings to the believers, who are united to him, but he likewise considers, on account of this most intimate and close union, that the good things bestowed, and the evils inflicted on believers, are also done to himself. Hence, arise commiseration for his children, and certain succour, but anger against those who afflict, which abides upon them unless they repent, and beneficence towards those who have given even a draught of cold water, in the name of Christ, to one of his followers.

DISPUTATION XLVI

ON THE COMMUNION OF BELIEVERS WITH CHRIST, AND

PARTICULARLY WITH HIS DEATH

I. The union of believers with Christ tends to communion with him, which contains, in itself, every end and fruit of union, and flows immediately from the union itself.

II. Communion with Christ is that by which believers, when united to him, have, in common with himself all those things which belong to him; yet the distinction is preserved, which exists between the head and the members, between him who communicates, and them who are made partakers, between him who sanctifieth, and those who are sanctified.

III. This communion must, according to the Scriptures, be considered in two views, for it is either a communion of his death, or of his life; because Christ must be thus considered in two relations, either according to the state in the body of his flesh, which was crucified, dead, and buried, or, according to his glorious state and the new life to which he was raised up again.

IV. The communion of his death is that by which, being planted together in the likeness of his death, we participate of his power, and of all the benefits which flow from his death.

V. This planting together is the crucifixion, the death and the burial of "our old man,"

or of "the body of sin," in and with the body of the flesh of Christ. These are the degrees by which the body of the flesh of Christ is abolished; that may also in its own measure, be called "the body of sin," so far as God has made Christ to be sin for us, and has given him to bear our sins, in his own body, on the tree.

VI. The strength and efficacy of the death of Christ consist in the abolishing of sin and death, and of the law, which is "the hand-writing that is against us;" and the strength or force of sin is that by which sin kills us.

VII. The efficacious benefits of the death of Christ which believers enjoy through communion with it, are principally the following: The First is the removal of the curse, which we had deserved through sin. This includes, or has connected with it, our reconciliation with God, perpetual redemption, remission of sins, and justification.

VIII. The SECOND. is deliverance from the dominion and slavery of sin, that sin may no longer exercise its power in our crucified, dead and buried body of sin, to obtain its desires by the obedience which we have usually yielded to it in our body of sin, according to the old man.

IX. The THIRD is deliverance from the law, both as it is "the hand-writing which was against us," consisting of ceremonial institutions, and as it is the rigid exactor of what is due from us, and useless and inefficacious as it is on account of our flesh, and the body of sin, according to which we were carnal, though it was spiritual, and as sin, by its wickedness and perversity, abused the law itself to seduce and kill us.

DISPUTATION XLVII

THE COMMUNION OF BELIEVERS WITH CHRIST IN REGARD TO HIS LIFE

I. Communion with the life of Christ is that by which, being engrafted into him by a conformity to his life, we become partakers of the whole power of his life, and of all the benefits which flow from it.

II. Our conformity to the life of Christ, is either that of the present life, or of that which is future. (1.) That of the present life is the raising of us up into a new life, and our being seated, with regard to the Spirit, "in heavenly places" in Christ our head.

(2.) That of the life to come is our resurrection into a new life according to the body, and our being elevated to heavenly places with regard to the entire man.

III. Hence, our conformity to Christ is according to the same two-fold relation: in this life, it is our resurrection to newness of spiritual life, and our conversation in heaven according to the Spirit; after the present life, it is the resurrection of our, bodies, their conformity to the glorious body of Christ, and the fruition of celestial blessedness.

IV. The blessings which flow from the life of Christ, fall partly within the limits of this life, and partly within the continued duration of the life to come.

V. Those which fall within the limits of the present life are, adoption into sons of God, and the communication of the Holy Spirit. This communication composes within itself three particular benefits: First. Our regeneration, through the illumination of the mind and the renewal of the heart. Secondly. The perpetual aid of the Holy Spirit to excite and co-operate. Thirdly. The testimony of the same Spirit with our hearts, that we are the children of God, on which account he is called "the Spirit of adoption."

VI. Those which fall within the boundless duration of the life to come, are our preservation from future wrath, and the bestowing of life eternal;' though this preservation from wrath may seem to be a continued act, begun and carried on in this world, but consummated at the period of the last judgment.

VII. Under the preservation from wrath, also, is not unsuitably comprehended continued justification from sins through the intercession of Christ, who, in his own blood, is the propitiation for our sins, and our advocate before God.

DISPUTATION XLVIII

ON JUSTIFICATION

I. The spiritual benefits which believers enjoy in the present life, from their union with Christ through communion with his death and life, may be properly referred to that of justification and sanctification, as in those two is comprehended the whole promise of the new covenant, in which God promises that he will pardon sins, and will write his laws in the hearts of believers, who have entered into covenant with him.

II. Justification is a just and gracious act of God as a judge, by which, from the throne of his grace and mercy, he absolves from his sins, man, a sinner, but who is a believer, on account of Christ, and the obedience and righteousness of Christ, and considers him righteous, to the salvation of the justified person, and to the glory of divine righteousness and grace.

III. We say that "it is the act of God as a judge," who though as the supreme legislator he could have issued regulations concerning his law, and actually did issue them, yet has not administered this direction through the absolute plenitude of infinite power, but contained himself within the bounds of justice which he demonstrated by two methods, First, because God would not justify, except as justification was preceded by reconciliation and satisfaction made through Christ in his blood; Secondly, because he would not justify any except those who acknowledged their sins and believed in Christ.

IV. We say that "it is a gracious and merciful act; "not with respect to Christ, as if the Father, through grace as distinguished from strict and rigid justice, had accepted the obedience of Christ for righteousness, but with respect to us, both because God, through his gracious mercy towards us, has made Christ to be sin for us, and righteousness to us, that we might be the righteousness of God in him, and because he has placed communion with Christ in the faith of the gospel, and has set forth Christ as a propitiation through faith.

V. The meritorious cause of justification is Christ through his obedience and righteousness, who may, therefore, be justly called the principal or outwardly moving cause. In his obedience and righteousness, Christ is also the material cause of our justification, so far as God bestows Christ on us for righteousness, and imputes his righteousness and obedience to us. In regard to this two-fold cause, that is, the meritorious and the material, we are said to be constituted righteous through the obedience of Christ.

VI. The object of justification is man, a sinner, acknowledging himself, with sorrow, to be such an one, and a believer, that is, believing in God who justifies the ungodly, and in Christ as having been delivered for our offenses, and raised again for our justification. As a sinner, man needs justification through grace, and, as a believer, he obtains justification through grace.

VII. Faith is the instrumental cause, or act, by which we apprehend Christ proposed to us by God for a propitiation and for righteousness, according to the command and promise of the gospel, in which it is said, "He who believes shall be justified and saved, and he who believeth not shall be damned."

VIII. The form is the gracious reckoning of God, by which he imputes to us the righteousness of Christ, and imputes faith to us for righteousness; that is, he remits our sins to us who are believers, on account of Christ apprehended by faith, and accounts us righteous in him. This estimation or reckoning, has, joined with it, adoption into sons, and the conferring of a right to the inheritance of life eternal.

IX. The end, for the sake of which is the salvation of the justified person; for that act is performed for the good of the man himself who is justified. The end which flows from justification without any advantage to God who justifies, is the glorious demonstration of divine justice and grace.

X. The most excellent effects of this justification are peace with God and tranquillity of conscience, rejoicing under afflictions in hope of the glory of God and in God himself, and an assured expectation of life eternal.

XI. The external seal of justification is baptism; the internal seal is the Holy Spirit, testifying together with our spirits that we are the children of God, and crying in our hearts, Abba, Father!

XII. But we have yet to consider justification, both about the beginning of conversion, when all preceding sins are for, given, and through the whole life, because God has promised remission of sins to believers, those who have entered into covenant with him, as often as they repent and flee by true faith to Christ their propitiator and expiator. But the end and completion of justification will be at the close of life, when God will grant to those who end their days in the faith of Christ, to find his mercy, absolving them from all the sins which had been perpetrated through the whole of their lives. The declaration and manifestation of justification will be in the future general judgment.

XIII. The opposite to justification is condemnation, and this by an immediate contrariety, so that between these two no medium can be imagined.

COROLLARIES

I. That faith and works concur together to justification, is a thing impossible.

II. Faith is not correctly denominated the formal cause of justification; and when it receives that appellation from some divines of our profession, it is then improperly so called.

III. Christ has not obtained by his merits that we should be justified by the worthiness and merit of faith, and much less that we should be justified by the merit of works: But the merit of Christ is opposed to justification by works; and, in the Scriptures, faith and merit are placed in opposition to each other.

DISPUTATION XLIX

ON THE SANCTIFICATION OF MAN

I. The word "sanctification" denotes an act, by which any thing is separated from common use, and is consecrated to divine use.

II. Common use, about the sanctification of which [to divine purposes] we are now treating, is either according to nature itself, by which man lives a natural life; or it is according to the corruption of sin, by which he lives to sin and obeys it in its lusts or desires. Divine use is when a man lives according to godliness, in a conformity to the holiness and righteousness in which he was created.

III. Therefore, this sanctification, with respect to the boundary from which it proceeds, is either from the natural use, or from the use of sin; the boundary to which it tends, is the supernatural and divine use.

IV. But when we treat about man, as a sinner, then sanctification is thus defined: It is a gracious act of God, by which he purifies man who is a sinner, and yet a believer, from the darkness of ignorance, from indwelling sin and from its lusts or desires, and imbues him with the Spirit of knowledge, righteousness and holiness, that, being separated from the life of the world and made conformable to God, man may live the life of God, to the praise of the righteousness and of the glorious grace of God, and to his own salvation.

V. Therefore, this sanctification consists in these two things: In the death of: the old man" who is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts," and in the quickening or enlivening of "the new man, who, after God, is created in righteousness and the holiness of truth."

VI. The author of sanctification is God, the Holy Father himself, in his Son who is the Holy of holies, through the Spirit of holiness. The external instrument is the word of God; the internal one is faith yielded to the word preached. For the word does not sanctify, only as it is preached, unless the faith be added by which the hearts of men are purified.

VII. the object of sanctification is man, a sinner, and yet a believer -- a sinner, because, being contaminated through sin and addicted to a life of sin, he is unfit to serve the living God -- a believer, because he is united to Christ through faith in him, on whom our holiness is founded; and he is planted together with Christ and joined to him in a conformity with his death and resurrection. Hence, he dies to sin, and is excited or raised up to a new life.

VIII. The subject is, properly, the soul of man. And, first, the mind, which is illuminated, the dark clouds of ignorance being driven away. Next, the inclination or the will, by which it is delivered from the dominion of indwelling sin, and is filled with the spirit of holiness. The body is not changed, either as to its essence or its inward qualifies; but as it is a part of the man, who is consecrated to God, and is an instrument united to the soul, having been removed by the sanctified soul which inhabits it from the purposes of sin, it is admitted to and employed in the service of God, "that our whole spirit and soul and body may be preserved blameless unto the day of our Lord Jesus Christ."

IX. The form lies in the purification from sin, and in a conformity with God in the body of Christ through his Spirit.

X. The end is, that a believing man, being consecrated to God as a priest and king, should serve him in newness of life, to the glory of his divine name, and to the salvation of man.

XI. As, under the Old Testament, the priests, when approaching to render worship to God, were accustomed to be sprinkled with blood, so, likewise, the blood of Jesus Christ, which is the blood of the New Testament, serves for this purpose-to sprinkle us, who are constituted by him as priests, to serve the living God. In this respect, the sprinkling of the blood of Christ, which principally serves for the expiation of sins, and which is the cause of justification, belongs also to sanctification; for in justification, this sprinkling serves to wash away sins that have been committed; but in sanctification, it serves to sanctify men who have obtained remission of their sins, that they may further be enabled to offer worship and sacrifices to God, through Christ.

XII. This sanctification is not completed in a single moment; but sin, from whose dominion we have been delivered through the cross and the death of Christ, is weakened more and more by daily losses, and the inner man is day by day renewed more and more, while we carry about with us in our bodies, the death of Christ, and the outward man is perishing.

COROLLARY

We permit this question to be made the subject of discussion: Does the death of the body bring the perfection and completion of sanctification -- and how is this effect produced?

DISPUTATION L

ON THE CHURCH OF GOD AND OF CHRIST: OR ON THE CHURCH IN

GENERAL AFTER THE FALL

I. As, through faith, which is the first part of our duty towards God and Christ, we have obtained the blessings of justification and sanctification from our union and communion with Christ, by which benefits we are, from children of wrath and the slaves of sin, not only constituted the children of God and the servants of righteousness, (on which account it is fit that we should render obedience and worship to our Parent and our Lord,) and as we have likewise obtained power and confidence for the performance of such obedience and worship, it would follow that we should now treat on obedience and worship as on another part of our duty.

II. But as there are multitudes of those who have, through these benefits, been made the sons and the servants of God, and who have been united, among themselves, by the same faith and the Spirit of Christ, as members in one body, which is called the church, and of which the Scriptures make frequent mention, it appears to be the most proper course to treat, First, upon this church, because, as she derives her origin from this faith, she comprehends within her embraces all those to whom the performance of worship to God and Christ is to be prescribed.

III. And as it has pleased God to institute certain signs by which may be sealed or testified, both the communion of believers with Christ and among themselves, and a participation of these benefits, and, on the other hand, their service of gratitude towards God and Christ, we shall deem it proper, NEXT, to treat upon these signs or tokens, before we proceed to the worship, itself, which is due to God and Christ. First, then, let us consider the church.

IV. This word, in its general acceptation, denotes a company or congregation of men who are called out, and not only the act and the command of him who calls them out, but likewise the obedient compliance of those who answer the call; so that the result or effect of that act is included in the word "church. "

V. But it is thus defined: A company of persons called out from a state of natural life and of sin, by God and Christ, through the Spirit of both, to a supernatural life to be spent according to God and Christ in the knowledge and worship of both, that by a participation with both, they may be eternally blessed, to the glory of God through Christ, and of Christ in God.

VI. The efficient cause of this evocation, or calling out, is God the Father, in his Son Jesus Christ, and Christ himself, through the Spirit, both of the Father and of the Son as he is Mediator and the Head of the church, sanctifying and regenerating her to a new life. The impulsive cause is the gracious good pleasure of God the Father, in Christ, and the love of Christ towards those whom he has acquired for himself by his own blood.

VII. The executive cause of this gracious good pleasure of God in Christ, which may also, in this respect, according to its distribution, be called "the administrative cause,"

is the Spirit of God and of Christ by the word of both; by which he requires outwardly a life according to God and Christ, with the addition of the promise of a reward and the threatening of a punishment; and he inwardly illuminates the mind to a knowledge of this life, imparts to us the feelings of love and desire for this life, and bestows on the whole man strength and power to live such a life.

VIII. The matter about which [it is occupied], or the object of the vocations, are natural and sinful men, who, indeed, according to nature, are capable of receiving instruction from the Spirit through the word, but who are, according to the life of the present world and the state of sin, darkened in their minds and alienated from the life of God. This state requires that the beginning of preaching be made from preaching the law as it reproves sin and convinces of sin, and thus that progress be made to the preaching of the gospel of grace.

IX. The form of the church resides in the mutual relation of God and Christ who calls, and of the church who obeys that call, according to which, God in Christ, by the Spirit of both, infuses into her supernatural life, feeling or sensation, and motion; and she, on the other hand, being quickened and under the influence of feeling and motion, begins to live and to walk according to godliness, and in expectation of the blessings promised.

X. The end of this evocation, which also contains the chief good of the church, is blessedness perfected and consummated through a union with God in Christ. From this, results the glory of God, who unites the church to himself and beatifies her, which glory is declared in the very act of union and beatification -- also the glory of the same blessed God, when the church in her triumphant songs ascribes to him praise, honour and glory forever and ever.

XI. From the act of this evocation and from the form of the church arising out of it, it appears that a distinction must be made among the men or congregation, as they are men, and as they are called out and obey the call; and they must be so distinguished that the company to whom the name of "the church" at any time belonged, may so decline from that obedience as to lose the name of "the church," God "removing their candlestick out of its place," and sending a bill of divorce to his disobedient and adulterous wife. Hence it is evident that the glorying of the papists is vain on this point -- that the church of Rome cannot err and fall away.

DISPUTATION LI

ON THE CHURCH OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, OR UNDER THE PROMISE

I. As Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day, and ever -- as he is the chief or deepest corner-stone, upon which the superstructure of the church is raised, being built up both by prophets and apostles, and as he is the head of all those who will be partaken of salvation, the whole church, therefore, may, in this sense, be called

"Christian," though under this appellation, peculiarly, comes the church as she began to be collected together after the actual ascent of Christ into heaven.

II. But though the church be one with respect to its foundation, and of those things which concern the substance itself yet, because it has pleased God to govern it according to different methods, in reference to this the church may, in the most suitable manner, be distinguished into the church which existed in the times of the Old Testament before Christ, and into that which flourished in the times of the New Testament and after Christ appeared on earth.

III. "The church, prior to the advent of Christ, under the dispensation of the Old Testament," is that which was called out, (by the word of promise concerning the seed of the woman and the seed of Abraham, and concerning the Messiah who was subsequently to come,) from the state of sin and misery, to a participation of the righteousness of faith and salvation, and to the faith placed in that promise -- and by the word of the law, to render worship to God in confidence of obtaining mercy in this blessed Seed and the promised Messiah, in a manner suitable to the infantile age of the church herself.

IV. The word of promise was propounded, in the beginning, in a very general manner and with much obscurity, but in succeeding ages, more specially and with greater distinctness, and still more so, as the times of the advent of the Messiah in the flesh drew nearer.

V. The law which contributed to this calling, was both the moral and the ceremonial; (for, in this place, the forensic does not come under consideration;) and both of them as delivered orally, and as comprised and proposed in writing by Moses, in which last respect, the law is principally treated upon in the Scriptures of the Old and the New Testament.

VI. The moral law serves this office in a two-fold manner: First, by demonstrating the necessity of the gracious promise, which it does by convincing [men] of sins against the law, and of the weakness [of man] to perform the law. To this purpose it has been rigidly and strictly propounded; and it is considered as so proposed, according to these passages: "The man that doeth them shall live in them," and "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them."

Secondly, by ewieikwv moderately, or with clemency, requiring the observance of it from those who were parties to the covenant of promise.

VII. Though the observance of the ceremonial law be not, of itself, and on account of itself, pleasing to God, yet the observance of it was prescribed for two purposes: (1.) That it might convince of the guilt of sins and of the curse, and might thus declare the necessity of the gracious promise. (2.) And that it might sustain believers by the hope of the promise, which hope was confirmed by the typical presignification of future things. In the former of these two respects, the ceremonial law was the seal of sins; but in the latter, it was the seal of grace and remission.

VIII. The church of those times must, therefore, be considered, both as it is called the heir, and as called the infant, either according to its substance, or according to the dispensation and economy suitable to those times. According to the former of these respects, the church was under the promise or the covenant of promise; and according to the latter respect, she was under the law and under the Old Testament, in regard to which, that people is called servile, or in bondage, and the infant heir "differing in nothing from a servant," as, in regard to the promise, the same people are denominated free, born of a free woman, and according to Isaac "counted for the seed" to whom the promise was made.

IX. According to the promise, the church was a willing people -- according to the Old Testament, a carnal people; according to the former relation, the heir of spiritual and heavenly blessings; according to the latter, the heir of spiritual and earthly blessings, especially of the land of Canaan and of its benefits. According to the former relation, the church was endowed with the Spirit of adoption; according to the latter, she had this Spirit intermixed with that of bondage as long as the promise continued.

X. The open consideration of these relations, and a suitable comparison and opposition between the covenant of promise, and the law or the Old Testament, contributes much to the [correct] interpretation of several passages of Scripture, which, otherwise, can scarcely be at all explained, or at least with great difficulty COROLLARIES

I. Because the Old Testament was forced to be abrogated, therefore it was to be confirmed, not by the blood of a testator or mediator, but of brute animals.

II. "The Old Testament" is never used in the Scriptures for the covenant of grace.

III. The confounding of the promise and of the Old Testament is productive of much obscurity in Christian theology, and is the cause of more than a single error.

DISPUTATION LII

ON THE CHURCH OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, OR UNDER THE GOSPEL

I. The Church of the New Testament is that which, from the time when that Testament was confirmed by the blood of Christ the mediator of the New Testament, or from the period of his ascension into heaven, began to be called out from a state of sin which was plainly manifested by the word of the gospel, and by the Spirit that was suited to the heirs who had attained to the age of adults -- to a participation of the righteousness of faith and of salvation, through faith placed in the gospel, and to render worship to God and Christ in the unity of the same Spirit; and this church will continue to be called out in the same manner to the end of the world, to the praise of the glory of the grace of God and of Christ.

II. The efficient cause is the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has now most plainly manifested himself to be Jehovah and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ; and it is Christ himself, elevated to the right hand of the Father, invested with full power in heaven and on earth, and endowed with the word of the gospel and with the Spirit beyond measure. The antecedent or only moving cause is the grace and mercy of God the Father and of Christ, and even the justice of God, to which, through the good pleasure of the Father, the fullest satisfaction has now been made in Jesus Christ, and which is clearly manifested in the gospel.

III. The Spirit of Christ is the administering cause, according to the economy, as he is the substitute of Christ and receives of that which is Christ's, to glorify Christ by this calling forth in his church, with only a full power to administer all things according to his own pleasure. The Spirit uses the word of the gospel placed in the mouth of his servants, which immediately executes this vocation, and the word of the law, whether written or implanted in the mind; the gospel serves both antecedently that a place may be made for this vocation, and consequently when it has been received by faith.

IV. The object of this evocation is, not only Jews, but also gentiles, the middle wall of partition which formerly separated the gentiles from the Jews being taken away by the flesh and blood of Christ; that is, the object is all men generally and promiscuously without any difference, but it is all men actually sinners, whether they be those who acknowledge themselves as such and to whom the preaching of the gospel is constantly exhibited, or those who are yet to be brought to the acknowledgment of their sins.

V. Because this church is of adult age, and because she no longer requires a tutor and governor, she is free from the economical bondage of the law, and is governed by the spirit of full liberty, which is, by no means, intermixed with the spirit of bondage; and, therefore, she is free from the use of the ceremonial law, so far as it served for testifying of sins, and as it was "the hand-writing which was against us."

VI. This church, also, with unveiled or open face, beholds the glory of the Lord as in a glass, and has the very express image of heavenly things, and Christ, the image of the invisible God, the express image of the Father's person, and the brightness of his glory, and the very body of things to come which is of Christ. She, therefore, does not need the law, which has the shadow of good things to come; on which account, she is free from the same ceremonial law, by which it typically prefigured Christ and good things to come.

VII. The church of the New Testament has not experienced, does not now experience, and will not, to the end of the world, experience, in the whole of its course, any change whatever with regard to the word itself or the spirit; For, in these last times, God has spoken to us in his Son, and by those who have heard him.

VIII. This same church is called "catholic," in a peculiar and distinct sense in opposition to the church which was under the Old Testament, so far as she has been diffused through the whole world, and has embraced within her boundary all nations, tribes, people and tongues. This universality is not hinder, by the rejection of the greater part of the Jews, as they will also be added to the church, some time hence, in a great multitude, and like an army formed into columns.

IX. We may denominate, not unaptly or inappropriately, the state of the church, as she existed from the time of John until the assent of Christ into heaven, "a temporary or intermediate one" between the state of the promise and of the gospel, or that of the Old Testament and of the New.

X. On which account, we place the ministry of John between the ministry of the prophets and that of the apostles, and plainly, and in every respect, conformable to neither of them. Hence, also, John is called "a greater prophet," and is said to be "less than the least in the kingdom of heaven.

COROLLARY

The baptism of John was so far the same with that of Christ, that there was afterwards no need for it to be restored.

DISPUTATION LIII

ON THE HEAD AND THE MARKS OF THE CHURCH

I. Though the head and the body be of one nature, and though, according to nature, they properly constitute one subsistence, yet he who, according to nature, is the head of the church, cannot have communion of nature with her, for she is his creature.

II. But it has been the good pleasure of God, who is both the head of the church according to nature, and her creator, to bestow on his church his Son Jesus Christ, made man, as her head, by whom, likewise, it has been his will to create his church -that is, a new creature, that the union between the church and her head might be closer, and the communication more free and confiding.

III. But a three-fold relation exists between the church and her head: (1.) That the head contains in himself, in a manner the most perfect, all things which are necessary and sufficient for salvation. (2.) That he is fitly united to the church, his body, by "the joints and bands" of the Spirit and of faith. (3.) That the head can infuse the virtue of his own perfection into her, and she can receive it from him according to the order of preordination and subordination fitly corresponding with it according to the difference of both.

IV. But these three things belong to Christ alone; nay, not one of the three agrees with any person or thing except with Christ. Wherefore, he, only, is the head of the church, to whom she immediately coheres according to her internal and real essence.

V. But no one can, according to this relation, be vicar or substitute to him; neither the apostle Peter, nor any Roman pontiff; nay, Christ can have no one among men as his vicar, according to the external administration of the church; and, what is still more, he cannot have a universal minister, which term is less than that of vicar.

VI. Yet we do not deny that those persons who are constituted by this head as his ministers, perform such functions as belong to the head; because it has been his pleasure to gather his church to himself, and to govern it by human means.

VII. But, according to her internal essence, this church is known to no one except to her head. She is likewise made known to others by signs and indications which have their origin from her true internal essence itself, if they be real, and not counterfeit and deceptive in their appearance.

VIII. These signs are, the profession of the true faith, and the institution or conducting of the life according to the direction and the instigation of the Spirit -- a matter that belongs to external acts, about which, alone, a judgment can be formed by mankind.

IX. We say that these are the marks of a church which outwardly conducts herself with propriety. But it may come to pass, that a mere profession of faith may obtain in this church through the public preaching and hearing of the word, through the administration and use of the sacraments, and through prayers and Thanksgivings; and yet in her whole life she may degenerate from the profession; and, lastly, she may in her deeds deny Christ, whom she professes to know in word, in which case, she does not cease to be a church as long as it is the pleasure of God and Christ to bear with her ill manners, and not to send her a bill of divorcement.

X. But it has happened that in her profession itself, she begins to intermix falsehoods with truth, and to worship, at the same time, Jehovah and Baal. Then, indeed, her condition is very bad, and "nigh to destruction," and all those who adhere to her are commanded to desert her, so far, at least, as not to become partakers of her abominations, and to contaminate themselves with the pollutions of her idolatry; nay, they are commanded to accuse their mother of being a harlot, and of having violated the marriage compact with her husband.

XI. In such a defection as this, those who desert her are not the cause of the dissension, but she who is justly deserted, because she first declined from God and Christ, to whom all believers, and each of them in particular, must adhere by an inseparable connection.

XII. The Roman pontiff is not the head of the church; and because he boasts himself of being that head, the name of "Antichrist" on this account most deservedly belongs to him.

XIII. The marks of the church of which the papists boast -- antiquity, universality, duration, amplitude, the uninterrupted succession of teachers, and agreement in doctrine-have been invented beyond those which we have laid down, because they are accommodated to the present state of the church of Rome.

DISPUTATION LIV

ON THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, HER PARTS AND RELATIONS

I. The catholic church is the company of all believers, called out from every language, tribe, people, nation and calling, who have been, are now, and will be, called by the saving vocation of God from a state of corruption to the dignity of the children of God, through the word of the covenant of grace, and engrafted into Christ, as living members to their head through true faith, to the praise of the glory of the grace of God. From this, it appears that the catholic church differs from particular churches in nothing which appertains to the substance of a church, but solely in her amplitude.

II. But as she is called "the catholic church" in reference to her matter, which embraces all those who have ever been, are now, and will yet be, made partakers of this vocation, and received into the family of God, so, likewise, is she denominated

"the one and holy church," from her form, which consists in the mutual relation of the church, who by faith, embraces Christ as her head and spouse, and of Christ, who so closely unites the church to himself, as his body and spouse, by his Spirit, that the church lives by the life of Christ himself, and is made a partaker of him and of all his benefits.

III. The Catholic Church is "ONE," because, under one God and Father, who is above all persons, and through all things, and in all of us, she has been united as one body to one head, Christ the Lord, through one Spirit, and through one faith placed in the same word, through a similar hope of the same inheritance, and through mutual charity, she has been "fitly framed and built for a holy temple, and a habitation of God through the Spirit." Wherefore, the whole of this unity is spiritual, though those who have been thus united together consist partly of body, and partly of spirit.

IV. She is "HOLY;" because, by the blessing of the Holy of holies, she has been separated from the unclean world, washed from her sins by His blood, beautified with the presence and gracious indwelling of God, and adorned with true holiness by the sanctification of the Holy Spirit.

V. But though this church is one, yet she is distinguished according to the acts of God towards her, so far as she has become the recipient of either of all of those acts, or of some of them. The church that has received only the act of her creation and preservation, is said to be in the way, and is called "the church militant," as being she that must yet contend with sin, the flesh, the world, and Satan. The church that, in addition to this, is made partaker of the consummation, is said to be in her native land, and is called "the church triumphant;" for, after having conquered all her enemies, she rests from her labours, and reigns with Christ in heaven. To that part which is still militant on earth, the title of "catholic" is likewise ascribed, so far as she embraces within her boundaries all particular militant churches.

VI. But the catholic church is distributed, according to her parts, into many particular churches, since she consists of many congregations far distant from each other, with respect to place, and quite distinct. But as these particular churches have severally the name of "a church," so they have likewise the thing signified by the name and the entire definition like similar parts which participate in the name and definition of the whole; and the catholic church differs from each particular one solely in her universality, and in no other thing whatever which belongs to the essence of a church.

Hence, is easily learned in what manner it may be understood that, as single, particular churches may err, yet the church universal cannot err; that is, in this sense, that there never will be a future time in which some believers will not exist who do not err in the foundation of religion. But from this interpretation, it is apparent that it cannot be concluded from the circumstance of the catholic church, being said to be in this sense, free from error, that any congregation, however numerous soever it may be, is exempt from error, unless there be in it one person, or more, who are so guided into all truth as to be incapable of erring.

VII. Hence, since the evocation of the church is made inwardly by the Spirit, and outwardly by the word preached, and since they who are called, answer inwardly by faith, and outwardly by the profession of faith, as they who are called have the inward and the outward man, therefore, the church, in reference to these called persons, is distinguished into the visible and the invisible church, from the subjoined external accident -- invisible, as she "believes with the heart unto righteousness," and visible, as "confession is made with her mouth unto salvation." And this visibility or invisibility belongs neither more nor less to the whole catholic church, than to each church in particular.

VIII. Then, since the church is collected out of this world, "which lieth in the wicked one," and often by ministers who, beside the word of God, preach another word, and since this church consists of men liable to be deceived and to fall, nay, of men who have been deceived and are fallen, therefore, the church is distinguished with respect to the doctrine of faith, into an orthodox and heretical church -- with respect to divine worship, into an idolatrous church, and into one that is a right worshiper of God and Christ, and with respect to the morals prescribed in the second table of the law, into a purer church or a more impure one. In all these, are also to be observed the degrees according to which one church is more heretical, idolatrous and impure than another; about all these things a correct judgment must be formed according to the Scriptures.

Thus, likewise, the word "catholic" is used concerning those churches that neither labour under any destructive heresy, nor are idolatrous.

DISPUTATION LV

ON THE POWER OF THE CHURCH IN DELIVERING DOCTRINES

I. The power of the church may be variously considered, according to various objects; for it is occupied either about the delivery of doctrines, the enactment of laws, the convening of assemblies, the appointment of ministers, or, lastly, about jurisdiction.

II. In the institution of doctrines, or in the first delivery of them, the power of the church is a mere nullity, whether she be considered generally, or according to her parts; for she is the spouse of Christ, and, therefore, is bound to hear the voice of her husband. She cannot prescribe to herself the rule of willing, believing, doing and hoping.

III. But the whole of her power, concerning doctrines, lies in the dispensation and administration of those which have been delivered by God and Christ -- necessarily previous to which is the humble and pious acceptance of the divine doctrines, the consequence of which is, that she justly preserve the name that has once been received.

IV. As the acceptance and the preservation of doctrines may be considered either according to the words, or according to the right sense, so, likewise the delivery of the doctrines received and preserved must be distinguished either with respect to the words, or with respect to their correct meaning.

V. The delivery or tradition of doctrines according to the words, is when the church declares or publishes the very words which she has received, (after they have been delivered to her by God, either in writing or orally,) without any addition, diminution, change or transposition, whether from the repositories in which she has concealed the divine writings, or from her own memory, in which she had carefully and faithfully preserved those things which had been orally delivered. At the same time, she solemnly testifies that those very things which she has received from above are [when transmitted through her] pure and unadulterated, (and is prepared even by death itself to confirm this her testimony,) as far as the variations of copies in the original languages permit a translator into other languages [thus to testify]; yet they do not concern the foundation so much as to be able to produce doubts concerning it on account of these variations.

VI. The delivery or tradition according to the meaning, is the more ample explanation and application of the doctrines propounded and comprehended in the divine words, in which explanation, the church ought to contain herself within the terms of the very word which has been delivered, publishing no particular interpretation of a doctrine or of a passage, which does not rest on the entire foundation, and which cannot be fully proved from other passages. This she will most sedulously avoid if she adhere as much as possible to the expressions of the word delivered, and if she abstain, as far as she is capable, from the use of foreign words or phrases.

VII. To this power, is annexed the right of examining and forming a judgment upon doctrines, as to the kind of spirit by which they have been proposed; in this, also she will employ the rule of the word which bears assured evidences that it is divine, and has been received as such; and indeed, they will employ the rule of this word alone, if she be desirous to institute a proper examination, and to form a correct judgment. But if she employ any human writings whatsoever, for a rule or guide, the morning light will not shine on her, and, therefore, she will grope about in darkness.

VIII. But the church ought to be guarded against three things: (1.) To hide from no one the words which have been divinely delivered to her, or to interdict any man from reading them or meditating upon them. (2.) When, for certain reasons, she declares divine doctrines with her own words, not to compel any one to receive or to approve them, except on this condition, so far as they are. consentaneous with the meaning comprehended in the divine words. (3.) And not to prohibit any man who is desirous of examining, in a legitimate manner, the doctrines proposed in the words of the church. Whichsoever of these things she does, she cannot, in that case, evade the criminal charge of having arrogated a power to herself, and of abusing it beyond all law, right and equity.

COROLLARY

It is one of the fabulous stories of the papists that the Holy Spirit assists the church in such a manner, in forming her judgment on the authentic Scriptures, and in the right interpretation of the divine meanings, that she cannot err.

DISPUTATION LVI

ON THE POWER OF THE CHURCH IN ENACTING LAWS

I. The laws which may be prescribed to the church, or which may be considered as having been prescribed, are of two kinds, distinguished from each other by a remarkable difference and by a notable doctrine -- according to the matter, that is, the acts which are prescribed -- according to the end for the sake of which they are prescribed, and, lastly, according to the force and necessity of obligation. 2. (1.) For some laws concern the very essence of ordering the life according to godliness and Christianity, and the necessary acts of faith, hope and charity; and these may be called the necessary and primary or principal laws, and are as the fundamental laws of the kingdom of God itself. (2.) But others of them have respect to certain secondary and substituted acts, and the circumstances of the principal acts, all of which conduce to the more commodious and easy observance of those first acts. On this account they deserve to be called positive and attendant laws.

III. 1. The church neither has a right, nor is she bound by any necessity, to enact necessary laws, and those which essentially concern the acts of faith itself, of hope and of charity. For this belongs most properly to God and Christ; and it has been so fully exercised by Christ, that nothing can essentially belong to the acts of faith, hope and charity, which has not been prescribed by him in a manner the most copious.

IV. The entire power, therefore, of the church is placed in enacting laws of the second kind; about the making and observing of which we must now make some observations.

V. In prescribing laws of this kind, the church ought to turn her eyes, and to keep them fixed, on the following particulars: First. That the acts which she will command or forbid be of a middle or an indifferent kind, and in their own nature neither good nor evil; and yet that they may be useful, for the commodious observance of the acts

[divinely] prescribed, according to the circumstance of persons, times and places.

VI. Secondly. That laws of this description be not adverse to the word of God, but that they rather be conformable to it, whether they be deduced from those things which are, in a general manner, prescribed in the word of God, according to the circumstances already enumerated, or whether they be considered as suitable means for executing those things which have been prescribed in the word of God.

VII. Thirdly. That these laws be principally referred to the good order and the decorous administration of the external polity of the church. For God is not the author of confusion; but he is both the author and the lover of order; and regard is in every place to be paid to decorum, but chiefly in the church, which is "the house of God,"

and in which it is exceedingly unbecoming to have any thing, or to do any thing, that is either indecorous or out of order.

VIII. Fourthly. That she do not assume to herself the authority of binding, by her laws, the consciences of men to acts prescribed by herself; for she will thus invade the right of Christ, in prescribing things necessary, and will infringe Christian liberty, which ought to be free from snares of this description.

IX. Fifthly. That, by any deed of her own, by a simple promise or by an oath, either orally or by the subscription of the hand, she do not take away from herself the power of abrogating, enlarging, diminishing or of changing the laws themselves. It would not be a useless labour if the church were to enter her protest, at the end of the laws, about the perpetual duration of this her power, in a subjoined clause, such as the civil magistrate is accustomed to employ in political positive laws.

X. But with regard to the observance of these laws; as they are already enacted, all and every one of those who are in the church are bound by them so far, that it is not lawful to transgress them through contempt, and to the scandal of others; and the church herself will not estimate the observance of them at so low a value as to permit them to be violated through contempt and to the scandal of others; but she will mark, admonish, reprove and blame such transgressors, as behaving themselves in a disorderly and indecorous manner, and she will endeavour to bring them back to a better mind.

COROLLARY

Is it not useful, for the purpose of bearing testimony to the power and the liberty of the church, occasionally to make some change in the laws ecclesiastical, lest the observance of them becoming perpetual, and without any change, should produce an opinion of the [absolute] necessity of their being observed?

DISPUTATION LVII

ON THE POWER OF THE CHURCH IN ADMINISTERING JUSTICE, OR ON

ECCLESIASTICAL DISCIPLINE

I. As no society, however rightly constituted and furnished with good laws, can long keep together unless they who belong to it be restrained within their duty by a certain method of jurisdiction or discipline, or be compelled to the performance of their duty, so, in the church, which is the house, the city and the kingdom of God, discipline of the same kind must flourish and be exercised.

II. But it is proper that this discipline be accommodated to the spiritual life, and not to that which is natural; and that it should be serviceable for edifying, confirming, amplifying and adorning the church as such, and for directing consciences, without

[employing] any force hurtful in any part to the body or to the substance, and to the condition of the animal life; unless, perhaps, it be the pleasure of the magistrate, in virtue of the power granted to him by God, to force an offender to repentance by some other method. Such a proceeding, however, we do not prejudge.

III. But ecclesiastical discipline is an act of the church, by which, according to the power instituted by God and Christ, and bestowed on her, and to be employed through a consciousness of the office imposed, she reprehends all and every one of those who belong to the church, if they have fallen into open sin, and admonishes them to repent; or, if they pertinaciously persevere in their sins, she excommunicates them, to the benefit of the whole church, the salvation of the sinner himself, to the profit of those who are without, and to the glory of God himself and Christ.

IV. The object of this discipline is all and each of those who, having been engrafted into the church by baptism, are capable of this discipline for the correction of themselves. The cause or formal condition why discipline must be exercised on them is, the offenses committed by them, whether they concern the doctrine of faith, and are pernicious and destructive heresies, or whether they have respect to morals and to the rest of the acts of the Christian life.

V. But it is requisite, that these sins be external and manifest, that is, known, and correctly known, to those by whom the discipline shall be administered; and that it be evident, that they are sins according to the laws imposed by Christ on the church, and that they have actually been committed. For God, alone, judges concerning inward sins.

VI. Let the form of administering the laws be with all kindness and discretion, also with zeal, and occasionally with severity and some degree of rigor, if occasion require it to be employed. But the intention is, the salvation of him who has sinned, and that of the whole body of the church, to the glory of God and of Christ.

VII. The execution of this discipline lies both in admonition and in castigation or punishment, or in censure, which is conveyed only in words, through reprehension, exhortation and communication, or which is given by the privation of some of those things which outwardly belong to the communion of saints, and to the saving edification or building up of every believer in the body of Christ.

VIII. Admonitions are accommodated, First, to the persons who have sinned, in which must be observed the difference of age, sex and condition, with all prudence and discretion. Secondly. They are accommodated to those sins which have been committed; for some are more grievous than others. Thirdly. To the mode in which sins have been perpetrated, which mode comes now under our special consideration.

IX. For some sins are clandestine, others are public, whether they are offenses only against God, or whether they have, in union with such offense, injury to a man's neighbour. According to this latter respect, it is called "a private sin," that is, an offense committed by one private individual against another-such as is intimated by the word of Christ, in Matt. xviii, 7-18, in which passage is likewise prescribed the mode of reproving an offense.

X. A clandestine sin is that which is secretly perpetrated, and with the commission of which very few persons are acquainted; to this belongs a secret reprehension, to be inflicted by those who are acquainted with it. One of the principal ministers of the church, however, will be able to impart authority to the reprehension; yet he can, by no means, refer it to his colleagues; but it will be his duty to deliver this reproof in secret.

XI. A public sin is that which is committed when several people are acquainted with it. We allow it to be made a subject of discussion, whether a sin ought to receive the appellation of a public one, when it has been secretly committed but has become known to many persons either through the fault of him who perpetrated it, or through the officiousness of those who divulged it without necessity.

XII. But there is still some difference in public sins; for they are known either to some part of the church, or to the whole, or nearly to the whole of it; according to this difference, the admonition to be given ought to be varied. If the sin be known to part of the church, it is sufficient that the sinner be admonished and reproved before the consistory, or in the presence of more persons to whom it had been known. If it be known to the whole church, the sinner must be reprehended before all the members; for this practice conduces both to the shame of him who has sinned, and to deter others from sinning after his example. Some consideration, however, may be had to the shame of any offender, and a degree of moderation be shown; that is, if he is not deeply versed in sinful practices, but if a sin has taken him by surprise, or "he is overtaken in a fault."

XIII. As this reproof has the tendency to induce the offender to desist from sinning, if this end is not obtained by the first admonition, it is necessary to repeat it occasionally, until the sinner stands corrected, or makes an open declaration of his contumacy. But some difference of opinion exists on this point among divines: "Is it useful to bring an offender to punishment, when, after having afforded hopes of amendment, he does not fulfill those hopes according to the judgment and the wishes of the church?" But it does not seem possible to determine this so much by settled rules, as by leaving the matter to the discretion of the governors of the church.

XIV. But if the offender despise all admonitions, and contumaciously perseveres in his sins, after the church has exercised the necessary patience towards him, she must proceed to punishment; which is excommunication, that is, the exclusion of the contumacious person from the holy communion and even from the church herself.

This public exclusion will be accompanied by the avoidance of all intercourse and familiarity with the person excommunicated, to [the observance of] which, each member of the church must pay attention as far as is permitted by the necessary relative duties which either all the members owe to him according to their general vocation, or some of them owe according to their particular obligation. [For a subject is not freed from his obligation toward his prince, on account of the excommunication of the prince; neither, in such circumstances, is a wife freed from the duty which she is bound to perform to her husband; nor are children freed from their duty to parents; and thus in other similar instances.]

XV. Some persons suppose, that this excommunication is solely from the privilege of celebrating the Lord's supper. Others suppose it to be of two kinds, the less and the greater -- the less being a partial exclusion from attendance on some of the sacred offices of the church -- the greater, an exclusion from all of them together, and totally from the communion of believers. But others, rejecting the minor excommunication, acknowledge no other than the major; because it appears to them, that there is no cause why a contumacious sinner ought to be rejected from this communion more than from that, since he has rendered himself unworthy to obtain any place in the church and the assembly of saints. We do not interpose our opinion; but we leave this matter to be discussed by the judgment of learned and pious men, that by common consent it may be concluded from the Scriptures what is most agreeable to them, and best suited to the edification of the church.

COROLLARIES

Excommunication must be avoided, where a manifest fear of a schism exists.

"Should not this also be done, where a fear exists of persecution being likely to ensue on account of excommunication?" We think, that, in this case, likewise, excommunication should be avoided.

DISPUTATION LVIII

ON COUNCILS

I. An ecclesiastical council is an assembly of men gathered together in the name of God, consulting and defining or settling, according to the word of God, about those things which pertain to religion and the good of the church, for the glory of God and the salvation of the church.

II. The power of appointing an assembly of this kind resides in the church herself. If she is under the sway of a Christian magistrate, who makes an open profession of religion, or who publicly tolerates it, then we transfer this power to such a magistrate, without whose convocation, those persons that protested to the church concerning the nullity of the Council of Trent have maintained that a council is illegitimate. But if the magistrate is neither a believer, nor publicly tolerates religion, but is an enemy and a persecutor, then those who preside in the church will discharge that office.

III. An occasion will be afforded for convening an assembly of this kind, either by some evil men who are an annoyance to the church, whether they be in the church or out of it, or even the perpetual constitution of the church so long as she continues on earth. For as she is liable to error, corruption, and defection from the truth of doctrine, from the purity of divine worship, from moral probity and from Christian concord, to heresies, idolatry, corruption of manners, and schisms, it is useful for assemblies of this kind to be instituted. Yet may they be instituted, not only to correct any corruption if it manifestly appears that it has entered, but likewise to inquire whether something of the kind has not entered; because the enemy sows tares while the men sleep, to whom is entrusted the safe custody of the Lord's field.

IV. We say that this is an assembly of men; for, "Let a woman. keep silence in the church, unless she has an extraordinary and divine call; and we say, these men ought to be distinguished by the following marks: First. That they be powerful in the Scriptures, and have their senses exercised in them. Secondly. That they be pious, grave, prudent, moderate, and-lovers of divine truth and of the peace of the church.

Thirdly. That they be free, and bound down to no person, church, or confession written by men, but only to God and Christ, and to his word.

V. They are men, whether of the ecclesiastical or of the political class -- in the first place, the supreme magistrate himself, and those persons who discharge any public office in the church and the republic. Then, also, private individuals, even those persons not being excluded who maintain some other [doctrine] than that which is the current opinion, provided they be furnished with the endowments which I have described. (Thesis 4.) And we are of opinion that such persons may deliver not only a deliberative but likewise a decisive sentence.

VI. The object about which the council will be engaged is, the things appertaining to religion and to the good of the church as such. These are comprised under two chief heads-the primary, comprehending the doctrine, itself, of faith, hope, and charity, and the secondary, the order and polity of the church.

VII. The rule, according to which deliberation must be instituted, and decision must be formed, is that single and sole one -- the word of God, who holds absolute dominion in the church. But in things which belong to the good order and eutaxian the discipline of the church, it is allowable for the members attentively to consider the present state of the commonwealth and of the church, and to exercise deliberation and form decisions according to the circumstances of places, times and persons, provided one thing be guarded against-to determine nothing contrary to the word of God.

VIII. But, because all things in assemblies of this kind ought to be done in order, it is requisite that some one preside over the whole council. If the chief magistrate be present, this office belongs to him; but he can devolve this charge on some other person, whether an ecclesiastic or layman; nay, he may commit this matter to the council itself, provided he take care that all and each of the members be restrained within the bounds of their duty, lest their judgments be concluded in a tumultuous manner. But it is useful that some bishop be appointed, who may perform the offices of prayer and thanksgiving, may propose the business to be transacted, and may inquire and collect the opinions and votes; indeed, so far, he, as an ecclesiastic, is the more suitable for fulfilling these duties.

IX. A place must be appointed for assemblies of this kind, that they may be most commodious to all those who shall come to the synod, unless it be the pleasure of the chief magistrate to choose that place which will be the most convenient to himself. It ought to be a place secure from ambuscade or hostile surprise; and a safe conduct is necessary for all persons, that they may arrive and depart again, without personal detriment, as far as is allowable by the law of God itself, against which the authority of no council, however great, is of the least avail.

X. The authority of councils is not absolute, but dependent on the authority of God; for this reason, no one is simply bound to assent to those things which have been decreed in a council, unless those persons be present, as members, who cannot err, and who have the undoubted marks and testimonies of the Holy Spirit to this fact. But every one may, nay, he is bound, to examine, by the word of God, those things which have been concluded in the council; and if he finds them to be agreeable to the divine word, then he may approve of them; but if they are not, then he may express his disapprobation. Yet he must be cautious not easily to reject that which has been determined by the unanimous consent of so many pious and learned men; but he ought diligently to consider, whether it has the Scriptures pronouncing in favour of it with sufficient clearness; and when this is the case, he may yield his assent, in the Lord, to their unanimous agreement.

XI. The necessity of councils is not absolute, because the church can be instructed respecting necessary things without them. Yet their utility is very great, if, being instituted in the name of the Lord, they examine all things according to his word, and appoint that which, by common consent, according to that rule, the members have thought proper to pronounce as their decision. For, as many eyes see more than one eye, and as the Lord is accustomed to listen to the prayers of a number who agree together among themselves on earth, it is more probable that the truth will be discovered and confirmed from the Scriptures by some council consisting of many learned and pious men, than by the exertions of a single individual transacting the same business privately by himself. From these premises, we also say that the authority of any council is greater than that of any man who is present at such council, even that of the Roman pontiff, to whom we ascribe no other right in any council, than that which we give to any bishop, even at the time when he performed with fidelity the duties of a true bishop. So far, are we disinclined to believe, that no council can be convened and held without his command, presidency and direction.

XIII. No council can prescribe to its successors, that they may not again deliberate about that which has been transacted and determined in preceding councils; because the matter of religion does not come under the denomination of a thing that is prejudged; neither can any council bind itself, by an oath, to the observance of any other word than that of God; much less can it make positive laws, to which it may bind either itself, or any man, by an oath.

XIV. It is also allowable for a later ecumenical or general council to call in doubt that which had been decreed by a preceding general council, because it is possible even for general councils to err; nor yet does it follow from these premises that the catholic church errs; that is, that all the faithful universally err.

DISPUTATION LIX

ON THE ECCLESIASTICAL MINISTRATIONS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

AND ON THE VOCATION TO THEM

I. By The word "ministry," we designate a public auxiliary office or duty, subservient to a superior, who, in this instance, is God and Christ as he is the Lord and Head of the church. It receives the appellation of "ecclesiastical" from its object, which is the church; and we distinguish it from a political ministry, which exercises itself in the civil affairs of the commonwealth.

II. But it is the public duty which God has committed to certain men, to collect a church, to attend to it when collected, and to bring it to Christ, its Head, and through him to God, that [the members of] it may attain a life of happiness, to the glory of God and Christ.

III. But as a church consists of men who live a natural life, and are called to live while in the body, a spiritual life, which is superior and ought to be as the end of the other, there is a two-fold office to be performed in the church according to the exigencies both of the natural and of the spiritual life: The First is that which is properly, per se, and immediately occupied about the spiritual life, its commencement, progress and confirmation; the Second is that by which the natural life is sustained, and, therefore, it belongs, only by accident and mediately, to the church. The First is always necessary per se. The Second is not necessary [in the church] except by hypothesis; because there are those who need a maintenance from others, and they do not obtain this through some order established in the community, in which case, it ought always to endure; but where any such order is established, it is unnecessary. On the former of these we are now treating; about the latter we have no further remarks to make.

IV. The office accommodated to the spiritual life, consists of these three acts: The First is the teaching of the truth which is according to godliness; the Second is intercession before God; the Third is regimen or government accommodated to this institution or teaching.

V. Institution or teaching consists in the proposing, explanation and confirmation of the truth, which contains the things that are to be believed, hoped for, and performed, in the refutation of falsehood, in exhortation, reprehension, consolation, and threatening, all of which is accomplished by the word both of the law and the gospel.

To this function, we add the administration of the sacraments, which serve for the same purpose.

VI. Intercession consists in prayers and Thanksgivings offered to God for the church and each of its members, through Christ our only advocate and intercessor.

VII. The government of the church is used for this end, that, in the whole church, all things may be done decently, in order, and to edification; and that each of its members may be kept in their duty, the loiterers may be incited, the weak confirmed, those who have wandered out of the way brought back, the contumacious punished, and the penitents received.

VIII. These offices are not always imposed in the same mode, nor administered by the same methods. For, at the commencement of the rising Christian church, they were imposed on some men immediately by God and Christ, and they were administered by those on whom they had been imposed, without binding them to certain churches; hence, also, the apostles were called "ministers," as being the ambassadors of Christ to every creature throughout the world. To these were added the evangelists, as fellow-labourers. Afterwards [the same offices were imposed] immediately on those who were called pastors and teachers, bishops and priests, and who were placed over certain churches. The former of these [the apostles and evangelists] continued only for a season, and had no successors. The latter [pastors, &c.] will remain in perpetual succession to the end of the world, though we do not deny that, when a church is first to be collected for any one, a man may traverse the whole earth in teaching.

IX. These offices are so ordered, that one person can discharge all of them at the same time; though, if the utility of the church and the diversity of gifts so require, they can be variously distributed among different men.

X. The vocation to such ecclesiastical offices is either immediate or mediate.

Immediate vocation we will not now discuss. But that which is mediate is a divine act, administered by God and Christ through the church, by which he consecrates to himself a man separated from the occupations of the natural life and from those which are common, and removes him to the duties of the pastoral office, for the salvation of men and his own glory. In this vocation, we ought to consider the vocation itself, its efficient and its object.

XI. The act of vocation consists of previous examination, election, and confirmation.

(1.) Examination is a diligent inquiry and trial, whether the person about whom it is occupied be well suited for fulfilling the duties of the office. This fitness consists in the knowledge and approval of things true and necessary, in probity of life, and a facility of communicating to others those things which he knows himself, (which facility contains language and freedom in speaking,) in prudence, moderation of mind, patient endurance of labours, infirmities, injuries, &c.

XII. Election, or choice, is the ordination of a person who is legitimately examined and found good and proper, by which is imposed on him the office to be discharged.

To this, it is not unusual to add some public inauguration, by prayers and the laying on of hands, and also by previous fasting and is like an admission to the administration of the office itself, which is commonly denominated "confirmation."

XIII. The primary efficient is God and Christ, and the Spirit of both as conducting the cause of Christ in the church, on which cause the whole authority of the vocation depends. The administrator is the church itself, in which we number the Christian magistrate, teachers, with the rest of the presbyters, and the people themselves. But in those places in which no magistrate resides who is willing to attend to this matter, there, bishops or presbyters, with the people, can and ought to perform this business.

XIV. The object is the person to be called, in whom is required, for the sake of the church, that aptitude or suitableness about which we have already spoken, and on account of it, the testimony of a good conscience, by which he modestly approves the judgment of the church, and is conscious to himself that he enters on this office in the sincere fear of God, and with an intense desire only to edify the church.

XV. The essential form of the vocation is that all things may be done according to the rule prescribed in the word of God. The accidental is, that they may all be done decently and suitably, according to the particular relations of persons, places, times, and other circumstances.

XVI. Wheresoever all these conditions are observed, the call is legitimate, and on every part approved; but if some one be deficient, the act of vocation is then imperfect; yet the call is to be considered as ratified and firm, while the vocation of God is united by some outward testimony of it, which, because it is various, we cannot define

COROLLARY

The vocations or calls in the papal church have not been null, though contaminated and imperfect; and the first reformers had an ordinary and mediate call.

DISPUTATION LX

ON SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL

We have thus far treated on the church, her power, and the ministry of the word; it follows that we now discuss those signs or marks which God appends to his word, and by which He seals and confirms the faith which has been produced in the minds of his covenant people. For these signs are commonly called "sacraments" -- a term, indeed, which is not employed in the Scriptures, but which, account of the agreement about it in the church, must not be rejected.

I. But this word, "sacrament," is transferred from military usage to that of sacred things; for, as soldiers were devoted to their general by an oath, as by a solemn attestation, so, likewise, those in covenant are bound to Christ by their reception of these signs, as by a public oath. But because the same word is either taken in a relative acceptation, (and this either properly for a sign, or by metonymy for the thing signified,) or in an absolute acceptation, (and this by synecdoche for both,) we will treat about its proper signification.

II. A sacrament, therefore, is a sacred and visible sign or token and seal instituted by God, by which he ratifies to his covenant people the gracious promise proposed in his word, and binds them, on the other hand, to the performance of their duty. Therefore, no other promises are proposed to us by these signs than those which are manifested in the word.

III. We call it "a sign or token, and a seal, both from the usage of Scripture in Gen.

xvii, 11, and Rom. iv, 11, and from the nature of the thing itself, because these tokens, beside the external appearance which they present to our senses, cause something else to occur to the thoughts. Neither are they only naked significant tokens, but seals and pledges, which affect not only the mind, but likewise the heart itself.

IV. We call it "sacred" in a two-fold respect: (1.) Because it has been given by God; and (2.) Because it is given to a sacred use. We call it "visible," because it is of the nature of a sign that it be perceptible to the senses; for that which is not such, cannot be called a sign.

V. The author of these signs is God, who alone, is the lord and lawgiver of the church, and whose province it is to prescribe laws, to make promises, and to seal them with those tokens which have seemed good to himself; yet they are so accommodated to the grace to be sealed, as, by a certain analogy, to be significant of it. Therefore, they are not natural signs, which, from their own nature, signify all that of which they are significant; but they are voluntary signs, the whole signification of which depends on the will or option of him who institutes them.

VI. The matter is the external element itself created by God, and, therefore, subject to his power, and made suitable to seal that which, according to his wisdom, God wills to be sealed by it.

VII. As the internal form of the sacrament is ek twn prov ti of things to their relation, it consists in relation, and is that suitable analogy and similitude between the sign and the thing signified which has regard both to the representation, and to the sealing or witnessing, and the exhibition of the thing signified through the authority and the will of him who institutes it. From this most close analogy of the sign with the thing signified, various figurative expressions are employed in the Scriptures and in the sacraments: as, when the name of the thing signified is ascribed to the sign, thus,

"And my covenant shall be in your flesh;" (Gen. xvii, 13; ) and, on the contrary, in 1

Corinthians v, 7, "Christ, our passover, is sacrificed for us." Or, when the property of the thing is ascribed to the sign, as "Whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall never thirst." (John iv, 14. ) And, on the contrary, "Take, eat: this is my body." (Matt. xxvi, 26.)

VIII. The end of sacraments is two-fold, proximate and remote. The proximate end is the sealing of the promise made in the covenant. The remote end is, (1.) the confirmation of the faith of those who are in the covenant, and by consequence the salvation of the church that consists of those covenanted members; and (2.) the glory of God.

IX. Those for whom the sacraments have been instituted by God, and by whom they are to be used, are those with whom God has entered into covenant, all of them, and they only. To them the use of the sacraments is to be conceded, as long as they are reckoned by God in the number of those who are in covenant; though by their sins they have deserved to be cast off and divorced.

X. But these sacraments are to be considered according to the varied conditions of men; for they have either been instituted before the fall, and are of the covenant of works; or, after the fall, and are of the covenant of grace. There was only a single sacrament of the covenant of works, and that the tree of life. Those of the covenant of grace are either so far as they have regard to the promised covenant, and belong to the church while yet in her infancy and placed under pedagogy [the law being her schoolmaster] as were those of circumcision and of the passover; or so far as now they have regard to the covenant confirmed, and belong to the Christian church that is of adult age, as are those of baptism and the Lord's supper. The points of agreement and difference between each of these will be the more conveniently perceived in the discussion of each.

COROLLARY

Though in some things, sacrifices and sacraments agree together, yet they are by no means to be confounded; because in many respects the latter differ from the former.

DISPUTATION LXI

ON THE SACRAMENTS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, THE TREE OF LIFE,

CIRCUMCISION, AND THE PASCHAL LAMB

I. The tree of life was created and instituted by God for this end -- that man, as long as he remained obedient to the divine law, might eat of its fruit, both for the preservation and continuance of this natural life against every defect which could happen to it through old age, or any other cause, and to designate or point out the promise of a better and more blissful life. It answered the former purpose, as an element created by God; and the latter, as a sacrament instituted by God. It was adapted to accomplish the former purpose by the natural force and capability which was imparted to it; it was fitted for the latter, on account of the similitude and analogy which subsist between natural and spiritual life.

II. Circumcision is the sign of the covenant into which God entered with Abraham to seal or witness the promise about the blessed seed that should be born of him, about all nations which were to be blessed in him, and about constituting him the father of many nations, and the heir of the world through the righteousness of faith; and that God was willing to be his God and the God of his seed after him. This sign was to be administered in that member which is the ordained instrument of generation in the male sex, by a suitable analogy between the sign and the thing signified.

III. By that sign all the male descendants from Abraham, were, at the express command of God, to be marked, on the eighth day after their nativity; and a threatening was added, that it should come to pass that the soul of him who was not circumcised on that day should be cut off from his people.

IV. But though females were not circumcised in their bodies, yet they were in the mean time partakers of the same covenant and obligation, because they were reckoned among the men, and were considered by God as circumcised. It, therefore, was not necessary that God should institute any other remedy for taking away from females the native corruption of sin, as the papists have the audacity to affirm, beyond and contrary to the Scriptures.

V. And this is the first relation of circumcision belonging to the promise. The other is, that the persons circumcised were bound to the observance of the whole law, delivered by God, and especially of the ceremonial law. For it was in the power of God to prescribe, to those who were in covenant with him, a law at his pleasure, and to seal the obligation of its observance by such a sign of the covenant as had been previously instituted and employed; and in this respect circumcision belongs to the Old Testament.

VI. The paschal lamb was a sacrament, instituted by God to point out the deliverance from Egypt, and to renew the remembrance of it at a stated time in each year.

VII. Beside this use, it served typically to adumbrate Christ, the true Lamb, who was to endure and bear away the sins of the world; on which account, also, its use was abrogated by the sufferings and [the sacrifice of Christ on the cross, as it relates to the right; but it was afterwards, in fact and reality, abrogated with the destruction of the city and the temple.

VIII. The sacrament of the tree of life was a bloodless one; in the other two, there was shedding of blood -- both suitable to the diversity of the state of those who were in covenant with God. For the former was instituted before the entrance of sin into the world; but the two latter, after sin had entered, which, according to the decree of God, is not expiated except by blood; because the wages of sin is death, and natural life, according to the Scriptures, has its seat in the blood.

IX. The passage under the cloud and through the sea, manna, and the water which gushed from the rock, were sacramental signs; but they were extraordinary, and as a sort of prelude to the sacraments of the New Testament, although of a signification and testification the most obscure, since the things signified and witnessed by them were not declared in express words.

COROLLARIES

I. It is probable that the church, from the primitive promise and reparation after the fall, until the times of Abraham, had her sacraments, though no express mention is made of them in the Scriptures.

II. It would be an act of too great boldness to affirm what those sacraments were; yet if any one should say, that the first of them was the offering of the infant recently born before the Lord, on the very day on which the mother was purified from childbearing, and that another was, the eating of sacrifices and the sprinkling of the blood of the victims; his assertion would not be utterly devoid of probability.

DISPUTATION LXII

ON THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT IN GENERAL

I. The sacraments of the New Testament are those which have been instituted for giving testimony to the covenant, or the New Testament confirmed by the death and blood of its mediator and testator.

II. Wherefore, it was necessary that they should be such as were adapted to give significance and testimony to the confirmation already made; that is, that they should declare and testify that the blood had been shed, and that the death of the mediator had intervened.

III. There ought, therefore, to be no shedding of blood in the sacraments of the New Testament; neither ought they to consist of any such thing as is or has been partaker of the life which is in the blood; for as sin has now been expiated, and remission fully obtained through the blood and death of the mediator, no further shedding of blood was necessary.

IV. But they were to be instituted before the confirmation of the new covenant was made by the blood of the mediator and the death of the testator himself; both because the institution and the sealing o! the testament ought to precede even the death of the testator; and because the mediator himself ought to be a partaker of these sacraments, to consecrate them in his own person, and more strongly to seal the covenant which is between us and him.

V. But as the communion of a sacrifice unto death, offered for sins, is signified and testified by nothing more appropriately than by the sprinkling of the blood and the eating of the sacrifice itself and the drinking of the blood, (if indeed it were allowable to drink blood,) hence, likewise, no signs were more appropriate than water, bread and wine, since the sprinkling of his very blood and the eating of his body could not be done, and, besides, the drinking of his blood ought not to be done.

VI. The virtue and efficacy of the sacraments of the New Testament do not go beyond the act of signifying and testifying. There can neither actually be, nor be imagined, any exhibition of the thing signified through them, except such as is completed by these intermediate acts themselves.

VII. And, therefore, the sacraments of the New Testament do not differ from those used in the Old Testament; because the former exhibit grace, but the latter typify or prefigure it.

VIII. The sacraments of the New Testament have not the ratio of sacraments beyond that very use for the sake of which they were instituted, nor do they profit those who use them without faith and repentance; that is, those persons who are of adult age, and of whom faith and repentance are required. Respecting infants, the judgment is different, to whom it is sufficient that they are the offspring of believing parents, that they may be reckoned in the covenant.

IX. The sacraments of the New Testament have been instituted, that they may endure to the end of time; and they will endure till the end of all things.

COROLLARY

The diversity of sects in the Christian religion does not excuse the omission of the use of the sacraments, though the vehemence of the leaders of any sect may afford a legitimate and sufficient cause to the people to abstain justly and without sin from the use of the sacraments of which such men have to become partakers with them.

DISPUTATION LXIII

ON BAPTISM AND PAEDO-BAPTISM

I. Baptism is the initial sacrament of the New Testament, by which the covenant people of God are sprinkled with water, by a minister of the church, in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost -- to signify and to testify the spiritual ablution which is effected by the blood and Spirit of Christ. By this sacrament, those who are baptized to God the Father, and are consecrated to his Son by the Holy Spirit as a peculiar treasure, may have communion with both of them, and serve God all the days of their life.

II. The author of the institution is God the Father, in his Son, the mediator of the New Testament, by the eternal Spirit of both. The first administrator of it was John; but Christ was the confirmer, both by receiving it from John, and by afterwards administering it through his disciples.

III. But as baptism is two-fold with respect to the sign and the thing signified -- one being of water, the other of blood and of the Spirit -- the first external, the second internal; so the matter and form ought also to be two-fold -- the external and earthy of the external baptism, the internal and heavenly of that which is internal.

IV. The matter of external baptism is elementary water, suitable, according to nature, to purify that which is unclean. Hence, it is also suitable for the service of God to typify and witness the blood and the Spirit of Christ; and this blood and the Spirit of Christ is the thing signified in outward baptism, and the matter of that which is inward. But the application both of the blood and the Spirit of Christ, and the effect of both, are the thing signified by the application of this water, and the effect of the application.

V. The form of external baptism is that ordained administration, according to the institution of God, which consists of these two things: (1.) That he who is baptized, be sprinkled with this water. (2.) That this sprinkling be made in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Analogous to this, is the inward sprinkling and communication both of the blood and the Spirit of Christ, which is done by Christ alone, and which may be called "the internal form of inward baptism."

VI. The primary end of baptism is, that it may be a confirmation and sealing of the communication of grace in Christ, according to the new covenant, into which God the Father has entered with us in and on account of Christ. The secondary end is, that it may be the symbol of our initiation into the visible church, and an express mark of the obligation by which we have been bound to God the Father, and to Christ our Lord.

VII. The object of this baptism is not real, but only personal; that is, all the covenanted people of God, whether they be adults or infants, provided the infants be born of parents who are themselves in the covenant, or if one of their parents be among the covenanted people of God, both because ablution in the blood of Christ has been promised to them; and because by the Spirit of Christ they are engrafted into the body of Christ.

VIII. Because this baptism is an initiatory sacrament, it must be frequently repeated; because it is a sacrament of the New Testament, it must not be changed, but will continue to the end of the world; and because it is a sign confirming the promise, and sealing it, it is unwisely asserted that, through it, grace is conferred; that is, by some other act of conferring than that which is done through typifying and sealing: For grace cannot be immediately conferred by water.

DISPUTATION LXIV

ON THE LORD'S SUPPER

I. As in the preceding disputation, we have treated on baptism, the sacrament of initiation, it follows that we now discuss the Lord's supper, which is the sacrament of confirmation.

II. We define it thus: The Lord's supper is a sacrament of the New Testament immediately instituted by Christ for the use of the church to the end of time, in which, by the legitimate external distribution, taking, and enjoyment of bread and wine, the Lord's death is announced, and the inward receiving and enjoyment of the body and blood of Christ are signified; and that most intimate and close union or fellowship, by which we are joined to Christ our Head, is sealed and confirmed on account of the institution of Christ, and the analogical relation of the sign to the thing signified. But by this, believers profess their gratitude and obligation to God, communion among themselves, and a marked difference from all other persons.

III. We constitute Christ the author of this sacrament; for he alone is constituted, by the Father, the Lord and Head of the church, possessing the right of instituting sacraments, and of efficaciously performing this very thing which is signified and sealed by the sacraments.

IV. The matter is, bread and wine; which, with regard to their essence, are not changed, but remain what they previously were; neither are they, with regard to place, joined together with the body or blood, so that the body is either in, under, or with the bread, &c.; nor in the use of the Lord's Supper can the bread and wine be separated, that, when the bread is held out to the laity, the cup be not denied to them.

V. We lay down the form in the relation and the most strict union, which exist between the signs and the thing signified, and the reference of both to those believers who communicate, and by which they are made by analogy and similitude something united. From this conjunction of relation, arises a two-fold use of signs in this sacrament of the Lord's supper -- the first, that these signs are representative -- the second, that, while representing, they seal Christ to us with his benefits.

VI. The end is two-fold: The first is, that our faith should be more and more strengthened towards the promise of grace which has been given by God, and concerning the truth and certainty of our being engrafted into Christ. The second is, (1.) that believers may, by the remembrance of the death of Christ, testify their gratitude and obligation to God; (2.) that they may cultivate charity among themselves; and (3.) that by this mark they may be distinguished from unbelievers.

DISPUTATION LXV

ON THE POPISH MASS

I. Omitting the various significations of the word "Mass" which may be adduced, we consider, on this occasion, that which the papists declare to be the external and properly called "expiatory sacrifice," in which the sacrificers offer Christ to his Father in behalf of the living and the dead, and which they affirm to have been celebrated and instituted by Christ himself when he celebrated and instituted his last supper.

II. First. We say, this sacrifice is falsely ascribed to the institution of the Lord's supper; for Christ did not institute a sacrifice, but a sacrament, which is apparent from the institution itself, in which we are not commanded to offer any thing to God, at least nothing external. Yet we grant, that in the Lord's supper, as in all acts, is commanded, or ought to exist, that internal sacrifice by which believers offer to God prayers, praises and thanksgiving. In this view, the Lord's supper is called "the eucharist."

III. Secondly. To this sacrifice are opposed the nature, truth and excellence of the sacrifice of Christ. For, as the sacrifice of Christ is single, expiatory, perfect, and of infinite value; and as Christ was once offered, and "hath by that one oblation perfected for ever them who were once sanctified," as the Scriptures testify, undoubtedly no place has been left either for any other sacrifice, or for a repetition of this sacrifice of Christ.

IV. Thirdly. Besides, it is wrong to suppose that Christ can be or ought to be offered by men, or by any other person than by himself; for he, alone, is both the victim and the priest, as being the only one who is truly "holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners."

V. From all these particulars it is sufficiently apparent, that it is not necessary, nay, that it is impious, for any expiatory sacrifice now to be offered by men for the living and the dead. Besides, it is a piece of foolish ignorance, to suppose either that the dead require some oblation; or that they can by it obtain remission of sins, who have not obtained pardon before death.

VI. In addition to these three enormous errors committed in the mass, with respect to the sacrifice, to the priest, and to those for whom the sacrifice is offered, there is a fourth, which is one of the greatest turpitude of all, and is committed in conjunction with idolatry -- that this very sacrifice is adored by him who offers it, and by those for whom it is offered, and is carried about in solemn pomp.

COROLLARY

In these words, "the mass is an expiatory, representative and commemorative sacrifice," there is an opposition in the apposition and a manifest contradiction.

DISPUTATION LXVI

ON THE FIVE FALSE SACRAMENTS

I. As three things are necessarily required to constitute the essence of a sacrament -that is, divine institution, an outward and visible sign, and a promise of the invisible grace which belongs to eternal salvation -- it follows that the thing which is deficient in one of these requisites, or in which one of them is wanting, cannot come under the denomination of a sacrament.

II. Therefore popish confirmation is not a sacrament, though the external signing of the cross in the forehead of the Christian, and the unction of the chrism, are employed; for these signs have not been instituted by Christ; neither have they been sanctified to typify or to seal any thing of saving grace; nor is promised grace annexed to the use or to the reception of these signs.

III. Penitence, indeed, is an act prescribed, by the Lord, to all who have fallen into sin, and has the promise of remission of sins. But because there does not exist in it, through the divine command, any external sign, by which grace is intimated and sealed, it cannot, on this account, receive the appellation of "a sacrament." For the act of a priest, absolving a penitent, belongs to the announcement of the gospel; as does likewise the injunction of those works which are inaccurately styled by the papists satisfactory, that is, fasting, prayers, alms, afflicting the soul, &c.

IV. That is called extreme unction, by the papists, which is bestowed on none except on those who are in their last moments; but it has then not the least power or virtue; nor was it ever instituted by Christ to signify the premise of spiritual grace. It cannot, therefore, obtain the appellation of "a sacrament."

V. Neither can the order or institution, confirmation or inauguration of any person to the official discharge of some ecclesiastical duties, come under the denomination of a sacrament -- both because it belongs to the particular and public vocation of some persons in the church, and not to the general vocation of all; and because, though it may have been instituted by Christ, yet, whatever external signs may be employed in it, they do not belong to the sealing of that grace which makes a man agreeable [to God] or which is saving, but only to that which is freely given, as they say by way of distinction.

VI. Though matrimony between a husband and wife agree by a certain similitude with the spiritual espousals subsisting between Christ and the church; yet it was neither instituted by the Lord for signifying this, nor has it any promise of spiritual grace annexed to it.

DISPUTATION LXVII

ON THE WORSHIP OF GOD IN GENERAL

I. The first part of our duty to God and Christ was, the true meaning concerning God and Christ, or true faith in God and Christ; the second part is, the right worship to be rendered to both of them.

II. This part receives various appellations. Among the Hebrews, it is called h r w k [

and µ y h w l a t a d y the honour or worship, and the fear of God. Among the Greek, it is called Eusebeia piety; Qesebeia godliness, or a worshipping of God; Qrhskeia religion; Latreia service rendered to God; Douleia religious homage; Qerapeia divine worship; Timh honour; Fobov fear; Agaph tou Qeou the love of God. Among the Romans it is called, pietas, cultus or cultura dei, veneratio, honos, observantia.

III. It may be generally defined to be an observance which must be yielded to God and Christ from a true faith, a good conscience, and from charity unfeigned, according to the will of God which has been manifested and made known to us, to the glory of both of them, to the salvation of the worshiper, and the edification of others.

IV. We express the genus by the word "observance," because it contains the express intention of our mind and of our will to God and to his will, which intention partly inspires life into this portion of our duty towards God.

V. The object is the same as that of the whole of religion, and of the first part of it, which is faith; and this object is God and Christ, in which the same formal reasons come under consideration, as those which we explained when treating generally on religion.

VI. In the efficient or the worshiper, whom we declare to be a Christian man, we require true faith in God and Christ, a good conscience, as having been sanctified and purified through faith by the blood and Spirit of Christ, and a sincere charity; for, without these, no worship which is rendered to God can be grateful and acceptable to him.

VII. The matter is, those particular acts in which the worship of God consists; but the very will and command of God gives form to it; for it is not the will of God to be worshipped at the option of a creature, but according to the pleasure and prescript of his own will.

VIII. The principal end is, the glory of God and Christ. The less principal is the salvation of the worshiper, and the edification of others, both that they may be won over to Christ, and that, having been brought to Christ, they may the more increase and grow in devotedness.

IX. The form is the observance itself, which is framed from the suitable agreement of all these things to the dignity, excellence and merits of the object that is to be worshipped -- from such a disposition of the worshiper according to such prescript, and from the intention of this end. If one of these be wanting the observance is vitiated, and is, therefore, displeasing to God.

X. Yet the worship which is prescribed by God must not, on this account, be omitted, though the man, to whom it is prescribed, cannot yet perform it, from such a mind, to this end.

DISPUTATION LXVIII

ON THE PRECEPTS OF DIVINE WORSHIP IN GENERAL

I. To those who are about to treat on the worship of God, the most commodious way and method seems to be this -- to follow the order of the commands of God in which this worship is prescribed, and to consider all and each of them. For they instruct and inform the worshiper, and they prescribe the matter, form and end of the worship.

II. In the precepts which prescribe the worship of God, three things come generally under consideration: (1.) Their foundation, on which rest the right and authority of him who commands, and the equity of his command. (2.) The command itself. (3.) The sanction, through promises and threatenings. The first of these may be called "the preface to the command;" the third, "the appendix to it;" and the second is the very essence of the precept.

III. The foundation or preface, containing the authority of Him who commands, and, through this, the equity of the precept, is the common foundation of all religion, and, on this account, also, it is the foundation of faith; for instance, "I am the Lord thy God," &c. "I, the God omnipotent or all sufficient, will be thy very great reward."I am thy God, and the God of thy seed." From these expressions, not only may this conclusion be drawn -- "Therefore shalt thou love the Lord thy God,"Therefore walk before me, and be thou perfect" -- but likewise the following: "Therefore believe thou in me." But we must not treat on this subject on this occasion, as it has been discussed in the preceding pages.

IV. I say that the other two are, the precept, and the sanction or appendix of the precept. For we must suppose that there are two parts of a precept, the first of which requires the performance or the omission of an act, and the second demands punishment. But we must consider that the latter part, which is called "the appendix,"

serves for this purpose, that, in the former, God enjoys the thing which he desired, dispensing blessings if he obtain his desire, and inflicting punishments if he does not obtain it.

V. With regard to the precepts, before we come to each of them, we must first look generally at that which comes under consideration in every precept.

VI. In the first place, the object of every precept is two- fold, the one formal, the other material; or the first formally required, the second materially,. Of these, the former is uniform in all circumstances and in every precept, but the latter is different or distinguishable.

VII. The formal object, or that which is formally required, is pure obedience itself without respect of the particular thing or act in which, or about which, obedience must be performed. And we may be allowed to call such obedience "blind," with this exception, that it is preceded solely by the knowledge by which a man knows that this very thing had been prescribed by God.

VIII. The material object, or that which is materially required, is the special or particular act itself, in the performance or omission of which obedience lies.

IX. From the formal object, it is deduced that the act in which it is the will of God that obedience be yielded to him by its performance, is of such a nature that there is something in man which is abhorrent from its performance; and that the act, the omission of which is commanded by God, is of such a nature that there is something in man which is inclined to perform it. If it were otherwise, neither the performance of the former, nor the omission of the latter, could be called "obedience."

X. From these premises, it further follows that the performance and the omission of this act proceed from a cause which overcomes and restrains the nature of man, that is inclined towards the forbidden act, and is abhorrent from that which is prescribed.

DISPUTATION LXIX

ON OBEDIENCE, THE FORMAL OBJECT OF ALL THE DIVINE PRECEPTS

I. The obedience which is the formal object of all the divine precepts, and which is prescribed in all of them, is properly and adequately prescribed to the will conducting itself according to the mode of liberty; that is, as it is free, that it may regulate the will conducting itself according to the mode of nature, that is, that it may regulate the inclination according to the prescribed obedience.

II. This liberty is either that of contradiction or exercise, or that of contrariety or specification. According to the liberty of exercise, the will regulates the inclination, that it may perform some act rather than abstain from it, or the contrary. According to the liberty of specification, the will regulates the inclination, that, by such an act, it may tend towards this rather than towards that object.

III. From this formal object of all precepts, and its relation thus considered, arises the first distribution and that a formal one, of all the precepts, into those which command, and those which forbid; that is, those in which the commission or the omission [of an act] is prescribed.

IV. A precept which forbids is so binding, as not to allow a man to commit what is forbidden. For we must not perpetrate wickedness that good may come; yet this is the only reason why we might occasionally be allowed to perform what has been forbidden.

V. A precept which commands is not equally rigidly binding, so as to require in every single moment of time the performance of what is commanded; for this cannot be done, though the period when man will or will not perform it, is not left to his option; but performance of it must be administered according to the occasions and exigencies which offer. Thus it was not lawful for Daniel to abstain for three days from calling upon his God.

VI. When a precept which forbids, and one which commands, are directly contrary --whether it be according to the act, "Thou shalt love God, and not hate him,"Thou shalt hate the world and not love it;" or, whether it be according to the object, "Thou shalt love God, and not love the world;"Thou shalt hate the world, but shalt not hate God;"

then the transgression of the law which forbids, is more grievous than that which commands, because it recedes further from obedience, and because the commission of an evil which has been forbidden includes in it the omission of a good which has been commanded.

DISPUTATION LXX

ON OBEDIENCE TO THE COMMANDS OF GOD IN GENERAL

I. Because the yielding of obedience is the duty of an inferior, therefore, for the performance of it, humility is requisite. This, generally considered, is a quality by which any one becomes ready to submit himself to another, to undertake his commands and to execute them; and, in this instance, to submit himself to God.

II. Obedience has respect partly to an internal act, and partly to one that is external.

The performance of both these is required for entire, true, and sincere obedience. For God is a Spirit, and the inspector of hearts, who demands the obedience of the whole man, both of the inward and the outward man -- obedience from the affections of the heart and from the members of the body. The external act without the internal is hypocrisy; the internal, without the external, is incomplete, unless man be hindered from the performance of the external act without his own immediate fault.

III. With this, nearly coincides the expression of the scholastic divines "to perform a command either according to the substance of the act only, or also according to the required quality and mode," in which sense, likewise, Luther seems to have uttered that expression -- "Adverbs save and damn."

IV. The grace and special concurrence of God are required for the performance of entire, true, and sincere obedience, even for that of the inner man, of the affections of the heart, and of a lawful mode. But we allow it to be made a subject of discussion, whether revelation, and that assistance of God which is called "general," and which is opposed to this special aid, and is distinguished from it, be sufficient only to perform the external act of the body and the substance of the act.

V. Though that special grace which moves, excites, impels and urges to obey, physically moves the understanding and the inclination of man, so that he cannot be otherwise than affected with the perception of it, yet it does not effect or elicit the consent except morally, that is, by the mode of suasion, and by the intervention of the free volition of man, which free volition not only excludes coaction, but likewise all antecedent necessity and determination.

VI. But that special concurrence or assistance of grace, which is also called "co-operating and accompanying grace" differs neither in kind nor efficacy from that exciting and moving grace which is called preventing and operating, but it is the same grace continued. It is styled "co-operating" or "concomitant," only on account of the concurrence of the human will which operating and preventing grace has elicited from the will of man. This concurrence is not denied to him to whom exciting grace is applied, unless the man offers resistance to the grace exciting.

VII. From these premises, we conclude that a regenerated man is capable of performing more good than he actually performs, and can omit more evil than he omits; and, therefore, that neither in the sense in which it is received by St. Augustine, nor in that in which some of our divines understand it, is efficacious grace necessary for the performance of obedience -- a circumstance which is highly agreeable with the doctrine of St. Augustine.

COROLLARY

Coaction only circumscribes the liberty of an agent, it does not destroy or take it away; and such circumscription is not made, except through the medium or intervention of the natural inclination; the natural inclination, therefore, is more opposed to liberty than coaction is.

DISPUTATION LXXI

ON THE MATERIAL OBJECT OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE LAW IN GENERAL

I. As mere obedience, considered in the abstract, is the formal object of all the precepts of the divine law, so the acts in which the obedience that must be performed is prescribed, are the material objects of the same precepts.

II. For this reason, these acts will at length be said to be conformable to law, and performed according to law, when obedience has given form to them; that when they have been performed from obedience, or through the intention and desire of obeying.

This desire to obey is necessarily preceded by a certain knowledge that those acts have been prescribed by God, according to this expression of the apostle:

"Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin."

III. Hence, it is apparent that a good intention does not suffice to justify an act, unless it be preceded by a command of God and a knowledge of such command; though, without a good intention, no act, even when commanded by God, can of itself be pleasing to him. But it is our wish that, under the term "actions," omission is also understood to be comprehended.

IV. A good work, therefore, universally requires these conditions: (1.) That it be prescribed by God. (2.) That man certainly knows it to have been commanded by God. (3.) That it be performed with the intention and desire of obeying God, which cannot be done without faith in God. To these ought to be added a special condition, which belongs to Christ and to his gospel -- that it be done through faith in Christ, because no work is agreeable to God after the commission of sin in a state of grace, except in Christ, and through faith in him.

V. But the acts which are prescribed in the law, are either of themselves and in their own nature indifferent; or they have in them. something why they are pleasing or displeasing to God -- why they are prescribed by him or forbidden. The law, which prescribes the former of these, [the indifferent acts,] is called "positive,"symbolical,"

and "ceremonial." That which prescribes the latter is styled "the moral law" and "the decalogue;" it is also called "the law of nature." On these last, we shall afterwards treat at greater length.

VI. The material acts, in which obedience is prescribed to be performed by the moral law, are either general, and belonging to the observance of the whole law and of all and each of its precepts; or they are special, and peculiarly prescribed in each of the precepts of the decalogue.

VII. The general acts are the love, honour and fear of God, and trust in him. The special acts will be treated in the particular explanation of each of the precepts.

DISPUTATION LXXII

THE LOVE, FEAR, TRUST, AND honour WHICH ARE DUE FROM MAN TO

GOD

I. These general acts may be considered either in the first act or in the second. In the first, they come under the denomination of affections; in the second, they retain to themselves the appropriate name of acts. But in consequence of the close union and agreement of nature between an affection and a second act, love, fear, trust and honour, receive the same denomination of "an affection," and "an act."

II. The love of God is a dutiful act of man, by which he knowingly and willingly prefers, before all other things, the union of himself with God and obedience to the divine law, to which is subjoined a hatred of separation and of disobedience.

III. The fear of God is a dutiful act of man, by which he knowingly and willingly dreads before all things and avoids the displeasing of God, (which is placed in the transgression of his commands,) his wrath and reprehension and any [sinister]

inauspicious estimation of him lest he be separated from God.

IV. Trust in God is a dutiful act of man, by which he knowingly and willingly reposes on God alone, assuredly hoping for and expecting from him all things which are salutary or saving to himself; in which we also comprehend the removal of evils.

V. The honour of God is a dutiful act of man, by which he knowingly and willingly repays to God the reward due for his excellent virtues and acts.

VI. The primary object of all these acts, as they are prescribed by law and are man's duty, is God himself; because, for whatever other things these acts are to be performed, they must be performed on account of God and through his command, otherwise no one can truly call them "good."

VII. The formal reason of the object, that is, why these acts may and ought to be performed to God, is, the wisdom, goodness, justice, and power of God, and the acts performed by him according to and through them. But we permit this to be made the subject of a pious discussion, Which of these, in requiring simple acts, obtain the precedence, and which of them follow?

VIII. The immediate cause of these acts is man, according to his understanding and inclination, and the freedom of his will, not as man is, natural, but as he is spiritual, and formed again after the life of God.

IX. The principal cause is the Holy Spirit, who infuses into man, by the act of regeneration, the affections of love, fear, trust, and honour; by exciting grace, excites, moves and incites him to second acts, and by co-operating grace, concurs with man himself to produce such second acts.

X. The form of these acts is that they be done through faith, and according to the law of God. Their end is, that they be performed to the salvation of the workers themselves, to the glory of God, and to the benefit and confirmation of others.

DISPUTATION LXXIII

ON PARTICULAR ACTS OF OBEDIENCE, OR THOSE WHICH ARE

PRESCRIBED IN EACH PRECEPT, OR CONCERNING THE DECALOGUE IN

GENERAL

I. The special acts of obedience are prescribed in the decalogue, and in each of the commandments. The decalogue, therefore, itself, must be considered by us in order.

II. A convenient distribution of the decalogue is that into a preface and precepts. The preface is contained in these words: "I am the Lord thy God, who have brought thee up from the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage." For we are of opinion that this preface belongs to the entire decalogue, rather than to the first commandment; though we do not consider it advisable to contend about a matter so small and unimportant.

III. The preface contains a general argument of suasion, why the children of Israel ought to yield obedience to Jehovah -- and this two-fold -- the first drawn from the right of confederation or covenant -- the second, from a particular and signal benefit recently conferred on him. The former of these is contained in the words, "the Lord thy God;" the latter, in the expression, "who have brought thee out of the land of Egypt," of which benefit a high commendation is given in the description which is added -- that Egypt was to the Israelites "the house of bondage" that by amplifying the misery of that servitude, they might be able to call to mind those things which had happened to them.

IV. Though this argument, "thy God," may likewise have respect to creation, and may comprise that benefit, yet it is more probable that it has a special reference to the concluding of a covenant with this people.

V. From this preface, may conveniently be deduced those general acts about which we have treated in the preceding disputation -- the love, fear, trust, and honour of God; for, as Jehovah is their God, who delivered them out of Egypt, therefore, most justly, as well as profitably, must he be loved, feared and honoured, and trust must be reposed in him.

VI. But some things generally must be observed for the correct performance of all the precepts together. Such are,

VII. The law of God requires the entire obedience of the mouth, heart and work, that is, inward and outward obedience -- for God is the God of the whole man, of the soul and body, and looks principally upon the heart.

VIII. The explanation of the precepts of the decalogue must be sought from Moses and the prophets, from Christ and his apostles; and it may be procured in sufficient abundance, so that nothing necessary can be imagined, which may not be drawn from the writings of the Old and the New Testament.

IX. The meaning of each precept must be taken from the end on account of which it was given; and all those things must be considered as included in it, without which the precept cannot be performed. Therefore, one and the same work may be referred to different precepts, so far as it has respect to different ends.

X. In affirmation, its opposite negative seems to be comprised; and, in a negative, the affirmation which is opposed to it; because God not only requires a refraining from evil, but likewise a performance of good, though a reason may be given why God declared some things negatively, and others affirmatively.

XI. Homogeneous and cognate acts are commanded or are forbidden in the same precept; and a genus comprehends its species; and a species comprises, in the same command, other species allied to it, unless a just law exists why it must be otherwise determined.

XII. An effect in its cause, or a cause in its effect, (if the conversion be necessary and according to nature,) is not commanded and prohibited through accident.

XIII. When of those things which have a relation to each other, one is prescribed or forbidden, the other is also commanded or forbidden, because they mutually lay themselves down and remove themselves.

XIV. If it happen that the observance of two precepts cannot be paid at the same time to both of them, regard must be had to that which is of the greater moment, and for the performance of which more and juster causes exist.

DISPUTATION LXXIV

ON THE FIRST COMMAND IN THE DECALOGUE

I. The ten precepts of the decalogue are conveniently distributed into those of the first and those of the second table. To the first table are attributed those precepts which immediately prescribe our duty towards God himself; of this kind, there are four. The second table claims those precepts which contain the duties of men towards their fellow-men; and to it are attributed the last six.

II. This is the relation which subsists between the commands of each table -- that, from love to God and in reference to him, we manifest love, and the offices of love towards our neighbour; and if it should happen that we must of necessity relinquish either our duty to God or our neighbour, God should be preferred to our neighbour.

Let this relation, however, be understood as concerning those precepts only which are not of the ceremonial worship; otherwise, [respecting ceremonies] this declaration holds good: "I will have mercy, and not sacrifice."

III. The first commandment is, "Thou shalt have no other god before my face," or

"against my face."

IV. It is very certain that, in this negative precept, the subjoined affirmative one is included or presupposed as something preceding and prerequisite: "Thou shalt have me, who am Jehovah, for thy God." This is likewise immediately consequent upon the preface, "I am the Lord thy God;" therefore, "Let me be the Lord thy God;" or, which is the same, "Therefore, have thou me, the Lord, for thy God."

V. But "to have the Lord for our God, is the part both of the understanding and of the inclination or the will; and, lastly, of an effect proceeding from both or from each of them.

VI. "Another god" is whatever the human mind invents, to which it attributes the divinity that is suitable and appropriate to the true God alone -- whether such divinity be essence and life, or properties, works, or glory.

VII. Or whether the thing to which man attributes divinity be something existing or created, or whether it be something non-existent and merely imaginary and a figment of the brain, it is equally "another god" for the entire divinity of that other god lies radically, essentially and virtually in human ascription, and by no means in that to which such divinity is ascribed. Hence is the origin of this phrase, in Scripture, "To go a whoring after their own heart."

VIII. But this "other God" may be conceived under a three- fold difference, according to the Scriptures. For those who have him, have (1.) either themselves been the first inventors of him, (2.) have received him from their parents, or (3.) from other nations, when neither they nor their fathers knew him; and this last is done either by force, by persuasion, or by the free and spontaneous choice of the will.

IX. For this reason, that "other god" is truly called "an idol;" and the act by which he is accounted another god, is idolatry; whether this be committed in the mind, by estimation, acknowledgment, and belief, or by the affections, love, fear, trust and hope, or by some external effect of honour, worship, adoration and invocation.

X. The enormity of this sin is apparent from the fact of its being called "a defection from God,"a forsaking of the living fountain," and "a digging of broken cisterns that hold no water,"a perfidious desertion of holy matrimony," and "a violation of the connubial compact." Nay, the gentiles are said to sacrifice to devils whatsoever they suppose that they offer to God, in this ignorance of God and alienation from the life of God.

XI. The cause why men are said to do service unto devils, although they have themselves other thoughts, is this: because Satan is the fountain head, and origin of all idolatry; and is the author, persuader, impeller, approver and defender of all the worship which is expended on another god. Hence, likewise, it is the highest degree of idolatry when any one accounts divine or ascribes divinity to Satan as Satan, displaying himself as Satan and vaunting himself for God.

XII. But though the gentiles worshipped angels or devils, not as the supreme God, but as minor deities and his ministers, by whose intervention they might have communication with the supreme God; yet the worship which they paid to them was idolatry, because this worship was due to no one except to the true God. But it does not belong to the definition of idolatry, that any one should pay to another, as to God, that worship which is due to the true God alone; for it is sufficient if he account him as God, by ascribing divine worship to him, though, in his mind, he may account him not to be the supreme God. It is no palliation of the crime, but an aggravation, if any one knowingly performs divine worship to him whom he knows not to be God.

XIII. And since Christ must be honoured as the Father is, because he has been constituted by his Father KING and LORD, and has received all judgment, since every knee must bow to him, and since he is to be invoked as Mediator and the Head of his church, so that the church can pay this honour to no one except him, without incurring the crime of idolatry; therefore, the papists, who adore Mary, the angels, or holy men, and who invoke them as the donors and administrators of gifts, or as intercessors through their own merits, are guilty of the crime of idolatry.

XIV. Besides, when they adore the bread in the Lord's supper, and receive and account the pope for that personage whom he boasts himself to be, they commit the sin of idolatry.

DISPUTATION LXXV

ON THE SECOND COMMAND IN THE DECALOGUE

I. The second precept consists of a command and its sanction, from a description of God, who is prompt and powerful to punish the transgressor, and who is greatly inclined to bless him that is obedient. In this are consequently included a threat of punishment and a promise of reward.

II. This command is negative: A deed which is displeasing to God is forbidden in these words: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them."

III. The sum of the precept is, that no one should adore or offer divine worship to any sculptured, molten or painted image, or one made in any other way, whether it has for its archetype a thing really existing or something fictitious, God or a creature, or whether it resemble its archetype according to some real conformity, or only by institution and opinion, or, which is the same thing, that he do not in or to any image adore or worship that which he considers in the place of a deity and worships as such, whether this be truly or falsely.

IV. As, from a comparison of this precept, with other passages of Scripture in which God commands certain images to be made, it appears that the mere formation of every kind of image whatsoever is not forbidden, provided that they be not prostituted to worship; so, from a comparison of this same precept with others which are analogous to it or collateral, it is evident that no image ought to be made to represent God, because this very act is nothing else but a changing of the glory of the incorruptible God into the image or likeness of a corruptible thing. For whatever can be fashioned or framed is visible, therefore corruptible. We are not afraid of making this general affirmation under the sanction of the Scriptures, though with them and from them we know, that now, according to the body, Christ is incorruptible.

V. A double distinction is here employed by the papists, of an archetype and its image; and also of an image itself as it is formed of such materials, and as it is an image, that is, calculated and fitted to represent the archetype. From these, they further deduce the distinction of the intention in worshipping; by which the worshiper looks upon either the archetype alone, not its image; or, if he even looks on the image, does not behold it as it is made of such materials, neither on it principally, but in reference to its archetype. We do not attempt to deny that the mind of man can frame a distinction of this kind.

VI. But when those who fall down before an image attempt, by such a distinction, to excuse themselves from the transgression of this precept, they accuse God himself of a falsehood, and deride his command. (1.) They charge him with falsehood; because, when God declares that he who falls down before an image, says to the wood and to the stone, "Thou art my Father!" they assert, that the prostrated person does not say this to the wood and the stone, but to their archetype, that is, to God. (2.) They mock God and his command; because by this distinction it comes to pass, that no man at any time, though paying adoration to any kind of images, can be brought in guilty of having violated this precept, unless, according to his own opinion, he has judged that wood really to be God, and therefore that he has himself truly and in reality formed a god, which cannot possibly enter into the conception of one who uses his reason.

VII. But they partly annihilate their own excuse which rests on this distinction, when they say that the same honour and worship (whether it be that of latria, of dulia, or of hyperdulia,) must be given to an image as to its archetype. Neither does this prolong its existence by such distinction, when they represent God himself by an image, because that is simply forbidden to be done.

VIII. We assert, therefore, that, according to the judgment of God, and express passages of Scripture, the papists are correctly charged with giving a portraiture of the essence of God, when they represent him in the form of an old man, graced with an ample gray beard, and seated on a throne -- though in express words they say, that they know God has not a body, and though they protest that they had fashioned this form, not for the purpose of representing his essence, but that they had instituted this similitude to represent the appearance which he occasionally made to his prophets, and to signify his presence. For the protestation is contrary to facts; since facts are, by nature, not what we feign them to be, but what God, the legislator, declares them to be. But he says those facts are, that he has been assimilated, that a [supposed] likeness of himself has been formed, and that he has been [falsely] set up in a gold or silver graven image.

IX. We assert that all those images of which we have spoken - - both those of God, placed only for representation, and those of other things (whether true or fictitious,) exposed for adoration -- are correctly called "idols," not only according to the etymology of the word, but likewise according to the usage of the Scriptures, and that the distinction which is employed by the papists between idols and resemblances or images has been produced from the dark cave of horrid idolatry.

X. In the same precept in which it is forbidden to fashion or make any images for divine worship, it is likewise commanded to remove others, if they have been previously made and exposed for worship, these two cautions being always observed, (1.) That it be done, when preceded by a suitable and sufficient teaching. (2.) That it be the work of those who are in possession of the supreme authority in the commonwealth and the church.

XI. Though the honour exhibited to such images, or to the deity through such images, be reproachful to the true God himself; yet he, also, who pours contumely on the images which he considers to be correctly formed, and lawfully proposed for worship, pours contumely on the deity himself, whom he presumes to worship, and declares himself to be an atheist.

XII. The affirmation seems here to be strictly and directly opposed to the whole negative precept, that we may worship God, because he is a Spirit, with a pure cogitation of mind and abstracted from every imagination.

XIII. The sanction of the precept, which includes the threatening, is this: "For I, the Lord thy God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me;" that is, unless you obey this, my precept, you shall feel that I am jealous of mine honour, and that I will not, with impunity, suffer it to be given to another, or my glory to be communicated to graven images.

XIV. The other part of the sanction contains a promise in these words: "I am the Lord thy God, showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me and keep my commandments;" [That is, if you obey this my precept, you shall feel that I will display mercy towards you, and towards your children to the thousandth generation, provided that they also love me.]

XV. But mention is made of posterity, that men may be thus the more incited to obedience, since their future compliance with the precept will prove beneficial, not only to themselves, but to their posterity, or their future transgression will be injurious to them and their offspring.

XVI. From a comparison of the preceding command with this, it appears that there is a two-fold idolatry -- one, by which a false and fictitious deity is worshipped; another, by which a true or false deity is worshipped in an image, by an image, or at an image.

Yet this very image is sometimes called "a false and another god," which the Lord God also seems to intimate in this place, when he endeavours to deter men from a violation of this precept by an argument drawn from his jealousy.

COROLLARY

Without any exaggeration, the idolatry of the papists may be placed on an equality with that of the Jews and gentiles. If it be urged as an exception, that they have neither made their children pass through the fire, nor have offered living men in sacrifice --we reply, The horrid tyranny which the papists have exercised in the murder of so many thousand martyrs, with the design of confirming the idolatry that flourishes among them, may be equitably compared to making their children pass through the fire, and the oblation of living men in sacrifice, if not according to the appearance of the deed, at least according to the grievous nature of the crime.

DISPUTATION LXXVI

ON THE THIRD PRECEPT OF THE DECALOGUE

I. This precept, as well as its predecessor, consists of a command, and of its sanction through the threatening of a punishment. The precept is a negative one, and prohibits a deed which is displeasing to God, in these words: "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."

II. The reason, and end of the precept is this: Because God is entirely holy, and because his name is full of majesty, we must use it in a holy and reverend manner, and must, by no means, account it common or contaminate it.

III. "The name of God" is here received in its most general notion, for every word which, according to the purpose God, is used to signify God and divine things.

IV. "To assume" or "to take the name of God," properly, to take that word into our mouth and pronounce it with our tongue. If, under this phrase, any one, by a synecdoche, is desirous, likewise, of comprehending the deeds, in which God and divine things are less religiously treated, he has our full permission; and, we think, he does not depart from the sense of the precept. But we still continue in the explanation of the proper acceptation.

V. The particle, "in vain," is variously received -- for that which is done rashly and without just cause -- for what is done in vain and with no useful end -- for what is done with mendacity, dissimulation, falsely, inadvertently, &c. Hence, this prohibition likewise diffuses itself extensively in every direction.

VI. But, perhaps with some propriety, every "taking of the name of the Lord in vain"

may be reduced to two principal heads or kinds: The First genus comprehends the use of the name of God when no mention of it, whatever, should be made; that is, in a word or deed, in which, it has been the will of God that the mention of his name shall not intervene, either because the word or deed is not lawful, or because it is of minor moment.

VII. But the Second genus comprises the incorrect use of the name of God; that is, when it is not truly used in any of our duties in which it may be lawfully used, or in which it ought also to be dutifully used according to the divine direction.

VIII. The duties of this class are, the adoration and invocation of God, the narration and preaching of his word or of divine things, oaths, &c. in these, the name of God is taken in vain, in three ways: (1.) Hypocritically, when it is not used sincerely from the whole heart. (2.) With a doubting conscience, when it is used with an uncertain belief that it is lawful to be used in that duty. (3.) Against conscience, as when it is employed to bear testimony to a falsehood.

IX. The threatening is expressed in these words: "For the Lord will not leave him unpunished that taketh his name in vain." By this he endeavours to persuade men, that no one should dare to use his name; of which persuasion there is so much the greater necessity, as the heinousness of this offense is not sufficiently considered among men.

DISPUTATION LXXVII

ON THE FOURTH COMMAND IN THE DECALOGUE

I. This precept contains two parts, a command and a reason for it. But the command is first proposed in few words; it is afterwards more amply explained. The proposition is in these words: "Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy." The explanation is thus expressed: "Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy work," &c. But the reason is comprehended in the following words: "For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the seas," &c.

II. In the proposition of the precept, three things are worthy of observation: (1.) The act prescribed, which is sanctification. (2.) An anxious and solicitous care about not omitting this act, which is expressed in the words, "remember," and "do not forget."

(3.) The object, which is called "the Sabbath," or "the seventh day;" that is, the seventh in the order of the days in which the creation was commenced and perfected.

It is also called "the Sabbath," from the circumstance of God having rested at that period, and man was required to repose.

III. The explanation contains two things: (1.) A concession or grant, that men may spend six days in labours belonging to the natural life and its sustenance; this concession contains the equity of the command. (2.) A command about resting from those works on the seventh day, with an enumeration of the persons whose duty it is to rest: "Not only thou, but also thy son, thy man servant, thy maid servant, thy cattle, and thy stranger shall rest;" that is, thou shalt cause as many persons to rest as are under thy power.

IV. The reason contains, in itself, two arguments: The First is the example of God himself, who rested from his works on the seventh day. The Second is the benediction and sanctification of God, by which it was his pleasure that the seventh should be separated from the rest of the days, and devoted to himself and to his worship.

V. "To sanctify the seventh day," is to separate it from common use, and from such as belong to the natural life, and to consecrate it to God, and to acts which belong to God, to things divine, and to the spiritual life. This sanctification consists of various acts.

VI. We think that it may be made a most useful point of consideration, how far must abstinence from those works which belong to the natural life be extended? And though we prescribe nothing absolutely, yet we should wish that the liberty of performing such labour should be restricted as much as possible, and confined to exceedingly few necessary things. For we have no doubt that the Sabbath is in various ways violated among Christians, by not abstaining from such things as are lawful to be done on other days.

VII. We think that the acts which belong to the sanctification of the Sabbath may be included in two classes: (1.) Some per se and primarily belong to the worship of God, and are in themselves grateful and acceptable to God. (2.) Others are subordinate to those acts which are to be performed, and they answer the purpose, that those acts may, in the best possible manner, be performed to God by men; such are those which belong to the instruction of believers in their duty.

VIII. But this kind of sanctification ought not only to be private and domestic, but also public and ecclesiastical. For it is the will of God, not only that he should be acknowledged, worshipped, invoked and praised by each individual in private, but likewise by all united together in the great church; that he may, by this means, be owned to be the God and Lord not only of each individual, but likewise of the whole of his universal family.

IX. But because the neglect of God and of things divine easily creeps upon man, who is too closely intent on this natural life, it was, therefore, necessary that men's memories should be refreshed by this word "Remember," &c.

X. But now, with regard to the seventh day, which is commanded to be sanctified. In it, this is moral and perpetual -- that the seventh day, that is, one out of the seven, be devoted to divine worship, and that it be unlawful for any man, at any time, after having expended six days in the labours of the natural life, to continue the seventh day in all the same labours, or in the same manner.

XI. But with regard to that day among the seven which followed the six days in which God completed the creation, its sanctification is not of perpetual institution and necessity; but it might be changed into another day, and in its own time it was lawful for it to be changed, that is, into the day which is called "the Lord's day;" because the new creation was then perfected in Christ our head, by his resurrection from the dead; and it was equitable and right that the new people should enter on a new method of keeping the Sabbath.

XII. That reason which was taken from the example of God who rested on the seventh day, (that is, when the creation was completed,) endured to the time of the new creation; and, therefore, when it ceased, or at least when a second reason was added to it from the new creation, it was no subject of wonder that the apostles changed it into the following day, on which the resurrection of Christ occurred. For when Christ no longer walks in the flesh, and is not known after the flesh, all things become new.

XIII. But the benediction and the sanctification of God are understood to be transferred from the Sabbath to the Lord's day; because all the sanctification which pertains to the new earth, is perfected in Jesus Christ, who is truly the Holy of holies, and in whom all things are sanctified for ever.

XIV. Because the reason, by which God afterwards persuaded the people to observe the Sabbath, was for a sign between him and His people that God would engage in the act of sanctifying them; it may likewise be accommodated to the times of the New Testament, and may persuade men to the observance of the [new] Sabbath.

XV. If any one supposes that the Lord's day is by no means to be distinguished from the rest of the days [of the week]; or if, for the sake of declaring evangelical liberty, this person has changed it into another day, either into Monday or Tuesday; we think he ought at least to be considered a schismatic in the church of God.

DISPUTATION LXXVIII

ON THE FIFTH COMMAND IN THE DECALOGUE

I. This precept is the first of the second table. It contains the precept itself, and the promise attached to it. The end of the precept is, that a certain order should exist among men, according to which some are superiors and others inferiors, and which consists in the mutual performance of the duties of commanding and obeying that are necessary for the defense of society.

II. The precept prescribes an act, and adds an object to which that act must be performed. The act is contained in the word "honour;" the object in these words: "thy father and thy mother." From this, it appears, according to the nature of relations, that this law is prescribed to all those who are relatively opposed to father and mother [as are sons and daughters].

III. The word "honour" is not appropriately employed to signify eminence; for honour is the reward of excellence, and its performance is a sign of recognition; and this word comprehends, either in the wide compass of its signification, all the duties which are due from an inferior to a superior; or, as an end, it comprehends all things necessary to the rendering of such honour.

IV. Three things principally are contained in this word: (1.) That reverence be shown to the persons of our parents. (2.) That obedience be performed to their commands.

(3.) That gratitude be evinced, in conferring on them all things necessary to the preservation of the present life, with respect to the dignity of their persons and of their office.

V. Reverence consists both in the performance of those acts which contain, [on our part] a confession of their pre- eminence and of our submission under them, and in the endurance of their faults and manners, in a connivance at them, in a modest concealment of them, and in kind excuses for them.

VI. Obedience lies in the prompt and free performance of those things which they prescribe, and in the omission of those which they prohibit. This obedience must be performed not only "for wrath," or the fear of punishment, but also "for conscience'

sake," and this, not so much that we may obey them, as God himself, whose vicegerents they are.

VII. Gratitude, which contains the conferring of things necessary for them to the uses of life according to their dignity, ought to extend itself not only to the time when they discharge this duty, but likewise through the whole life -- though it may happen that, through old age or some other cause, they are rendered unfit to discharge the parental office.

VIII. The duties of superiors are analogous to those of inferiors -- that they conduct themselves with moderation, seriousness, and decorum, in the whole of their life, public as well as private -- that they observe justice and equity in issuing their commands, and that, in requiring gratitude, they do not transgress the bounds of moderation. But these points will be more particularly discussed in the disputation on the magistracy.

IX. The object is enunciated in the words "father," and "mother," in which, likewise, are comprehended all those who are placed above us in human society, whether it be political, ecclesiastical, scholastic or domestic society -- whether in the time of peace or in that of war -- whether such persons discharge the duties of an ordinary or an extraordinary office, or whether they be invested with this power either constantly, or only for a season, however short.

X. But all these persons in authority are, in this commandment, fitly, and not without just cause, expressed under the name of "parents," which is an endearing and delightful appellation, and most appropriate both to signify the feeling which it is right for superiors to indulge towards inferiors, and most efficaciously to effect a persuasion in inferiors of the equity of performing their duty towards their superiors.

It may be added that the first association among men is that of domestic society, and from this follow the rest by the increase of mankind.

XI. Superiors lose no degree of this eminence by any sin, or by any corruption of their own; therefore, this duty of honour, reverence, obedience and gratitude must be performed to superiors, even when they are evil, and abusing their power; provided caution be used that the interest of God be always the more powerful with us, and lest, while that which is Caesar's is given to Caesar, that which belongs to God, be taken from him, or be not given.

XII. To this, must necessarily be subjoined another threefold caution -- (l.) That no one commit an error in judgment, by which he persuades himself this or that belongs to God, and not to Caesar. (2.) That he discern correctly between that which he is commanded to do or to tolerate; and, if he must do it, whether or not it be an act about a thing or object which is subject to his power. (3.) That under the name of liberty, no one arrogate to himself the right of a superior, of not obeying in this thing or that, or the power of rising against his superior, either for the purpose of taking away his life, or only his rule and dominion.

XIII. The promise which is added to this precept is contained in the following words:

"that thy days maybe long upon the land which the Lord thy God will give thee" in which are promised, (1,) to the Jewish believers who perform this precept, length of days in the land of Canaan; (2,) and also to the gentile believers who perform this command, the duration of the present life; (3,) typically, to such persons are promised the eternal or heavenly life, of which the land of Canaan was a type.

DISPUTATION LXXIX

ON THE SIXTH PRECEPT

I. Order in human society being appointed by the fifth commandment, through the mutual duties of superiors and inferiors in commanding and obeying, God now manifests his care for all those things which, in order to pass one's life in this society, are necessary for the life of each person, for the propagation of the species, for the blessings necessary to life, and for reputation, at the end of which God adds the tenth commandment, in which the coveting of certain things is prohibited.

II. By these words, "thou shalt not kill," the sixth precept provides for the preservation of the natural life, and designs the safety of men's bodies that it may be preserved inviolate.

III. The sum of the precept is neither in reality to injure the life of another person, and to endanger his safety, nay not even our own, whether we use fraud or violence, nor to wish his injury by our will, to which must be added that we do not intimate this kind of wish by any external token.

IV. From this, it appears that the accident must not receive the appellation of

"homicide," if, as the Scripture phrase is, any one going into a wood with his neighbour to cut down timber, and the head of his ax slips from the handle and strikes his neighbour so that he dies, nor, if, for the defense of his own life, any one be compelled, at the peril of his life, to repel the force employed against him by another.

V. But in this precept, we are commanded to endeavour by all legitimate means and methods, to save the life of our neighbour, as well as our own, and to defend them from all injury.

VI. But the cause of this precept, which is universal and always, and in every place, valid, is the following: because man was created after the image of God, which, in this place, principally denotes immortality. To this, may be added similitude of nature, and because all of us derive our origin from one blood. But several particular causes may be adduced, which agree with the spiritual state of men, such as because they have been redeemed by Christ with a price -- because their bodies are a habitation for the Holy Spirit -- because they are all members of one mystical body under one head, &c.

VII. But, in the mean time, God reserves to himself the right of disposing of the life of every man according to his own pleasure. Hence, commands have been issued to magistrates concerning killing transgressors, and a command was delivered to Abraham about slaying his son.

COROLLARY

The perpetration of homicide cannot consist with a good conscience, unless pardon for it be sought and obtained by particular repentance, &c.

DISSERTATION OF THE SEVENTH CHAPTER OF ROMANS

DEDICATION.

TO THE MOST HONOUR ABLE AND NOBLE WILLIAM BARDESIUS,

LIEUTENANT OF WARMENHUYSEN, A NOBLEMAN WHO IS OUR PATRON,

AND WHO, ON MANY ACCOUNTS, IS TO BE HONOUR ED BY US.

MOST HONOUR ABLE AND NOBLE SIR:

THAT expression of the apostle Paul, by which he designates the doctrine of the gospel as "the truth which is according to godliness," (Tit. i, 1) is very remarkable and worthy of perpetual consideration. From this sentiment, with the leave of all good men, we may collect that this "truth" neither consists in naked theory and inane speculation, nor in those things which, belonging to mere abstract knowledge, only play about the brain of man, and which never extend to the reformation of their will and affections. But it consists in those things which imbue the mind with a sincere fear of God, and with a true love of solid piety, and which render men '"zealous of good works." Another passage, not less famous and remarkable, in the same epistle and by the same apostle, tends greatly to confirm and illustrate this view of the matter; it is thus expressed: "For the grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men, teaching us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, we should live soberly, righteously and godly in this present world." (Tit. ii, 11,19.) Whosoever they be, therefore, that profess themselves the heralds of this divine "truth," they ought to give additional diligence that, casting aside all curious and thorny questions, and those idle subtilities which derive their origin from human vanity, they commend to their hearers this one and only "godliness," and that they seriously instruct them in faith, hope and charity. And, in return, those of their auditors who are enamored with this

"truth," are bound strenuously to conform themselves to this course of conduct -- to pass by and to slight all other things which may come across their path, and constantly to aim at this "godliness" alone, and keep their eyes intent upon it. For both clergy and laity may receive this as a principle, that they are yet rude and complete strangers in true theology, unless they have learned so to theologize, that theology may bear the torch before them to that piety and holiness which they sedulously and earnestly pursue.

If this admonition ever was necessary, it is undoubtedly the more necessary at this time; because we see impiety overflowing in every direction, like a sea raging and agitated by whirlwinds. Yet, amidst all this storm, such are the stupor and insensibility of men, that not a few who remain exactly the same persons as they formerly were, and who, indeed, have not changed the least particle of the manner of their impure life, still imagine themselves to be in the class of prime Christians, and promise themselves the favour of the supreme God, the possessing of heaven and of life eternal, and of the company of Christ and of the blessed angels, with such great and presumptuous confidence, and with such security of mind, that they consider themselves to be atrociously injured by those who, judging them to be deceived in this their self-persuasion, desire them in any wise to entertain doubts about it. In a condition of affairs thus deplorable, no endeavour appears to be more laudable, than to institute a diligent inquiry into the causes of such a pernicious evil, and, by employing a saving remedy, to arouse erring souls from this diabolical lethargy, and induce them to alter their lives, under the felicitous auspices of the gospel and the Spirit of Christ, to devote their energies to a solid amendment of manners, and thus, at length, from the divine word, to promise themselves, when answering this description, grace with God and eternal glory.

The causes of this evil are various, and most of them consist in certain erroneous and false conceptions which, being impressed on their minds, some men carry about with them, being either their own inventions, or furnished to them from some other quarter; yet, either in general or in particular, either directly or indirectly, such erroneous conceptions lay a stumbling-block and an impediment before the true and serious study of piety and the pursuit of virtue. We will not, in this place, introduce any mention of the impious conceptions of some men who do not believe either that there is a life eternal, or that, if it really exists, it is of such great and sublime excellence as it is described to be in the Holy Scriptures -- who either despair of the mercy of God towards repentant sinners, or who consider it to be impossible to enter on that way of piety and new obedience which has been prescribed by the prince of our salvation.

We say nothing about these persons, because they not only relax the asseverations and the promises of God, which are the true foundations of the Christian religion, but they likewise entirely overturn them, and thus, with one effort, they pluck up, by the roots, all piety, and all desire and love of it, from the hearts of men.

We now begin to make some observations on those hypotheses, whether secret or avowed, which are injurious to piety, and which obtain among Christians themselves, whether they be publicly defended or otherwise. Among them, the first which comes under enumeration, is the dogma of unconditional predestination, with those which depend on it by a necessary connection; and, in particular, the so highly extolled perseverance of the saints, in a confidence in which such things are uttered by some persons as we dread to recite, for they are utterly unworthy of entering into the ear of Christians. It is no small impediment which these dogmas place in the way of piety.

When, after a diligent and often- repeated perusal of the Holy Scriptures, after long meditations and ardent prayers to God, with fasting, our father, of blessed memory, thought that he had made a sure discovery of the baneful tendency of these dogmas, and had reflected upon them within his own breast, and that, however strenuously they might be urged by certain divines, and generally instilled into the minds of students by scholastic exercises, yet neither the ancient church nor the modern, after a previous lawful examination of them, ever received them or allowed them to pass into matters that had obtained mature adjudication. When he perceived these things, he began by degrees, to propose his difficulties about them, and his objections against them, for the purpose of shewing that they were not so firmly founded in the Scriptures as they are generally supposed to be; and, in process of time, being still more strongly confirmed in the knowledge of the truth, especially after the conference which he had with Doctor Francis Junius, and in which he had seen the weakness of his replies, he began to attack those dogmas with greater boldness; yet on no occasion was he forgetful of the modesty which so eminently became him. But, of the arguments with which he attacked those dogmas, this [on the seventh chapter of St.

Paul's epistle to the Romans] in which we have now engaged, was not the last -- that is, such was the nature of these doctrines that they were calculated to relax the study of piety, and thus to extinguish it. In that labour he also occasionally employed subtilities. and such reasons as are not at once obvious to the multitude; but they were subtle distinctions, necessary for overturning dogmas which, in his judgment, were very baneful. And, undoubtedly, as love is not conquered except by another love, so that subtlety, which is the inventor and establisher of falsehood, can scarcely be conquered and overturned without the subtlety which is the assertor of the truth and the convictor of falsehood. Therefore, the subtilities which he employed on that occasion, [his conference with Junius,] were useful and necessary -- not insignificant, trifling, and invented for pleasure, ostentation or display. But with regard to other things, it is known to all those who were on terms of familiarity with him -- especially during the last years of his life, when he was much engaged in the schools, in which it is an established custom principally to pursue subtilities -- what a rigid enemy he was of all subtilities and of lofty language; and even those whom he had among his students that differed on some other points from him, could testify, if they would conscientiously relate the truth, that he referred all things to use and to the practice of a Christian life; and thus that piety and the fear of the divine Majesty uniformly breathed in his lectures, in his disputations, (both public and private,) in his sermons, discourses and writings. But it is not necessary for us, in this place, to rehearse the method by which he proved the genius of unconditional predestination and its annexed dogmas to be adverse to godliness; because his writings on this subject are partly extant, and the remainder, under the divine auspices, will soon be published. It is better that prudent readers should listen to him uttering his own words, than to us who are but stammerers about him. The water is sweeter which we taste at the fountain, than that which we drink at a distance from the spring.

Various are the other hypotheses which operate as hindrances to piety, and the whole of which we are not able now to mention; but we will briefly discuss a Jew of those which occur, that we may not produce weariness in you, most noble sir, by our prolixity.

A capital error which first offers itself, and which closely adheres to the inmost core and fibers of nearly all mankind, is that by which they silently imagine in their own minds that illimitable mercy exists in God; and from this they opine that they will not be rejected, though they have indulged themselves a little too much in vicious pursuits, but that, on the contrary, they will continue to be dear to God and beloved.

This error is in reality joined with notorious incredulity, and, in a great measure destroys the Christian religion, which is founded on the blood of Christ. For, in this way, is removed all necessity for a pious life, and a manifest contradiction is given to the declaration of the apostle, in which he affirms that "without holiness no man shall see God." (Heb. xii, 14) Alas for the insanity of men, who have the audacity to bless themselves when they are cursed by God!

This is succeeded by the false hypothesis of others, who, revolving in their minds the designs, the morals, and the life of mortals, and reflecting on the multitude, among men of all orders, of those who are wandering in error, conclude that the mercy of God will not permit eternally to perish so many and such infinite myriads of rational creatures, formed after the divine image. The consequence is, that, instead of performing their duty according to the tenor of Christianity, by opposing the torrent of impiety, they, on the contrary, suffer themselves to be carried away by the impulse of such views, and associate with the multitudes of those who are devious in error. They seem to forget that the many walk in the broad way, whose end, according to the truth of God, will be "destruction from the presence of the Lord." A multitude will preserve no man from perdition. Unhappy and most miserable solace, to have many companions in enduring everlasting punishment!

Let the force of this deception, likewise, be considered, that vices are dignified with the names of virtues, and, on the other hand, virtues receive the defiling appellation of vices. The effect of this is, that men, who are of themselves, prone to vicious indulgences, pursue them with the greater avidity when they are concealed under the mask of virtues, and, on the contrary, are terrified at virtues, in the attainment of which any difficulty is involved, as though they were clothed in the monstrous garb of the most horrid vices. Thus, among mankind, drunkenness obtains the name of hilarity; and filthy talking, that of cheerful freedom; while sobriety in food and drink, and simplicity in dress, are opprobiously styled hypocrisy. This is really to "call good evil, and evil good," and to seek an occasion, by which a man may cease from the practice of virtue, and devote himself to vicious courses, not only without any reluctance of conscience, but likewise at the impulse and instigation of his [seared]

conscience. Into this enumeration, must come that shameful and false reasoning by which unwise men infer, from those passages in Scripture in which we are said to be justified by faith without works, that it is not, therefore, necessary to attend to good works, they being of such a nature that without them we may be justified, and, therefore, saved. They never advert to the fact that, in other passages, it is recorded -True faith, that is, the faith by which we are justified, must be efficacious through charity; and that faith, without works, is dead, and resembles a lifeless carcass.

This vain idea also, in no trifling degree, consoles the men who try to flatter themselves in those vices to which they have a constitutional propensity -- that they are not given up to all vices, they have not run into every excess of wickedness, but, though addicted to certain vices peculiar to themselves, they feel an abhorrence for all others. As men are most ingenious in the invention of excuses for themselves, in support of this incorrect view are generally cited these common phrases: "No man lives without sin;" "Every man is captivated by that which he finds to be pleasing to himself." Such men, therefore, consider themselves to be true Christians, and that, on this account, it will be eternally well with them, when, as they foolishly persuade themselves, they abstain from most evils, and, as for the rest, they cherish only some one vice, a single Herodias alone. A most absurd invention! since no one is, no one can be, addicted to all vices at once; because some among them are diametrically opposed to others, and are mutual expellers. If this conceit be allowed, no mortal man either will or can be impious. The subjoined passage in the epistle of St. James ought to recur to the remembrance of these persons: "Whosoever shall offend in one point, he is guilty of all." (ii, 10.) We are also commanded to "lay aside," not some one, but

"all malice, guile, and hypocrisy," (1 Pet. ii, 1,)that we may thus the more fully devote ourselves to God.

Others suppose that, if in some degree their affections be partly drawn out towards God and goodness, they have adequately discharged their duty, though in some other part of their affections they are devoted to the service of the prince of this world and of sin. These men assuredly have forgotten, that God must be adored and loved with the whole affections of the heart -- that the Lord God of Heaven, and the prince of this world, are opposing masters, and, therefore, that it is impossible to render service to both of them at once, as our saviour has most expressly declared.

Not very dissimilar from this is that invention by which some persons divide their time into portions, and when they have marked off one part for God and Christ, and another part for the flesh and the affections, they imagine that they have most excellently performed their duty. But these men, whosoever they be, never reflect that our whole lives, and all the time of which they are composed, must be consecrated to God, and that we must persevere in the ways of piety and obedience to the close of life; and for this brief obedience of a time which is short at the longest, God has, of grace, covenanted to bestow on the obedient, that great reward of life eternal.

Undoubtedly, if at any time a man falls, he cannot return into favour with God until he has not only deplored that fall by a sincere repentance, and is again converted in his heart to God, with this determinations -- that he will devote the remaining days of his life to God.

Those men must not be forgotten who are in this heresy -- that all those things which are not joined with blasphemy to God, and with notorious injury and violence to one's neighbour, and which, with regard to other things, bear the semblance of charity and benevolence, are not to be reckoned among the multitude of sins. According to their doctrine, they are at liberty to indulge their natural relish for earthly things, to serve their belly, to take especial care of themselves, to gratify their sensual and drunken propensities, to live the short and merry life which Epicurus recommends, and to do whatsoever a heart which is inclined to pleasure shall command; provided they abstain from anger, hatred, the desire of revenge, bitterness and malice, and the other passions which are armed for force and injury. If we follow these masters, we shall assuredly discover a far more easy and expeditious way to heaven, than that which has been taught us by the divine ambassador of the great God, whose sole business it was to point out the way to heaven.

Occasion is also afforded to unjust conceptions respecting the extreme of piety, by the mode in which some theological subjects are treated, and by some ecclesiastical phrases which are either not sufficiently conformable to the Scriptures, or which are not correctly understood. We must briefly, and without much regard to order, animadvert on a few of these, for the sake of example. When our good works are invested with the relation of gratitude towards God, it is a well ascertained fact, that men collect from this that they are now the heirs and proprietors of life eternal, and are in a state of grace and everlasting salvation, before they ever begin to perform good works. This delusion makes them think it expedient also to follow the hypothesis that the performance of good works is not absolutely necessary. In this case, it must be maintained from the Scriptures, that a true conversion and the performance of good works form a prerequisite condition before justification, according to this passage from St. John, "But if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ, his Son cleanseth us from all sin." (1 John i, 7) This is consonant with that celebrated passage in Isaiah, in which the Lord promises to the Jews the cleansing and the destruction of all their sins, even those which were of the most aggravated kind, after they turned themselves to him, and corrected their ways. (Isa. i, 15-20.) When the sacraments are considered only in the light of sealing to us the promises and the grace of God, but not as binding us to the performance of our duty and admonishing us of it, the discussion of them is not only defective, but it may also, through such defect, be accounted injurious to the work of personal piety. "Believers and the regenerate are still prone and inclined to every evil;" and "the most holy among them have only the small beginnings of the obedience which is required." These are phrases which describe, in a manner far too low and weak, the efficacy of the new creation, and they are, therefore, kata ton rhton in reality exceedingly dangerous. For the former of these phrases seems entirely to remove all distinction between the regenerate and the, while the latter seems to place such minutiae of obedience in the regenerate, as will induce a man, who has been accustomed to bless himself if he perceives even the slightest thought or motion about the performance of obedience, immediately to conclude himself to be a partaker of true regeneration.

When the continued imperfection of the regenerate, and the impossibility of keeping the law in this life, are urged unseasonably and beyond measure, without the addition of what may be done by holy men through faith and the Spirit of Christ, the thought is apt to suggest itself to the mind even of the most pious of their hearers, that they can do nothing which is at all good. Through this erroneous view, it happens that sometimes far less is attributed to the regenerate than the unregenerate are themselves able to perform. The ancient church did not reckon the question about the impossibility of performing the law among those which are capital: This is apparent from St. Augustine himself, who expresses a wish that Pelagius would acknowledge it possible to be performed by the grace of Christ, and declares that peace would then be concluded. The apostles of Christ were themselves occupied in endeavouring to convince men, when placed out of the influence of grace, of their incapability to perform obedience. But about the imperfection and impotency of the regenerate, you will scarcely find them employing a single expression. On the contrary, they attribute to believers the crucifying of the flesh and the affections, the mortification of the works of the flesh, a resurrection to a new life, and walking according to the Spirit; and they are not afraid openly to protest, that by faith they overcome the world. The acknowledgment of their imperfection was but a small matter, because that was a thing previous to Christianity. But the glory of Christians lies in this -- that they know the power of the resurrection of Christ, and, being led by the Spirit of God, they live according to the purest light of the gospel. The distribution of theology into God, and the acts of God, introduces to us a speculative religion, and is not sufficiently well calculated to urge men to the performance of their duty. To this may be added that too subtle disquisition, which is an invention unsanctioned by Scripture, about the relations of those acts which are performed by us.

As unsuitable for the promotion of piety, seems likewise that deduction or dispensation of our religion, by which all things are directed to the assurance of special mercy as the principal part of our duty, and to the consolation which is elicited from it against the despair that is opposed to it, but in which all things are not directed to the necessary performance of obedience in opposition to security. It derives its origin from the idea that greater fear ought to be entertained respecting despair than respecting security, when the contrary to this is the truth. For in the whole history of the Old and New Testament, which comprises a period of so many thousand years, only a single instance occurs of a person in despair, and that was Judas Iscariot, the perfidious betrayer of his saviour -- the case of Cain being entirely out of the question; while, on the contrary, as the world was formerly, so is it now, very full of persons in a state of security, and negligent of the duty divinely imposed on them; yet these men, in the mean time, sweetly bless their souls, and promise themselves grace and peace from God in full measure.

To proceed further: To these and all other delusions of a similar nature, we ought to oppose a soul truly pious, and most firmly rooted in the faith of God and Christ, exercising much solicitous caution about this -- not to be called off from the serious and solid study of piety, and not to yield ourselves up to sins or to take delight in them, either through the deceptive force of any conceits, such as have now been enumerated or any others, or by the incautious use of any phrases and the sinister distortion of particular subjects; but, on the contrary, denying all ungodliness, let us sedulously and constantly walk in the paths of virtue; and let us always bear in mind the very serious admonition which the apostle Paul propounds to the Ephesians; having dehorted them from indulging in impurity and other crimes, he says: "Let no man deceive you with vain words" or reasons; "for, because of these things cometh the wrath of God upon the children of disobedience." (Verse 6) It is worthy of observation, how significantly the hypothesis and arguments on which men depend when they bless themselves in their vices, are designated as "vain speeches;" For

"vain" they truly are; that is, false and deceitful are those reasons with which men are deceived while they are in bondage to their lusts, and persuade themselves that they are in a state of grace and salvation, when, on the contrary, they are in a state of wrath and eternal perdition; than which, no other more capital imposture or deception can be produced.

But, beside those things of which we have made previous mention, and which place obstructions to the progress of piety, another also occurs, which particularly belongs to the subject on which we are now treating; that is, the depraved and perverted interpretation of certain passages of Scripture, by which, in general, either all attention to good works is superseded, or in particular some part of it is weakened.

This kind of hindrance ought undoubtedly to be reckoned among those which are the greatest; for thus either evil itself seems to be established by divine authority, or a more remiss pursuit of good, which, of the two, is without exception the greater evil.

Wherefore, as all those persons deserve praise who endeavour to overturn every kind of hypothesis that is injurious to piety, so those among them are worthy of the highest commendation who try to give a correct interpretation, and such as is agreeable to

"the form of sound words," of those passages which are, through common abuse, generally so explained as, by such exposition, either directly or indirectly to countenance a disorderly course of life -- to free them from such a depraved interpretation, and to act as torch-bearers, in a thing so useful and necessary to Christian people and chiefly to the pastors of the church. Many are those passages which are usually distorted to the injury of godliness; and from which we shall in this place select only the three following.

(1.) In the Proverbs of Solomon it is said, "A just man falleth seven times." This sentence is in the mouth of every one, with this gloss superadded, "in a day," which is an interpolation to be found in the Latin Vulgate. This passage ought to be understood of falling into misfortune; yet it is most perversely interpreted to signify a fall into sin, and thus contributes to nourish vices.

(2.) In the prophecy of Isaiah, when the Jewish church, after having been defiled by manifold idolatries, by her defection from God, and by other innumerable crimes, was severely punished for all these her foul transgressions; in a tone of lamentation, complaining of the heaviness of her punishment, and at the same time making humble confession of her sins, she acknowledges, amongst other things, that "her righteousnesses are as the cloth of a menstruous woman," designating by this phrase the best of those works which she had performed during her public defection. This passage, by a pernicious contortion, is commonly corrupted; for it is very constantly quoted, as if the sense to be inferred from it was, that each of the excellent works of the most eminent Christians, and therefore that the most ardent prayers poured forth in the name of Christ, deeds of charity performed from a heart truly and inwardly moved with mercy, and the flowing of the blood of martyrs even unto death for the sake of Christ -- that all these are as the cloth of a menstruous woman, filthy, detestable and horrid things, and thus mere abominations in the sight of God. And as this name is, in the Scriptures, bestowed only on flagitous crimes and the greatest transgressions, it further follows [from this mode of reasoning] that the best and most excellent works differ in no respect from the most dreadful wickedness. When a man has once thoroughly imbibed this conceit, will he not east away all care and regard for piety?

Will he not consider it of no great consequence whether he leads a bad or a good life?

And will he not, in the mean time, indulge in the persuasion, that he can, notwithstanding all this, be a true disciple of Christ Jesus? The reason, undoubtedly, seems to be evident, since, according to this hypothesis, the best works are equally filthy with the worst crimes in the sight of God.

(3.) In this number of abused passages is included the seventh chapter of the epistle of Paul to the Romans, from the fourteenth verse to the end of the chapter; that is, if the apostle be understood, in that chapter, to be speaking about a man who is regenerated.

For then it will follow that a renewed man is still "carnal, and sold under sin," that is, the slave of sin; that "he wills to do good, but does it not; but the evil which he wills not, that he does;" nay, that he is conquered, and "brought into captivity to the law of sin," that is, under the power and efficacy of sin. From this view it is further deduced, that, if any one be regenerate, it is sufficient for him "to will that which is good,"

though with a will that is incomplete, and that is not followed by action; and "not to will that which is evil," though he actually perpetrates it. If this view of that chapter be correct, then all attention to piety, the whole of new obedience, and thus the entire new creation, will be reduced to such narrow limits as to consist not in effects, but only in affections or feelings. Every man, at first sight, perceives how languid, cold and remiss such a belief will render all of us, both in our abstaining from evil, and in the performance of that which is good. Those, indeed, who defend this opinion, have their subterfuges and palliatives; but they are of such a kind, that the comment is generally repugnant to the text on which it is founded. With respect to the exercise of piety, it is dangerous for men to have this conceit previously impressed on their minds: "This chapter must be understood about regenerate persons;" for they who hold it as a foundation, in other things wander wherever they are led by their feelings, and never recollect the glosses proposed by their teachers. This effect was observed by St. Augustine, and being afraid of giving offense, in the more early period of his Christian career, he interpreted the passage as applicable to a man under the law, but in his latter days he applied it to a man under grace; but he held this opinion in a much milder form than it is now maintained, and almost without any injury to godliness. For

"the good" which the apostle says "he willed but did not," St. Augustine interprets into "a refraining from concupiscence;" and "the evil" which the apostle declares "he willed not and yet did," he interprets as "an indulgence in concupiscence;" -- though this novel interpretation involves a wonderful mixture of the preceptive and prohibitive parts of the law. Modern interpreters [among the Calvinists] understand it as relating to actual good and evil -- a most notable distinction! But as our venerated father laboured with all diligence in removing the other hindrances of piety, so did he principally expend much toil and unwearied study in searching out the true meaning of such passages of Scripture as were imperfectly understood, particularly if they placed a stumbling-block in the way of those who were studious of piety. If, in that species of labour, he ever had eminent success, it must undoubtedly be confessed that it was in his attempts on this seventh chapter of the epistle to the Romans; for he wrote a commentary on it of great length, which, with the greatest accuracy, he prepared and finished, and which we now publish.

When he returned from Geneva to his native country, he understood this very chapter as it is now commonly explained; having been instructed in that view of it by his teachers, whose authority was so great among the students, that not one of the latter durst even inquire about any thing which they uttered. But when, in the exercise of his ministry in the church of Amsterdam, he had afterwards taken epistle to the Romans as the subject of a series of discourses from the pulpit, and when he had come to the explication of the seventh chapter, concerning the received interpretation of which he had then begun to conceive scruples in his mind, because it seemed both to undervalue the grace of regeneration and to diminish all zeal and attention to piety; he diligently considered the chapter from the beginning to the conclusion with a good conscience, as it was proper that he should do, and as the nature of his public function required; he collated it with those passages which preceded it and followed; he revolved all of them, in their several particulars, as in the presence of God; he read all the various commentators upon it which he could procure, whether among the ancients, those of the middle ages, or among the moderns; and, at length, after having frequently invoked the name and aid of Almighty God, and having derived his chief human assistance from the commentaries of Bucer and Musculus on that part of Holy Writ, he discovered that the received interpretation could not bear the scrutiny of truth, but that the passage was to be entirely understood in reference to a man living under the law, in whom the law has discharged its office, and who, therefore, feeling true contrition in his soul on account of sins, and being convinced of the incapability of the law to save him, inquires after a deliverer, and is not, in fact, a regenerated man, but stands in the nearest grade to regeneration. This explanation of the chapter he publicly delivered from the pulpit; because he thought that such a course was allowable by the liberty of prophesying, which ought always to have a place in the church of Christ. Though this diligence in elucidating the Scriptures, and the candour which he displayed, deserved singular praise and commendation, especially from all persons of the ecclesiastical order, yet, by some zealots, in whom such a conduct was the least becoming, it was received in a manner which shewed that the author ranked no higher with them than as one who, instead of receiving a reward, ought to be charged with mischief and insanity. Such is the result of employing a sedulous care in the investigation of the Scriptures, and of cultivating the liberty of prophesying; and it is esteemed a preferable service, to render the servants of Christ the slaves of certain men who lived only a short time before ourselves, and almost to canonize their interpretation of the Scriptures as the only rule and guide for us in our interpretation.

When our father perceived these things, he began to write this commentary, which at length he brought to a conclusion. If God had granted him longer life, he would have corrected his production with greater accuracy, as he had already begun to do; but as he was prevented by death, and thus rendered incapable of giving it a final polish, and yet as, in the judgment of many great men, it is a work that is worthy to see the light, we have now ventured to publish it. Here then, Firstly, the author proposes his own sentiments, and proves them by deductions from the entire chapter, as well as from the connection in which it stands with the preceding and following chapters.

Secondly. He shows that this interpretation has never been condemned, but has always had the greatest number of supporters. Thirdly. He defends it from the black charge of Pelagianism, and demonstrates that it is directly opposed to that error.

Fourthly. He contends that the interpretation now generally received is quite new, and was never embraced by any of the ancients, but rejected by many of them. Lastly.

And that it is injurious to grace and hurtful to good morals. He then enters into a comparison of the opinion of St. Augustine, and of that which is now generally received with his own interpretation; and concludes the work with a friendly address to his fellow-ministers.

It was our wish, most noble Bardesius, to dedicate and address this work to your mightiness; for this desire, we had several reasons. From the first entrance on his ministry, a sacred friendship subsisted between our revered father and that nobleman of honoured memory, your excellent father -- a friendship which continued till our venerable parent came down to the grave, full of years and loaded with honours. You, as the lawful inheritor of your father's possessions, have also succeeded in his place as the heir of his friendships; and this is the reason why the closest intimacy was formed between you and our good father, immediately after your return from your travels, which you had undertaken for the purpose of prosecuting your studies and visiting foreign nations. You were accustomed to place a high estimate on his endowments, and frequently consulted him on questions of theology, and very often acted upon his advice -- as he did, also, upon yours. But after he had reflected in his mind, that he was not the slave of men, but the servant of Jesus Christ, and that he was under an oath [to the observance of] his words alone, when, on this account, he had begun freely to inquire into the sentiments invented by men, and into their truth and necessity, and, after comparing them with the Scriptures, had also occasionally proposed, with great modesty, his doubts concerning them, and His animadversions on them -- when for this reason, many of those who were formerly his acquaintances and intimate friends, became alienated from him as from one who had removed the ancient land-marks out of their places; and when some of them, by degrees, both in public and private, began either to take an occasion or to make one, to circulate sinister reports concerning him, while others, with sufficient plainness, openly renounced all friendship with him; and when the whole chorus of ecclesiastical zealots had excited each other to rise up against him; yet, amidst all these things, you took no offense, but, having weighed the matter in the just balance of your judgment, you persisted to cherish a constant love for him. When he was debilitated by a slow and constant malady, as soon as the mildness of the weather and the intervals in his disorder would permit his removal, you invited him to your house in a manner the most friendly, and, on his arrival, you received him as the angel of the Lord; and a friendship, thus pure and refined, you cultivated with him, until he departed out of this life, and ascended to Christ, his Lord and Master. Besides, after his decease, by your conduct to our afflicted family, you shewed yourself such a one as it became that man to be who was not a pretended friend to the survivors of his departed friend --affording, by words and deeds, such substantial proofs of your kindness and beneficence towards his sorrowing widow and distressed orphans, as far exceed the feebleness of our expressions. Therefore, unless we wished not only to be the most ungrateful of mortals, but likewise to be generally depicted as such, it was exceedingly proper in us, while the posthumous writings of our revered parent are occasionally issuing from the press, to inscribe some portion of them to your very honourable and most friendly name, and by this method, as by a public document, to testify at once before the whole world our gratitude to you as well as our vast obligations.

To these considerations, we may add that our father had determined within himself, if God had granted him life and leisure, to write a system of the whole Christian religion, not drawing it out of the stagnant lakes of Egypt, but out of the pure fountains of Israel, and to inscribe it to your mightiness. As he was unable to execute his purpose, partly through the multiplicity of his engagements, and partly through the lingering nature of his disorder, you have here, in the place of the other world, the present commentary; for in no other way than this, can the design of our father now be fulfilled. We hope the subject itself, which is treated in this commentary, will not be disagreeable to you; for it is one which is excellently accordant with your genius and disposition. It is a fact which is well known to all those who are acquainted with you and which you do not wish to be regarded as a secret, but which you openly profess, as often as occasion demands, that you take no delight in those thorny disputations and discussions which contribute nothing to the practice of the Christian life; but that you place the chief part of religion in the pursuit of real and solid piety.

As our honoured father also shows in this work that his wishes and purposes were in this respect similar to yours, we have thought that nothing could be more appropriate than to dedicate to a man of extensive learning, who is likewise deeply attached to the interests of religion, a work which is highly conducive to the promotion of piety.

Accept, therefore, with a cheerful heart and a serene countenance, this small gift, which we and our dear mother are desirous to commit to posterity, that it may perpetually remain as an endless monument of that sacred friendship which subsisted between you and James Arminius, our venerated parent, and, at the same time, of our own great obligations to you. To you, who have been under the influence of mercy towards our afflicted family, may the Lord God in return shew mercy; and may he enrich you and your very honourable family with every kind of heavenly blessings, to the glory of his name and to the salvation of all of us! Amen.

INTRODUCTION

1. What is the subject of inquiry concerning the meaning of this chapter? 2. The manner in which this question is made a subject of dispute; formerly, a latitude of sentiment respecting it, was permitted. 3. Those who explain this passage as relating to a man under the law, are rashly charged with having some affinity With the Pelagian heresy. 4. Distribution of the subjects to be discussed in this Commentary.

1. The subject of inquiry concerning the meaning of the seventh chapter of the epistle to the Romans, and particularly of the latter part of it, which is treated upon from the beginning of the fourteenth or fifteenth verse to the end of the chapter, is this: "Does the apostle there treat of himself, such as he then was?" Or, which is almost the same question, "Under his own person, does he treat about a man living in the possession of the grace of Christ, or does he there personate a man placed under the law?" This question is also usually proposed in other words, thus: "Does the apostle there treat about a man who is still unregenerate, or about one who is already regenerated through the Spirit of Christ?" The latter question differs a little in its meaning from the former, (1.) because the word "unregenerate" has a more extensive signification, embracing even those who are under the law, and at whose state the apostle has also briefly glanced in the ninth verse of this chapter, and (2.) because the same word, with some persons, denotes not only the mere absence of regeneration, but likewise of all those things which are necessarily previous to regeneration; and these previous things are so far from being excluded by the words, "under the law," that, on the contrary, a great part of them is necessarily comprehended in the ample compass of that state which these words describe. This ought not to be passed over without some animadversion; because this notion about the word "unregenerate" which many persons have previously formed, is no small cause why they think they must reject the opinion, which declares that this passage of Scripture relates to an unregenerate man, that is, to one not only devoid of regeneration, but likewise of all those things which usually precede regeneration; and why they suppose that they ought to approve of the one contrary to this, without any further attentive consideration of the words and of the things signified.

2. But this question has now become a subject of dispute, not as one of those about which the writers who treat on Catholic doctrine may be allowed to maintain different sentiments, but as if it was one of such importance and weight to the truth of faith, that, without great detriment to truth and manifest heresy, no determination can be made concerning it except in one way, which is the affirmation that the apostle is there treating about a man who lives under grace and is regenerate. This judgment about the question seems new to me, and is one which was never heard in the church before these our times. In those better days, liberty was granted to the divines of the church to maintain an opinion on the one part of this question or on the other, provided they did not produce an explanation of their meaning that was at variance with the articles and doctrines of faith. The thing itself will shew that it is possible to do so in this matter, and such was the persuasion which was entertained on the subject by those who granted this liberty of sentiment, because no man ever supposed that any opinion was to be tolerated in the church which could not admit of an explanation that was agreeable to the doctrines and articles of belief.

3. Those who explain this passage in reference to a man living under the law, are charged with holding a doctrine which has some affinity to the two-fold heresy of Pelagius, and are said to ascribe to man, without the grace of Christ, some true and saving good, and, taking away the contest between the flesh and the spirit which is carried on in the regenerate, are said to maintain a perfection of righteousness in the present life. But I ingenuously confess that I detest, from my heart, the consequences which are here deduced; in the mean time, I do not perceive how they can flow from such an opinion. If any one will deign to prove this, I will instantly abjure an opinion thus conducting to heresy; knowing that nothing can be true, from which a falsehood may, by good consequence, be concluded. But if this cannot be demonstrated, and if I can make it evident that neither these heresies, nor any other, are derived from this opinion when it is properly explained, then, under these circumstances, it seems that I may require, in my own right, that no molestation shall be offered to me, or to any one else, on account of this opinion. If I shall confirm this opinion by arguments which are not only probable, but likewise incapable of refutation, or which at least have a greater semblance of probability than those by which the contrary opinion is supported, then let me be allowed to request that, by at least an equal right, this sentiment may obtain a place with the other in the church. If, lastly, I shall prove that the other opinion as it is in these days explained by most divines, cannot, without the greatest difficulty, be reconciled to many of the plainest passages of Scripture, that it is in no small degree injurious to the grace of the indwelling Spirit, that it has a hurtful effect on good morals, and that it was never approved by any of the ancient fathers of the church, but, on the contrary, disapproved by some of them, and even to St.

Augustine himself; then may I be permitted by a most deserved right to admonish the defenders of that other sentiment, that they reflect frequently and seriously, whether they be wishful to excite the wrath of God against themselves by an unjust condemnation of this better opinion and of those who are its defenders.

4. Having premised these things, let us now enter on the matter itself, which shall be treated by us after being distributed in the following parts: I. I will show that, in this passage, the apostle does not speak about himself, nor about a man living under grace, but that he has transferred to himself the person of a man placed under the law.

II. I will make it evident that this opinion has never been condemned in the church as heretical, but that it has always had some defenders among the divines of the church.

III. I will show that no heresy, neither that of Pelagius, nor any other, can be derived from this opinion, but that it is most evidently opposed to Pelagianism, and that in a most distinguished manner and designedly, it refutes the grand falsehood of Pelagius.

Confining myself within the bounds of necessary defense, I might, after having explained these three heads, conclude this treatise, unless it might seem to some one advisable and useful to confute by equal arguments the contrary opinion, especially as it is explained in these days. This I will attempt in other two chapters, subjoined to the preceding three, which will then be analogous and appear as parallels to the last two.

IV. Therefore, I will prove that the meaning which some of our modern divines attribute to the apostle in this was not approved by any of the ancient fathers of the church, not even by St. Augustine himself, but that it was repudiated and confuted by him and some others.

V. And, lastly, I will demonstrate, that this opinion, as explained in these days by many persons, is not only injurious to grace, but likewise adverse to good morals.

God grant that I may meditate and write nothing but what is agreeable to his sacred truth. If, however, any thing of a contrary kind should escape from me, which is a fault of easy occurrence to one who "knows but in part, and prophesies in part;" I wish that neither to be [considered as] spoken nor written. I make this previous protestation against any such thing; and will, in reality, declare those things which possess greater truth and certainty, when any one has taught them to me.

FIRST PART

I. THE THESIS TO BE PROVED

1. A description of the terms contained in the Thesis. 2. The reason why the description of the apostle is here omitted. 3. What is meant by "being under the law.

4. What it is to be "under grace." 5. What is meant by "a regenerate man?" 6. Who is

"an unregenerate?"

THE apostle, in this passage, is treating neither about himself, such as he then was, nor about a man living under grace; but he has transferred to himself the person of a man placed under the law.

Or as some other persons express it :

The apostle, in this passage, is not treating about a man who is already regenerate through the Spirit of Christ, but has assumed the person of a man who is not yet regenerate.

1. To the proof of the thesis, must be premised and prefixed definitions or descriptions of the subjects which it comprises. The subjects are -- the apostle himself, a man placed under grace, a man placed under the law, a man regenerate by the Spirit of Christ, and a man not yet regenerate.

2. I have set the apostle apart from those who are regenerate and placed under grace, not because I would take him away from the number of regenerate persons, among whom he holds a conspicuous station, but because some people have thought proper to deduce, from the description of the apostolical perfection, arguments by which they prove, that the apostle could not, in this passage, be speaking concerning himself, as he then was; because those things which he here ascribes to himself are at variance with some things that, in other passages, he writes about himself, and because they are a disgrace to his eminent state of grace, and to his progress in faith and newness of life. But since it is certain, that the apostle has not, in this chapter, treated of himself personally, as distinguished from all other men of whatsoever condition or order they may be, but that he, under his own person, described a certain kind and order of men, whether they be those who are under the law and not yet regenerate, or those who are regenerate and placed under grace, omitting the description of the apostle, we will first see what is meant by being under grace and under the law, and what by being regenerate, and not yet regenerate or unregenerate; yet we will do this in such a man -

- that, in the subsequent establishment of our own opinion, we may produce arguments drawn from the description given by the apostle.

3. The expression, therefore, to be under the law, does not signify merely that the man is liable to perform it, or that he is bound to obey the commands of the law; in which sense all men generally, both those who are said in the ninth verse of this chapter to be "without law," are reckoned to be under the law by right of creation, and those also who are under grace, are considered to be under the law by the further fight of redemption and sanctification, and yet in such a manner as not to be under its rigor, because they are under the law to Christ, who makes his people free from the rigor of the law. But because the office of the law concerning sinners is two-fold -- the one, to conclude sinners under the guilt of that punishment which is denounced by the law against transgressors, and to condemn them by its sentence -- the other, first to instruct sinners and to give them assurance about its equity, justice and holiness, and afterwards to accuse them of sin, to urge them to obedience, to convince them of their own weakness, to terrify them by a dread of punishment, to compel them to seek deliverance, and, generally, to lead, govern and actuate sinners according to its efficacy. Therefore, with regard to the first office of the law, all sinners universally are said to be under it, even those who are without law and have sinned without it;

"for they shall also perish without law (Rom. ii, 12) yet they are not to be condemned without a just sentence of the law. In relation to the second office of the law, they are said to be under its dominion, government, lordship and (pedagogy) tutelage, who are ruled and actuated by the efficacy and guidance of the law, in whom it exerts its power, and exercises these its operations, whether some of them or all, whether more or less, in which respect there may be, and really are, different degrees and orders of those persons who are said, in this second view, to be under the law. But in this passage, we define a man under the law to be "one who is under its entire efficacy and all its operations;" the design of the apostle requiring this, as we shall afterwards perceive.

4. This phrase "to be under grace," answers in opposition to the other of being "under the law," since the effect of this grace is two-fold. The first is, to absolve a sinful man from the guilt of sin and from condemnation; the second is, to endow man with the Spirit of adoption and of regeneration, and by that Spirit to vivify or quicken, to lead, actuate and govern him. Hence, not only are they said to be "under grace" who are free from guilt and condemnation, but likewise they who are governed and actuated by the guidance of grace and of the Holy Spirit. But since we are in this place discussing, not properly the condemnation of sin, but the tyranny and dominion which it violently exercises over those who are its subjects, by compelling them with its own force to yield it complete obedience, and to which are opposed in vain the efficacy and power of the law; and since we are now treating, not about the remission of sins, but about that grace which inhibits or restrains the force of this tyrant and lord, and which leads men to yield it due obedience; therefore we must restrict the expressions,

"to be under the law," and "to be under grace," to the latter signification -- that he is

"under the law" who is governed and actuated by the guidance of the law, and that he is "under grace" who is governed and actuated by the guidance of grace. This will be rendered evident from the fourteenth verse of the sixth chapter, when accurately compared with the preceding and following verses of the same chapter, and from the 17th and 18th verses of the fifth chapter of the epistle to the Galatians, when they are properly applied to this matter. Yet if any one be desirous of extending these passages to the two-fold signification of each of the expressions, he has my free permission for such extension; for it cannot prove the least hindrance in the inquiry and discovery of the truth of the matter which is the subject of our present discussion.

5. LET us now see about the regenerate and the unregenerate man. That we may define him with strictness, as it is proper to do in oppositions and distinctions, we say that a regenerate man is one who is so called, not from the commenced act or operation of the Holy Spirit, though this is regeneration, but from the same act or operation when it is perfected with respect to its essential parts, though not with respect to its quantity and degree; he is not one "who was once enlightened, and has tasted of the heavenly gift, and was made partaker of the Holy Ghost, and who has tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come;" (Heb. vi, 4,5) because the explanation given by most of our divines to this passage, applies only to unregenerate persons. Neither is he one who "has escaped the pollutions of the world through the knowledge of the Lord and saviour Jesus Christ, and who has known the way of righteousness;" (2 Pet. ii, 20,21) or they explain this passage also as applicable solely to the unregenerate. Nor is it a man who "heareth the law, and has the work of the law written in his heart, whose thoughts mutually accuse or else excuse themselves, who rests in the law, makes his boast of God, knows his will, and approves the things that are more excellent, being instructed out of the law." (Rom. ii, 13-18.) Neither is he one who "has prophesied in the name of the Lord, and in his name cast out devils;" (Matt. vii, 22) and who "has all faith, so that he could remove mountains." (1 Cor. xiii, 2) Nor is he one who acknowledges himself to be a sinner, mourns on account of sin, and is affected with godly sorrow, and who is fatigued and

"heavy laden" under the burden of his sins; (Matt. xi, 28) for such persons as these Christ came to call, and this call precedes justification and sanctification, that is, regeneration. (Rom. viii, 30.) Neither is it he who "knows himself to be wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked;" for this is the man whom Christ "counsels to buy" of him the things necessary for himself. (Rev. iii, 17,18.) This interpretation is not invalidated by the fact that the church of Laodicea is said not to know herself; for the "counsel" or advice bestowed will never persuade her to buy those things of Christ, unless she have previously known herself to be such a one as is there described. Nor is he one who knows that a man cannot be justified by the works of the law, and who, from this very circumstance, is compelled to flee to Christ, that in him he may obtain justification. (Gal. ii, 16) Nor is he a man, who, acknowledging himself as being unworthy even to lift up his eyes to heaven, and who, smiting on his breast, has exclaimed, God be merciful to me a sinner!

This has been well observed by Beza in his Refutation of the calumnies of Tilman Heshusius, where he makes a beautiful distinction between "the things which precede regeneration" and "regeneration itself" and thus expresses himself: "It is one thing to inquire by what methods God prepares for repentance or newness of life, and it is another to treat on repentance itself. Let, therefore, the acknowledgment of sin and godly sorrow be the beginning of repentance, but so far as God begins in this way to prepare us for newness of life, in which respect it was the practice of Calvin deservedly to call this fear initial. Besides, in the description of penitence we are not so accustomed as some people are, to call these dreadful qualms of conscience the mortification of the flesh or of the old man; though we know that the word of God is compared to a sword, which, in some manner, slays us, that we may offer ourselves for a sacrifice to God; and St. Paul somewhere calls afflictions the death of Christ which we carry about with us in the body. For it is very evident that, by the mortification or death of the flesh and of the old man, or of our members, St. Paul means something far different: He means not that efficacy of the Spirit of Christ which may terrify us, but that which may sanctify us, by destroying in us that corrupt nature which brought forth fruit unto death. Besides, we also differ from some persons on this point, not with respect to the thing itself, but in the method or form of teaching it, that they wish faith to be the second part of penitence, but we say that metanoia [a change of mind for the better,] by which term we understand, according to Scripture usage, renovation of life or newness of living, is the effect of faith," &c.

(Opuscula, tom. I, fol. 328.) Such are the sentiments of Beza; but how exactly they agree with those things which I have advanced, will be rendered very apparent to any man who will compare the one with the other.

Consonant with these is that which John Calvin says about initial fear, in the following words: "They have probably been deceived by this -- that some persons are tamed by the qualms or terrors of conscience, or are prepared by them for obedience, before they have been imbued with the knowledge of grace, nay, before they have tasted it. And this is that initial fear which some persons reckon among the virtues, because they discern that it approaches nearly to a true and just obedience. But this is not the place for discussing the various ways by which Christ draws us to himself, or prepares us for the pursuit of piety," &c.

But a regenerate man is one who comprises within himself all the particulars which I shall here enumerate: "has put off the old man with his deeds, and has put on the new man, who is renewed in knowledge, which agrees with the image of him who created him." (Col. iii, 9,10.) has received from God "the Spirit of wisdom and revelation through the knowledge of Him, the eyes of his understanding being illuminated" or opened. (Ephes. i, 18.) He has put off, "concerning the former conversation, the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts; and he is renewed in the spirit of his mind, and has put on the new man, which, after God, is created in righteousness and true holiness." (Ephes. iv, 22- 24) He, "with open face, beholding, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, is changed into the same image from glory to glory, even us by the Spirit of the Lord." (2 Cor. iii, 18) He is "dead to sin; his old man is crucified with Christ, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth he should not serve sin; he is freed from sin, and is alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord?" (Rom.

vi, 2,6, 7,11) "he is crucified with Christ; nevertheless he lives, yet not he; but Christ liveth in him; and the life which he now lives in the flesh, he lives by the faith of the Son of God." (Gal. ii, 20.) Being one of Christ's followers, "he has crucified the flesh with its affections and lusts, and now lives in the Spirit." (v. 24,25) "By our Lord Jesus Christ, the world is crucified unto him, and he unto the world." (vi, 14) "In Christ Jesus the Lord, he is also circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ."

(Col. ii, 11.) "In him, God worketh both to will and to do." (Phil. ii, 13.) "He is not in the flesh, but in the Spirit; the Spirit of Christ dwelleth in him; through the Spirit, he mortifies the deeds of the body; he is led by the Spirit of God, and does not walk after the flesh, but after the Spirit." (Rom. viii, 4,9,13,14) Uniting in a brief manner, all the parts and fruits of generation into one summary -- A regenerate man is he who has a mind freed from the darkness and vanity of the world, and illuminated with the true and saving knowledge of Christ, and with faith, who has affections that are mortified, and delivered from the dominion and slavery of sin, that are inflamed with such new desires as agree with the divine nature, and as are prepared and fitted for newness of living, who has a will reduced to order, and conformed to the will of God, who has powers and faculties able, through the assistance of the Holy Spirit, to contend against sin, the world and Satan, and to gain the victory over them, and to bring forth fruit unto God, such as is meet for repentance

-- who also actually fights against sin, and, having obtained the victory over it, no longer does those things which are pleasing to the flesh and to unlawful desires, but does those which are grateful to God; that is, he actually desists from evil and does good -- not indeed perfectly, but according to the measure of faith and of the gift of Christ, according to the small degree of regeneration, which, begun in the present life, must be gradually improved or increased, till at length it is perfected after this short life is ended -- not with respect to essential parts, but with respect to quantity, as we have already declared -- not always without interruption, (for he sometimes stumbles, falls, wanders astray, commits sin, grieves the Holy Spirit, ac.,) but generally, and for the most part, he does good.

6. But an unregenerate man is, not only he who is entirely blind, ignorant of the will of God, knowingly and willingly contaminating himself by sins without any remorse of conscience, affected with no sense of the wrath of God, terrified with no compunctions visits of conscience, not oppressed with the burden of sin, and inflamed with no desire of deliverance -- but it is also he who knows the will of God but does it not, who is acquainted with the way of righteousness, but departs from it -- who has the law of God written in his heart, and has thoughts mutually accusing and excusing each other -- who receives the word of the gospel with gladness, and for a season rejoices in its light -- who comes to baptism, but either does not receive the word itself in a good heart, or, at least, does not bring forth fruit -- who is affected with a painful sense of sin, is oppressed with its burden, and who sorrows after a godly sort -

- who knows that righteousness cannot be acquired by the law, and who is, therefore, compelled to flee to Christ.

For all these particulars, in what manner soever they be taken, do not belong to the essence and the essential parts of regeneration, penitence, or repentance, which are mortification and vivification and quickening; but they are only things preceding, and may have some place among the beginnings, and, if such be the pleasure of any one, they may be reckoned the causes of penitence and regeneration, as Calvin has learnedly and nervously explained them in his Christian Institutes. (Lib. 3, cap. 3.) Besides, even true and living faith in Christ precedes regeneration strictly taken, and consisting of the mortification or death of the old man, and the vivification of the new man, as Calvin has, in the same passage of his Institutes, openly declared, and in a manner which agrees with the Scriptures and the nature of faith. For Christ becomes ours by faith, and we are engrafted into Christ, are made members of his body, of his flesh and of his bones, and, being thus planted with him, we coalesce or are united together, that we may draw from him the vivifying power of the Holy Spirit, by which power the old man is mortified and we rise again into a new life. All these things cohere together with each other in a certain order, and must thus also be considered, if any one be desirous of knowing them not confusedly but distinctly, and of explaining them well to others. But we are not, in this place, treating about all the unregenerate in general, but only about those in whom the law has exerted all its efficacy, and who are, on this account, reciprocally said to be under the law.

II. THE CONNECTION OF THE SEVENTH CHAPTER WITH THE SIXTH

1. The design of the Apostle in the sixth chapter. 2. A short disposition of this argument. 3. Four enunciations of it. 4. This distribution is treated in order [in the seventh chapter]. 5. The two former enunciations are contained in conjunction. 6.

What therefore is proved by them. 7. The third and fourth enunciations are proposed in the fifth and sixth verses. 8. In the third enunciation lies the principal part of the controversy; its deduction consists of the proposition of the enunciation and of its method of being treated. 9. The proposition of the enunciation. 10. The investigation of the proposition, consisting of a larger explanation, and the rendering of the cause.

11. A larger explanation of the seventh chapter, from the seventh verse to the fourteenth. 12. The rendering of the cause, from the fourteenth verse to the end of the seventh chapter. 13. The fourteenth verse contains the rendering of a two-fold reason.

14. The proof of this is contained in the fifteenth verse. 15. And a more ample explanation of it. 16. From which two consectaries are deduced -- the first in the sixteenth verse, and the second in the seventeenth. 17. From this, the apostle returns to the rendering of the cause, in the eighteenth verse, and to the proof of it. 18. Its more ample explanation follows in the nineteenth verse, from which is deduced the second consectary in the twentieth verse. 19. The conclusion of the thing intended, in the twenty-first verse, and the proof of it is given in the twenty-second and twenty- third verses. 20. A votive exclamation for the deliverance of a man who is under the law, occurs in the twenty-fourth verse. 21. An answer or a thanksgiving reference to that exclamation, is given in the former part of the twenty-fifth verse, and the conclusion of the whole investigation, in which the state of a man who is under the law is briefly defined in the latter part of the twenty-fifth verse. 22. A brief recapitulation of the second part.

1. Having, from necessity of the thing and of order, thus premised these things, let us now proceed to treat on the question and the thesis itself. But it will be useful, briefly to place before our eyes the sum of the whole chapter, its disposition and distribution; that, after having considered the design of the apostle, and those things which conduce to that design, and which have been brought forward by the apostle as subservient to his purpose, his mind and intention, may the more plainly be made known to us. That this may the more appropriately be done, the matter must be traced a little further backward. In the 12th and 13th verses, as well as in the preceding verses of the sixth chapter of the epistle to the Romans, the apostle had exhorted all the believers at Rome to contend strenuously against sin, and not to suffer sin to domineer or rule over them, or to exercise authority in their mortal body; but to devote themselves to God, and to yield their members as the instruments of righteousness unto God; and he demonstrated and confirmed the equity of his exhortation by many arguments, especially by those which are deduced from the communion of believers with Christ. But, in order to animate them the more powerfully to this spiritual contest -- the persuasion to enter on which was to be wrought not only by a demonstration of its equity, but also by a promise of its felicitous and successful issue -- in the 14th verse of the same chapter, he proposed to them the certain hope of victory, declaring "sin shall not have dominion over you."

For nothing can so strongly incite men to engage manfully and with spirit in this warfare, as that certain confidence of obtaining the victory which the apostle promises in these words. But he grounds his promise, in the 14th verse, on a reason drawn from it, and on the power and ability of that [grace] under the guidance and auspices of which they were about to contend against sin, or from that state in which they were then placed it, and through Christ, when he says, "For ye are not under the law but under grace," thus extolling the powers of grace at the expense of the contrary weakness of the law, as though he had said, "I employ these continual exhortations to induce you strenuously to engage in the conflict against sin; and I do this, not only because I consider it most equitable that you should enter into that warfare, while I have regard to your communion with Christ, but also because I arrive at an assured hope, while I view your present condition, that you will at length enjoy the victory over sin, through that under whose auspices you fight; and it can by no means come to pass, that sin shall have dominion over you, as it formerly had; for you are under grace, under the government and guidance of the Spirit of Christ, and no longer under the law. if you were still in that state in which you were before faith in Christ, that is, if you were yet under the law, I might indulge in despair about declaring a victory for you, as placed under the dominion of sin. Such a victory over the power of sin contending within you, you would not be able to obtain by the strength or power of the law, which knows how to command, but affords no aid for the performance of the things commanded, how great soever might be the exertions which you made to gain the battle under the auspices of the law." But this reasoning, in the first place, possessed validity to prove the necessity of the grace which was offered and to be obtained in Christ alone, in opposition to those who were the patrons of the cause of the law against the gospel, and who urged that covenant, the law of works, against the covenant of grace and the law of faith. This reasoning also contributed greatly to the design which the apostle proposed to himself in the principal part of this epistle. His design was to teach that, not the law, but "the gospel is the power of God to salvation to every one that believeth," both because by the law, and by the works of the law, no man can be justified from the sins which he has committed, and because, by the power and aid of the same law no one can oppose himself to the power of sin to shake off its yoke, and, alter having been freed from its yoke, to serve God, since he immediately falls in the conflict. But in Christ Jesus, as he is offered to us through the gospel, and apprehended by faith we can obtain both these blessings -- the forgiveness of sins through faith in his blood, and the power of the Spirit of Christ, by which, being delivered from the dominion of sin, we may, through the same Spirit, be able to resist sin, to gain the victory over it, and to serve God "in newness of life."

These things in the sixth chapter may be perceived at one glance when placed before the eyes in the following order:

THE PROPOSITION OF THE APOSTLE

Dehortatory. -- "Neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin."

Hortatory. -- "But yield your members as instruments of righteousness unto God."

THE REASON

"For sin shall not have dominion over you."

Hence, an enthymeme, whose

Antecedent is -- "Sin shall not have dominion over you."

Its consequent -- "Therefore, neither yield your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin, but yield yourselves unto God," &c.

THE PROOF OF THE ANTECEDENT OR OF THE REASON

"For ye are under grace; therefore, sin shall not have dominion over you."

AN ILLUSTRATION CF THE PROOF FROM ITS CONTRARY

For ye are not under the law."

A BRIEF EXPLICATION OF THE PROOF, AND OF ITS ILLUSTRATION

"If, indeed, you were yet under the law, as you formerly were, sin would have the dominion over you as it once had; and, having followed its commands and impulses, you would not be able to do any other than yield your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin.

"But as you are now no longer under the law, but under grace, sin shall not in any wise have the dominion over you, but by the power of grace you shall easily resist sin, and yield your members as instruments of righteousness unto God."

From the 14th verse, the apostle perseveres in the same exhortation throughout the remainder of the sixth chapter, with a slight intermission of this argument, yet having previously refuted the objection which might be deduced from it; being about to resume the same argument, and to treat it more at large, in the whole of the seventh chapter, and in the former part of the eighth, since, as we have already perceived, the prosecution of this argument contributes very materially to his design.

2. But the apostle treats this subject in the order and method which was demanded by reason itself, and by the necessity of its discussion. For he had said, "Sin shall not have dominion over you, for ye are not under the law, but under grace."

3. In these words, are contained the four following enunciations: (1.) Christians are not under the law. (2.) Christians are under grace. (3.) Sin shall have dominion over those who are under the law. (4.) Sin shall not have dominion over those who are under grace.

Of these four enunciations, the second and the fourth are necessary and sufficient to persuade in favour of this exhortation; but the first and the third are adduced, both for the sake of illustration, and because they were required by the principal design of the entire epistle. The former of these [pairs of conjoint enunciations] is well known to all who understand the nature of a separated axiom and the mutual relation which exists between its parts; but the latter of them will he rendered very apparent by the deduction of the epistle itself, and on a diligent inspection of its conformation.

4. The apostle, therefore, thought that these four axioms ought to be treated by him in order, and indeed always with the mention of the conclusion which he was desirous to infer from them as from premises; and in which the sum of the exhortation consisted.

5. But the apostle treats those two former enunciations conjointly, such a course being required by their nature. For he gives one thing to those from which he takes another away, and this very properly; because there exists one and the same cause why the one should be attributed and the other taken away, why they are under grace and not under the law. This cause is expressed in the fourth verse of the seventh chapter, in the following words: "Ye, also, are become dead to the law in the body of Christ, that ye should be married to another."

6. But in the first four verses, the apostle proves that Christians or believers are not under the law, but under grace; which proof may be comprised in this syllogism: They who are dead to the law, and this in the body of Christ, that they may be married to another, even to Christ, are no longer under the law, but are now under grace; But Christians are dead to the law, that they should he married to another, even to Christ;

Therefore, Christians are no longer under the law, but under grace.

The first part of the proposition -- "They who are dead to the law, are no longer under the law," is expressed in the first verse of the seventh chapter in these words: "The law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth." The latter part of it, "They who are made Christ's are under grace, -- is included in the fourth verse, from which it may be deduced. But a confirmation of the first part of the proposition is added, in the first verse, from the testimony of the consciences of those who are expert in the knowledge of the law; and the same part of the proposition is illustrated, in the second and third verses, by a simile, that of marriage, in which the woman is no longer liable to the law of her husband than "so long as he liveth;" but when he is dead, she is free from the law of her husband, so that she may be allowed to transfer herself to another man without committing the crime of adultery. The application of this comparison is evident, the difference only being observed, that the apostle has declared, by a change in the mode of speaking, that Christians are become dead to the law, and not that the law is become dead to them. This change of speech is attributed by some persons to the prudence of the apostle, who wished to avoid the use of a phrase which he previously knew would be offensive to the Jews. By others it is transferred to the nature of the thing, in which they say that sin, and not the law, sustained the part or person of the husband, because in the sixth verse sin is said to be dead; but this makes nothing to our present purpose.

The assumption, in the fourth verse, is in these words: "we also are become dead to the law in the body of Christ, that ye should be married to another, even to Christ."

This assumption is illustrated, First, by the efficient cause of that mortification or death, which is the crucifixion and the resurrection of the body of Christ, and the communion of believers with Christ in that crucifixion and in the rising again of His body. Secondly. This assumption is illustrated by the final cause of deliverance, which contains the scope or design of the apostolical exhortation, that is, "to bring forth fruit unto God." But he perseveres in the same end in the two subsequent verses, the sixth and seventh, by treating it through a comparison of things similar, as he had also done in the nineteenth verse of the sixth chapter. The parallel is, that we serve God, and since we are not now in the oldness of the letter, but in the newness of Spirit, and are delivered from the law, that thing being dead in which we were held, it is equitable that we bring forth fruit unto God; because when we were in the flesh, the motion of sins, existing through the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death.

The conclusion is not openly inferred, but is understood, which is a mode of frequent occurrence, because the proposition, or question to be treated, does not differ from the conclusion in the matter, but only in the mode of position.

7. But though these two verses, the fifth and sixth, have such a relation to those things which preceded as has been already explained, yet they are likewise to be referred to those which follow. For the third and fourth enunciations are proposed in these two verses -- the third in the fifth verse, and the fourth in the sixth. For, this expression,

"The motions of sins, which are by the law, are vigourous, or operate in the members of men who are yet in the flesh," (verse 5) is tantamount in meaning to these words:

"Sin has the dominion over those who are under the law." These words likewise, "But now we are delivered from the law, that being dead wherein we were held, wse so that we should serve in newness of spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter," (verse sixth,) agree well with the following: "Sin shall not have the dominion over those who are under grace." This will be rendered evident if any one translates the particle wse as an ancient interpreter has done, by the words "so that," and understands it not of the end or intention, but of the issue or event, as the almost perpetual use of that particle requires. For the sense is this: "When we were yet in the oldness of the letter and under the law, then we were held under sin; and when we are now delivered from the law and placed in newness of spirit, we are able to serve God in righteousness and true holiness," agreeably to this state of our newness of living.

8. But let us now more closely inspect how this third enunciation is treated, since in it is laid the principal part of the controversy. The exposition of the whole matter consists of the proposing of the enunciation, and of its investigation, the latter of which is partly an explanation, and partly an application of the cause. Both of these are briefly joined to the proposition, as it is laid down in the fifth verse of this chapter; wherefore they are more copious, and better accommodated to the more prolix investigation, than as they are proposed from the fourteenth verse of the sixth chapter.

9. For that proposition is, "sin," or, as it is more energetically expressed, "The motions of sins have the dominion over those who are under the law." This attribute is likewise more nervously expressed by this method of speech, by which the motions of sins are said to have existence by the law itself.

Two effects of this dominion, therefore, are added to the proposition for the sake of explication. One is, its vigour, and its working in the members; the other is, its bringing forth fruits unto death. The cause why, in men under the law, "the motions of sins work in their members to bring forth fruit unto death," is rendered in these words,

"when we were in the flesh." For the reference to the time preceding is taken from the carnal state, which state comprises the cause why, in times past, "the motions of sins did work in our members." As if the apostle had said, "It is not wonderful that the motions of sins have had the dominion over us, and have worked in our members to bring forth fruit unto death; for we are in the flesh; and the law itself is so far from being able to hinder this dominion and to restrain the vigourous growth of sin, that these motions are by the law far more fervid and vehement, not through the fault of the law, but through the wickedness and obstinacy of sin that holds the dominion and abuses its power."

10. This proposition, therefore, is more largely explained, from the seventh verse to the fourteenth; and its cause is fully treated from the fourteenth verse inclusive, to the end of the chapter. The explanation is occupied about this two- fold effect -- the working of sin, and its fructification by which it brings forth fruit unto death. The rendering of the cause is continually intent upon what is said in the fifth verse, "When we were in the flesh." But on both these points, we must carefully guard against bringing the law under the suspicion of blame, as though it were of itself the cause of depraved desires in us, and of death; when it is only the occasion, upon which sin violently seizes, and uses it to produce these effects in men who live under the law. In the explanation, both these effects are removed from the law, and they are attributed to sin as to their proper cause; yet this is done in such a way, that it is at the same time added, that sin abuses the law to produce these effects.

11. (i) The former of these effects is removed from the law, in the seventh verse, by these words: "What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid." That is, as if he had said, "Can it, therefore, be attributed to the law that it is itself, or the cause of depraved desires in us, because it is called in the fifth verse, the motions of sin which are by the law?" The apostle replies, that it is very wrong to entertain even the bare thought of such a thing concerning the law. He subjoins a proof of this removal of the first effect, from the contrary effect which the law has; for the law is the index of sin, or that which points it out; therefore, it is neither sin nor the cause of sin. He then illustrates this proof by a special example: "For I should not have known concupiscence, unless the law had said, Thou shaft not desire or covet."

But the same effect is, in the eighth verse, attributed to sin, in these words: "But sin wrought in me all manner of concupiscence," yet so that it abuses the law as an occasion to produce this effect. This is intimated in the words which immediately follow:. "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me," &c. The latter effect [the fructification of sin] is proved in the next verse, in these words: "For, without the law, sin was dead; but, on the approach of the law, sin revived," which is illustrated by its opposite privatives, "For I was alive when sin was dead; but when sin revived then I died;" but, as this was done by the law, it is evident that sin abused the law to produce this effect. But the apostle here joins the second effect to the first, (because they cohere together by nature, and the former is the cause of the latter,) and thus in the tenth and eleventh verses, ascribes death to sin, which abuses the law, yet so as to excuse the law also from the effect of death, as it is expressed in the tenth verse, "the commandment which was unto life;" the cause of death being transferred to sin, in the expression, "for sin, taking occasion by the commandment," &c. But he follows up his exculpation of the law, in the twelfth verse, by a description of the nature of the law, that it "is holy, and just, and good," and, therefore, by no means the cause of death -- an insinuation against the law which he indignantly repels in the former part of the thirteenth verse, by saying, "God forbid that that which is good, should be made death unto me." But in the latter part of this verse, he ascribes the same effect to sin, with the addition of a two-fold end, both of them inclining to the disparagement of sin itself, in these words: "That sin might appear sin, working death in me by that which is good; that sin, by the commandment, might become exceedingly sinful." As though he had said -- "Sin, by this abuse of the law to seduce and kill us, has produced the effect, that. in return, its own depravity and perverseness be made manifest by the law. This perverse depravity consists in sin working death by the law which is good, and in being made exceedingly sinful by the commandment which is just and holy, and that it might only become as it were a sinner above measure by its own wickedness, but also might be declared to be such by the indication of the law, which it has so shamefully abused to produce these effects." But it is apparent from the whole of this explanation, that the apostle has so attempered his style as to draw a conclusion of the necessity of the grace of Christ, from the efficacy of sin, and from the weakness of the law. This will be still more perspicuous, if we briefly comprise this explanation of the apostle in the following form: "Sin has the dominion over those who are under the law, by working in them all manner of concupiscence through the law itself, and also by killing them through it, yet so that the law is free from all blame in both cases, since, it is holy and good, the index of sin, and was given for life. But sin is so powerful in men who are still under the law, that it abuses the law to produce those effects in a man who is under subjection to it; by which abuse of the law, sin, on the other hand, takes away the reward from the law, that its own perverse and noxious disposition and tendency may be manifested by the indication of the law. From these circumstances a man who is under the law is compelled to flee to grace, that he may by its beneficent aid be delivered from the tyranny of such a wicked and injurious master."

12. The rendering of the cause follows from the fourteenth verse to the end of the chapter; in which, as we have already observed, the utmost care is evinced not to impose any ignominy on the law, or to ascribe any blame to it; and the entire mischief is attributed to the power of sin, and to the weakness of that man who is under the law. But the cause is briefly given in the fourteenth verse, in these words: "For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin." But in order that this rendering of the cause may be accurately understood, we must again consider that proposition, the cause of which the apostle determines in this place to explain, and which is this: "Sin has dominion over those who are under the law;" or, "The motions of sins, which are by the law, work in men who are under the law."

13. That the cause of this may be fully and perfectly rendered, it must be shown why the law cannot weaken the force and tyranny of sin in those who are under the law, and why sin holds those who are under the law bound and obnoxious to itself as by some right of its own. Therefore, this rendering of the cause consists of two parts: The first is contained in these words: "For truly the law is spiritual; but I am carnal." That the particle "indeed" or "truly" must be added, is proved both by its relative de, "but,"

as well as by the very subject. The second is contained in these words: "For I am sold under sin;" that is, I am under the dominion of sin, as one who is constituted a purchased servant by the right of sale, and like one who becomes the bond-slave of sin. As though the apostle had said, "That the law is incapable of hindering the strength and operation of sin in men who are under the law, arises from this, that men under the law are carnal; in whom therefore the law, though it is spiritual, does not possess so much power as to enable it to restrain the strong inclination of the flesh to things which are evil and contrary to the law. And since sin, by a certain right of its own, exercises dominion over those men who are under the law, therefore it comes to pass that they have been made bond-slaves to sin, and are bound and "fettered like a purchased menial."

14. The apostle immediately subjoins a proof, in the fifteenth verse, not so much of the fact that a man under the law is carnal, as that he is the slave of sin. But the proof is taken from the peculiar adjunct or effect of a purchased servant, in these words:

"For that which I do I allow not." For a servant does not do that which seems good to himself, but that which his master is pleased to prescribe to him; because thus is the word "I allow" used in this passage, for "I approve." But if any one thinks that it is here used in its proper signification, the argument will be the same, and equal its validity; "for," as Christ has told us, "the servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth;"

(John xv, 15;) neither is his Lord bound, nor is he accustomed, to make known to his servant all his will, except so far as it seems proper to himself to employ the services of his menial through the knowledge of that will.

15. But the first signification of the word is better accommodated to this passage, and seems to be required by those things which follow; for a more ample explanation of this argument is produced in the following words: "For what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I;" which is an evident token of a will that is subjugated, and subject to the will of another; that is, to the will of sin. Therefore he is the servant and the slave of sin.

16. The apostle now deduces two consectaries from this, by the first of which he excuses the law, and by the second, he throws on sin all the blame respecting this matter, as he had also done in a previous part of the chapter. The first consectary is,

"if, then, I do that which I would not, I consent unto the law that it is good." (16.) That is, "if I unwillingly do that which sin prescribes to me, now, indeed, I consent unto the law that it is good, as being that against which sin is committed. I assent to the law that commands, though, while placed under the dominion of sin, I am unable to perform what it prescribes." The second consectary is, "Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." (17.) That is, "therefore, because I reluctantly do what I do, not at my own option but at that of another, that Is, of my master, who is sin; it follows from this, that it is not I who do it, but sin which dwells in me, has the dominion over me, and impels me to do it."

17. Having treated upon these subjects in the manner now stated, the apostle returns to the same rendering of the cause and the proof of it. The eighteenth verse contains the rendering of the cause, in these words: "For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing:" Wherefore it is not surprising that the law, though it be spiritual, is not able to break the power of sin in a man who is under the law; for that which is good does not dwell, that is, has not the dominion, in a carnal man who is under the law. The proof of this is subjoined in the same verse: "For to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not." Or, "I do not find how I can perform any thing good."

18. The more ample explanation of it is given in the nineteenth verse, "For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil that I would not, that I do;" which is an evident token that no good thing dwelleth in my flesh. For if any good thing dwelt in my flesh, I should then be actually capable of performing that to which my mind and will are inclined. He then deduces once more the second consectary, in the twentieth verse: "Now if I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me."

19. But from all these arguments, in the twenty-first verse he concludes the thing intended: "I find then a law, [which is imposed in this way,] that, when I would do good, evil is present with me." That is, In reality, therefore, I find from the circumstance of "to will being present with me," but of not being capable of performing what is good, that evil or sin is present with me, and not only has it a place in me but it likewise prevails. This conclusion does not differ in meaning from the rendering of the cause which is comprised in the fourteenth verse, in this expression:

"But I am carnal, sold under sin." But in the two subsequent verses, the twenty-second and twenty-third, the apostle proves the conclusion which immediately preceded; and, in proving it, he more clearly explains whence and how it happens, that a man who is under the law cannot have dominion over sin, and that, whether willing or unwilling, such a person is compelled to fulfill the lusts of sin; and he says, "for I delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members."

20. At the close, from a consideration of the miserable state of those men who are under the law, a votive exclamation is raised for their deliverance from this tyranny and servitude of sin, in the following terms: "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver (or snatch) me from the body of this death?" That is, not from this mortal body, but from the dominion of sin, which he here calls the body of death, as he calls it also in other passages the body of sin.

21. To this exclamation he subjoins a reply -- "the grace of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord, will deliver thee" -- or a thanksgiving, in which the apostle intimates, in his own person, whence deliverance must be sought and expected. In the last place, a conclusion is annexed to the whole investigation, in the latter part of the twenty-fifth verse, in which is briefly defined the entire condition of a man under the law, that had been previously and at great length described; "so then, with the mind, I myself, serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of sin." And in this manner is concluded the seventh chapter.

22. But in order that these arguments, after having been reduced to a small compass, may be perceived at a single glance, let us briefly recapitulate this second part likewise, in the following manner:

"We have already declared, that sin has dominion over those men who are under the law: But the cause of this is, that, though the law itself is spiritual, and though the men who are under it consent unto it that it is good, and though they will what is good and delight in the law of God after the inward man; yet these very men who are under the law are carnal, sold under sin, have no good thing dwelling in their flesh, but have sin dwelling in them, and evil is present with them; they have likewise a law in their members which not only wars against the law of their mind, but which also renders them captives to the law of sin which is in their members. Of this matter it is a certain and evident token, that the good which such men would, they do not; but the evil which they hate, that they do; and that when they will to do good, they do not obtain the ability. Hence it is undoubtedly evident, that they are not themselves the masters of their own acts, but sin which dwelleth in them; to which is also chiefly to be ascribed the culpability of the evil which is committed by these men who are like the reluctant perpetrators of it. But on this account, these persons, from the shewing of the law, having become acquainted with their misery, are compelled to cry out, and to implore the grace of Jesus Christ."

VERSE THE FOURTEENTH

1. A closer investigation of this question and a demonstration taken from the text itself, that the apostle is here treating about a man paced under the law, and not under grace. 2. The manner in which Carnal and spiritual are opposed to each other in the scriptures. 3. An objection taken from 1 Corinthians iii, 1,2; and a reply to it. 4. The meaning of the phrase, sold under sin. The views of Calvin and Beza on this verse.

1. Having, in the preceding manner, considered the disposition and economy of the whole chapter, let us now somewhat more strictly investigate the question proposed by us, which is this: "Are those things which are recorded, from the fourteenth verse to the end of the seventh chapter, to be understood concerning a man who is under the law, or concerning one who is under grace?"

First of all, let some attention be bestowed on the connection of the fourteenth verse with those which preceded it; for the rational particleevail, and who are said, in other passages, to be in the flesh, and to walk according to the flesh, in opposition to those who are spiritual, who, "through the Spirit, have mortified the deeds of the flesh and have crucified the flesh with its affections and lusts." But the apostle seems here to bestow this appellation on the Corinthians, or on some of them, with this two-fold reference; for he says that, with respect to knowledge, they are "babes in Christ," that is, unskillful and inexperienced in the doctrine of piety, who had to be "fed with milk, and who were not able to bear solid food." But with respect to affections, he says that they "are carnal, and walk as men," on account of the contentions and divisions which prevailed among them, from which it was evident that, in them, the flesh had the predominance over the Spirit. But in whatever sense or manner the word is used in this passage, it brings no advantage to the cause of those who declare that the apostle calls himself a carnal man in Romans vii, 14. For if the same word is not used in 1

Corinthians iii, 1, in a sense similar to that which it bears in Romans vii, 14, then it is adduced in an unlearned and useless manner in elucidation of this question; for equivocation is the fruitful parent of error. If the word is to be received in the same sense in both passages, then I am at liberty firmly to conclude from this, in favour of my opinion, that the apostle cannot be called carnal in Romans 7, for under that appellation he severely reprehends the Corinthians because he "was not able to speak unto them as unto spiritual persons," since they were such as were still carnal; which he would have done without any just cause, if he were himself also comprehended under that title when understood in the same signification.

4. Thirdly. The same man about whom the apostle is here treating, is also said, in this, the fourteenth verse, to be sold under sin, or, (which is the same thing,) the slave of sin, and become its servant by purchase, which title can, in no sense whatsoever, be adapted to men placed under grace -- a misappropriation of epithet, against which the Scriptures openly reclaim in many passages: "If the Son, therefore, shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." (John viii, 36.) "For he that is dead" is justified, that is, he "is freed from sin" (Rom. vi, 7.) "But God be thanked that ye were the servants of sin; being then made free from sin, ye became the servants of righteousness," or those who are completely subject to it. (Rom. vi, 17,18.) But that the two things here specified [the service of sin, and that of righteousness] are so opposed to each other, as not to be able to meet together at once in the same individual, is evident from the twentieth verse of the same chapter: "For when ye were the servants of sin, ye were free from righteousness." But that the same remark applies to a man who is under the law, is apparent from a comparison of 2 Corinthians iii, 17, "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty," with Gal. v, 18, "But if ye be led of Spirit, ye are not under the law;" therefore, they who are of the Spirit are free. But such persons are not under the law; therefore, those who are under the law are not free, but are the servants of sin.

For, whether any one unwillingly, and compelled by the force of sin, obeys it, or whether it willingly -- whether anyone becomes the slave of sin by the deed of his first parents, or whether, in addition to this, "he has sold himself to work evil in the sight of the Lord," as it is related concerning Ahab in 1 Kings xxi, 20. In each of these cases is the man truly and deservedly called the servant of sin. "For of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought into bondage." (2 Pet. ii, 19.) And "whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin." (John viii, 34.) "Know ye not that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey, whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness?" (Rom. vi, 16.) For the different mode of servitude does not exempt or discharge [the subject of it] from servitude, but is conclusive that he is under it.

Should any one reply, concerning the man mentioned in Romans vii, 14, "that he is not simply called the servant of sin, but that he is so denominated with this restriction

-- that he is the servant of sin with respect to the flesh, and not with respect to the mind, as is apparent from the last verse of the same chapter, which is an explanation of this verse," I rejoin that this man is simply called the servant of sin, but of the description of those who unwillingly and with a reluctant conscience serve sin. But with respect to the manner in which the last verse of the chapter is to be understood, we shall perceive what it is when we arrive at that part.

But the greater part of the divines of our profession acknowledge that this fourteenth verse must be understood as relating to an unregenerate man, to one who is not placed under grace. Thus Calvin observes on verse, "The apostle now begins to bring the law and the nature of man a little more closely into hostile contact with each other." And on the subsequent verse he says, "He now descends to the more particular example of a man already regenerate." Thus also, Beza, against Castellio, in the refutation of the first argument to the thirteenth and fourteenth calumny, (fol. 413,) says, "St. Paul exclaims that he is not sufficient even to think that which is good; and in another passage, considering himself not within the boundaries of grace, he says, But I am carnal, sold under sin."

VERSE THE FIFTEENTH

1. He does not approve of that which he does, neither does he do that which he would, but he does that which he hates. 2. The nature of the contest carried on in man. 3. The opinion of St. Augustine and Peter Martyr, respecting the conflict in men who are not born again.

1. The fifteenth verse contains a proof of the affirmation in the preceding verse, which is, that the man about whom the apostle is treating, is "sold under sin" or is the bond-slave of sin.

For the argument is taken from the office and proper effect of a purchased servant, and of one who has no legal control over himself, but who is subjected to the power of another. For it is the property of a servant, not to execute his own will, but that of his lord, whether he does this willingly and with full consent, or he does it with the judgment of his own mind exclaiming against it, and with his will resisting it. This is expressed in no unskillful manner by St. Augustine, in his Retractions (lib. I, cap. i, )

"he who by the flesh that lusteth against the Spirit, does those things which he would not, lusteth indeed unwillingly; and in this he does not that which he would; but if he be overcome [by the flesh lusting against the Spirit] he willingly consents to his lusts -

- and in this he does nothing but what he has willed, that is, devoid of righteousness and the servant of sin." This is confirmed by Zanchius, on the works of Redemption: (lib. I, cap. iii, ) "Undoubtedly Peter, therefore, denied Christ because he would, though he did not that with a full will, but reluctantly." But the proof [which the apostle adduces in the fifteenth verse] is accommodated to the condition of the man about whom he is treating, that is, of a man who is under the law, and who is the servant of sin just so far as to serve it not with full consent, but with a conscience crying out against it. For these are the words of the apostle: "For that which I do, I allow not," that is, I do not approve of it. This sentiment, he explains and proves more at large in the words which immediately follow in the same verse: "For what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that I do," from which we frame this syllogism. He who approves not of that which he does, nor does that which he would, is the slave of another, that is, of sin; But the man about whom the apostle is treating, approves not of that which he does, nor does what he would, but he does that which he hates: Therefore, the man who is in this place the subject of discussion, is the slave of another, that is, of sin; and therefore the same man is unregenerate, and not placed under grace.

2. But perhaps you will say, "In this passage is described a contest in the man about whom the apostle is treating, which contest cannot take place in a man who is unregenerate."

Answer. In this passage, the contest between this man and sin is not described; but the dominion of sin, and the servitude of the man himself under sin, are demonstrated from the proper effect of a servant by purchase, which effect, in reality, is not produced by this man without much reluctance of conscience and great mental struggles, which precede the very production of the act; but this deed is not committed except by a mind which is conquered and overcome by the force of sin. Then I deny the preceding affirmation that, in an unregenerate man, of what description soever he may be, there is discovered no contest of the mind or conscience with the inclinations and desires of the flesh and of sin. Nay, I further assert and affirm, that, in a man who is under the law, there is necessarily a conflict between the mind and conscience on the one part, that prescribe those things which are just and honest, and the inclinations or motions of sin, on the other, which impel the man to things that are unlawful and forbidden. For the Scriptures describe to us a two-fold conflict against sin -- the First, that of the flesh, and of the mind or the conscience-the Second, that of the flesh, or sin, and of the Spirit.

The former of these obtains in all those who have a knowledge of what is righteous and iniquitous, of what is just and unjust, "in whose hearts is written the work of the law, and whose thoughts, in the mean while, either accuse or excuse one another," as it is recorded in Romans ii, 15, "who hold the truth in unrighteousness," (i, 18) whose consciences are not yet seared as with a hot iron, who are not yet "past all feeling,"

(Ephes. iv, 19,) and who know the will of their Lord, but do it not. (Luke xii, 47) 3. This view of the matter is confirmed to us by St. Augustine, in his book "The Exposition of certain propositions in the Epistle to the Romans,"(cap. 3) in which he says, "Before the law, that is, in the state or degree before the law, we do not fight; because we not only lust and sin, but sins have also our approval. Under the law we fight, but are overcome; for we confess that those things which we do, are evil; and, by making such confession, we intimate that we would not do them. But, because we have not yet any grace we are conquered. In this condition it is shown to us, in what situation we be; and while we are desirous of rising up, and still fall down, we are the more grievously afflicted," &c. This is likewise acknowledged by Peter Martyr, who observes, on Romans v, 8, "We do not deny that there is occasionally some contest of this kind in unregenerate men; not because their minds are not carnal and inclined to vicious pursuits, but because in them are still engraven the laws of nature, and because in them shines some illumination of the Spirit of God, though it be not such as can justify them, or can produce a saving change."

The latter contest, that between the flesh and the Spirit, obtains in the regenerate alone. For in that heart in which the Spirit of God neither is nor dwells, there can be no contest -- though some persons are said to "resist the Holy Spirit," and, to "sin against the Holy Ghost," which expressions have another meaning.

The difference between these two contests is very manifest from the diversity of the issue or consequence of each: For, in the first, the flesh overcomes; but, in the latter, the Spirit usually gains the victory and becomes the conqueror. This may be seen by a comparison of this passage with Gal. v, 16,17 -- a comparison which we will afterwards undertake.

But from the proper effects of the law itself, it may be most certainly demonstrated that a contest against sin is carried on within a man who is so under the law as that it has discharged all its office towards him, and has exerted all its powers in him. For it is the effect of the law to convict a man, already convicted of sin, of the righteousness of God, to incite him to obedience, to convince him of his own weakness, to inflame him with a desire to be delivered, and to compel him to seek for deliverance. It is well known, however, that these effects cannot be completed without a contest against indwelling sin. But we have already said that about such a man as this the apostle treats in this passage - - one who is in this manner under the law.

If any man will yet obstinately maintain, that all unregenerate persons in general perpetrate that to the commission of which, sin and the flesh persuade, with full consent and without any reluctance, let him not view it as a grievance if I demand proof for his assertion, since it is made against express testimonies of Scripture, and since many examples may be adduced in proof of the contrary, such as that of Balsam, who, against his own conscience, obeyed the king of Moab -- that of Saul, who, against his own conscience, persecuted David -- that of the Pharisees, who, through obstinate malice, resisted the Holy Spirit, &c. But even that very common distinction, which sins are distinguished into those of ignorance, infirmity and malice, is likewise by this method destroyed, if all unregenerate persons commit sin with full assent and without any struggle or reluctance. I am desirous also, on this occasion, to bring to the recollection of the adverse party, the steps or degrees by which God is accustomed to convert his children to himself from wickedness of life, and which, if they will diligently and without prejudice consider, they will perceive that the contest between the mind and the flesh, which is excited by the law, must of necessity be placed among the beginnings and the precursors of regeneration.

VERSE THE SIXTEENTH.

1. He consents to the law that it is good; a consectary deduced. 2. An objection answered. 3. A second objection.

1. From what has preceded, a consectary or consequence is deduced for the excuse of the law, in the following words: "If then, I do that which I would not, I consent unto the law that it is good." In this verse nothing is said, which may not, in the best possible manner and without any controversy, agree with one who is under the law.

For unless a man under the law yields his assent to it that it is good, he is not at all under the law: For this is the first effect of the law in those whom it will subject to itself -- to convince them of its equity and justice; and when this is done, such consent necessarily arises. It is also apparent from the first and second chapters of the epistle to the Romans, and from the tenth chapter, in which "a zeal of God touching the law"

is attributed to the Jews, that this consent is not peculiar to a regenerate man, nor is it the proper effect of the regenerating Spirit.

2. If any one say, "The subject in this passage is that assent by which a man assents to the whole law of God, and which cannot be in those who do not understand the whole law, but none among the unregenerate understands the entire law of God,"

I reply, FIRST, it can never be affirmed with truth, that "none among the unregenerate understands the entire law" while the following passages exclaim against such an assertion: "That servant who knew his Lord's will and did not according to it, shall be beaten with many stripes." (Luke xii, 47) "Though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing;" (1 Cor. xiii, 2 )

"Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth;" (1 Cor. viii, 1) "For it had been better for them not to have known the way of righteousness, than, after they have known it, to turn from the holy commandment delivered unto them." (2 Pet. ii, 21.) Secondly. Neither can this affirmation be truly made in every case: "No man assents to the entire law unless he understands the whole of it;" for he assents to the whole law who knows it to be from God and to be good, though he may not particularly understand all things which are prescribed and forbidden in the law. And where, among the regenerate, is that man to be found who dares to claim for himself such a knowledge of the whole law?

Thirdly. That which is appropriately subservient to this purpose, is, a denial that this passage has any reference to that consent by which a man assents to all the precepts Of the law as being specially understood; for neither do the words themselves indicate any such thing, nor does the analogy of the connection permit it. Because it is concluded from the circumstance of his doing what he would not, that he "consents unto the law that it is good "which conclusion cannot be deduced from this deed if it be said, that this expression relates to the consent which arises from a special acquaintance with and an understanding of all the precepts of the law. For that which this man here says that he does, is a particular deed; it is, therefore, prohibited by some special precept of the law, the knowledge and approval of which is the cause why he who does that deed does it with reluctance. Hence, as from a consequent, it is concluded from this deed thus performed, (that Is committed with a mind crying out and striving against it,) that he who commits the deed in this manner, consents to the law that it is good.

3. But some one will perhaps rejoin and say, "This passage does not relate to the consent of general estimation, which may be possessed, and is so, in reality, by many of the unregenerate. But it has reference to the consent of particular approbation, which is the peculiar act of the regenerating Spirit." Such an objector ought to know that those things which are confidently uttered without any attempt at proof, may, with equal freedom, be rejected without offering the smallest reason. The thing itself, however, evinces the contrary; for, to consent to the law that it is good, is not to approve in particular a deed which has been prescribed by the law; for this consent of particular approbation cannot consist with the perpetration of a deed which is particularly disapproved. But the commission of such an act agrees well with the consent about which the apostle here treats.

VERSE THE SEVENTEENTH

1. He no longer himself perpetrates this evil, but it is done by sin that dwelleth in him, a second Consectary deduced. 2. From this verse are drawn two arguments for the contrary opinion, both of which are refuted -- the first argument, and a reply to it. 3.

The second argument and a reply. 4. An argument from this verse in favour of true opinion. 5. On the word dwelling, or inhabiting, according to its signification, and the usage of Scripture, with quotations from Zanchius, Bucer, Peter Martyr, and Musculus.

1. From the preceding verses is deduced another consectary, by which this man transfers to sin all the blame of this matter -- not to excuse himself, that be far from him, for the law has been given and written on his heart, that "his thoughts may accuse or else excuse one another, but to point out his servile condition under the dominion of sin. In this consectary, therefore, nothing can be contained which does not agree with a man who is under the law. If it were otherwise, the consectary would contain more than was to be found in the premises, which, it has been demonstrated, agree extremely well with a man who is under the law.

2. But let us see the words of the consectary: "Now then, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me," that is, sin that dwelleth in me, does this." From these words, the opposite party seem capable of eliciting two arguments in support of the opinion which affirms that the apostle is here treating about a regenerate man and one who is placed under grace.

The First of these arguments is of this kind: -- "It cannot be said of unregenerate men when they sin, that they do not commit it themselves, but that it is committed by sin which dwells in them. But this is most appropriately said about the regenerate: Therefore, the man about whom the apostle here treats, is "not an unregenerate man, but one who is regenerate."

Answer. The antecedent must be examined; for, when it is either granted or denied, the consequence is also granted or denied.

(1.) It is evident, that it cannot simply be affirmed concerning any man, whatever his condition may be, that he does of himself commit the sin which he commits; for this is a contradiction in the adjunct; and the apostle declares, that this man "does evil."

Therefore, if this can be said with truth, the expression must be understood relatively and in a certain respect. But this relation or respect ought to be founded either in the man himself who perpetrates the offense, or in the perpetration itself. (i.) If this respect be founded in the man himself, it must be thus generally explained and enunciated -- "The sin which this man commits, he does as he is such a one; and he does not as he is such a one." (ii.) If the respect be founded in the perpetration and the effecting of the sin, then it must be taken from the varied relation of causes of the same kind to the effect. But in this passage, the apostle is treating on the efficient cause of sin, which is here allowed to be two-fold -- The man, and sin dwelling in him, but so as this may be said to be effected by indwelling sin, and not by the man.

Wherefore, this effect must be taken from the distribution of the efficient cause, by which it is distributed into that which is primary and principal, and that which is secondary and less principal.

(2.) It can by no means be said by him who is inspired with a sincere love of truth, that this two-fold respect is applicable only to a man who is regenerate and placed under grace, but that it does not at all appertain to a man placed under the law or does not in the least agree with him. For as this respect or relation is two-fold in the regenerate, On account of the imperfection of regeneration in this life, and the remains of "the old man," according to which respect it may be said concerning a regenerate man, that "as he is regenerate he does this, and as he is not regenerate he does it not or does not do it perfectly;" so, likewise, in a man under the law, the respect is two-fold on account of the coming in of the law; for he is "carnal" and "the servant of sin," and is under the law, that is, "he consents to the law that it is good,"

which consent is neither of the flesh nor according to the flesh, that is, it is not from depraved nature. Wherefore, it may be said concerning a man under the law, that he commits sin, not as he is under the taw, nor as he consents to the law that it is good, but as he is carnal and the servant of sin.

(3.) The second respect (according to which the effect, that has simply proceeded from two concurrent causes, is taken away from one of them and ascribed to the other) seems to hold the chief place in this passage, as it does also in this saying of the apostle, "I laboured more abundantly than they all; yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me." (1 Cor. xv, 10.) For it is well known to be a very general practice to ascribe the effect to the principal and primary of two concurrent causes, at the same time taking away the same effect from the secondary cause; especially if by some means, either beyond nature, or against the will and by the force of the superior cause, the secondary one has been drawn forth to efficiency. Thus, an ambassador who manages the cause of his prince, is not said himself to act, but his prince, who makes use of his services. Thus, much more appropriately, if a servant, who is oppressed by a tyrannical lord, does something against his own will at the command and through the compulsion of his lord, he will not himself be said to do this, but his lord who has the dominion over him. And it is most manifest, to every one who will look upon these words of the apostle with unjaundiced eyes, that they convey this meaning; as is apparent from the epithet which is attributed to sin, the perpetrator of this evil, and by which the dominion of sin is denoted, that is, "sin that dwelleth in me does it."

(4.) It is no matter of wonder, that "he does it not, but sin does it;" for "when the law came, sin revived and he died." (Rom. vii, 9) Therefore, the cause of actions, is that which lives, and not that which is dead.

It is apparent, then, that the first part of the antecedent in this argument is false, and on this account the second part is not reciprocal; therefore, the conclusion cannot be deduced from it by good consequence, which consequence concludes [that the apostle is here treating] about a regenerate man, to the exclusion of the unregenerate, 3. The second argument is drawn from the adverbs of time, "now," and "no more,"

which are used in this verse; and from which a conclusion is thus drawn in favour of the same opinion: "These adverbs have respect to time antecedent; but the time antecedent is the time when the man was not regenerate. As though he had said, Formerly, when I was not yet regenerated, I committed sin; but now I no longer do this, because I am regenerated. Therefore, it is apparent that this present time, which is signified by the adverb "now," must be understood concerning the state of regeneration, since it cannot be said concerning an unregenerate man, that "though he formerly committed sin, he commits it no more."

Answer. -- I grant it to be a great truth, that these adverbs denote relation to time antecedent, and that in fact the passage is thus commodiously explained: Formerly indeed perpetrated evil, but now I no longer do this. But I deny that the time antecedent embraces the entire state before regenerations; for the state of unregeneracy, or that which is prior to regeneration, is distinguished by our author, the apostle himself, into another twofold state -- before or without the law, and under the law, as it is expressed in the ninth verse of this very chapter. And the antecedent time, in reference to which it is said "now" and "no more," comprises the state without the law; but the present time [described by the two adverbs] comprises the state under the law. As if he had said, "Formerly, when I was without the law, I committed sin, but now, when I am under the law, I no longer commit it, but sin that dwelleth in me."

This is in unison with what is said in the ninth verse: "For I was alive without the law once," or formerly; "but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died." For, while "he was alive without the law," he committed evil without any reluctance of mind or of will. Therefore, at that time, he did evil; but now, being placed under the law, he undoubtedly commits sin, but he does it against his conscience and not without resistance on the part of his will. Wherefore, the cause and culpability of sin must be ascribed, not so much to the man himself, as to the violent impulse of sin.

4. Thus far we have perceived, that this verse contains nothing which can afford support to the opposite opinion. Let us further see whether an argument may not be elicited from it, for establishing the truth of the other opinion, which declares that it must be understood concerning an unregenerate man, and one who is placed under the law:

The apostle says that "sin dwelleth in this man." But sin does not dwell in those who are regenerate.

Therefore, the apostle is not, in this passage, treating about the regenerate or those who are placed under grace, but about the unregenerate and those who are under the law.

One of the premises of this syllogism is in the text: the other must be demonstrated by us. I am aware indeed, that this seems wonderful to those who are accustomed to the distinction of sin, by which one kind is called ruling or governing, and another receives the appellation of sin existing within us, or of indwelling and inhabiting sin, and who suppose that the former of these epithets is peculiar to the unregenerate, and the latter to the regenerate. But if any one require a proof of this distinction, those who ought to give it will evince a degree of hesitation. But is not one kind of sin ruling or reigning, and another existing within and not reigning, and is not the former peculiar to the unregenerate, and the latter to the regenerate? Who can deny, when the Scriptures affirm, that there are in us the remains of sin and of the old man as long as we survive in this mortal life? But what man, conversant with the Scriptures, shall distinguish reigning from indwelling or inhabiting sin, and will account indwelling sin to be the same as the sin existing within? Indeed, indwelling sin is reigning sin, and reigning is indwelling, and therefore sin does not dwell in the regenerate, because it does not domineer or rule in them. I prove the first part of this, both from the very signification of the word to inhabit or dwell, and from the familiar usage of the Scriptures.

5. Concerning the signification of the word, Zanchius observes, in his treatise On the Attributes of God, "God is not said to dwell in the wicked, but he dwells in the pious.

For what is it to dwell in any place? It is not simply to be there, as people are at inns and places of entertainment during journeys; but it is to reign and have the dominion at his pleasure as if in his own residence." (Lib. 2, cap. 6, quest. 3.) On Ephes. iii, 17, the same Zanchius says, "In this proposition, Christ dwells in your heart by faith, the word to dwell is undoubtedly put metaphorically; the metaphor being taken, not from those persons who, as tenants or lodgers, and as strangers or travelers, tarry for a season in the house or inn belonging to another; but it is taken from masters of families, who, in their own proper dwelling houses live at liberty, work, govern the family, and exercise dominion."

Bucer observes, on the very passage which is the subject of our meditation, "He says that this destructive force or power dwells in him, that is, it entirely occupies him and has the dominion, as is the manner of those who are at their own house, in their proper dwelling and domicile. The apostle Paul, and all Scripture, frequently employ this metaphor of inhabitation or residing; and by it they usually signify the dominion and the certain presence, almost perpetually, of that which is said to inhabit." And this is one of his subsequent remarks: "When, in this manner, sin resides in us, it completely and more powerfully besieges us and exercises dominion."

Peter Martyr says, on Romans viii, 9, "The metaphor of habitation, or indwelling, is taken from this circumstance -- that they who inhabit a house, not only occupy it, but also govern in it and order [all things in it] at their own option."

The subjoined remark is from Musculus on this passage: "And that he may evidently express this tyranny and violence of sin, he does not say, 'Sin exists in me,' but 'Sin dwells in me.' For by the word to dwell or inhabit, he shows that the dominion of sin is complete in him; and that sin has, as it were, fixed his seat, or taken up his residence, in him. Evil reigns in no place with greater power than in the place where it has fixed its seat; that is what we see in the case of tyrants. Thus, in a contrary manner, God is said to have dwelt in the midst of the children of Israel; because among no other people did he declare his goodness with such strong evidence, as he did among them, according to this expression of the Psalmist -- He hath not dealt so with any nation. (cxlvii, 20) In this sense, the word to inhabit or to dwell, is very often used in the Scriptures. When, therefore, the apostle wished to declare the power and tyranny of sin in him, he said that it dwelt in him, as in its proper domicile, and thus fully reigned."

Calvin, in his Institutes, says (lib. iv, cap. 6, sec. 11,) that we are circumcised in Christ, with a circumcision not made by hands, having laid aside the body of sin which dwelt in our flesh; which he calls the circumcision of Christ.

(2.) What I have said, in accordance with Bucer, about the usage of Scripture, is plain from the following passages: "My Father and I will come unto him, and make our abode with him." (John xiv, 23.) "But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you." (Rom. viii, 11.) "For ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will dwell in them, and walk in them; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people." (2 Cor. vi, 16.) "That Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith." (Ephes. iii, 17.) "When I call to remembrance the unfeigned faith that is in thee, which dwelt first in thy grand-mother Lois, and thy mother Eunice; and, I am persuaded, in thee also." (2 Thess. i, 5.) "That good thing which was committed unto thee, keep by the Holy Ghost which dwelleth in us." (i, 14.) "Do ye think that the Scripture saith in vain, The Spirit that dwelleth in us lusteth to envy? (James iv, 5.) "Nevertheless, we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness?' (2 Pet. iii, 13.) "Thou has not denied my faith, even in those days wherein Antipas was my faithful martyr, who was slain among you where Satan dwelleth." (Rev. ii, 13.) According to this usage, the saints are said to be "a habitation of God through the Spirit." (Ephes. ii, 22.) It is manifest, therefore, from the signification of the word and its most frequent usage in the Holy Scriptures, that indwelling sin is exactly the same as reigning sin.

But it is easy now, likewise, to demonstrate the second premise in the syllogism, (p.

53,) which is, "Sin does not dwell in those who are regenerate." For [according to the passages of Scripture quoted in the preceding paragraph] the Holy Spirit dwells in them. Christ, also, dwells in their hearts by faith; and they are said to be "a habitation of God through the Spirit;" therefore, sin does not dwell in them; because no man can be inhabited by both God and sin at the same time; and when Christ has "overcome the strong man armed," he binds him hand and foot and casts him out, and thus occupies his house and dwells in it. Sin does not dwell in those who are "dead to sin,"

and "in whom Christ liveth." But the regenerate "do not live in sin," but are "dead to it;"(Rom. vi, 2) and in them Christ dwelleth and liveth; (Gal. ii, 20) therefore, sin does not dwell in the regenerate.

Let the two subjoined passages of Scripture be compared together: "Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me:" (Rom. vii, 17) "I live; yet no more I, but Christ liveth in me." (Gal. ii, 20.) We shall be able by this comparison most fully to demonstrate, that in this verse the apostle has not been speaking about himself, but has taken upon himself to personate the character of a man who lives to sin, and in whom sin lives, dwells and operates. Yet it does not follow from this, that no sin is in the regenerate; for it has already been shown, that to be in any place, and there to dwell, to have the dominion, and to reign, are two different things.

THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH VERSES

1. "In this man, (that is, in his flesh,) dwelleth no good thing," &c. 2. An argument for the contrary opinion is proposed from the eighteenth verse -- the answer to it. 3. A reply and its rejoinder. 4. Another reply and its rejoinder. 5. An argument from the same words in favour of the true opinion. 6. The second part of the eighteenth verse,

"To will is present with this man, but how to perform that which is good, he finds not." 7. An argument for the contrary opinion from the second part of this verse -- the answer to it, with distinctions between each kind of willing and nilling, with extracts from St. Augustine, Zanchius and Bucer. 8. An argument for the true opinion, from the eighteenth and nineteenth verses -- the proof of the major proposition, which alone can be called in question. 9. An objection and the answer to it. 10. Another reply and its rejoinder -- not only some other things, but likewise those which precede things, that are saving, have a place in some of the unregenerate, with extracts in confirmation from St. Augustine, and references to Calvin, Beza and Zanchius. 11.

The dissimilar appellations by which the Scriptures distinguish those who are under constraint through the law, from those who are renewed or regenerated by the grace of the gospel.

1. Let the 18th verse now be brought under consideration, in which the apostle follows up the same rendering of a cause, and the proof of it. The rendering of the cause is, "For I know that in me, (that is, in my flesh,)dwelleth no good thing;" by which words the same thing is signified, as by the following: "I am carnal." For he is carnal, in whom no good thing dwelleth. The proof is contained in these words: "For to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good, I find not."

2. From this rendering of the cause, some persons have instituted an argument for the support of their opinion, in the following terms: "In this man, about whom the apostle is treating, are the flesh, and some other thing either distinct or differing from flesh; otherwise, the apostle would not have corrected himself by saying, In me, that is, in my flesh. "But in unregenerate persons, there is nothing else but the flesh; Therefore, the man about whom the apostle here treats, is a regenerate person.

Answer. I grant, that, "in this man is some other thing diverse or distinct from the flesh;" for this is to be seen in the apostolical correction. But I deny, that "in unregenerate persons is nothing else beside the flesh" -- in those unregenerate persons, I say, who are under the law, and about whom we are engaged in this controversy.

I adduce this reason for the justness of my negation; because in men who are under the law is a mind which knows some truth concerning God and "that which may be known of God," (Rom. i, 18,19) which has a knowledge of that which is just and unjust, and whose "thoughts accuse or else excuse one another," (ii, 1-15,) which knows that the indulgence of carnal desires is sinful, (vii, 7) which says that "men must neither steal nor commit adultery," (2, 21,22)&c., &c. To certain of the unregenerate, also is attributed some illumination of the Holy Ghost, (Heb. vi, 4,) a

"knowledge of the Lord and saviour Jesus Christ,", a "knowledge of the way of righteousness," (2 Pet. 2, 20,21) some acquaintance with the will of the Lord, (Luke xii, 47,) the gift of prophecy, &c., &c. (1 Cor. 13.) That man who is bold enough to style such things as these "the flesh," inflicts a signal injury on God and his Spirit.

And indeed how, under the appellation of "the flesh" can be comprehended that which accuses sin, convinces men of sin, and compels them to seek deliverance?

There is, then, in men who are under the law, "the flesh, and something beside the flesh," that Is a mind imbued with a knowledge of the law and consenting to it that it is good; and in some unregenerate persons there Is beside the flesh, a mind enlightened by a knowledge of the gospel. But to the "other thing which is distinct from the flesh," the apostle does not, in this chapter, give the title of the Spirit, but that of the mind.

The remark of Musculus on this passage is as follows: "Behold how cautiously the apostle again employs the word to dwell. He does not say, "I know that in me is no good thing;' for, whence could he otherwise approve of good things and detest those which are evil, consenting to 'the law of God, that is holy, and just, and good,' if he had in himself nothing of good? But he say, 'I know that in me dwelleth no good thing;' that Is, it does not reign in me, does not possess the dominion, since it has seized upon sin for itself, and since the will earnestly desires that which is good, though it is not free, but weak and under restraint, enduring the power of a tyrant."

3. But some one will here reply, "Not only is something different from the flesh attributed to this man, but the inhabitation or residence of good is likewise attributed to that which is different from the flesh; for, otherwise, that part of the verse in which the apostle corrects himself, would not have been necessary; but in an unregenerate man, or one who is under the law, there is nothing in which good may reside.

Therefore, this is a regenerate man," &c.

Rejoinder. While I concede the first of these premises, I deny the second which affirms, "In an unregenerate man, or one who is under the law, there is nothing in which good may dwell or reside." For in the mind of such a man dwells some good thing, that is, some truth and knowledge of the law. The signs of habitation or residence are the works which this knowledge and truth in the mind unfold or disclose. For instance -- a conscience not only accusing a man of sin, but also convincing him of it -- the delivering of a sentence of condemnation against the man himself -- the enacting of good laws -- careful attention to public discipline -- the punishment of crimes -- the defense of good people -- despair of obtaining righteousness by the law and by legal works the impelling necessity to desire deliverance and to seek for it. These works, indeed, are most certain signs of the law dwelling and reigning in the mind of such a man as has been described.

On this point, I intreat, that no one will condemn as heresy that which he has yet either not heard, or not sufficiently considered. For I do not assert that good dwells and reigns in a man under the law, or in any of the unregenerate. For to reign in the mind, and, simply, to reign in the man, are not the same thing. Because, if this knowledge were simply to dwell and reign in the man, this very man would then live in a manner agreeable to his knowledge, the resistance of the flesh being repelled by that which would simply obtain the first and principal place in a man.

If any one closely considers this rendering of the cause, and accommodates it to the design of the apostle, he will understand that the apostolical correction was both necessary and produced for this purpose -- that, notwithstanding the indwelling of something good in the mind of a man who is under the law, a proper and adequate cause might be given why, in such a man as this, "the motions of sins" flourish, and work all concupiscence; which cause is this: In the flesh of this man dwelleth no good thing. For if any good thing dwelt in his flesh, he would then not only know and will what is good, but would also complete it in actual operation, his passions or desires being tamed and subdued, and subjected to the law of God. In reference to this, it is appositely observed by Thomas Aquinas on this very passage -- "And by this, it is rendered manifest that the good thing [or blessing] of grace does not dwell in the flesh; because if it dwelt in the flesh, as I have the faculty of willing that which is good through the grace that dwells in my mind, so I should then that of perfecting or fulfilling what is good through the grace that would dwell in my mind."

4. But some one will object -- "In the Scriptures, the whole unregenerate man is styled flesh. Thus, For that he also is flesh. (Gen. vi, 3.) That which is born of the fish, is flesh. (John iii, 6.)"

REPLY. -- First. This mode of speaking is metonymical, and the word carnal "flesh,"

is used instead of carnal, by a usage peculiar to the Hebrews, who employ the abstract for the concrete. This is clearly pointed out by Beza, on the passage just quoted, (John iii, 6,) on which he observes -- "Flesh is here put for carnal, as, among the Hebrews, appellatives are frequently employed as adjectives. This was also a practice among the Greeks and Romans, as in the words, kaqarma &c.

Secondly. Though the word flesh, in the abstract, be urged, yet the whole man may be called flesh, but not the whole of man; for the mind which condemns sin and justifies the law, is not flesh. But this very same mind may in some degree be called carnal, because it is in a man who is carnal, and because the flesh, which fights against the mind, brings the whole man into captivity to the law of sin, and by this means has the predominance in that man.

5. But from these remarks may be constructed an argument in confirmation of the true sentiment, in the following manner:

In the flesh of a regenerate man dwells that which is good; therefore, the man about whom the apostle discourses is unregenerate.

I prove the proposition from the proper effect of the indwelling Spirit; for the Holy Spirit crucifies the flesh with its affections and lusts, mortifies the flesh and its deeds, subdues the flesh to Himself, and weakens the body of the flesh of sin: And He performs all these operations by his indwelling. Therefore, good dwelleth in the flesh of a regenerate man. The assumption is in the text itself; therefore, the conclusion follows from it.

6. Let us now examine the proof of the affirmation -- that in the flesh of this man

"dwelleth no good thing." This is contained in the words subjoined: "For to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good, I find not." From a comparison of the question to be proved, and the argument produced to prove it, it is apparent that the argument is contained in these words: "For I find not to perform that which is good," that is, I attain not to the performance of that which is good. This proof is taken from the effect; for as, from the indwelling in the flesh of that which is good, would follow the performance of good; so, from "no good thing dwelling in the flesh," arises the impossibility of performing that which is good. For these words, "for to will is present with me," are employed through a comparison of things that differ; which was necessary in this place, because the proof was to be accommodated to the man about whom the apostle was treating: And this is the way in which the proof is accommodated -- "To will is indeed present" with a man who is under the law; but the same man "does not find to perform that which is good," because he is carnal. From this it is apparent, that "he is carnal," and that "in his flesh dwelleth no good thing." If any good thing resided in his flesh, it would in that case restrain the strong force and desires of the flesh, and prevent their being able to hinder the performance of the good which he might will.

But let the whole proof be stated in the following syllogism: In the flesh of him who has the power to will, but who "does not find to perform that which is good," dwelleth no good thing; But the man about whom the apostle is treating, has indeed the power of willing, but "does not find to perform that which is good; " Therefore, in the flesh of such a man as this, "dwelleth no good thing."

It will not be denied by any one who is in the least degree acquainted with logic, and who has accurately considered the eighteenth verse, that this is the syllogism of the apostle. But from this proposition I may conclude the proposition of the syllogism which I have already adduced for confirming my opinion, and which is, "In the flesh of a regenerate man dwelleth some good thing," by this argument, "Because a regenerate man finds to perform that which is good." For the contrary would be a consequence from things contrary. That this may the more plainly appear, let us now see this proposition, with others which are deduced from it by inversion. The proposition is, "No man who is incapable of performing that which is good, has any good thing dwelling in his flesh;" therefore, by inversion, "No man who has that which is good dwelling in his flesh, is incapable of performing what is good." To this, is equivalent the following: "Every man who has any thing good dwelling in his flesh, is capable of performing what is good; in fact he is capable, because he has good dwelling within him," therefore, by simple Inversion in a necessary and reciprocal matter, "Every one who is capable of performing what is good, has good dwelling in his flesh." This is the major, from which I assume, "But a regenerate man can perform that which is good." (Phil. 2.) "Therefore, a regenerate man has good dwelling in his flesh;" which was the major of the syllogism that I had previously adduced.

7. But the defenders of the contrary opinion seem to think, that, from this proof, they are able, for the confirmation of their own opinion, to deduce an argument, which they frame thus:

He is a regenerate man, with whom to will that which is good is present: But to will that which is good, is present with this man; Therefore, this man is regenerate.

Answer. Before I reply to each part of this syllogism, I must remove the ambiguity which is in this phrase, "to will that which is good," or the equivocation in the word

"to will." For it is certain, that there are two kinds of this volition or willing; since it is here asserted of one and the same man, that he is occupied both in willing and in not willing that which is good, concerning one and the same object; in willing it, as he

[merely] wills, it but in not willing it as he does not perform it; for this is the reason why he does not perform it, because he does not will it, though [he acts thus] with a will which is, as it were, the servant of sin and compelled not to will [that which is good]. Again, he is occupied both in not willing and in willing that which is evil concerning one and the same object -- in not willing it, as he does not will it and hates it -- in willing it, as he performs the very same [evil] thing; for he would not do it, unless he willed it, though [he acts thus] with a will which is impelled to will by sin that dwelleth in him.

St. Augustine gives his testimony to the expressions which I have here employed, in his Retractions. (Lib. I, cap. 13.)

The remarks of Bucer on this passage are: "Hence it came to pass that David did, not only that which he willed, but also that which he willed not. He did that which he willed not, not indeed when he committed the offense, but when the consideration of the divine law still remained, and when it was restored. He did that which he willed, just at the time when he actually concluded and determined about the woman presented to his view. So Peter," &c. (Fol. 368.) Zanchius, also, in his book, On the Works of Redemption, observes -- "This was undoubtedly the reason why Peter denied Christ, because he willed so to do, though not with a full will, neither did he willingly deny Him." (Lib. I, cap. 3, fol. 25) Wherefore, since it is impossible that there should be only a single genus of volition and nolition, or one mode of willing and not willing, by which a man wills the good and does not will the same good, and by which he does not will the evil and wills the same evil; this phrase, "to will that which is good" and "not to will that which is evil,"

must have a twofold meaning, which we will endeavour now to explain.

(1.) Because every volition and every nolition follows the judgment of the man respecting the thing presented as an object, each of them, therefore, is also different according to the diversity of the judgment. But the judgment itself, with reference to its cause, is two-fold: For it either proceeds from the mind and reason approving the law that it is good, and highly esteeming the good which the law prescribes, and hating the evil which it forbids; or, it proceeds from the senses and affections, and (as the expression is) from sensible knowledge, or that which is derived from the senses, and which approves of that which is useful, pleasant and delightful, though it be forbidden; but which disapproves of that which is hurtful, useless, and unpleasant, though it be prescribed. The former of these is called "' the judgment of general estimation," the latter "the judgment of particular approbation or operation." Hence, one volition is from the judgment of general estimation; the other is from the judgment of particular approbation, and thus becomes a nolition. On this account, the will which follows the judgment of general estimation wills that which the law prescribes, and does not will that which the law forbids. But the same will, when it follows the judgment of particular approbation, wills the delectable or useful evil which the law forbids, and does not will the troublesome and hurtful good which the law prescribes.

(2.) This distinction, when considered with respect to one and the same object contemplated in various ways, will be still further illustrated. For that object which is presented to the will, is considered either under a general form, or under one that is particular. Thus adultery is considered either in general, or in particular; considered in general, adultery is condemned by reason as an evil and as that which has been forbidden by the law; considered in particular, it is approved, by the knowledge which is derived from the senses, as something good and delectable. Bucer, when treating on this subject, in his remarks on the same verse, says: "But there is in man a two-fold will -- one, that by which he consents to the law -- another, that by which he does what he detests. The one follows the knowledge of the law by which it is known to be good; The other follows the knowledge which is derived from the senses, and which is concerning things present."

(3.) This volition and nolition may likewise be distinguished in another manner. There is one volition and nolition which follow the last judgment formed concerning the object; and another volition and nolition which follow not the last but the antecedent judgment. In reference to the former of these, volition will be concerning good; in reference to the latter, volition will be concerning the evil opposed to it, and contrariwise. Thus, likewise, concerning nolition. And with respect to the former, it will be volition; in respect to the latter, it will be nolition, concerning the same object, and the contrary. But the volition and nolition which follow not the last judgment, cannot so well be simply and absolutely called "volition" and "nolition," as velicity and nolicity. Those, however, which follow the last judgment, are simply and absolutely called efficacious volition and nolition, to which the effect succeeds.

(4.) Thomas Aquinas, on this very passage in Romans 7, says, that the former is not a full will, the latter is a complete will. But let this same distinction be considered as it is employed concerning God. For God is said to will some things approvingly as being good in themselves, but to will other things efficaciously, as simply conducing to his glory.

We must now consider the kind of willing and nilling about which the apostle is here treating. He is treating, not about the volition and nolition of particular approbation, but about those of general estimation -- not about the volition and nolition which are occupied concerning an object considered in particular, but concerning one generally considered -- not about the volition and nolition which follow the last judgment, but about those which follow the antecedent judgment -- not about simple, absolute and complete volition, but about that which is incomplete, and which rather deserves to be called velicity. "For the good that he would, he does not; but the evil which he would not, that he does." If he willed the good prescribed by the law, with the will of particular approbation, which follows the last judgment, he would then also perform the good which he had thus willed. If, in the same manner, he did not will the evil forbidden by the law, he would then abstain from it. This is explained, in a learned and prolix manner, by Bucer on this passage.

(1.) I now come specially to each part of the syllogism, in which the Major Proposition seems to me to be reprehensible on two accounts: (1.) Because "to will that which is good, "which is here the subject of the apostle's argument, is not peculiar to the regenerate; for it also appertains to the unregenerate -- for instance, to those who are under the law, and who have in themselves all those things which God usually effects by the law; (2.) Because, even when used in that other sense, [as applicable to the regenerate,] it does not contain a full definition of a regenerate man; for a regenerate man not only wills that which is good, but he also performs it; because "it is God who worketh in" the regenerate "both to will and to do." (Phil. ii, 13.) And "God hath prepared good works," that the regenerate "might walk in them;"

or, "he hath created them in Christ Jesus unto good works." (Ephes. ii, 10.) They are

"new creatures;" (2 Cor. v, 17) are endued with that "faith which worketh by love;"

(Gal. v, 6) and to them is attributed the observance, or "keeping of the commandments of God;" (1 Cor. vii, 19; ) they "do the will of God from the heart;" (Ephes. vi, 6)

"have obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine to which they were delivered."

(Rom. vi, 17) etc, &c. From these observations, it is apparent that the particle "only"

must be added to the proposition; for when this is appended, it will, at first sight, betray the falsehood and insufficiency of the proposition in this manner: "He is a regenerate man, with whom only to will that which is good is present."

(2.) To the assumption, I reply that it is proposed in a mutilated form. For this, "to will is present with me," is not the entire sentence of the apostle; but it is one part separated from another. without which it is not consistent. For this is a single discrete axiom: "To will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good, I find not." But nothing can be solidly concluded from a passage of Scripture proposed in a form that is mutilated. I add that, when this latter part of the apostle's sentence is omitted, the reader is left in doubt concerning the kind of volition and nolition which is here the subject of investigation. But when the omission is supplied from the text of the apostle, it plainly signifies that the subject of discussion is inefficacious volition and that of general estimation, but, as has already been observed, this kind of volition is not peculiar to the regenerate.

But the assumption may be simply denied, as not having been constructed from the context of the apostle. For St. Paul does not attribute to the man about whom he is treating, that he wills that which is good and does not will that which is evil, but that he does that which is evil, and does not perform that which is good, to which attributes, something tantamount to a description is added -- "That which I would not," and "that which I would." This description is added in accommodation to the state of the man about whom the apostle is treating, and it is required by the method of demonstrative investigation. For he had determined to produce the proper and reciprocal cause, why the man about whom he is treating "does not find to perform that which is good;" and therefore all other causes were to be removed, among which were the nolition of good and the volition of evil, also ignorance of that which is good and that which is evil, &c. Thus, in that other disjunctive axiom, "to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not," the principal thing which is attributed to the man about whom the apostle is treating, or that which is predicated concerning him, is that "he does not find to perform that which is good;" for the illustration of which, is produced that differing attribute, "to will indeed is present with me." This is a remark which must be diligently observed by every one who engages in the inquiry, about the most correct manner in which this very difficult passage is to be understood.

8. But the preceding observations make it evident that a contrary conclusion may be drawn from these two verses in the following manner: He is not a regenerate man, with whom to will is indeed present, but not to perform, and who does not perform the good which he would, but who commits the evil which he would not; (this is from the description of regeneration and its parts; ) But to will is present with this man, but not to perform; and the same man does not perform the good which he would, but commits the evil which he would not; Therefore, the man about whom the apostle is treating, is unregenerate.

The assumption is in the text of the apostle; the proposition alone, therefore, remains to be proved. Regeneration not only illuminates the mind and conforms the will, but it likewise restrains and regulates the affections, and directs the external and the internal members to obedience to the divine law. It is not he who wills, but he who performs the will of the Father, that enters into the kingdom of heaven. (Matt. vii, 21.) And, at the close of the same chapter, he is called a wise or prudent man "who doeth the sayings of Christ," not he who only wills them. Consult what has already been remarked in the negation of the proposition in that syllogism which was produced for the establishment of the contrary opinion; And, Those persons who fulfill the will of the flesh in its desires, are unregenerate; But this man fulfills the will of the flesh; Therefore, he is unregenerate.

But these [attributes] agree most appropriately with a man who is under the law -- to will that which is good and not to will evil, as agreeing with one who "consents to the law that it is good," but not to do that which is good and to do evil, as agreeing with one who is "carnal and the servant of sin."

9. But perhaps some one will here reply, "From this man is not simply taken away the performing of that which is good, but the completion of it, that is, the perfect performance of it -- a view of the matter which has the sanction of St. Augustine, who gives this explanation of the word."

Answer. Omitting all reference to the manner in which the opinion of these persons agrees with that of St. Augustine, which we shall afterwards examine, I affirm that this is a mere evasion. For the Greek verb katergazomai does not signify to do any thing perfectly, but simply to do, to perform, to dispatch, as is very evident from the verb poiw "to do," which follows, and from this word itself as it is used in the fifteenth verse, where, according to their opinion, this verb cannot signify completion or perfect performance -- for the regenerate, to whom, as they understand it, this clause in the fifteenth verse applies, do not perfectly perform that which is evil. Let those passages of the sacred writings be consulted in which this word occurs, and its true meaning will be easily understood from Scripture usage.

I add that, in this sense, "the completion," that is, "the perfect performance" of that which is good, can no more be taken away from a regenerate man, than "the willing"

of that which is good. For while the regenerate continue in this state of mortality, they do not "perfectly will" that which is good.

10. But some one will further insist, that "to will good" and "not to will evil," in what mode and sense soever these expressions are taken, is "some good thing;" and that, to an unregenerate man can be attributed nothing at all which can be called GOOD, without bringing contumely on grace and the Holy Spirit.

To this I reply, We have already understood the quality and the quantity of this "good thing." But I am desirous to have proof given to me, that nothing at all which is good can be attributed to an unregenerate man, of what description soever he may be.

According to the judgment which I have formed, the Scriptures in no passage, openly affirm this; neither do I think that, by good consequence from them, it can be asserted.

But the contrary assertion may be most evidently proved:

"The truth" which is mentioned in Romans i, 18, is good, as being opposed to

"unrighteousness;" but this "truth" is in some unregenerate persons. "The work of the law," which is mentioned in Romans ii, 15, is a good thing; but it is: written in the hearts" of heathens, and that by God. "The taste of the heavenly gift, of the good word of God, and of the powers of the world to come," (Heb. vi, 4,5,) is good; and yet it is in the unregenerate. "To have escaped the pollutions of the world through the knowledge of the Lord and saviour Jesus Christ, and to have known the way of righteousness," (2 Pet. ii, 20,21) are good things; yet they belong to the unregenerate.

"To receive the word of God with joy," (Matt. xiii, 20, is good; and it appertains to the unregenerate. And, in general, all those gifts of the Holy Spirit which are for the edification of the church, and which are attributed to several of the reprobate, are good things. (1 Cor. 12 & 13.) To acknowledge themselves to be sinners, to mourn and lament on account of personal transgressions, and to seek deliverance from sin, are good things; and they belong to some who are unregenerate. Nay, no man can be made partaker of regeneration, unless he have previously had within him such things as these. From these passages, it is evident that it cannot be said with truth, that nothing of good can be attributed to the unregenerate, what kind of men soever they may be.

If any one reply, "But these good things are not saving in their nature, neither are they such as they ought to be "I acknowledge the justness of the remark. Yet some of them are necessarily previous to those which are of a saving nature; besides, they are themselves in a certain degree saving. That which has not yet come up to the point toward which it aims, does not immediately lose the name of "a good thing" The dread of punishment, and slavish fear are not that dread and fear which are required from the children of God; yet they are, in the mean time, reckoned by St. Augustine among those good things which precede conversion. In his thirteenth sermon on these words of the apostle, have not received the spirit of bondage again unto fear, (Rom.

viii, 15) he says, "What is this word again? It is the manner in which this most troublesome schoolmaster terrifies. What is this word again? It is as ye received the spirit of bondage in Mount Sinai. Some man will say, The Spirit of Bondage is one, the spirit of liberty another. If they were not the same, the apostle would not use the word again. Therefore, the spirit [in both cases] is the same; but, in the one case, it is on tables of stone in fear, in the other, it is on the fleshly tables of the heart in love,"

&c. In a subsequent passage he says, "You are now, therefore, not in fear, but in love, that you may be sons, and not servants. For that man whose reason for still doing well is his fear of punishment, and who does not love God, is not yet among the children of God. My wish, however, is that he may continue even to fear punishment. Fear is a bond-servant, love is a free man; and, if we may thus express ourselves, fear is the servant of love. Therefore, lest the devil take possession of the heart, let this servant have the precedence in it, and preserve a place within for his Lord and Master, who will soon arrive. Do this, act thus, even from fear of punishment, if you are not yet able to do it from a love of righteousness. The master will come and the servant will depart; because, when love is perfected, it casts out fear."

Calvin likewise numbers initial fear among good things; and Beza, from the meaning attached to it by Calvin and himself, makes it to be preliminary to regeneration, as we have already perceived.

But these things, and others, (if any such there be,) are attributed to the unregenerate, without any injury to grace and the Holy Spirit; because they are believed to be, in those in whom they are found, through the operation of grace and of the Holy Spirit.

For there are certain acts which precede conversion, and they proceed from the Holy Spirit, who prepares the will; as it is said by Zanchius, in his Judgment on the First and Second Tome of the objections and answers of Pezelius, which judgment is subjoined to the second tome. Consult likewise what we have cited in a preceding page from Beza against Tilman. Heshusius.

11. What man is there who possesses but a moderate acquaintance with theological matters, and does not know, that the Holy Spirit employs the preaching of the word in this order, that he may first convict us of sin, by the law, of whose equity and righteousness he convinces the mind -- may accuse us of being obnoxious to condemnation -- may place before our eyes our own impotency and weakness -- may teach us that it is impossible to be justified through the law, (Rom. iii, 19-21) -- that he may compel us to flee to Christ, using "the law as a schoolmaster, to lead us by the hand to Christ," who is "the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth"? (Gal. ii, 16-21; iii, 1-29.) On this account, also, the unregenerate receive certain names or appellations, in the Scriptures: They are called sinners, as they are contra-distinguished from the righteous that boasted themselves of their righteousness, which sinners Christ came to call -- labouring and Heavy-Laden, to whom Christ came to afford refreshment and rest -- sick and infirm, and such as stand in need of a Physician's aid, that they may be distinguished from those who supposed themselves to be "whole," and not to require the services of a Physician -- poor and needy, to whom Christ came to preach the gospel -- captives and prisoners in bonds, who acknowledge their sad condition, and whom Christ came to deliver -- contrite in spirit and broken hearted, whom Christ came to bind up, &c.

Secondly. Having completed these effects by the law, the same Spirit begins to use the preaching of the gospel, by which he manifests and reveals Christ, infuses faith, unites believers together into one body with Christ, leads them to a participation of the blessings of Christ, that, remission of sins being solicited and obtained through his name, they may begin further to live in him and from him. On this account likewise, the very same persons are distinguished by certain other appellations in the Scriptures.

They are called believers, justified, redeemed, sanctified, regenerated, and liberated persons, grafted into Christ, concorporate with him, bones of his bones, flesh of his flesh, &c.

From this order, it appears that some acts of the Holy Spirit are occupied concerning those who are unregenerate, but who are to be born again, and that some operations arise from them in the minds of those who are not yet regenerate, but who are to be born again. But I do not attempt to determine whether these be the operations of the Spirit as He is the regenerator. I know that, in Romans viii, 15-17, the apostle distinguishes between the Spirit of adoption and the spirit of bondage. I know that, in 2 Corinthians iii, 6-11, he distinguishes between the ministration of the law and of death, and the ministration of the gospel and of the Spirit. I know the apostle said, when he was writing to the Galatians, that the Spirit is not received by the works of the law, but by the faith of the gospel of Christ. And I think that we must make a distinction between the Spirit as he prepares a temple for himself, and the same Spirit as He inhabits that temple when it is sanctified. Yet I am unwilling to contend with any earnestness about this point -- whether these acts and operations may be attributed to the Spirit, the regenerator, not as He regenerates, but as He prepares the hearts of men to admit the efficiency of regeneration and renovation. Hence, I think it is once generally clear, that this opinion is not contumelious to the Holy Spirit, nor can it take away from the Spirit any thing which is attributed to Him in the Scriptures; but that it only indicates the order according to which the Holy Spirit disposes and distributes his acts. I am not certain whether, on the contrary, it be not contumelious to the Spirit of adoption who dwells in the hearts of the regenerate, if he be said to effect in them a volition of this description from which no effect follows, but which fails or becomes defective in the very attempt, being conquered by the tyranny of sin that dwelleth within -- and this in opposition to the declaration in 1 John iv, 4, "Greater is HE that is in you, than he that is in the world." Neither do I think it to flow as a consequence from this, that in Romans vii, 18,19, the subject under investigation is a man faced under grace; for it is one thing to feel or perceive some effect of preparing grace; and it is another to be under grace, or to be ruled, led and influenced by grace.

VERSE THE TWENTIETH

If he does that which he would not, then it is no more he that does it, but sin that dwelleth in him.

We have already taken the twentieth verse into consideration. But I here briefly remind the reader, that in this passage, likewise, is manifestly discovered the truth of our exposition which has been adduced; because, in this verse, he says, both that he does what he would not, and yet that he does not do it himself, but sin that dwelleth in him. He does it, therefore, and he does it not; because he does it as a servant who is under compulsion by his master, and who does not execute his own will so much as that of his master, though it is also his own, otherwise he would not perform it; for he consents to the will of his master before he performs it, because he does it without coaction or force; for the will cannot be forced.

VERSE THE TWENTY-FIRST

He finds that, where he would do good, evil is present with him. The twenty-first verse contains a conclusion from the preceding, accommodated to the purpose of the apostle upon which he is here treating. For, from the circumstance of this man knowing that "to will is present with him" but not to perform it, he concludes, that

"when he would do good, evil is present with him." But it must be observed, that, in the eighteenth verse, the apostle employs the same phrase about willing, as he here uses about evil; and thus he says, that both to will good, and to will evil, are present with him, or lie close to him. And as "to will that which is good is present with him"

through his inclination for the law, and through his mind which approves of it as "just and good," so "to will evil is likewise present with him" through a certain law of sin, that is, by the force and tyranny of sin, assuming to itself the power, and usurping the right or jurisdiction over this man.

We must now consider whether the essence and adjacency of each (if I may employ such a word) are of equal power; or whether the one prevails over the other, and which of them it is that acquires this ascendancy. It is manifest that the two are not equally potent, but that the one prevails over the other, and that, in fact, "evil is present" in a more powerful and vehement manner: For that obtains and prevails in a man, through the command, instigation and impulse of which he is found to act and to cease from acting. But I wish to see it explained from the Scriptures, how such an assertion as this can be made with truth concerning a regenerate man who is placed under grace; for, in every passage, the sacred records seem to me to affirm the contrary.

THE TWENTY-SECOND AND TWENTY-THIRD VERSES

1. HE delights in the law of God, or he finds a kind of con, delectation with it, after the inward man; but he sees another law in his members, warring against the law of his mind, &c. 2. An argument, from the twenty-second verse, for the contrary opinion.

3. An answer to the PROPOSITION in this argument. The inward man signifies the MIND, as the OUTWARD Man signifies the BODY. (1.) This is shown from the etymology of the word, and from the usage of Scriptures, especially in 2 Corinthians iv, 16, and in Ephes. iii, 16,17. (2.) Proofs of this are given at great length from the ancient Christian fathers. (3.) Similar proofs are adduced from modern divines 4. The meaning of the phrase, "to delight in the law of God after the inward man." 5. An answer to the assumption, which is shown to be proposed in a mutilated form, by the omission of those things which are mentioned in the twenty-third verse. 6. An argument, from the twenty-third verse, for the contrary opinion. (1.) An answer to the proposition in it. (2.) And to the assumption. 7. A most irrefragable argument deduced from these two verses. (1.) To the refutation of the contrary opinion. (2.) To the establishment of the true one, which at first is proposed in an ample manner, and afterwards in an abridged form. (3.) The proposition is proved by three reasons, which are confirmed against all objections. (4.) It is proved from the Scriptures, that, in the conflict against sin, the regenerate usually obtain the conquest 8. A special consideration of the text, Gal. v, 16-18, and a collation of it with this passage. 9. An objection, and a reply to it. 10. An objection to the third reason, and a reply. 11. A consideration of Isaiah lxiv, 10.

1. In the twenty-second and twenty-third verses is adduced a clearer explanation and proof of the conclusion which had been drawn in the twenty-first verse, and which agrees with the very topic that the apostle had, in this part, proposed to himself for investigation. But the proof is, properly, contained in the twenty-third verse; because that verse corresponds with these words, "When I would do good, evil is present with me," an affirmation which was to be proved. The proof is taken from the effect of the evil which is present with the man, and it is the warfare against the law of his mind, the victory obtained over him, and, after such victory, the captivity of the man to the law of sin. The twenty-second verse has reference to these words, "When I would do good;" and it contains a more ample explanation of this willing, from the proper cause, and an illustration of the following verse from things diverse and disjunctive.

But in these two verses is contained one axiom, which is appropriately called a discrete or disjunctive axiom; as is apparent from the use of the particle, de "but," in the twenty-third verse, which is the relative of men though the latter is omitted in the twenty-third verse. It is likewise apparent from the very form of opposition. The antecedent and less principal part of this axiom is contained in the twenty-second verse; the consequent and principal part, in the twenty-third. For the antecedent is employed for the illustration of the consequent, as is very manifest in all axioms.

Thus, as in many similar instances, "I indeed baptize you with water unto repentance; but He that cometh after me, shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with life."

(Matt. ii, 11.) "Though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." (2 Cor. iv, 16.) For the particles, indeed, though, since, when, &c., denote the antecedent and less principal part of the axiom; while the particles, but, yet, then, &c., denote the consequent and principal part. "To delight in the law of God," or, "to find a sort of condelectation in it," "after the inward man," is the cause that to will is present with this man. "The evil which is present with him," is "the law of sin in his members." The effect, by which the presence of this evil is proved, is contained in these words, "Warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members."

I have considered it proper to offer these remarks to assist in forming a right judgment about a discrete or disjunctive axiom, lest any one should separate the one part from the other, and should account the less principal to be the principal one. Let us now further see what conclusion can be drawn from these two verses, in proof of the one opinion or of the other.

2. Those who hold sentiments contrary to mine, draw the following conclusion, from the twenty-second verse, for the establishment of their view of the subject: He who delights in the law of God after the inward man, is regenerate and placed under grace; But this man about whom the apostle is treating delights in the law of God after the inward man; Therefore, this man is regenerate and placed under grace.

They suppose that, in the proposition, they have a two-fold foundation for their opinion: (1.) Because "the inward man" is attributed to this person. (2.) Because that same individual is said "to delight in the law of God after the inward man? For, they say, both these adjuncts can appertain to regenerate persons alone. The First agrees with them only, because, in the Scriptures, "the inward man" has the same signification as that of "the new man and the regenerate;" the Second, because it is declared concerning the pious, that "they meditate in the law of the Lord, and that their delight is in it, day and night?

3. To the proposition, I reply, first, that the inward man is not the same as the new man or the regenerate, either from the etymology of the word, or from the usage of Scripture; and the inward man is not peculiar to the regenerate, but that it also belongs to the unregenerate. Secondly, that to delight in the law of God, or, rather, to find a sort of condelectation in the law of God after the inward man, is not a property peculiar to the regenerate and to those who are placed under grace, but that it appertains to a man placed under the law.

(1.) With regard to the first, I say, from the etymology of the epithet, he is called the inward man, relatively and oppositely to the outward man. For there are two men in the same individual, the one existing within the other, and the one having the other first within himself. The first of these is the hidden man of the heart, (Peter iii, 4,) the second is the outward man of the body; the former is he who inhabits or dwells in, the latter, he who is inhabited; the former is calculated or adapted to invisible and incorporeal blessings, the latter, to those which are earthly and visible; the former is immortal, the latter is mortal and liable to death. In these two words, not a single syllable occurs which can afford even the least indication of regeneration, and of the newness arising from regeneration. But these three epithets, the inward man, the regenerate Man, and the new man, hold the following order among each other, which the words themselves indicate at the first sight of them. The inward man denotes the subject, the regenerate man denotes the act, of the Holy Spirit who regenerates; and the new man denotes the quality which exists in the inward man through the act of regeneration.

(2.) The sense and usage of Scripture are not adverse to this signification, but, on the contrary, are very consentaneous to it. This will be apparent from a diligent consideration of those passages in which mention is made of "the inward man." One of them is the text now under discussion; the second is 2 Corinthians iv, 16; and the third is Ephes. iii, 16,17. Let us at present take into consideration the last two passages.

2 CORINTHIANS iv, 16.

The former of the two is thus expressed: "for which cause we faint not; but though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." From this verse itself, I shew that the inward and the outward man are not in this passage taken for the new and the old man; but that the inward man is to be understood as that which is incorporeal and inhabiting, so denominated from the interior of man, that is, his mind or soul; and that the outward man is here taken for that which is corporeal and inhibited, so denominated from the body, the exterior part of man. This I shew, First. Because, if the outward and the inward man were to be taken for the old and the new man, then this disjunctive mode of speech could not attain in this verse. For these two could not then be distinguished in this following manner from each other:

"Though our old man perish, yet the new man is renewed day by day;" for [as there stated] they are necessarily cohering, and mutually consequent on each other; because whatever is taken away from the old man, is so much added to the new. The absurdity of such a distinction will be still more manifest, if the same thing be thus proposed:

"Though our old man be crucified, destroyed and buried, yet the new man rises again, is quickened or vivified, and is renewed still more and more." And, "Though we lay aside our former oldness, yet we make greater and still greater proficiency in newness of life." Let any one that pleases render himself ridiculous by employing the following language: "Though this youth unlearns and lays aside his ignorance, yet he daily makes a greater proficiency in the knowledge of necessary things."

Secondly. The solace which the apostle produces, in opposition to those oppressions and distresses to which holy people are liable, while they remain in this world, consists in the following words: "The inward man is renewed day by day;" and not in these, "though our outward man perish." This is shown by the mode of speech adopted by the apostle, indicating that this very "perishing of the outward man,"

which is effected through oppressions and distresses, is that against which the consolation, comprehended in the following words, is produced by the apostle. The afflicted person says, "But our outward man is perishing." The apostle replies to him,

"Do not grieve on this account; for our inward man is renewed day by day, in the renewal of which consists our salvation. For we must not have regard to external and visible blessings, which conduce to the life of the outward man; because they are liable to perish. But we must highly estimate and regard internal and invisible things, which appertain to the life of the inward man; because these are eternal, and will never perish."

But if, by this word, "the outward man" were to be understood "the old man," then the apostle must have produced this in the place of consolation, in the following manner:

"Do not lament that you are liable to many afflictions and oppressions, for those are the very things by which your old man perishes, and by which the inward man is the more renewed." But that the perishing of the outward man, and that of the old man, are not the same, is evident from this circumstance, that the former of these is against the very nature of man and the good of natural life, but that the latter is against depraved nature, and is contrary to the life of sin in man.

Thirdly. From the word "renewed," it is apparent that "the inward man" is the subject of renovation or renewal, and of the act of the Holy Spirit.

I confess indeed, that it may be correctly said, "The new man is daily renewed more and more," both because it is needful that this newness, which has been produced in a man by the act of the regenerating Spirit, should increase and be augmented day by day, and because the remains of the old man ought by degrees to be taken away and weakened yet more and more. But even in this case the subject is the inward man, that is called new from the newness which now begins to be effected in him by the regenerating Spirit; for the subject of increasing and progressive renovation, and that of commencing renovation, are the same.

But the subject of incipient or commencing renovation is not the new man, (for he is not called new before the act of renovation, and prior to the quality impressed by that act,) but it is the inward man. Therefore, though the new man be said to be renewed, (a phrase which I am not aware that the Scriptures employ,) yet the subject is the inward man, which subject may receive the appellation of the new man from the quality impressed. As we say that a white man becomes whiter every day, whiteness being communicated to a white man not as he is white, but as he is a man who has still some dark shades remaining, and who has not yet attained to that degree of whiteness which he desires. ConsonantIy with this view, the Scriptures themselves use these words: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness," (Ephes. iv, 23,24.) In this passage the subject of renovation is called "the spirit of our mind," that is, the inward man, or the mind; and "the new man," in the same passage, is not the subject itself, but it is the quality which the subject ought to induce: This quality is there called "righteousness and true holiness."

I have said that I am not quite certain whether the Scriptures use this phrase in any passage: I have felt this hesitation on account of Col. iii, 10, in which it seems to be so used; the apostle saying, "and ye have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of Him who created him." But it will be obvious to every one who consider, the passage with diligence, that these words, "which is renewed,"

or ton anakainoumenon must be joined with what preceded, "and ye have put on the new man," that is, "that which is renewed," or, "the renewed,"in knowledge," &c., so as to be a description of the new man, not some new attribute of this new man. But to this criticism no great importance is attached; and I have said, I do not deny that the new man is renewed more and more.

The same thing is manifest from the rest of this passage. (2 Cor. iv, 16.) For, "the outward man," (16,) "an earthen vessel," (7,) "our body," (10,) "our mortal flesh,"

(11,) are all synonymous terms; as are also, "troubled,"perplexed,"

"persecuted,"bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus,"delivered unto death," and "perishing." This may be rendered very clear to the studious inquirer after the truth, who will compare the preceding and the succeeding verses with the 16th.

EPHESIANS iii, 16,17.

The latter of the two passages is thus expressed: "That he would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man; that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith." From these verses, it is plain, that by the inner man is denoted the subject about which the Holy Spirit is occupied in his act and operation; and this operation is here denominated "a corroboration," or "a being strengthened." This is also plain from the synonym mentioned in the following verse,

"that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith;" for "the heart," and "the inner man,"

are taken from the same thing. In this view of the subject I am supported by the very learned Zanchius, who writes in the following manner upon this passage: "We have asserted, and from 2 Corinthians iv, 16, we have demonstrated, that by the term inner man is signified the principal part of man, that is, the mind, which consists of the understanding and the will, and which is usually denoted by the word heart, in which the affections or passions flourish; as, on the contrary, by the term outward man, no other thing can be understood than the corporeal part of man, which grows, possesses senses, locomotion," &c. And in a subsequent passage, he says, "Therefore, by this particle, in the inner man, the apostle teaches, that as the gift of might or strength, so likewise the other virtues of the Spirit, have not their seat in the vegetative or growing part Of man, but in his mind, heart, spirit," &c.

(2.) Because it is not only held for a certainty by some persons, that "the inward man"

is the same with the new and the regenerate man, from which they venture to assert,

"that the regenerate alone possess the inward man;" but because this is also urged as an article of belief, let us therefore see what a great portion of the divines of the Christian church here understood by the epithet, "the inward man."

THE ANCIENT FATHERS

CLEMENT 0F ALEXANDRIA.

The apostle gives two appellations to the man -- his person and his mind. (Strom. lib.

3, fol. 194.)

TERTULLIAN

"BUT," says the apostle, "though our outward man be destroyed," that is, the flesh, by the force of persecutions, "yet the inward man is renewed day by day," that is, the mind, by the hope of the promises. (Against the Gnostics, cap. 15.) Having, therefore, obtained the two men mentioned by the apostle -- the inward man, that is, the mind, and the outward man, that is, the flesh -- the heretics have in fact adjudged salvation to the mind, that is, to the inward man, but destruction to the flesh, that is, to the outward man; because it is recorded 2 Corinthians iv, 16, "for though our outward man perish," &c. (On the resurrection of the Body, cap. 40.) From without, wars that overcome the body; inwardly, fear that afflicts the mind. So,

"though our outward man perish," perishing will not be understood as losing our resurrection, but as sustaining vexation; and this, not without the inward man. Thus it will be the part of both of them to be glorified together, as well as to be fellow-sufferers. (lbid.)

For though the apostle calls the flesh "an earthen vessel," which he commands to be honourably treated; yet it is also called, by the same apostle, "the outward man," that is, the clay which was first impressed and engraved under the title of man, not of a cup, of a sword, or of any small vessel; for it was called "a vessel" on account of its capacity, which holds and contains the mind. But this flesh is called "man," from community of nature, which renders it not an instrument in operations, but a minister or assistant, (Ibid. cap. 16.)

AMBROSE.

"For I delight in the law of God after the inward man." he says that his mind delights in those things which are delivered by the law; and thus it is the inward man. (On Rom. vii, 22.) "Though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." The flesh perishes or wastes away by afflictions, stripes, famine, thirst, cold and nakedness; but the mind is renewed by the hope of a future reward, because it is purified by incessant tribulations. For the mind is profited in afflictions, and does not perish; so that when additional temptations occur, it makes daily advances in worthiness; because this "perishing" is profitable also to the body for its immortality through the excellence of the mind. (On 2 Corinthians iv, 16.)

"I delight in the law of God after the inward man." Our inward man is that which was made after the image and likeness of God; the outward man is that which was formed and shaped from clay. As therefore there are two men, there is likewise a two-fold course of conduct -- one is that of the inward man, the other that of the outward man.

And, indeed, most of the acts of the inward man extend to the outward man. As the chasteness of the inward man also passes to the chastity of the body. For he who is ignorant of the adultery of the heart, is likewise unacquainted with the adultery of the body, &c. It is, therefore, the circumcision of the inward man; for he who is circumcised has stripped off the enticements of his whole flesh, as his foreskin, that he may be in the Spirit, and not in the flesh; and that in the Spirit he may mortify the deeds of his body, &c., &c. When our inward man is in the flesh, he is in the foreskin.

(Letter 77th, to Constantius.)

BASIL THE GREAT

"Let us make man according to our image." He means the inward man, when he says,

"Let us make man," &c., &c. Listen to the apostle, who says, "Though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." How do I know the two men?

One of them is apparent; the other is hidden in him who appears, it is the invisible, the inward man. We have then a man within us; and we are twofold; and what is said is very true, that we are inward. (Homily 10th, on the six days of Creation.)

"Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me." God made the inward man, and fashioned the outward man. For "the fashioning" belongs to clay; but "the making"

appertains to that which is after his own image. Wherefore the thing which was fashioned is the flesh, but that which was made is the mind. (Ibid. Homily 11.) Since there are, indeed, two men, as the apostle declares, the one outward and the other inward, we must also, in like manner, receive the age in both, according to him whom we behold, and according to him whom we understand in secret. (Discourse on the beginning of the Proverbs of Solomon.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA

"But though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." If any one, therefore, says that our inward man dwells in the outward man, he repeats an important truth; yet he will not on this account seem to divide the unity of man. (On the incarnation, of the only begotten Son, cap. 12.)

MACARIUS

The true death consists in the heart, and is hidden, when our inward man is dead. If therefore any one has passed over from death to the hidden life, he in reality lives forever, and dies no more, &c., &c. Sin acts secretly upon the inward man and the mind, and commences a conflict with the thoughts. (Homily 15.) The members of the soul are many: such as the mind, the conscience, the will, the thoughts which accuse or else defend. But all these have been collected together into one reason; yet they are the members of the soul. But the soul is single, that is, the inward man. (Homily 7.)

"The inward man" and "the soul" are taken for the same thing, in his 27th Homily.

CHRYSOSTOM

"But though our outward man perish," &c. How does it perish? While it is beaten with stripes, is driven away, and endures innumerable evils. "Yet the inward man is renewed day by day." How is it renewed? By faith, hope and alacrity, that it may have the courage to oppose itself to evils. For, the more the evils which the body endures, the greater is the hope which the inward man entertains, and the more bright and resplendent does it become, as gold which is examined or tested by much fire. (On 2

Corinthians iv, 16.)

Let us now see what is said by one who stands higher than many: AUGUSTINE

But who, except the greatest mad man, will say that in the body we are, or shall afterwards be, like God, That likeness, therefore, exists in the inward man, "which is renewed in the knowledge of God, after the image of him that created him." (Tom. 2, Epist. 6.)

By this grace, righteousness is written in the inward man, when renewed, which transgression had destroyed. (On the Spirit and the Letter, cap. 27.) As he called him the inward man when coming into this world, because the outward man is corporeal as this world is. (On the Demerits and Remission of Sin, lib.1, cap. 25; Tom. 7.) As the eyes of the body derive no aid from the light, that they may depart from it with eyelids closed and turned in another direction, but in order to see, they are assisted by the light, (nor can this be done at all, unless the light lends its aid,) so God, who is the light of the inward man, assists the drowsiness of our mind, that we may perform something that is good, not according to our righteousness, but according to his own.

(Ibid. lib. 2, cap. 5.)

If, in the mind itself, which is "the inward man," perfect newness were formed in baptism, the apostle would not declare, "Though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." (Ibid. cap. 7.) As that tree of life was placed in the corporeal Paradise, so this wisdom is in the spiritual Paradise, the former of them affording vital vigour to the senses of the outward man, the latter to those of the inward man, without any change of time for the worse. (Ibid. cap. 21.) Behold, then, of how many things are we ignorant -- not only such as are past, but also of those which are present, concerning our nature, and not only in reference to the body, but likewise I, reference to the inward man; yet we are not compared to the beasts. (Tom. 7. 0n the Soul and its Origin, lib. 4, cap. 8.) Because the thing is either the foot itself, the body, or the man, who hobbles along with a lame foot; yet the man cannot avoid a lame foot, unless he have it healed. This can also be done in the inward man, but it must be by the grace of God through Jesus Christ. (On Perfection against Caelestius, fol. I, letter f.) Thus also the mind is the thing of the inward man, robbery is an act, avarice is a vice, that is, a quality, according to which the mind is evil, even when it does nothing by which it can render any service to avarice or robbery. (Ibid.) Beside the inward and the outward man, I do not indeed perceive that the apostle makes another inward of the inward man, that is, the innermost of the whole man. (On the Mind and its Origins, lib. 4, cap. 4.)

He confesses in the same passage, that the mind is the inward man to the body, but he denies that the spirit is the inward man to the mind.

Some persons have also made this supposition, that now the inward man was made, but the body of the man afterwards, when the Scripture says, "And God formed man of the dust of the ground." (Tom. 3. On Genesis according to the letter, l. 3, c. 22.) The apostle Paul wishes "the inward man" to be understood by the spirit of the mind,

"the outward man" in the body and this mortal life. Yet it is sometimes read in his epistles, that he has not called both of these together "two men," but one entire man whom God made, that is, both that which is the inward man, and that which is the outward. But he does not make him after his own image, except with regard to that which is inward, not only what is incorporeal, but also what is rational, and which is not within beasts. (Tom. 6. Against Faustus the Manichee, lib. 24, cap. 1.) Behold God is likewise proclaimed, by the same apostle, as former of the outward man. "But now hath God set the members every one in the body as it hath pleased him."(Ibid.)

The apostle says that "the old man" is nothing more than the old [course of] life, which is in sin, and in which men live according to the first Adam, concerning whom he declares, "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." Therefore, the whole of that man, both in his outward and inward part; has become old on account of sin, and is sentenced to the punishment of mortality, &c. (Ibid.)

And therefore, by such a cross, the body of sin is emptied, that we may "not now yield our members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin;" because this inward man also, if he be really renewed day by day, is certainly old before he is renewed. For that is an inward act of which the apostle speaks thus: "Put off the old man, and put on the new man." (Tom. 3. On the Trinity, lib. 4, cap. 3.)

But now the death of the flesh of our Lord belongs to the example of the death of our outward man, &c. And the resurrection of the body of the Lord is found to appertain to the example of the resurrection of our outward man." (Ibid.) Come now, let us see where is that which bears some resemblance to the confines of the man, both the outward and the inward; for, whatever we have in the mind in common with the beasts, is correctly said still to belong to the outward man; For not only will the body be accounted as "the outward man," but likewise certain things united to its life, by which the joints of the body and all the senses flourish and grow, and with which it is furnished for entering upon outward things. When the images of these perceptions, infixed in the memory, are revisited by recollection, the matter is still a transaction which belongs to the outward man. And in all these things we are at no great distance from the cattle, except that in the shape of our bodies we are not bending downwards, but erect. (On the Trinity, lib. 12, cap. 1.) While ascending, therefore, inwardly by certain degrees of consideration through the parts of the mind, another thing begins from this to occur to us, which is not common to us with the beasts; thence reason has its commencement, that the inward man may not be known. (Ibid. cap. 8.)

Both believers and unbelievers are well acquainted with the nature of man, whose outward part, that is, the body, they have learned the lights of the body; but they have learned the inward part, that is, the mind, within themselves. (Ibid. lib. 13, cap. 1.) Besides, the Scriptures thus attest it to us in this that, when these two things also are joined together and the man lives, and when likewise they bestow on each of them the appellation of man, calling the mind "the inward man," but the body "the outward man," as though they were two men, while both of them together are only one man.

(Tom. 5. On the City of God, lib. 13, cap. 24. See also lib. 11, cap. 27 & 3.) As this outward and visible world nourishes and contains the outward man, so that invisible world contains the inward man. (Tom. 8. On the First Psalm.) He who believes in Him, eats and is invisibly fattened, because he is also invisibly born again. The infant is within, the new man is within; where young and tender vines are planted, there are they filled and satiated. (On John, Tract 26.) THEOPHYLACT

Moreover, "the outward man," that is, the body, "perishes." How is this? While it is beaten with stripes, while it is driven about. "But the inward man," that is, the spirit and the mind, "is renewed." By what means? When it hopes well, and freely acts, as though suffering and rejoicing on account of God. (On 2 Corinthians iv, 16.) VIGILIUS

Let us spiritually advert to the spiritual expressions of the apostle, by which he testifies, that he has seen and handled the word of God, not with his bodily eyes and hands, but with the members of the inner man. (Against Eutychus, lib. 4.) PROCOPIUS OF GAZA

The substance of man, if you consider his inward man, is this image of God; if you take his outward man into consideration, his substance will be the earth, or the dust of the ground. Yet one and the same is the man in the composition which is completed from both of them. (0n Genesis, cap. 1.)

BERNARD

As the outward man is recognized by his countenance, so is the inward man pointed out by his will. (Sermon 3, On Ascension Day.)

LEO THE GREAT

When the outward man is slightly afflicted, let the inward man be refreshed; and withdrawing corporeal fullness from the flesh, let the mind be strengthened by spiritual delights. (Sermon 4, On Quadragesima Sunday.)

GREGORY NAZIANZEN

But in this, our nature, every care is towards the inward man of the heart, and every desire is directed to it. (Apology for his flight.)

GREGORY NYSSEN

Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. God speaks thus respecting the inward man. "But," you will say, "you are giving a dissertation upon reason. Shew us man after the image of God. Is reason the man?" Listen to the apostle: Though your outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. By what means? I own that man is two-fold, one who is seen, another who is hidden, and whom he that is seen does not perceive. We have, therefore, an inward man, and in some degree are two-fold. For I am that man who is inward; but I am not those things which are outward; but they are mine. Neither am I the hand, but I am the reason which is in the mind; but the hand is a part of the outward man. (On Genesis, i, 26.) Thus, when the inward man, whom God denominates the heart, has wiped off the rusty filth which, on account of his depraved thirst, had grown up with his form; he will once more recover the likeness [of God] with his original and principal form, when he will become good. (On the Beatitudes.)

(3.) MODERN DIVINES

Let us now see the opinions of certain divines of our own age and religious profession, on the inward man.

CALVIN

Though the reprobate do not proceed so far with the children of God, as, after the casting down of the flesh, to be renewed in the inner man, and to flourish again.

(Instit. lib. 2, cap. 7, sect. 9.)

But the reprobate are terrified, not because their inward mind is moved or affected, but because, as by a bridle cast upon them, they refrain less from outward work, and inwardly curb their own depravity, which they would otherwise have shed abroad.

(Ibid. sect. 10.)

Besides, since we have already laid down a two-fold regimen in man, and as we have, in another place, said enough about the other, which is placed in the mind, or the inward man, and which has reference to life eternal, &c. (Ibid. lib. 4, cap. 20, sect. 1.) Though the glory of God shines forth in the outward man, yet the proper seat of it is undoubtedly in the mind. (Ibid. lib. I, cap. 15, sect. 3.) Some persons perversely and unskillfully confound the outward man with the old man. For the old man, about whom the apostle treats in Romans vi, 6, is something far different. In the reprobate, also, the outward man perishes, but without any counterbalancing compensation. (On 2 Corinthians iv, 16.)

BEZA

- Is renewed, that is, acquires fresh strength, lest the outward man, who is sustained by the strength of the inward man, should be broken when assaulted with fresh evils, for which reason, the apostle said, in the 12th verse, "So, then, death worketh in us."

(On 2 Corinthians iv, 16.)

BUCER

In holy persons, likewise, there are two men, an inward and an outward one. St. Paul says, "Though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day."

As, therefore, man is two-fold, so, likewise, are his judgment and his will two-fold --a fact which our Lord himself was not ashamed to confess, when he said to his Father,

"nevertheless, not my will, but thine, be done." By saying this, "not what I will, but what thou willest, be done," he undoubtedly shewed that he willed what the Father willed; and yet, at the same time, he acknowledges that this was his will: "Remove this cup from me." Our Lord, therefore, acknowledges the existence within himself of two wills, one of which was apparently at variance with the other. (On Romans 5. Fol.

261.)

FRANCIS JUNIUS

The outward man hears the word of God outwardly, but the inward man hears it inwardly. (On the Three Verities, lib. 3, cap. 2. fol. 182.) But then, as in ecclesiastical administration, not only the inward man is informed in the knowledge of God, but as aids and services are also sought by the outward man, so far as the external signs of the communion of saints are required to feed and promote the inward communion, in this cause, likewise, we acknowledge that God has delegated his authority to the magistrate. (On Ecclesiast. lib. 3, cap. 5.) PISCATOR

The outward man, that is, the body, as he had previously called it. The inward man, that is, the soul or mind. (On 2 Corinthians iv, 16.)

THE CHURCH OF HOLLAND

When, indeed, from the depraved heart, and from the inward man, evil fruits do proceed, a necessary consequence of this is that he who is desirous of boasting that he is pure, must demonstrate the truth of his assertion by a spontaneous approval of the commands of Christ, and by a willing obedience to them. (A pamphlet, in which they give a reason for the excommunication of Koolhaes. Fol. 93.) JOHN DRIEDO

The inward man is the rational mind unfolded in its powers, which never perishes. But the body, adorned with its senses, is called "the outward man," or "our man who is outward and corruptible," as the apostle says in 2 Corinthians iv, 16," though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." Again, he says, in Romans vii, 22, "I delight in the law of God after the inward man." (On Grace and Free Will. Fol. 262.)

The apostle Paul frequently does not understand the same thing by "the old man" and by "the outward man," nor has he signified the same thing by "the new man" and by

"the inward man;" but in the inward man are found both the old and the new man.

For, in the mind, oldness of this kind is formed at the same time as newness. In it, the likeness is either heavenly or earthly, that is, either a carnal will, living according to the exciting feel of Sin, or a Spiritual will, living according to the Spirit of God.

(Ibid.)

I AM aware that the divines of our profession frequently take "the inward man" for the regenerate and this new man; but then they do not consider "the inward man,"

except with a certain quality infused into it by the Holy and Regenerating Spirit, with which quality, when the inward man is considered, he is then correctly called regenerate and a new man. If any one urges that the very designation of "the inward man" possesses, of itself, as great a value with those divines as do the titles of "the regenerate" and "the new man," I shall desire him to demonstrate, by sure and stable arguments, that the meaning adopted by those divines is conformable to truth.

4. Let us now approach to the other foundation, which is that this man, to whom it is attributed that "he delights in the law of God," is regenerate; and that this attribute can agree with no other than a regenerate person. That we may be able to clear up this matter in a satisfactory manner, we must see what is meant by this phrase, "to delight in the law of God;" or "to feel a joint delight with the law of God," as it appears the Greek text is capable of being rendered, and as an ancient version has it; for the verb, sunhdomai seems to signify the mutual pleasure which subsists between this man and the law, and by which not only this man feels a joint delight in the law, but the law also feels a similar delight in him.

"I feel a joint delight with the law of God," that is, I delight with the law: the same things are pleasing to me as are pleasing to the law. This interpretation may be illustrated and confirmed by a comparison of similar phrases, which frequently occur in other passages of the New Testament; Sunagwnisasqai moi "that ye strive together with me in your prayers to God for me" -- Sunanapauswmai umin "that I may with you be refreshed, (Rom. xv, 30,32) -- Sunhqlhsan moi "those women who laboured with me in the gospel," (Phil. iv, 3) -- Summarturei tw pneumati umwn "the Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God," (Rom. viii, 16,) from which St. Chrysostom not inappropriately explains, "I feel a joint delight with the law," by this paraphrase, "I assent to the law that it is well applied, as the law, also, in return, assents to me, that it is a good thing for a man to will to do it." He takes this explanation of the phrase from the text itself, which kind of interpretation not only may obtain, but likewise ought to be employed, in this passage, since there is no other in the whole of the Scriptures in which this same phrase is used.

If any one wishes to attach the same meaning to the phrase as to that which is used in Psalm i, 2, "But his delight is in the law of the Lord;" let him who says this, know that it is incumbent on him to produce proof for his assertion. This is not unreasonably required of him, because the antecedents and the consequences which are attributed to the man who is denoted in the first Psalm and described as being blessed, are not only vastly different from those things which are attributed to the man on whom we are now treating, but are likewise quite contrary to them. Conceding, however, this for the sake of argument, but by no means absolutely granting it, (which I am far from doing,) we must observe, that this man [in Romans vii, 22] is said, not simply "to delight in the law of God," or "to feel a joint delight with the law of God," but he does so with restriction and relatively, that is "according to the inward man." This restriction intimates that "the inward man" has not obtained the pre-eminence in this man, but that it is weaker than the flesh; as the latter is that which hinders it from being able, in operation and reality, to perform the law, to which it consents, and in which it delights.

He who will compare the following verse with this will perceive that the cause of that restriction is the one which we have here assigned. For in the subsequent verse, (the 23rd,) it is not said, "But I see another law in my members, according to which I do not delight in the law of God," such as the opposition ought to have been, it, by that restriction, the apostle wished only to ascribe this "delighting" to the man according to one part of him, and to take it away according to the other part of him. But since the apostle not only takes this "delighting" from the other part of him, but likewise attributes it to the power of warring against that inward man and overcoming him, it is evident that the restriction has been added on this account - - to shew that, in the man who is now the subject of discussion, "the inward man" has not the dominion, but is, in fact, the inferior.

Let him who is desirous to contradict these remarks, shew us, in any passage in which regenerate persons are made the subject of investigation, a similar restriction employed, and adduced for another purpose. From these observations, therefore, it appears that the proposition is most deservedly denied. Let us now attend to the assumption.

5. l say that the assumption is proposed in a mutilated form, as it was previously in the argument produced from the eighteenth verse. For with it, the apostle joins the following verse, in such a manner that the twenty-third verse may be the principal part of a compound and discrete axiom, employed for the purpose of proving what the apostle intended. But that which is now placed in the assumption, is a less principal part, conducing to the illustration of the other by separation. From this, it follows that the conclusion cannot be deduced From the premises, because the proposition is destitute of truth, the assumption mutilated, and the conclusion itself, beyond the purpose of the apostle and contrary to his design.

6. Let us see whether any thing further can be brought from the twenty-third verse for the demonstration of the contrary opinion. The man who has within him, beside the law of his members, the law of his mind, which is contrary to the other, is a regenerate man. Such a man is the one mentioned in this passage; Therefore, he is a regenerate man.

(1.) The defenders of the contrary opinion believe the proposition in this syllogism to be true, because "the law of the mind" is opposed to "the law of the members," as it consents to the law of God -- a quality which they suppose to belong only to the regenerate. This, they think, is confirmed from the circumstance that the same apostle expressly calls a certain mind, in Col. ii, 18, "a fleshly mind," which he likewise calls in Romans viii, 7, "the carnal mind."

But the proposition cannot be supported by these passages; for it is simply false, and those arguments which are produced in proof of it are inappropriate. For to some of the regenerate also, (that is, to those who are under the law, who have some knowledge of the law, who have thoughts accusing or else excusing them, and who know that concupiscence is sin,) belongs something beside "the law of the members,"

'"a fleshly mind," and one that is "carnal," which is opposite and repugnant to these: And this is "the work of the law written in their hearts;" which is neither "the law of the members,"a fleshly mind," nor one that is "carnal," but it contends with them. For a conscience or consciousness of good and evil, which compels a man, though in vain, to good, and deters him from evil, is directly opposed to "the law of the members"

impelling to evil, and "to the carnal affections which cannot be subject to the law of God." For this conscience consents to the law of God, and is the instrument of the same law even in an unregenerate man to accuse and convict him. We may, therefore, be permitted to deny that proposition, and to demand stronger proofs for it. (2.) With regard to the assumption, we may say the same as we did about the assumption in the previous syllogism -- that it is not fully proposed, as it ought to have been, and it omits those things which were joined together in the text of the apostle. But those things are of such a description, as, when added to the assumption, will easily point out the falsity of the proposition; that is, such is the opposition in this man between this law of the members and that of the mind, that the former not only "wars against"

the latter, but likewise obtains the conquest in the fight; that is, "it brings man into captivity under the law of sin." From these observations also it is evident, that no good consequence can ensue from the assumption.

7. But let us now try, whether something cannot be deduced from these two verses for the establishment of our opinion. It appeals indeed to me, that I can from them deduce an invincible argument for the refutation of the contrary opinion, and for the confirmation of my own.

(1.) The argument in refutation of the contrary opinion may be stated in the following manner: The law of the mind which wars against the law of the members, is conquered by the law of the members, so that the man "is brought into captivity to the law of sin which is in his members;" (as it occurs in this very passage; ) But the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, when warring against the law of the members, overcomes the latter; so that it liberates the man, who had been brought into captivity under the law of sin, from the law of sin and death: (Rom. viii, 2.) Therefore, the law of the Spirit is not the law of the mind; neither is the law of the mind, the law of the Spirit. This is evident from simple inversion, and from this very syllogism, the premises being so transposed, as for the assumption to take the place of the proposition, and vice versa: and, therefore, the word "mind" is not used in this passage for "the Spirit."

This argument is irrefragable. Let him who is desirous of proving the contrary, make the experiment, and he will find this to be the result. But its peculiar force will be more correctly understood towards the close of this investigation, in which is more fully explained the whole of the matter about which the apostle is here treating. (2.) For the confirmation of my own opinion, I deduce the following argument from these verses:

That man, who delights indeed in the law of God after the inward man, but who, with the law of his mind warring against the law of his members, not only cannot prevail against the latter, but is also conquered by it and brought into captivity under the law of sin, while the law of his mind fruitlessly contends against it, is an unregenerate man, and placed, not under grace, but under the law; But though this man delights in the law of God after the inward man, and though with the law of his mind he wars against the law of His members; yet not only is he unable to prevail against the law of his members, but he is likewise brought into captivity under the law of sin by the law of his members, the law of his mind maintaining a strong but useless contest; Therefore, the man [described] in this passage is unregenerate, and placed, not under grace, but under the law; Or, to state the argument in a shorter form, omitting whatever it is possible to omit -- That man in whom the law of the members so wages war against the law of the mind, as, when the latter is overcome, or at least while it offers a vain resistance, to bring the man himself into captivity under the law of sin, is unregenerate, and placed under the law; But in this man, about whom the apostle is treating, the law of the members so wages war with the law of the mind, as, when the latter is overcome, or at least while it offers a vain resistance, to bring the man himself into captivity under the law of sin; Therefore, this man is unregenerate and placed under the law.

(3.) The truth of the proposition rests on these three reasons: I. Because a regenerate man not only with the law of his mind wages war against the law of his members, but he does this principally with the law of the Spirit, that is, by the strength and power of the Holy Spirit; for it is said in Gal. v, 17: "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh."

II. Because far different is the result of that contest which, by the strength and power of the Spirit, or by "the law of the Spirit," a regenerate man maintains against the law of the members and against the flesh. For the law of the Spirit always obtains the victory, except when the man ceases from employing it in the battle, and from defending himself with it against the invading temptations of the flesh, Satan, and the world.

III. Because it is not an attribute of a regenerate man, of one who is placed under grace, to be brought into captivity under the law of sin; but that, rather, is his which is ascribed to him in the second verse of the following chapter -- "The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death." For when he was formerly placed under the law, he was in captivity under the strength and power of sin.

I will now confirm these reasons against the objections which are, or which can be, made against them.

Against the first it may be objected -- "Since 'the law of the mind,' and 'the law of the Spirit,' are one, they are in this argument unskillfully distinguished; both because no one lights against the law of the members except by the law of the Spirit, or by the strength and power of the Holy Spirit; and therefore the law of the mind is the law of the Spirit."

To this I reply, it has already been proved, that the law of the mind, and the law of the Spirit, are not the same, and that the conscience also wages war against the law of the members in those men who are under the law.

Against the Second reason it may be objected, "Even the regenerate themselves

'offend in many things.' (James iii, 2.) There is on earth 'no man that sinneth not.' (1

Kings viii, 46.) The regenerate cannot say with truth 'that they have no sin.' (1 John i, 8.)" With other objections similar in their import.

To these, I reply, that I heartily acknowledge all these things, but that I do not perceive how by means of them the second reason can be weakened. For these expressions are not repugnant to each other -- "In many things the regenerate offend,"

and "The regenerate most generally gain the victory in the contest against sin," that is, when they use the arms with which they are furnished by the Holy Spirit.

(4.), any one says, "In this contest, the regenerate are more frequently the conquered than the conquerors," I shall request him to explain how then it can be declared concerning the regenerate, "that they walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit;" for,

"to be the conquered" is "to fulfill the desires of the flesh;" and he who usually does this, "walks after the flesh." But many passages of Scripture teach that this contest, which the regenerate maintain against sin by the strength and power of the Holy Spirit, has generally a felicitous and successful termination; "for whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world; and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith. Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth Jesus to be the Son of God," (1 John v, 4,5.) "Submit yourselves therefore to God; resist the devil, and he will flee from you." (James iv, 7.) Greater is He that is in you, than he that is in the world." (1 John iv, 4.) "Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil. Wherefore, take unto you the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to withstand in the evil day, and, having done all, to stand."

(Ephes. vi, 11,13.) "I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me." (Phil.

iv, 13.) "All things are possible to him that believeth." (Mark ix, 23.) This truth also is proved, by various examples, through the whole of Hebrews 11. "Now unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us, unto him be glory," &c. (Ephes. iii, 20,21.) "Now unto Him that is able to keep you from falling,"and to present you, faultless, before the presence of his glory with exceeding joy, to the only wise God our saviour, be glory," &c.

(Jude 24, 25.) "They that are after the Spirit, do mind the things of the Spirit. If ye, through the Spirit, do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live. Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors through Him that loved us." (Rom. viii, 5,13,37.) By many other passages of Scripture, this may also be proved.

GALATIANS v, 16-1

8. But let us now consider Gal. v, 16-18, and let us compare it with Romans vii, 22,23, the passage at present under investigation, that it may also clearly appear, from such consideration and comparison, that the result of the contest between the Spirit and the flesh is generally this: the Spirit departs from the combat the conqueror of the flesh, especially as, in this seventh chapter to the Romans, we perceive an entirely contrary issue or result is described and deplored. The passage may be thus rendered:

"This I say then, Walk in the Spirit and fulfill not that after which the flesh lusteth," or

"ye shall not fulfill the lusts of the flesh."For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other; that ye may not do the things that ye would. But if ye be led of the Spirit, ye are not under the law?

The exhortation of the apostle occurs in the sixteenth verse; and, on account of the ambiguity of the Greek word, it may be read in two different ways, "fulfill not," or

"ye shall not fulfill." If the former rendering be adopted, then the exhortation consists of two parts, of which the one teaches what must be done, and the other what must be omitted; that is, we must walk in the Spirit, and the desires of the flesh must not be fulfilled." But if the clause be rendered in the second manner, then the sixteenth verse contains an exhortation in these words: "Walk in the Spirit;" and a consectary subjoined to the exhortation in these words: "And ye shall not fulfill the desires or lusts of the flesh." The latter mode of reading the passage seems to be more agreeable to the mind of the apostle; for he had previously, in the thirteenth verse, exhorted the Galatians not to abuse their Christian liberty for carnal licentiousness and lasciviousness. But now, in the sixteenth verse, he produces a remedy, by which they will be able to restrain and curb the assaults and the power of the flesh, and which is, if they walk in the Spirit, it shall then come to pass, that they shall not fulfill the lusts of the flesh.

In the seventeenth verse a reason is added, that is deduced from the contrariety or contest which subsists between the flesh and the Spirit, and from either the end or the result of this contest. (1.) The contrariety or contest is described in these words: "For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh." From which is manifest the necessity both of the exhortation, not to abuse their Christian liberty to carnal licentiousness, and not to fulfill the lusts of the flesh; and of the remedy, by which alone the lusts of the flesh can be curbed and restrained, and which is this: "if they walk in the Spirit, that lusteth against the flesh." For it is from this enmity and contrariety which subsists between the flesh and the Spirit that the conclusion is drawn, "If ye walk in the Spirit, ye shall not fulfill the lusts of the flesh." From this it is also manifest, that this latter mode of rendering is better adapted to the meaning of the apostle.

(2.) The end or result of this contest is described in these words: "And these are contrary the one to the other, that ye may not do the things that ye would." I have said that the end or the issue of the contest is here described; because some persons suppose that its issue, and not its end, is pointed out in this passage. (i.)But the particle, ina "that," which is used by the apostle, signifies the end or intention, and not the result or issue; and this interpretation is entirely agreeable to the mind of the apostle. "For the Spirit lusteth against the flesh" for this purpose, "that we may not do those things" which we lust according to the flesh, and "which we would," the consequence of which is, "if we walk in the Spirit, we shall not fulfill the desires of the flesh." And, on the contrary, since "the flesh also lusteth against the Spirit" for this purpose, "that we may not do those things which we lust according to the Spirit," it follows that if we walk in the flesh or according to the flesh, we shall not fulfill the desires of the Spirit. But this rendering is agreeable to the scope or design of the apostle, "that ye may not do what things soever ye would according to the flesh."

(ii.) If we assert that the result or issue is here signified, then the meaning will likewise be two-fold. For it will be possible for it to be as follows: "The flesh and the Spirit are contrary the one to the other, so that ye cannot do those things which according to the Spirit ye would." It may likewise be this: "So that ye cannot do these things which, according to the flesh ye would." That is, this contest obtains the following result, "that ye cannot do those things which, according to the Spirit, ye would;" or, "that ye cannot do those things, which, according to the flesh, ye would."

But let us see which of these two meanings is the more suitable: Truly, the latter of them is. It is not only more suitable, but likewise necessary, if the apostle is here treating about the issue or result. This will be still more apparent from the absurdity of the admonition, if the passage be explained in the other sense: The apostle admonishes the Galatians, "to walk in the Spirit, and not to fulfill the desires of the flesh;" (for we will now retain this rendering of the latter clause, as that which is more consentaneous with the meaning that explains the passage concerning this issue or result;) and the persuasion to this will then be: "For the flesh and the Spirit are contrary the one to the other, by this result, that ye cannot do those things which, according to the Spirit, ye would." This indeed is not to exhort, but to dissuade and dehort by a forewarning of the unhappy result.

Besides, reason itself requires, according to [logical] scientific usage, that what has been proposed be drawn out in the conclusion; otherwise the parts of connection will be broken. But the proposition was either this -- "Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfill the lusts of the flesh," or it was this: "Walk in the Spirit, and fulfill not the lusts of the flesh." I am desirous to have it demonstrated to me, by what means this proposition can be concluded from the eighteenth verse understood about the issue or result, by which the flesh hinders the Galatians from doing that which, according to the Spirit, they would. But it has been already shown, that each of these propositions may be fairly concluded from the passage, when understood as relating to the end or intention of the conflict, nay, when also understood as referring to the issue or result when the Spirit is the conqueror. It is apparent, therefore, not only that this is the end or design of the contest which is here mentioned from the lusting of the Spirit, but that this is likewise its issue or result from the strength and power of the Spirit -- that, when the flesh is subdued, the Spirit comes off as the conqueror; and that the man who, by the Spirit, wages war against the flesh, and who walks in the Spirit, does not fulfill the lusts of the flesh.

From these is inferred a consectary in the eighteenth verse: "But if ye be led of the Spirit, ye are not under the law;" that is, if ye walk in the Spirit, if under the guidance of the Spirit ye contend against the lusts of the flesh, and contend so as not to fulfill them, from these circumstances you may assuredly conclude that ye are not under the law.

In this consectary, we see, that the phrases, "to be under the law," and "not to fulfill the lusts of the flesh," are opposed to each other; for the latter of them is descriptive of the proper effect of the guidance of the Spirit. Wherefore, the phrases, "to be under the law," and "to fulfill the lusts of the flesh," are consentaneous and of the same import. But this is the very thing which is asserted in Romans vi, 14: "For sin shall not have dominion over you; for ye are not under the law, but under grace." From this, it is apparent, that the dominion of sin, which is the cause why the lusts of the flesh are fulfilled, prevails in those persons who are under the law. But since the dominion of sin does not obtain in those who are under grace, (and, in fact, on this account, because they are under grace,) it is therefore evident that these phrases, "to be under grace," and "to be led by the Spirit," are consentaneous, nay, that they are exactly the same. For the effect of each of them is one and alike, and that is, to prevent sin from having dominion over a man, and to hinder man from fulfilling the lusts of the flesh, which is also explained at great length in Romans 8, in a manner agreeable to that which is briefly laid down in this seventeenth verse, that is, "The Spirit is contrary to the flesh for this purpose -- that men may not do those things which, according to the flesh, they would." But, from Romans 7 it is very plain, that the result of that contest is different from the one upon which the apostle is here treating: For, in that chapter, the man does that which, after the flesh, he would, and does not what he is said to will after the inward man; the law of God, the law of the mind, and the inward man, vainly attempting to restrain the power of sin and to hinder the lusts of the flesh, because all these [strive as they may] are debilitated through the flesh.

9. If any one urge this as an objection, "It likewise befalls the best of the regenerate, that they do not the things which, according to the Spirit, they would, but that they fulfill the lusts of the flesh;" I perfectly assent to the truth of this, if the small addition be made, that "this sometimes happens to the regenerate." For if such be their general practice, they do not now walk in the Spirit; though this is a property of the regenerate. I say, that Romans 7 does not describe what sometimes befalls the pious, and that it contains a description of the state of that man about whom the apostle is there treating, that is, of a man who is under the law, before he is led by the guidance of grace, and is governed by the motions of the Holy Spirit. This is confirmed by the passage in Gal. v, 16-18.

Then I reply, such a case as this does not occur from the circumstance of the Spirit, who has for a long time maintained a strenuous contest with the desires of the flesh, being at length conquered, and yielding on account of impotence or weakness: But it happens, because the man is either overtaken with temptation and overcome, before he begins to oppose to it the arms of the Spirit and of grace; or, in the progress of the conflict, he throws out of his hands those arms which, at the commencement, he began to use; or he uses them no longer, having begun the battle in the Spirit, but ending in the flesh. In no other way than in this can it happen, that the flesh, the world and Satan can overcome us; because "greater is He who is in us, than he that is in the world "as has already been pointed out in several passages. Without manifest ignominy and contumely poured on divine grace and on the Spirit of Christ, no other cause can be assigned why the pious, and those who are placed under grace, should sometimes be conquered by the flesh, the world and Satan; for either the Spirit that is in us is not the stronger of the two; or, while lusting and fighting against the flesh, He overcomes. And how can it possibly come to pass, that He who has conquered the flesh while it was still in its full strength, and has thus subjected us to Himself, should not be able to gain the victory over the flesh when it is crucified and dead in the body of Christ?

10. To the Third reason it is objected, "Even the regenerate may in some degree and relatively be said to be captives under sin, that is, so far as they are not yet fully regenerated, and still feel within themselves the motions of the flesh lusting against the Spirit, from which they are not completely delivered while they continue in this mortal body." I grant the antecedent, but I deny the consequence; for so far are the scriptures from ascribing the detention of the regenerate as captives under sin, to the imperfection of regeneration and to the remains of the flesh, that they are said with respect to this very regeneration to be freed from the yoke and slavery of sin and from the tyranny of the devil. "The remains of sin survive in the regenerate," and, "The regenerate are detained as captives by the remains of sin," are contradictory affirmations: For the former of the two is a token of sin conquered and overcome; the latter attributes victory and triumph to sin. After the Holy Spirit has commenced the mortification and death of sin, what is the act of the same Spirit respecting sin?

Undoubtedly it is the persecution of the remains of sin, that He may subdue and extinguish them until they no longer exist; "and when their place is sought after, it is no more to be found," as St. Augustine has elegantly observed, when treating on this matter in a passage of his works.

But the cause why such an opinion as this is entertained, is because "deliverance from sin" and "slavery under its tyrannical power,"a being loosed from the chains of Satan"

and "captivity under his tyranny," are so accounted as if they can concur together, as the phrase is, in remiss degrees, and meet together in one subject, in much the same manner as the colour of white and that of black meet together in green, and heat and cold meet together in lukewarmness. Yet this matter stands in a situation vastly different; for liberty cannot consist with even the smallest portion of servitude or captivity; though it may labour under great difficulties in resisting its assaulting foes, and though it may occasionally come out of the conflict with something like a defeat.

But if the matter stood in the relation of similes which have been adduced, yet even then it could not be said, "This man is partly free from sin, and partly its slave and captive;" but a necessity would then arise for the existence of a third thing from these two, which might obtain the name of "a medium between the extremes," belonging neither to this nor to that. But I am desirous to see some passage of Scripture adduced, where that is said about the regenerate, and about those who are placed under grace, which is ascribed to the man about whom the apostle is treating, or what is equivalent to it.

ISAIAH LXIV, 6

11. But a passage is produced from the prophet Isaiah to prove that pious persons, and those who are placed under grace are, by the law of their members, brought into captivity under the law of sin. The degree of correctness with such an affirmation is made, will be very manifest from a comparison of the two passages. That in Isaiah (lxiv, 6) says, "But we are all as an unclean thing, and all our righteousness are as filthy rags; and we all do fade as a leaf; and our iniquities, like the wind, have taken us away." The passage in Romans, (vii, 23,) now under investigation, is this. "But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members."

Let us now approach and institute a comparison. The subject of the first of these passages is, the captivity by which the children of Israel were led away into exile on account of their sins; the subject of the latter is, captivity under sin; therefore, this is to pass over to a different genus, contrary to the method observed in every approved discussion.

In the former of these passages, the subject is the punishments which that people deservedly suffered on account of the actual sins which they had committed against God; but, in the latter, the subject is the cause whence it arises that the man who consents to the law of God, and who, with the law of his mind, wages war against the law of his members, is conquered and overcome, so that he actually commits sin, to which he is instigated and impelled by sin which dwelleth in him. Wherefore, the latter passage treats upon the CAUSE of actual sin, and the former upon the PUNISHMENTS of actual sins. For this phrase, "We all do fade as a leaf, and our iniquities, like the wind, have taken us away," does not signify that those men were impelled to some kind of sin through the depraved lusts of the flesh, as by a vehement wind, or that they melted away, as it were, into sins; but it signifies, that, on account of actual sins, which are distinguished by the appellation of "our iniquities," they are driven away into banishment as by a wind, and were scattered about as leaves. Let this passage be compared with the first Psalm, in which similar declarations are made concerning the wicked. Consult our interpreters of holy writ, such as Calvin, Musculus, Gualther, &c., and it will be evident, even with respect to the things which precede it, that the whole of this passage is unaptly cited by many persons to prove what they are desirous to establish.

For the plainer and more obvious explanation of this matter we must observe, that there is a two-fold captivity under the tyranny of sin -- the one, that of our primeval origin from Adam, according to which we are all born "children of wrath" and the servants of sin -- the other, that of our own particular act, when, by actual transgressions, we subject and bind ourselves still more to sin, and engage in its service. Some persons will have this two-fold servitude to have been allegorically typified by the Egyptian and Babylonian captivities. For the Israelites, in their parents, entered into Egypt; and while there, after a lapse of years, they began to be oppressed and to be regarded as servants. The same people, on account of their sins, were led away, by the violence of their enemies, into captivity in Babylon.

But the captivity about which the apostle is here treating, is posterior to the first of these two kinds; for the law of the members, which we have from our primeval origin, waging war with the law of the mind, when the latter is overcome, brings a man who is under the law into captivity to the law of sin, that very man who was formerly conceived in sin and born in iniquity. And, to express the whole in one word, he who was born in sin and originally under captivity to it, is brought into captivity under the law of sin by means of actual sins.

From these observations, therefore, it is apparent, that the proposition of our syllogism is true, and stands unshaken against all these objections. The assumption stands in the very text of the apostle, from which the conclusion follows, that the man about whom the apostle treats in this passage, is an unregenerate man, and not placed under grace, but under the law.

VERSE THE TWENTY-FOURTH

1. The lamentable exclamation, O wretched man that I am! -- a two-fold reading of it.

2. The body of death is the body of sin. 3. By four reasons it is proved that the body of death is not our mortal body. 4. This is confirmed by the testimonies of St. Augustine and Epiphanius. 5. An argument in favour of the true opinion. 6. Another argument in its favour.

1. From the condition of this man, when accurately considered by himself, follows the mournful lament and exclamation, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death, or from this body of death?" Of this, a two-fold explanation is produced, according the double meaning of the words -- either "from the body of this death," or "from this body of death," which some people interpret by

"this mortal body that we bear about with us," and others, by "that body of sin which has the dominion in a man who is under the law, and which renders him liable to death." The latter interpretation, however, is more agreeable both to the phrase and to the context; for the pronoun, toutou must not be referred to Swmatov "the body," but to Qanatou "death," to which it is most nearly conjoined; and the clause ought to be rendered thus: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death," [which is sin not only existing within me, but dwelling and reigning]? as it is expressed in the 17th and 20th verses.

2. For the apostle attributes a body to sin in the sixth verse of the sixth chapter of this epistle: "Our old man is crucified with him, that The Body of Sin might be destroyed," the destruction of which is followed by a deliverance from the servitude of sin, as it is expressed in the same verse. The phrase also occurs in Col. ii, 11: "In putting off the Body of the Sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ."

Wherefore, according to this mode of reading it, the meaning of the exclamation is,

"Who shall deliver me from this tyranny of sin, which, reigning in me and dwelling in my flesh, bringing me into captivity and subjecting me to itself, brings certain death to me?"

3. Some other persons are urgent about a different rendering, and give this meaning to the words, "Who shall deliver me from this mortal body?" That is, as the apostle speaks in another passage, "I desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ." But this meaning does not agree with the exclamation, (1.) On account of the construction, which declares that the pronoun, toutou "this," must not be referred to the body, but to death. (2.) Because the preceding verses do not permit this meaning to be entertained.

For the force and tyranny of sin, dwelling in this man, and impelling him to fulfill his desires, is the subject on which the apostle is here treating. But "the deliverance"

which is earnestly sought in this 24th verse, opposed to "the captivity" which is the subject of the verse. (3.) On account of the thanksgiving which is appended to it, and which ought not to be subjoined to a desire which was not then fulfilled [if the meaning of the phrase were, this mortal body]. (4.) Because the grace of Christ is not simply to deliver out of this mortal body, but to free us from the body of sin and from its dominion. It is true indeed, that, through the blessed analusin "dissolution" or

"departure," for which we are waiting in the faith and hope of Christ, rest is granted to us from all our labours, and from the conflict of lusts with which we are inwardly attacked. But in this passage the apostle is treating, not about the conflict and impulse of lusts which exist within us, but about the fulfilling of those lusts by that impulse to which "the law of the mind" opposes itself in vain.

4. St. Augustine is one of my supporters, who says, in his treatise On Nature and Grace (cap. 53,) "The saints most certainly do not pray to be delivered from the substance of the body, which is good, but from carnal vices; from which no man is delivered without the grace of the saviour, nor at the time of his departure from the body, when it dies." It is no injury to my interpretation, that St. Augustine here says, that, according to his interpretation, "Saints or holy persons pray for deliverance from carnal vices" &c.; I only point out what he understood by "the body of death?

On the Perfection of Justice, against Celestius, St. Augustine also says, "It is one thing, therefore, to depart out of this body, which the last day of the present life compels all men to do; but it is another thing to be delivered from the body of this death, which divine grace alone, through Jesus Christ, imparts to his saints and believers?

Epiphanius, On the 64th Heresy, (lib. 2, tom. I,) from Methodius, says, "Wherefore, O

Aglaophon, he does not call this body death, but sin which dwells in the body through the lust of the flesh, and from which God has delivered him by his coming?

5. Wherefore, from the 24th verse, when rightly understood, I argue thus for the establishment of my own opinion: Those men who are placed under grace are not wretched; But this man is wretched; Therefore, this man is not placed under grace.

The assumption is in the text, and thus placed beyond all controversy.

In reference to the proposition, perhaps some one will say, "Men, placed under grace, are partly blessed, and partly wretched -- blessed, as they are regenerate and partakers of the grace of Christ -- wretched, as they still have within them the remains of sin, with which they ought to maintain a constant warfare. This is a sure sign of a felicity which is not yet full and perfect." I confess that, while the regenerate continue as sojourners in this mortal life, they do not attain to a felicity that is full, complete in all its parts, and perfect. But I do not recollect ever to have read [in the Scriptures] that they are, on this account, called "wretched" with regard to the "spiritual life which they live by faith of the Son of God," though, in reference to this natural life, "they be of all men most miserable." (1 Cor. xv, 19.) The opposite to this may be easily proved from the Scriptures: "Blessed are the poor in spirit -- they that mourn -- that hunger and thirst after righteousness," &c. (Matt. v, 3-12.)

"But," some one will rejoin, "Is it not wretched to contend with the remains of sin, to be buffeted by the messenger of Satan, sometimes to be overcome, and to be grievously injured?" It is undoubtedly desirable that this were not necessary, that it never occurred, that they might be delivered from the messenger of Satan; but the contenders, and those who are thus buffeted, cannot be called "wretched" on account of that contest and buffeting. But it is wretched indeed, to be overcome; yet neither are they called "wretched," who, though they be sometimes conquered, more frequently obtain the victory over the world, sin and Satan.

6. He who desires to be delivered from the body of this death, that is, from the dominion and tyranny of sin, is not placed under grace, but under the law. But this man desires to be delivered from the dominion and tyranny of sin; therefore, this man is not placed under grace, but under the law.

The proposition is true, because regenerate men, and those who are placed under grace, are free from the servitude and tyranny of sin -- not indeed perfectly free, but yet so far as to render it impossible for them to be said to be under the dominion and servitude of sin, if the person who speaks concerning them be desirous of talking in accordance with the Scriptures. But it has been already proved, that this man is desirous of being freed from the body of sin which dwells and reigns within him; therefore, the conclusion regularly follows.

VERSE THE TWENTY-FIFTH

1. Various readings of the first clause, from the ancient fathers. 2. In the latter clause, this man is said "to serve the law of God with his mind, but with his flesh, the law of sin." 3. "To serve God," and "to serve the law of God," are not the same thing. 4. The various kinds of law mentioned in this chapter, with a diagram, and the explanation of it. 5. From this verse nothing can be obtained in confirmation of the contrary opinion.

1. St. Chrysostom reads the former part of this verse thus: "I thank," &c., which is also the reading of Theophylact.

This is the reading of St. Ambrose: "The grace of God through Jesus Christ." St.

Jerome, also, against Pelagius, adopts the same reading.

St. Augustine renders the clause thus: "By the grace of God through Jesus Christ."

(Discourse 5. On the Words of the Apostle. Tom. 10.)

Epiphanius renders it, "The grace of God through Jesus Christ." (From Methodius against Origen, Heresy 64. Lib. 2, tom. 1.)

But this clause contains a thanksgiving, in which St. Paul returns thanks to God that he, in his own person, has been delivered from this body of sin, about which he had been treating, and to which that man was liable whose character he was then personating. In this, thanksgiving is contained, by implication, an answer to the preceding interrogatory exclamation; that is, "The grace of God will deliver this man from the body of this death, from which he could not be delivered by the law." This is directly and openly explained by some copies of the Greek original, in which this verse is thus read: "The grace of God, through our Lord Jesus Christ," that is, "This grace will deliver me, or the man whose character I have been personating, from the body of this death" -- a thing which it was the chief purpose of the apostle to prove in this investigation.

2. In the latter part of the same verse, is something resembling a brief recapitulation of all that had been previously spoken, in which the state of the man about whom the apostle is here treating, is briefly defined and described in the following words: "So then, with the mind, I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh, the law of sin."

In the correct explanation of these phrases, lies an important key for the clear exposition and dilucidation of the whole matter; these phrases must, therefore, be subjected to a diligent examination.

3. Those persons who interpret this passage as relating to a regenerate man and to one placed under grace, are desirous to intimate, by these phrases, that St. Paul, so far as he was regenerate, "served God," but that so far as he was unregenerate, and still partly carnal, "he served sin." They also take "the mind" in the acceptation of the regenerated portion of man, and "the flesh" for that portion of him which is not yet regenerate; and they suppose that "to serve the law of God" is the same thing as "to serve God," and that "to serve the law of sin" is the same thing as "to serve sin." But neither of these suppositions can be proved by this text or by other passages of Scripture.

(1.) For the apostle is not accustomed to bestow on man, as he is regenerate, the epithet of "the mind," but that of "the Spirit." And this he does for a very just reason; for "the mind" is the subject of regeneration, "the Holy Spirit" is the effector of it, from communion with whom a participation also with his name arises. Besides, "the mind" is attributed to the flesh:" Vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind." (Col. ii, 18.) The gentiles are said to have "walked in the vanity of their mind." (Ephes. ii, 17.) Idolaters are "given over to a reprobate mind;" (Rom. i, 28; ) and the apostle mentions

"men of corrupt minds." (1 Thess. vi, 5; 2 Thess. iii, 8.) (2.) But that "to serve God" is not the same as "to serve the law of God," and "to serve sin" is not the same as "to serve the law of sin," is evident, First. From the difference of the words themselves. For it is very probable, that different phrases denote different meaning. If any one denies this, the proof of his position is incumbent on himself.

Secondly. From the words of Christ, who denied the possibility of any man serving two masters, God and Mammon, God and sin. If any one say that "it is possible for this to be done in a different respect, that is, to serve God with the mind, and to serve sin with the flesh," I reply that, by such a petty distinction as this, the general affirmation of Christ is evaded, to the great detriment of piety and divine worship, and that a wide door will thus be opened for libertines and Pseudo-Nicodemites. But some one will say, "The apostle expressly affirms this, which I deny, and my denial will be supported by the phrases themselves, when correctly explained, as they will soon be; for this man serves sin, and not God.

Thirdly. From the perpetual usage of the Scriptures, which are not accustomed to employ these restrictions when any man is said to serve God, or to serve sin.

Wherefore, since they are employed in this passage, it is exceedingly probable that the same thing is not signified by these different phrases.

4. But the subject itself, upon which the apostle here treats, when placed plainly before the eyes, may disclose to us the true meaning of these phrases; so that the man who will inspect it with honest eyes, and with eyes desirous to investigate and ascertain the truth alone, may have that with which to satisfy himself.

The apostle, therefore, here makes mention of four laws. (1.) The law of God. (2.) The law of sin. (3.) The law of the mind. (4.) The law of the members. They are opposed to each other and agree together in the following manner:

"The law of God," and "the law of sin," are directly opposed; as are likewise "the law of the mind," and "that of the members."

"The law of God," and "the law of the mind," agree together; as do likewise "the law of sin," and "the law of the members.

From this, it follows that "the law of God," and "the law of the members," are indirectly opposed; as are also "the law of sin," and "that of the mind." But it will be possible to render these things more intelligible by the subjoined diagram: "The law of God" and "the law of sin," obtain in this place the principal dignity. "The law of the mind" and "that of the members" are placed as hand-maids or assistants to them, rendering due service to their superiors; for "the mind delights in the law of God," and

"the law of the members brings a man into captivity to the law of sin." (Rom. vii, 22,23.) These things being premised, I proceed to the explanation.

The apostle here lays down two lords, who are completely contrary to each other, and directly opposed, God and sin -- the former of these, the lawful lord; the latter, a tyrant, and, by violent means, usurping dominion over man, by the fault indeed of man himself, and by the just judgment of God. Both of them impose a law on man.

God imposes his law, that man may obey him in those things which it prescribes; and sin Imposes its law, that man may obey it in "the lusts thereof," which it proposes by a certain law of its own. The former is called "the law of God;" the latter, "the law of sin." By the former, God endeavours to lead the man, who is placed under the law, to yield obedience to him; by the latter, sin strives and attempts, by every kind of violence, to compel the man to obey him. By his law, God prescribes those things which are "holy, and just, and good;" by its law, sin proposes those things which are useful, pleasant, and agreeable to the flesh. Now both of them, God and sin, have, in this man who is under the law, something which favours their several causes and purposes, and which assents to each of these laws. God has the mind, or "the law of the mind;" sin has the flesh, or the. law of the flesh, or "of the members." The mind, consenting to the law of God, that it "is holy, and just, and good;" the flesh, assenting to the law of sin, that it is useful, pleasant and agreeable; "the law of the mind," which is the knowledge of the divine law, and an assent to it; "the law of the members,"

which is an inclination and propension towards those things which are useful, pleasant, and agreeable to the flesh, that is, towards these mundane, earthly and visible objects.

In the 23rd verse of this chapter, these two laws are said to be, antisrateuomenoi

"waging war together," like soldier, who are in the field of battle, and drawn up in hostile array against each other, that the one army may overcome that which is opposed to it, and may gain the victory for its lord and general. "The law of the mind"

fights for "the law of God," and "the law of the members" marches under the banner of "the law of sin;" the former, that, after having conquered the flesh and the law of the members, it may bring man into subjection to the law of God, with this design -that man may serve God; the latter, that, after having overcome the law of the mind, it may sentence man to bondage, and "bring him into captivity to the law of sin," with this design -- that man may serve sin.

The conflict between these two contending parties, is about man, whom God wishes to bring into subjection to himself; and sin eagerly indulges the same wish. The former of these prescribes his own law to him; the latter also prescribes its law; and both of them employ their own military forces, that they severally have in the man, each to obtain the victory for himself.

From these explanations it will now appear what the phrases signify; "With the mind to serve the law of God," is, with a mind consenting to the law of God, to perform its military services to that law, for the purpose of bringing man into subjection to God;

"With the flesh, to serve the law of sin," is with the flesh assenting to the desires of sin, to render its military services to the law of sin, in order to bring man into captivity to that law and to subject him to sin.

The end, therefore, or the intention of the battle is, that man may be brought into subjection either to the law of God, or to the law of sin; that is, that he may walk either according to the flesh, or according to the mind. The act tending to this end, is the waging of war, which is indeed actual hostility, and an inimical encounter between the parties; but it is also the employment of persuasion towards man, without whose assent neither party can obtain this its end. The mind, adverse to the flesh, persuades the will of man to do that which is holy, and just, and good, and to reject what is merely delectable. The flesh, repugnant to the mind, persuades the same human will to set aside and disregard that which is holy, and just, and good, and to embrace that which is capable of affording present delight and usefulness.

The effect produced by the mind on the will, is the volition of good and the hatred of evil; the effect which the flesh produces on the same will, is the volition of evil and the nolition of good. This is a change of the will, first to one party, and then to the other.

But the issue or result declares which of the parties in this man has produced the stronger and more powerful effect. But this is the result of the conflict, [as it is described in the twenty-third verse,] the nonperformance of good, the nonomission of evil, a token of the impotence of the mind, which commanded good to be done, and forbade the commission of evil, which approved of the performance of good, but disapproved of the perpetration of evil; and it is the commission of what is evil, the omission of what is good, the captivity of man under the law of sin, plainly demonstrating that, in this man, the party of sin and of the flesh is the more powerful of the two, the law of the mind fruitlessly striving against it.

The cause of this result is the weakness of the law, which has been debilitated by the flesh, (Rom. viii, 3,) and the force and pertinacious power of the flesh in this man, the effect of which is, that the man does not walk according to the law but according to the flesh, and does not march according to the law of the mind but according to that of the members.

But if to this conflict be added a stronger force of the Spirit of Christ, who does not write the letter of the law on tables of stone, but impresses the love and fear of God on the fleshly tables of the heart -- then are we permitted not only to hope for a different result, but it is also given us assuredly to obtain a successful issue. This is indicated by the apostle in Romans viii, 2: "For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me tree from the law of sin and death." For it comes to pass, by means of the power of this Spirit, that the man, who had previously been "brought into captivity to the law of sin," is delivered from it, and "no longer walks after the flesh, but after the Spirit;" that is, in his life, he follows the motion, the influence, and the guidance of the Holy Spirit, which motion, influence and guidance tend indeed to the same end as that to which the law of God, and the law of the mind, endeavoured to lead the man, but with an energy not equal; as not being able to complete their attempt, on account of the hindrance of the law of sin and of the members. This is likewise the cause why this man is said to walk not according to the law of the mind, but according to the Spirit, [a phrase frequently employed by the apostle in Romans 8,] and "to be led of the Spirit, and not to be under the law," (Gal. v, 18.) Not indeed because the man who lives according to the Spirit, does not live according to the law of God; but because the Spirit of Christ, and not the law, is the cause why the man regulates his life according to the law of God. For the law knows how to command, but cannot afford any assistance -- a doctrine which St. Augustine frequently inculcates.

5. From these observations, it may now be evident, that even from this (25th) verse, nothing can be adduced in proof of the contrary opinion; but that the opinion which explains the passage as referring to a man under the law, is also established by this verse. For this man, as he is under the law, "with his mind serves the law of God;"

but, as he is carnal, "with his flesh he serves the law of sin," and he serves it so as to bring himself into captivity to the law of sin -- his mind and conscience vainly struggling against it.

Nor is it of the least service for the establishment of the other opinion, that the apostle says, "I myself;" for he had previously used the word "I" in many instances in this chapter, even when he said, "Sin wrought in me all manner of concupiscence;" (verse 8) "for I lived," or I was alive, "without the law once; but, when the commandment came, I died;" (9) "I found the commandment to be unto death to me;" (10; ) "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and by it slew me," (11) and other passages. But the pronoun, autov [in our English version, translated "myself,"]

which is an adjunct to the pronoun "I," indicates that this pronoun "I" must be referred to the person about whom he had been previously treating. For it is the demonstrative

[pronoun] of the nearest antecedent; as though he had said, "I am he about whom I have already been discoursing." This is likewise evident, because he concludes from the preceding verses, that the man whose character he took on him self to personate, (the prudence of [him who was under the influence of] the Holy Spirit requiring such personation,) "with his mind serves the law of God, but with his flesh the law of sin."

Let those things be taken into consideration which, in his epistle, the apostles writes concerning himself, and let them be compared with the particulars of the description here given; and it will then clearly appear, that the apostle, in this passage, was by no means treating about himself, such as he was at that time.

III. RECAPITULATION

1. What distinctly belongs to the man described in this chapter, both as he is under the law, and as he is carnal and the slave of sin. 2. The inconsistent state of a man who is under the law. 3. The manner in which God leads a sinner to penitence, faith in Christ, and the obedience of faith. 4. This representation of it confirmed by St. Augustine and Musculus -- How far this is the work of the regenerating Spirit. 5. To this it is objected that a three-fold state of man is thus laid down -- A reply to this objection.

1. But now, if not disagreeable, let all these things be collected together, and in a compendious form be exhibited before the eyes, that they may at one glance be examined, and a judgment formed concerning them.

THE MAN ABOUT WHOM THE APOSTLE IS HERE TREATING, DO FAR AS

HE IS:

UNDER THE LAW.

He allows not, or approves not of, that which he does; He wills indeed that which is good; He hates evil; He consents to the law of God that it is good; He has it [in him]

to will that which is good; It is no longer himself that does evil; He truly delights in the law of God after the inward man; According to the law of his mind he wages war with the law of his members; This causes him to exclaim, Who shall deliver me With his mind, therefore, he serves the law of God;

CARNAL AND THE SLAVE OF SIN.

He does that which he allows not, or of which he disapproves. But he does not what is good. And yet he does that which is evil. Yet he does that which he would not. But he finds evil present with him, and he finds not [how] to perform what is good. But the evil is done by sin which dwelleth in him.. But he has another law in his members.

But the law of his members wages war against the law of his mind, so as to bring the man into captivity to the law of sin. From this misery, and the body of this death? But with his flesh he serves the law of sin.

The things which are thus opposed to each other must not be disjoined, while they are attributed to the man about whom the apostle here treats; but they ought both to be united together, and jointly attributed to him. For this is required by the analogy of the subject itself that is under the law and the dominion of sin -- as he is under the law, the particulars enumerated in the first column belong to him -- as he is under the dominion of sin, those in the second column are his attributes.

But the mode by which the apostle joins these things with each other, and attributes them to this man in a conjoint form, is that of a disjunctive enunciation. This is indicated by the frequent use of the particle, de which is the post- positive of men itself, or what immediately follows it. The one without the other does not render a sentence complete; but men "indeed, truly," denotes that something will follow, and de "but, yet, then," that something has preceded, with which the former or the latter part of the sentence ought to be joined. This remark must be diligently observed in the consideration of Romans 7, as must likewise the following -- that both parts are not of the same order and dignity, but that the latter clause [in which de is used as the connecting word] is the chief and principal one, for whose explanation, illustration and amplification, the former clause [in which men occurs] is employed; as a proposition, or the first part of a sentence, is for its rendition or concluding part.

Those latter particulars, therefore, [which are here inserted in the second column,]

belong to the more ample explanation and proof of the proper cause, on account of which a man who is under the law cannot resist sin, but sin has the dominion over him. But the former particulars [enumerated in the first column] belong or conduce to the excusing of the law, lest the blame of this crime could be justly ascribed to it.

From all which things united together the conclusion may be drawn that the man about whom the apostle is treating, must, on account of the predominant flesh and of sin which dwells in his flesh, be still reckoned in the number of carnal persons. But, because he is under the law, and so under it that it has effected in him whatever is usually effected by the law in transferring and conducting man as a sinner to the grace of Christ, he must, [almost at any hour], speedily be taken out from the number of carnal persons, and placed in a state of grace; in which higher state, he will no longer be put to the necessity of fighting, under the auspices and guidance of the law, against the vigourous and lively "motions of sins;" but, by the power of grace and under the guidance and influence of the Holy Spirit, he will contend against his crucified and mortified inclinations, till he obtain over them, when they are nearly dead and buried, a complete victory.

2. The man who will reflect upon this inconsistent state, if I may so denominate it, will easily perceive, that the things which the apostle has here written, must be referred to this state. For, diligently, and as if purposely, he exercises caution over himself not to employ the word "Spirit" in any passage in his description of this state; yet this word, the use of which he here so carefully avoids, is that which he employs in almost every verse of the next chapter, (Rom. 8) and which is so familiar to this apostle in all his epistles, as to seem to be perpetually before his eyes and his mind, especially when he is treating about the regenerate and their duty to God and their neighbour, and also when he treats upon the contest which the pious still have with the flesh and the remains of sin. The thoughtful consideration of this single matter is able and ought to cause doubts in the minds of those who interpret this portion of holy writ as applicable to regenerate persons and those who are placed under grace, if they only be animated with a sincere desire of ascertaining the truth, and love the truth for its own sake, even when it does not agree with their own preconceived opinions.

3. I am also desirous that all men seriously consider how God leads us to faith, in his Son, and to the obedience of faith, and what means he uses to convert a sinner. We know that God employs his holy word to produce this effect; we know that this word consists of two essential and integral parts, the law and the gospel; we know, also, that the law must first be preached to a sinner, that he may understand and approve it, that he may explore and examine his life by it when it is known and approved, that, when such examination is completed, he may acknowledge himself to be a sinner, and by his demerits, deserving of damnation, that he may mourn and be sorrowful on account of sin, and may detest it, that he may understand himself to be in urgent need of a deliverer, and that he may be instigated and compelled to seek him.

To a man who is thus prepared by the law, the grace of the gospel must be announced, which, being manifested to the mind by the Holy Spirit, and by the same Spirit sealed on the heart, produces faith within us, by which we are united to Christ; that, holding communion with him, we may obtain remission of sins in his name, and may draw from him the vivifying power of his Spirit. By this quickening power, the flesh is mortified with its affections and lusts, and we are regenerated to a new life, in which we not only will or resolve to bring forth the fruits of gratitude to God, but we are likewise capable to bring them forth, and actually do so by this same Spirit, "who worketh in us both to will and to do."

Let any man now describe to me out of the Scriptures the proper effects which flow from the preaching of the law, in the minds of those whom God has decreed to convert to a better life; and I will instantly present to him a man, such as he who is described to us by the apostle, under his own person, in this chapter, (Rom. 7.) "But are these effects through the preaching of the law produced in this man, without the grace of Christ, and the operation of the Holy Spirit?"

What man can have the audacity to affirm this, unless he be one of the prime defenders of Pelagian doctrine, He who, by the preaching of the law, (the Holy Spirit blessing such preaching, and co-operating with it,) is compelled to flee to the grace of Christ, is not instantly, or at once, under grace, or under the influence, guidance and government of the Spirit. For, "the law is our schoolmaster [to bring us] unto Christ."

(Gal. iii, 24.) "Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth." (Rom. x, 4.) "By the law is the knowledge of sin." (iii, 20.) 4. St. Augustine, when treating upon the use of the law, says, in his Reply to the two epistles of the Pelagians to Boniface, "The law, as a schoolmaster, leads and conducts a man to this grace of God, by terrifying him concerning his transgressions of the law, that something may be conferred on him which it was not able to bestow." And in a subsequent passage, "We do not, therefore, make void the law through faith, but we establish the law,' which, by terrifying men, leads them to faith. Therefore, 'because the law worketh wrath,' that grace may bestow, on the man who is thus terrified and turned to fulfill the righteousness of the law, the mercy of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, who is the wisdom of God, and concerning whom it is written, He beareth in his tongue law and mercy. Law, by which he may terrify -- Mercy, by which he may afford relief; law by a servant -- mercy, by himself" &c., &c. (Lib. 4, cap. 5.) Let St. Augustine also be consulted, in his treatise on corruption and grace, in the first chapter of which he speaks thus appropriately to the matter under discussion: "The Lord himself has not only shown us from what evil we may turn aside, and what good we may perform, which the letter of the law alone is able to shew; but he also assists us, that we may turn aside from evil and may do good, which no one can do without the Spirit of grace. If this grace be wanting, the law is present for this purpose -- to bring us in guilty and to kill us, on which account, the apostle says, The letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life. (2 Cor. iii, 6.) He, therefore, who lawfully uses the law, learns in it evil and good; and, not confiding in his own strength, he flees to grace, by the aid of which he ceases from evil and does good. But what man thus flees to grace, except when his steps are directed by the Lord, and he delighteth in his way? (Psalm xxxvii, 23.) And by this also, the act of desiring the assistance of grace is the beginning of grace."

Consult also the fifth chapter of the same treatise, in which the following passage occurs: "You are not willing to have your faults pointed out. You are unwilling that they should be smitten, and that you should feel useful grief, which may induce you to seek a physician. You are not desirous to have yourself shown to yourself, that when you perceive your own [mental] deformity you may be very importunate for a reformation of yourself, and may supplicate God not to suffer you to remain in this foul and deformed condition."

And in the sixth chapter, he says: "Therefore, let the damnable origin be reprehended, that a willingness for regeneration may arise out of the sorrow consequent on such reprehension; yet, if he who is thus chastised be a son of the promise, that, when the noise of the correction sounds outwardly and the strokes of the whip are heard, God may work inwardly in him also to will by his secret inspiration."

Musculus says, in his Common Places, in the chapter On Laws, (fol. 124,) "The law causes me not only to understand, but likewise with anguish and remorse of conscience to feel and experience that sin is in me. The proper effect of the law is, that it convicts us of being inexcusably guilty of sin, subjects us to the curse, and condemns us, (Gal. 3,) and when we are deeply affected with the smart of sin and condemnation, it renders us, anxious and earnest in our desires for the grace of God.

Hence, arises that of the apostle, which is the subject of his investigation in Romans 7, and at the close of which he exclaims, O wretched man that l am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? THE GRACE OF GOD THROUGH JESUS

CHRIST."

"But is this, therefore, the work of the regenerating Spirit?" With regard to the END, I confess that it is; but with regard to the EFFECT itself, I dare not make any assertion.

For mortification and vivification, which, as integral parts, contain the whole of regeneration, are completed in us by our participation of the death and resurrection of Christ. (Rom. 6.) In Romans viii, 15, the apostle distinguishes between "the Spirit of bondage to fear," and "the Spirit of adoption." Many persons denominate the former of these, "a legal Spirit," and the latter "the Spirit of the gospel of Christ." I, therefore, make the service of the Spirit of bondage to precede that of the Spirit of adoption, though both of them tend to one design. Whence, it appears that this my explanation of the seventh chapter is not contrary to the true doctrine concerning the law and its use, and the necessity of the grace of Christ; but that the doctors of the church, who give a different interpretation of it, have not reflected on this matter when they entered on an explanation of the chapter. For, since they teach, from the Scriptures, the very same thing as I suppose the apostle here to make the subject of his investigation, we do not differ from each other in our opinion of doctrines, but only in this single circumstance -- that they do not think this passage relates to that head of doctrine, which, I affirm, is professedly treated in it: Yet, in this opinion, I do not stand alone, but I have many others with me, as we shall afterwards perceive.

5. Some one may here object, "that by this, my explanation, a three-fold state of man is laid down, when the Scriptures acknowledge but a two-fold state; and that three kinds of men are introduced, when no more than two are known to the Scriptures -that is, the state of regeneration and that which precedes regeneration, believers and unbelievers, regenerate and unregenerate men," &c.

To this I reply, (1.) that in my explanation three consistent states of men are not laid down, neither are there three distinct and perfectly opposite kinds of men; but that it teaches how much the law has the power of effecting in a man, and how the same individual is compelled by the law to flee to the grace of Christ.

(2.) I say that the state of the man described in this chapter is not a consistent one, but is rather a grade or step from the one to the other -- from a state of impiety and infidelity to a state of regeneration and grace -- from the old state in Adam to the new state in Christ. According to this grade or step, the man is denominated by some persons renascent, [or in the article of being born again]. And, truly, the distance of the one of these states from the other is far too great, for a man to be able to pass from one to the other without some intermediate steps.

(3.) I deny that there is any absurdity in laying down a three-fold state of man, regard being had to the different times; that is, a state before or without the law, one under the law, and another under grace. For the apostolical Scriptures make mention of such a three-fold state in the two chapters now under consideration, and in Romans 6 and 7, and Galatians 4 and 5.

St. Augustine says, in his book, The Exposition of certain Propositions in the Epistle to the Romans, (Cap. 3) "Therefore we distinguish the four conditions of man, into that BEFORE the law, UNDER the law, under grace, and in peace. In the state before the law, we follow the lusts of the flesh; under the law, we are drawn along with them; under grace, we neither follow those lusts, nor are drawn by them; in peace, there is no lusting of the flesh. Before the law, therefore, we do not fight; under the law, we fight," &c., &c.

Consult also Bucer, in his commentary on this passage. For he lays down a three-fold man, (1.) a profane man who does not yet believe in God, (2.) a holy man who loves God, but who is weak to prevail against sin, and (3.) lastly, a man furnished with a stronger portion of the Spirit of Christ, so that he is able, not only to repress and condemn the flesh, but likewise to live, in reality, the life of God, with pleasure, and with confirmed and perpetual diligence. Let, therefore, the whole of his commentary on this passage be perused, and it will appear that, with respect to the substance of the matter, the difference is very slight between his explanation of it, and that which I have now given. This I shall also clearly prove in the following chapter, by passages cited from the same commentary.

But let us see whether the Scriptures themselves do not, in many places, propose three kinds of men, and give us a description of a three-fold state. In Rev. iii, 15,16, some persons are described, as being neither hot nor cold, but lukewarm. Christ says that he came not to call to repentance "the righteous," that is, those who esteemed themselves as such, but "sinners," that is, those who owned themselves, or who, on his preaching, would own themselves to be of that description. (Matt. ix, 13.) Christ calls to himself those who are fatigued, weary, heavy-laden, and oppressed with the burden of their sins, (Matt. xi, 28,)but drives away from him those who are proud and puffed up with arrogance on account of their own righteousness. (Luke xviii, 9.) "Jesus said unto them, If ye were blind, ye should have no sin; but now ye say, We see; therefore, your sin remaineth." (John ix, 41.) In the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican, is intimated to us a three-fold description of men -- one kind in the Pharisee, two kinds in the Publican, one before his justification, the other after it. But who can enumerate all the similar instances, Indeed, such enumeration is unnecessary. It is rather a matter of surprise, that, as the books of our divines are filled with such distinctions, they did not occur to their minds when meditating on this passage, in which this matter [of the different conditions or states of man] is professedly treated.

IV. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SEVENTH AND THE EIGHTH

CHAPTERS

1. The truth of the interpretation of the seventh chapter, as it has been so far deduced by the author, is proved from some of the early verses of the eighth chapter when compared with those which precede them. 2. The first verse. 3. The second verse, and an explanation of the phrases used in it. 4. The third verse. A comparison of the former part of it with Romans vii, 5 and 14, and of the latter part of it with the sixth verse of the same chapter. 5. The fourth verse, and a comparison of it with Romans vii, 4. A paraphrastical recapitulation of those things which are taught in the first four verses of the eighth chapter, and their connection with the preceding chapter.

1. But I may now be permitted to confirm this my interpretation from some of the first of the verses of the next chapter, provided they be diligently compared with those in the seventh chapter.

2. For, in the first verse, a conclusion is inferred from verses of the preceding chapter, which is agreeable and accommodated to the principal design proposed by the apostle through the whole of this epistle. The words are these: "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit."

That this verse contains a conclusion, is evident from the illative particle "therefore,"

and indeed a conclusion not deduced from the former part of the last verse in the seventh chapter, but from the entire investigation, which consists of these two parts:

"Men do not obtain righteousness, and power to conquer sin and to live in a holy manner, by means either of the law of nature or that of Moses; but, through the faith of the gospel of Jesus Christ, those very blessings are gratuitously bestowed on them who work not, but believe on Christ." But these two things, JUSTIFICATION which consists of remission of sins, and The Spirit of Holiness by which believers are enabled to overcome sin and to live in a holy manner, are parts of the gracious covenant into which God has entered with us in Christ: "I will put my laws into their minds, and write them in their hearts, &c.; for I will be merciful to their unrighteousness, and their sins and their iniquities will I remember no more." (Heb.

viii, 10,12.) Therefore, when the apostle had proceeded so far with the proof of this thesis, (having in the first five chapters treated on righteousness and remission of sins, and in the sixth and seventh chapters, on the power to conquer sin and live in a holy manner,) he now infers this conclusion: "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit."

The emphasis of the conclusion lies in these words: "Who are in Christ Jesus, who walk, not after the flesh, but after the Spirit," to the exclusion of those who are under the law, and for whom is prepared certain condemnation, as being persons out of Christ, and subjected to the dominion of sin -- as if the apostle had said, "From all these things, therefore, it is apparent that condemnation impends over all those who are under the law, because they neither perform the law, nor are able to perform it; but that freedom from condemnation granted only to those who are in Christ, and who walk according to the Spirit."

But that the emphasis lies in these words: "Those who are in Christ Jesus," to the exclusion of the others, is apparent,

(1.) From the fact, that this very part is repeated. though in other words, which are these, "who walk after the Spirit."

(2.) Because the exclusion of other persons is openly placed in the repetition, "who walk not after the flesh."

(3.) From the subject, itself, of the apostle's investigation, which is this: "The gospel and not the law, is the power of God to salvation to those who believe and do not work." Wherefore, in order that the conclusion may correspond with the proposition, it ought to be read and understood with the opposition here produced.

(4.) From other conclusions in this epistle, inferred in similar cases -- "therefore, we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law," (Rom. iii, 28) also, in the twenty-seventh verse of the same chapter, "Where is boasting then, It is excluded. By what law? By that of works? No; but by the law of faith."But it was written for us also, to whom it shall be imputed," that is, to those who "believe on him that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead." (iv, 24) And it appears that these things are spoken in opposition, to the complete exclusion of another opposite, thus: "But to him that worketh not, but believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is accounted for righteousness." (iv, 5.) "For the promise was not made to Abraham through the law, but through the righteousness of faith." (13.) "Ye are become dead to the law, that ye should be married to Christ." (vii, 4.) As, likewise, in the passage at present under consideration, "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit,"

From these remarks, it is apparent that the words after the flesh, but after the Spirit,"

do not belong to the description either of the subject or of the attribute of the preceding conclusion, as if they were described who are in Christ, but that they are the consequent or the antecedent itself of the same conclusion, though enunciated in a form somewhat different. This is likewise evident from the very words; for the pronoun, toiv "those," which is properly subservient to this matter, is not used in this clause.

3. The same thing is taught in the second verse, in which these two things are united,

"the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus," that have reference to these two things in the preceding verse, "Those in Christ Jesus," and walking after the Spirit." But let us inspect the verse itself, which reads thus: "For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death."

Before we compare this verse with that which preceded it, we must give a preliminary explanation of the phrases used in it. "The law of the Spirit" is, therefore, called the right, the power, and the force or virtue of the Holy Spirit; for the apostle continues in the mode of speaking which he had previously adopted in the seventh chapter, where he attributes a law to sin, to the mind and to the members, that is, the power and force of commanding and impelling. The Spirit is here called that "of life," that is, "the vivifying Spirit" by a phrase familiar to the Hebrews, who employ the genitive cases of substantives instead of adjectives; as "the city of God,"the man of God,"the God of justice," &c. But the Spirit is thus designated in opposition or distinction to the law of the letter, or the letter of the law, which is weak for the work of vivification, and knows nothing more than to kill -- according to this passage, "The letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life," (2 Cor. iii, 6) and according to this: "for if there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law."

(Gal. iii, 21.)

But this "law of the Spirit of life" is said to be "in Christ Jesus," not because it is only in the person of Christ Jesus, but because it can be obtained in Jesus Christ alone; according to this declaration: "Believers receive the Spirit, not by the works of the law, but by the hearing of faith." (Gal. iii, 2,5.) This phrase, "in Christ," is very often used in the same manner in the apostolical writings. But that the phrase is to be received in this sense also in the present passage, is manifest, (1.) From the scope or design of the apostle, which is to teach, that not through the law, but through the grace of Christ, believers obtain righteousness and the Holy Spirit, by whose power they may be enabled to have dominion over sin, and to yield their members instruments of righteousness unto God.

(2.) From comparing this passage with the first verse. For, "to those who are in Christ Jesus," is attributed freedom from condemnation, because "the vivifying Spirit in Christ Jesus has made them free from the law of sin and death."

(3.) Because this "vivifying Spirit" does not "deliver from the law of sin and death,"

except as it is communicated "to those who are in Christ Jesus."

But to this "Spirit of life" is attributed that "it makes those who are in Christ Jesus free from the law of sin and death;" that is, from the power and tyranny of sin reigning, and killing by means of the law. This deliverance or emancipation is opposed to "the captivity unto the law of sin," of which mention is made in Romans vii, 23, and to

"the body of death" which is mentioned in verse the twenty-fourth. From this "law of sin," and from this "body of death," a man who is under the law could be delivered neither through the law of Moses, nor through "the law of the mind" which "consents to the law of God." But from this is also most admirably proved the conclusion deduced in the first verse from those which preceded it [in the seventh chapter]. For

"deliverance from the law of sin and death" is opposed to "condemnation;" and, therefore, when the former of those is laid down, the latter is removed.

This deliverance is attributed "to those who are in Christ Jesus," and "who walk according to the Spirit," from which it follows, that they are made free from condemnation. But the reason why this deliverance is attributed to that subject, arises from the cause of deliverance, that is, the vivifying Spirit, which Spirit, as it exists in Christ and is to be obtained in him, is likewise in "those who are in Christ Jesus."

Wherefore, it is not at all wonderful, that this Spirit exercises his own proper force and efficacy in those persons in whom he dwells; and since this force or virtue is so peculiar to him, that he has it not in common with the law of Moses, it follows from this, that those only "who are in Christ Jesus" and are partakers of his Spirit, or that those who, being in Christ Jesus, are partakers of his Spirit, are delivered from condemnation, while those who are under the law remain under condemnation, as being those who are overcome by "the law of the members," and have been "brought into captivity under the law of sin," no successful resistance being offered by "the law of the mind," which "consents to the law of God."

We have already said that, from a comparison of this verse with the twenty-third verse of the preceding chapter, an unanswerable argument is deducible in proof -- that, in the two verses now specified, the apostle is not treating about the same man; but that, in the twenty-third verse of the seventh chapter, he treats about a man who is under the law, and in this second verse, about one who is under grace; because the man described in the former of these verses is "brought into captivity under the law of sin and death," and this by "the law of the members,"the law of the mind" offering fruitless resistance; but the man who is mentioned in the second verse, by the power of the life-giving Spirit, whom he has obtained in Christ Jesus, is "made free from the same law of sin and death."

4. Let us consider the third verse, in which the same thing may appear still more plainly to us; for in it the cause is explained why men who are under the law, cannot be made free from the dominion and condemnation of sin; but it is shown that this is obtained for them and effected by Christ. But the cause is this, because deliverance from the law of sin and death, or freedom from condemnation, could not be obtained except by the condemnation of sin, that is, except sin had been previously despoiled of the [assumed] right which it possessed, and of its power which it exercised over men who were subject to it. But it possessed the right and power of exercising dominion and of killing. But sin could not be despoiled of its right, and deprived of its power, by the law; for the law was rendered "weak, through the flesh," for the performance of such an arduous service. When God saw this state of things, and was unwilling the unhappy race of men should be perpetually detained under the tyranny and condemnation of sin, "he sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and indeed for sin," that is, for destroying it, and he condemned sin in the flesh of his Son, who bore sin in his own body [on the tree] and took away from it that authority over us which it possessed, and weakened its powers.

From these remarks it appears that this passage, which has hitherto been accounted one of great difficulty, is plain and perspicuous, provided each part of it be arranged aright, in the following manner: "For God, having sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh; which was a thing impossible to the law, because it was weakened through the flesh." For "that which the law could not do" is, "the condemnation of sin in the flesh?'

Hence it is manifest, that this verse briefly explains the whole cause why sin reigns unto death over men who are under the law, and why it possesses neither the authority nor the power of reigning over "those who are in Christ Jesus" and under grace. This may be briefly shown from a comparison of those things which had been previously said, with this verse. For these words, "what was impossible to the law because it was weakened by the flesh," agree with the following declaration, contained in the fifth verse of the preceding chapter: "When we were in the flesh, the motions of sing, which are by the law, did work in our members;" and with these words in the fourteenth verse, "We know that the law is spiritual, but I am carnal;" they also agree with the eighteenth verse, "I know that in me, [that is, in my flesh,] dwelleth no good thing."

But these words, "God, in the flesh of his Son, condemned sin," agree with what is said in the sixth verse, of the preceding chapter: "But now we are delivered from the law, that being dead wherein we were held;" that is, sin being condemned which held us bound and in subjection to it. But, in this passage, the cause is more fully explained, that in the flesh of Christ such condemnation was effected.

5. From these observations is deduced the meaning of the fourth verse, plainly agreeing with those which preceded. It is this, after it had come to pass, that sin was condemned in the flesh of the Son of God, the right or authority of the law was completed and consummated in those who are in Christ Jesus, and who walk after the Spirit; so that they are no longer under the guidance and government of the law, but under the guidance of Him who has delivered us from sin, and who has claimed us for his own people.

This is plainly expressed by the apostle, in the fourth verse of the preceding chapter, in these words: "Ye also are become dead to the law in the body of Christ, that ye should be married to another, even to Him who is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God."

For these phrases agree with each other: "Ye are become dead to the law," and, "the right or authority of the law is fulfilled or completed in you." And, "in the body of Christ ye are become dead to the law," is the same as, "sin was condemned in the flesh of Christ, that the right or authority of the law might be fulfilled in us." But when the right of the law is completed and consummated by the condemnation of sin which was effected in the flesh of Christ, we belong or are married to another, that is, the right is transferred from the law to Christ, that we may be no longer under the law, but under Christ, and may live under grace and the guidance of his Spirit.

For these words, "that the right or authority of the law might or may be fulfilled in us," must not be understood as if, when sin had been condemned in the flesh of Christ, the right or authority of the law was still to be completed; but that after the condemnation of sin in the flesh of Christ, the right of the law was actually fulfilled.

Several forms of speech, similar to this, are used in this manner in the Scriptures. For instance: "All this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet: (Matt. i, 22) "He came and dwelt in a city called Nazareth, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophets, He shall be called a Nazarene."

(ii, 23.) "He came and dwelt in Capernaum, which is upon the sea coast, in the borders of Zabulon and Nephthalim, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the prophet, saying, The land of Zabulon, and the land of Nepthalim, &c., light is sprung up to them who sat in the region and shadow of death." (iv, 13-16.) "He cast out the spirits With His word, and healed all that were sick, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the prophet, saying, Himself took our infirmities," &c.

(viii, 16,17.) See also Matt. xii, 17; xiii, 35; xxvi, 56. In all these examples, the phrase, "that it might be fulfilled," evidently means that the prediction was actually fulfilled by those acts which are mentioned in the several passages. This is also signified by a phrase different from the preceding, in Matt. xxvii, 9, "Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremy the prophet." It is lawful also to change the mode of speech in this verse, (Rom. viii, 4,) into another exactly of the same import:

"Then was fulfilled the right or authority of the law in us." In addition to these, consult Matt. xxvii, 35; Luke xxi, 22; John xiii, 18; xvii, 12; xviii, 9; and innumerable other passages.

From this explication it is apparent, that this portion of holy writ, (Rom. viii, 1-4,) is plain and perspicuous, though, without this interpretation, it is encompassed with much obscurity, as almost all interpreters have confessed, while they have laboured hard to explain it.

We will now, by permission, compress all these remarks into a small compass, and briefly recapitulate them; what I have advanced will then become far more evident.

Let us do this in the following manner:

"Since, therefore, we have already seen, that men under the law are held captive under the dominion and tyranny of sin, we may easily conclude from this, that those only who are in Christ Jesus, and who walk after the Spirit and not after the flesh, are free from all condemnation; because the law, the right, the power, the force or virtue of the vivifying Spirit, which is and can be obtained in Jesus Christ alone, has liberated persons of this description from the law, the power and this force of sin and death, from the empire and dominion of sin, and of its condemnation. Christ Jesus could lawfully do this by his Spirit, as being the person in whose flesh sin was condemned, that it has no longer any right, neither can have any, over those who are Christ's; in which flesh, indeed, He was sent by his Father, because this very thing was impossible to the law, weakened as it was through the flesh. And thus it has come to pass, that the right of the law, which it had over us when we were still under the law, is completed or fulfilled in persons of this description, who have become Christ's people through faith, that they might hereafter live, be influenced, and governed by his grace and according to the guidance of the Holy Spirit. From these things we may certainly conclude that sin cannot have dominion over them, and therefore, that they are able to yield their members instruments of righteousness to God, as those who have been translated from the death of sin to the life of the Spirit."

But these topics the apostle pursues as far as the sixteenth verse of this eighth chapter, in a manner accommodated to the same scope or design as we have hitherto pointed out; and he seems always mindful of the exhortation which he had given in Romans vi, 12,13; from the conjoint reason in which he descends into the succeeding long investigation.

These observations, however, may suffice, lest we be too operose in demonstrating a matter that is so plain and perspicuous.

SECOND PART

I. THE OPINION WHICH IS TO BE CORROBORATED BY TESTIMONIES

This opinion, which explains Romans 7, as relating not to a man under grace, but to one who is placed under the law, and to one who is not yet regenerated by the Spirit of Christ, was never yet condemned in the church of Christ, as heretical, but has always had some defenders among the doctors of the church.

We will now approach to the second part of our proposition, which we have judged it right to treat for the purpose of making it evident to all men, that the opinion which I defend is not of recent growth, neither has it been fabricated by my brain, nor borrowed from some heretic, but that it is very ancient, and approved by a great part of the doctors of the primitive church, and that, besides, it has never been so far rejected, by those who have given a different interpretation to the passage, as to induce them to judge it worthy of being branded with the black mark of heresy.

II. THE MOST ANCIENT AND MOST RESPECTABLE OF THE CHRISTIAN

FATHERS APPROVE OF THE INTERPRETATION WHICH WE GIVE TO THIS

CHAPTER

1. Irenaeus. 2. Tertullian. 3. Origen. 4. Cyprian. 5. Chrysostom. 6. Basil the Great. 7.

Theodouret. 8. Cyril. 9. Macarius the Egyptian. 10. Damascenus. 11. Theophylact. 12.

Ambrose. 13. Jerome.

1. IRENAEUS

Irenaeus thus cites part of this chapter in lib. 3, cap. xx, "On this account, therefore, he, who through the virgin is Emmanuel, God with us, the Lord himself, is the sign of our salvation; because he was the Lord who saved them, as through themselves, they possessed not the means of being saved. On account of this also, when St. Paul is shewing the weakness of man, he says, I know that in me, (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing, thus intimating that the blessing of salvation is not from us, but from God. And again, O wretched man that l am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? He then infers a deliverer, the grace of Jesus Christ our Lord." In this quotation, [when referring to St. Paul's declaration,] he does not say, "a regenerate Man,"a believer," or Christian," but simply "a man," under which appellation, neither the Scriptures nor the fathers are accustomed to speak of one who is a Christian, a believer, and a regenerate man.

2. TERTULLIAN

For though he denied that in His flesh dwelt any good thing, yet it was according to the law of the letter in which he was; but according to the law of the Spirit, with which he connects us, he delivers from the weakness of the flesh. He says, "For the law of the Spirit of life hath manumitted thee from the law of sin and death." For though he seems to dispute on the part of Judaism, yet he directs to us the integrity and plenitude of instructions, on account of whom, as labouring "in the law through the flesh, God sent his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh." (On Chastity, cap. 17.)

In this sentence, Tertullian openly affirms, that the passage must be explained concerning "a man who is under the law of the letter." Nor is it a very great objection if any one assert, that this book was written by him while he was in a heresy; for on this point he was not heretical, and the opinion, it is apparent, had then obtained, that this chapter was to be understood in this manner.

3. ORIGEN

But with respect to what he says, "but I am carnal, sold under sin," on this occasion, as a teacher of the church, he takes upon himself the personation of the weak, on which account he has also said in another passage, "to the weak became I also as weak." Therefore, in this passage St. Paul is made "a carnal man and sold under sin,"

to those who are the weak, (that is, to the carnal,) and who are sold-under sin, and he speaks those things which it is their practice to utter under the pretext either of excuse or of accusation. Speaking, therefore, as in their person, he says, "but I am carnal, sold under sin," that is, living according to the flesh, and reduced, [as a servant] by purchase, to the power of sin, lust and concupiscence; "for that which I do, I allow not," &c.

And he (that is, Paul the carnal man) here says, "now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." But in other passages Paul the spiritual man says, "I laboured more abundantly than they all, yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me." Therefore, as he thus ascribes his labours, not to himself, but to the grace of God which worked in him; so does that carnal man attribute the evil works, not to himself, but to sin that dwelleth and worketh in him. On this account he says, "now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me; for in me, (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing." For Christ does not yet dwell in him, neither in his body yet the temple of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, this man whose character is personated is not in every respect averse from good things, but in purpose and in will he begins to seek after good things. But he cannot yet obtain such things in reality and in works. For there is a certain infirmity of this kind in those who receive the beginnings of conversion, that when they truly will instantly to do every thing that is good, the effect does not immediately follow the will. (On Romans 7.) 4. CYPRIAN

When treating upon the contest between the flesh and the Spirit, in his sixth Discourse On the Lord's Prayer, as well as in his pamphlet On the Celibacy of the Clergy, Cyprian does not cite Romans 7, but he quotes Gal. v, 17, "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh," &c. But that he understood Romans 7, to relate not only to the indwelling of sin, but also to its dominion, is evident from his Prologue concerning the Cardinal Works of Christ, in which, among other remarks, the following occurs - - "If I do not know who it is that inscribed this law in my members that it may, with such violent domination, oppress the Spirit, and that the better and more worthy nature may succumb to the worse, I must patiently endure it if I do not understand the Almighty Operator of the universe."

He adds, in a subsequent passage of the same prologue: It is difficult to understand wherefore this law of sin, in this and in similar individuals, oppresses the law of righteousness, and wherefore weak and enervated reason so miserably falls, when it is able to stand; especially when this defect depends on the sentence of damnation, and the ancient transgression has obtained this inevitable punishment."

5. CHRYSOSTOM

When treating professedly on this portion of holy writ and explaining it, in his comment on Romans 7, Chrysostom, after confirming what he had advanced in the preceding verses, expresses himself in the following manner: Therefore, Paul subjoined this assertion, "but I am carnal, sold under sin." Thus describing a man who lives under the law and before it. Therefore, sin itself is adverse to the law of nature. For this is what he says, "Warring against the law of my mind." It also imposes on the law of nature a universal contest and warfare, when it afterwards draws up in battle array the forces of sin. For the Mosaic law was lastly added beyond what was necessary. But, though the former law teaches indeed those things which ought to be done, and though the latter unites in extolling them; yet neither the one nor the other has performed any execution in this battle against sin. So great is the tyranny of sin, so wonderfully prevailing and overcoming! This is likewise intimated by St. Paul, when, after announcing the conflict of opposing and predominant sin, he says: "But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin." For he does not simply say, "conquering me," but "rendering me a captive to the law of sin." Neither does he say, "bringing me into captivity to the impulse of the flesh or of carnal nature," but "bringing me into captivity to the law of sin," that is, to the tyranny and power of sin.

O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? Do you here behold how amazingly great is the tyranny of wickedness, and how it also overcomes the mind which "finds a condelectation, or joint delight, in the law of God?" For he says, "It is not that any one says I hate the law of God "or am averse to it, and am brought into captivity to sin. For "I find a condelectation in the law, I consent to it, and flee to it." Yet it was not able to save him when he fled to it. But Christ has saved him, when he was fleeing, from it. Here you acknowledge the great excellence of grace.

And in his Commentary on Romans viii, 9, he says:

After sin has been destroyed, this difficult warfare is terminated by the grace of the Holy Spirit, through which the contest is now become easy to us. For this grace first Crowns us [as Victors], and then leads us forth to battle honourably attended by numerous auxiliary forces.

6. BASIL THE GREAT

But we will now adduce what he has said in another passage, when delivering the same doctrine, in a manner far more objurgatory: "For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin. For that which I do I allow not," &c. And, prosecuting this speculation in more particulars, that it is impossible for him who is held captive by sin to serve the Lord, he manifestly points out to us our Deliverer from this tyranny, while he says, "O wretched man that I am I who shall deliver me from this body of death, I give thanks to God through Jesus Christ our Lord," &c. (On Baptism, lib. 1 fol. 409.)

It is, therefore quite necessary, both from the things already related, and from others of a similar kind, (if we have not received the blessing of God in vain,) that we be first delivered from the power of the devil, who leads the man that is detained in captivity by sin to [the commission of] those evils which he would not, and then, having denied all things present, and our own self, and having left all kindred feeling for this life, that we become the Lord's disciples, as he hath himself said, "If any man will come to me, let him deny himself," &c. (Ibid.)

This is what he who is unwillingly drawn by sin ought to know, that he is governed by another sin pre-existing in himself, which while he willingly serves, with regard to other things he is led by it even to those which he does not will. As it is said in Romans 7, "For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin,"

&c., quoted as far as the seventeenth verse, "but sin that dwelleth in me. (Summary of Morals, Sum. 23, cap. I, fol. 477.)

The spirit or mind, which is the patient bearer of the dominion of the affections or inclinations, is not permitted by them to be free to [do] those things which it wills, according to the speculation of the apostle already related, who said, "but I am carnal, sold under sin. For what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do 1."

(Compendium of Questions explained, Quest. 16, fol. 563.) "Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me," God himself permitting even this to befall us for our good, if by any means the mind, through those things which it reluctantly suffers, may be brought to understand that which has the dominion over it; and if, knowing itself, that it unwillingly serves sin, it recover from the snare of the devil, and seek for the mercy of God which is prepared to receive those who are legitimately penitent. (Ibid.)

7. THEODORET

But I am carnal. He introduces a man before [he has obtained] grace, who is beset with motions and perturbations of mind. For he denominates that man carnal who has not yet obtained spiritual grace. (On Romans 7.)

For what I would, that do l not; but what l hate, that do 1. The law beautifully effects one thing, that is, it teaches what is evil, and induces a hatred of it on the mind. But these words, "I would not," and "I hate," signify weakness, and not necessity. For we do not sin, as being impelled by necessity or by some force; but, being enticed by pleasure, we do those things which we abhor as wicked and flagitious deeds. (Ibid.) I delight in the law of God after the inward man. He has called the mind "the inward man" (Ibid.)

But I see another law in my members, warring, &c. He bestows on sin the appellation of "the law of sin." It exerts its operation when the corporeal perturbations of the mind are in lively motion; but, on account of that supineness with which the mind has invested itself from the beginning, it is unable to restrain them. Though the mind has cast away its own liberty, yet it has patience enough to serve them. But though the mind thus serves them, yet it hates servitude; and commends him who brings an accusation against servitude. After the apostle had discoursed on all these topics, that he might show what sort of people we were before grace, and our condition after grace, and having taken on himself the personation of those who, before grace, had been besieged and encompassed by sin; therefore, as though he was completely surrounded by a mass of enemies, and led away into captivity and compelled to become a slave, and seeing no aid from any other quarter, he grievously groans and laments; he shows that help could not be afforded by the law, and he cries out, "O

wretched man that I am!" (Ibid.)

There is therefore now no condemnation, &c. For the perturbations of our mind do not overcome us who are now unwilling, because we have accepted the grace of the divine Spirit. (On Romans 8.)

For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus, &c. As he called sin "the law of sin,"

so does he call the vivifying Spirit "the law of the Spirit." he says, that the grace of this Spirit, through faith in Jesus Christ, has endowed thee with a two-fold liberty; for it has not only broken the power of sin, but it has also destroyed the tyranny of death.

(Ibid.)

8. CYRIL

For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, &c. Therefore, when the only Begotten became man for us, the law of sin was indeed abolished in the flesh; and our affairs were brought back again that they may return to their first origin.

For death, corruption, pleasures and other lusts prevailed, which, having corruption as their assistant, committed depredations on the weak and infirm mind. (Against Julian, lib. 3, fol. 184.)

So then with the mind I myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh,, the law of sin. There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus, &c., quoting the whole passage down to the 5th verse. For the flesh and the spirit manifestly fight the one against the other; that is, carnal prudence and the motions of innate lusts war against the power of life according to the Spirit. Though the divine law urges us that we ought to choose the good, yet the desire of the flesh is born, towards that which is contrary. But now that is loosened which hindered, and the law of sin is weakened; but the law of the Spirit has prevailed. On what account, "For God hath sent his own Son in the likeness of the flesh of sin, that he might condemn sin in the flesh." Now, in what manner was not the incarnation of the Word exceedingly useful, For even "our sin is here condemned in the flesh." But if the Word had not been made flesh, our affairs would have remained without any amendment, and we should now be serving in the flesh the law of sin, no one having abolished it within us. (On the True Faith, to the Queens, lib. I, fol. 283.)

We confess, therefore, that, by Adam's personal transgression of the law, the human substance has been corrupted; and that, by the pleasures of the flesh, and those motions which are so pleasing to our nature, our understanding is oppressed as by the domination of a tyrant. Wherefore it was necessary for our salvation, who are sojourners on earth, that the WORD OF GOD should become man, and he should take human flesh upon himself as his own, given up though it was to corruption, and sickly through the allurements of pleasure; and that, as he is the life of all, he should indeed destroy its corruption, but restrain its innate motions, that is, those which impelled us headlong to vices and pleasures; for in this manner it was necessary that offenses should be mortified in our flesh. But we recollect that the blessed Paul denominates the voluptuous motions which art planted within us, "the law of sin." Wherefore, because human flesh became a property of the WORD, it has now ceased to yield to corruption. And because he knew no sin, as God who united him to himself, and, as I have already said, who made [human nature] a property [of the WORD], it has now ceased to be sick with vices and pleasures. Neither did the only begotten Son of God perform this for himself, (for he is the Word which always exists,) but he undoubtedly did it for us. For if we are alike brought into captivity through Adam's transgression of the law, therefore the blessings which are in Christ will descend upon us, and which are incorruption and the destruction of sins. (First Epistle to Successus.) 9. MACARIUS THE EGYPTIAN

Adam having transgressed the command of God, and having obeyed the impious serpent, sold himself to the devil; and thus wickedness invested his mind, that excellent creature, which God had formed after his own image, as the apostle likewise says: "Having spoiled principalities and powers, and triumphed over them in his cross." For the Lord came on this account, that he might expel them, [the principalities and powers,] and might receive his own house and his proper temple, which is MAN. The mind, therefore, is called "the body of darkness and of wickedness," so long as it has within itself the darkness of sin; because it lives there in a wicked world of darkness, and is there detained captive. As Paul likewise, when giving it the appellation of "the body of sin and death," says "that the body of sin might be destroyed." And again, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

On the contrary, the mind that has believed in God, is both delivered from the mortified sin of a life of darkness, and has received the light of the Holy Spirit as its life; living in which, from that time it perseveres; because it is there governed by the light divine. (Homily 1.) From this, it is evident, that Macarius understood this passage, as referring to a man who was subjected to the spirit of darkness, the slave of sin, and the captive of Satan, and who, not being yet dead to sin, has not received the light of the Holy Spirit, that is, who is not yet regenerated by the Spirit of Christ.

10. DAMASCENUS

In the fourth book of his Orthodox Faith, (cap. 23,) he explains this matter very satisfactorily; wherefore, it will not be considered irksome, if at greater length we transcribe his opinion in his own words, as they have been rendered by his Latin translator:

The law of God, when coming to our mind, attracts it to itself, and stimulates our consciences. But our conscience is also called "the Law of our mind." But the suggestion of the devil, that is, the law of sin, when coming to the members of the flesh, also commits itself, through the flesh, to us. For, after we have once voluntarily transgressed the law of God, and have admitted the suggestion of the devil, we have granted entrance to him, being brought into captivity by our own selves to sin: Whence our body is promptly led on to commit sin. Therefore, the odour and feeling of sin is said to be inherent to our body, that is, the lust and pleasure of the body, "the law in the members of our flesh." Therefore, "the law of the mind," that is, the conscience, feels a sort of condelectation in the law of God, that is, in the commandment which it really wills. But "the law of sin," that is, the suggestion through. the law which is in the members, that is, the concupiscence, the inclination and motion of the body, by means of the irrational part of the soul also "wars against the law of my mind," that is, my conscience, and brings me, consenting to the law of God and not fulfilling it, yet not desiring sin, into captivity, according to contradiction through the enticement of pleasure and the lust of the body, and the brute part of the soul which is devoid of reason -- as I have before said, it causes me to err, and persuades me to serve sin. "But what was impossible to the law, in that the law was rendered weak through the flesh, God, sending his own Son in the likeness of the flesh of sin," (for he assumed flesh, but by no means sin,) "condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." For "the Spirit strives with our infirmity," and affords strength to "the law of the mind" in our souls, against "the law which is in our members."

11. THEOPHYLACT

He says, "I am carnal," that is, human nature universally -- both that part of it in existence before the enactment of the law, and that at the time of the giving of the law

-- had a numerous multitude of passions associated with it. For we not only became mortal through Adam's transgression of the law, but human nature, being "sold under sin," receives likewise corrupt inclinations, being evidently subjected to the authority and domination of sin, so that it cannot raise its head. (On Romans 7.) This weakness, therefore, the law could not cure, though it dictated what ought to be done, but when Christ came, he healed it. This then is the scope or design of those things which the apostle has said, or will yet say -- to shew that human nature has endured those things which are immedicable, and that it cannot be restored to soundness by any other than by Christ, and by him alone. (ibid.) O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The law of nature was not able, the written law could not; but the tyranny of sin conquered both of them. Whence, therefore, is the hope of salvation, &c. (Ibid.) I yield thanks to God through Jesus Christ. For he has performed those things which the law was unable to do. For he has delivered me from weakness of body, inspiring into it strength and consolation, that it may no longer be oppressed by the tyranny of sin.

12. AMBROSE

Whether St. Ambrose, or some other person, was the author or the interpolator of those Commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans, which generally pass under his name, the following are some of his remarks on the seventh chapter: That he is sold under sin, is that he derives his origin from Adam, who first sinned, and by his own transgression rendered himself subject to sin, as Isaiah says, "For your iniquities have ye sold yourselves." (i, 1.) For Adam first sold himself; and by this act, all his seed was subjected to sin. Wherefore man is too full of weakness to observe the precepts of the law, unless he be strengthened by divine aids. Hence arises that which he says, "The law is spiritual, but I am carnal," &c.; that is, the law is strong, and just, and faultless; but man is frail, and subjugated by the offense of his progenitor, that he is unable to use his power with regard to yielding obedience to the law. He must therefore flee to the mercy of God, that he may avoid the severity of the law, and being exonerated from his transgressions, may, with regard to other things, resist his enemy under the favour of heaven.

But to perform that which is good I find not. Therefore, that which is commanded by the law is pleasing to him, and his will is to do it; but, in order to its completion, power and virtue are wanting; because he is so oppressed by the power of sin, that he cannot go where he would; neither is he able to contradict, because another is the lord and master of his power. (Ibid.)

That he may extol the grace of God, the apostle expounds these words, concerning the great evils from which it has delivered man; that he might point out what destructive materials he derives from Adam, but what blessings through Christ have been obtained for him whom the law could neither succour nor relieve. (Ibid.) Let the whole [of the rest of the] passage be perused.

13. JEROME

We have sinned, and have committed iniquity, and have done wickedly, and have rebelled, &c. Undoubtedly the three Hebrew children had not sinned, neither were they of that [accountable] age when they were led away to Babylon, so as to be punished for their vices. Therefore, as they here speak in the person of their nation at large, so we must read and apply that passage of the apostle, "for what I would, that do I not," &c. (On Daniel 9.)

III. THE OPINION OF ST. AUGUSTINE

1. Quotations from his writings. 2. These passages confirm the interpretation of the author. It is objected, that St. Augustine afterwards gave a different explanation, and retracted his former opinion; to this the reply is, it appears that his interpretation of this chapter was free from any such change. 3. What St. Augustine properly retracted is shown by quotations from his writings. 4. His modesty in the explanation of this chapter. He understands this passage to refer, not to actual sins, but to the internal motions of concupiscence.

1. But let us approach to St. Augustine, and see what was his opinion concerning this passage, since my opinion is loaded and oppressed with the weight of his authority: If then I do that which I would not, I consent unto the law that it is good. The law is indeed sufficiently defended from all crimination. But we must be on our guard to prevent any one from supposing, that, by these words, the free exercise or choice of the will is taken away from us; which is not the fact. For now is described a man placed under the law, before [the arrival of] grace. (Exposition of certain Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, cap. 7.)

But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, &c. He calls that "the law of sin" by which every one is bound who is entangled in the habit or nature of the flesh. He says that this wars against "the law of the mind," and "brings it into captivity to the law of sin." From this, the man is understood to be described who is not yet under grace. For, if the carnal habit or nature were only to maintain a warfare, and not to bring into captivity, there would not be condemnation. For in this consists condemnation -- that we obey and serve corrupt and carnal desires. But, if such desires still exist and do not all disappear, yet in this case we do not yield obedience to them, we are not brought into captivity, and we are now under grace, concerning which he speaks when he cries out for the aid of the Deliverer, that this might be possible through the grace, of love, which fear was not able to do through the law. For he has said, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death," And he added, "the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord."

He then begins to describe man placed under grace, which is the third degree of those four into which we have distinguished mankind. (Ibid.)

But not being yet content with the past inquiry and explanation, lest I had, with too much negligence, passed by any thing in it, (Rom. 7,) I have still more cautiously and attentively examined the very same words of the apostle, and the tenor of their meanings. For you would not consider it proper to ask such things, if the manner in which they may be understood were easy and devoid of difficulties. For, from the passage in which it is written -- "What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid,"

unto that in which the apostle says, "I find then a law, that, when I would do good,"

&c., and, I believe, as far the verse in which, it is said, "O wretched man that I am!

who shall deliver me from the body of this death, The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord" -- you wished me to elucidate or resolve the question first from these passages, in which the apostle seems to me to have transfigured unto himself, a man placed under the law, with whose words he speaks from his own person. (To Simplicianus, the Bishop of the Church of Milan.) Hence it is evident, FIRST, that the church had at that period prescribed nothing definite concerning the meaning of this passage: For Simplicianus, the bishop of Milan, indeed, officiating in the very Church in which St. Ambrose had formerly discharged the Episcopal functions, would not have earnestly requested to have the opinion of St. Augustine, if the opinion to be maintained concerning it had been prescribed. Secondly. After St. Augustine had diligently considered the matter, he openly declares, that the whole passage must be understood as referring to a man under the law. "For," he says, "I was without the law once." By this he plainly shows that he was not speaking properly in his own person, but generally in the person of "the old man." (Ibid.) He afterwards subjoins the cause why it is so, and says, "For we know that the law is spiritual, but I am carnal," in which he shows, that the law cannot be fulfilled except by spiritual persons, who do not become such without the aid of grace. (Ibid.) Indeed, when he had said -- "but I am carnal," he also subjoined the kind of carnal man that he was. For even those who are now placed under grace, and who are now redeemed by the blood of Christ, and born again through faith, are called "carnal"

after a certain manner; to whom the same apostle says, "And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal," &c. (1 Cor. iii, 1.) But that man who is still under the law and not under grace, is so very carnal as not yet to be born again from sin, but to be sold under the law by sin; because the price of deadly pleasure embraces that sweetness by which a man is deceived and delighted to act even contrary to the law, since the pleasure is greater in proportion to its unlawfulness, &c. "He consents, therefore, to the law of God," inasmuch as he does not what it prohibits, but chiefly by not willing that which he does. For, not being yet liberated by grace, he is conquered [by sin], although through the law he is both conscious that he is acting improperly, and is reluctant. But with regard to that which follows, where he says, "Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me;" he does not, therefore, say it, because he does not consent to commit sin, though he consents to the law by disapproving of the sin which he commits. But he is still speaking in the person of a man placed under the law, who is not yet under grace, and who is indeed drawn, by reigning concupiscence and by the deceitful sweetness of prohibited sin, to perpetrate evil, though, through his knowledge of the law, he partly disapproves of such bad actions. But this is the reason why he says, "It is no more I that do it," because, being conquered, he does it, since it is done by evil desires, to whose conquering power he yields. But grace causes him no longer thus to yield, and strengthens the mind of man against lusts, of which grace the apostle is now about to treat. (Ibid.) SEE ALSO WHAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS THIS QUOTATION.

"To will is present with me." He says this with respect to facility. For what can be more easy, to a man placed under the law, than to will that which is good, and to do what is evil, &c. (Ibid.)

But the whole of this is said for the purpose of shewing to man, while yet a captive, that he must not presume on his own strength or power. On this account he reproved the Jews as proudly boasting about the works of the law, when they were attracted by concupiscence to whatsoever was unlawful, though the law, of which they boasted, declared "Thou shalt not covet," or indulge in concupiscence. Therefore, a man who is conquered, condemned and captivated, must humbly declare -- a man who, after having received the law, is not as one that lives according to the law, but is rather a transgressor of it, must humbly exclaim, "O wretched man that I am," &c. (Ibid.) 2. That man who will compare these passages from St. Augustine with my arguments concerning Romans 7, will perceive that we entirely agree in sentiment, and that I subscribe to this opinion of St. Augustine. From these extracts, it likewise appears that nothing had, at that period, been prescribed by the church concerning this portion of the apostolical writing,, but nothing towards that part especially -- that it was to be understood about a man who is regenerate and placed under grace.

But I am here met with this objection: "St. Augustine, in subsequent years, gave a different explanation to this chapter, that is, as being applicable to a regenerate man placed under grace, as he has done in the 43rd, 45th, and 47th of his discourses On Time, and in several other passages." I confess, that the fact was as it is here stated; and we will afterwards examine those passages; we shall perceive how much they are able to contribute towards the establishment of the opinion that is opposed to mine.

"But," the same objectors say, "St. Augustine retracted and condemned that very opinion which he had first explained in his treatise, entitled, An Exposition of certain Propositions in the Epistle to the Romans, and in his book addressed to Simplicianus, bishop of Milan; his authority, therefore, cannot be adduced in confirmation of that opinion."

To this I might reply, First, from the fact of St. Augustine having first entertained the same opinion about this passage as I do, and afterwards a different one, it is evident that neither of these opinions had been considered by the church in the light of a catholic or universally admitted doctrine. Secondly. It is possible that St. Augustine may, in the beginning, have held a more correct opinion than that which he subsequently maintained, especially when, in the first instant, he followed his own judgment, which had been formed from an accurate inspection of the entire chapter, and from a diligent comparison of different sentiments on the subject; but he was afterwards influenced by the authority of certain interpreters of holy writ, as he informs us in his Retractions, (lib. I, cap. 23,) though he adds, that he had with much diligence considered the subject; for he did not consider it without some of that prejudice which he had imbibed from the authority of those expositors.

3. But though I might make those preliminary replies, yet the answer which I will give is this: St. Augustine never trusted or condemned that opinion by which he had explained this chapter as applicable to a man placed under the law; but he only retracted this part of his early opinion "These words must not be received as uttered in the person of the apostle himself, who was then spiritual, but in that of a man placed under the law and not yet under grace." For he had made two assertions, First, that this chapter must be understood as relating to a man placed under the law. Secondly, that it must neither be understood as relating to a man placed under grace, nor as relating to the apostle himself who was then spiritual. The former of these assertions was never retracted by St. Augustine; the latter he has retracted, as will most clearly appear to any one who will examine the passage, which it will be no trouble to transcribe on this occasion, since the works of this father are not in the hands of every one. In the first book of his "Retractions," (cap. 23,) he says:

"While I was yet a priest, it happened that the Epistle of the apostle to the Romans was read among us who were at that time together at Carthage, and my brethren made inquiries of me about some passages in it, to which when I had given as proper replies as I was able, it was the wish of my brethren that what I spoke on this subject should be written out, rather than be uttered in an extemporaneous manner; when, on this point I had acceded to their request, another book was added to my Opuscula. In that book I say, ' But when the apostle asserts, For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin, he shows in a manner sufficiently plain, that it is impossible for the law to be fulfilled by any persons, except by those who are spiritual, and are made such by the grace of God.' This I wished not to be received in the person of the apostle, who was at that time spiritual, but in that of a man placed under the law, and who was not yet under grace. For that was the manner in which I first understood these words; which I afterwards considered with more diligence, after having perused the productions of certain commentators on the divine oracles, by whose authority I was moved; and I perceived that, when he says for we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin, the words may also be understood as referring to the apostle himself. This I have shown, with as much diligence as I was able, in those books which I have lately written against the Pelagians.

"In this book, therefore, I have said that, by the words but l am carnal, sold under sin, through the remainder of the chapter to the verse in which he says, O wretched man that I am! a man is described who is still under the law, but not yet placed under grace, who wills to do that which is good, but who, conquered by the desires of the flesh, does that which is evil. From the dominion of this concupiscence the man is not delivered, except by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, by the gift of the Holy Ghost, through whom love being diffused, or shed abroad, in our hearts, overcomes all the desires of the flesh, that we may not consent to those desires to do evil, but rather that we may do good. By this, indeed, is now overturned the Pelagian heresy, that will not admit that the love by which we live good and pious lives is from God to us, but that asserts it to be from ourselves.

"But in those books which we have published against the Pelagians, we have shown, that the words of the apostle in Romans 7, are better understood as those of a spiritual man who is now placed under grace on account of the body of flesh which is not yet spiritual, but which will be so in the resurrection of the dead, and on account of carnal concupiscence itself, with which the saints maintain such a conflict, not consenting to it for evil, as not to be without its opposing motions in this life which yet they resist.

But the saints will not have such motions to evil in that world in which death will be swallowed up in victory. Therefore, on account of this concupiscence and those motions to which such a resistance is given as they may still be in us, [or as suffers them yet to be in us,] every holy person who is now placed under grace can utter all those words which I have here said are the expressions of a man who is not yet placed under grace, but under the law. To show this, would require much time; and I have mentioned the place where I have shown it." (Ibid.)

"Of the books which I wrote when a bishop, the first two were addressed to Simplicianus, bishop of the church of Milan, who was successor to the blessed Ambrose -- in them I discussed diverse questions. Two of the questions on which I treated in the first book, were from St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. The first of them was on what is written in vii, 7 -- What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid!

-- down to the 25th verse in which it is said, Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God though Jesus Christ our Lord. In that book, I have expounded these words of the apostle, The law is spiritual, but l am carnal, and the other expressions by which the flesh is shown to contend against the Spirit. In it I have explained them in such a manner as that in which a man is described who is still under the law, but not yet placed under grace. For a long time afterwards elapsed, before I discerned that they could also be the words of a spiritual man, and this with a stronger semblance of probability." (Retractations, lib. 2, cap. 1.) 4. These are the passages transcribed with verbal accuracy, in which St. Augustine retracts the opinion which he had previously explained, from which it is apparent that he neither rejected his former opinion, nor convicted it of falsehood, error or heresy; but that he only said, "This passage in the apostle's writings may also be understood as referring to a man who is regenerate, spiritual, and placed under grace, and this much better and with more probability than concerning a man placed under the law;"

yet he says that this [his first] opinion is opposed to the Pelagian heresy. But the very words which he employs in his Retractations teach us, that this chapter in the apostolical writings may likewise be understood concerning a man who is placed under the law, but [according to his latest judgment] not so well, and with less probability.

We see therefore, that the modesty of St. Augustine was at an immense distance from the vehemence of those who assert, that "this part of holy writ must be understood concerning a man who is placed under grace, nor can it by any means be explained as referring to a man placed under the law without incurring the charge of Pelagian heresy." Let the reader examine, if he pleases, the works of St. Augustine, (tom. 10,) concerning the words of the apostle, (Sermon 5, on Romans vii, 7, fol. 59, col. 3,)

"Speak to me, holy apostle, about thyself, when no one doubts that thou art speaking about thyself."

And in the same sermon, (col. 4,), 'If, therefore, I say that the apostle speaks of himself, I do not affirm it."

But it is improper for this last, whether it be an explanation or a retractation of St.

Augustine, to be urged by those who reject the cause of this change, by which, he openly declares, he was moved to suppose that this passage might likewise be explained in reference to a man under grace, and this much better and with greater probability. He says that the cause of it was, because he perceived that this man might be called "carnal" on account of the body of flesh which is not yet spiritual, and because he has yet within him the desires of the flesh, though he does not consent to them. This is also the opinion of those expounders whom St. Augustine says he followed.

But our divines who oppose themselves to me on Romans 7, do not explain that chapter in this manner, as, -- to will that which is good, is to will not to lust or indulge in unlawful desires, and to do evil, is to lust; but they explain it, actually to do or to commit that which is evil. The authority, therefore, of St. Augustine ought not to be produced by them; because, as we shall afterwards more clearly demonstrate, his judgment was this: If this chapter be explained as referring to actual sins, it cannot be explained concerning a regenerate man. But if it be explained respecting a regenerate man, it must necessarily be understood only concerning the inward motions of concupiscence or lust.

Wherefore, I have St. Augustine in his first opinion, fully agreeing with me, and in his latter not differing greatly from me; but those who are opposed to me have St.

Augustine contrary and adverse to them in both these his opinions.

IV. OUR OPINION IS SUPPORTED BY SEVERAL WRITERS OF THE MIDDLE

AGES

1. Venerable Bede. 2. St. Paulinus. 3. Nicholas De Lyra. 4. Ordinary Gloss. 5.

Interlineary Gloss. 6. Hugh the cardinal. 7. Thomas Aquinas, who thinks that Romans vii, 14, may be explained in both ways, but he refers its application to a regenerate man. 8. He is of opinion, that the 17th and 18th verses can only be considered by a forced construction to relate to a man under sin. His reasons for advancing this last assertion are examined and answered. 9. An abbreviation of the comments which Thomas has given on these two verses; with a conclusion deduced from them, that they may be appropriately understood to relate to a man under the law, but in no other than a forced manner to a man under grace.

1. VENERABLE BEDE

For we know that the law is spiritual, but I am carnal. Perhaps, therefore, it is some other person, or perhaps thyself. Either thou art the person, or I am. If, therefore, it be some one of us, let us listen to him as if concerning himself, and, divesting our minds of angry feelings, let us correct ourselves. But if it be he, [the apostle,] let us not thus understand what he has said, "What I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I."

(On Romans 7.)

Therefore, because he thrice intreated the Lord, that this thorn might be taken away from him; and because he who was, not heard according to his wishes, was heard according to that which was for his healing; he perhaps does not speak in a manner that is unbecoming when he says, The law is spiritual, but I am carnal." (Ibid.) 2. ST. PAULINUS

And I am perfectly aware that this blessed man prefers to employ my weakness; and, lamenting concerning my afflictions, he cries out, instead of me, "O wretched man that I am I" (Second Epistle to Severus Sulpicius, Priest at Tours.) 3. NICHOLAS DE LYRA

For we know that the law is spiritual and placing men in right order to follow the instigation of the Spirit or of reason. (On Romans 7.)

But I am carnal, that is, I follow the impulse of the flesh or of sensuality; and the apostle speaks, as was before observed, in the person of the fallen human race, in which there are more persons who follow the impulse of sensuality than that of reason.

After the inward man that is according to the natural dictates of reason; because reason is called "the inward man," and sensuality "the outward man."

O wretched man that I am! In this passage, he consequently begs to be delivered, speaking in the person of all mankind, "O wretched man that I am" through the corruption of nature!

So then, with the mind, I serve the law of God that is, according to the inclination of reason.

But with the flesh, the law of sin by following the inclination of the flesh.

4. ORDINARY GLOSS

"For we know that the law is spiritual," &c., quoted to the end of the chapter. It is not perfectly clear whether these things are better understood as spoken in his own person, or in that of all mankind. (On Romans 7.)

5. INTERLINEARY GLOSS

But I am carnal unable to resist the corruption of my mind or the devil. (On Romans 7.)

Sold under sin in my first parent, that I may be really under sin as a servant.

Now then it is no more I that do it under the law before the times of grace.

Evil is present with me with my reason; it is near to my inward man.

I see another law the fuel or flame, which reigns.

Warring against the law of my mind, the law and my reason united together in one.

Bringing me into captivity through consent and working, because it governs by habit or custom.

To the law of sin for sin is the law, because it has the dominion. The grace of God, not that the law, nor my own powers, but that the grace of God delivers.

So then with the mind the rational and inward man, having, as before, fuel.

6. HUGH THE CARDINAL

For we know that the law is spiritual. This is the third part of the chapter, in which he shows, that those things which were commanded in the law of Moses, cannot be fulfilled without the law of the Spirit, that is, without grace.

But I am carnal that is, frail and weak to resist the devil and the lust of the flesh.

For what I would according to reason, that is, I approve. but what I hate that is, evil.

But from this it is inferred that he wants the spiritual law, by which he may do that which he wills according to reason.

There is, therefore, now no condemnation. The preceding things have been expounded concerning the captivity of mortal sin under which man was carnally living, and concerning the captivity of the venial sin of the man who is in grace; and that the law of the Spirit, or grace, delivers from the captivity of death; and he draws this inference: "There is, therefore, now no condemnation," that is, no mortal sin through which is condemnation.

7. THOMAS AQUINAS

But I am carnal. He shows the condition of the man: And this expression may be expounded in two ways. In one way, that the apostle is speaking in the person of a man who is in sin.

And St. Augustine expounds it thus in the 83d hook of his Questions. But, afterwards, in his book against Julian, he expounds it, that the apostle may be understood to speak in his own person, that is, of a man placed under grace. Let us proceed, therefore, in declaring what kind of words these are, and those which follow them, and how they may be differently expounded in either manner, though the second mode of exposition is the best. (On Romans 7.)

I am fully aware that the same Thomas has marked out two passages in this chapter, which he asserts it to be impossible to explain concerning an unregenerate man except by a distorted interpretation. But it will repay our labour if we inspect those passages, and examine those reasons which moved Thomas to hold this sentiment. The first passage is the 17th verse: "Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." The second passage is the 18th verse: "For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing."

(1.) He says "that the first of these passages cannot, except by a distorted interpretation, be understood concerning a man who is under sin; because the sinner himself perpetrates that din, while he is one who, according to the principal part of himself, that is, according to his reason and mind, consents to the perpetration of sin.

But this must properly be attributed to a man, which belongs to him according to what is man; but he is a man by his mind and his reason."

But I answer, First, It is said, not only respecting a man who is under sin, that he does not perpetrate sin except with his mind and reason, which dictate, that sin is forbidden by the law, which yet are conquered through the lust of the flesh, and by the consent of the will, but it is likewise said respecting the regenerate and those who are under grace; for these persons do not actually commit sin except with a mind that is conquered, and through consent of the will; and, therefore, it is a vain attempt to be desirous to distinguish, in this manner, between him, who is under sin and him who is under grace.

Secondly. I deny that all those who are under sin commit iniquity with the consent of their mind, that is, without any resistance of conscience. For when those persons who are under the law, sin, they do this against conscience and with a mind that is reluctant, because they are overcome by the tyranny of sin and carnal concupiscence.

Thirdly. Though the matter really were as he has stated it, yet it would not follow that it cannot be said of this man by any interpretation, except a distorted one: "It is no more he that commits this sin, but it is sin." A reason is produced by Thomas himself; for the man does this through the motion and compulsion of sin which dwelleth in him and has the dominion. But effects are usually ascribed to the principal causes; therefore, this verse may be understood, without any distorted meaning, to relate to a man who is under the law.

If any one, according to the judgment of St. Augustine, declare -- "It cannot be attributed to a man who actually gives his consent to sin, that he does not himself commit it, but sin, and, therefore, the perpetration of it must be understood as relating not to the consent to evil and the commission of it, but to concupiscence or evil desire, and thus this act belongs to a man under grace," to this objection, I reply that I deny the antecedent, as I have previously observed; but I confess that if it be understood concerning concupiscence alone, and not concerning the consent to sin and the actual perpetration of it, the expression contained in this verse can by no means, not even distortedly, be employed concerning a man who is under the law and under sin.

(2.) Thomas says "that the latter of these passages, the 18th verse, cannot be explained, except in a distorted manner, concerning a man under sin, on account of the correction which is added, and which it was unnecessary to adduce if the discourse were about a man under sin, as being one who has no good thing dwelling either in his flesh or in his mind.

To this, I reply that the antecedent is false; for we have already demonstrated, in the remarks on this 18th verse, that, in the mind of a man who is under the law, some good exists and dwells, as Thomas here employs the word to dwell - - nay, that it also reigns and has the dominion, as the word ought properly to be received. Therefore, the ignorance of Thomas about this matter, caused him thus to think and to write.

9. But let the entire comment of Thomas on this passage be perused, and it will then appear, that all these things in the two verses may be explained in the plainest manner concerning a man under the law, but with much perversion and contortion about a regenerate man who is placed under grace, l show this in the following brief manner, having united together, in a compendious summary, those things which he has treated with greater prolixity, as any one may perceive on referring to his pages:

"If the man or the reason be called fleshly or carnal because he is attacked by the flesh

-- if to do signifies the same as to lust or desire -- if to will good, and not to will evil, be taken for a complete volition and nolition, which continue in the election or choice of a particular operation; -- but if to commit evil, and not to do good, be understood according to an incomplete act, which consists only in the sensitive appetite, not reaching so far as to the consent of reason -- if this captivity be produced solely at the motion of concupiscence -- if deliverance from the body of this death be desired, that the corruption of the body may be totally removed, then the expression in this passage of Scripture must be understood concerning a regenerate and just man, who is placed under grace.

"But if this man or reason be called fleshly or carnal because he is in subjection to the flesh, consenting to those things to which he is instigated by the flesh -- if to do be the same thing as to execute by actual operation -- if to will that which is good, and not to will what is evil, be taken in the acceptation of an incomplete volition and nolition, by which men will good in general and do not will what is evil, and if they do neither of these in particular; -- but if to commit evil, and not to do good, be understood according to a complete act, which is exercised in external operation through the consent of reason -- if this captivity be produced through consent and operation or doing, and, lastly, if deliverance from the body of this death be desired or asked, that the corruption of the body may not have dominion over the mind, drawing it to commit sin, then the expressions in this passage must be understood concerning a man who is a sinner, and who is placed under the law."

But let us now subjoin -- A man who is attacked by the flesh, yet who conquers it in the conflict, is not called fleshly or carnal; but this appellation is bestowed on the man who, by yielding his consent, is brought into subjection to the flesh. The apostle is here treating about a volition and a nolition that are incomplete and imperfect, and about the actual perpetration of evil and the omission of good, and not solely about the act or motion of lusting or desiring; (for this is declared by the matter itself, for the man wills and does not, therefore the volition is imperfect.) This captivity is not at the motion of concupiscence alone, but it is by consent and operation; for either concupiscence itself, or the law of the members, brings a man into captivity through the waging of war against the law of the mind; and the deliverance which is required is from the corruption of the body, that it may not have dominion over the mind, and not that it may be totally removed; for the apostle presents a thanksgiving to God for having obtained that which he had desired. Therefore, this passage must be understood, not about a man under grace, but about one who is under the law; not about a man who is already restored by grace, but about one who is yet to be restored.

Our proposition is taken from Thomas Aquinas. We have added the assumption from the text itself.

V. THE FAVOURABLE TESTIMONIES OF MORE RECENT DIVINES

1. Haimo. 2. Bruno. 3. Faber Stapulensis. 4. Erasmus. 5. Whitaker. 6. Bucer. 7.

Musculus. Let us now likewise examine some of the more modern divines of the church.

1. HAIMO

O wretched man that I am. He speaks in the person of the human race, or in the person of those who are departing from their sins.

2. BRUNO

Observe that St. Paul significantly speaks about all men under his own person, assuming to himself the person of one who is sometimes before the law, and at other times under the law.

3. FABER STAPULENSIS

St. Paul transfers to himself a carnal man, and one who feels the weakness of the flesh, when he was by no means a person of that description, but was living entirely after the Spirit. But he transfigures himself into a weak person to those who are weak.

4. ERASMUS

Since I have now, for the purpose of instructing you, taken upon myself the person of a man who is still liable to vices and affections. (Paraphrase on Romans 7.) 5. WHITAKER

But I am carnal, sold under sin, &c. They interpret the whole of this passage so as to say that St. Paul does not speak concerning himself, but in the person of a man who is not yet born again. (Controversy respecting the Interpretation of Scripture, Quest. 5, fol. 508.)

6. BUCER

The question is, "Which of these agrees -- that we will what is good, yet do it not, or that we do what is evil, and yet do not will it, but hate it -- nay, that we commit evil, and that we do not commit it," For the apostle affirms both these things.

The solution is this: We shall be able to understand these things as truly and properly spoken, from this circumstance- if it be evident of what description of man St. Paul is here speaking under the instance of himself, and then what original sin is capable of producing.

But if we consider what the apostle confesses about himself in this chapter, it is, I think, abundantly evident that he proposes, in himself, the example of a man to whom the law of God is known, and by whom it is loved. For he says -- "I consent unto the law that it is good; I will that which is good, and I hate evil. To will, is present with me. With the mind, I myself serve the law of God." These undoubtedly are not the traits of a wicked or profane man, and of one who is not yet approaching to God; but they are those of a holy man who loves God and who trembles at his words. For God rescues us by certain degrees from that death into which we are all born. First, he suffers us, for some time, to live in ignorance, disregarding his judgments. At this period, "sin is dead," &c. But when it has pleased God to terminate this ignorance, he sends forth his law, and gives us to see that it is "holy, and just, and good." From this, it necessarily arises that "we consent to the law," that we will what it commends, and that we are abhorrent from those things which it condemns. But if the Spirit of Christ do not afford unto us powerful succour, this love of God and consent to his law remain so weak, and the force of sin which is still within us prevails so strongly, that, through the correction and command of the law, the depraved lusts become the more inflamed, and we occasionally do, not only by lusting or desiring, but also by actually committing, that which we ourselves detest, and we neglect those things of which we are not capable of doing otherwise than approving and willing. But these things cause the dread of the divine judgment to increase within us, by which we are completely unnerved, and deprived of sensation.

All these effects are produced by the law, but through the corruption of our depraved nature; and it is the condition of the period now mentioned, which the apostle describes in himself in the present chapter. But whilst God, who is the Father of mercies, resolves more fully to impart himself to us, and vouchsafes more bountifully to bestow the Spirit of his Son upon us, by this, his Spirit, he represses and subdues that power of sin which otherwise impels us against the law and authority, how much soever we may consent to the law itself; he implants within us a true judgment concerning things, and a solid love, [honest, for that which is upright and honourable, so that now, with pleasure, and with a confirmed and perpetual inclination or purpose, we live the life of God. This condition of holy people is described by the apostle in the subsequent chapter, in which he declares that "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus had made him free from the law of sin and death." (Rom. viii, 2.) As, therefore, the apostle in this place begins to declare what the law, of itself, effects in holy people, and from this begins to commend it when it is so exceedingly beneficial, yet he asserts that it cannot render a man just before God, but that it drives him to Christ who alone can justify. And he brings forward in this place, and points out, the condition of a man of God, which is that of the middle age of holy people, in which the law is indeed already known, but not yet fully inscribed on the heart; that is, when the mind of man consents to the law of God, but the appetite of nature still offers resistance, and impels to act in opposition to the precepts of the law. I repeat it, in this condition, the apostle has proposed himself for an example, that he might point out in himself what power the law possessed, and how all things are death, until the Spirit of Christ obtains greater influence within us. But St. Paul did not still contend with his nature after the manner which is described in this passage, for he soon afterwards declares that "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus had made him free from the law of sin and death," and that through the Spirit of Christ, "the righteousness of the law was now fulfilled in him, as he walked, not after the, flesh, but after the Spirit." (On Romans 7.)

7. WOLFGANG MUSCULUS

The law, indeed, has righteousness and justification, by commanding those things which are just. But it is impossible that it should have that by which to justify; for it is hindered and rendered inefficacious through the flesh, that is, through the corrupt and depraved inclinations of the flesh, through which it comes to pass that a man who is carnal, and the slave of sin, is incapable of obeying those commands which are holy, and just, and good. (Common Places in the chapter on the laws, under the title of The Power and efficacy of the law.)

We say that the power and efficacy of the law, which is called "the letter," is two-fold.

The one is that which it produces of its own, and may be called proper. The other is improper, which it does not bring from itself, but which it performs through the corruption of our flesh. The first is proper, because it produces the knowledge of sin.

On this subject, the apostle speaks thus: "I had not known sin but by the law; for I had not known lust except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." (Rom. vii, 7.) He also says, "By the law is the knowledge of sin." (iii, 20.) (Ibid.) He afterwards not only speaks about "the knowledge of sin," which consists of the understanding, but he also speaks principally about that knowledge of it which is received by a lively feeling of sin in our flesh; that is, the law causes me not only to understand, but likewise with gnawing remorse of conscience to feel and to experience that sin is within me. It is proper, because it convinces us that we are inexcusably guilty of sin, subjects and condemns us to malediction, (Gal. iii, 10,) and, through a feeling of sin, and when terrified of condemnation, it renders us anxious, and desirous of the grace of God. Hence, arises that which is the subject of the apostle's investigation in Romans 7, when at length he cries out, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ."(Ibid.)

After the apostle, in Romans 7, has disputed about the power and efficacy of the law, which works in carnal and natural men, speaking in the next chapter of the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is bestowed on those who believe in Christ, he subjoins -- "for the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death," &c. under the title of the Law of the Spirit.) St. Paul understands "the law of sin" to be the power and tyranny of sin reigning in our flesh, by which we are violently dragged and impelled to commit sin. "The law of death" is that by which sinners are adjudged to death eternal. Therefore "the law of the Spirit of life" not only produces this effect in us, that we are not condemned on account of the imputation of righteousness which is through faith in Christ; but it likewise extinguishes the power of sin in us, that sin may now no longer reign in us, but the strength and grace of Christ, and that we may no more serve sin, but righteousness, nor be obnoxious to death, but challenged and claimed for the true life.

(Ibid.)

For the more lucid explanation of this matter, we must observe the three degrees of the saints, by which they are divinely led to the perfection of piety: The first is of those who resemble drunken men, and who, having for some time lulled to sleep all judgment and every good inclination, live in sins, the law of God not having yet produced its effect in them; the second degree is of those who, by what way soever they may have returned to themselves, the judgment of their reason being now illuminated, and their inclinations changed, desire that which is good, and thus consent to the law of God and delight in it, and really abhor that which is evil; but the tyranny of sin still prevailing, they are reluctantly drawn to evil things; and, therefore, the good of which they approve, and which they desire and will, they perform not; but the evil which they hate and avoid, they perpetrate, though their consciences exclaim against it, and though the judgment of their minds dictate something far different, &c.

To this second degree must be referred those things of which St. Paul here treats in his own example. The Third Degree is of those who have been rescued into the liberty of righteousness, after having, through the Spirit, subdued and conquered the power and wickedness of sin, that they do not now obey the law of sin, but the law of the Spirit that reigns in their members, and possesses the double faculty of willing and doing.

About this degree, the apostle will treat in the subsequent chapter. (Comment on Romans 7.)

I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord. A most wonderful and sudden turn of the affections. He had just before deplored himself as a wretched man and a captive, and almost immediately he gratefully returns thanks. From this, we perceive that St. Paul now uses his own person, not that which he sustained when he wrote these things, but that which he had formerly represented. (Ibid.)

There is, therefore, now no condemnation. As he had previously described the condition of the man who was living in a legal spirit, so now he describes and points out the condition of him who is endued with the evangelical Spirit. (On Romans 8.) The mutual and unanimous agreement of the witnesses whom I have here produced, will, according to my judgment, very easily liberate my opinion from all surmise and suspicion of novelty.

THIRD PART

I. THIS OPINION IS NEITHER HERETICAL NOR ALLIED TO ANY HERESY

1. In this third part, two things are contained: the first is a negative -- that this, my interpretation of Romans 7 is not favourable to the Pelagian heresy. The principal dogmas of the Pelagian heresy are recounted from St. Augustine. 2. It is proved by induction and by comparison that this interpretation agrees with none of these dogmas. 3. Two rejoinders to the contrary. An answer to the first of them, that every good thing must not be taken away from the regenerate. 4. An answer to the second.

The truth must be confirmed, and falsehood refitted, by solid arguments. 5. It is proved from St. Augustine that the doctrine which relates to the necessity of the grace of Christ, and to the impossibility of the law for the conquest of sin, was accounted by the ancients to be of far more importance than that which proves the perpetual imperfections of the regenerate in this life. 6. To this, the fathers of the Council of Carthage seem to give their assent, in their epistle to Pope Innocent.

Thesis. -- No heresy, neither that of Pelagius nor any other, can be derived or confirmed from this opinion. But this opinion is, in the most obvious manner, adverse to Pelagianism, and affords a signal and professed confutation of its grand and leading falsehood.

1. This thesis contains two parts. The First is, that this opinion is neither heretical, nor allied to heresy. The Second that it is directly contrary to the Pelagian heresy, and professedly refutes it.

With regard to the First of these parts, because it consists of a negation, those who maintain the affirmative of it must destroy it by the proof of the contrary. I am desirous, therefore, to hear from them what heresy it is which this opinion advocates and favours. They will undoubtedly announce it to be that of Pelagius. But I require a proof of the particular point in which there is the least agreement between this opinion and Pelagianism. Let us shew, however, ex abundanti, that this opinion is not favourable to Pelagianism.

The following heads of doctrine are those which St. Augustine has laid down in his book on Heresies and his Hypognosticon, as belonging to Pelagianism: (i.) Whether Adam had sinned, or had not sinned, he would have died. (ii.) The sin of Adam was injurious to no one except to himself; and therefore, (iii.) Little children do not contract original sin from Adam; neither will they perish from life eternal, if they depart out of the present life without the sacrament of baptism. (iv.) Lust or concupiscence in man is a natural good; neither is there any thing in it of which man may be ashamed. (v.) Through his free will, as per se, man is sufficient for himself, and is able to will what is good, and to fulfill or perfect that which he wills. Or even, for the merits of works, God bestows grace on every one. (vi.) The life of the just or the righteous in this life has in it no sin whatsoever; and from these persons, the church of Christ in this state of mortality are completed, that it may be altogether without spot or wrinkle. (vii.) Pelagius, being compelled to confess grace, says that it is a gift conferred in creation, is the preaching of the law, and the illumination of the mind, to know those things which are good and those which are evil, as well as the remission of sins if any one has sinned, excluding from this [definition of grace] love and the gift and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without which, he says, the good which is known may be performed, though he acknowledges that this grace has also been given for this purpose -- that the thing may be the more easily done, which can indeed be otherwise done by the power of nature, but yet with greater difficulty.

2. These are the principal dogmas of the Pelagian heresy, to which others, if any such there be, may be referred. But none of these dogmas are patronized by the opinion which explains Romans 7, as applicable to a man placed under the law, and in the manner in which we have explained it, and as St. Augustine has declared it in his book entitled "The Exposition of certain Propositions from the epistle to the Romans,"

and in his first book to Simplicianus. This will be proved thus by induction: (i.) Our opinion openly professes that sin is the only and sole meritorious cause of death, and that man would not have died, had he not sinned. (ii.) By the commission of sin, Adam corrupted himself and all his posterity, and rendered them obnoxious to the wrath of God. (iii.) All who are born in the ordinary way from Adam, contract from him original sin and the penalty of death eternal. Our opinion lays this down as the foundation of further explanation; for this original sin is called, in Romans 7, "the sin,"the sin exceedingly sinful,"the indwelling sin,"the sin which is adjacent to a man, or present with him," or "the evil which is present with a man and" the law in the members." (iv.) Our opinion openly declares that concupiscence, under which is also comprehended lust, is an evil. (v.) The fifth of the enumerated Pelagian dogmas is professedly refuted by our opinion; for, in Romans 7, the apostle teaches, according to our opinion, that the natural man cannot will what is good, except he be under the law, and unless the legal spirit have produced this willing in him by the law; and though he wills what is good, yet it is by no means through free will, even though it be impelled and assisted by the law to be capable of performing that very thing. But it also teaches that the grace of Christ, that is, the gift of the Holy Spirit and of love, is absolutely necessary for this purpose, which grace is not bestowed according to merits, (which are nothing at all,) but is purely gratuitous. (vi.) The sixth of the enumerated dogmas of Pelagius is neither taught nor refuted by our opinion, because it maintain, that Romans 7 does not treat about the regenerate. But, in the mean time, the patrons and advocates of our opinion do not deny that what is said respecting the imperfection of believers in the present life, is true. (vii.) The seventh of the enumerated dogmas of Pelagius is refuted by our opinion; for it not only grants, that good can with difficulty be done by the man who is under the law, and who is not yet placed under grace; but it also unreservedly denies that it is possible for such a man by any means to resist sin and to perform what is good.

3. But some one will perhaps rejoin, and say "Your interpretation of this chapter is favourable to Pelagianism, on two accounts. First, because it attributes something of good to a man who is not yet regenerated and placed under grace. Secondly, because it takes away from the church a passage of Scripture, by which she is accustomed to prove the imperfection of the regenerate in the present life, and the conflict which is maintained between the flesh and the Spirit as long as man lives upon earth."

With regard to the First of these objections, I reply that we must see, First, what kind of good it is that our interpretation attributes to a man who is unregenerate. For, it is certain that every good, of what kind soever it may be, must not be entirely taken away from an unregenerate man and one who is not yet placed under grace; because the knowledge of the truth, (Rom. i, 18,19,) the work of the law written in his heart, his thoughts accusing or else excusing one another, the discernment of what is just and unjust, (ii, 15,18,) the knowledge of sin, grief on account of sin, anxiety of conscience, desire of deliverance, &c., (vii, 7,9,13,24) are all good things, and yet they are attributed to a man who is unregenerate.

Secondly. We must know that this, our opinion, which explains Romans 7 as relating to a man under the law, does not bring forth these good things from the storehouse of nature, but it deduces them from the operation of the Spirit, who employs the preaching of the law and blesses it.

Thirdly. We must also consider that this was not a subject of controversy between the church and the Pelagians: "May something of good be attributed to an unregenerate man who is not yet under grace, but who is placed under the law; or may it not?" But the question between them was "Can something of good be attributed to man, without grace and its operation?" He who receives some operation of grace is not instantly under grace or regenerate; for grace prepares the will of man for itself, that it may dwell in it. Grace knocks at the door of our hearts; but that which has occasion to knock does not yet reside in the heart nor has it the dominion, though it may knock so as to cause the door to be opened to it on account of its persuasion. But we have frequently treated on topics similar to this in the first part of this our treatise.

4. With respect to the Second of these objections, I reply, First. This passage of Holy Writ was not produced by the church, in her earliest days, for establishing the imperfection of the regenerate in this life, and the conflict between the flesh and the Spirit such as that which is maintained in regenerate persons; for we have already shown that the most ancient of the Christian fathers did not explain Romans 7 in reference to the regenerate, or those who are placed under grace; though it subsequently began to be employed, by some divines, to establish this dogma.

Secondly. It is inconsequent argumentation to say that "the opinion by which some passage is otherwise explained than it is by the many, nay which has been quoted by the church herself to destroy some heresy, is therefore or can be judged to be allied to heresy, because it takes away from the church a passage which has been usually employed to prove a true doctrine, and to refute a heresy." For if this be not inconsequent reasoning, there will scarcely be one of our divines who will not thus be deservedly judged to be allied to some heresy or other, and sometimes indeed to a very enormous one. By such a law [of criticism] as this, Calvin is called "an Aryan"

by the Lutherans, because he openly avows in his writings, that "many passages of Scripture, which have been adduced by the ancient church (both Greek and Latin) to establish the doctrine of the trinity, do not contribute in the least to that purpose," and because he gives to them such a different interpretation.

Thirdly. No detriment will accrue to the church by the removal of this passage, from the support of the imperfection of the regenerate in this life as she is furnished with a number (which is sufficiently copious) of other passages to prove the same doctrine, and to weaken the contrary one. This is abundantly demonstrated by St. Augustine, when be professedly treats upon, the Perfection of Righteousness in this life in opposition to Coelestius.

Fourthly. We must well and carefully examine by what passages of Scripture, and by what arguments, the truth may be proved, and falsehood refuted, lest, if weak and less valid, and in some degree doubtful, passages and arguments be adduced, the hopes of heretics should be elevated, after they have demolished such weak bulwarks as those, and they should suppose it possible to disprove and confute the remaining [more suitable and valid] arguments on the same subject. For that man inflicts no slight injury on the truth who props it up by weak arguments; and the rules of art teach us, that a necessary conclusion must be verified or proved by necessary arguments; for the conclusion, follows that part [of a syllogism] which is the weakest. But it has been already shown, that this portion of Scripture has not been devoid of controversy even among the catholic commentators on the Holy Scriptures.

Fifthly,. In what manner soever this chapter, as thus explained according to my mind, may not be able to serve the church to prove the imperfection of the regenerate in the present life, yet it serves her for the confirmation of another doctrine, and one of a far greater importance, against the Pelagians -- that is, the necessity of the grace of Christ. and the incapability of the law to conquer or to avoid sin, and to order or direct the life of a man according to its rule.

5. But we may discover, from various passages in the writings of St. Augustine, the vast difference which the ancient church put between the necessity of the former of the two questions or doctrines, [specified in the preceding paragraph,] and the latter.

For instance:

But in that which Pelagius argues against those who say, "And who would be unwilling to be without sin, if this were placed in the power of man?" he in fact disputes correctly, that by this very question they own that it is not impossible, because either many persons or all men wish to be without sin. But let Pelagius only confess [from what source this is possible, and peace is instantly established. For the origin of it is the grace of God through Jesus Christ, &c. (On Nature and Grace, against the Pelagians, cap. 59.)

There may be some question among real and pious Christians, whether there has ever been in this world, is now, or can possibly be, any man who lives so righteously as to have no sin whatsoever. Yet he is assuredly void of understanding who entertains any doubt whether it is possible for a man to be without sin after this life. But I do not wish to enter into a contest about this question. Though it seems to me that in no other sense can be understood what is written in the Psalms, and in similar passages, if any such there be: "In thy sight shall No man living be justified;" (cxliii, 2) yet it may be shown that even these expressions may be better understood in another sense, and that even perfect and complete righteousness, to which there may be no addition, was yesterday in an individual, while he lived in the body, is in him to-day, and will be in him to-morrow while there are still far more persons, who, while they do not doubt that it is necessary for them truly to say, even to the last day of [their continuance in]

this life, "Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us," yet are firmly persuaded that their hope in Christ and in his promises is real, certain and firm, yet in no way except by the aid of the grace, of the saviour, Christ the crucified, and by the gift of his Spirit. I do not know whether that man can be correctly reckoned in the number of Christians of any description, who denies either that any persons attain to the most complete perfection, or that some arrive at any degree whatever of proficiency in true piety and righteousness. (Ibid. cap. 60.) Besides, though I am more inclined to believe that there is not now, has not been, and will not be, any one who is perfect with such a purity as this; and yet when it is defended and supposed, that there is, has been, or will be such a perfect man, as far as I am able to form a judgment, they who hold this opinion do not greatly or perniciously err, &c. But those persons are most strenuously and vehemently to be resisted, who suppose it possible either to fulfill or to perfect the righteousness of the human will, by its own power, without the aid of God, or by aiming at it to make some proficiency. (On the Spirit and the Letter, cap. 2.)

Consult likewise his treatise On Nature and Grace, cap. 42, 43, 58, & 63; in which he briefly says -- "It is no question at all, or not a great one, what man is perfected, or the time. when he becomes so, as long as no doubt is entertained that it is impossible for this to be done without the grace of Christ."

See also his treatise On the Demerit and Remission of Sin, lib. 2, cap. 6,14; and lib. 3, cap. 13.

6. But in order that we may know this to have been the opinion not only of St.

Augustine, but also of the church universal, let us listen to the bishops assembled together in the Council of Carthage, who write in the following manner to Pope Innocent:

"But in what manner soever this question turns itself, because though a man is not found in this life without sin, yet it may be said to be possible by the adoption of grace and of the Spirit of God; and that [such perfection] may be attained we must urge most importunate intreaties and use our best endeavours. Whosoever is deceived on this point, ought to be tolerated. It is not a diabolical impiety, but it is a human error, to affirm that it must be MOST diligently pursued and desired, though it cannot shew that which it affirms; for it believes it possible for that to be done which it is undoubtedly laudable to will."

We perceive, therefore, that Romans 7, when explained according to my mind, is serviceable to the church in establishing a doctrine of far greater importance than that which is declared from the other opinion.

"But," some one will say, "it is possible to establish both these doctrines, [the imperfection and the perfection of the regenerate,] From that opinion which explains the chapter as relating to a man who is under grace." I reply, granting this, yet I deny that it is possible to establish both in a direct manner; for, one doctrine, that of the imperfection of the regenerate in this life, will be directly proved from this passage, and the other will be deduced from it by consequence. But it is a matter of much importance, whether a doctrine be confirmed by a passage of Scripture properly explained and according to the intention of the Scriptures, or whether it be deduced from them by the deduction of a consequence. For some passages of Scripture are like certain seats, out of which controversies ought to be determined; and those which are of this kind are usually employed in a very stable and safe manner for the decision of controversies.

II. OUR OPINION IS DIRECTLY OPPOSED TO THE PELAGIAN HERESY

1. THE Second thing contained in this third part is an affirmation, that our interpretation of Romans 7 is professedly adverse to the Pelagian heresy. 2. This is proved from the fact, that the principal dogma of that heresy is professedly confuted through this very interpretation. 3. In some passages of his works, which are here cited, St. Augustine confesses with sufficient plainness that this is true. 4.Objection and an Answer to it. 5. Another Objection -- that Prosper Dysidaeus, the Samosatenian, explains this chapter in the same manner. Answer -- no heretic is in error on every point. The Jesuits, those myrmidons of the pope, explain this chapter as referring to a man placed under grace. 6. A third objection -- that his interpretation differs from the confessions of the reformed churches, which have been framed and established by the blood of martyrs. Answer -- no article of any confession is contrary to this interpretation: No man ever shed his blood for the contrary interpretation.

Numbers of martyrs were not even interrogated about this article on the perfection of righteousness.

1. I now come to the second part of the thesis, in which I said, that this chapter, when explained as referring to a man who is under the law, is directly and professedly contrary to the Pelagian heresy. Though I have already proved this in part, on the occasion of replying to the preceding objection, yet I will now at somewhat greater length teach and confirm it.

2. We have just seen that the article of the Pelagian heresy which is by no means either the last or the least, is that in which it is asserted that a man is able through his own free will, as being of itself sufficient for him, to fulfill the precept of God, if he be only instructed in the doctrine of the law, so as to be capable of knowing what he ought to perform and what to omit.

It appears that this dogma is not only firmly refuted, but that it is also plucked up as if by the roots and extirpated, according to the very design and purpose of the apostle, by means of this chapter, when it is understood as referring to a man under the law.

This is apparent from the opposition of the dogma to the context of the apostle. The former says, "Man, instructed by the teaching of the law, is capable, by the powers of his free will alone, to overcome sin and to obey the law of God." But the apostle declares that this cannot be effected by the powers of free will and of the law. he says,

"sin shall not have dominion over you; for ye are not under the law, but under grace,"

(Rom. vi, 14,) from which it is manifest that, if they were under the law, sin would have the dominion over them -- a consequence upon which he treats more copiously in the seventh chapter. Pelagius says, "Man is able, without the grace of Christ, and instructed solely by the teaching of the law, to perform the good which he wills, through his free will, and to omit the evil which he does not will;" but the apostle declares that this man "consents indeed to the law that it is good, but that to perform what is good he finds not in himself; he omits the good which he wills, and he performs the evil which he wills not." Therefore, the doctrine of the apostle is, independently of its consequence, directly repugnant to the Pelagian dogma, and this, indeed, from the scope and end which the apostle had, in the same chapter, proposed to himself.

But, from passages of this description, heresies are far more powerfully convicted and destroyed, than they are from passages accommodated to their refutation beyond the scope and intention of the writer, though this also be done according to the correct meaning of the same passages.

3. St. Augustine himself confesses that, when this chapter is explained in reference to a man under the law, it is adverse to the Pelagian heresy:

"But," says Pelagius, "why should I thus exclaim, who am now baptized in Christ?

Let them make such an exclamation who have not yet perceived such a benefit, and whose expressions the apostle transferred to himself, if indeed this is said by them?

But this defense of nature does not permit them to cry out with this voice. For nature does not exist in those who are baptized; and, in those who are not baptized, nature has no existence. Or, if nature is granted to be vitiated even in baptized persons, so that they exclaim, not without sufficient reason -- O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? -- and if succour is afforded to them in that which immediately follows, The Grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, let it now at length be granted, that human nature requires the aid of a physician. (On Nature and Grace, cap. 54.) From these remarks it is apparent, according to the mind of St. Augustine, that this passage, even when it is understood in reference to a natural man, is destructive to that dogma of Pelagius, in which he asserts that the natural man is able, by the powers of nature, to perform the law of God.

Thus also in a passage upon which we have already made some observations from his Retractations, lib. I, cap. 23, St. Augustine openly affirms that this chapter, when explained as relating to a man under the law, confutes the Pelagian heresy. These are his words: "By this, indeed, is now overturned the Pelagian heresy, that will not admit that the love, by which we live good and pious lives, is from God to us, but that asserts it to be from ourselves."

Besides, if we can obtain from them even this admission, that those who are not yet baptized implore the aid of the saviour's grace, this will indeed be no small matter against that false defense of nature, as being sufficient for itself, and of the power of free will. For he is not sufficient for himself who says, O wretched man that l am!

who shall deliver me? or else he must be said to possess full liberty, who still requires to be liberated. (On nature and Grace, cap. 55.)

But at this point, on account of which we have undertaken the consideration of these things, the apostle begins to introduce his own person, and to speak as if concerning himself. In this passage the Pelagians are unwilling that the apostle himself should be understood, but assert that he has transferred to himself another man who is yet placed under the law, and not delivered through grace, in which passage they ought indeed to concede "that by the law no man is justified." as the same apostle has declared in another part of his writings, but that the law is of force for the knowledge of sin and the transgression of the law itself; that, after sin has been known and increased, grace may be required through faith. (Against the two Epistles of the Pelagians to Boniface, lib. I, cap. 8)

4. "But," some man will say, "the Pelagians have interpreted that chapter as applicable to a man who is unregenerate, not without good reason. They undoubtedly knew that such an interpretation was peculiarly favourable to their sentiments which they defended against the church."

To this I reply, First. It has already been shown, both in reality, and by the testimony of St. Augustine, that this chapter, even when understood as applicable to a man under the law, and not yet regenerate, is adverse to the Pelagian doctrine.

Secondly. It may have happened that the Pelagians supposed the chapter might be explained in reference to a man placed under the law, and not under grace, without any consideration of the controversy in which they were engaged with the orthodox.

Thirdly. It cannot favour the sentiments of the Pelagians, that the apostle is said in this chapter to be treating about a man under the law; but this might be favourable, that they adduced such a description of a man who is under the law, as they knew was accommodated to strengthen their sentiments. For they said that "a man under this law is he who, by the power and instinct of nature, (which was not corrupted in Adam,) is able to will that which is good, and not to will what is evil; but who, through a depraved habit, was so bound to the service of sin, as in reality, and actually he was not able to perform the good which he would," &c. This false description of the man might also be met, not by denying that the subject of this chapter is a man under the law, but by refuting that description. For heretics are not heretical on all subjects and in every point; and it is their usual practice to intermix true things with those which are false, and frequently on true foundations to erect a superstructure of falsehoods --I repeat it, on true foundations, which, by some artifice, or by manifest violence are perverted to the support of falsehoods.

5. It is objected, besides, "It is impossible for this opinion not to be heretical or allied to heresy, when we see one Prosper Dysidaeus. a Samosatenian, who is deeply polluted by a multitude of heresies, interpreting Romans 7 in reference to a man who is not yet under grace, but under the law, which he undoubtedly would not have done, had he not understood that through it he had a mighty support for his own heresies."

REPLY. -- This objection is truly ridiculous -- as if he who is a heretic ought to err in all things, and can speak nothing that is true, or if he does utter any truth, the whole of it must be referred to the confirmation of his heresy. Even the very worst of heretics have, in some articles, held the same sentiments as those of the church. It is a well known fact that the ancient heretics endeavoured, and indeed were accustomed, to interpret many passages of Scripture against the orthodox, in such a way as they could not injure their several heresies. Yet these very passages are, even at the present time, explained by our theologians against the sense of the ancient orthodox, and in accordance with the interpretation of those heretics. But such persons are not, on this account, to be denominated "the favourers of heresies."

But I am desirous to have it demonstrated to me what affinity my explanation of Romans 7 has with Aryanism or Samosatenianism. If the same person, who is either an Aryan or a Samosatenian, is likewise earnest about the perfection of righteousness in this life, he will deny that this chapter ought to he understood as relating to the regenerate, not as he is either a Samosatenian or an Aryan, but as he is a Pelagian or a follower of Celestius.

If it be allowable to reason in this manner, then the opinion which explains this chapter as referring to a man under grace, will itself labour under great prejudices, from the fact that it is generally so interpreted by the Jesuits, and by their leaders, who are the sworn enemies of the church of Christ, and of the truth, and, at the same time, the most able retainers of the popish church, that is, of a church which is idolatrous, tyrannical, and most polluted with innumerable heresies. Away, then, with such a mode of argumentation as this, about the explanation of any portion of Scripture! Let it never proceed from the mind or the lips of those persons who, with a good conscience, have undertaken the defense of the truth. Who does not perceive that arguments of this kind are employed for the purpose of abashing and unsettling the minds of ignorant and inexperienced hearers; that, being blinded by a certain fear and stupor, they may not be able to form a judgment on the truth, nay, that they may not dare to touch the matter under controversy, through a vain fear of heresy! Such artifices as these are notorious; and all men of learning and moderation are aware of them. Nor are they capable of proving injurious to any persons except to the unlearned and the simple, or to those who have spontaneously determined to wander into error. For we have shewn that this chapter has been understood in the same sense as we interpret it, by many doctors of the church, who declared and proved themselves to be the most eminent adversaries of Aryanism, Samosatenianism, and other heresies, and the most strenuous defendants of the true doctrine concerning the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Gracious Lord! What a wide and ample plain is here opened for those persons who feel a pleasure in thrusting out the most able and efficient assertors of catholic doctrine into the camp of heretics, under this pretext, that they Interpret certain passages of Scripture which have been usually adduced for the refutation of heresy, in such a manner as not to enable other persons to attack heresies with those passages so interpreted.

6. Lastly. This, my explanation is burdened with another objection -- that "it differs from the confessions of all the reformed churches in Europe, for the establishment of which such a multitude of martyrs have shed their blood."

This argument likewise, I assert, is employed, not for teaching the truth, but to inflame and blind the minds of those who listen to it, through the indignation which they conceive. For I deny that -- in any confession, whether that of the French, the Dutch, the Swiss, the Savoy, the English, the Scotch, the Bohemian, or the Lutheran churches, or of any other -- there is extant a single article that is contrary to this interpretation, or that is in the least weakened by this interpretation of Romans 7. It may, indeed, possibly have happened that some portion of this chapter has been used in some confession for the establishment of a doctrine which cannot be confirmed from it, unless it be explained as relating to a regenerate man who is under grace. But how does this circumstance militate against him who approves of the very same doctrine, and defends it in an earnest and accurate manner, by adducing several other passages of Scripture in its support, Such a man affirms this alone -- that the true doctrine, in whose defense it has been cited, is not sufficiently well defended by this passage of holy writ. And what man ever shed his blood, or was compelled to shed it, because he was of opinion that this chapter ought to be explained in reference to a regenerate man, and not to a man who is under the law?

I speak with freedom, and frankly declare that, while I am listening to such reasons, I am scarcely able to govern and restrain myself from openly crying out, through grief, that God would have mercy on those who teach these things, and would put within them a good mind and a sincere conscience, lest, while rushing headlong against conscience, they at length receive due punishment for the demerit of malignant ignorance, or that he would be pleased to hinder their attempts, or at least, that he would render them abortive, lest they should injure the truth which has been divinely manifested, and the church of Christ! For I cannot put any milder construction on such expressions, when they proceed from men that are endued with knowledge and understanding.

All those matters contained in confessions are not equally necessary. All the particulars in any confession are not confirmed by the blood of those who are dragged away to the stake not for the whole of that confession, but on account of some part of it. And we know that many thousands of martyrs have sealed the truth of the gospel with their blood, who were never questioned respecting this article of the perfection or imperfection of righteousness, and who never expended any thoughts upon it. I refer now to this question: "Are those who, through Christ, are justified and sanctified, able in this life to fulfill the law of God without any defect, through the assistance of Christ and the Spirit of grace?" For all Christians are well assured, that, without the grace of Christ, they are not able to do any good whatsoever. Wherefore, the use of this kind of argument must be laid aside by those who are good and conscientious inquirers after the truth, and who endeavour to preserve her when she is discovered.

FOURTH PART

THE OPPOSITE OPINION IS APPROVED BY NONE OF THE ANCIENT

DOCTORS OF THE CHURCH

1. THE ancients who have interpreted this chapter as relating to a man under grace, and the moderns who give it a similar interpretation, differ very materially from each other; because, by the good which the apostle says he wills and does not, and by the evil which he says he wills not and does, the ancients understand only the not-indulging in concupiscence, and the indulging in it; while the moderns understand GOOD and EVIL actually performed. 2. That such was the opinion of the ancients is proved by citations from Epiphanius, Augustine, Bede, and Thomas Aquinas. 3. The difference between these two diverse explanations of good and evil is so great, in the judgment of the ancients, that, according to both explanations, they cannot agree with a regenerate man. This is proved by citations from Augustine, Bede, Thomas Aquinas, and Hugh the cardinal.

Thesis. -- The meaning which the greater part of our modern divines ascribe to the apostle in this chapter, is not approved by any of the ancient doctors of the church, not even by Augustine himself; but by many of them, it was repudiated and rejected.

In this thesis, I do not assert that none of the ancient doctors has interpreted this chapter as relating to a man who is regenerate and placed under grace; for I have already confessed that St. Augustine and some others give it that interpretation. But I affirm that the interpretation of our divines differs from the explanation of those ancients in a point of great moment; and so great is this difference, that, except by a forced construction and a meaning contrary to the mind of those old authors themselves, the moderns are unable to confirm their opinion on this subject by the authority of the ancients. This will, I think, be proved with sufficient accuracy, if it be shewn that those things which the apostle attributes to this man, are received by our divines in a widely different acceptation from that in which they were understood by those among the ancients who explained the chapter as relating to a man under grace.

Indeed the moderns receive it in a sense so far different and dissenting from this explanation of some of the ancients, that these very ancients have entertained the opinion that these attributes, when received according to their modern construction by our divines, do not agree with a man who is regenerate and under grace, but with one who is placed under the law.

The truth of this affirmation I will now proceed to point out in the following manner: That Good which the apostle says he indeed wills but does not, and that EVIL which, he says, he wills not and yet does, are interpreted by most of our divines as referring to ACTUAL GOOD AND EVIL. And they explain the evil by that very deed which is committed, with the consent of the will, through the lusting of the flesh against the lusting of the Spirit; in like manner, they explain the GOOD by that very deed which a man indeed lusts or desires to do according to the Spirit, but which he does not actually perform, being hindered by the lusting of the flesh. let the commentaries of our divines be examined, and it will at once be evident that this is their interpretation of the chapter; and this is openly declared by those who, on this subject, are opposed to me in opinion.

But when St. Augustine, and all those ancients whom I have had an opportunity of perusing, interpret this chapter as referring to a man who is regenerate and placed under grace, they assert that the evil which the apostle says he would not, but did, is to lust or desire; but they interpret the GOOD which he says he would, but did not, by not lusting or coveting; yet they make a distinction between these two -- lusting and going after their lusts -- and not lusting and not going after their lusts. In a manner nearly similar, the apostle St., James denotes this difference in his epistle, i, 14,xv,

"But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin," that is, actual sin; "and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death."

That this was the meaning of the ancients, is proved by

1. EPIPHANIUS

For, that which is said, "What I do I allow not, but what I hate that I do," must not be received concerning that evil which we have performed and completed, but concerning that about which we have only thought. (Heresy 64th, against Origen, lib.

2, tom. 2.)

Otherwise, how should the apostle have indeed chiefly done the evil which displeased him, but not the good which was pleasing, if he had not spoken about extraneous thoughts, which we have occasionally thought, and not willing them, not knowing from what cause they arise? (Ibid.)

For this good is perfect, not only to abstain from doing, but likewise from thinking; and the good is not done which we will, but the evil which we will not. (Ibid.) Wherefore, this is placed within us: to will, that we will not think about these things.

Yet this is not placed within us: to gain our end, that they be dispersed so as not to return again to our minds, but only that we may in some degree use them, or not use them -- as is the sentiment in the subsequent passage: "For the good that I would I do not;" for I will not to think on those things which hurt me, because this is a good and immaculate employment, and devoid of reprehension, according to the common saying, [in reference to another affair.] "a square may be formed either in the mind, or by the hands, without any blame." Therefore, "the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do;" I will not to think, and yet I think on those things which I will not.(Ibid.)

In a subsequent passage, when refuting those who interpreted this passage as descriptive of the deeds performed by the apostle himself, his words are: But now, if any venture to dispute these words by objecting, "The apostle teaches us this, by these words -- For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do that they are to be referred not only to our thinking evil in our minds from which we are averse and which we avoid, but likewise to our actually doing and performing evil," we therefore request the man who reasons thus, if what he says be correct, to explain to us what that evil was which, though the apostle hated and nilled to do, yet he did it. Or, on the contrary, let him inform us what good that was which he willed greatly to perform, but which he was not able to do, &c. (Ibid.) Consult the remaining portion of this passage.

2. AUGUSTINE

And it follows, "I find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present with me;" that is, I find a law to be within me when I will to do the good which the law wills; because "evil is present," not with the law itself which says, "Thou shalt not covet" or lust, but "evil is present with me," because I likewise unwillingly lust. (On Marriage and Concupiscence, cap. 30, ten,. 7.)

To "the body of this death," therefore, is understood to belong, that "another law in the members wages war indeed against the law of the mind;" while the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, although it does not subjugate the mind, because the Spirit also lusteth against the flesh; and thus, though the law of sin itself holds some part of the flesh in captivity, by which it may resist the law of the mind, yet it does not reign in our body, though it be mortal, if we do not obey it in the lusts thereof (Ibid. cap. 31. ) But the apostle subjoins this expression: "So, then, with the mind I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh, the law of sin," which must be understood in this manner: "With my mind I serve the law of God, by not consenting to the law of sin; but with the flesh, I serve the law of sin by having desires of sin, to which, though I do not yield my consent, yet I am not totally free from them." (Ibid.) Or perhaps we are afraid of those words which follow: "For that which I do, I allow not; for what I would that do I not; but what I hate, that do 1." Are we afraid that, from these words, any one should suspect the apostle of consenting to the concupiscence of the flesh to evil works, But we must take into our consideration that which the apostle immediately subjoins: "If, then, I do that which I would not, I consent unto the law that it is good." For he here says that he consents to the law more than to the concupiscence of the flesh because he bestows on this latter the appellation of "sin." Therefore, he said that he does and performs not with an inclination of consenting and fulfilling, but with the very motion of lusting or coveting. Hence, therefore, he says, "I consent to the law that it is good."I consent," because I will what it does not will. He afterwards says, "Now it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." What does this mean -- "Now then," -- except that he is now under grace, which has delivered the delighting of the will from consenting with lust, Neither is the other part of the clause any better understood: "It is no more I that do it," than that he does not now consent to "yield his members as instruments of unrighteousness to sin." For if he both lusts, and consents, and performs, how is it "no more he that does it," though he is grieved at his doing it, and grievously groans on account of having been conquered? (Against the two Epistles of the Pelagians, cap.

10.)

For this is "to perform that which is good," that a man do not indulge in concupiscence or lust. But this good is imperfect when the man lusts, though he does not consent to concupiscence for evil. (Ibid.)

And from these things he afterwards concludes -- "So, then, with the mind, I myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of sin," that is, "with the flesh, the law of sin" by indulging in concupiscence, "but with the mind, the law of God" by not consenting to such concupiscence. (Ibid.)

He does not say, how to do or to perform, but "how to fulfill or complete that which is good;" because to perform or to do what is good, is, not to go after lusts; but to fulfill or to perfect what is good, is not to lust or to indulge in concupiscence. That, therefore, which is said to the Galatians, (v, 16,) "ye shall not fulfill or perfect the lusts of the flesh," is said about a contrary object in this passage of the epistle to the Romans -- "but how to fulfill or perfect that which is good, I find not." Because those lusts are not perfected or fulfilled in evil, when the assent of our will is not added to them; nor is our will perfected or fulfilled in good, so long as the motion of those lusts continues, though we do not consent to such motion. But this conflict, in which even those who are baptized struggle as in an agony, when "the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh," in which the Spirit also does or performs a good work, by not consenting to evil concupiscence; but it does not fulfill or perfect such work, because it does not consume or remove those evil desires or lusts. The flesh, likewise, does or performs an evil desire; but it does not fulfill or perfect it, because, the Spirit not consenting to it, the flesh also does not come so far as to the condemned works. This conflict, therefore, is not that of the Jews nor of any other description of men whatsoever, but it is evidently that of Christian believers, and of those who live good lives and labour hard in this contest, as is briefly shewn by the apostle, in Romans vii, 25, where he says, "then, with the mind, I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin." (Against Julian the Pelagian, lib. I, cap. 26.) Be unwilling, therefore, to do that which you are not willing to suffer; and do not say, that we allure you to sweet deeds, about which we cite the apostle as thus declaring himself: "For I know that in me, (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing." For, though "they do not perfect or fulfill the good which they would" in not indulging in concupiscence; yet they do or perform good, in not going after their lusts. (Ibid. lib. 5, cap. 5.)

Be it far from us, therefore, to assert what you pretend, that we affirm that, "the apostle spake these words as though he was desirous to be understood by them, that he was in the act of fornication, struggling hard against it, whilst he was led away by some hand of a pestiferous voluptuousness," when the apostle himself says, It is no more I that do it; thus shewing that the lusts of the flesh did work only a libidinous impulse without a consent to the sin. (Ibid. lib. 6. cap 11.) He likewise refrains himself from every evil thing, who has sin which he does not suffer to reign within him, and into whom secretly creeps a reprehensible thought which he does not permit to arrive at the end [intended] of a deed or performance. But it is one thing not to have sin, and it is another not to obey its desires or lusts. it is one thing to fulfill that which is commanded, "Thou shalt not covet or lust," and it is another at least, by a certain attempt at abstinence, to do that which is also written:

"Thou shalt not go after thy lusts." Yet it is impossible for us to know any of these things correctly, without the grace of the saviour. To do or perform righteousness, therefore, in the true worship of God, is to fight by an internal conflict against the inward evil of concupiscence, and not at all to have, to perfect, or fulfill that which is its opposite. For he who fights, is still not only in great peril, but is also sometimes smitten, though he is not utterly cast down. But he who has no adversary, rejoices in full peace and tranquillity. He also is most truly said to be without sin, in whom no sin dwells, but not he, who, through abstaining from an evil work, says, "It is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." (On Nature and Grace, cap. 62.) Therefore, the apostle "does that which he would not," because he wills not to lust or indulge in concupiscence, and yet he lusts; therefore, "he does that which he would not." Did that evil concupiscence draw the apostle into subjection to concupiscence to commit fornication? Far from it. Let not such a thought as this arise in our hearts. He struggled hard, and was not subdued. But because he was unwilling also to have this against which he was struggling, therefore, he said, "I do that which I would not;" I am unwilling to indulge in concupiscence, and yet I lust. Therefore, "I do that which I would not," but yet I no not consent to concupiscence. For otherwise he would not have said, "Ye shall not fulfill the lusts of the flesh," if he himself fulfilled them. (On Time, Sermon 55, tom. 10.)

How do I perform that which is good, and not perfect what is good, I do or perform good, when I do not consent to evil concupiscence; but I do not perfect or fulfill what is good, in not entirely refraining from concupiscence. Again, therefore, how does my enemy perform that which is evil, and not perfect what is evil? He does or performs evil, because he moves an evil desire; and he does not perfect what is evil, because he does not draw me to evil.(Ibid.)

"With the mind, I myself serve the law of God," by not consenting, "but with the flesh, the law of sin," by not indulging in concupiscence. (Ibid.) Hence, also this expression, "I do that which I would not;" "for the flesh lusteth against the Spirit" and I am unwilling that it should lust. I account it a great matter if I do not consent, for I wish to abstain from it; therefore, "I do that which I would not."

For I will that the flesh lust not against the Spirit, and I am unable; this is what I have said, "I do that which I would not." (Sermon 13th, on the Words of the Apostle.) If, therefore, "the flesh lusteth against the Spirit," that in this very thing you do not what you would, because you will not to indulge in concupiscence and are not able,

[to refrain from such indulgence,] at least hold thy will in the grace of the Lord, and persevere by its assistance. Repeat before him that which you have sung, "Direct my steps according to thy word; and let not any iniquity have dominion over me." (Psalm cxix, 133.) What is this, "Let not any iniquity have dominion over me"? Listen to the apostle: "Let not sin reign in your mortal body." What is this reigning, "By obeying it in the lusts thereof." He has not said, Do not have evil desires. For how have I not evil desires "in this mortal body," in which "the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh"? This thing, therefore, "Let not sin reign," &c. (Ibid.) 3. VENERABLE BEDE

But if it be himself, (that is, the apostle,) let us not so understand that which he has said: "What I would, that do I not, but what I hate, that I do;" as if he willed to be chaste and yet was an adulterer, or willed to be merciful and was cruel, or willed to be pious and was impious. But what are we to understand, I will not to indulge in concupiscence, and yet I do indulge in it. (On Romans 7.)

Though I do not consent to concupiscence, and though I do not go after my lusts, yet I still indulge in concupiscence. (Ibid.)

What is it that I hate? To indulge in concupiscence: I hate to indulge in concupiscence, and yet I do so from my flesh and not from my mind. (Ibid.) But that which I do, is to indulge in concupiscence, not to consent to it; that no one may now seek in the apostle an example for himself of sinning, and afford a bad example. "What I would, that do I not." For what says the law? "Thou shalt not lust or covet." And I would not lust, and yet I do lust, although I do not yield up my consent to concupiscence, and though I do not go after it. For I offer resistance, I turn away my mind, I give a denial to the instruments, I repress my members; and yet that is done within me which I will not. That which the law likewise wills not, I nill with the law. What it would not, that I would not. Therefore, "I consent to the law." I am in the flesh, I am in the mind; but I am more in the mind than in the flesh. Because, when I am in the mind, I am in that which governs; for the mind governs; the flesh is governed. And I am more in that by which I rule or govern, than in that by which I am governed. Therefore, I rule more in the mind. (Ibid.)

4. THOMAS AQUINAS

To will is present with me, that is, to me who am now recovered by grace. It is through the operation of divine grace, by which indeed I not only will that which is good, but I also perform something that is good, because I offer resistance to concupiscence, and under the guidance of the Spirit, I act against it. But I do not find in my power the manner in which I may perform that which is good, that is, in order entirely to exclude concupiscence. (On Romans 7.)

3. But these two explanations of those attributes are, in the judgment of those very ancients who have explained this chapter as relating to a regenerate man, so vastly diverse and dissentient, that the same things cannot agree with a regenerate man according to both these explanations; nay, that, according to the first of these explanations, they can agree with a regenerate man, but according to the second they can agree only with a man who is under sin and under the law. This I will now proceed to prove from the testimonies of those ancients themselves: 1. AUGUSTINE

For in no better manner is this understood -- "It is no more I that do it" - than that he does not consent "to yield his members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin."

For if he both lusts, and consents, and does, how is it "no more he that does it,"

though he is grieved that he does it, and groans grievously at being conquered, (Against the two Epistles of the Pelagians, lib. I, cap. 10.) On two of these three passages we have before disputed, and which say, "But I am carnal, sold under sin:" And this is the third: "- bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." On account of all the three, the apostle may seem to be describing him who is still living under the law, and not yet under grace. But as we have already expounded the two former of them to be spoken in reference to the flesh which is yet corruptible, so may this third passage likewise be understood; as if it said that I was brought into captivity by the flesh not by the mind, by motion not by consent; and that it therefore brought me into captivity, because in my flesh itself there is no other than our common [sinful] nature. (Ibid.) He is spiritual because he lives according to the Spirit; but still, on the part of mortal flesh, the same man is spiritual and carnal. Behold the spiritual man: "With the mind I myself serve the law of God.", Behold the carnal man: "But with the flesh I serve the law of sin." Is, then, this same man both spiritual and carnal? He is evidently so, as long as he is a dweller on earth. Whosoever thou art, be not surprised if thou yieldest and consentest to any lusts whatsoever, since thou either supposest them to be good for fulfilling libidinous excess, or thou undoubtedly seest them now to be so evil, that yet by yielding to them thou consentest, and followest whither they lead, and dost perpetrate those things which they wickedly suggest; thou art entirely carnal, whosoever thou art that dost correspond with this description -- thou art totally carnal.

But if indeed thou lustest or desirest that which the law forbids when it says: "Thou shaft not covet," yet if thou dost also observe that other thing which the law likewise says, "Thou shalt not go after thy lusts," in thy mind thou art spiritual, and in thy flesh carnal. For it is one thing, not to lust or not to indulge in concupiscence; and it is another, not to go after its lusts. The non-indulgence in concupiscence is the property of one who is entirely perfect; not to go after his lusts, is that of one who is fighting, engaged in a struggle, and labouring. Let me be allowed, likewise, to add what the thing itself requires, that it is also the property of him who does not walk after his lusts; it is the property of a man who is conquering and overcoming. For the first of these [the non- indulgence in concupiscence] is obtained by the battle, the struggle and the labour, but not till after the victory has been secured. (On the Words of the Apostle, Sermon 5.)

It is apparent, therefore, from the mind of St. Augustine, that, if this chapter be explained as relating to consent and to the actual perpetration of evil, it can by no means be understood concerning a regenerate man, but concerning a man who is under the law, and "is merely carnal," as he expresses himself.

2. VENERABLE BEDE

We know that the law is spiritual. There is, therefore, perhaps, some other; probably thou art the man; either thou art he, or I am. If, then, he be some one of us, let us listen to him about himself, and, not being offended, let us correct ourselves. But if it be himself, (that is, the apostle,) let us not so understand that which he has said: "What I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that I do;" as if it was his will to be chaste and yet he was an adulterer, or to be merciful and yet was cruel, or to be pious and yet was impious. But what are we to understand? My will is, not to indulge in concupiscence; and yet I do indulge in it. (On Romans 7.)

3. THOMAS AQUINAS

Of all these writers, Thomas Aquinas most plainly places the two explanations in opposition to each other; and he declares that the things which are in this chapter attributed by the apostle to the man about whom he is treating, according to one of these explanations agree with a regenerate man, but, according to the other they agree with a man who is under sin:

Man, therefore, is said to be carnal, because his reason is carnal. It is called "carnal"

on two accounts: On the First, because when the reason consents to those things to which it is instigated by the flesh, it is brought into subjection to the flesh, according to the declaration in 1 Corinthians iii, 3: "For, whereas there is among you envying, and strife, and divisions, are ye not carnal?" In this manner, it is also understood about a man not yet restored by grace. On the Second account, reason is said to be carnal from the circumstance of its being attacked by the flesh; according to that declaration in Gal. v, 17, "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit." And, in this manner, the reason even of a man who is placed under grace is understood to be carnal. But both these carnalities proceed from sin, &c.

Hence he says, "For that which I do I understand not," [or "allow not,"] that is, that it ought to be performed. This may indeed be understood in two ways: In the ONE

mode, it may be understood concerning him who is subjected to sin, who knows in general that sin must not be committed, yet, being conquered, by the suggestion of the devil, or by passion, or by the inclination of a perverse habit, he commits it, and is, therefore, said to perform that which he understands ought not to be performed, doing this against his conscience, as it is said in Luke xii, 47, "That servant, who knew his Lord's will, and did not according to his will, shall deservedly be beaten with many stripes." In the other mode, it may be understood concerning him who is placed in grace, who indeed does that which is evil; not indeed by executing it in operation or with a consenting mind, but only by indulging in concupiscence according to the feeling of the sensual appetite. And that concupiscence is on account of the reason and the understanding, because it precedes his judgment, at this approach of which such an actual operation is hindered, &c.

First, therefore, he says, in reference to the omission of good, "for the good which it is my will to do, I do not." This may indeed be understood, in one mode, about a man who is placed under sin; and thus that which he says in this place, "I do," must be received according to a complete act, which is exercised externally, through the consent of reason. But when he says, "It is my will," it must be understood not indeed in reference to a complete will which is preceptive of a work or operation, but in reference to a certain incomplete will, by which men will in general that which is good, as they also have in general a correct judgment concerning one thing; and such a will is corrupted in particular because it does not what it understands in general ought to be done, and that which it wills to do. But according to its being understood respecting a man recovered by grace, we must, on the contrary, understand by this which he says, "It is my will," a complete will continuing throughout in the election or choice of a particular operation, that by this which he says, "I do," may be understood an incomplete act which consists only in the sensual appetite, and does not extend to the consent of reason. For a man who is placed under grace, wills indeed to preserve his mind from corrupt lusts; but he does not perform this good, because of the inordinate motions of concupiscence which rise up in his sensual appetite. Similar to this is what he says in Gal. v, 17, "so that ye do not the things which ye would."

Secondly, he subjoins, in reference to the perpetration of evil, "But the evil which I hate, that I do." If this be indeed understood concerning a man who is a sinner, then by this which is said, "I hate," is understood a certain imperfect hatred, according to which every man naturally hates evil. But by this which he says, "I do," is understood an act perfected by the execution of a work according to the consent of reason; for that hatred in general is taken away in a particular which is eligible through the inclination of a habit or passion. But if it be understood concerning a man placed under grace, then by this which he says, "I do," is, on the contrary, understood an imperfect act, which consists solely in the concupiscence of the sensual appetite; and by this which he says, "I hate," is understood a perfect hatred, by which any one perseveres in the detestation of evil, until the final reprobation of it, &c.

But the law of sin brings a man into captivity in two ways: By the one mode, through consent and operation, it captivates a man who is a sinner; by the other mode, it captivates a man placed under grace, with respect to the motion of concupiscence.

Grace delivers from the body of this death in two ways: By the ONE mode, that the corruption of the body may not have the dominion over the mind, drawing it to summit sin; by the OTHER mode, that the corruption of the body may be totally removed. Therefore, with respect to the First, it appertains to the sinner to say, "Grace has delivered me from the body of this death, that is, it has delivered me from sin, into which my soul was led through the corruption of the body." But from sin a righteous man has been already delivered; wherefore it belong, to him to say, "The grace of God hath made me free from the body of this death, that is, that there may not be in my body the corruption of sin or of death," which will occur in the resurrection.

Afterwards when he says "so then with the mind I myself serve the law of God," &c., he infers a conclusion, which is inferred according to these two premised expositions, in different ways, from the premises. For, according to the exposition of the preceding words in the person of a sinner, the conclusion must be inferred thus: "It has been said that the grace of God hath made me free from the body of this death, that I may not be led away by it to sin. Therefore, since I shall now be free, with the mind I serve the law of God; but with the flesh I serve the law of sin, which indeed remains in the flesh with respect to the fuel, by which the flesh lusts against the Spirit." But if the preceding words be understood [as proceeding] from the person of a righteous man, then the conclusion must be thus inferred: "The grace of God through Jesus Christ hath made me free from the body of this death; that is, so that the corruption of sin and death may not be in me."

4. HUGH THE CARDINAL

There is, therefore, now no condemnation. The preceding words have been expounded concerning the captivity of mortal sin, under which the man was carnally living; and concerning the captivity of venial sin, of the man who is in grace. But he gives the appellation of "mortal sin" to that which is exercised in operation itself, and "venial"

to that which consists in the act and motion of lusting or indulging in concupiscence, without the consent of the will.

FIFTH PART

I. THE OPPOSITE OPINION IS INJURIOUS TO GRACE AND HURTFUL TO

GOOD MORALS

1. It is First shewn, that the interpretation of Romans 7, which prevails in the present day is injurious to grace, by attributing to it less than is proper. (1.) The contest which is described in that chapter, cannot be attributed to the Holy Spirit dwelling in a man, without manifest contumely to the Holy Ghost. (2.) An objection and reply. 2. It is Secondly shewn, that the modern interpretation is hurtful to good morals; because it draws along with it, as a consequence, that a man flatters and encourages himself in his sins, provided only that he commits them with a reluctant conscience. This is illustrated by some instances. 3. It is likewise confirmed by St. Augustine and by the Venerable Bede.

Thesis. -- The opinion which affirms, that this chapter treats about a man who is regenerate and placed under grace; and which also interprets the good which this man would and does not, and the evil which he would not but does, as referring to actual good and evil; is injurious to grace, and inimical to good morals.

1. That this modern opinion is injurious to divine grace, I demonstrate in the following manner:

An injury is inflicted on grace, not only by him who attributes to nature or to free will that which belongs to grace, that is, having taken it away from grace; but likewise by him who attributes to it less than is its due, and than ought truly to be ascribed to grace. In the last of these modes, this modern opinion is inimical to grace: For it attributes less than, according to the Scriptures, ought to be ascribed to grace. The Scriptures ascribe to divine grace, that, in the regenerate, it worketh not only to will but also to do; (Phil. ii, 13) that, by its power, our old man is crucified, and the body of sin is destroyed or enervated, so that henceforth we should not obey it in the lusts thereof; that, through grace, the regenerate are dead indeed unto sin, and are raised up again to walk in newness of life, in which they serve not sin but God, neither do they yield their members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin, but as instruments of righteousness to God; (Rom. vi, 2-13) that, through the efficacy of the Spirit, they mortify the deeds of the body; (viii, 13) and that grace not only supplies to the regenerate strength to resist the world, Satan, and the flesh, but, likewise, power to gain the victory over them. (Ephes. vi, 11-18; James iv, 4-8; 1 John iv, 4; v, 4; &c.,

&c.)

But this modern opinion attributes to grace, that its only effect in the regenerate is to will and not to do, that it is too weak to crucify the old man, to destroy the body of sin, or to conquer the flesh, the world and Satan. For the regenerate man, according to this opinion, is said to obey sin in its lusts, and to walk after the desires of the flesh; though he is said to do this, compelled by the violence of sin, in opposition to conscience, and with a reluctant will. For the interpretation and addition alter the mode of obedience by which men obey sin; it does not deny obedience itself. This was also the cause why St. Augustine interpreted the chapter in reference to concupiscence; for he perceived that if he interpreted it concerning actual sins, he would be inflicting an injury on grace.

(1.) I am desirous that it should be made the subject of diligent consideration, and that it should be frequently and deliberately pondered, whether the contest which is said to be described in this chapter can be ascribed to the indwelling Holy Spirit, without manifest contumely and dishonour to the grace of Christ and of His Spirit, if this be laid down as the issue of the contest, that the man works from the will of the flesh, not from concupiscence of the Spirit. This is the result of the battle, which is laid down by those who interpret the chapter concerning actual good and evil. To any who earnestly peruses the passage, it will indeed appear evident that such a contest cannot be ascribed to the Holy Spirit, without enormous disgrace to Him. For, what is it? It is said to be a contest, and a waging of war between "the law of the mind," that is, the Holy Spirit dwelling within, and "the law of the members;" and the victory is assigned to the law of the members against the law of the mind; for it leads the man away, as a captive, to the law of sin, the Holy Spirit, who dwells within vainly resisting and warring against it. Under these circumstances, is not the Holy Spirit represented as being much weaker than the law in the members, that is, than the lust of the flesh and indwelling sin, The man who denies this, will deny that the sun shines when he is to be seen in all his meridian splendour. For, in this place, no mention is made of his spontaneous yielding or surrender, of desisting from the combat, or the casting away of his weapons, which we have declared to be the cause why he who begins to fight in the Spirit is conquered by the flesh. But no mention of such circumstances can here be made; for it is said to be a battle, and a waging of war not between "the law of the members" and a man who uses "the law of the mind," but to be between "the law of the mind" and "the law of the members;" to which law of the mind the casting away of its weapons cannot be attributed, for it is itself engaged in the battle and not by proxy. Neither can a desisting from the combat be ascribed to the law of the mind before it has actually been conquered and overcome. Much less can a spontaneous surrender be attributed to it, because this can by no means occur between these two combatants. For "the law of the mind" must necessarily lose its life, and cease to have any existence, before it willingly and spontaneously yields to the rebellious flesh.

(2.) Some one, however, may reply, "This is a metaphorical kind of speaking or discourse, and through a Prosopopoeia, a person and the properties of a person are attributed to the law of the mind and to that of the members. But, properly and without any trope or figure, this man is said to fight with himself; that is, the man, as he is regenerate, fights with himself as he is unregenerate."

My answer to this is, there is nothing to prevent the thing from being done in the manner now specified; for a regenerate man, as such, fights in the power and strength of the grace and the Spirit of Christ. Therefore, if while fighting he is conquered, the grace and the Spirit of Christ are overcome, which would be a fact most ignominious to the grace and Spirit of Christ. But if he be conquered while in a state of nonresistance, and not during the conflict, but after he has cast away his weapons or has desisted from the combat, then this is not the case which is the subject of the present investigation; for, in the case stated by the apostle, the man is made prisoner while in actual combat, not after he has ceased to be a belligerent; because the effect and accomplishment of this bringing into captivity is joined to the act of waging war and that indeed immediately. But these two are properly joined together, and in a manner that is agreeable to the nature of parties fighting against each other, if "the law of the mind," that is, the conscience, convinced of the equity and justice of the law, be said to contend with "the law of the members;" for the former is conquered while fighting and in the very midst of the conflict, because it is too weak to be capable of withstanding the impetuosity of the shock against "the law of the members," that is, the lusts of the flesh and the desires of sin, though it earnestly strives to bear away, by every exertion and with all its powers, the palm of victory from the field of battle.

2. But matter of fact teaches that this opinion is inimical and hurtful to good morals.

For nothing can be imagined more noxious to true morality than to assert that" it is a property of the regenerate not to do the good which they would, and to do the evil which they would not;" because it necessarily follows from this that those persons flatter themselves in their sins, who, while sinning, feel that they do so with a reluctant conscience and with a will that offered some resistance. For they conclude themselves to be regenerate from this circumstance -- because it is not one of the properties of the unregenerate to do the evil which they would not, and to omit the performance of the good which they would; the unregenerate being those who omit the good, and perpetrate the evil, with a full consent of the will, and without any resistance. I truly and sacredly affirm that this has, in more instances than one, fallen within the range of my experience: When I have admonished certain persons to exercise a degree of caution over themselves and to guard against the commission of some wickedness which they knew to be prohibited by the law, they have replied "that it was indeed their will so to refrain, but that they must declare, with the apostle, We are unable to perform the good which we would."

"I speak the truth in Christ and lie not, my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost," that I have received this very answer from a certain individual, not after he had perpetrated the crime, but when he was previously admonished not to commit it. I am also acquainted with a lady, who on being admonished and blamed for a certain deed which she knew she had perpetrated against the law of God and her own conscience, coolly replied "that as she had done that deed with a reluctant will and not with a full consent, in this she experienced something similar to what the apostle Paul endured when he said, The evil that l would not, that I do." I have known both men and women, young persons and old, who, when I have explained this seventh chapter of the epistle to the Romans in the sense in which I defend it in this treatise, have openly confessed to me "that they had always previously entertained the opinion that, if they had actually perpetrated any evil with a reluctant mind, or had omitted the performance of any good when their conscience exclaimed against such omission, it was not necessary for them to care much about the matter or deeply to lament it, since they considered themselves in this respect to be similar to St. Paul." These persons, therefore, have returned me hearty thanks, as they have declared, because, by my interpretation, I had delivered them from that false opinion.

3. But, lest it might appear that I alone make this assertion, and, without any witness or supporter, declare that "the opinion which interprets this chapter as referring to actual good and evil, is adverse to good morals arid to piety," let us now see what judgment some of the ancients have formed about this matter.

AUGUSTINE

When discussing these words of the apostle -- "for the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do" -- this father makes the following remarks: As often as the divine words which have just been recited from the epistle of the apostle Paul, are read, it is to be feared that, when they arc incorrectly understood, they furnish an occasion to men who are seeking one; because they are inclined to the commission of sin, and with difficulty restrain themselves. Therefore, when they have heard the apostle declaring, "For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I hate, that I do," they commit evil; and, as if displeased with themselves because they thus do evil, they suppose that they resemble the apostle, who said, "For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do." For this passage is sometimes read, and at present imposes on us the necessity of admonishing, that, when men take it in a wrong acceptation, they convert salutary food into poison. (0n Time, Sermons 43 a 45, tom. 10.)

But lest, in this battle, these divine words when read should seem, to those who have not a good understanding of them, as the trumpet of the enemy's army and not that of our own ranks, by which we may be incited, and not by which we may be conquered, pay attention, I beseech you, my brethren, and, you who are in the contest, contend manfully. For, you who have not yet begun the combat, will not understand what I say; but you who are now contending, will easily understand my meaning. I speak openly; your words will be in silence. Recollect, in the first place, what the apostle has written to the Galatians, from which this passage may be well expounded; for, speaking to believers who had been baptized, he says -- speaking to them as those to whom all sins had been remitted in the sacred laver; but speaking to them as to those who are still fighting, he says, "This I say then: Walk in the Spirit and ye shall not fulfill the lusts of the flesh." He has not said, Ye shall not do or perform, but, Ye shall not fulfill or perfect. And why does he say this, He proceeds to say "for the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; for these are contrary, the one to the other, that ye may not do the things that ye would. But if ye be led of the Spirit, ye are not under the law." If ye be led of the Spirit -- What is "to be led of the Spirit"? To consent to the Spirit of God which commands, and not to the flesh which lusteth. Yet it lusts, and resists, and wills something, and thou wiliest not. Persevere in not willing [that which the flesh wills]. And yet thy desire to God should be of this description, that there may not be any concupiscence for thee to resist. Consider what I have said. I repeat it: Thy request unto God should be of this kind, that no concupiscence whatever may remain which it may be necessary for thee to resist. For thou dost resist; and, by not consenting, thou dost overcome; but it is far better to have no enemy than to conquer one. The time will arrive when that enemy will have no existence. Apply thy mind to the notes of triumph, and see if it will be "O death, where is thy contest?" It will not be "O death, where is thy sting?" Thou shalt seek its place, and shalt not find it. (Ibid.)

In a subsequent passage on the same treatise, when explaining still more plainly the meaning of the apostle, lest his words should prove hurtful to those who seek occasion, St. Augustine writes in the following manner:

The apostle, therefore, does not what he would, because he wills not to lust or indulge in concupiscence; yet he lusts; therefore he does the evil which he wills not. Did this evil concupiscence draw the apostle into subjection to lust for fornication? By no means. Let not such thoughts as these arise in thy heart. He contended against it; he was not subdued. But because he willed not, and had this against which he might contend, therefore he said "What I would, that do I not;" I will not to lust, or to indulge in concupiscence, and yet I do lust. "Therefore, what I would, that do I not;"

but yet I consent not to concupiscence. For, otherwise, he would not have said, "Ye shall not fulfill the lusts of the flesh:" if he fulfilled them himself. But he has placed for thee, before thy eyes, the combat in which he was engaged, that thou mayest not be afraid concerning thine own. For, if the blessed apostle had not said this, when thou hast perceived concupiscence in motion within thy members to which thou wouldst not yield thy consent, yet, since thou hast perceived it to be in motion, perhaps thou mightest despair concerning thyself, and say -- if I belonged unto God, l should not have such motions. Look at the apostle engaged in the battle, and be unwilling to fill thyself with despair. He says, "But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind; and because I am unwilling that it should wage ware for it is my own flesh, I am myself the person, it is a part of myself -- "that which I would, I do not; but the evil which I hate, that do I," because I lust. Therefore, the good which I do in not giving consent to my evil concupiscence, I perform it, but I do not perfect it. And concupiscence, which is my enemy, performs evil, and does not perfect it. In what way do I perform good and not perfect it? I perform good when I do not consent to evil concupiscence, but I do not perfect good so as not to indulge the least concupiscence. Again, therefore, in what way does my enemy perform evil, and not perfect evil? It performs evil, because it puts evil desires in motion. It does not perfect evil, because it does not draw me to evil.(Ibid.)

VENERABLE BEDE

But the thing which I do or perform is to lust, not to consent to lust; lest any one should now seek in the apostle an example for himself, and should himself afford a bad one. "That which I would, I do not." For what saith the law, "Thou shalt not covet." And it is not my will to lust, and yet I lust, though I give no consent to my lust, and though I go not after it. (On Romans 7.)

II. VARIOUS OBJECTIONS IN FAVOUR OF THE COMMON

INTERPRETATION ANSWERED

1. An objection for the common interpretation; it is possible for this to be the meaning of Romans 7, "that the regenerate do not so frequently and so perfectly perform what is good, and omit what is evil as they wish." Reply: The gloss is contrary to the text, because this chapter describes the continuous state of the man about whom it treats. 2.

The manner in which St. Paul would have spoken, if had intended to convey the meaning that generally obtains, and this in conformity with the style and modes of speaking which he usually adopts in other passages when writing concerning himself.

An argument against the usually received opinion, taken from those things which have been previously spoken, and which are here reduced into the form of a syllogism. 3. Another objection in favour of the common interpretation, and this in two members. An answer to the first member. An answer to the second, "that when the regenerate sin, they sin with reluctance." Every inward struggle against sin is not a sign that the man is regenerate. 4. Another objection, and a reply to it. Remarks on a complete and an incomplete will. The regenerate will not, with a complete will, more good than they perform, neither perpetrate more evil than they will. 5. Each of us must institute a serious examination into self and into all the motions of his will.

1. But some one will say, in defense of this modern opinion, and in order to wipe away this double stain, "By this interpretation, no injury is inflicted on divine grace, and no harm is done to good morals." Some other man, possessed of still greater vehemence in defending the opinion which he has once conceived, will bring against me the charge of calumny, [and will say,] "It is a well known fact that they who give this interpretation to the chapter, do not take away from the regenerate the performance of all actual good, and the omission of what is evil, and consequently,

[the work of] the grace of regeneration; but this is all that they affirm: Sometimes, nay, very often, those men who are regenerated by the Spirit of Christ do the evil which. they would not, and, far more frequently, omit or do not perform the good which they would; and the same regenerate persons never perform so perfectly the good which they do as they will to perform it, and they never omit evil so perfectly as they will to omit it. But neither of these assertions can be denied by those who acknowledge the imperfection of righteousness in this life, and who accurately consider the examples of the most holy of mortals which are depicted in the Holy Scriptures."

I reply, this subterfuge affords no defense or excuse for the modern explanation of Romans 7. For, (as the phrase is,) in this instance the gloss is contrary to the text. For that chapter does not treat about that which occasionally befalls the man who is the subject of discussion, but about what generally and for the most part is accustomed to happen to him; and it contains a description of the continuous state of the man about whom it treats. This is openly declared by the words themselves and by the mode of speech employed. The apostle says, "The good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do." This is said without any distinction or contraction of the general saying to its being specially understood as though he sometimes did not the good which he would, and sometimes did the evil which he would not, or as though he many times abstained from the evil which he hates, and performed the good which he would. But the apostle simply and indefinitely enunciates concerning the detested evil that he perpetrates it, and concerning the good which he willed that he performs it not.

But if this indefinite enunciation be said to mean "that the good which has been willed is more frequently performed than omitted, and that the detested evil has been more frequently avoided than committed," which must necessarily be affirmed by those who explain the chapter in reference to a regenerate man, for a regenerate man walks not according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit -- then I say, the apostle did not know how to enunciate his own meaning. For indefinite enunciations possess equal force with those which are universal, or they approach as near as possible to them; they enunciate, concerning objects, those attributes which are in every one of them and at all times, or most usually and according to the more excellent part. Thus it is said concerning the Cretians, that they are liars. (Tit. i, 12.) The Athenians are said to be light and frivolous, and to take pleasure in "hearing some new thing;" and the Carthaginians are called perfidious. The Scriptures speak thus, that the Jews have been rejected on account of the greater part, (for "God doth not cast away his people whom he foreknew,") and that the gentiles were received into their place. For power was given, and a command enjoined on the apostles, to preach the gospel to all nations, and most of them have now long since been converted to Christ, or will yet be converted. Neither in this chapter is the apostle treating about a perfect and, in every respect, complete performance of good and omission of evil, but simply about the performance of the one and the omission of the other. For he says that the man commits evil, but not perfectly, if he is regenerate; otherwise, he would sin with an entire and full will. But this will be subsequently treated at greater length.

2. But if St. Paul intended in this chapter to convey such a meaning as those interpreters ascribe to him, then he must have spoken in the following manner, if he was desirous of saying thing, in accordance with himself: "We know that the law is spiritual, and requires from us an obedience perfect in all its parts, and continuous without any intermission or interruption. But I have not yet so far conquered the flesh, I have not yet such a complete dominion over sin, neither have I broken or subdued the lusts of the flesh so much, as to be able to perform that perfect and uninterrupted obedience to the law. For it occasionally happens to me, that I do the evil which I would not, and omit the good which I would; nay, I perceive that I never perform what is good in such perfection and with so much zeal as it is in my will to perform; nor have I omitted what is evil in such perfection as I have wished. For in both cases, even while I am performing what is good and omitting what is evil, I feel the concupiscence of the flesh struggling and resisting; and I consider myself to have experienced admirable success if I come victorious out of the combat, that is, if I do that which the Spirit lusteth, and not what the flesh lusteth."

Such a declaration as this would have been suitable to the sense which they attribute to the apostle, and this is properly the index and interpreter of that meaning. But many passages of Scripture, in which the apostle treats about himself, teach us that he ought to have spoken thus, if he had spoken things that were consistent with himself: "For I am conscious to myself of nothing; yet am I not hereby justified." (1 Cor. iv, 4.) "I therefore so run, not as uncertainly; so perform I my part as a combatant, not as one who beateth the air; but I beat down and keep my body under, and bring it into subjection; lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a reprobate." (vi, 26,27.) "Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of Christ."

(xi, 1.) "- While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporary, but those which are not seen are eternal." (2 Cor. iv, 18.) "- Giving no offense in any thing, that the ministry be not blamed; but in all things approving ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience," &c. (vi, 3-10.) "For I through the law am dead to the law, that I may live unto God. I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me." (Gal. ii, 19, 20.) "But God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world." (vi, 14.) Many other passages of a similar import might be cited.

Since, therefore, this interpretation does not agree with the chapter, it cannot, by this opinion, be excused from the two crimes which are objected against it, [as being injurious to divine grace, and noxious to good morals]. Wherefore I persist in preferring the same accusation, and I declare, The opinion which attributes to a regenerate man "that he generally does the evil which he would not, and that he most commonly omits the good which he would," is injurious to the grace of regeneration and hurtful to good morals; But the opinion which explains Romans 7 as referring to a regenerate man, attributes these things to one who is regenerate; Therefore, this opinion is injurious to the grace of regeneration, and hurtful to good morals. The light of the major proposition is so great as not to require either proof or illustration. The minor is in the text. For, as has already been shewn, to the man about whom the apostle is treating it is attributed, that he most commonly commits what is evil and omits what is good; therefore, the conclusion properly follows.

It appears, therefore, that I have not through calumny affixed this objection to the opinion which is opposed to my own; and I can sacredly affirm, now, that prior to the act of taking the pen into my hands, I had made a vow before God that [in the discussion of this subject] I would indulge in no calumny. Wherefore, though the objection were false, it would in that case have escaped from me through ignorance and not through malice.

3. Some one, however, who is desirous of pertinaciously keeping and retaining the thesis which has been once laid down, will here reply -- "Let it be granted, that this explanation is deficient in those things which the apostle attributes to this man; let it likewise be granted, that the interpretation produced by other persons is not suitable to the passage; yet it does not become disadvantageous to good morals, nor is any injury inflicted on grace through this opinion, provided that the whole together be excepted, as it equitably should be, and that one part be not separated from another -- this also being granted, that, though this interpretation be unsuitable for Romans 7, yet it is agreeable to the rest of the Scriptures and to the analogy of faith."

(1.) That I may not seem to be too rigid, I am willing to grant the former of these; about the latter we shall see something further. For I own, that the opinion of St.

Augustine, which interprets the chapter as relating only to the act and motion of concupiscence, neither proves to be detrimental to grace, nor injurious to good morals, though he explains the passage concerning a regenerate man.

But I say that, after it has been impressed and inculcated on the minds of hearers or readers that the apostle is treating about a regenerate man in Romans 7, it is not in our power to hinder such persons from understanding the rest of those things which are attributed to this man in a different manner from that in which they ought to be understood, that is, from receiving them in an acceptation which is not agreeable to the text and design of the apostle, and as they are not received when they are explained as relating to a man who is under sin, and under the law, especially when the inclination is a persuasive to such an interpretation, and when the concupiscence of the flesh gives a similar impulse. This, as I have already related, has been actually done by many people, and certainly not without blame attached to the opinion itself, though "the whole of it be received together." For this is not the only thing declared by that opinion, "The regenerate sometimes commit sin; and they never perfectly perform what is good, and omit what is evil, while they continue in the present life;"

but this is likewise added: "It is a property of the regenerate, to commit sin not with a full consent of the will, and while in the act of sinning to will not to sin; since the unregenerate sin with a full consent of the will, and without any reluctance on its part." Those persons who wish to excuse themselves by this chapter, and who, while engaged in sin, feel some resistance of the will and remorse of conscience in the act of sinning, conclude from the preceding assertion, that they commit sin not with a full consent of the will, and, therefore, that the very fact itself of their thus committing sin is a sign of their regeneration. Such a conclusion as this is both injurious to grace and inimical to good morals. (i.) It is injurious to grace, because it lays that down, as a sign of regeneration, which is alike common to the regenerate and to the unregenerate, that is, to those who are under the law. (ii.) It is inimical to good morals, because sin is neither so much avoided by that man who holds such an opinion as this, nor does its perpetration produce deep sorrow in him who is its author, because from the mode of the deed he still concludes that he is regenerate.

(2.) But let us now consider, whether those things which have been adduced to liberate their opinion from this two-fold criminal charge, be conformable to the rest of the Scriptures and to the analogy of faith, or not. I confess it indeed to be a very great truth, that, while the regenerate pass their lives in this mortal body, they neither perfectly perform what is good, nor omit what is evil. But I add, that, while in the present life, they never perfectly will what is good, or perfectly hate what is evil. I likewise confess, that even the best of the regenerate offend in many things, and sometimes actually sin, by doing what is evil and omitting what is good; for the regenerate do not always act from the principle of regeneration.

But I deny that, when they sin, they sin unwillingly, though they may do so with a struggle in their mind and conscience. For, while the contest and struggle continued between the mind and the flesh, how much soever they might nill the evil to which the flesh incited them, and will the good from which it dehorted them; yet they do not proceed onward to the deed itself except when the battle is terminated, the mind or conscience is overcome, and after the will has yielded consent to the flesh -- though such consent be not without stinging remorse of conscience. Then I deny, that it can be concluded from this opposition of the mind, that he is a regenerate man who sins in this manner. For, as we have often previously shewn, the commission of sin with a reluctant mind and conscience belongs to many of the unregenerate. Besides, as we have also previously taught, that resistance which immediately preceded the perpetration of sin, was not from the Holy Spirit who regenerated and inhabited, but from the mind which was convinced of the righteousness and equity of the law. For the life of the conscience continues; and from its life, action and motion remain, when the Holy Spirit is either wholly departed, or is so grieved as to employ no motion and act for the hindrance of sin. It is a well known fact, that the soul in man which is vegetative, performs the first and the last offices of life, while the rational soul ceases its operations as in the case of lunatics and maniacs, and the sensitive soul desists from acting in lethargic persons. I wish these observations to receive a diligent consideration; for they have a great tendency to induce a man to enter upon a serious and sure examination respecting himself, to attain a correct knowledge of the state of regeneration, and sedulously to distinguish between it and the state BEFORE the law, and chiefly between it and that UNDER the law.

4. Yet some person will here rejoin, and, for the sake of excusing or defending his opinion, will say, "It cannot be denied that the regenerate will more good than they actually perform, and perpetrate more evil than they will."

My answer is, this, when correctly understood, may be conceded; for it is stated with some ambiguity. "To will and not to will this thing," may be understood concerning either a complete or an incomplete volition and nolition, (to use the words of Thomas Aquinas,) though in a sense a little different. (1.) I give the appellation of a complete will to that which is borne to a particular object that is particularly considered, approving or disapproving of that object according to the prescript or direction of the last judgment of the reason that is formed concerning it. (2.) I give the appellation of an incomplete will to that which is borne towards the same object generally considered, approving or disapproving of it according to the prescript or direction not of the last judgment of the reason which is formed concerning it. The former of these, which is indeed complete, may be called simply a volition and a nolition. But the latter, which is incomplete, is otherwise expressed by the words, desire and wishing, and ought to be called vellcity rather than will.

Having premised these things, I now say, It cannot be affirmed with truth, "that a regenerate man wills more good with a complete will than he actually performs,"

unless without any fault of his own, he be hindered by necessity or by some greater force, or "that he actually does more evil than it is his will to do." For he does it not through coaction. A merchant who, for the sake of avoiding shipwreck, throws his heavy bales into the sea, willingly performs that act, having followed this last judgment of his reason -- that it is better for his bales of goods to be destroyed, than for himself to perish with them. Thus, with a complete (I do not say with a full) volition, David willed his adulterous intercourse with Bathsheba. Willingly, and with a complete volition, Peter denied Christ.

But if this be understood concerning an incomplete will, then I grant it may be said

"that the regenerate will to perform more good than they really execute, and to omit more evil than they omit." This, however, is not an exclusive property of the regenerate; for it belongs to all those who are so under the law, that in them the law has discharged all its functions, and (the Holy Spirit employing it for this purpose) in them has produced all those effects which it is possible and usual for the law to produce. Both the regenerate, and those who are under the law, might indeed will, that there was not in them such a vast force and efficacy of sin yet existing and reigning in them; and might wish, that they were not solicited and impelled to evil deeds through concupiscence and the temptation of sin; nay, they might also will that they did not lust or indulge in concupiscence; but those evil acts to which they are solicited by sin which either is in them, or dwells in them and reigns, they do not perform, except through the intervention of the consent of the will that has been obtained by this temptation of sin. For lust does not bring forth sin, unless it has conceived; but it conceives through the consent of the will tanquam ex marito. But as long as the will remains in a state of suspense, inclining to neither part, so long no act is produced --as we behold in a just balance, or true scales, of which neither part verges upward or downward prior to one of them receiving an accession of weight which depresses that scale and elevates the opposite one. All motion reclines or depends on rest as on a foundation. Thus, the will does not move towards the part of sin unless when acquiescing in its temptation.

5. These remarks are exceedingly plain, and capable of being fully confirmed by experience itself, if any one will only accurately ponder within himself all the motions of his own will. But the greatest part of us avoid this duty; for it cannot be performed without [inducing] sorrow and sickness of mind, which no man willingly brings upon himself. But it is by no means probable, that sin should obtain a full consent from the will of that man who is generally well instructed in the righteousness and unrighteousness of actions, before he has ceased to feel any sorrow or regret: Wherefore, the difference between a regenerate and an unregenerate man must not be placed in this particular when both of them commit sin. For, in that particular deed, they equally yield to the temptation of sin, both of them sin from the same principle of depraved nature, and in both instances the resistance is one and the same when sin is perpetrated, that is, on the part of the mind and conscience convicted of the justice or the injustice of the deed. For if the Spirit were itself that resistance, then sin would not be perpetrated in the very act.

"Is there then no difference between the regenerate and the unregenerate, when they commit sin?" That I may not deny this, I say that such difference must be brought forward from plain passages in the Holy Scriptures; otherwise, that man will deceive himself to his great peril, who follows some other rule of judging.

THE CONCLUSION

AN Examination and comparison of each of the three Interpretations of this chapter.

1. The FIRST, which is the latest of the two opinions embraced by St. Augustine, and which interprets this chapter concerning a man under grace, has various disadvantages: (1.) in the meaning of the word CARNAL, and that of the phrase,

"sold under sin." (2.) In the explanation of the evil which, the apostle says, he did; and of the good which he omitted. (3.) In the explanation of the word To Do or To PERFORM. (4.) In the interpretation of "indwelling sin." (5.) In the explanation of

"the law of the mind." (6.) In explaining the captivity of man under the law of sin. (7.) In the distorted meaning given to the votive exclamation. (8.) In assigning to a regenerate man a double servitude, and in interpreting "the mind" for "the spirit."

These eight inconveniences are sufficient to induce a rejection of this First Interpretation. 2. The SECOND, which is that of modern divines, and which also explains the chapter concerning a man under grace, in addition to the inconveniences that it has in common with the First, has likewise some which are peculiar to itself.

(1.) In saying, what permanently belongs to the continuous state of this man, sometimes only happens to him. (2.) In giving a rash explication of "performing that which is good." (3.) In asserting, that the regenerate commit sin unwillingly. (4.) In predicating contradictory things concerning this man. (5.) In predicating with restriction those things concerning the regenerate, which the Scriptures simply attribute to them. 3. The THIRD, which is St. Augustine's first opinion, as well as that of Arminius, and which understands this chapter as relating to a man who is under the law, is plain and perspicuous, and not at disagreement either with apostolical phraseology or with other passages of Scripture; this fact is rendered obvious even from this circumstance -- that this man is said at once to be "placed under the law"

and "under the dominion of sin." 4. This treatise is closed with an address, by Arminius, to his brethren in the ministry, in which the author offers himself for examination, with a most serious intreaty for them to admonish him, in a fraternal manner, if he has erred; but to yield their assent to the truth, if he has in this work written such things as are in accordance with the scriptures and with the meaning of the apostle.

Let us now briefly compare these three expositions of Romans vii, FIRST, that which St. Augustine gave not long before his death; Secondly, that which he taught in early life, which is likewise my interpretation, and that of many doctors of the primitive church, as I have already proved, and that of some even among our own divines; and, LASTLY, the exposition of those persons who assent to St. Augustine in this particular-that in common with him they explain it as relating to a regenerate man, but who dissent from him on another particular -- that they interpret GOOD and EVIL, not as relating to the act of CONCUPISCENCE, but as referring to ACTUAL GOOD

AND EVIL.

1. That St. Augustine might be able to interpret this chapter as relating to a regenerate man and one placed under grace, (which he supposed would be serviceable to him in his disputes with the Pelagians,) he was compelled to put a forced construction on the apostolical phraseology, and to interpret many things in opposition to the express meaning and intention of the apostle.

(1.) He has interpreted a carnal man to mean one who yet bears about with him mortal flesh, who is not yet become spiritual in the flesh, and who still has and feels within himself the lusts of the flesh. But about the first of these two descriptions of men the apostle is not here treating: It is, therefore, quite beyond the purpose; and I beseech St.

Augustine to point out to me a single passage of Scripture, in which the regenerate are called carnal because they still have within them the lusts of the flesh. If they are called spiritual in the Scriptures, "because by the Spirit they mortify the deeds of the flesh" and do not go after carnal lusts, but walk according to the Spirit, then indeed they cannot be called carnal from the fact of their still having those lusts. They may be called "those who are not perfectly spiritual" on account of the presence of sinful lusts; but they can by no means be styled carnal, because the dominion of sin is taken away from them.

In a similar manner he was under the necessity of distorting another attribute of this man, sold under sin, when this phrase properly signifies "one who is the slave of sin, and who serves sin," whether he does this willingly without any resistance of conscience, or in opposition to his mind and so far unwillingly. It is not allowed to us to frame petty distinctions, and, according to these, to attribute to persons certain words, which the Scriptures do not employ, in that sense, and which are not usually ascribed to those persons in holy writ.

(2.) Then he interprets the evil which the apostle says he did, by the word to lust or to indulge in concupiscence; and the good which he says he omitted, by the word not to lust -- a most absurd and distorted application of those terms!

First. Because the words, Katergazesqai, Prassein and Poiein "to do," cannot have the same signification as concupisco, "to lust." At least, so far as I know, the Scriptures have in no passage, explained "to lust" by any of those three words. And St.

Augustine himself, in the definition of sin, when distinguishing between these things, says, "Sin is every thing which is spoken, done, and lusted or desired against the law of God."

Bucer, in his "Comment on Romans 7," says, "Some persons receive the three verbs here rendered 'to do,' in the acceptation, 'to lust,' but that is not St. Paul's mode of speaking. He understands by the word, the deed itself which is actually committed at the impulse of concupiscence, in opposition to that which the law dictates, and which the mind, consenting to that law, approves. Concupitio, 'to lust' or desire, is in reality, an internal act of concupiscence in the mind, which indulges in such concupiscence.

But these verbs 'to do,' in this chapter do not signify an internal act of lusting, but, properly, the external act of doing those things which have been lusted or desired."

(Fol. 369.)

Secondly. "Sin is said to do this evil, and, by the perpetration of the evil, to slay the man himself." Sin does not slay him through concupiscence. St. James speaks thus:

"Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished [or completed by action], bringeth forth death." (i, 15.) But it slays the man through actual sin. This is declared by the apostle in the fifth verse of this very chapter, when he says, "for when we were in the flesh, the motions of sin, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." I am now speaking, not according to the rigor of the law, but according to the grace of the gospel in Jesus Christ.

Thirdly. The evil and the good, the former of which, he says, he perpetrates, but the latter he omits, are so opposed to each other, that evil is what is forbidden by a prohibitive law, which law is usually proposed by a negative; but Good is what is commanded by a preceptive law, which is usually propounded by an affirmative. A sin is perpetrated against a prohibitive law by commission, but against a preceptive law by omission. On this account they are called sins of omission and of commission.

If a prohibitive law be observed, evil is said to be omitted, but if a preceptive law be observed, good is said to be performed.

Now, to lust, and not to lust, are not thus opposed to each other. For though to lust be forbidden by a prohibitive law, yet not to lust is not commanded by a preceptive law; neither can it be commanded by such a law; for not to lust consists of a negative or the omission of an act; but by omission, an offense is committed against a preceptive law.

But, by the omission of concupiscence, no offense is committed against a positive or preceptive law, but a prohibitive law is fulfilled; and by obedience, which consists in not lusting, good is not performed, but evil is omitted. That we may point out this absurdity [of St. Augustine's exposition], we will invert in the following manner what the apostle has said: "The good that I would, I do," that is, I do not lust; "but the evil which I would not, I do not," that is, I do not lust. For I will not to lust, and I do not lust; I nill to lust, and I do not lust. Therefore, in this case, the very same act is the performance of good and the omission of evil -- a complete absurdity. And that is called the performance of a good action which is the omission of an evil one -- an equal absurdity! O Augustine, where was thy usual acumen? Let the expression be pardoned; for a good philosopher is not always a philosopher, and our Homer himself will sometimes nod.

Fourthly. It is an illogical mode of expression to say, "I will to lust," and "I will not to lust," because actual concupiscence is prior to volition and nolition, and the act of concupiscence does not depend upon the choice or determination of the will.

According to the trite and true saying, "first motions are not in our power, unless they be occasioned by some act of the will," as the schoolmen express themselves. But we must say, "I could wish not to lust," that is, "I could wish to be free from the impulse of concupiscence." And this is an expression of desire, not tending to or going out towards the performance or omission of our act, but earnestly demanding the act of another person for our liberation from that evil which impels us to an evil act, and which hinders us from a good act -- we approving of the good act and disapproving of the bad one.

(3.) He was compelled, when expounding what the apostle says in the 18th verse,

"But to perform that which is good I find not," to interpret it by "completing what is good," that is, "I find not perfectly to do what is good," as is evident from those passages which we have cited from St. Augustine. This interpretation is absurd, distorted, and contradictory to the sentiments and meaning of the author; for, First. The word, Katergazesqai does not signify "to perfect," that is, "perfectly to do any thing;" but it signifies "to operate, to perform, to effect, or to do," as this word is most commonly used, not for "doing any thing perfectly," but for "producing an effect." My observations on this point are evident from the text itself; for the same Greek word is employed in the first clause of the 15th verse, when the apostle says,

"For that which I do, I allow not," yet he does not perfectly perform the evil of which he disapproves. It is also used in the latter clause of the 20th verse, "Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." But sin does not perfectly perpetrate evil in this man, especially if he be regenerate, as St. Augustine supposes; and he openly says himself the contrary to this, as is evident from the passages which we have already cited in the fourth part of this treatise.

Secondly. The synonyms of this verb which are promiscuously used in the seventh chapter, prassein and poiein prove the same thing. For the apostle says that he does and performs the evil which he would not, (verses 15, 16, 19,) yet he does not perfectly perform that evil; this is obvious from what he adds, "which I would not."

Therefore he performs it not with a full consent of his will. For this is confessed by St.

Augustine, when he explains the passage about the regenerate; but he does it not with a full consent of the will, that is, he does it not perfectly.

Thirdly. "The GOOD which the apostle would, but which he does not," (19,) is, according to St. Augustine, not to lust. But how is it that the apostle indeed does this

"good," [by willing it, but does not perfect it, Therefore, a two-fold omission of concupiscence must be laid down [by those who adopt St. Augustine's argumentation,] one, under the term to do, is called an imperfect omission; the other, under the word to complete, receives the appellation of perfect. According to St.

Augustine's sense, the apostle says in this verse, (19,) "I will not to lust, and this good I indeed do, but I do not perfect it." From this remark, the absurdity which I have mentioned is most manifest.

Fourthly. More good is attributed to the will of this man, than to its capability and powers or efficacy. But the perfect volition of good is not attributed to his will, neither can it be attributed. Therefore, from its capability and efficacy not only can the perfect performance of good be taken away, but the imperfect performance is likewise taken away from them. That is, it is denied respecting this man, not only that he perfects good, but that he even performs it. Wherefore, this passage must not be understood concerning perfection, that is, the perfect performance of good.

(4.) He was forced to interpret "sin that dwelleth or inhabiteth within me," by "sin existing within," and to create a distinction between it and "sin reigning and exercising the dominion over a man," while the phrase, "dwelling within me," denotes dominion, and the full and supreme power of him who is the resident, as we have previously shewn in its proper place. But it is apparent that sin reigns in this man; for it commits that sin in him which he himself would not, and leads him away as a captive under its power.

(5.) He was under the necessity of interpreting "the law of the mind" by "the law of the Spirit," though in contradiction to the great contrariety subsisting between the attribute which is given to "the law of the mind," and that which is ascribed to "the law of the Spirit." For, in Romans vii, 23, "the law of the mind" is said to be overcome in combat by "the law of the members," from which event, the man "is brought into captivity to the law of sin." And in Romans viii, 2, "the law of the Spirit"

is said to make the man "free from the law of sin and death;" that is, it is stronger and superior in the conflict against "the law of the members;" and, when the latter is conquered and overcome, "the law of the Spirit" delivers the man from the captivity into which he had been brought by the force of "the law of the members."

(6.) St. Augustine was compelled to pervert the phrase, "captivity to the law of sin,"

and to give it the meaning of our primeval state in Adam, from whom we are born corrupt and under the captivity of sin and Satan, when, in this passage, the apostle is not treating on that captivity, but on another, which is produced from it, that is, by

"the law of the members" which we have contracted from Adam, waging war against

"the law of the mind," overcoming it, and bringing man, by his own act, under captivity to the law of sin. For we have the former captivity originally from Adam, but we bring down the latter upon ourselves by our own act. Even if the discourse of the apostle had referred to our primeval state, yet, because the regenerate have received remission of sin and are endowed with the spirit of the grace of Christ, they cannot be said to be captives under sin. For, though the fuel has not been extinguished, yet the power of commanding, and of subjecting us to itself, is taken away from sin by the power of regeneration.

(7.) He is forced to torture the votive exclamation in the 24th verse, to a desire different from that on which the apostle is here treating, and with which the thanksgiving in the 25th verse does not correspond. For, in this passage, St. Paul treats upon the desire by which the man requests to be delivered from the dominion of sin, which he calls "the body of death;" and St. Augustine is compelled [by the scheme of interpretation which he had adopted] to explain in reference to the desire by which he desires to be liberated from this mortal body, and when that event occurs, he will at once be free from the concupiscence of sin. A thanksgiving, however, seems [in this case] to be most unadvisedly subjoined to the votive desire, before the fruition of the thing which is said to be wished; yet this is done in this passage, according to the interpretation of St. Augustine.

(8.) Lastly, St. Augustine is forced to assign a double servitude to a regenerate man -the one, as he serves God -- the other, as he serves sin; and this in contradiction to the express declaration of Christ -- "No man can at one time serve two masters." It is objected, "that in a different respect, and according to his different parts, man is said to serve God, and to serve sin;" but this remark does not clear this opinion from the stain with which it is aspersed. (i.) Because the Scriptures are unacquainted with that distinction, when they are speaking about regenerate persons; let a passage to the contrary be produced. (ii.) Because, if even the flesh war against the Spirit or the mind by lusting; yet a man cannot be said, solely on account of this resistance and warfare,

"with his flesh to serve" sin, or "the law of sin;" for, with St. Augustine, these two are the same things.

He is likewise compelled to use the word, "the mind," for the regenerated part of man, for the man so far as he is regenerate, in opposition to Scripture usage and phraseology, as we have explained in the first part of this treatise.

These appear to me most equitable reasons for rejecting the latter opinion of St.

Augustine, and for appealing from him when asleep to St. Augustine in his waking moments. I have no doubt that he would also have abandoned this his second opinion, had he taken into his consideration the arguments which are now adduced, especially when he had perceived the explication of the whole chapter to be so suitable and proper, and impossible to be wrested in any point by the Pelagians for proving their doctrine.

2. Our divines have fallen into some of these errors with which we have charged the opinion of St. Augustine, such as the following: They are forced to interpret "to be carnal," and "to be sold under sin," in a manner very different from that which the meaning of the apostle will allow; they call "sin that dwelleth in a man,"sin existing within," thus distinguishing it from reigning sin; they assert that "the law of the mind"

signifies "the law of the Spirit;" they explain in a corrupt manner the votive exclamation; and, lastly, they attribute a two-fold servitude to a regenerate man. In addition to these mistakes, they fall into others which are peculiar to their interpretation, but which are agreeable neither to the meaning of the apostle in this chapter, nor to the rest of the Scriptures, for,

(1.) They are compelled to interpret that which, according to the meaning of the apostle, belongs to the continuous state of this man, as if it happened to him only occasionally, in contradiction to the express phraseology of the apostle, who says,

"The good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do." This phraseology is by no means in accordance with the signification by which any one is said occasionally to perpetrate evil and to do good, as we have already rendered very manifest.

(2.) They are under the necessity of interpreting the phrase, "The good that I would, I do not" by "I do not good in the perfection in which I ought," or, "I do not so much good as it is my will to do;" yet neither of these explanations is agreeable to the meaning of the apostle, as we have previously seen.

(3.) They broadly assert, that while the regenerate are actually committing sin, they are unwilling to commit sin in the very act of sinning, in opposition to the whole of the Scriptures and to the nature of actual sin itself, which, if it be not voluntary, ceases to be sin.

(4.) They are compelled to say contradictory things about this man. For they take away from sin, which exists within him, the dominion over him; and yet they attribute to it a habitation or indwelling, and they ascribe such force and efficacy to it, that it perpetrates evil itself in the man in opposition to his will, and brings him into captivity to the law of sin. These are most undoubted effects indeed of sin reigning and exercising dominion.

(5.) Lastly, as there are many passages of Scripture, which attribute to the regenerate the willing of good, a delight in the law 0f God, and things of a similar kind, they are compelled to interpret those passages by this restrictive particle, "after the inward man," while, in the rest of the Scriptures, such attributes are simply ascribed to a regenerate man, because they have the predominance in him. But it is not necessary, at this time, to repeat all those things which we have before written and proved against that opinion.

3. But the opinion which I have undertaken to explain, is plain and perspicuous, under no necessity to affix any thing to the phraseology of the apostle, or to impinge against any other portions of holy writ. This may be perceived at one glance, by him who will cast his eyes upon these two things, that the man who is the subject of the present investigation, is said to be placed under the dominion of sin and under the law, that is, he is one in whom the law has discharged its entire office.

(1.) For, as he is placed under the dominion of sin, the following affirmations are correctly and without any contortion made concerning him: "he is sold under sin; he does that which he wills not, and omits that which he wills; sin dwells in him, and in his flesh dwelleth no good thing; he cannot attain to the performance of that which is good; he does not perform that which is good, but he perpetrates evil; evil is present with him; the law of his members wages war with the law of his mind and overcomes it, and renders the man a captive under the law of sin which he has in his members; and, being thus entangled and bound down, he is detained by the body of this death, (that is, by the body of sin,) and required with his flesh to serve the law of sin."

(2.) But, as he is said to be placed under the law, the following affirmations belong to him correctly and without any contortion: "He allows not (he approves not) that which he does; he wills that which he does not, and he wills not that which he does; he consents to the law of God that it is good; it is no longer he who commits evil; he has good dwelling in his mind; the good that he wills he does not, but the evil which he wills not, that he does; he delights in the law of God after the inward man; with the law of his mind he wages war against the law of his members; he is exceedingly desirous of deliverance; and with his mind he serves the law of God."

Nay, these two united classes of attributes, joined as they intimately are, in the text of the apostle, cannot belong to any other man than to this as he is placed under the law, and at the same time under the dominion of sin. So far from these two relations not being capable of belonging at once to the same man, that he who is under the law necessarily endures the dominion of sin, that is, the law is too weak to be able to release and liberate the sinner from the tyranny of sin. This is the subject upon which the apostle treats through the whole of this chapter, and points it out in the person of that man who is placed under the law in a mode the most excellent of all, that is, one in whom the law has fulfilled not only some part of its office, (for that did not serve the purpose which he had in view,) but in whom the law had discharged all its offices and acts; for this was required by the necessity of the cause about which the apostle was treating; because "the weakness of the law" could not be taught by the example of him who had not within himself all those things which are usually effected by the law.

For the Jews might have always objected that some other persons had made still further progress through the power and efficacy of the law.

If this observation, as well as many others, be diligently considered, it will be of great potency in effecting a persuasion that the present chapter must be understood as relating to a man who is under the law. And I feel fully persuaded within myself, that if views similar to these had entered into the minds of our expositors, when they explained this portion of Scripture, they would undoubtedly have interpreted it in this manner; for such were their piety and their learning, that I cannot bring myself to feel any other persuasion than this concerning them. But it frequently happens, that the fear of falling into error or heresy, if any passage be explained in a manner different from that generally received, hinders those who are under the influence of such a fear from venturing the more diligently to inspect such passage, and to consider whether it may not be explained appropriately and agreeably to the analogy of faith, even by that mode which is said to be favourable to heresy.

I likewise believe, that this interpretation of mine is rejected by many persons who have never once thought on the mode in which the Scriptures define that man whom I assert to be described in this chapter. If they had earnestly endeavoured to ascertain this point, they would assuredly have discovered that all these things may be most commodiously explained concerning a man who is under the law. I will add, as the result of my own experience, that I have found multitudes who have not only not considered with sufficient diligence, but who also have not exhibited any desire to consider, what these names and epithets properly signify, and how they must be accurately distinguished from each other -- the natural man, the carnal man, the outward man, the old man, the sensual man, the earthly man, the worldly man -- also, the spiritual man, the heavenly man, the inward man, the new man, the illuminated man, the regenerate man, &c. The same persons also have not manifested any inclination to distinguish in an accurate and suitable manner between the acts and operations of the Spirit -- when making use of the law, and when employing the gospel -- when preparing a home or abode for himself, and when actually the inhabitant of his own temple -- of his enlightening, regenerating and sealing -- of his bringing men to Christ, uniting them to Christ -- and communicating to them the benefits of Christ -- of his operating, co-operating, exciting, aiding, assisting, and confirming or strengthening -- and of his infusing habits, and producing good actions.

All these things seem to me to be of such a description that if any person were, without a consideration of these matters, to attempt a serious and solid explanation of those things of which the apostle is treating in this chapter, his conduct would appear to me like that of a man who should endeavour to construct a large and splendid edifice without stones and lime.

4. These remarks I offer, with a sincere and candid mind, to those pious and learned men, and those eminent servants of Christ, my beloved brethren in Christ and fellow-labourers in the work of the Lord, who ought ever to receive from me all due honour and deference, to be read, known, judged, and approved or disapproved; and I request and most earnestly beseech of them only one thing, in the name of our common saviour -- that, if they shall discover me to have written anything, in the preceding treatise, which is either contrary to the analogy of faith or contrary to the sense and meaning of the apostle, they will admonish, teach and instruct me about it in a fraternal manner. If they find any such matter, I testify, before God, that I will not only lend an attentive and patient hearing to their admonitions, teaching and instruction, but will also yield them full compliance. I likewise protest, that if, in the present instance, any things of this description have escaped from me, (for we all know but in part,) I consider them as not written and as not spoken.

But if they shall perceive that these very things are agreeable to the rest of the Scriptures and conformable to the mind of the apostle, then I may be permitted to request and intreat from them that they will grant a place to the truth, thus pointed out, in the church of Christ, which is the pillar and ground of the truth.

I solemnly engage, that there is no cause for them to be afraid lest disturbances, quarrels, dissensions, or the occasions of such great evils, in the Christian church, should arise from such an examination and conference. They will have to discuss the subject with one -- who knows in part how to distinguish between those doctrines which are simply necessary and fundamental, and those which have not in them an equal necessity, but are as the parts of a superstructure raised on a foundation -- who, next to the necessity for truth, thinks all things should be yielded to the peace of the churches -- who can, with Christian charity, bear with those that differ from him, provided they do not attempt "to have dominion over the faith of other persons" --who is not desirous with an officious hastiness to obtrude on the public either his own admissions, or those of other persons, which had been confided to each other for the sake of a mutual conference, but who knows how to retain them faithfully, and has skill enough to revolve them in his mind for nine long years, according to the ancient proverb, "One day is the disciple of another; our later meditations are wiser and more accurate than our early ones; we daily grow old and yet are learning many things"

Lastly, they will have to discuss the subject with one who may be in error, but who cannot be a heretic, and whose will assuredly it is not to be one.

Amicable, fraternal, and placid conferences of this description, instituted between professors of the same faith and of the same religion, are not only useful, but likewise necessary to the churches of Christ, for the further investigation of the truth, for retaining it firmly when discovered, and for boldly defending it against adversaries.

From these friendly conferences, we may discover truth, since they are not undertaken through a desire for victory, or for the sake of defending some topic which had been formerly conceived and adopted. But from those others, which are not so much Christian conferences, as vehement, bitter and vexatious altercations, and which we perceive to be agitated by the followers and defenders of different religious professions, generally ensues the result that is comprised in the vulgar proverb, "Truth is lost in the midst of their wrangling." Such an issue is no ground of surprise when the very method and circumstances of the altercation very often declare that the whole affair was at its commencement undertaken, and afterwards prosecuted, without the spirit of truth, charity and peace; and that, as a necessary consequence, it has been conducted to a sad catastrophe, most lamentable to the churches of Christ.

And let no man rashly persuade himself, that as long as the [visible] church shall be a sojourner in this world, and shall have, in the midst of her, unskillful, infirm and wicked persons, she will maintain the doctrine of Christ so correctly as not to require a still further investigation of the truth from the Scriptures, which are the inexhaustible fountain of divine wisdom, as to be able to dispense with the examination of those dogmas which are built up as a superstructure on the foundation of the Scriptures, and as not to be under the least necessity of confirming and defending Christian doctrine, by the force and weight of solid arguments, against ancient heresies which have been polished up after a new method, and against novel heresies which are daily springing up and becoming still more prevalent.

It is not an act of arrogance to enter upon such an exercise and employment as this, but it is an act of true and solid piety towards God, which commands and prescribes that, as "a dispensation of the gospel has been committed to us," we ought to "stir up the gifts of God which are in us," to study and strive to augment the talents which have been divinely granted to us, and, with a pure conscience and in the fear of the Lord, to discharge the duties of this sacred ministry, to the sanctification of his name, the building up and edification of the church of Christ, and to the demolition and extirpation of the kingdom of Satan and of Antichrist -- which may the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ vouchsafe to grant to us, through and for the sake of his only begotten Son, and in the power and efficacy of his Spirit. Amen.

END OF DISSERTATION ON ROMANS.

A LETTER ADDRESSED TO HIPPOLYTUS A COLLIBUS

BENEVOLENT READER,

IT cannot be a matter of secrecy to you, how various, uncertain and prodigious the rumors are which have been circulated through Holland, Germany, and Great Britain, concerning James Arminius, Professor of Divinity; and in what manner (I do not stop to discuss with how much zeal) some persons accuse this man of schism and others of heresy, some charge him with the crime of Pelagianism and others brand him with the black mark of Socinianism, while all of them execrate him as the pest of the reformed churches. On this account, those persons who feel a regard for the memory of this learned man, and who, not without good reason, are desirous of maintaining his reputation and character, and of defending him from those atrocious imputations and virulent calumnies, have lately published some of his erudite lucubrations, which are polished with the greatest care. They have thus placed them within the reach of the public, that the reader, who is eager in the pursuit after truth, may more easily and happily form his judgment about the station which Arminius is entitled to hold among posterity, not from fallacious rumors and the criminations of the malevolent, but from authentic documents, as if from the ingenuous confession itself of the accused speaking openly in his own cause, and mildly replying to the crimes with which he has been charged.

With this object in view, the friends of Arminius have published, as separate treatises, his "Modest Examination of a Pamphlet, written some years ago by that very learned Divine, William Perkins, on Predestination: To which is added, an Analysis of the Ninth Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans," and his "Dissertation on the true and genuine Meaning of the Seventh Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans."

But these two works are neither sufficient nor satisfactory to many dispositions that are prying or that indulge in surmises, and to other eminent men who abound with an acrimonious shrewdness of judgment; because they embrace neither the whole nor the chief of the perplexing difficulties of James Arminius. Some of those who attended his Academical Lectures, affirm that he frequently uttered novel and astounding paradoxes about other points of the orthodox doctrine [than are contained in the two works just mentioned]. Other persons relate, as a great secret, that Arminius addressed

"A Letter" to Hippolytus a Collibus, in which he more fully discloses his own pestiferous sentiments; and that "CERTAIN ARTICLES" are circulated in a private manner, in which, while treating upon several of the chief heads of orthodox theology, he introduces his own poisonous dogmas.

In this state of affairs, we may be permitted to give some assistance to an absent person, nay, to one who is dead, and to offer a reply to the accusations and criminations which we have now specified, by the evidence of witnesses who are worthy of credit, and by the publication of the very documents which we are thus challenged to produce. Perhaps, by this means, we shall be able to remove those sinister insinuations and suspicions. We shall, at least, meet the wishes of a number of persons, and shall terminate the anxieties of several minds that have till now been in a state of suspense.

Accept, therefore, candid reader, of that "Letter" about which so many reports have been circulated, and which was addressed to Hippolytus a Collibus, Ambassador from Prince Frederick 4, the Electar Palatine.

Accept, likewise, of those "ARTICLES" which are to be diligently examined and pondered, and which give us the sentiments of Arminius on the One and the Triune God, The Attributes of God, the Deity of the Son, Predestination and Divine Providence, Original Sin, Free Will, the Grace of God, Christ and his Satisfaction, Justification, Faith and Repentance, Regeneration, the Baptism of Infants, the Lords Supper, and On Magistracy. Accurately consider and candidly judge whatever he thought necessary to be amended or to be rendered more complete in the doctrine of the reformed churches.

The writing of this man require no commendations from me, or from any other person: There is no need of ivy in this instance, for these productions will insure approbation.

A LETTER, BY THE REV. JAMES ARMINIUS, D.D. &c. &c.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE NOBLE LORD, HIPPOLYTUS A COLLIBUS,

AMBASSADOR, FROM THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS PRINCE, THE ELECTOR

PALATINE, TO THE SEVEN UNITED DUTCH PROVINCES, JAMES

ARMINIUS WISHETH HEALTH AND SUCCESS

MOST NONOURABLE SIR:

When I was lately admitted to a conversation with you, you had the kindness to intimate to me the reports which you understood had been circulated at Heidelberg about my heterodoxy in certain articles of our faith; and you gave me this information, not only that you might yourself hear from me personally the whole truth about the matter, but, much more, that, by the intervention of your good offices, the suspicions concerning me, which have been so unhandsomely conceived and propagated, might be removed from the minds of other persons, since this is a course which truth requires. I endeavoured at that interview, with diligence and seriousness to comply with your obliging request, and by returning a frank and open reply to each of those questions which your excellency proposed, I instantly disclosed my sentiments about those several Articles. For, in addition to my being bound to do this, by my duty as a Christian man, and especially as a divine, such a course of conduct was demanded from me by the great candour, condescension and benevolence which you exhibited towards me.

But my explanation was so agreeable to your excellency, (which I ascribe to an act of the divine Benignity towards me,) as to induce you, on that occasion, to think it requisite that those propositions of mine should be committed to writing and transmitted to you, not only for the purpose of being thus enabled the more certainly and firmly to form your own judgment about the matter when you had maturely reflected upon it, but also with the design of communicating my written answers to others, that they might confute the calumny and vindicate my innocence. Having followed the counsel of your prudence, and firmly relying on the same hope, I now accede to your further wishes, in this letter; and I intreat your excellency to have the goodness to peruse its contents with the same candour and equanimity as were displayed when you listened to their delivery. Unless my mind greatly deceives me, your excellency will find in this letter that which will not only be able to obliterate, but also completely to eradicate, every unjust suspicion concerning me, from the minds of those good men who know that every one is the best interpreter of his own sentiments, and that the utmost credit is to be given to him who sacredly, and in the presence of God, bears testimony to his own meaning.

The articles of doctrine about which your excellency made inquiries, were, as far as my memory serves me, the following: the Divinity of the Son of God, Providence, Divine Predestination, Grace and Free Will, and Justification. Beside these, you inquired about the things which concerned our opinions, in answer to the interrogatories of the States of Holland, concerning the mode of holding the proposed synod. But as the latter relate to that most eminent man, the Revelation John Uytenbogard, minister of the church at the Hague, as much as to me, I leave them to be explained by him, whose residence is much nearer to that of your excellency.

With regard to all these doctrinal Articles, I confidently declare that I have never taught anything, either in the church or in the university, which contravenes the sacred writings, that ought to be with us the sole rule of thinking and of speaking, or which is opposed to the Dutch Confession of Faith, or to the Heidelberg Catechism, that are our stricter formularies of consent. In proof of this assertion I might produce, as most clear and unquestionable testimonies, the theses which I have composed on these several Articles, and which have been discussed as Public Disputations in the university; but as those theses are not entirely in readiness for every one, and can be with difficulty transmitted, I will now treat upon each of them specially, as far as I shall conceive it necessary.

I. THE DIVINITY OF THE SON OF GOD.

Concerning the divinity of the Son of God, I have taught, and still teach, that the Father has never been without his Word and his Spirit, but that the Word and the Spirit are not to be considered in the Father under the notion of properties, as wisdom, goodness, justice, or power, but under that of really existing persons, to whom it belongs to be, to live, to understand, to will, to be capable, and to do or act, all of which, when united, are indications and proofs of a person, but that they are so in the Father as to be also from the Father, in a certain order of origin, not through collaterality, to be referred to the Father, and that they are from the Father neither by creation nor by decision but by a most wonderful and inexplicable internal emanation, which, with respect to the Son, the ancient church called generation, but with respect to the Holy Spirit, was denominated spiration or breathing, a term required by the very [etymon of the] word spirit. But about this breathing, I do not interpose my judgment -- whether it is from the Father and the Son, as the Latin fathers express themselves, or from the Father through the Son, as the Greek fathers prefer to define it, because this matter, I confess, far surpasses my capacity. If, on any subject, we ought to think and speak with sobriety, in my opinion, it must be on this.

Since these are my sentiments on the divinity of the Son of God, no reason could exist why, on this point, I should endure the shafts of calumny. Yet this slander was first fabricated and spread through the whole of Germany by one in whom such conduct was exceedingly indecorous; because he was my pupil, and ought to have refrained from that course, having been taught by his own painful experience that he either possessed an unhappy memory, or was of doubtful credit; for he had previously been convicted of a similar calumny, and had openly confessed his fault before me, and requested my forgiveness. But, as I learned from a certain manuscript which was transmitted to Leyden out of Germany, and which the same youth had delivered to the Heidelberg divines, he took the groundwork of his calumny from those things which I had publicly taught concerning the economy of our salvation, as administered by the Father through the Son and the Holy Spirit. In the explanation of this economy, I had said "that we must have a diligent regard to this order, which the Scriptures in every part most religiously observe; and that we must distinctly consider what things are attributed as peculiar to the Father in this matter, what to the Son, and what to the Holy Spirit."

After this, some other persons seized upon a different occasion for the same calumny, from my having said that the Son of God was not correctly called Autoqeon "very God," in the same sense in which that word signifies "God from himself."

This audacious inclination for calumniating was promoted by the circumstance of my having explained in a different manner, certain passages of the Old and New Testament, which have been usually adduced to establish the Consubstantiality or the coessentiality of the trinity. But I can with ease in a moment shew, from the books of the Old and New Testament themselves, from the whole of antiquity, and from the sentiments of the ancient church, both Greek and Latin, as well as from the testimony of our own divines, that nothing can be deduced from those alleged misinterpreted passages, which is with the least semblance of probability, adverse to the sound and orthodox faith. In his able defense of Calvin, against the treatise of Hunnius, entitled

"Calvin Judaizing," the learned Paraeus has taught that this last occasion was seized upon in vain; and he has liberated me from the necessity of this service.

To spend any time in confuting the first slander, which was circulated by the young student, would not repay my trouble. Those who know that the Father in the Son hath reconciled the world unto himself, and administers the word of reconciliation through the Spirit, know, likewise, that, in the dispensation of salvation, an order must be considered among the persons of the Trinity, and their attributes must not be confounded, unless they be desirous of falling into the heresy of the Patripassionists.

Respecting the second occasion, which concerns the word Autoqeon "very God," an answer somewhat more laboured must be undertaken, because there are not a few persons who are of a contrary opinion, and yet our church does not consider such persons as holding wrong sentiments concerning the trinity. This is the manner in which they propound their doctrine. "Because the essence of the Father and of the Son is one, and because it has its origin from no one, therefore, in this respect, the Son is correctly denominated Autoqeon that is, God from himself."

But I reply, "The essence of the Son is from no one, or is from himself," is not the same as "the Son is from himself, or from no one." For, to speak in a proper and formal manner, the Son is not an essence, but having his essence by a certain mode Uparxewv of being or existence.

They rejoin -- "The Son may be considered in two respects, "as he is the Son, and as he is God. As he is the Son, he is from the Father, and has his essence from the Father. But as he is God, he has his essence from himself or from no one." But the latter of these expressions is the most correct; for to have his essence from himself implies a contradiction.

I reply, I admit this distinction; but it is extended much further than is allowable. For as he is God, he has the divine essence. As he is the Son, he has it from the Father.

That is, by the word "God," is signified, generally, that which has the divine essence without any certain mode of subsistence. But, by the word "the Son," is signified a certain mode of having the divine essence, which is through communication from the Father, that is, through generation.

Let these double ternaries be taken into consideration, which are opposed to each other, in one series,

To have Deity -- To BE God To have Deity from the Father -- To BE the Son To have Deity from no one -- To BE the Father

And it will be evident, that among themselves they mutually correspond with each other, thus: "to have Deity," and "to be God" -- "to have Deity from the Father," and

"to be the Son" -- "to have Deity from no one," and "to be the Father" -- are consentaneous, though under the word "Father," as an affirmative, that is not signified which has its essence from no one; for this is signified by the word "ingenitus, inwardly born, which is attributed to the Father, though not with strictness, but only to signify that the Father has not his essence by the mode of generation. But the word

"FATHER" by its own force and meaning is conclusive on this point: For where order is established, it is necessary that a beginning be made from some first person or thing, otherwise there will be confusion proceeding onwards ad infinitum. But, with respect to origin, he who is the first in this order has his origin from no one; he who is the second, has his origin from the first; he who is the third has his origin from the first and the second, or from the first through the second. Were not this the real state of the matter; there would be a Collaterality, which would make as many Gods as there were collateral persons laid down; since the Unity of the Deity in the trinity is defended against the Anti-trinitarians solely by the relation of origin and of order according to origin.

But that it may evidently appear what were the sentiments of antiquity about this matter, I will here adduce from the ancient fathers, both of the Greek and Latin church, some passages which are applicable to this subject.

BASIL THE GREAT

According to the habit of causes to those things which are from them, we say that the Father has precedence before the Son. (Ever. lib. 1.)

- because the Son has his source from the Father. According to this, the Father is the greater, as the cause and the source. Wherefore our Lord also has said, "My Father is greater than I," that is, because He is the Father. But what other signification can the word "FATHER" have, than the cause and the beginning of Him who is begotten from Him? (Ibid.)

The Father is the root and the fountain of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. (Discourse against the Sabellians and Arius.)

When I have said "one essence," I do not understand two [persons] distinguished from one, but the Son subsisting from the source of the Father, not the Father and Son from one superior essence. For we do not call them "brothers," but we confess them to be

"the FATHER and the SON." But essence is identity, because the Son is from the Father, not made by command, but begotten from nature; not divided from the Father, but while he remains perfect, reflecting perfectly back again the light. But that you may not be able to charge these our assertions against us as a crime, and lest you should say, "He preaches two gods; he announces a multitude of deities;" there are not two gods, neither are there two fathers. He who produces two original sources, preaches two gods. (Ibid.)

The way of the knowledge of God is, by one Spirit, through one Son, to one Father.

And, on the contrary, natural goodness, natural sanctification, and royal dignity are transmitted from the Father, through the only begotten Son, to the Spirit. Thus we confess the persons [in the Godhead] and at the same time the pious doctrine of the unity is not undermined. (On the Holy Spirit, cap. 18.)

GREGORY NAZIANZEN

THE essence is common and equal to the Son with the Father, though the Son has it from the Father. (Fourth Discourse on Theology.)

How is it possible for the same thing to be greater than itself and yet equal to itself? Is it not, therefore, plain, that the word "greater," which is attributed to the Father in reference to the Son, must be referred to CAUSE; but the word "equal," which is attributed to the Son, as to his equality with the Father, must be referred to Nature?

(Ibid.)

It may indeed be truly said, but not therefore so honourably, that, "with regard to the humanity, the Father is greater than the Son:" For what is there wonderful in God being greater than man? (Ibid.)

AMBROSE

Though Christ has redeemed us, yet "all things are of God," because from him is all the paternity. It is, therefore, of necessity that the person of the Father have the precedence. (On 2 Corinthians v, 18.)

Consult also his remarks On 1 Corinthians 15.

AUGUSTINE

IF that which begets is the original source of that which is begotten, the Father is the source of the Son, because he begets him. (On the Trinity, lib. 5, cap. 14.) He did not say "whom the Father will send from me," as He said, "whom I will send from the Father," that is, plainly shewing the Father to be the source of the entire Deity. (Ibid. Lib. 4, Cap. 10.)

- Therefore this was said concerning the Father: "He doeth the works;" because from Him also is the origin of the works, from whom the cooperating persons [in the Deity]

have their existence: For both the Son is born of Him, and the Holy Spirit principally proceeds from Him, from whom the Son is born, and with whom the same Spirit is common with the Son. (Idem, tom. 10, fol. 11, col. 1.)

Indeed God the Father is not God from another God; but God the Son is God from God the Father. But the Son is as much from the Father, as the Father is from no one.

(Against Maximinus, Lib. 3, cap. 23, col. 2.)

HILARY

There is no God who is eternal and without beginning, and who is God to that God from whom are all things. But the Father is God to the Son; for from Him He was born God. (Lib. 4, fol. 60.)

The confession of the true faith is, God is so born of God, as light is from light, which, without detriment to itself, offers its own nature from itself, that it may bestow that which it has, and that it may have what it bestows, &c. (Lib. 6, fol 87.) It is apparent from these passages, according to the sentiments of the ancient church, that the Son, even as he is God, is from the Father, because he has received his Deity, according to which he is called "God," by being born of the Father; though the name of God does not indicate this mode of being or existence. From these quotations, it is also evident that, because the Father is the source of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, he is called the source of the whole Deity; not indeed because God has any beginning or source, but because the Deity is communicated by the Father to the Son and the Holy Spirit. So far, therefore, is this from being a correct expression: "The Son of God as he is God, is from no one; and, with respect to his essence, is from himself or from no one." For he who has received his essence by being born of the Father, is from the Father with respect to his essence.

I consider, therefore, that those who desire to think and to speak with orthodox antiquity, ought to abstain from these methods of expression; because, by adopting them, they seem to become the patrons of the opposing heresies of the Tritheists, and the Sabellians. Peruse the preface to the Dialogues of St. Athanasius On the Trinity, by Theodoure Beza; who excuses Calvin by saying, that he did not so solicitously observe the difference between the two phrases - - "He is the Son per se, through himself," and "He is the Son a se, from himself."

If any one be desirous of knowing from me anything further on this point, I will not refuse to hold a placid conference with him either in writing or by conversation. I now proceed to the other topics, in the discussion of which I will consult brevity.

II. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

My sentiments respecting the providence of God are these: It is present with, and presides over, all things; and all things, according to their essences, quantities, qualities, relations, actions, passions, places, times, stations and habits, are subject to its governance, conservation, and direction. I except neither particular, sublunary, vile, nor contingent things, not even the free wills of men or of angels, either good or evil: And, what is still more, I do not take away from the government of the divine providence even sins themselves, whether we take into our consideration their commencement, their progress, or their termination.

1. With respect to the Beginning of Sin, I attribute the following acts to the providence of God:

First. Permission, and that not idle, but which has united in it four positive acts: (1.) The preservation of the creature according to essence, life and capability. (2.) Care lest a greater or an equal power be placed in opposition. (3.) The offering of an object against which sin will be committed. (4.) The destined concession of its concurrence, which, on account of the dependence of a second on the first cause, is a necessary concurrence.

Secondly. The administration of arguments and occasions, soliciting to the perpetration of sin.

Thirdly. The determination of place, time, manner, and of similar circumstances.

Fourthly. The immediate concurrence itself of God with the act of sin.

2. With respect to the Progress of sin, I attribute also the following four acts to the divine government:

The First is the direction of sin that is already begun, to a certain object, at which the offending creature either has not aimed, or has not absolutely aimed.

The Second act is the direction of sin to the end which God himself wills, whether the creature intend or do not intend that end, nay, though he intend another and quite opposite end.

The Third act is the prescribing and determination of the time during which he wills or permits sin to endure.

The Fourth act is the defining of its magnitude, by which limits are placed on sin, that it may not increase and assume greater strength.

The whole of these acts, both concerning the commencement and the progress of sin, I consider distinctly in reference to the act itself, and to the anomy or transgression of the law, a course which, according to my judgment, is necessary and useful.

3. Lastly, with respect to the END and COMPLETION of sin, I attribute to divine providence either punishment through severity, or remission through grace; which are occupied about sin, in reference to its being sin and to its being a transgression, of the law.

But I most solicitously avoid two causes of offense -- that God be not proposed as the author of sin, and that its liberty be not taken away from the human will. These are two points which, if any one knows how to avoid, he will think upon no act which I will not in that case most gladly allow to be ascribed to the providence of God, provided a just regard be had to the divine pre-eminence.

But I have given a most ample explanation of these my sentiments, in the theses which were twice publicly disputed on the same subject in the university. On this account, therefore, I declare that I am much surprised, and not without good reason, at my being aspersed with this calumny - - that l hold corrupt opinions respecting the providence of God. If it be allowable to indulge in conjecture, I think this slander had its origin in the fact of my denying that, with respect to the decree of God, Adam necessarily sinned -- an assertion which I yet constantly deny, and think it one that ought not to be tolerated, unless the word "necessarily" be received in the acceptation of "infallibly," as it is by some persons; though this change does not agree with the etymology of the two words; for, necessity is an affection of being, but infallibility is an affection of the mind. Yet I easily endure the use of the first of these words, provided those two inconveniences to which I have recently alluded be faithfully avoided.

III. DIVINE PREDESTINATION

With respect to the article of predestination, my sentiments upon it are the following: It is an eternal and gracious decree of God in Christ, by which he determines to justify and adopt believers, and to endow them with life eternal, but to condemn unbelievers, and impenitent persons; as I have explained in the theses on the same subject, which were publicly disputed, and in which, no one found any thing to be reprehended as false or unsound. Only it was the opinion of some persons that those theses did not contain all the things which belong to this decree; nay, that the predestination about which there is the greatest controversy at this time, is not the subject of investigation in those theses. This indeed I confess; for I considered it the best course to discuss that decree of predestination which is the foundation of Christianity, of our salvation, and of the assurance of salvation, and upon which the apostle treats in the eighth and ninth chapters of the epistle to the Romans, and in the first chapter of that to the Ephesians-But such a decree as I have there described is not that by which God resolves to save some particular persons, and, that he may do this, resolves to endow them with faith, but to condemn others and not to endow them with faith. Yet many people declare, that this is the kind of predestination on which the apostle treats in the passages just cited. But I deny what they assert.

I grant that there is a certain eternal decree of God, according to which he administers the means necessary to faith and salvation, and this he does in such a manner as he knows to be suited to righteousness, that is, to his mercy and his severity. But about this decree, I think nothing more is necessary to be known, than that faith is the mere gift of the gracious mercy of God; and that unbelief is partly to be attributed to the fault and wickedness of men, and partly to the just vengeance of God, which deserts, blinds and hardens sinners.

But concerning that predestination by which God has decreed to save and to endow with faith some particular persons, but to damn others and not endow them with faith, so various are the sentiment, entertained even by the divines of our profession, that this very diversity of opinion easily declares the difficulty with which it is possible to determine any thing respecting it. For while some of them propose, as the object of predestination generally considered, that is, of election and reprobation, man as a sinner and fallen in Adam, others lay it down, man considered as created and placed

"in puris naturalibus." Some of them consider this object to be, man to be created, or, as some of them express it, man as salvable and damnable, as capable of being created and of falling. Others of them lay down the object of election and reprobation, which they denominate Nonelection and Preterition, man considered in common and absolutely; but they lay down the object of reprobation, on which they bestow the appellation of Predamnation and Affirmative Reprobation, man a sinner and guilty in Adam. Lastly, some of them suppose that the object must be considered entirely in common, man as yet to be created, as created, and as fallen.

I am aware that when this diversity of opinion is offered as an objection, it is usual to reply that, in the substance of the matter there is complete agreement, although some difference exists in the circumstances. But it would be in my power to prove, that the preceding opinions differ greatly in many of the things which conduce to the very matter and substance of this kind of predestination; but that of consent or agreement there is nothing except in the minds of those who hold such sentiments, and who are prepared to bear with those who dissent from them as far as these points extend.

Such a mode of consent as this, [of which they are themselves the patrons,] is of the highest necessity in the Christian church -- as, without it, peace can by no means be preserved. I wish that I also was able to experience from them any such benevolent feelings towards me and my sentiments. In that species of predestination upon which I have treated, I define nothing that is not equally approved by all. On this point, alone, I differ -- I dare not with a safe conscience maintain in the affirmative any of the preceding opinions. I am also prepared to give a reason for this conscientious scruple when it shall be demanded by necessity, and can be done in a suitable manner.

IV. GRACE AND FREE WILL

Concerning grace and free will, this is what I teach according to the Scriptures and orthodox consent: Free will is unable to begin or to perfect any true and spiritual good, without grace. That I may not be said, like Pelagius, to practice delusion with regard to the word "grace," I mean by it that which is the grace of Christ and which belongs to regeneration. I affirm, therefore, that this grace is simply and absolutely necessary for the illumination of the mind, the due ordering of the affections, and the inclination of the will to that which is good. It is this grace which operates on the mind, the affections, and the will; which infuses good thoughts into the mind, inspires good desires into the actions, and bends the will to carry into execution good thoughts and good desires. This grace goes before, accompanies, and follows; it excites, assists, operates that we will, and co-operates lest we will in vain. It averts temptations, assists and grants succour in the midst of temptations, sustains man against the flesh, the world and Satan, and in this great contest grants to man the enjoyment of the victory. It raises up again those who are conquered and have fallen, establishes and supplies them with new strength, and renders them more cautious. This grace commences salvation, promotes it, and perfects and consummates it.

I confess that the mind of a natural and carnal man is obscure and dark, that his affections are corrupt and inordinate, that his will is stubborn and disobedient, and that the man himself is dead in sins. And I add to this -- that teacher obtains my highest approbation who ascribes as much as possible to divine grace, provided he so pleads the cause of grace, as not to inflict an injury on the justice of God, and not to take away the free will to that which is evil.

I do not perceive what can be further required from me. Let it only be pointed out, and I will consent to give it, or I will shew that I ought not to give such an assent.

Therefore, neither do I perceive with what justice I can be calumniated on this point, since I have explained these my sentiments, with sufficient plainness, in the theses on free will which were publicly disputed in the university.

V. JUSTIFICATION

The last article is on justification, about which these are my sentiments: Faith, and faith only, (though there is no faith alone without works,) is imputed for righteousness. By this alone are we justified before God, absolved from our sins, and are accounted, pronounced and declared righteous by God, who delivers his judgment from the throne of grace.

I do not enter into the question be the active and the passive righteousness of Christ, or that of his death and of his life. On this subject, I walk at liberty: I say "Christ has been made of God to me righteousness" -- "he has been made sin for me, that through faith, I may be the righteousness of God in him."

Nor yet do I refuse to confer with my brethren on this question, provided such conference be conducted without bitterness, and without an opinion of necessity, [that the partial view of any one should be generally received,] from which scarcely any other result can ensue than the existence of distraction, and of increased effervescence in the minds of men, especially if this discussion should occur between those who are hot controversialists, and too vehement in their zeal.

But some persons charge me with this as a crime -- that I say the act itself of faith, that is, believing itself, is imputed for righteousness, and that in a proper sense, and not by a metonymy. I acknowledge this charge, as I have the apostle St. Paul, in Romans 4, and in other passages, as my precursor in the use of this phrase. But the conclusion which they draw from this affirmation, namely, "that Christ and his righteousness are excluded from our justification, and that our justification is thus attributed to the worthiness of our faith," I by no means concede it to be possible for them to deduce from my sentiments.

For the word "to impute ," signifies that faith is not righteousness itself, but is graciously accounted for righteousness; by which circumstance all worthiness is taken away from faith, except that which is through the gracious condescending estimation of God. But this gracious condescension and estimation is not without Christ, but in reference to Christ, in Christ, and on account of Christ, whom God hath appointed as the propitiation through faith in his blood.

I affirm, therefore, that faith is imputed to us for righteousness, on account of Christ and his righteousness. In this enunciation, faith is the object of imputation; but Christ and his obedience are the impetratory [procuring] or meritorious cause of justification.

Christ and his obedience are the object of our faith, but not the object of justification or divine imputation, as if God imputes Christ and his righteousness to us for righteousness. This cannot possibly be, since the obedience of Christ is righteousness itself, taken according to the most severe rigor of the law. But I do not deny that the obedience of Christ is imputed to us; that is, that it is accounted or reckoned for us and for our benefit, because this very thing -- that God reckons the righteousness of Christ to have been performed for us and for our benefit -- is the cause why God imputes to us for righteousness our faith, which has Christ and his righteousness for its object and foundation, and why he justifies us by faith, from faith, or through faith.

If any one will point out an error in this my opinion, I will gladly own it, because it is possible for me to err, but I am not willing to be a heretic.

The preceding, then, as far as I remember, are the Articles which your excellency mentioned to me, with my explanations of them produced from sincerity of mind; and as thus sincere, I wish them to be accounted by all who see them. This one favour I wish I could obtain from my brethren, who are associated with me in the Lord by the profession of the same religion, that they would at least believe me to have some feeling of conscience towards God. And this favour ought to be easily granted by them, through the charity of Christ, if they be desirous to study his disposition and nature.

Of what service to me can a dissension be which is undertaken merely through a reckless humour of mind, or a schism created in the church of Christ, of which, by the grace of God and Christ, I profess myself to be a member? If my brethren suppose that I am incited to such an enterprise through ambition or avarice, I sincerely declare in the Lord, that they know me not. But I can confess that I am so free from the latter of these vices, as never to have been tickled, on any occasion, with even the most enticing of its snares -- though it might be in my power to excuse or palliate it under some pretext or other. With regard to ambition, I possess it not, except to that honourable kind which impels me to this service -- to inquire with all earnestness in the Holy Scriptures for divine truth, and mildly and without contradiction to declare it when found, without prescribing it to any one, or labouring to extort consent, much less through a desire to "have dominion over the faith of others," but rather for the purpose of my winning some souls for Christ, that I may be a sweet savour to him, and may obtain an approved reputation in the church of the saints. This good name I hope I shall obtain by the grace of Christ, after a long period of patient endurance; though I be now a reproach to my brethren, and "made as the filth of the world and the offscouring of all things" to those who with me worship and invoke one God the Father, and one Lord Jesus Christ, in one spirit and with the same faith, and who have the same hope with me of obtaining the heavenly inheritance through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ.

I hope the Lord will grant unto me, that they and I may meekly meet together in his great name, and institute a Christian conference about those things which appertain to religion. O may the light of that sacred and happy day speedily shine upon me. In that assembly, I engage, through the grace of God, to manifest such moderation of mind, and such love for truth and peace, as ought deservedly to be required and expected from a servant of Christ Jesus.

In the mean time [till this assembly can be convened], let my brethren themselves remain quiescent and suffer me to be quiet, that I may be at peace, and neither annoy them, nor create any uneasiness. If they entertain other thoughts concerning me, let them institute an [ecclesiastical] action against me; I will not shun or evade the authority of a competent judge, neither will I forfeit my recognizances by failing to appear.

If it be supposed that the minds of those who hear me are preoccupied in my favour, at a distance, by some politic subtlety which I display, and that the matter is so managed through cunning, as makes my brethren neither to consider it advisable to arraign me before the judges, nor to account it sufficiently safe to commit to my care the youthful students; and therefore, that the black stain which I have deserved ought to be affixed to my reputation, that my pupils and hearers may be frightened away; therefore, lest the result of this should be that the deferring of such a conference be productive of certain danger, behold I now offer myself, that I may, in company with them, address, solicit, and intreat those high personages who are invested with the power of issuing a summons for a convention of this kind, or of granting it, not to suffer us any longer to continue in this anguish and disquietude of mind, but either themselves to apply a speedy remedy, or allow it to be applied by others, but still by their order and under their direction.

I will not refuse to place myself before any assembly whatsoever, whether it be composed of all the ministers in our United Netherlands, or of some to be convoked from each of the seven provinces, or even of all the ministers of Holland and West Friesland, to which province our university at Leyden belongs, or of some ministers to be selected out of these, provided the whole affair be transacted under the cognizance of our lawful magistrates. Nor do I avoid or dread the presence of learned men, who may be invited from other countries, provided they be present at the conference on equitable conditions, and subject to the same laws as those under which I must be placed.

To express the whole matter at once -- let a convention be summoned, consisting of many members or of few, provided some bright hope of success be afforded [to them], a hope, I repeat it, which I shall be able, by sound arguments, to prove destitute of good foundation. Behold me, this day, nay, this very hour, prepared and ready to enter into it. For I am weary of being daily aspersed with the filthy scum of fresh calumnies, and grieved at being burdened with the necessity of clearing myself from them. In this part of my conduct, I am assuredly dissimilar from heretics, who have either avoided ecclesiastical assemblies, or have managed matters so as to be able to confide in the number of their retainers, and to expect a certain victory.

But I have finished. For I have occupied your attention, most honourable sir, a sufficient length of time; and I have made a serious encroachment on those valuable moments which you would have devoted to matters of greater importance. Your excellency will have the condescension to forgive the liberty which I have taken to address this letter to you, as it has been extorted from me by a degree of necessity -and not to disdain to afford me your patronage and protection, just so far as divine truth and the peace and concord of the Christian church will allow you to vouchsafe.

I pray and beseech Almighty God long to preserve your excellency in safety, to endue you yet more with the spirit of wisdom and prudence, by which you may be enabled to discharge the duties of the embassy which has been imposed upon you, and thus meet the wishes of the most illustrious prince, the Elector Palatine. And, after you have happily discharged those duties, may he benignantly and graciously grant to you a prosperous return to your own country and kindred.

Thus prays

Your excellency's most devoted servant, JAMES ARMINIUS, Professor of Theology in the University of Leyden.

LEYDEN, April 5, 1608

END OF THE LETTER TO HIPPOLYTUS A COLLIBUS

CERTAIN ARTICLES DILIGENTLY EXAMINED & WEIGHED

I. ON THE SCRIPTURE AND HUMAN TRADITIONS

1. The rule of theological verity is not two-fold, one primary and the other secondary; but it is one and simple, the Sacred Scriptures.

2. The Scriptures are the rule of all divine verity, from themselves, in themselves, and through themselves; and it is a rash assertion, "that they are indeed the rule, but only when understood according to the meaning of the confession of the Dutch churches, or when explained by the interpretation of the Heidelberg Catechism."

3. No writing composed by men -- by one man, by few men, or by many -- (with the exception of the Holy Scriptures,) is either axiopison "creditable of itself," or autopison "of itself deserving of implicit credence," and, therefore, is not exempted from an examination to be instituted by means of the Scriptures.

4. It is a thoughtless assertion, "that the Confession and Catechism are called in question, when they are subjected to examination;" for they have never been placed beyond the hazard of being called in doubt, nor can they be so placed.

5. It is tyrannical and popish to bind the consciences of men by human writings, and to hinder them from being submitted to a legitimate examination, under what pretext soever such tyrannical conduct is adopted.

II. ON GOD CONSIDERED ACCORDING TO HIS NATURE

1. GOD is good by a natural and internal necessity, not freely; which last word is stupidly explained by the terms "unconstrainedly" and "not slavishly."

2. God foreknows future things through the infinity of his essence, and through the pre-eminent perfection of his understanding and prescience, not as he willed or decreed that they should necessarily be done, though he would not foreknow them except as they were future, and they would not be future unless God had decreed either to perform or to permit them.

3. God loves righteousness and his creatures, yet he loves righteousness still more than the creatures, from which, two consequences follow:

4. The First, that God does not hate his creature, except on account of sin.

5. The Second, that God absolutely loves no creature to life eternal, except when considered as righteous, either by legal or evangelical righteousness.

6. The will of God is both correctly and usefully distinguished into that which is antecedent, and that which is consequent.

7. The distinction of the will of God into that which is secret or of his good pleasure, and that which is revealed or signified, cannot bear a rigid examination.

8. Punitive justice and mercy neither are, nor can they be "the only moving" or final causes of the first decree, or of its first operation.

9. God is blessed in himself and in the knowledge of his own perfection. He is, therefore, in want of nothing, neither does he require the demonstration of any of his properties by external operations: Yet if he do this, it is evident that he does it of His pure and free will; although, in this declaration [of any of His properties] a certain order must be observed according to the various egresses or "goings forth" of his goodness, and according to the prescript of his wisdom and justice.

III. ON GOD, CONSIDERED ACCORDING TO THE RELATION BETWEEN

THE PERSONS IN THE TRINITY

1. The Son of God is not called by the ancient fathers "God from himself," and this is a dangerous expression. For, Autoqeov [as thus interpreted, God from himself,]

properly signifies that the Son has not the divine essence from another -- But it is by a catachresis, or improperly, that the essence which the Son has is not from another; because the relation of the subject is thus changed: for "the Son," and "the divine essence," differ in relation.

2. The divine essence is communicated to the Son by the Father, and this properly and truly. Wherefore it is unskillfully asserted "that the divine essence is indeed properly said to be common to the Son and to the Father, but is improperly said to be communicated:" For it is not common to both except in reference to its being communicated.

3. The Son of God is correctly called Autoqeov "very God," as this word is received for that which is God himself, truly God. But he is erroneously designated by that epithet, so far as it signifies that he has an essence not communicated by the Father, yet has one in common with the Father.

4. "The Son of God, in regard to his essence, is from himself," is an ambiguous expression, and, on that account, dangerous. Neither is the ambiguity removed by saying "The Son, with respect to his absolute essence, or to his essence absolutely considered, is from himself." Besides, these modes of speaking are not only novel, but are also mere prattle.

5. The divine persons are not trowoi uparxewv or modes of being or of existing, or modes of the divine essence; For they are things with the mode of being or existing.

6. The divine persons are distinguished by a real distinction, not by the degree and mode of the thing.

7. A. person is an individual subsistence itself, not a characteristic property, nor is it an individual principle; though it be not an individual, nor a person, without a characteristic property or without an individual principle.

8. QUERIES. -- Is it not useful that the Trinity be considered, both as it exists in nature itself, according to the co-essential relation of the divine persons, and as it has been manifested in the economy of salvation, to be accomplished by God the Father, in Christ, through the Holy Spirit? And does not the former of these considerations appertain to religion universally, and to that which was prescribed to Adam, according to the law? But the latter consideration properly belongs to the gospel of Jesus Christ, yet not excluding that which I have mentioned as belonging to all religion universally, and therefore to that which is Christian.

IV. ON THE DECREE OF GOD

1. The decrees of God are the extrinsic acts of God, though they are internal, and, therefore, made by the free will of God, without any absolute necessity. Yet one decree seems to require the supposition of another, on account of a certain fitness of equity; as the decree concerning the creation of a rational creature, and the decree concerning the salvation or damnation [of that creature] on the condition of obedience or disobedience. The act of the creature also, when considered by God from eternity, may sometimes be the occasion, and sometimes the outwardly moving cause of making some decree; and this may be so fare that without such act [of the creature]

the decree neither would nor could be made.

2. QUERY. -- Can the act of the creature impose a necessity on God of making some decree, and indeed a decree of a particular kind and no other -- and this not only according to some act to be performed respecting the creature and his act, but also according to a certain mode by which that act must be accomplished?

3. One and the same in number is the volition by which God decrees something and determines to do or to permit it, and by which he does or permits the very thing which he decreed.

4. About an object which is one and the same, and uniformly considered, there cannot be two decrees of God, or two volitions, either in reality, or according to any semblance of a contrary volition -- as to will to save man under conditions, and yet to will precisely and absolutely to condemn him.

5. A decree of itself imposes no necessity on any thing or event. But if any necessity exists through the decree of God, it exists through the intervention of the divine power, and indeed when he judges it proper to employ his irresistible power to effect what he has decreed.

6. Therefore, it is not correctly said, The will of God is the necessity of things."

7. Nor is this a just expression: "All things happen necessarily with respect to the divine decree."

8. As many distinct decrees are conceived by us, and must necessarily be conceived; as there are objects about which God is occupied in decreeing, or as there are axioms by which those decrees are enunciated.

9. Though all the decrees of God have been made from eternity, yet a certain order of priority and posteriority must be laid down, according to their nature, and the mutual relation between them.

V. ON PREDESTINATION TO SALVATION, AND ON DAMNATION

CONSIDERED IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE

1. The first in order of the divine decrees is not that of predestination, by which God foreordained to supernatural ends, and by which he resolved to save and to condemn, to declare his mercy and his punitive justice, and to illustrate the glory of his saving grace, and of his wisdom and power which correspond with that most free grace.

2. The object of predestination to supernatural ends, to salvation and death, to the demonstration of the mercy and punitive justice, or of the saving grace, the wisdom, and the most free power of God, is not rational creatures indefinitely foreknown, and capable of salvation, of damnation, of creation, of falling, and of reparation or of being recovered.

3. Nor is the subject some particular creatures from among those who are considered in this manner.

4. The difference between the vessels to honour and those to dishonour, that is, of mercy and wrath, does not appertain to the adorning or perfection of the universe or of the house of God.

5. The entrance of sin into the world does not appertain to the beauty of the universe.

6. Creation in the upright state of original righteousness is not a means for executing the decree of predestination, or of election, or of reprobation.

7. It is horrid to affirm, that "the way of reprobation is creation in the upright state of original righteousness;" (Gomarus, in his Theses on Predestination;) and in this very assertion are propounded two contrary volitions of God concerning one and the same thing.

8. It is a horrible affirmation, that "God has predestinated whatsoever men he pleased not only to damnation, but likewise to the causes of damnation." (Beza, vol. I, fol.

417.)

9. It is a horrible affirmation, that "men are predestinated to eternal death by the naked will or choice of God, without any demerit on their part." (Calvin, Inst. l. I, c. 2, 3.) 10. This, also, is a horrible affirmation: "Some among men have been created unto life eternal, and others unto death eternal."

11. It is not a felicitous expression, that "preparation unto destruction is not to be referred to any other thing, than to the secret counsel of God."

12. Permission for the fall [of Adam] into sin, is not the means of executing the decree of predestination, or of election, or of reprobation.

13. It is an absurd assertion, that "the demerits of the reprobate are the subordinate means of bringing them onward to destined destruction."

14. It is a false assertion, that "the efficient and sufficient cause and matter of predestination are thus found in those who are reprobated."

15. The elect are not called "vessels of mercy" in the relation of means to the end, but because mercy is the only moving cause, by which is made the decree itself of predestination to salvation.

16. No small injury is inflicted on Christ as mediator, when he is called "the subordinate cause of destined salvation."

17. The predestination of angels and of men differ so much from each other, that no property of God can be prefixed to both of them unless it be received in an ambiguous acceptation.

VI. ON THE CREATION, AND CHIEFLY THAT OF MAN

1. The creation of things out of nothing is the very first of all the external acts of God; nor is it possible for any act to be prior to this, or conceived to be prior to it; and the decree concerning creation is the first of all the decrees of God; because the properties according to which he performs and operates all things, are, in the first impulse of his nature, and in his first egress, occupied about nihility or nothing, when those properties are borne, ad extra, "outwards."

2. God has formed two creatures rational and capable of things divine; ONE of them is purely spiritual and invisible, and [that is the class of] angels; but the OTHER is partly corporeal and partly spiritual, visible and invisible, and [that is the class of]

men; and the perfection of this universe seeing to have required the formation of these two [classes of] creatures.

3. QUERY. -- Did it not become the manifold wisdom of God, and was it not suitable to the difference by which these two rational creatures were distinguished at the very creation, that, in the mode and circumstances of imparting eternal life to angels and to men, he might act in a different manner with the former from that which he adopts towards the latter? It appears that he might do so.

4. But two general methods may be mentally conceived by us, ONE of which is through the strict observance of the law laid down, without hope of pardon if any transgression were committed; but the OTHER is through the remission of sins, though a law agreeable to their nature was likewise to be prescribed by a peremptory decree to men, with whom it was not the will of God to treat in a strict manner and according to the utmost rigor; and obedience was to be required from them without a promise or pardon.

5. The image and likeness of God, after which man was created, belongs partly to the very nature of man, so that, without it, man cannot be man; but it partly consists in those things which concern supernatural, heavenly and spiritual things. The former class comprises the understanding, the affections, and the will, which is free; but the latter, the knowledge of God and of things divine, righteousness, true holiness, &c.

6. With respect to essence and adequate objects, the faith by which Adam believed in God is not the same as that by which he believed in God after the promise made concerning the Blessed Seed, and not the same as that by which we believe the gospel of Christ.

7. Without doing any wrong to God, to Adam, and to the truth itself, it may be said, that in his primeval state Adam neither received or possessed a Proximate capability of understanding, believing, or performing any thing whatsoever which could be necessary to be understood, believed, or performed by him, in any state whatsoever at which it was possible for him to arrive, either by his own endeavours or by the gift of God, though he must have had a remote capability, otherwise something essential would still have been to be created within man himself.

8. The liberty of the will consists in this -- when all the requisites for willing or not willing are laid down, man is still indifferent to will or not to will, to will this rather than that. This indifference is removed by the previous determination, by which the will is circumscribed and absolutely determined to the one part or to the other of the contradiction or contrariety; and this predetermination, therefore, does not consist with the liberty of the will, which requires not only free capability, but also tree use in the very exercise of it.

9. Internal necessity is as repugnant to liberty as external necessity is; nay, external necessity does not necessitate to act except by the intervention of that which is internal.

10. Adam either possessed, or had ready and prepared for him, sufficient grace, whether it were habitual or assisting, to obey the command imposed on him, both that command which was symbolical and ceremonial, and that which was moral.

VII. ON THE DOMINION OF GOD OVER THE CREATURES, AND CHIEFLY

OVER MAN

1. The dominion of God over the creatures rests on the communication of the good which he has bestowed on them: And since this good is not infinite, neither is the dominion itself infinite. But that dominion is infinite according to which it may be lawful and proper for God to issue his commands to the creature, to impose on him all his works, to use him in all those things which his omnipotence might be able to command and to impose upon him, and to engage his services or attention.

2. Therefore the dominion of God does not extend itself so far as to be able to inflict eternal death on a rational creature, or to destine him to death eternal, without the demerits of the creature himself.

3. It is, therefore, falsely asserted, that "though God destined and created for destruction any creatures (indefinitely considered) without any consideration of sin as the meritorious cause, yet he cannot be accused of injustice, because he possesses an absolute right of dominion over them." ( Gomar's Theses on Predestination.) 4. Another false assertion is this: "By the light of GLORY we shall understand by what right God can condemn an innocent person, or one who has not merited damnation, as by the light of GRACE we now understand by what right God saves unworthy and sinful men; yet this right we do not comprehend by the light of nature."

(Luther On the Servitude of the Will.)

5. But still more false is the following assertion: "Man is bound to acquiesce in this will of God, nay, to give thanks to God, that he has made him an instrument of the divine glory, to be displayed through wrath and power in his eternal destruction."

6. God can make of his own whatsoever he wills. But he does not will, neither can he will, to make of that which is his own whatever it is possible for him to make according to his infinite and absolute power.

VIII. ON THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD

1. The providence of God is subordinate to creation; and it is, therefore, necessary that it should not impinge against creation, which it would do, were it to inhibit or hinder the use of free will in man, or should deny to man its necessary concurrence, or should direct man to another end, or to destruction, than to that which is agreeable to the condition and state in which he was created; that is, if the providence of God should so rule and govern man that he should necessarily become corrupt, in order that God might manifest his own glory, both of justice and mercy, through the sin of man, according to his eternal counsel.

2. It appertains to the providence of God to act and permit; which two things are confounded when permission is changed into action under this pretext -- that it cannot be idle or unemployed.

3. Divine providence does not determine a free will to one part of a contradiction or contrariety, that is, by a determination preceding the actual volition itself; under other circumstances the concurrence of the very volition with the will is the concomitant cause, and thus determines the will with the volition itself, by an act which is not previous but simultaneous, as the schoolmen express themselves.

4. The permission of God by which he permits any one to fall into sin is not correctly defined as "the subtraction or withdrawing of divine grace, by which, while God executes the decrees of his will through his rational creatures, he either does not unfold to the creature his own will by which he wills that wicked work to be done, or he does not bend the will of the man to obey the divine will in that action." (Ursinus On Providence, tom. I, fol. 178.)

IX. ON PREDESTINATION, CONSIDERED IN THE PRIMEVAL STATE OF

MAN

1. It is not a true assertion, that "out of men considered in puris naturalibus, (either without supernatural things or with them,) God has determined, by the decree of election, to elevate to supernatural felicity some particular men, but to leave others in nature."

2. And it is rashly asserted that "it belongs to the relation or analogy of the universe, that some men be placed on the right and others on the left, even as the method of the master Builder requires, that some stones be placed on the left side, and others on the right, of a house which is to be built."

3. The permission by which God permits that some men wander from and miss the supernatural end, is unwisely made subordinate to this predestination; for it appertains to providence to lead and conduct a rational creature to supernatural felicity in a manner which is agreeable to the nature of that creature.

4. The permission, also, by which God permitted our first parents to fall into sin, is rashly said to be subordinate to this predestination.

X. ON THE CAUSE OF SIN UNIVERSALLY

1. Though sin can be committed by none except by a rational creature, and, therefore, ceases to be sin by this very circumstance if the cause of it be ascribed to God; yet it seems possible, by four arguments, to fasten this charge on our divines. "It follows from their doctrine that God is the author of sin."

2. First reason. -- Because they teach that, "without foresight of sin, God absolutely determined to declare his own glory through punitive justice and mercy, in the salvation of some men and in the damnation of others." Or, as others of them assert,

"God resolved to illustrate his own glory by the demonstration of saving grace, wisdom, wrath, ability, and most free power, in the salvation of some particular men, and in the eternal damnation of others; which neither can be done, nor has been done, without the entrance of sin into the world."

3. Second reason. -- Because they teach "that, in order to attain to that chief and supreme end, God ordained that man should sin and become corrupt, by which thing God might open a way to himself for the execution of this decree."

4. Third reason. -- Because they teach "that God has either denied to man, or has withdrawn from man, before he sinned, grace necessary and sufficient to avoid sin;"

which is equivalent to this -- as if God had imposed a law on man which was simply impossible to be performed or observed by his very nature.

5. Fourth reason. -- Because they attribute to God some acts, partly external, partly mediate, and partly immediate, which, being once laid down, man was not able to do otherwise than commit sin by necessity of a consequent and antecedent to the thing itself, which entirely takes away all liberty; yet without this liberty a man cannot be considered, or reckoned, as being guilty of the commission of sin.

6. A Fifth reason. -- Testimonies of the same description may be added in which our divines assert, in express words, that "the reprobate cannot escape the necessity of sinning, especially since this kind of necessity is injected through the appointment of God." (Calvin's Institutes, Lib. 2, 23.)

XI. OF THE FALL OF ADAM

1. Adam was able to continue in goodness and to refrain from sinning, and this in reality and in reference to the issue, and not only by capability not to be brought into action on account of some preceding decree of God, or rather not possible to lead to an act by that preceding decree.

2. Adam sinned freely and voluntarily, without any necessity, either internal or external.

3. Adam did not fall through the decree of God, neither through being ordained to fall nor through desertion, but through the mere permission of God, which is placed in subordination to no predestination either to salvation or to death, but which belongs to providence so far as it is distinguished in opposition to predestination.

4. Adam did not fall necessarily, either with respect to a decree, appointment, desertion, or permission, from which it is evident what kind of judgment ought to be formed concerning expressions of the following description: 5. "I confess, indeed, that by the will of God all the sons of Adam have fallen into this miserable condition in which they are bound and fastened." (Calvin's Institute, lib. 3, cap. 23.)

6. "They deny, in express words, the existence of this fact - - that it was decreed by God that Adam should perish by his own defection."

7. "God foreknew what result man would have, became he thus ordained it by his decree."

8. "God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, but by his own will he ordained it."

XII. ON ORIGINAL SIN

1. Original sin is not that actual sin by which Adam transgressed the law concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and on account of which we have all been constituted sinners, and rendered obnoxious or liable to death and condemnation.

2. QUERIES. -- Is original sin only the absence or want of original righteousness and of primeval holiness, with an inclination to commit sin, which likewise formerly existed in man, though it was not so vehement nor so inordinate as now it is, on account of the lost favour of God, his malediction, and the loss of that good by which that inclination was reduced to order? Or is it a certain infused habit (or acquired ingress) contrary to righteousness and holiness, after that sin had been committed, 3. Does original sin render men obnoxious to the wrath of God, when they have been previously constituted sinners on account of the actual sin of Adam, and rendered liable to damnation?

4. Adam, when considered in this state, after sin and prior to restoration, was not bound at once to punishment and obedience, but only to punishment.

XIII. ON THE PREDESTINATION OF MAN CONSIDERED PARTLY IN HIS

PRIMEVAL STATE, AND PARTLY IN THE FALL

1. IT is rashly asserted that "the matter of predestination, as it is opposed to reprobation, is man in common or absolutely, if regard be had to the foreordaining of the end; but if regard be had to the means for the end, it is man about to perish by and in himself and guilty in Adam." (Trelcatii Institut., lib. 2. On Predestination.) 2. With equal infelicity is it asserted that "one reprobation is negative or passive, another affirmative or active -- that the former is before all things and causes in things foreknown and considered, or that will arise from things; and that this act is respective of sin, and is called predamnation."

3. It may become a subject of discussion in what manner the following things can be said agreeably to this doctrine: "The impulsive cause of this predestination is the benevolent inclination of the will of God in Christ; and predestination is an eternal act of God, by which he resolves to make in Christ some creatures partakers of his grace and glory."

4. This is a stupid assertion: "The just desertion of God, by which he does not confer grace on a reprobate man, and which appertains to predestination and to its execution, is that of exploration or trial." This also cannot be reconciled with the expressions in the preceding paragraph.

XIV. ON PREDESTINATION CONSIDERED AFTER THE FALL

1. QUERIES. -- Out of the fallen human race, or out of the mass of corruption and perdition, has God absolutely chosen some particular men to life, and absolutely reprobated others to death, without any consideration of the good of the one or of the evil of the other? And from a just decree, which is both gracious and severe, is there such a requisite condition as this in the object which God is about to elect and to save, or to reprobate and condemn?

2. Is any man damned with death eternal, solely on account of the sin of Adam?

3. Are those who are thus the elect necessarily saved on account of the efficacy of grace, which has been destined to them only that they may not be able to do otherwise than assent to it, as it is irresistible,

4. Are those who are thus the reprobate necessarily damned, because either no grace at all, or not sufficient, has been destined to them, that they may assent to it and believe,

5. Or rather, according to St. Augustine, Are those who are thus the elect assuredly saved, because God decreed to employ grace on them as he knew was suitable and congruous that they might be persuaded and saved; though if regard be had to the internal efficacy of grace, they may not be advanced or benefited by it, 6. Are those who have thus been reprobated certainly damned, because God does not apply to them grace as he knows to be suitable and congruous, though in the mean time they are supplied with sufficient grace, that they may be able to yield their assent and be saved,

XV. ON THE DECREES OF GOD WHICH CONCERN THE SALVATION OF

SINFUL MEN, ACCORDING TO HIS OWN SENSE

1. The first decree concerning the salvation of sinful men, as that by which God resolves to appoint his Son Jesus Christ as a saviour, mediator, redeemer, high priest, and one who may expiate sins, by the merit of his own obedience may recover lost salvation, and dispense it by his efficacy.

2. The SECOND DECREE is that by which God resolves to receive into favour those who repent and believe, and to save in Christ, on account of Christ, and through Christ, those who persevere, but to leave under sin and wrath those who are impenitent and unbelievers, and to condemn them as aliens from Christ.

3. The THIRD DECREE is that by which God resolves to administer such means for repentance and faith as are necessary, sufficient, and efficacious. And this administration is directed according to the wisdom of God, by which he knows what is suitable or becoming to mercy and severity; it is also according to his righteousness, by which he is prepared to follow and execute [the directions] of his wisdom.

4. From these follows a FOURTH DECREE, concerning the salvation of these particular persons, and the damnation of those. This rests or depends on the prescience and foresight of God, by which he foreknew from all eternity what men would, through such administration, believe by the aid of preventing or preceding grace, and would persevere by the aid of subsequent or following grace, and who would not believe and persevere.

5. Hence, God is said to "know those who are his;" and the number both of those who are to be saved, and of those who are to be damned, is certain and fixed, and the quod and the qui, [the substance and the parties of whom it is composed,] or, as the phrase of the schools is, both materially and formally.

6. The second decree [described in § 2] is predestination to salvation, which is the foundation of Christianity, salvation, and of the assurance of salvation; it is also the matter of the gospel, and the substance of the doctrine taught by the apostles.

7. But that predestination by which God is said to have decreed to save particular creatures and persons and to endue them with faith, is neither the foundation of Christianity, of salvation, nor of the assurance of salvation.

XVI. ON CHRIST

1. QUERIES. -- After the entrance of sin into the world, was there no other remedy for the expiation of sin, or of rendering satisfaction to God, than through the death of the Son of God,

2. Had the human nature in Christ any other thing, than substance alone, immediately from the LOGOS, that is, without the intervention of the Holy Spirit, 3. Have the holy conception of Christ through the Holy Ghost, and his birth from the Virgin Mary, this tendency -- to cover the corruption of our nature lest it should come into the sight of God,

4. Does the holy life of Christ, in which he fulfilled all righteousness according to the prescript of the moral law concerning the love of God and of our neighbour, conduce only to this purpose -- that Christ may be a pure and innocent High Priest and an uncontaminated victim, But was it not like-wise for this purpose -- that this righteousness [of the holy life of Christ] may be our righteousness before God, and by this means performed by him for us, that is, in our name and in our stead, 5. Do those things which Christ suffered prior to his being placed before the tribunal of Pilate, concur with those which he afterwards endured, for the purging away and expiation of sins, and the redemption and reconciliation of sinners with God?

6. Was the oblation by which Christ offered himself to the Father as a victim for sin, so made on the cross that he has not offered himself and his blood to his Father in Heaven,

7. Is not the oblation by which Christ presents himself to his Father in heaven sprinkled with his own blood, a perpetual and continuous act, on which intercession rests or depends?

8. Is not the redemption which has been obtained by the blood of Christ, common to every man in particular, according to the love and affection of God by which he gave his Son for the world, though, according to the peremptory decree concerning the salvation of believers alone, it belongs only to some men?

XVII. ON THE VOCATION OF SINNERS TO COMMUNION WITH CHRIST, AND TO A PARTICIPATION OF HIS BENEFITS

1. Sinful man, after the perpetration of sin, has such a knowledge of the law as is sufficient for accusing, convicting, and condemning him; and this knowledge itself is capable of being employed by God when calling him to Christ, that he may, through it, compel man to repent and to flee to Christ.

2. An unregenerate man is capable of omitting more evil external works than he omits, and can perform more outward works which have been commanded by God than he actually performs; that is, it is possible for him to rule his inducements for abstaining in another and a better manner than that in which he does rule them; although if he were to do so, he would merit nothing by that deed.

3. The distribution of vocation into internal and external, is not the distribution of a genus into its species, or of a whole into its parts.

4. Internal vocation is granted even to those who do not comply with the call.

5. All unregenerate persons have freedom of will, and a capability of resisting the Holy Spirit, of rejecting the proffered grace of God, of despising the counsel of God against themselves, of refusing to accept the gospel of grace, and of not opening to Him who knocks at the door of the heart; and these things they can actually do, without any difference of the elect and of the reprobate.

6. Whomsoever God calls, he calls them seriously, with a will desirous of their repentance and salvation. Neither is there any volition of God about or concerning those whom he calls as being uniformly considered, that is, either affirmatively or negatively contrary to this will.

7. God is not bound to employ all the modes which are possible to him for the salvation of all men. He has performed his part, when he has employed either one or more of these possible means for saving.

8. "That man should be rendered inexcusable," is neither the proximate end, nor that which was intended by God, to the divine vocation when it is first made and has not been repulsed.

9. The doctrine which is manifested only for the purpose of rendering those who hear it inexcusable, cannot render them inexcusable either by right or by efficacy.

10. The right of God -- by which he can require faith in Christ from those who do not possess the capability of believing in him, and on whom he refuses to bestow the grace which is necessary and sufficient for believing, without any demerit on account of grace repulsed -- does not rest or depend on the fact that God gave to Adam, in his primeval state, and in him to all men, the capability of believing in Christ.

11. The right of God -- by which he can condemn those who reject the gospel of grace, and by which he actually condemns the disobedient -- does not rest or depend on this fact, that all men have, by their own fault, lost the capability of believing which they received in Adam.

12. Sufficient grace must necessarily be laid down; yet this sufficient grace, through the fault of him to whom it is granted, does not [always] obtain its effect. Were the fact otherwise, the justice of God could not be defended in his condemning those who do not believe.

13. The efficacy of saving grace is not consistent with that omnipotent act of God, by which he so inwardly acts in the heart and mind of man, that he on whom that act is impressed cannot do otherwise than consent to God who calls him; or, which is the same thing, grace is not an irresistible force.

14. QUERY. -- Are efficacious and sufficient grace correctly distinguished according to a congruous or suitable vocation and one that is incongruous, so that it may be called efficacious grace, which God employs according to his purpose of absolutely saving some particular man, as he knows it to be congruous or suitable that this man should be moved and persuaded to obedience; and so that it may be called sufficient grace which he employs, not for such a purpose, though, from his general love towards all mankind, some are affected or moved by it, on whom, by a peremptory decree, he had resolved not to have mercy?

15. The efficacy which is distinguished from efficiency itself, seems not to differ at all from sufficiency.

16. Those who are obedient to the vocation or call of God, freely yield their assent to grace; yet they are previously excited, impelled, drawn and assisted by grace; and in the very moment in which they actually assent, they possess the capability of not assenting.

17. In the very commencement of his conversion, man conducts himself in a purely passive manner; that is, though, by a vital act, that is, by feeling, he has a perception of the grace which calls him, yet he can do no other than receive it and feel it. But, when he feels grace affecting or inclining his mind and heart, he freely assents to it, so that he is able at the same time to withhold his assent.

XVIII. ON PENITENCE

1. The doctrine concerning repentance is not legal but evangelical; that is, it appertains to the gospel and not to the law, although the law solicits and impels to repentance.

2. The knowledge or confession of sins, sorrow on account of sin and a desire for deliverance, with a resolution to avoid sin, are pleasing to God as the very beginnings of conversion.

3. In propriety of speech, these things are not the mortification itself of the flesh or of sin but necessarily precede it.

4. Repentance is prior to faith in Christ; but it is posterior to that faith by which we believe that God is willing to receive into his favour the penitent sinner.

5. QUERIES. -- Is the repentance of Judas properly called legal?

6. Was the penitence or repentance of the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, of which Christ speaks in Matt. xi, 21, dissembled and feigned, or true repentance?

XIX. ON FAITH

1. Justifying faith is not that by which any one believes that his sins are remitted to him for the sake of Christ; for the latter faith follows justification itself or remission of sins, which is the effect of justifying faith.

2. Justifying faith is not that by which any one believes himself to be elected.

3. All men are not bound to believe themselves to be elected.

4. The knowledge and faith by which any one knows and believes that he is in possession of faith, is prior by nature to that knowledge and faith by which any one knows and believes himself to be elected.

5. From these remarks, some judgment may be formed concerning that which is sometimes asserted, "A believing and elect person is bound to believe that he is elected."

6. Justifying faith is that by which men believe in Jesus Christ, as in the saviour of those universally who believe, and of each of them in particular, even the saviour of him who, through Christ, believes in God, who justifies the ungodly.

7. Evangelical and saving faith is of such vast excellency as to exceed the entire nature of man, and all his understanding, even that of Adam, when placed in a state of innocence.

8. God cannot of right require faith in Christ from that man whom, by an absolute will, he has reprobated, either without consideration of any sin, or as fallen in Adam; therefore, it was not his will that Christ should be of the least advantage to this man; or, rather, he willed that Christ should not profit him.

9. Faith is a gracious and gratuitous gift of God, bestowed according to the administration of the means necessary to conduce to the end, that is, according to such an administration as the justice of God requires, either towards the side of mercy or towards that of severity. It is a gift which is not bestowed according to an absolute will of saving some particular men; for it is a condition required in the object to be saved, and it is in fact a condition before it is the means for obtaining salvation.

10. Saving faith is that of the elect of God; it is not the faith of all men, of perverse and wicked men, not of those who repel the word of grace, and account themselves unworthy of life eternal, not of those who resist the Holy Spirit, not of those who reject the counsel of God against themselves, nor of those who have not been ordained to life eternal. No man believes in Christ except he has been previously disposed and prepared, by preventing or preceding grace, to receive life eternal on that condition on which God wills to bestow it, according to the following passage of Scripture: "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." (John vii, 17.)

XX. ON REGENERATION AND THE REGENERATE

1. The proximate subject of regeneration, which is effected in the present life by the Spirit of Christ, is the mind and the affections of man, or the will considered according to the mode of nature, not the will considered according to the mode of liberty. It is not the body of man, though man, when renewed by regeneration through his mind and feelings, actually wills in a good manner, and performs well through the instruments of the body.

2. Though regeneration is not perfected in a moment, but by certain steps and intervals; yet, as soon as ever it is perfected according to its essence, that is, through the renovation of the mind and affections, it renders the man spiritual, and capable of resisting sin through the assisting grace of God. Hence, also, from the Spirit, which predominates in him, he is called spiritual and not carnal, though he still has within him the flesh lusting against the Spirit. For these two, a carnal man and a spiritual man, are so denominated in opposition, and according to [that which is in each of them] the more powerful, prevailing or predominant party.

3. The regenerate are able to perform more true good, and of such as is pleasing to God, than they actually perform, and to omit more evil than they omit; and, therefore, if they do not perform and omit what they ought to do, that must not be ascribed to any decree of God or inefficacy of divine grace, but it must be attributed to the negligence of the regenerate themselves.

4. He who asserts that "it is possible for the regenerate, through the grace of Christ, perfectly to fulfill the law in the present life," is neither a Pelagian, nor inflicts any injury on the grace of God, nor establishes justification through works.

5. The regenerate are capable of committing sin designedly and in opposition to their consciences, and of so laying waste their consciences, through sin, as to hear nothing from them except the sentence of condemnation.

6. The regenerate are capable of grieving the Holy Spirit by their sins, so that, for a season, until they suffer themselves to be brought back to repentance, he does not exert his power and efficacy in them.

7. Some of the regenerate actually thus sin, thus lay waste their conscience, and thus grieve the Holy Spirit.

8. If David had died in the very moment in which he had sinned against Uriah by adultery and murder, he would have been condemned to death eternal.

9. God truly hates the sins of the regenerate and of the elect of God, and indeed so much the more, as those who thus sin have received more benefits from God, and a greater power of resisting sin.

10. There are distinctions by which a man is said to sin with a full will, or with a will that is not full -- fully to destroy conscience, or not fully but only partly, and to sin according to his unregenerate part. When these distinctions are employed in the sense in which some persons use them, they are noxious to piety and injurious to good morals.

XXI. ON THE PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS

1. QUERIES. -- Is it possible for true believers to fall away totally and finally: 2. Do some of them, in reality, totally and finally fall from the faith?

3. The opinion which denies "that true believers and regenerate persons are either capable of falling away or actually do fall away from the faith totally and finally,"

was never, from the very times of the apostles down to the present day, accounted by the church as a catholic doctrine. Neither has that which affirms the contrary ever been reckoned as a heretical opinion; nay, that which affirms it possible for believers to fall away from the faith, has always had more supporters in the church of Christ, than that which denies its possibility of its actually occurring.

XXII. ON THE ASSURANCE OF SALVATION

1. QUERIES. -- Is it possible for any believer, without a special revelation, to be certain or assured that he will not decline or fall away from the faith, 2. Are those who have faith, bound to believe that they will not decline from the faith?

3. The affirmative of either of these questions was never accounted in the church of Christ as a catholic doctrine; and the denial of either of them has never been adjudged by the church universal as a heresy.

4. The persuasion by which any believer assuredly persuades himself that it is impossible for him to decline from the faith, or that, at least, he will not decline from the faith, does not conduce so much to consolation against despair or against the doubting that is adverse to faith and hope, as it contributes to security, a thing directly opposed to that most salutary fear with which we are commanded to work out our salvation, and which is exceedingly necessary in this scene of temptations.

5. He who is of opinion that it is possible for him to decline from the faith, and who, therefore, is afraid lest he should decline, is neither destitute of necessary consolation, nor is he on this account, tormented with anxiety of mind. For it suffices to inspire consolation and to exclude anxiety, when he knows that he will decline from the faith through no force of Satan, of sin, or of the world, and through no inclination or weakness of his own flesh, unless he willingly and of his own accord, yield to temptation, and neglect to work out his salvation in a conscientious manner.

XXIII. ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF MAN AS A SINNER, BUT YET A

BELIEVER, BEFORE GOD

1. QUERIES. -- was it possible for the justice of God to be satisfied unless the law were likewise satisfied,

2. Is the satisfaction which has been rendered in Christ to the justice of God, the same as that rendered to the law through Christ?

3. Do legal righteousness and that of the gospel differ in essence? Or, Is the essence of both of them the same, that is, the matter -- the obedience performed to God, and the universal form -- the necessary conformity to the law?

4. Are there three parts of the righteousness of Christ by which believers are constituted righteous? Is the first of them the holiness of the nature of Christ, which is denominated habitual righteousness? Is the second those sufferings which, from infancy to the moment of his decease, he sustained on our account, and is this denominated his passive obedience, or that of his death? Is the third the most perfect, nay, the more than perfect fulfillment of the moral law, (add also that of the ceremonial law,) through the whole of his life to the period of his death; and is this denominated his active obedience, or that of his life?

5. Were not the acts of that obedience which Christ performed, and by which we are justified, imposed on him according to the peculiar command of the Father, and according to a peculiar compact or covenant entered into between him and the Father, in which he prescribed and stipulated those acts of obedience, with the addition of a promise that he should obtain eternal redemption for them, [the human race] and should see his seed, whom this obedience should justify through his knowledge, that is, through faith in him,

6. To which of the offices of Christ do those acts of obedience belong, 7. Is the righteousness of Christ the righteousness of a believer or of an elect person, before God imputes it to him?

8. Does God impute this righteousness to him before he justifies him through faith?

9. Or, which is the same thing, Is the object about which God is occupied in the act of justification, an elect person, unrighteous indeed in himself but righteous in Christ his head; so that he accounts him righteous because he is already righteous in Christ, that is, because the punishment due to him has been paid and endured by him in His Surety and Head, or because he has thus performed the obedience which was due from him?

10. Has an elect person really endured punishment in Christ and performed obedience, or only in the divine estimation or reckoning! And is this divine estimation, by which the elect person is reckoned to have endured punishment and performed obedience, an act preceding justification?

11. Does not the act of acceptation, by which God accepted the obedience of his Son, precede the oblation by which, through the gospel, he offers his Son for righteousness, 12. Is the accepted imputation of the righteousness of Christ justification itself, or a preliminary to justification?

13. Is not the act of apprehension, by which faith apprehends Christ and his righteousness, or Christ for righteousness, prior to justification itself?

14. If this act [of apprehension] be prior to justification, how is faith the instrumental cause of our justification; that is, at once the instrumental cause of the apprehending which precedes justification, and of justification itself which succeeds this apprehending,

15. Or, Does not faith apprehend Christ offered for righteousness, before faith is imputed for righteousness?

16. In this enunciation, "faith is imputed to the believer for righteousness," is the word

"faith" to be properly received as the instrumental act by which Christ has been apprehended for righteousness? Or is it to be improperly received, that is, by a metonymy, for the very object which faith apprehends?

17. Is this phrase, "faith is received relatively and instrumentally," the same as "by the word Faith is signified, through a metonymy, the very object of faith"?

18. Or, Is it the same thing to say "we are justified by faith correlatively, and as it is an instrumental act, by which we apprehend Christ for righteousness" as we say "we are justified by obedience or righteousness"?

19. May the righteousness of Christ be correctly said to be graciously imputed for righteousness, or to be graciously accounted for righteousness?

20. When the apostle expresses himself in this manner, "Faith is imputed for righteousness," must not this be understood concerning the imputation which is made, not according to debt, but according to grace?

21. May that of which we are made partakers through faith, or by faith, be called the instrumental effect of faith?

22. When God has decreed to justify no one through grace and mercy, except him who believes in Christ, and, therefore, through the preaching of the gospel, requires faith in Christ from him who desires to be justified, can it not be said "when God is graciously judging according to the gospel, he is occupied about faith, as about a condition, which is required from, and performed by, him who appears before the throne of grace to be judged and justified"?

23. If this may be asserted, what crime is there in saying "through the gratuitous and gracious acceptance [of God] is faith accounted for righteousness on account of the obedience of Christ"?

24. Is "If the work of men who are born again were perfect, they might be justified by them, though they may have perpetrated many evil works when [or before] they obtain the remission of them" a correct assertion?

XXIV. ON THE GOOD WORKS OF BELIEVERS

1. QUERIES. -- Is it truly said, concerning the good works of believers "they are unclean like a menstruous cloth", And does this confession, "We are all as an unclean thing, and all our righteousness are as filthy rags," &c., (Isa. lxiv, 6,) belong to those works?

2. In what sense is it correctly said "Believers sin mortally in every one of their good works"?

3. Do the good works of believers come into the judgment of God so far only as they are testimonies of faith; or like- wise so far as they have been prescribed by God, and sanctioned and honoured with the promise of a reward, although this reward be not bestowed on them except "of grace" united with mercy, and on account of Christ, whom God hath appointed and set forth as a propitiation through faith in his blood, and, therefore, with reference to faith in Christ?

XXV. ON PRAYER

1. QUERIES. -- Does prayer, or the invocation of God, hold relation only to the performance of worship to his honour? Or, does it likewise bear the relation of means necessary for obtaining that which is asked -- means, indeed, which God foresaw would be employed before he absolutely determined to bestow the blessing on the petitioner,

2. Is the faith with which we ought to pray, that faith by which he who prays believes assuredly that he will obtain what he asks? Or is it that faith by which he is assuredly persuaded, that he is asking according to the will of God, and will obtain what he asks, provided God knows that it will conduce to his glory and to the salvation of the petitioner?

XXVI. ON THE INFANTS OF BELIEVERS WHEN THEY ARE OFFERED FOR

BAPTISM QUERY. -- When the children of believers are offered for baptism, are they considered as "the children of wrath," or as the children of God and of grace?

And if they be considered in both ways, is this relation according to the same time, or according to different times?

XXVII. ON THE SUPPER OF THE LORD

QUERY. -- Is not the proximate and most appropriate, and, therefore, the immediate end of the Lords Supper, both as it was at first instituted and as it is now used, the memory, or commemoration, or annunciation of the Lord's death, and this with thanksgiving for the gift of God, in delivering up his Son to death for us, and in having given his flesh to be eaten and his blood to be drank through faith in him?

XXVIII. ON MAGISTRACY

1. The chief magistrate is not correctly denominated political or secular, because those epithets are opposed to the ecclesiastical and spiritual power.

2. In the hands and at the disposal of the chief magistrate is placed, under God, the supreme and sovereign power of caring and providing for his subjects, and of governing them, with respect to animal and spiritual life.

3. The care of religion has been committed by God to the chief magistrate, more than to priests and to ecclesiastical persons.

4. It is in the power of the magistrate to enact laws concerning civil and ecclesiastical polity, yet not unless those persons have been asked and consulted who are the best versed in spiritual matters, and who are peculiarly designed for teaching the church.

5. It is the duty of the magistrate to preserve and defend the ecclesiastical ministry --to appoint the ministers of God's word, after they have previously undergone a lawful examination before a presbytery -- to take care that they perform their duty -- to require an account of their ministry -- to admonish and incite those among them who are negligent -- to bestow rewards on those ministers who preside well over their flocks, and to remove such as are pertinaciously negligent, or who bring a scandal on the church.

6. Also to invoke councils, whether general, national or provincial; by his own authority to preside as moderator of the assembly, either in person or through deputies suitable for discharging such an office.

7. QUERY -- Is it useful to ecclesiastical conventions or assemblies, that those persons preside over them whose interest it is that matters of religion and church discipline should be transacted in this manner rather than in that?

8. For the discharge of these duties, the magistrate must understand those mysteries of religion which are absolutely necessary for the salvation of men; for in this part [of his high office] he cannot depend upon and confide in the conscience of another person.

9. The Christian magistrate both presides in those ecclesiastical assemblies in which he is present, and pronounces a decisive and definitive sentence, or has the right of delivering a decisive and definitive sentence.

XXIX. ON THE CHURCH OF ROME

1. QUERIES. -- Must a difference be made between the court of Rome, (that is, the Roman pontiff, the cardinals, and the other sworn retainers and satelites of his kingdom,) and the Church which is denominated Romish?

2. Can those persons by no means be called "the church of Christ," who, having been deceived by the Roman pontiff consider him as the successor of St. Peter and the head of the church?

3. Has God sent a bill of divorcement to those persons, so that he does not at all acknowledge them as his, any more than he does Mahometans and Jews?

THE LETTER

ON THE SIN AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST

TO JOHN UYTENBOGARD, HIS MOST DEAR AND PECULIARLY BELOVED

BROTHER IN CHRIST, JAMES ARMINIUS WISHES HEALTH AND HIS

WELFARE THROUGH CHRIST

Most Friendly Of Mankind:

As You intend soon to preach before the members of your church on The Sin against the Holy Ghost, you request that I will disclose to you my meditations and musings on that subject, on which you had also previously asked my opinion; but at that time, it was not in my power to comply with your request; for I had formed no distinct conception in my mind respecting it, neither have my sentiments upon it yet attained to any certain and full persuasion. But my slight musings and meditations, I neither feel any desire of denying to you, nor would it be my duty to withhold them from one to whom I have long ago transferred the plenary fight of requiring and even commanding any thing from me. Nor will I suffer myself to be seduced from this desire of obeying you by any false and rustic shame, though I know that my contemplations on this question, are such as cannot satisfy you, since, in fact, they are not much approved by myself. For, of what kind soever they may be, I am aware that they deserve to obtain some excuse, as they are concerning that question, than which scarcely any one of greater difficulty can be found in the whole Scripture, as St.

Augustine testifies when professedly treating upon this subject, (tom. 19, fol. 9,) in his explication of Matt. xii, 31,32. Besides, I hope and feel fully persuaded, that you will so polish these, my rough notes, that I may afterwards receive them from you not only with interest, but also others which will be able entirely to complete my wishes.

But I will not at present examine what St. Augustine has produced on the same passage, when writing about this sin; nor what is found on this subject in the writings of other authors, whether among the ancients or in our own times, lest I should be unnecessarily prolix, especially as you are yourself extremely well furnished with their works, and are ready to make the necessary inquiry into their sentiments. I will transcribe for you my own meditations, not in that order which is suitable to the nature of the thing itself, (for how is it possible for me to do this, when it is not fully known by me?) but in the order which it is possible for me to observe in the confusion of various thoughts.

It will not be useless, in the first place, to prefix to this investigation those passages of Scripture in which mention is made of this sin, or in which it seems at least to be made.

"Wherefore I say unto you, All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men; but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men. And whosoever speaketh against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come. (Matt. xii, 31,32.) "Verily I say unto you All sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and blasphemies wherewithsoever they shall blaspheme; but he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation." (Mark iii, 28,29.) "and whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him; but unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven." (Luke xii, 10.) There are, besides, two passages in the epistle to the Hebrews, the first of them in the sixth chapter, the other in the tenth, which it seems possible to refer to this subject without any great detriment. "For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, if they shall fall away, to renew them again to repentance; seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame? (Heb. vi, 4-6.) "He that despised Moses'

law, died without mercy under two or three witnesses; of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified, an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of grace?" (x, 28,29.) To these may be added a passage from St. John's first epistle: "If any man see his brother sin a sin which is not unto death, he shall ask, and he shall give him life for them that sin not unto death. There is a sin unto death: I do not say that he shall pray for it?" (1

John v, 16.) Let the following passage also, from the epistle to the Hebrews, be added, for the sake of explanation, not because it is on exactly the same subject: "For if the word spoken by angels was steadfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward, how shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation, which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him, God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will?" (Heb. ii, 2-4.) To these, let another passage be subjoined from the Acts of the Apostles: "Ye stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost. As did your fathers, so do ye." (Acts vii, 51.) But about the same persons, it was said, in a preceding chapter, "And they were not able to resist the wisdom and the Spirit by which Stephen spake." (vi, 10.) "And all that sat in the council looking steadfastly on him, saw his face as it had been the face of an angel."

(vi, 15.)

I unite these passages for no other reason than that I may be able to contemplate them all together at one glance, and may direct my thoughts according to them.

And, first, we must see the appellations which the sin receives about which we are here treating.

The Evangelists Matthew, Mark and Luke call it "the blasphemy of the Spirit," or "the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost." In the sixth chapter of the epistle to the Hebrews, it is called "a prolapsing" or "falling away," and in the tenth chapter of the same epistle, it is called "contumely poured on the Spirit of grace," or "a doing despite to the Spirit of grace." I might add, from the sixth chapter, "the crucifying afresh of the Son of God," and "the putting of him to an open shame;" and from the tenth, "the treading under foot of the Son of God," and "the profanation of the blood of the covenant," unless they were capable of being referred to some other thing, which we shall afterwards discuss. In 1 John v, 16, it is designated as "a sin unto death." The sin which is described in Hebrews, ii, 2-4, is denominated "a neglecting of the salvation which was first announced by Christ and his apostles," and confirmed by God with infallible testimonies. In Acts vii, 51, it is called "a resisting of the Holy Ghost." We are permitted thus to employ these passages, because an inquiry is instituted into the genus of the sin.

He, against whom the sin is committed, is styled by St. Matthew, Mark and Luke, "the Holy Spirit;" and, in Hebrews 10, he is called the "Spirit of grace;" by this addition of the epithet "of grace" to the Spirit, seems to be intimated that the person of the Holy Spirit himself is not so much the object of consideration in this passage, as some gracious act of his. The same Evangelists make a distinction between this sin and that against "the Son of Man," while in Hebrews 6 and 10, the same sin is said to redound to the ignominy of the Son of God and of his blood -- two declarations which must afterwards be reconciled, for each of them is true.

But when the men who commit this sin are described, in Hebrews 6, as "those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of that heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come," in Hebrews 2, salvation is said to have been announced to them, and confirmed by indubitable testimonies. In Acts 6, it is attributed to them that "they were not able to resist the wisdom and Spirit by which Stephen spoke," and that they

"saw his face as that of an angel." From these particulars, it seems proper to collect by what cause they were impelled who committed this sin.

It is, moreover, attributed to this sin by Matthew, Mark and Luke, that it is irremissible, or not to be forgiven; by St. John that his unto death. The same thing is affirmed in Hebrews 6, but, as it appears to me, it is in the cause; for it is said to be impossible that he who has thus "fallen away should be renewed again unto repentance." In Hebrews 10, in the application of the comparison, this sin is said to deserve a more severe punishment than the despising of the law of Moses; and in the commencement of the same passage, the certainty of punishment is signified by these words: "He died without mercy," which seems also to be placed in the antapodosis, the repetition or summing up. In Hebrews 2, he who neglects this salvation is said "to receive a just recompense of reward."

Besides, the cause why that sin is irremissible, unto death, and why the man who thus sins cannot be renewed unto repentance, seems to be rendered in Hebrews 6, in the following terms: "- seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame." And in Hebrews 10, in the following words: "- who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant, wherewith he was sanctified, an unholy thing." For it does not seem to me that these expressions can be placed collaterally with falling away and doing despite to the Spirit of grace; but I think they must be placed in subordination among themselves.

Lastly, in Hebrews 2 a 10, is instituted a comparison between this sin and the violation and the despising of the law of Moses; for this likewise is worthy of consideration, that we may correctly determine concerning the kind of sin. From this comparison of it appears that the sin about which those passages treat, is not committed against the law of Moses.

But from the contexture of those things which precede, and from a comparison of those which follow, is to be taken the occasion through which Christ, in the Evangelists, St. Paul in the epistle to the Hebrews, and St. John in his first epistle, have made mention of this sin.

Let us now commence an inquiry into the matters which come under consideration in this sin, following, as far as possible, the guidance of those passages which we have premised and prefixed to this our disquisition. But to me it appears possible, most commodiously to circumscribe them within the following bounds: Let us, in the first place, (1.) enter into a discussion on the genus or kind of this sin; (2.) its object and mode; (3.) those who commit the sin; (4.) the impelling cause; (5.) the end of this sin; (6.) the degrees of this sin; (7.) the peculiar attribute of this sin -- its irremissibility or unpardonableness, and its cause. To these we shall subjoin the three other questions, which you mention in your letter. (1.) Can this sin be known by the human judgment, and what are the marks? (2.) Are those who are commonly considered to have perpetrated this sin, to be held as being guilty of it or not, (3.) Does not this distinction between the sin against the Son of Man, and that against the Holy Spirit, contribute to the confirmation of the truth of the personality of the Holy Ghost?

1. With respect to the genus or kind, it is a subject of much regret that a disquisition upon it is a matter of great difficulty. For it is produced from no other source than the too great fertility of sin, and its deduction and derivation into various species; yet it is not necessary to refer all the distributions and distinctions of sin to this point; we must descend commodiously by those degrees which may bring us down to this kind of sin.

In order to do this, we must commence with that which is the highest. Sin, therefore, is the transgression of the divine law, of whatever description that law may be; for we are treating upon a sin of this kind. A transgression of the law is either special, against one or more of the precepts of the law; or it is universal, against the whole and entire law, which is called a rejection and abrogation of the law, and a defection from it, and which is as much against what is commanded or forbidden in the law, as against him who directly commanded it, through contempt for Him. This kind of sin, I suppose, is signified in the Old Testament by the phrase, to sin with a high or elevated hand; for the moral law consists of a preface which is contained in these words: "I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt," &c., and of an enumeration of the precepts. Either the preface itself is rejected and God directly despised, or sin is committed against the precepts, none of which can in fact be violated without bringing ignominy on the divine Majesty and pouring contempt upon God. But every sin is not from a contempt for God. David committed adultery, which may be reductively or consequently referred to a contemning of God, and resolved into it; but he did not commit that sin through a contempt for God.

The law of God is now two-fold -- the one of works, the other of faith; or, the precepts of the law are of two kinds: some, of the law properly so called, and others of the gospel. But this sin about which we are treating is not of the kind of those which are perpetrated against the law of God, whether it be a special or universal transgression and an apostasy from the law. This is evident from Hebrews x, 28,29; for this sin is there compared with the violation or abrogation of the law of Moses, as a greater sin with a smaller one. It is also evident from Hebrews ii, 2-4. This sin is also called "a doing despite unto the Spirit of grace," which is not that of the law, but the Spirit of Christ and of his gospel. It is easy to perceive the same thing in the Evangelists; for, in St. Matthew's gospel, Christ says, "but if I by the Spirit of God cast out devils, then the kingdom of God is come unto you." (xii, 28.) This sin, therefore, is committed against the Spirit who testifies that the kingdom of God has arrived; and, on this account, it is not committed against the law of God, but against the gospel of Jesus Christ. The same thing may be rendered evident from Hebrews 6, in which the apostle treats about a falling away from those gifts which are there enumerated, and which are the gifts of the gospel of Christ. Christ is also said "to be crucified afresh and put to an open shame "by this "falling away;" and, in Hebrews 10, he is said to be "trodden under foot," and "the blood of the covenant is said to be profaned." All these are sins committed, not against the law, but against the gospel of Christ.

From these observations, it is evident, that those persons who assert that this sin is committed against the acknowledged truth concerning God, and concerning His will and works, have not taught concerning it with sufficient distinctness; they ought to have subjoined "against the truth of the gospel." But the commands of the gospel are two -- that of faith in Christ, and that of conversion to God. Concerning faith it is manifest. About conversion let us now inquire; for as aversion from God is produced by sin, the law accuses him who is thus averse or turned aside, and condemns him to cursing, without any hopes of pardon; but the gospel requires conversion and promises pardon. Therefore, conversion to God is an evangelical command, and not legal. But impenitence is opposed to conversion to God; and this, when final, condemns a man through the peremptory decree of God, that is, through that which is evangelical. This final impenitence, however, cannot be called "the sin against the Holy Ghost," which is the subject on which we are now treating. For (1.) final impenitence is common to all those who are to be condemned; while the sin against the Holy Ghost attaches to certain persons, or, rather, to very few. (2.) Final impenitence is not committed except at the closing period of life; but this sin is perpetrated while he is still running the space of life. This is apparent from 1 John v, 16: "There is a sin unto death; I do not say that he shall pray for it." (3.) Concerning him who commits the sin unto death it is said that "it is impossible for him to be renewed again to repentance;" but this would be a useless expression respecting one who was finally impenitent; for it is well known that all hopes of pardon are terminated by the short course of the present life. (4.) Respecting the sin against the Holy Ghost, it is affirmed that "it shall not be forgiven, neither in this world nor in that which is to come;" that is, it shall never be forgiven. But it is unnecessary to make such an affirmation concerning final impenitence.

This sin, therefore, is a transgression of the precept which commands faith in Jesus Christ. But as the doctrine concerning faith in Jesus Christ is not only entire, but likewise consists of certain parts; from this may be assumed a difference in the transgression, that one is universal, the other special. The universal is that by which Christ is simply rejected and refused, and which may receive the general appellation of "infidelity" or "unbelief." The special is that by which Christ is not universally rejected, but is merely not accepted as he has been manifested in his word; and this is called "a heresy," that term being employed concerning those who, after having professed faith in Christ, do not preserve his doctrines entire and unsullied, but corrupt them. But the sin about which we are treating does not lie in this special transgression. It belongs, therefore, to the universal transgression of this precept concerning faith in Christ; and it is infidelity or unbelief. It is not all unbelief, of which there are various kinds. (1.) The infidelity of those who have heard nothing respecting Christ; but such persons do not commit the sin against the Holy Ghost. (2.) That of those persons who have indeed heard of Christ, but have not understood; (Matt. xiii, 19; ) neither does the sin against the Holy Ghost attach to these men. (3.) The unbelief of those who have understood, but who have not been certainly persuaded and convinced in their consciences respecting the truth of the things understood; but these persons are not guilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost. (4.) That of those men who, being convinced in their consciences that Jesus is the Christ, by their infidelity still reject him; and, according to my judgment, to this class of persons belongs the sin against the Holy Ghost, about which we are now treating.

Therefore, the genus or kind is a repulsion and rejection of Christ in opposition to conscience. It is not a mere abnegation or disowning; for that is the part of him who has previously made a profession. It is not an oppugnation or attack; for that belongs to further progress, [in the sin], as we shall, afterwards perceive. But it is worthy of observation, that in reality it is one and the same thing, whether it be called "a refusal of Christ," or "a rejection of the truth concerning Christ," provided a universal rejection be understood, and not a particular rejection in one doctrine or more.

2. Let us now come to the object. The object of this sin is said to be a person against whom the offense is committed, whether that person be God, or the offending mortal himself, or his neighbour. But we must take into our consideration not only the object, but also its mode, which the schoolmen denominate "the formal reason." This mode, when added to the object, causes the latter to be proper, adequate, and peculiar or suitable. A surface is an object of sight, but it is one which is coloured. An offense is committed against God by ingratitude, but it is against him as having merited better returns from us. We also sin against God by disobedience and contempt, as against him commanding, forbidding, promising, threatening, chastising, correcting, &c.

Apostasy is committed against God, but it is against him when acknowledged as God, and to whose Deity and name he who falls away had devoted himself by oath. But, in this place, the object of the sin about which we are treating is Jesus Christ, and he immediately. This is the reason why I add the word "immediately," because he who rejects the Son, rejects also the Father. The mode of formal reason has been manifested and proved, [to the man who commits this sin,] nay, it has been known to be the Messiah and Redeemer of the world. This is evident from Hebrews vi, 6, in which those who thus "fall away" are said to "crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh and put him to an open shame." It is also evident from Hebrews x, 29, in which such persons are said to "tread under foot the Son of God, and to count the blood of the covenant an unholy thing." This is still more apparent from the words of the Pharisees, who said, "He casteth out devils by Beelzebub, the prince of devils," which are thus related by St. Mark: "For they said, he has an impure spirit," whether by these words they committed this sin, or not; for they contain the occasion on which Christ began to speak about the sin against the Holy Ghost. But because this mode agrees with the object through some gracious act, which proceeds principally and immediately from the Holy Spirit or the Spirit of grace; on this account this sin is called "the sin against the Holy Ghost" or against "the Spirit of grace;" because the offense is committed against that act of the Holy Spirit, either by despising the act, or by treating him also with ignominy. But that act of the Spirit is the act of testifying concerning Christ and the coming of his kingdom; an act not only sufficient to prove that Jesus is the Christ; but also efficacious, and assuredly convincing the mind and conscience of him to whom the testification is communicated concerning Christ; the operation and complete effect of which, in the mind of man, are an assured knowledge and persuasion of this truth, that "Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God." But of this sin the Holy Spirit is not the object; for it is not directed against his person. This is apparent from the end of the testifying and the object; for the end of this testification is Christ. But the object of this sin committed against the testification, and the object of the testification itself, are one and the same. And the end of the testifying is, not that the Holy Spirit, but that Jesus, be acknowledged and accepted for the Son of God and for the Anointed of the Lord. This is declared by Christ in the following words:

"If I by the Spirit of God cast out devils, then is the kingdom of God come unto you."

It also conduces to the same purpose that, not the Spirit out of Christ, but Christ himself in and through the Spirit, performed the miracles. From this, it appears, that the performing of miracles serves to prove the truth of the preaching of Christ concerning himself.

From these remarks, I think, we may easily solve the difficulty which lies in the words of Christ, who distinguishes this "sin against the Holy Ghost" from "the sin against the Son of Man," and who declares that the former is irremissible or unpardonable, but that the latter is capable of forgiveness. For the sin against the Son of Man, without this testification of the Spirit, is remitted to many men; and it appears from the whole of this discussion, that regard is not had so much to the person against whom the sin is committed, as to the act of testification proceeding from the Holy Spirit, against whom the sin is perpetrated. With respect to the act, therefore, it is said to be perpetrated against the Holy Ghost, not against the Son of Man, but, with respect to the object, against the Son of Man, but who is known from the act of testifying.

Since, then, regard is had rather to the act than to the object, in this respect this sin is called by Christ "the sin against the Holy Ghost," and is distinguished from the sin which is committed against Christ without any consideration of this mode and formal reason. I know there are among the fathers those who understand the appellation,

"Son of Man," through a reduplication or reflection, to signify Jesus as he is the Son of Man, and the epithet, "Son of God," to signify Jesus as he is the Son of God. They also consider, that, when a sin committed against Jesus as he is the Son of Man, the offense is another and a less one than when he is sinned against as the Son of God.

But such a consideration has no place here; for the testification of the Holy Spirit conduces to this end -- that the person who is sometimes denominated the Son of Man and sometimes the Son of God, be received as the true and only Messiah. Yet if any man be desirous of referring this consideration of some of the ancient fathers to the point under discussion, he will be able to say that a sin is committed against the Son of Man when Jesus is not recognized as the Son of God, but that a sin is committed against the Son of God, when it has been already proved, by undoubted testimonies, that he is the Son of God. The expressions in the Evangelist "Whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him," serve to favour this consideration, as do also those in the Epistle to the Hebrews, "crucifying to themselves the Son of God," and they who have "trodden under foot the Son of God,"

that is, Jesus, whom, through "the enlightening" of the Holy Spirit, they had previously accounted as "the Son of God." For it is manifest from the Scriptures that it was necessary to believe this attribute concerning Jesus of Nazareth, that he was the Christ, the Son of God, the saviour and Redeemer of the world, &c.; and as the object and the acts occupied about it have a mutual relation so that from an adequate object we can determine concerning the act, and from an act we can form a conclusion respecting the adequate object, it appears possible for us to conclude, from the acts which the apostle enumerates in Hebrews 6, and 10, that those persons who had thus sinned against Jesus, not only acknowledged him as the Son of God, but also sinned against him as against the Son of God whom they had so acknowledged. For, no one is said to "crucify the Son of God afresh," and to "tread him under foot," except that man who acknowledges him as the Son of God, and who sins against him under that consideration. For instance, the American Indians cannot be said to have "trodden under foot the gospel of Christ," when they trampled under their feet, and threw into the fire, the small volume of the four gospels, which was shewn to them by the Spaniards, who, in a boasting manner, represented it to them as the true gospel.

3. Let us now proceed to the description of the persons who commit this sin, that is, such as they are defined to us according to the Scriptures. But, generally, they are those who, through the testification of the Holy Spirit in their minds and consciences, are convinced of this truth -- that Jesus, the son of Mary, is Christ the Sod of God. Yet these persons may differ among themselves, and in reality do differ; for, after having been convinced of this truth, they either immediately reject Christ, never tendering him their names to be enrolled among his followers; or, having for a season embraced and professed Christ, they decline from him and fall away. Of the first of these two classes were the Pharisees, if, at the time when they said that" Christ cast out devils through Beelzebub," they were convinced in their consciences that such ejectment of the devils was truly the work of the Holy Spirit, as Christ had laid down his argument,

"If I by the Spirit of God cast out devils, by whom do your sons cast them out?" Of the second class, are those of whom mention is made in Hebrews 6 and 10. For they who embrace Christ even with a temporary faith, do this through the illumination of the Holy Spirit; because "no man can say that Jesus is the Lord, except by the Holy Ghost." (1 Cor. xii, 3.) To these persons has been granted some "taste of the heavenly gift, of the good word of God, and of the powers of the world to come;" for the testification of the Holy Spirit concerning Jesus Christ the Son of God, when impressed with a full persuasion on the mind, can be followed by no other effect than the excitement of joy and gladness in the heart of him who professes Christ, as Christ himself declares, in Matthew xiii, 20, "But he that received the seed into stony places, the same is he that heareth the word, and anon with joy receiveth it," and as he also declares, in John v, 35, concerning those who "were willing for a season to rejoice in the light of John the Baptist." But on this subject consult Calvin's Institutes. (Lib. 3, cap. 2, sec. 11.) With regard to what is added in Heb. vi, 5, that the same persons

"were made partakers of the Holy Ghost," this may be understood to relate to those extraordinary gifts of the Holy Spirit which at that period flourished in the church.

This is likewise declared in Heb. ii, 4: "God likewise bare them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will." In these persons, that abnegation or renouncing of Christ occurs which, in Hebrews 6, is denominated "a falling away," that is, from the truth which they have acknowledged, and from the confession of the name of Christ which they have made.

About this renunciation of himself, Christ treats in a general manner in Luke xii, 9, subjoining to that passage a special mode in the particular deed which we are now discussing, and says, "Whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him; but unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven." To this genus of renunciation belongs the deed of Peter; but it is distinct, and differs greatly from this species, as will be very apparent in the next member that comes under our consideration. Therefore, the sin against the Holy Ghost is distinguished according to the mode of efficient causes, of which we have already adduced a distinction.

4. It follows that we now institute an inquiry into the cause of this sin. The cause of all sin is commonly represented to be either ignorance, weakness, or malice. Ignorance, not negative, but privative of the knowledge which ought to be within, and, therefore, ignorance of the law. Weakness, too infirm to resist vehement passion and temptation, and the seductions which impel men to sin. Malice, by which any one knowingly and willingly, being enticed indeed by some temptation, but which can be easily resisted by the will, and which the will is able readily to overcome, is induced to sin. Though ignorance and infirmity are not directly and immediately the causes of sin, yet they are causes through the mode of prohibiting absence -- ignorance, through the mode of the absence of right knowledge and reason, which might be able to hinder from sin by instructing the will -- infirmity, through the mode of the absence of strength and capability, which might hinder from sin by confirming and invigourating the will. If, therefore, we be desirous accurately to examine this matter, the will is the proper, adequate and immediate cause of sin, and has two motives and incentives to commit sin, the one internal, the other external. The internal, which lies in man himself, is the love of himself and a concupiscence or lusting after temporal things, or of the blessings which are visible. The external motive is an object moving the appetite or desire; such objects are honours, riches, pleasures, life, health and soundness, friends, country, and similar things, the contraries to which the man hates and execrates, and is afraid of them, if he imagine them to be impending over him. But these motives do not move the will so efficaciously that the will is necessarily moved; for, in this case, the will would be excusable from sin; but they move the will through the mode of suasion and enticement. But now, when, through love of himself and the desire of some apparent good, (in which is included an avoiding or hatred of an apparent evil,) man is solicited or enticed to some act, which is indeed forbidden, but which he does not know to be sinful, then the will, following the appetite and erroneous reason, is said to sin through ignorance. But when, through the same motives, he is tempted to an act which he knows to be sin, then the will, following the appetite, sins indeed knowingly; but whether such sin is committed through infirmity or through malice, ought to be decided chiefly from the necessity of that good which the man is pursuing, and from the deep heinousness of the evil which he avoids. On this point, a judgment must also be formed from the vehemence of the appetite or passion, as well as from the inclination towards the person who seems desirous to hinder the completion or fulfilling of the desire, (a circumstance which does not on every occasion occur, but which for a certain reason I thought must be added in this place,) where a discrimination of the mode by which he endeavours to hinder, comes under consideration, whether it be good, lawful, and commanded, or whether it be evil, unlawful and forbidden.

Let us now apply these remarks to our purpose. Paul persecuted the church of Christ, but he did it ignorantly, being inflamed with too great a zeal and desire for the law, as many of the Jews also crucified Christ, being ignorant that he was the Lord of glory; otherwise they would have refrained from such a nefarious crime. By those men, therefore, the sin about which we are treating was not committed. Peter denied Christ his Lord, whom he knew to be the true Messiah and the Anointed of the Lord, and his knowledge of this was obtained through an immediate revelation from the Father; but his conduct proceeded from a desire of life and a fear of death -- feelings which may attack even the bravest of mankind. he did it, therefore, through infirmity. Through fear of banishment, prescription, condemnation to the mines or to perpetual imprisonment, some persons have shrunk back from a confession of the name of Christ; and they must be considered as having thus sinned through infirmity. In order to recover the dignity of the sword, the official girdle, &c., which the emperor had threatened to take away from them unless they abjured Christ, some of the early Christians retained all their honours at the expense of denying Christ; yet still even these must be said to have sinned through infirmity. Some individual, having been vehemently tormented, afflicted, injured and stripped of his goods by a Christian prince, or by Christian people, breaks forth into passionate expressions of blasphemy against God and Christ; yet he must be considered as having acted thus through anger and dreadful commotion of spirit. But if the persons in the preceding instances were to add, to this their sin, hatred against Christ Himself and his doctrine, according to my judgment they would not be far from committing the sin against the Holy Ghost.

To express and conclude the whole in one word, I affirm that this sin against the Holy Ghost is properly committed through malice. I understand, here, malice of two kinds: The one, by which no resistance is offered to concupiscence or desire, when that can easily be done, without much inconvenience; the other, by which Christ himself is hated, either because he endeavours, by his precepts, to hinder the completion or fulfillment of the unlawful desire; or because the enjoyment of such illicit desire is not permitted, on account of his cause and name. Both kinds of this malice were in those Jews with whom Christ had the transaction which is mentioned in Matthew 12. But they do not seem then to have been fully convinced in their consciences, that Jesus was the Christ and the promised Messiah. Let us add, therefore, to the other parts of the definition of this sin, that it is committed through malice and hatred against Christ, or through hatred of Christ and of the truth concerning him. This hatred I think is included in the words employed by the apostle in Hebrews 6 & 10; for such persons are there said "to crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh and put him to an open shame, to tread under foot the Son of God, to count the blood of the covenant an unholy thing, and to do despite unto the Spirit of grace." I suppose, by these words, are signified, not the results which happen to those who, beyond expectation, fall away or decline from Christ through their sin; but the acts which, of themselves, and by their own nature are allied to their sin, and which have an affinity with, and are consequences from, the same sin, not without the fixed purpose of those by whom it is committed.

5. To this cause, we will commodiously subjoin an end; for they correspond, for the most part, between themselves, and in a certain respect agree with each other. The end, therefore, is twofold. The one is the obtaining and the enjoyment of an apparent good which has been desired; the other is the completion of hatred, and the rejection of Christ and of his acknowledged truth, which Calvin has enunciated in these words:" -- for this purpose, that they may resist." By this very circumstance, is signified the malice of the man who thus sins, which, not content with obtaining the apparent good through the act of sin, is delighted even with the very act of sin as with its end or intention. This is a certain sign, that the will of this man has not been impelled by inclination or passion to perpetrate this crime, but that it has freely followed the inclination, and has added of its own this other thing -- hatred against Christ, from which, this hatred may be said to be entirely voluntary, and, therefore, arising from malice. For as appetite or desire is attributed to the concupiscible faculty, infirmity to the irascible, and ignorance to the reason or mind, so is malice attributed to the will.

But from these things, considered in this manner, it seems the sin against the Holy Ghost may be thus defined: "The sin against the Holy Ghost is the rejection and refusing of Jesus Christ through determined malice and hatred against Christ, who, through the testifying of the Holy Spirit, has been assuredly acknowledged for the Son of God, (or, which is the same thing, the rejection and refusing of the acknowledged universal truth of the gospel,) against conscience and committed for this purpose -that the sinner may fulfill and gratify his desire of the apparent good which is by no means necessary, and may reject Christ."

6. Let us subjoin these observations concerning the devotees of this sin. The following degrees of this sin, it seems to me possible to lay down in a commodious manner: The First is the rejection and refusal of Christ acknowledged, or of the acknowledged truth of the gospel. This degree is universal and primary; and it holds good under every circumstance, whether he who rejects and refuses Christ have for a season professed himself to be a disciple of Christ, or not -- a point which we have already discussed under the third head. The second degree is blasphemy against Christ the Son of God, and against the acknowledged truth of the gospel. The third is the assaulting and persecution of Christ, either in his own person or in those of his members, or the extirpation of the truth acknowledged. A fourth degree may be added, from the difference between the object, and the act by which that object is demonstrated and manifested; and this is blasphemy against the Spirit himself, or against the act of the Holy Spirit. For. he who calls Christ "a wine bibber,"a friend of publicans and sinners,"a seducer and false prophet," while he owns him to be the Son of God, sins in a different manner From him who says, that those miraculous operations of the Holy Spirit were performed by Beelzebub and were diabolical.

7. We have now arrived at the seventh division, which relates to the adjunct or attribute peculiar to this sin, that is, its being irremissible or unpardonable, and the cause why it is thus incapable of being forgiven. This sin is called "the sin unto death," not in the sense in which all sins merit death eternal, and that are, notwithstanding, remitted to many persons, as they have believed in Christ and are converted to God, but because no one who has committed this sin against the Holy Ghost, or who shall hereafter commit it, has at any time had the felicity, nor will he have it, of escaping death eternal. It is called "irremissible," not in the same manner as that in which unbelief and final impenitence are unpardonable, through this decree of God: "He that believeth not on the Son of God, is condemned," and "Unless ye repent and be converted, ye shall all likewise perish," &c. For these are conditions, without which sin is forgiven to no man. But it is called "unpardonable" in this sense, that, when it has once been perpetrated, the sinner never obtains remission from God, and never can obtain it, through the definitive and peremptory statute and decree of God, even though the offender should live many ages afterwards. But the proximate and immediate cause why this sin is unpardonable, seems to me to be comprehended in these words of the apostle in the epistle to the Hebrews: "It is impossible for those who shall thus fall away, to be renewed again unto repentance." The efficacy of this cause proceeds from the perpetual and immutable decree of God concerning the nonforgiveness of sins without repentance. But the mind cannot rest here; for it is further asked, "Why is it impossible for those who thus sin to be renewed again unto repentance?" The solution of this question, as it seems to me, must be taken partly from the causes of this "renewing again unto repentance," and partly from the heinousness of this sin, as described by the apostle in Hebrews 6 and 10. From a collation of these passages, it will be manifest why those who thus sin "cannot be renewed again to repentance."

(1.) Let us treat on the causes of this renewing again. Renewing again to repentance seems to proceed from the mercy or grace of God in Christ, on account of the intercession of Christ, through the operation of the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit of grace.

But this mercy of God, intercession of Christ, and operation of the Holy Spirit, are not infinite, that is, they do not operate according to the infinite omnipotence of God and Christ, and of his Spirit; but they are circumscribed by a certain mode of the equity and will of God, of Christ, and of the Spirit of God. This is apparent from particular passages of Scripture. Concerning the mercy of God, "God has mercy on whom he will have mercy; and whom he will, he hardeneth." Concerning the intercession of Christ, "I pray not for the world." Concerning the operation of the Holy Spirit, "whom the world cannot receive."

(2.) Let us now consider the heinousness of this sin from the description of this apostle, who says, Those who thus sin, "crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame; they tread under foot the Son of God, count the blood of the covenant an unholy thing, and do despite unto the Spirit of grace." But I account these acts to be so black and diabolical, that we must affirm, the mercy of God in Christ is circumscribed by no bounds whatsoever, the intercession of Christ is concluded within no space, and the Spirit of grace can be hindered by no malice, if God does not deny his mercy to such persons, if Christ intercedes for them, and if the Spirit of Grace is not deterred from them so as not to exert upon them his gracious efficacy. Take into consideration the difference of the sin which is committed against the law of God, and that against the gospel and the grace of God in Christ; and reflect how much more heinous it is to reject the remedy of the disease than to fall into the disease itself! To remove from his hearers their despair of pardon, St. Peter says to them, after having been convicted of the sin which they had committed against Christ,

"Now, brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it." (Acts iii, 17.) St. Paul says to the Corinthians, "For had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory." (1 Cor. ii, 8.) He also says, concerning himself, "but I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." (1 Tim. i, 13.) Christ, when hanging on the Cross, and as the Scriptures express it in Isaiah liii, 12, while making intercession for the transgressors, said, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." (Luke xxiii, 34.) The Scriptures declare, respecting the Holy Spirit, that he is capable not only of being grieved, (Ephes. iv, 30,) but likewise of being vexed, (Isa. lxiii, 10,) and of being quenched. (1 Thess. v, 19.) Whosoever they be who answer this description, and crucify Christ long acknowledged by them as the Son of God, and who tread under foot his blood, that blood by which God hath redeemed the church unto himself, which is the price of redemption, than which nothing is more precious, and by which alone the gratuitous covenant between God and men is confirmed and established --who, against their consciences, treat the Holy Spirit with the greatest contempt and disgrace, and who sin so grievously against him that no sin can equal this in heinousness; it follows that, to people of this class, is justly and equitably denied their being renewed again to repentance, unless we completely divest God of justice, and remove from his free will the administration of divine mercy. When we have done this, and have ascribed the dispensing of salvation to the infinity of the divine mercy or goodness only, the very foundations of religion are then overturned, and by this means, life eternal is assigned to all men universally, and even to the devils.

If any one supposes that the affirmations which are made in Hebrews 6 and 10, belong only to those who, after their open profession of Christianity, shall relapse and fall away, let him know that contumely and reproach are poured on "the Spirit of grace,"

by those who have never made a profession of Christianity, and that these words -- "to renew them again unto repentance," and "the blood through which he was sanctified,"

seem properly to belong to those who have not made a profession, and that the remaining parts of the description belong to the entire order of those who sin against the Holy Ghost.

Having considered the preceding matters in this hasty and slight manner, let us now proceed to investigate those three questions which you proposed.

I. With regard to the first, I think it may be known when any one has committed this sin; because, if this had been impossible, John would not have forbidden us to pray for that man. For we ought to pray for all those to whom, with even the least semblance of probability, the mercy of God has been manifested, for whom the intercession of Christ has been prepared, and to whom the grace of the Holy Spirit has not been denied. The ancient church formed a similar judgment, when she not only accounted it improper to pray for Julian, the apostate, but also actually prayed against him. But, according to my judgment, an indication of the knowledge of this sin is afforded by acts on the part of those who commit it. The first act is that profession of the name of Christ which is neither forced nor affected, but voluntary; the second is the rejection of Christ and the abandonment of all profession. If to these two acts be added blasphemy, opposition, &c., the judgment concerning this sin is rendered still more evident.

From these remarks, it is manifest that the judgment of man can be formed only concerning those persons who have, at some time or other, made an open profession of Christianity, and have afterwards relapsed and fallen away. For it is impossible for us to know, except through [an act of] divine revelation, what effects the testification of the Holy Spirit has produced in the minds of those who reject Christ before they make an open profession of him and his religion. This seems to be intimated by St.

John, when he says," If any man shall see his brother," that is, one who has made an open profession of faith in Christ, "sin a sin which is not unto death, he shall ask, and he shall give him life;" and it appears to be immediately repeated on the general principle, "There is a sin unto death," which, if a brother commit, I do not say that he shall pray for it." Let the whole history concerning Julian, the apostate, be taken into consideration, and it will be rendered manifest that the judgment of the church in that age was founded on the two acts which we have enumerated -- the former being the public profession of Christianity, and the latter the act of desertion, blasphemy and persecution.

II. The second question is -- "Have Cain, Saul, Judas, Julian, Francis Spira, &c., perpetrated this crime?"

In regard to this, I say, without any prejudice to the judgment of those who hold other and perhaps more correct sentiments on the subject, it seems to me that Cain did not perpetrate this crime. For this, a probable reason may, I think, be rendered: For he did not sin against grace through hatred to it, but through a perverse jealousy for grace, and through envy against his brother, because Abel had obtained that grace which was denied to himself, he committed crime of fratricide. Concerning the despair which is attributed to him, we know that interpreters differ in their opinions; and though he may have despaired of the mercy of God, yet it cannot be concluded from this that he had committed the sin about which we are treating; for despair is also a consequence of other sins, and not always, I think, an attendant on this sin.

The sin of Saul was against David as a type of Christ, whom he persecuted in opposition to his conscience; but he committed it with this intention -- that he might afterwards preserve the kingdom safe and unimpaired for himself and his posterity.

But as it is another thing to sin against the type of Christ, than to sin against Christ himself, (for Saul was in all likelihood ignorant of David being such a type,) and as he did not entirely decline from the Jewish religion, it has to me the air of probability that Saul did not commit the sin against the Holy Ghost.

My opinion is different respecting Judas Iscariot; for I think that he sinned against the Holy Ghost, and this by the two indications which we have previously laid down. For as he lived three whole years in familiar converse with Christ, heard his discourses, saw his miracles, was himself sent forth with his fellow-disciples to preach the gospel, and was so far enlightened by the Holy Spirit as to be capable of executing that office, and actually did perform its duties, and, having been made a partaker of the Holy Ghost, he himself performed miracles, cast out devils, healed the sick, and raised the dead in the name of Christ, it cannot remain a matter of uncertainty that he assuredly and undoubtedly acknowledged his teacher, Jesus Christ, as the true Messiah and the Son of God. However, he not only deserted him whom he had thus acknowledged, but also delivered him up to his enemies, that sought to put him to death; and he did this not through weakness or some excusable necessity, but merely out of malice and pure hatred of Christ. This is evident from the history of the Evangelists, who relate that, at the moment when the "very precious ointment" was poured on the head of Christ, Judas departed and went to the chief priests, and bargained with them concerning the reward of his treason, which conduct was undoubtedly adopted by him to revenge himself upon Christ for the loss of the three hundred pence, for which the ointment might have been sold, and which were taken away from him, by Christ's permission.

To this must be added, that the Scriptures reckon him among those against whom David, the type of Christ, formerly uttered the same petitions as those which St. Peter enumerates in that passage, (Acts i, 2, ) as having had their accomplishment in Judas.

I entertain a similar opinion respecting Julian the apostate, whom I consider to have completed every branch of this sin through consummate malice and the most bitter enmity against Christ. For he abandoned Christianity, poured infinite contumelies on Christ, and persecuted Christian people and the Christian truth in various ways, nay, by every method which it was possible for him to devise. He also attributed the miracles of Christ more to the devil than to the Son of God, for which reason, the church, in those early days, prayed against him, and her prayers were heard by God, and answered.

With respect to Francis Spira, it would be with great reluctance that I should venture to pronounce him guilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost. On the contrary, I incline to the opposite opinion respecting him, and in this I follow the judgment of some learned men of the present age, who not only acquit him from the guilt of being charged with this sin, but who likewise do not even exclude him from the pardon of his sins.

For (1.)he did not deny Christ himself, but declined to make such a confession of Christ as the Papists disapproved. (2.) He did not avoid this Protestant confession through malice and hatred of the truth known by him, but through weakness and too intense a desire for a good which appeared to him in some degree necessary; for he feared the forcible seizure and loss of his goods, without which he supposed it to be utterly impossible for him to gain a livelihood for himself and family. (3.) In the very agonies of his despair, he made frequent and honourable mention not only of Christ, but likewise of his truth which he had professed. (4.) Being asked by those who stood around him if he wished God to grant him pardon for that offense and to impress the assurance of it upon his mind, he replied, that there was nothing of which he was more desirous, nay, that he wished it could be purchased even by the greatest torments. The purchase of it, however, he knew to be an impossibility -- that no one might suppose that, by this his desire, he inflicted an injury on the blood of Christ. (5.) He diligently and seriously admonished those who visited him to apply themselves to the mortification of the flesh, to renounce the good things of the present life, and also to despise life itself if the cause of Christ and of truth were to be forsaken, lest they, having followed his example, should rush into the same abyss of despair and damnation. All these particulars [in His case] served as inducements to many persons

[in the Venitian states] to withdraw from the papal church, and to unite themselves with the evangelical or reformed church; and to some of those who had entered into this union, they served as reasons for persevering in their profession.

III. With respect to the third question, I answer, that this sin is not directly committed against the Holy Ghost himself, but that it is primarily, properly and immediately perpetrated against his gracious act. Yet this so redounds to the disgrace and contumely of the Holy Spirit himself, that he is said to be blasphemed and to be treated with ignominy by this sin; and that not accidentally, but per se, of itself. But I think, from this, by good consequence, may be deduced that the Holy Spirit is not some property, virtue, or power in God, usually considered by us under the mode of quality, but that it is something living, intelligent, willing and acting, distinct from the Father and the Son; upon which men are accustomed to bestow the appellation of "a person."

To me, this seems possible to be proved by many arguments. (l.) Because he is distinguished in opposition to the Son, which ought not to be done, if he were a virtue or power not subsisting, communicated to Christ by the Father, by which he might perform miracles, as through a principle from which he has the dominion and power of his own act, and not through a principle which itself possesses such a dominion and power. (2.) Because it is said that men sin against the Holy Ghost, and blasphemy is said to be uttered against the Spirit, and he is treated with scorn and contempt. These phrases do not seem to me to indicate the inbeing of the Holy Ghost within God and Christ, but the existence and subsistence of the Holy Spirit; especially as this sin is distinguished from the sin against the Son of Man, which ought not to be done if this sin had been perpetrated against an act of the power which exists within Christ and is employed by him, and not against the act of the powerful and operating Holy Spirit himself; for as there are acts that appertain to persons, (though they operate through some natural property of their own,) so are there also passions belonging to persons. If any man rejects the gracious invitation of God to repentance, that sin is said to be committed against an act of the mercy of God; and, in this manner, he who has so sinned is said to sin against the mercy of God, but so that, by this very act the sin is properly committed against God, who is, himself, the author of this gracious invitation according to his own gratuitous mercy. Neither could he who thus sins against the mercy of God be said not to sin against God, but against his mercy; as he who sins against the gracious act of the Holy Spirit, is said, in this passage, (Matt. xii, 31,32) to sin, not against the Son of Man, against the Holy Spirit.

IV. To these three questions might be added a FOURTH: "Can the mere thinking upon the perpetration of this sin, and the serious deliberation about its commission, come under the denomination of the sin itself, and receive such an appellation, in the same way as he is called a murderer who is angry with his brother, and as that man is said to have committed adultery in his heart who has looked upon the wife of his neighbour to lust after her?"

I reply, that this does not seem to me to be the sin itself; for, as long as this deliberation continues, so long flourishes in that man the efficacy of the Holy Spirit employed to hinder that sin, until he finally and absolutely concludes about the commission of this sin, having spurned and rejected the resistance offered by the Holy Spirit. Such a conclusion is followed by the sin in that very moment, with regard to the refusing and rejection of Christ, not with regard to the other devotees enumerated, which the man produces at his own opportunities, even if his malice and hatred of Christ did not cease to impel him to the completion of those degrees.

Amsterdam March 3d, 1599.

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