issue Materials | |
| ^    Monitoring (RGciproofll, | Unilateral, None)
feapcms    - -          • ismantlement | |
itermediate | Technical Intact Pits Deformed Pits | Institutional Who Safeguards? Who Protects?
torage | Oxides Ingots Others | Who Owns? Who Finance*!.? Whoro LocaUid?

(with mpiot:M?;r;i(U)    hu ludn-, acr.tilorattM dnvon ttMtluc.t
,ong-Term lisposition

Indefinite Storage
Minimized Storage
Elimination

Reactors
(without niprocnssifuj)
Disposal
Vitrification, Uornholo. Stiabud, UrulorciKiurul Explosion, utc.

Spacu Launch Ocoan Dilution
IGURE 1-1   Phases of plutonium management
omparison to the security stakes. The cost of management ami disposition ni /capons plutoniurn must be seen as an investment in security, just as the i nsi nt ts production was once viewed.
All of the options for long-term plulonium disposition will rcquuc mam ^rears to complete. Thus, storing this material is the only available m\u trnu >ption. The United States and Russia must quickly develop appropriate- in hut ;al and institutional arrangements for dismantlement and stonier, tuHuutii!.' hrough on the discussions already under way. Judgments about tin- must iU-.ii tble immediate approaches for these tasks must necessarily l>e based cut intuit ions that exist or can be readily foreseen today. Ai the same time, these ••.tm.u'v irrangements must be designed to endure for decades.
Planning for long-term disposition of plulonium will inevitably unuiu-nore uncertain extrapolations of risks—although because of the lunjri luur involved, it will also be easier to make corrections in planning over lime. I im ., :his report does not provide a single definitive answer for the dispuMUmi |ih,i,«,