once-through fuel cycles. (Only the use of reactors for plutonium "elimir would require reprocessing.) Whatever is done with excess weapons pluti moreover, will affect only a small portion of the world's current and futu tonium inventory. For either the use or the disposal options, if the United wishes to maintain a policy of generally discouraging separated plutoniu cycles, or if it wishes to make support for such cycles contingent on sti safeguards and security measures, it will need to make a clear statement its choice fits within that broader context.
Non-Security Criteria. Protection of the environment, safety, and (ES&H), along with public and institutional acceptability, are also es criteria for all disposition options. Additional important criteria, descri Chapter 3, include the cost of the option, and its compatibility with othe cies and objectives.
As noted elsewhere, however, the committee does not believe that ture of civilian nuclear power—which depends on economic, politic! technical issues outside the scope of this study—should be a major criter choosing among disposition options.
Tritium Production. Tritium production was not part of the comr charge, and it has not examined alternatives for this purpose in detail. Tl however, no essential reason why plutonium disposition and tritium pro< need be linked, and there appear to be good arguments why they should r
At present, arms reductions are continuing at a rate of more than 5 j per year, thus outpacing tritium decay. The reactor or accelerator capac would ultimately be needed to produce enough tritium to support an ars the size currently projected is many times less than that needed to ca disposition of 50 tons of weapons plutonium over 20 to 40 years. Thus, production capacity will be easier to provide than plutonium disposition ity and should not bias consideration of alternatives for the latter purp such low production levels, accelerator production of tritium may be pr over reactor production, and purchase could also be considered, thou; would raise other policy issues.
From a policy perspective, producing new weapons materials in th reactor being used for disposition of other weapons materials would hi portant ramifications for the nonproliferation and arms reduction regime political support, and safeguards. In particular, President Clinton's c ment to put excess U.S. fissile materials under International Atomic Agency (IAEA) safeguards would mean that if tritium production anc nium disposition were carried out in the same reactor, either the tritiu duction reactor would have to be under IAEA safeguards or the plu would have to be removed from safeguards during disposition. Weapons," Lawrence Liverrnore National Laboratory, UCRL-LR-115542, 1994 (S/KD), Sfee also U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Qfiick and Secret Construction of Plutonium Reprocessing Plants:'.-A Way,;to'Nuclear Weapons Proliferation?, General Accounting Office, BMD-78-104 (Washington D.C.,' U.S. Government Printing Office, October 6,1978). r ,hat deposited the plutonium could withdraw it at will for peaceful purposes, or whether the storage organization would have authority to approve or disapprove withdrawals—were among thea possible "international management regime" for