Tannenberg
zone unsafe. It was doubtful whether the enemy would give us time to carry out our plans.
But the greatest difficulties were due to the refugees, numbering many thousands, some on foot and some in vehicles, wrho blocked the roads behind von Scholtz's group. They hung on to the troops, and a sudden retreat on the part of this Army Group would have had the most distressing consequences, both for refugees and soldiers. But it could not be avoided, for the few gendarmes were not sufficient to take charge of such masses. We could do nothing for them. The memory of the many sad sights I then saw haunts me still.
Ill
On the 24th and 25th of August, our Headquarters were at Rosenberg and on the 26th at Lobau. We took advantage of these last two days to get into touch with commanders and troops in various parts.
On the evening of the 26th the positions of J>oth sides were somewhat as follows:
General von Muhlmann—who had the ist A.C. under his orders —was in Lautenburg and Strasburg, with portions of the garrisons of the Vistula fortresses, in close touch with enemy cavalry. The ist A.C. itself had been concentrated to the south of Montowo, and had fought its way as far as Usdau, which was strongly held by the Russian ist Corps. General von Frangois was ready to continue his advance on the 27th.
To the right wing of the reinforced 20th A.C. had been allotted the task of attacking Usdau from the north and then joining hands with the ist Army Corps in its later advance upon Nei-denburg. The 4ist Infantry Division was to march upon Waplitz from Gross Gardienen, while on their left a Landwehr Brigade, the 3rd Reserve Division and the 37th Infantry Division were simultaneously to attack Waplitz and Hohenstein on a line running north from Miihlen. The enemy had pushed forward on the whole front and occupied AUenstein.
5i 4*