The Entente Offensive, Autumn, 1916
liability to service to fifty. So they made the utmost use of their man-power—on paper, at any rate.
In such a situation G.H.Q. must devote more attention than ever to the question of using the resources of the occupied territories.
These were the definite changes made by G.H.Q. for the future.
The Chief of the Naval Staff advocated unrestricted submarine warfare, which would apply to neutral ships also in the Barred Zone. That was the most effective assistance that the Navy could render the Army in its desperate struggle.
It was doubtful whether the enemy's naval forces would again give battle; an attempt to bring it on had been made in August, but without result. Enemy minefields progressively restricted the freedom of movement of our High Seas Fleet, and limited its use.
The question of the unrestricted U-boat war was discussed as early as August 30th at the request of the Imperial Chancellor.
It was a matter of immediate concern to the Field-Marshal and myself that any part of our Naval forces should simply lie idle in this contest of nations. It was not enough help for the Army merely to keep the Baltic open and contribute the Naval Corps in Flanders, while the operations of the Entente received decisive assistance from their Navy. Only with extreme regret could we refuse to pronounce in favour of unrestricted submarine warfare on the ground that, in the opinion of the Imperial Chancellor, it might possibly lead to war with Denmark and Holland. We had not a man to spare to protect ourselves against these States, and even if their armies were unaccustomed to war, they were in a position to invade Germany, and give us our death-blow. We should have been defeated before the effects, promised by the Navy, of an unrestricted U-boat cam paign could have made themselves felt.
The discussion, however, afforded an opportunity of over hauling our defensive arrangements on the Danish and Dutch frontiers. The Northern Command at Hamburg was instructed
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