The Situation at the End of 1916
the 23rd December, the Field-Marshal, in the presence of the Chancellor, expounded more fully his view that the adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare was essential. The latter, on the 24th, stated that he was ready to initiate discussion on the matter so soon as the answer expected from the Entente to our peace proposal had brought the matter more or less to finality ; he repeated, however, his declaration of the 6th October to the effect that the adoption of the campaign was a question of foreign policy and that he and he alone bore and could bear the constitutional responsibility for the step. Our view of this question had not changed. The Chancellor had his responsibilities and we had ours. In a telegram to von Bethmann the Field-Marshal fc made his position clear in the following words: " . . . Your Excellency as Chancellor can, of course, claim the sole responsibility, but I must clearly work, with all my strength and with a full sense of my responsibility, for the victorious end of the war, to secure that everything is done which I hold as proper for the achievement of that end." That was the right and duty of General Headquarters, just as it was the right and duty of the Chancellor, in this difficult and momentous question, to support his own opinion with all the prestige of his high office. If there were differences of opinion, the decision lay with His Majesty.
As it seemed probable that the answer of the Entente, both to our offer of peace and to Wilson's proposal for intervention, would be a refusal, the Chancellor came to Pless to discuss the question as early as the end of December, but nothing definite was then decided. The actual decision was arrived at on the gth January, at a meeting presided over by His Majesty, after the receipt of the answer to our peace offer, and in the certainty that a like reply would be given to President Wilson. The Chief of the Naval Staff expressed the views stated above; he advised that the campaign would be decisive in a few months and urged its adoption. The Field-Marshal reported our view of the situation, and also advised its adoption. The Chancellor stated the effect the use of this weapon might have upon neutrals, and in particular upon the United States. He thought it possible, and indeed
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