My War Memories, 1914-1918
probable, that the States would enter the war, and anticipated difficulties with regard to the provisioning of Belgium by the Entente. He regarded our offer of peace as having failed ; he saw no other possibility of achieving peace, not even by a new attempt on the part of Wilson (the Note of the i8th December might be taken to have failed). He had no hope of a separate peace, and he did not anticipate any improvement in our position through the collapse of one of our enemies, such as subsequently happened in the case of Russia. The likelihood of this happening would, of course, have altered the whole situation, and would have had the greatest weight with us in our decisions. The Chancellor's judgment as to our military position was the same as our own. While we felt compelled resolutely to draw the inevitable and serious inference, and act on it, the Chancellor, as his nature was, remained undecided and came to such conclusions as : " The decision to embark on the campaign depends on the effects which are to be expected from it; " and: " If the military authorities regard it as essential, I am not in a position to withstand them ;" and : "If success beckons, we must act."
However, with a full sense of his political responsibility, the Chancellor did advise the adoption of the campaign, as did His Majesty's other advisers. The Emperor fell in with their views and commanded that the campaign should open on the ist February. He directed, however, that time should be given to neutral vessels in the blockaded area to leave it, and to neutral vessels on their way to the area to complete their voyages.
The Chancellor then prepared, in co-operation with the Chief of the Naval Staff, the notes to neutral Powers as to the declaration of the blockade area around England, along the West Coast of France and in the Mediterranean, These were to be delivered on the 3ist January.
The Chief of the Naval Staff gave the detailed instructions for operations in the blockade area, making various concessions to the wishes of the Foreign Office in order to lessen the danger of a rupture with America* We were, of course, quite in agreement with such a course.
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