THE MIGHT HAVE BEEN 211

sisted of politicians, who were at that time professed
pacifists, but who did not seem to appreciate that
pacifism takes the sting out of truculent talk, it is
not too much to say that the political guidance of
Great Britain was fraught with danger to the posi-
tion of the country. That the decline has taken place,
and that danger has visited us is a matter of common
knowledge. That such would be the development,
with things as they then were, was no occasion for
surprise, when to the vigour of disappointed political
nationalism was added the stimulus of economic
depression and consequent need.

The early 1930's witnessed a crescendo of the
internal struggle in Germany as to whether Nazidom
should prevail or no. The struggle was keen, but the
forces of the Republic were handicapped by their
identification with the Treaty of Versailles and by
the economic depression. In the beginning of 1933
Herr Hitler finally emerged victorious and gained as
his prize the government of Germany. Far-sighted
people at once realized that here was an event of
perhaps incalculable importance in the history of
Europe. Unhappily the same fatal combination of
wishful thinking and truculent talking exhibited itself
in many quarters with the result that there was a
simultaneous tendency to disparage and provoke. In
fact it should have been dear that here was a body
of men, likely to be very different in choice of method
and quality of determination from their predecessors
of the Weimar Republic. This being so, it should
have been obvious that an ultimate appeal to force
should not be considered a remote possibility. At
the same time there was no reason why their pro-
posals should not have been immediately invited and
considered in a reasonable spirit. At that time it
must be remembered the Nazi party was new to
power, their hold on the country was speculative,