PEACE FRONT 389

ever tortuous and delicate the negotiations between
Britain and Japan might be, the weapons of war were
stored away safely in the cupboard. "If the issue
can be confined," Mr. Chamberlain declared, "to the
original source of dispute, it ought to be possible to
settle it by negotiations. But I am bound to say that
no Government can tolerate that its nationals should
be subjected to such treatment. No British Govern-
ment will submit to dictation from another Power as
to its foreign policy. I trust I am right in supposing
that the Japanese Government have no intention of
condoning the brutal acts of its soldiers, and have no
intention of challenging the rights and interests of the
British people in China."-

By the end of July the Tokyo talks had produced
a formula whereby we recognized that as long as
hostilities were in progress the Japanese had "special
requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their
own security/' "This," explained Mr. Chamberlain,
to a partly sceptical, partly admiring House of
Commons, "has nothing to do with His Majesty's
Government's China policy, but is a question of fact.
The Japanese army had to provide for its own security
and maintain order in the occupied areas." The talks
on the local Tientsin issues could now begin or be
postponed. Towards the end of August Mr. Cham-
berlain conceded the prima facie case for the release
of the four Chinese to be tried in a court under
Japanese control.

By then he had won the battle against time. The
balance of Europe was about to be overthrown, and
in the process the British position in the Far East
strengthened beyond all expectations; but that
Britain was able to take the opportunity when it
came was almost entirely due to Mr. Chamberfam s
masterly inaction and the clear vision of Ws^resdye
not to allow our relations with Japan to odsraate m