the * Unionists/ had long ago been sent back to her novels. Berling had
just disappeared. The new c Cabinet' was officially composed of four
Communists who held the main portfolios^ together with an equal number
of members from Soviet-sponsored Peasant, Socialist and Democratic
Parties,, the latter party had never been heard of in Poland until now, and
neither had any of these £ Cabinet Ministers.3 The only figures retained
from the£ Committee J was Osubka (who now became the Prime Minister)
and Zymierski.
As is well-known to all students of Soviet State organisation^ the
highest authority of that bureaucratic fabric was its f Polit-bureau'
headed by Stalin. The same system was now applied in Poland^ where
the branch of Moscow's 6 Polit-bureau/ comprising a few Comintern
agents., the specialists in foreign affairs^ began to function under Bierut
in the name of the ' Political Committee of the Home National Council/
The policy of the c Provisional Government * proved to be identical
with that of the c Committee.5 Osubka Morawski declared., at a meeting
on January 2 of the ' National Home Council.5
" Our claims in the West for the return of the lands on the Oder5 the
Neisse (Lusatian) and the Baltic> which have forever been dear to the
Motherland, have for long been regarded as justified by our Great Eastern
ally5 the U.S.S.R. They have also found appreciation from the Prime
Minister of Great Britain.
" We shall direct Poland's foreign policy into new channels. We are
aiming consistently at turning the friendship and solidarity of the Slav
nations into a constructive and fruitful factor in shaping political relations
in the new Europe^ and into one of the guarantees of collective security.
We shall strive to extend and tighten friendly relations between Poland and
our great neighbour^ the U.S.S.R0 to establish direct diplomatic relations
and tighten the neighbourly bonds of friendship with the sister republics
of the Soviet Ukraine^ White Ruthenia and Lithuania. This will make it
easier for us to arrange for a reciprocal and voluntary exchange of popula-
tions, which will, radically and for all time5 settle the tangle of nationalities
in our country."
Zymierski used the opportunity to explain once more the basis of the
* Lublin Committee's ' alliance with the U.S.S.R.:
" Our alliance with the U.S.S.R./' he said3 " rests on a far-reaching
convergence of the Polish and Soviet reasons of State. The Polish reason
of state demands that our eastern frontier should cease to be a seed of dis-
cord5 a barrier between the two sister nations^ and become a line of friendly
neighbourhood. As such we regard the * Curzon Line/ We must expect
that even in the future^ after this war has been won., an aggressive Germany
will await an opportune moment to fall upon us once more. But German
imperialism will also remain an enemy of the Soviet Union. The military
alliance with our powerful eastern neighbour assures us of his military aid
and guarantees us the defence of our western frontier. Our national
interests^ namely^ frontiers on a wide stretch of the Baltic^ acquisition of
territories on the Oder and the Neisse, undivided rule over the estuaries
of the Vistula and the Oder, the liquidation of East Prussia,, the return to
Poland of the whole of Silesia—all this coincides with the Soviet Union's
{strategic interests."
401