not be deprived of its state. Such a policy would turn
the German people into our irreconcilable enemies, and
push them into the arms of the German revanchists and
militarists. With such a policy, the democratization of
Germany would be out of the 'question, because to adopt
the line of dismembering and liquidating Ihe German Slate
would be to render service to the worst elements in Ger-
many, who dream of revanche and of restoring Germany
as an imperialist power with plans of new aggression. Such
is the view of the Soviet Government.
Mr. Bevin dwelt in his speech on the evolution of the
views of the Allied Governments on the German problem.
He described this evolution as follows:
At Teheran,, a proposal was advanced that in Ihe inter-
est of the security of Europe, Germany should be divided
into five parts. The representative of Great Britain reserved
his opinion on this question. He was even twitted for not
having pronounced in favour of the division of Germany.
At that time a commission composed of representatives of
the three governments was set up to study the problem.
This commission, I think, met only once, and nothing came
of this meeting. At the end of the Potsdam session we
were unexpectedly confronted with a proposal the very op-
posite of that advanced at Teheran. It was proposed that
Germany should be treated as a single unit, that central
departments be established there arid a declaration made
to the effect that the Ruhr was to be a component part of
Germany.
After this, Mr. Beviu added that the British Government
decided to support the proposal regarding the economic
unity of Germany, and to treat Germany as a single
economic unit in order to meet the wishes of their
colleagues.
This historical reference does not altogether correspond