However, Mr. Marshall himself did not dwell on the
question of security, postponing its examination until the
discussion of the treaty on the demilitarization of Gei-
inany. He spoke yesterday only on the second question—
the economic resources of the Ruhr—although it must be
admitted that these two questions are very closely inter-
connected.
More, Mr. Marshall said that during the period of
military occupation no special control should l>e estab-
lished over the Ruhr, but lie foresees that on the termina-
tion of the occupation special measures for controlling the
Ruhr resources may be necessary. This proposal is direct-
ed against establishment of quadripartite control hi
I he Ruhr during the occupation period. It is impossible to
agree to this, if we really recognize the great importance
of the Ruhr industrial area for the international security of
which Mr. Marshall spoke, and which all of us regard as
indisputable. On the other hand, the question of special
measures of control over the resources of the Ruhr after
the occupation calls for special discussion,
Already at Potsdam the Soviet Government presented
its proposals concerning the Ruhr industrial area. The
Soviet Government proposed that it be recognized that the
Ruhr industrial area, regarded as part of Germany, should
administratively come under the joint control of Great
Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States.
At the same time we proposed that a special Allied Council,
composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, the
Soviet Union and the United States, be set up for the Ruhr
industrial area. And we already then proposed that a provi-
sional Allied Council consisting of representatives of these
states be appointed immediately.
As I have already said, at that time Mr. Bevin pro-
posed that discussion of this project be postponed because
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