necessary in order to weaiken the main cadres of German
militarism and revanchism. Unless we introduce such
amendments and additions, the treaty cannot be a reliable
guarantee of international security.
At the same time, the Soviet delegation considers that the
French delegation's proposals should be carefully studied.
No one, so far, has commented on these proposals. Yet the
French delegation has made such important proposals as,
for instance, economic and scientific disarmament, pro-
posals regarding the Ruhr, and so o-n, which ought to be
thoroughly examined. At all events, we cannot brush them,
aside if we recognize the need for serious discussion of
a treaty aimed at preventing a repetition of German
aggression.
It is particularly necessary to consider the question of
Allied control of the Ruhr. In this connection, I would
call to mind that in June of last year Mr. Bevin likewise
declared in favour of international control of the Ruhr
industry. At that time it was clear to Mr. Bevin that the
problem of the Ruhr was closely bound up with interna-
tional security.
We are told that the proposals made by the Soviet
Government with regard to the treaty under consideration
were already examined when we discussed the Control
Council's report. But we then examined only those ques-
tions which directly relate to the present moment and the
immediate future. But this does not mean that some of the
problems under consideration, which are closely connected
with the task of preventing a recurrence of German ag-
gression, should be ignored by us now, when we are dis-
cussing a treaty for the security of the nations of Europe
i'or a full forty years.
\Ve are told, on the other hand, thai some of the
(jupslkms raised by the Soviet delegation should be dis-
m