76 THREE YEARS OF CALM BEFORE THE STORM

COMIC RELIEF

In these politically dark days in Washington it must have brought
joy to the heart of the Department when it recently received a telegram
from one of my distinguished colleagues in a European capital :
" The Queen has given birth to a daughter. I have congratulated
the Prime Minister."

CAN ANY PEACE PACT KEEP THE PEACE ?

February 23, 1933

In the diary I recently said that I was in accord with the Report
and Recommendations of the League of Nations in the Sino-Japanese
dispute. This statement must be modified, as indeed many of the
statements in this diary, in which I am merely thinking aloud, are
modified from time to time on maturer thought and consideration.
The recommendations may be all right in theory, but the trouble is
that they are ineffective in practice because they don't fit the facts
and at least at present are unworkable. No doubt, from the League's
point of view, it could hardly have acted otherwise, and once having
become involved, spurred on by our own Government, it has at least
shown patience and restraint. Yet the more one mulls over the whole
problem, the more one is inclined to question whether the peace
machinery which the world has been trying so earnestly and pains-
takingly to erect these last fourteen years is basically sound, or rather
whether it is basically practical.

To let one's imagination rove a bit—compare the Manchurian
situation in 1931 with the Cuban situation in 1898. If the latter
crisis had developed subsequent to the conclusion of the Kellogg Pact,
and if the Maine had been blown up in Havana Harbour, resulting
in a war psychology sweeping over our country like a forest fire and
the words " Remember the Maine " on the lips of every man, woman,
and child in the land, could our Government ever have prevented
hostilities with Spain? McKinley wanted to avoid war in 1898 but
couldn't. Even if the Kellogg Pact had existed at that date, might
we also not have occupied Cuba without declaring war, on the grounds
of self-defence, forced by public opinion to do so ? The public guesses
but does not know to-day who blew up the Maine. The public guesses
but does not know to-day who engineered the incidents which led to
the Japanese attack of September 18, 1931.

Of course the Cuban situation was very different from the
Manchurian situation in many respects, for our action was basically
humanitarian while Japan's action was expediency pure and simple.
Yet the force of the war psychology was equally potent in both cases.
There are many who are convinced that Japan had long intended
to take Manchuria, just as she took Korea, and was merely awaiting
a favourable opportunity. Very likely they are right.