THE SITUATION FLARES UP AGAIN I2I tenance of order in East Asia. If such negotiations are of a nature that might disturb peace and order in East Asia, Japan will be obliged to oppose them. For example, supplying China with warplanes, building aero- dromes in China, and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to separate Japan and other countries from China and ultimately .would prove prejudicial to the peace of East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects* The foregoing attitude should be made clear by the policies followed by Japan in the past. But, due to the fact that gestures for joint assistance to China and for other aggressive assistance, by foreign countries, are becoming too conspicuous, it is deemed advisable to make known the foregoing policies. * There has been much conjecture regarding the reasons for the issuance of Amau's statement of April 17. I endeavoured to define those reasons in our telegrams and in our last dispatch to the De- partment, based chiefly on the theory that Japan was becoming restive at the cumulative evidence of foreign activities in China. Furthermore, approval of the doctrine that Japan alone is respon- sible for the maintenance of peace in the Far East would give Japan added claims to naval parity in the forthcoming naval conference, and would also enable her to dominate China, Amau had been pressed by the Japanese newspaper correspondents for comment on these various matters and Shigemitsu finally agreed to his giving out the substance of an instruction already sent to Ariyoshi, Minister to China. Whether or not Hirota approved the issuance of the statement is unessential, for the statement accurately expresses the policy which Japan would like to pursue. While there has been criticism of the phraseology, the substance of the statement seems to have the un- qualified approval of practically all Japanese, and Hirota, in the present state of public opinion, could not repudiate the statement and remain in office. The net result of the statement will probably be : (i) an intensification of the feeling of isolation that has pre- vailed since the Manchurian campaign; (2) a furtherance of the Army and Navy campaign to prepare for the " crisis" of 1935-36, and (3) the development of patriotic feeling to such an extent that no Japanese Government will be able to compromise with the powers in case of decided differences in viewpoint regarding policies towards China or with respect to naval ratios. Saw Sir Francis Lindley off at the station, Hirota and most of the colleagues being there. With deep regret I saw Lindley go. We were colleagues in Cairo thirty years ago, and Alice and I have always had sincere affection for him and his wife. He has been a good colleague and perfectly frank and free in imparting even confidential information.