THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT : JAPANESE STYLE 127

the other hand, no one, no government official even, has publicly
denied that this statement represents the genuine policy of the Govern-
ment. It happens, as a matter of fact, that the original Amau
statement was an instruction to Japan's diplomatic representatives
abroad and that its public announcement did not have the approval
of the Foreign Minister, but this circumstance is beside the point.
Japan has revealed herself as firmly opposed—say what she may—to
the objects and purposes of the Nine-Power Treaty and the efforts
of the League of Nations to extend international (and Occidental)
assistance to China. . . .

With Soviet Russia Japan is trying to keep the peace at present.
Viewing the situation from Tokyo, neither side has now any stomach
for war, nor are there indications in Japan or Manchuria of prepara-
tions pointing to imminent warfare. For the time being at least we
need only fear a frontier incident of unusual gravity. Although
Hirota has taken up the Chinese Eastern Railway question, the
yen-rouble exchange question, the fisheries dispute, and the boundary
problems one by one with an evidently genuine desire to remove
them from the slate, progress has been very halting and bids fair to
continue so.

The rumours that the U.S.S.R. is contemplating joining the League
have not aroused great attention here although such comments as
have come to light interpret the step as prompted by considerations
of national safety. Undoubtedly the Japanese realize that the League's
influence in the Far East would be strengthened by the entry of the
Soviets, but the possibility seems too remote to have aroused any
great degree of apprehension as yet. Incidentally, the Soviet Am-
bassador recently told me that he had no reason to believe that Soviet
Russia was about to join the League but that he did not know what
might come about in future.

So far as the question of a non-aggression pact between the U.S.S.R.
and Japan is concerned, Hirota has stated that it is his policy first
to remove the specific points of conflict between the two nations
before taking up the question of a general pact. It is believed that a
strong minority, notably the Army, opposes such a pact and that to
ignore this minority would court the risk of reversing the present
trend towards a. more normal national psychology. After these
specific points of conflict have been removed, the minority would
retain no valid reason for continuing their opposition.

In concluding this letter I refer to the portion of your dispatch
outlining the position which Japan m is taking at the present time in
Geneva, namely, the wish to be represented on League bodies in
return for Japanesfe co-operation, the alternative being withdrawal
from all League treaties. Writing from Tokyo I should be inclined
to question the value of Japanese co-operation in the first place
(except in social matters such as narcotics control) owing to the ex-
clusive character of Japanese ambitions in the Far East, and in the
second place I should question whether withdrawal from all League