BACKGROUND OF THE FINAL JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS 383

Tripartite Pact, whether Germany should win or lose, but that their
own economic system could not stand the strain of Anglo-Dutch-
American economic pressure.

The conversations actually began long before all this came to
pass. A group of influential Japanese persuaded most of the then
cabinet that a rapprochement with the United States was highly
desirable, and although Matsuoka himself opposed the movement
strenuously for a long time, he was finally induced to withdraw his
active opposition, even though he was still telling me that if we
should go to war with Germany we would certainly have war with
Japan on the basis of his own interpretation of Article 3 of the pact.
But when Germany attacked Soviet Russia, contrary to all assurances
given to Matsuoka by Berlin, his egregious miscalculation forced
him out of the Government, and the new set-up, \vith Admiral
Toyoda at the helm of the Foreign Office, soon intensified the drive
for an agreement with the United States.

Prince Konoye bore the heavy responsibility for having brought
the country to its present pass, but since Matsuoka was made the
scapegoat, the Premier stayed on and was evidently far from reluctant
to support and abet the new orientation of policy. Japan was rapidly
drifting towards war with the United States and Great Britain,
and we know that the Emperor had long ago told his ministers that
whatever policy they pursued, they must on no account get Japan
into war with either of those countries, I think there can be no doubt
that the Emperor was never very happy about the Tripartite Pact
and was persuaded to approve it only in the light of misrepresentations
by Matsuoka that Japan was about to be strangled economically
by the democracies and that Germany's victory over Great Britain
was certain, and also in the light of the great preponderance of
public opinion, especially military opinion, at that time in favour
of the totalitarian powers, carefully developed by Government
propaganda.

Anyway, with the new set-up, both Prince Konoye and Admiral
Toyoda started all-out for a quick agreement with the United States,
professing to be willing to meet all our wishes and to bring the pre-
liminary conversations to a head in formal negotiations to be con-
ducted by the Prime Minister himself at a proposed meeting with
the President on American soil. So far as I am aware, the first
suggestion for such a meeting was broached by the Japanese in one
of their early drafts submitted -in April, it being then proposed that
a conference between American and Japanese delegates should be
held at Honolulu, to be opened by President Roosevelt and Prince
Konoye, as soon as possible after an understanding had been reached
in the preliminary conversations.1 The plan was, however, communi-
cated to me as a definite proposal by the Japanese Government by
the Foreign Minister in our long two-and-a-half-hour conversation

1 Tliis proposal was made in a purely unofficial document which was not con-
finned by the Japanese Government.