HOW THE EMPEROR INTERVENED " COMPROMISE, COMPROMISE, COMPROMISE J; October 24, 1941 A Japanese friend made some suggestions about the American- Japanese conversations. He wants us to make a joint declaration with Japan stating that we have no intention of " infiltratingv into Indo-China, and, as usual, he said that compromise would be necessary if we were to make progress. I was pretty severe in reply- ing, pointing out that there was no room for compromise and explair.- ing die absurdity of issuing such a joint declaration as he suggested. I gave him a copy of my long letter to-----of September i, to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest. My friend, much as I like him, is difficult to debate with, for he keeps coming back to his original point no matter what one says—compromise, compromise, com- promise. HOW THE EMPEROR INTERVENED October 25, 1941 A reliable Japanese informant tells me that just prior to the fall of the Konoye cabinet a conference of the leading members of the Privy Council and of the Japanese armed forces had been sum- moned by the Emperor, who inquired if they were prepared to pursue a policy which would guarantee that there would be no war with the United States. The representatives of the Army and Navy who attended this conference did not reply to the Emperor's question, whereupon the latter, with a reference to the progressive policy pursued by the Emperor Meiji, his grandfather, in an unprecedented action ordered the armed forces to obey his wishes. The Emperor's definite stand necessitated the selection of a Prime Minister who would be in a position effectively to control the Army, hence the appoint- ment of General Tojo, who, while remaining in the Army active list, is committee! to a policy of attempting to conclude successfully the current Japanese-American conversations. The informant emphasized to me that the recent anti-American tone of the Japanese press and the extreme views expressed by pro- Axis and certain other elements gave no real indication of the desire of Japanese of all classes and in particular of the present political leaders that in some way or other an adjustment of relations with the United States must be brought about. He added in this connec- tion that Mr. Togo, the new Foreign Minister, had accepted his appointment with the specific aim of endeavouring to pursue the current conversations to a successful end and it had been understood that should he fail in this he would resign his post. The belief is current among Japanese leaders that the principal difficulty in the way of an understanding with the United States is the question of the removal of Japanese armed forces from China