THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 31

and armies; but Parliament's authority as the law-making body
made it a centre round which opposition to the King could
rally. Separation of Powers, however, can do the work of
weakening government too well. Charles II and his Ministers
declared war on the Dutch—an executive action, within their
constitutional rights; but only Parliament could make the kws
to provide the necessary money; Parliament was not inclined to
do so, and the Dutch fleet sailed up the Medway. Since then the
legislative and executive powers have been fused la that section
of the King's Ministers called the Cabinet. These Ministers are
the real Executive; but they are also in Parliament and largely
control Parliamentary business. None the less, they must be
prepared to, face questions and criticism in Parliament; any
suggestion that they are trying to evade Parliament's authority
by giving it too little time to discuss measures, will cause much
indignation, even among M.P.s who usually support the
Government. The gap between Legislature and Executive has
been bridged; but the bridge rests on good relations between
the Government and the majority in Parliament. Separation of
these two powers, therefore, is no longer a permanent principle
of the Constitution; it is a possibility, kept in the background
and available for use against a Government which fails to
recognise the Sovereignty of Parliament. c\; ,' 2&tyJ
When the Judicature is considered, the Reparation of Powers
is more obvious. One of the results of the lytfa century struggle
is that judges cannot be removed from office by the Government
of the day, and so need not hesitate to declare actions of the
Government illegal, if necessary. When the police searched the
premises of Mr. Wai Hannington, and removed documents
1 about the National Unemployed Workers' Movement, of which
Mr* Hannington was a leader, he was able to bring an action
and secure judgment against them. This judgment could not
have been pleasing to the Government, of which Mr. Hannington
was an opponent. So separation of the Judicature from the
Executive is certainly one safeguard jij^msQ^imy. At the head

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