THE TWO HOUSES CMP PARLIAMENT 137

has passed since the First Chamber was elected, it may no longer
be truly representative; or the majority party, having been,
elected on one issue., may snatch the opportunity to make great
changes about which the people have not been consulted. Cannot
the Second Chamber be given power to prevent such action* at
least until another Election has been held? This is dearly shown
to be the purpose of the Parliament Act, when the two years'
delaying power and the limitation of the life of Parliament to
five years, are considered together. A Government with a majority
in the Commons can, at the worst, get through those measures
which it introduces in the first three years; after that the Lords
can postpone anything4 they dislike till after the nest election.
But the ideal of a Second Chamber which will use its checking
power solely to keep the First Chamber in line with the popular
will, is not realised in the Hpuse of Lords. This was recognised
in the Parliament Act; the Preamble states that "it is intended
to substitute for the House of Lords as it at present exists a
Second Chamber constituted on a popular instead of a hereditary
basis": but the intention has never been carried out. How
could such a Chamber be made? If all its members are to be
elected on the same plan as those of the First Chamber, its views
will be the same and there will be no check. Could they be
elected on a different plan? Various proposals have been made.
The Second Chamber might be elected on a "functional" basis;
that is to say, the Trade Unions, the learned professions, and
other bodies of citizens grouped according to the work they do,
might elect representatives from their own number. Would
this give a better expression to the people's will? If so, why not
simply one Chamber elected on this plan? The right to vote
for the Second Chamber might be limited to those, say, over
30; or to those who had attained a certain standard of education.
Then the Second Chamber, being less representative than the
First, could hardly claim to act as a check.

It may further be questioned whether there is any need«to
impose a check ra the First Chamber. The chief weakness of