LAW, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE 263

particularly inctimbent on police and magistrates. Speech and

behaviour which is so provocative that it gives reasonable cause

to fear a breach of the peace is forbidden. The application of the

last clause of this principle, has given rise to some nice points of

law, and several Statutes try to define the matter more precisely

Suppose, for example, that Fascists wish to* hold a meeting in

Whitechapel and set forth their reasons for disliking Jews, or

that an ardent band of Protestants wish to proclaim their beliefs

in the heart of a Catholic district in Liverpool. Meetings on such

topics are not in themselves unlawful, but held in those districts,

they may well provoke a breach of the peace. Are the authorities

to permit them, and so give the police the duty of dispersing

them when disorder begins—a duty dangerous and unpleasant

both to police and public? It seems more sensible to prohibit

them in advance, but this action admits the dangerous principle

that a meeting may be made unlawful by the disorderly conduct

of those who dislike it. Once this is granted, any section of the

community can prevent their opponents from holding meetings,

and the forces of the law, instead of protecting the law-abiding

citizen, will be putting into effect the wishes of the disorderly.

On this point, the Public Meetings Act, 1908, and the Public

Order Act, have endeavoured to frame a compromise. It is

forbidden for anyone at a public meeting to carry an offensive

weapon, or to use "threatening, abusive, or insulting words and

behaviour". No ojie may act m a disorderly manner so as to

prevent the meeting from doing its business, and a policeman

who reasonably suspects anyone of doing so, may, if the chairman

of the meeting requests, insist on the suspect's giving his name

and address. These provisions are aimed against the disorderly,

and are unobjectionable as long as police and magistrates act with

reason and fairness. The prohibition, by the Public Order Act, of

the public wearing of political uniforms appears to have been

usefdl in preventing disorder. Uniforms appeal to emotion rather

than reason, and bring into politics an excitability which is

harmful both to the public peace, and the sensible expression of