76 Benthatn and the Early Utilitarians [CH.III
His writings, also, were numerous. The first volume of his Ele-
ments of the Philosophy of the Human Mind appeared in 1792,
the second in 1814, the third in 1827. His Outlines of Moral
Philosophy was published in 1794, Philosophical Essays in 1810,
a dissertation entitled The Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical,
and Political Philosophy since the Revival of Letters (contributed
to Tlie Encyclopaedia Britannica) in 1815 and 1821, The
Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers in 1828; and
accounts of the lives and writings of Adam Smith, Robertson and
Reid were contributed to the Transactions of the Royal Society
of Edinburgh*
Himself, in his youth, a pupil of Reid, Stewart remained his
follower in philosophy. But he avoided the use of the term
* common sense/ which, as employed by Reid, had produced the
impression that questions of philosophy could be decided by an
appeal to popular judgment He speaks, instead, of 'the funda-
mental laws of human belief, or the primary elements of human
reason'; and these he regards not as the data upon which
conclusions depend, but, rather,
as the Yincula which give coherence to all the particular links of the chain,
or (to vary the metaphor) as component elements without which the faculty
of reasoning is inconceivable and impossible.
He varied from Reid, also, in many special points, often approxi-
mating to the positions of writers of the empirical school; but,
according to Mackintosh, he ' employed more skill in contriving,
and more care in concealing, his very important reforms of Reid's
doctrines, than others exert to maintain their claims to originality/
His works often betray their origin in the lecture-room, and are
full of quotations from, and criticisms of, other authors. They are
written in a style which is clear and often eloquent, without ever
being affected; but the exposition and criticism are devoted to
those aspects of philosophical controversy which were prominent
in his own day, and they have thus lost interest for a later genera-
tion. Nor did he show any such profundity of thought, or even
distinction of style, as might have saved his work from comparative
neglect Among his numerous writings, there is no single work of
short compass which conveys his essential contribution to the
progress of thought.