FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES 185
explained to parliament in 1659 how he had served Cromwell
for fourteen years but had been, without any trial or appeal,
cashiered because he would not acknowledge the other house
to be a house of lords. But Packer, and the five captains who
suffered with him, found no open support, although it is pro-
bable that a good many officers in the army sympathized with
them.
The abrupt dissolution of parliament, however successful in
checking disaffection, had one great drawback. It aggravated
a disease that, unless checked, threatened to gnaw away the
strength of the protectorate—the chronic want of money. The
Petition and Advice had contemplated a revenue of £1,300,000
per annum, but the expense of the government was at the rate
of £2,500,000. To make good some of the deficit, parliament
voted with great reluctance that £600,000 should be raised by
a monthly assessment—a tax that had been levied in varying
amounts since 1643, but remained as unpopular as when first
imposed. Part of the £500,000 still wanting was to be secured
by a final assessment lasting only three months, another part
by a tax on new buildings within ten miles of the walls of the
City of London. The shortcomings of Cromwell's financial
advisers may be gauged by the income from the latter tax,
which produced little more than a tenth of the expected
amount. Moreover the yield from the other taxes fell short of
the anticipation. The excise tax, always odious, became even
more abhorrent when farmed out. Therefore the contractors
could not afford to offer so much for the right to collect the
duties, with evasion and even resistance apt to be widespread.
The customs duties were similarly disappointing to the treasury,
for the new rates recently fixed were too high and interposed
a barrier to trade. Altogether the revenue was nearly £500,000
less than the expenditure. Unfortunately this was not the
whole story, for there was already about £1,000,000 owing,
partly a legacy from the commonwealth but mainly the price
of the ambitious foreign policy pursued during the protectorate.
The bulk of the debt was due to the armed forces, about
£540,000 to the navy, £300,000 to the army. The consequences
of this indebtedness threatened to be unpleasant. In the case
of the navy the device often adopted, of keeping ships at sea
when there was no money to pay them off, could not be con-
tinued indefinitely. The army was also in difficulties, for