VARIOUS USES OF FACTORS 33 rather than probable generalizations ; secondly, it is treated as a positive rather than as a negative procedure— as being based on the agreement1 of positive instances instead of on elimination by means of negative instances. These misconceptions are so common in factorial work that I may be pardoned for exposing them in some detail: for unless we can fit factor-analysis in its true logical setting, we shall, I am convinced, utterly misconstrue its nature, and be continually led astray. Where, as in psychology, the issue is somewhat involved, it is, I think, a helpful practice to encourage the young research student to outline for himself the successive steps in his argument so that the formal aspect of his reasoning shall be obvious at a glance. Any illicit transition will then leap to the eye. Here, assuming for the moment that the generalization to be proved is a certain and not a probable proposition, the essential premisses and conclusions may be set out schematically as follows. The writer begins with a hypothetical syllogism. " If relation-finding is the cause of educational progress in these children, then their performances in the two types of test should agree ; " The correlations show that they do agree ; " Therefore, relation-finding is the cause of their pro- gress." The fallacy is plain. It could be succinctly if somewhat pedantically pinned down with the labels of scholastic logic : the writer argues in the modus fonendo fonens (and commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent), whereas he ought 1 The * method of agreement/ to which the writer (like so many other factorists) more than once appeals, is somewhat deceptively named. It assumes, not merely (as correlationists who cite Mill appear to suppose) that " the instances have one factor in common," but that (in Mill's own words) they have " only one circumstance in common " (System of Logic, Bk. Ill, chap, viii, p. 428). Its value therefore depends more on disagreement than on agreement. As Mill himself admits, the method " is an inferior resource " (p. 433), and the required assumption cannot be made unless we show we have " excluded all other causes," In other words, it is only valid when the c rele- vant known positive analogy' (to use the terminology adopted below) is equal to the' total analogy *; and this can hardly ever be the case in psycho- logy, though it may seem to be the case in elementary mechanics.