ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY
without the necessity of fighting a costly war.
Whether or no the Nazis had planned to see their
ally enter the last phase of a victorious war in which
they had borne the burden and the heat, nothing
could have restrained the Duce at this point, and
on 10 June Italy entered the war. Ten days later
France was suing for an armistice and Italy seemed
to have won the immense gamble of her Axis policy.
The disastrous development of the war for Italy
since that day in June springs from the miscalcula-
tion which brought her in. Mussolini was convinced
that, with the collapse of France, Britain would
accept defeat and that the war was over. The
Italian nation entered the struggle to triumph and not
to fight, and it followed that the military preparations
were inadequate. There was no full mobilization,
no large reinforcement of the Libyan garrison,1 and
the Duce himself complained in February 1941 that
the Italians were caught unawares.
Economically the nation was unprepared. Ration-
ing had barely been introduced, supplies had been
passed on to Germany. On the propaganda front
matters were even worse. The Italian populace
were given nothing but tales of immediate victory
and magnificent vistas of easy conquest. There was
no hint at first that they would even have to fight.
Thus, when, in the grim days of early July, Britain
was left stranded, deserted, and outnumbered in the
Mediterranean and Egypt, and the Italians might
perhaps by a swift and brutal campaign have pressed
on to the Suez Canal, they did not stir. They held
victory parades in Italy and in Africa waited for the
end. Even when weeks had passed and Britain was
1 Marshal Graziani later attributed his defeat to lack of equip-
ment. There is no reason to suppose that his account was inaccurate.
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