20 HOLLAND AND THE WAR
and Mussert worked by propaganda on anti-Semitic
and racialist lines, by infecting the public services,
by creating 'incidents', and by arming and drilling
his followers. The popularity of the movement may
be judged from its electoral history, which consisted
of a rise and a fall. During the depression the N.S.B.
was able to exploit the discontent of the peasants, of
the lower middle class, and of the youth generally.
It obtained financial support from some employers
who supposed that in Germany National Socialism
was saving capitalism from its enemies; and it ap-
pealed to some of the conservative elements of
society. Consequently in the elections for the Pro-
vincial States in 1935 it obtained 7-9 per cent, of all
the votes cast; but it never did so well again. The
course of events in Germany was against it. The
open militarism of the German Nazis set the pacific
and individualist Dutchmen against them; their ex-
cesses disgusted both trade unionists and employers.
Finally the German aggressions of 1936-9 aroused
apprehensions for Dutch independence and led
people of all classes to rally to the House of Orange.
Consequently the popularity of the movement fell
away and in 1939 it won only 3-7 per cent, of the votes
for the Provincial Estates. It never had more than
four of the hundred seats in the Lower Chamber.
The attitude of the N.S.B. to Dutch independence
was cunningly deceptive. Its leaders always professed
to be patriots and denounced the internationalism of
Catholics and Socialists; but the object of their
patriotism was not the Dutch kingdom but the
'Dietsch5 race. This race, the existence of which is
more than questionable from the point of view of
ethnology and history, is that of which the Dutch are
said to form a part, the other parts being first the
Flemings1 who live in Belgium and a small corner
1 The Flemings live in the more northerly parts of Belgium and