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THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR

BY
E. L. WOODWARD

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IN this Pamphlet Mr. Woodward first describes the immediate events leading up to the outbreak of war: Hitler's demands on Poland, and their rejection, the familiar German 'drum-fire of lies and calumnies' against the intended victim, the failure of the British attempt to hold open the door to negotiation.

Next he traces the history of international relations in Europe during the years between Hitler's rise to power in 1933 and Munich. These years 'will be a warning to future generations about the difficulties in the way of giving form and force to the peaceful desires of the majority against the stark and unscrupulous threats of a minority of the world's inhabitants'.

Finally he turns to the deeper causes of the war, the hostilities of certain dominant tendencies in German thought to the liberal, humanitarian philosophy and way of life of Western civilization. 'National Socialism inherited an evil tradition. Unless this tradition is understood, it is impossible to realize the deeper causes working towards war in Germany.'

Mr. Woodward is a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, who has specialized in the study of modern European history. His two best-known books are his volume in the *Oxford History of England*, entitled *The Age of Reform (1815-1870)* and *Great Britain and the German Navy*.

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THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR

THE immediate cause of the war was the German attack on Poland. A German war of aggression against the Polish people meant a German war against Great Britain and France, since these two Powers had promised to come to the aid of Poland 'in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces'.¹

Hitler and his associates knew, and accepted, the consequences of their attack upon Polish independence. It seems possible, indeed, that Hitler, deluded by Ribbentrop, believed that, if the Germans could overrun Poland quickly by sheer weight of numbers and terrorism, Great Britain and France would then accept accomplished facts and allow Germany, with Russia as her accomplice, to enslave the Poles as she had already enslaved the Czechs. Hitler may well have believed Ribbentrop, since the National Socialist theory of State approved of acts of bad faith in international relations, and the Führer himself had broken treaty after treaty. Nevertheless, the German leaders were ready to fight Great Britain and France. Ten days before the outbreak of war Hitler said to Sir Nevile Henderson that 'he was fifty years old; he preferred war now to when he would be fifty-five or sixty'.²

¹ The Prime Minister in the House of Commons, 31 March 1939. This British guarantee was reaffirmed in the Anglo-Polish agreement of 25 August 1939. The French already had treaties with Poland—notably the Franco-Polish Political Agreement of 1921, and the Franco-Polish treaty signed at Locarno in 1925.

² British Blue Book: *Documents concerning German-Polish*

More than half a century earlier Moltke had written of the war fought by Prussia against Austria in these words: 'The war of 1886 did not take place because Prussia was threatened, or in obedience to public opinion, or to the will of the people. It was a war long foreseen, prepared with deliberation, and recognised as necessary by the Cabinet, not in order to obtain territorial aggrandisement, but in order to secure the establishment of Prussian hegemony in Germany.' Germans recur, and there is a grim sameness about their history and their ideas. It is therefore important to look beyond the questions of Danzig and the Polish Corridor in order to understand why German military force and German terrorism were loosed again in Europe in 1939.

At the same time, in a matter of such terrible gravity for all civilized peoples the immediate occasion of the war deserves study no less than the deeper causes. Moreover, the events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities throw much light on these deeper causes. Throughout the summer of 1939 Germans and German diplomacy were true to type.

I. The Immediate Cause. Danzig and the Corridor

The prelude to the war came in March 1939. In this month Hitler added to his previous breaches of faith by the occupation of Prague and the suppression of the last remains of Czech independence. The next stage in German aggression against weaker States seemed likely to be an attack on Poland. Hitler had signed, in 1934, a ten years' agreement

relations and the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939 (Cmd. 6106), p. 100.

with Poland. He had said to the Reichstag, in 1936, that it would be 'unreasonable and impossible' to deny Poland 'any outlet to the sea at all'. He had declared, in 1938, that, after the settlement of the Sudeten question, Germany had no more territorial demands in Europe. In the spring of 1939, however, it had become evident that Hitler's promises merely indicated the direction of his next act of treachery. In order to make it clear beyond doubt that Great Britain and France, now disillusioned of their hopes of European 'appeasement', intended to resist further aggression by Germany, these two Powers gave their pledge of assistance to Poland. The two western democracies hoped that this pledge would be followed by a league of all peacefully-minded European States to preserve Europe from reversion to the law of the jungle. They looked, as it turned out in vain, for the support of the U.S.S.R. in this endeavour.

Before they received a promise of help from the British and French Governments that they would defend Poland, the Poles had already rejected demands made by Hitler for the return of Danzig to the Reich and the grant of a wide zone across the Polish Corridor which would allow the construction of a military road and railway. It is necessary to be clear on this point. Why did the Poles refuse these demands? The answer reveals at once the deeper causes of the war: the impossibility of trusting Germany. If the return of Danzig to the Reich had been the sole question at issue, if the creation of 'a corridor across the corridor' had been merely a matter of economic convenience, or even of political sentiment, these concessions might have been

granted. The Poles knew, the Germans knew, and the world knew, from previous experience, that such concessions were the first stage, for Poland, on the road down which the Czechs had been compelled to travel to their destruction. Hitler had made no secret of his eastern aims. They could be read in *Mein Kampf*. Not a single word had been retracted. Russia might be strong enough and far enough away to resist these eastern plans. Poland, deprived of her main strategic positions, surrounded and strangled by Germany, cut off from the sea by a military line defended with all the force Germany could command, would be at the mercy of German ambitions. In any case Ribbentrop let it be known, during his visit to Warsaw in January 1939, that the political implication of acceptance of the German requests would be the close alinement of Polish foreign policy with that of the Reich. Hence the Poles rejected the German demands, and rejected them before they were sure of an Anglo-French guarantee. It would be idle talk to suggest that, if they cared for their independence, their very existence as a nation, they could have done otherwise than reject these demands.

The German answer was to denounce the ten years' agreement with Poland. In other words, Hitler showed that the Poles were right in their suspicions. Henceforward the danger of war was immediate. The British and French Governments, with the British Government in the lead, did their utmost to ease the strain, while the Germans took every step possible to aggravate the tension and to intensify anti-Polish feeling in Germany. The German press invented story after story of 'atro-

cities' against Germans in Poland. The Germans saw openly to the defence of Danzig, and treated the Free City as a National Socialist stronghold. On Aug. 23 Ribbentrop, in Hitler's name, signed a non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R. An agreement with the U.S.S.R. conflicted, nominally, with almost every important statement of policy which Hitler had made before and after his rise to power. There was, however, no inner conflict. Words, to Hitler, were counters; his promises or pledges of non-aggression would be kept as long as, and no longer than, it suited German convenience to keep them. For the moment, an agreement with Communist Russia was necessary because the German army command wished to avoid the risk of war on two fronts.

Hitler made a second move. He offered an Anglo-German understanding on condition that he had his way in Poland. The offer was made in curious language. Hitler told Sir Nevile Henderson that he was 'a man of great decisions. He accepted the British Empire, and was ready to pledge himself personally for its continued existence and to place the power of the German Reich at its disposal',¹ if his conditions were fulfilled. The British reply was plain. 'The German Government will be aware that His Majesty's Government have obligations to Poland by which they are bound and which they intend to honour. They could not, for any advantage offered to Great Britain, acquiesce in a settlement which put in jeopardy the independence of a State to whom they have given their guarantee.'²

¹ British Blue Book, p. 121 (25 Aug. 1939).

² *Ibid.*, p. 126 (28 Aug.).

The British Proposal for Direct Negotiations

In spite of the German preparations for immediate war, the British Government still tried to find a solution which would satisfy Hitler's *amour-propre* and, at the same time, preserve the existence of Poland. They suggested 'the initiation of direct discussions between the German and Polish Governments on a basis which would include . . . the safeguarding of Poland's essential interests and the securing of the settlement by an international guarantee'.¹ They found no difficulties on the Polish side. The Poles well knew what the ordeal of war might mean to them; they were ready to go as far as they could go towards placating the Germans without putting themselves in the terrible position of the Czechs after Munich. Hence the Polish Government agreed to the principle of direct negotiations, obviously on condition that these negotiations were real, and that the Polish representatives were not treated like President Hacha of Czechoslovakia, and compelled to give way to German force.

The British proposal put Hitler in a difficulty. His method of eluding this difficulty illuminates the deeper reasons for the outbreak of the war. The British plan aimed at the removal of grievances by peaceful negotiation. The plan implied that each side should state its case; that all grievances of Poles against Germans and Germans against Poles should be examined impartially and quietly at a conference table, and that the negotiating parties were genuinely anxious to avoid war. The Poles certainly, as the weaker party, did not want war,

¹ British Blue Book, p. 127 (28 Aug. 1939).

but the Germans had already decided on war, and upon the annihilation of Poland as an independent State. If they came to a conference, and rejected every peaceful solution put before them, if they allowed the Poles to expose the hollowness of the German case, and the deliberate manufacture of 'incidents' and 'atrocities', they destroyed every pretext for going to war. If, on the other hand, they refused outright to hold any discussion with the Poles, again they showed themselves the aggressors.

Hitler attacks Poland

Hence, with war, not peace, in their hearts, the German leaders could neither easily accept nor easily reject the British plan. Hitler chose a way of escape which deceived no one (outside Germany) at the time, and will not deceive posterity. He accepted the British proposal and, at the same time, added conditions to his acceptance which destroyed all chance of peaceful and reasonable negotiation. His answer was given on the evening of 29 August 1939. He demanded the arrival in Berlin, on the following day (30 August), of a Polish representative with full powers. In other words, the Polish representative would be given the German terms, and, without referring them to the Polish Government, would have to accept or reject them forthwith. The Polish Government would have to send their representative without knowing what terms would be put in front of him for his immediate acceptance. There were to be no free negotiations, no exchange of views, no examination of the truth of German allegations. The sinister drama which Hitler had

played with the Austrians and with the Czechs would be repeated.

The British Ambassador told Hitler and Ribbentrop that their demand sounded like an ultimatum. The British Government regarded the demand for the immediate arrival of a Polish plenipotentiary as 'wholly unreasonable',¹ and suggested that the German Government should follow the normal procedure of handing their proposals, when ready, to the Polish Ambassador for transmission to Warsaw, and of inviting suggestions about the conduct of the negotiations. Sir Nevile Henderson put this plan to Ribbentrop on 30 Aug., but 'in the most violent terms Herr von Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Polish Ambassador to visit him. He hinted that if the Polish Ambassador asked him for an interview it might be different.'² Ribbentrop refused to give the British Ambassador a copy of the terms upon which Germany insisted, although the German Government had promised, if possible, to submit their proposals to the British Government before the arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary. The terms were merely read out in German 'at top speed'³ to Sir Nevile Henderson, and Ribbentrop said that it was 'too late'⁴ to hand over a copy of the text, since the Polish plenipotentiary had not arrived within the time limit laid down by Hitler.

Meanwhile the Polish Government instructed their Ambassador to seek an interview at the German Foreign Office in order to confirm the Polish acceptance of the British plan. The Polish Ambassador called on Ribbentrop at 6.30 p.m. on 31

¹ British Blue Book, p. 142.

³ Ibid., p. 145.

² Ibid., p. 146.

⁴ Ibid., p. 146.

August. He was told that unless he had come with full powers to accept the German proposals (which had not yet been told to the Polish Government or to the Ambassador) his visit was useless.

The visit was indeed useless. The German travesty of the British plan had served its flimsy purpose.¹ All preparations were complete, and on 1 September German troops crossed the Polish frontier, and German aeroplanes began the bombardment of Polish towns, while Hitler announced the reunion of Danzig to the Reich. The British and French Governments sent a warning note to Germany that they would fulfil their obligations to Poland unless the Germans suspended 'all aggressive action' against Poland, and were prepared 'promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory'.²

There remained one faint hope of preventing a European war. On 31 August Mussolini had suggested to the British and French Governments a plan for a Five-Power Conference. The plan, in accordance with the obvious wishes of Mussolini's

¹ The last, and almost ludicrous, feature in this German make-believe was an assertion, in November 1939, that, in order to lead the Germans into a war which Great Britain had planned for the destruction of the Reich, the British Government deliberately deceived the German Government in saying that the Poles had given their consent to direct Polish-German negotiations. It is difficult to understand why, if the British Government had wished for war, they should have urged these direct negotiations upon Poland and Germany alike. In any case, the facts speak for themselves. In addition to the evidence in the British Blue Book, the British Government subsequently published the telegram giving the Polish consent. In the German White Book (December, 1939) on the origins of the war this telegram is ignored, and in the preface to the book (signed by Ribbentrop) the charge is again repeated.

² British Blue Book, p. 168 (1 Sept.).

German partner, envisaged as a preliminary condition the surrender of Danzig. The British Government refused to agree that the Poles should be compelled to give way in advance on one of the main points which the Conference would meet to discuss. Then followed the opening of the German attack in all its ferocity. On 2 September the Italian Government again approached both the British and the French Governments. The British and French Governments pointed out that, before any conference could meet, the Germans must cease from attacking Poland, and withdraw their armies from Polish soil. A conference between the aggressor and the two western allies of Poland, while the German armies were advancing rapidly across the country they intended to conquer, would have suited Hitler well. A conference on the terms suggested by Great Britain, and supported by France, would have prevented the German occupation of Poland. Hence the Germans were bound to pay no attention to it; they continued without respite their invasion and their bombardment of Polish towns while the Italian proposals were under discussion.

On the morning of 3 September Great Britain and France sent an ultimatum to the German Government to the effect that, unless the conditions laid down in the warning notes of 1 September were given effect, the two Governments would be at war with Germany in fulfilment of their pledges to Poland. Before nightfall the second war between Germany and the two western democracies had begun.¹

¹ The British ultimatum was delivered at 9.0 a.m. and expired

II. The Troubled Years : 1933-1939

Such, in outline, were the immediate causes of the war. The details of the exchange of diplomatic correspondence can be read in the British Blue Book and in the publications of the French and Polish Governments. Two facts stand out: German bad faith, and German aggression. These two facts had become increasingly clear in the European horizon ever since Hitler attained the German Chancellorship at the end of January 1933. It is always dangerous, in the light of an after-knowledge of events, to deduce a chain of inevitability from past to present. The leaders of the democratic States were not altogether foolish in regarding Hitler at first as a somewhat doubtful figure; an adventurer who knew how to exploit his 'nuisance value', but who appeared, in these early days, to be making a great deal of noise over a number of minor successes, but not always to be speaking his real mind when he mouthed phrases about war, or always telling lies when he spoke of peaceful intentions.

Nevertheless, the six years and a half between Hitler's accession to power and the outbreak of war in 1939 will be a warning to future generations about the difficulties in the way of giving form and force to the peaceful desires of the majority against the stark and unscrupulous threats of a minority of the world's inhabitants. It is not easy to say when the cause of peace was finally lost. Germany had already left the Disarmament Conference before Hitler became Chancellor of the Reich. She had at 11.0 a.m. (British Summer Time). The French ultimatum expired at 5.0 p.m.

agreed to return under a formula adopted after much discussion, which recognized her 'equality of status in a system which would provide security for all nations'. The British Government attempted to give this formula practical effect in a draft disarmament convention. While diplomatic discussions were taking place about the British plan, the bellicose speeches of National-Socialist leaders and their plain intention to rearm on land, on sea, and particularly in the air, destroyed the hope of finding a system which would provide security for all nations. The final withdrawal of Germany from the Conference in October 1933, and the simultaneous announcement of her withdrawal from the League of Nations¹ were followed by separate negotiations between the Powers concerned. Great Britain took part in and encouraged these negotiations, and tried to find means of allaying French fears and of setting a limit to Hitler's increasing demands. In March 1934 the publication of the German financial estimates for the coming year showed such enormous increases in military, naval, and air expenditure that the French Government refused to continue discussions which would have resulted in the diminution of French armaments. Once again the British Government attempted to bring about a general settlement. Negotiations were opened for an Eastern Pact on the general lines of the Locarno agreements, and, in the early part of 1935, for an Air Pact. These negotiations

¹ According to the terms of the Covenant, two years' notice was required before the withdrawal became effective. Germany took no direct part in the political deliberations or acts of the League after October 1933.

continued until March 1936.¹ The failure to reach agreement was, again, almost entirely the fault of Hitler.

Germany denounces Locarno

The denunciation of the Locarno Treaty and the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 thus came at the end, or rather at the end of the first stage, of a long series of Hitler's acts of bad faith. The Locarno agreements had not been 'dictated' to Germany; she had entered into them of her own free will and had affirmed, more than once, her intention to respect them. The excuse for breaking faith was worthless. The Germans complained that the Franco-Soviet Treaty was itself a breach of the Locarno Treaty. This view was not shared by the British, French, Italian, and Belgian Governments. The Germans had given their consent to bilateral agreements between States which would come into a general eastern pact, and it was common knowledge that these bilateral agreements would include a Franco-Soviet Pact. Finally, if the Germans had any grounds of complaint, they were under obligation to bring them before the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.

In spite of the accumulation of evidence that Germany could not be trusted, and in spite of the increasing tempo of German rearmament, the western Powers were unwilling to fight a preventive war. It is outside the province of this inquiry into

¹ A series of diplomatic documents recording the exchanges of views between the Powers on the subject of these Pacts was published in a British Blue Book: *Correspondence showing the course of certain Diplomatic Discussions directed towards securing an European Settlement, June, 1934 to March, 1936* (Cmd. 5143).

the causes of the present war to ask or answer the question whether a war on behalf of the maintenance of a treaty freely negotiated could be described as a preventive war. The German General Staff were afraid that they might have to meet armed resistance, and Hitler's move was undertaken against their advice. Hitler took the precaution of making, at the same time, a grand and far-reaching offer in which he asserted that Germany was ready to come back to the League of Nations, on the assumption that the Covenant of the League would be separated from the 'Treaty of Versailles, and that Germany's 'equality of rights' was recognized in the colonial sphere.

The German plan was discussed by the representatives of the Locarno Powers at a meeting held in Geneva in April 1936. It was agreed that, although the German offer did nothing to restore confidence in the willingness of Germany to respect new treaties any more than she had respected the Locarno agreements, full consideration ought to be given to any proposals for conciliation. The British Government was asked to put a number of questions to the German Government on points in the German plan which appeared vague and uncertain. A questionnaire was given to the German Government on 7 May.¹ No reply to this questionnaire was ever received,² while German policy continued to develop on lines opposed to European concilia-

¹ This questionnaire was published as a White Paper (Cmd. 5175 of 1936).

² In his speech of January 1937 Hitler had the impudence to say that 'it was not possible for the German Government, for reasons which the British Government will appreciate, to reply to those questions'.

tion and to co-operation in the maintenance of international law and order. Italy and Japan had broken the Covenant of the League. Germany sought their company. The Rome-Berlin Axis was proclaimed on 1 November 1936. Three weeks later Germany and Japan signed the so-called 'Anti-Comintern' Pact. Germany and Italy used the Spanish Civil War, which broke out in July 1936, as an opportunity for increasing their military and political influence and for testing new armaments and new methods of war; German military aeroplanes, for example, flew to Spanish Morocco within three days of the outbreak of fighting.

German Preparations for War

Thus the year 1937 brought no relief. In January Hitler made what was becoming his usual speech about German good intentions. 'The period of so-called surprises has come to an end. Germany is more conscious than ever that she has a European task before her, which is to collaborate loyally in getting rid of those problems that are a cause of anxiety to ourselves and also to the nations.' In fact, throughout this year, the Germans worked steadily to secure themselves against any risks which might be involved in their next acts of bad faith. They devoted their resources and their industry—at the expense of the standard of living of German workpeople, and with reckless disregard of economic consequences—to the manufacture of material of war. They were thus responsible for a new and intense 'armaments race', in which, for internal reasons, Great Britain and France began all too slowly to make up the leeway they had lost. In

spite of this atmosphere of increasing calamity the British Government refused to give up all belief in the possibility of 'appeasement' (a term which, in its French equivalent, had been used of European reconciliation during more hopeful years). British policy, as shown, for example, in the visit of Lord Halifax to Berlin in November 1937, continued to ignore German expressions of petulance and bad manners, and to test the sincerity of Hitler's talk of peace by asking what Germany really wanted as the conditions of a final settlement. These attempts were as unsuccessful as all such attempts since the rise of National Socialism to power.

Munich

The last phase opened with the occupation and annexation of Austria in 1938. This act secured the military and economic encirclement of Czechoslovakia, and led directly to the crisis which ended, temporarily, with the Munich agreement. It was clear, within a few weeks, that Hitler's talk of peace at Munich was merely a continuation of his treachery. This immediate evidence of German bad faith caused an outburst of anger in the democratic countries, notably in Great Britain, against the Governments which had trusted Hitler's word and, consequently, sacrificed the Czechs to German terrorism. The argument may be left to posterity. One set of observers may consider that—to the last—the responsible leaders of Great Britain and France were right in thinking that Hitler must be taken at his word, and given a final opportunity of turning his undisciplined mind towards order and quiet. The chances of a return to sanity might be

slight, but upon these chances rested the one hope of saving not only the Czechs but the whole world from the infinite horrors of war. Another set of observers may sum up their judgement of Munich in the terms of the old proverb 'God builds the nest of the blind bird'; in other words, Great Britain and France, in assuming Hitler wanted a peaceful settlement, did in fact deprive him of an occasion for making war against the Czechs and the western Powers at a time when the armaments of Great Britain (and, for that matter, of the U.S.S.R.) were at their weakest, especially in the air, in comparison with the armies and the air force of Germany.

In any case, from the point of view of the origins of the present war, the enlightenment or moral strength of the democratic protagonists at Munich are of little relevance. War was not averted; it was merely postponed. Hitler's promises meant nothing to him. Henceforward they could mean nothing to those to whom they were addressed. No one could trust any promise made by the German Government in the name of the German people. Nevertheless, Hitler remained the most admired, the most popular figure in Germany. There could be no doubt that the German people would obey his orders, and also no doubt that he intended to lead them from violence to violence until the whole crazy notion of the hegemony of a chosen Germanic race had been realized throughout the world. Thousands upon thousands of Germans might indeed be Hitler's unwilling slaves, dragooned and terrorized by their own fellow countrymen; but those who secretly opposed Hitler would obey his

orders. The majority would obey willingly. They would obey Hitler because they wanted what Hitler wanted. In words spoken of the blind and doomed house of Bourbon after the French Revolution, they 'had learned nothing and forgotten nothing' since 1914. The tale of their infatuation indeed goes back many years earlier. In 1895 the socialist Bebel, watching a crowd in Berlin as it cheered a regiment of soldiers passing under the Brandenburg gate, had said of the Germans: 'The people is still drunk with victory.' National Socialism inherited an evil tradition. Unless this tradition is understood, it is impossible to realize the deeper causes working towards war in Germany.

III. The Deeper Causes

The world, and particularly the English-speaking world, has been too ready to assume that National Socialism is a freakish thing, an accident of personalities, a sudden new turn in German history; that the views held and put into practice by Hitler, Göring, and their unpleasant company are views which do not reach back into the German past. It has also been suggested that Hitlerism is a special and peculiar reaction, of a virulent pathological kind, to the harsh treatment of Germany after the War of 1914-18 and to the exceptional sufferings of Germans during the period of currency inflation and again during the economic crisis which began at the end of 1929.

It is true that the Germans suffered hardly from the effects of the War, though it might well be said that the sufferings of France, taken all in all, were more severe. There was indeed a certain historical

justice in the penalty paid by Germany, since Germans, far more than any other people, were responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914. It is also true that the terms of the Treaty of Versailles were in some respects too severe (notably on the financial side), just as in other respects these terms were unpractical and doctrinaire. Here again there has been a certain historical irony about German complaints. Before their own defeat in arms (and of this defeat there can be no question, in spite of the German legend of a 'stab in the back') the Germans had imposed upon Russia and Rumania far harsher terms than those laid down at Versailles.¹ To the last, also, the leaders of German industrial and intellectual life, with few exceptions, had shouted for the imposition of terms on the western Powers which would have been more stringent in every respect—including financial conditions and the surrender of territory—than the terms which the victors imposed upon Germany. It is true, again, that the terms of Versailles were imposed, dictated, just as Germany had dictated terms at Brest-Litovsk. It would be difficult to find any peace treaty, after a great war ending in a decisive victory for one side, which was not imposed against the wishes of the defeated parties. It is also impossible to suppose that any settlement which restored North Slesvig to Denmark and Alsace-Lorraine to France, and which revived the political liberty and independence of 'submerged' peoples like the Czechs or the Poles, would ever have been carried into effect if it had not been imposed upon Germany.

¹ See Oxford Pamphlets 6, *The Treaty of Versailles*; 14, *The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk*; 35, *Was Germany Defeated in 1918?*

The rise of Hitlerism was not due to the Treaty of Versailles, but to the military defeat of Germany. After the last war opinion in Great Britain and the United States, and, to a lesser extent, in France assumed that the fall of the Imperial régime implied a complete change of heart among Germans, and that, henceforward, militarism was broken in Germany, and that the Germans would never allow this militarism to be revived. The history of the Weimar Republic shows that these hypotheses were, unfortunately, wrong. From the outset there was no fundamental change of view among the people as a whole, and, above all, among the bureaucracy and the governing class, in a country inclined by habit of mind and long usage to follow the lead and accept the views dictated by authority.

There was, in fact, no real revolution in Germany, in the sense that there had been a real revolution in France in the years following 1789, or in Russia after 1917. The republican leaders in the early days leaned upon the army to protect them from the small group of men who wanted real revolution. These leaders were Germans, trained to German ways of thought, brought up in a German tradition. In this tradition not war, but defeat in war, was 'evil'. The 'dictated' Treaty of Versailles was an outrage, not because the treaty was 'dictated'—no German was foolish enough to suppose that a victorious Germany would have argued about peace terms with a defeated Great Britain and France—but because the dictators were not Germans, and the dictation ended German rule over people who did not want this rule, and destroyed German dreams of continental and, perhaps, world hegemony.

Germans of all parties aimed at 'breaking the bonds of Versailles'. The dividing line came between those who looked to direct military action and a war of revenge, and those who hoped for the recovery of the old dominant position of Germany through a policy of 'fulfilment' of the treaty. The former party advocated defiance, the latter a temporary submission, combined with an attempt to prove to the victors that many clauses in the treaty were unworkable, or pressed unfairly upon German economic life, or—a less reputable plea—offended German pride and made it impossible for Germany to assert her armed strength. Gustav Stresemann was the best and ablest representative of the policy of 'fulfilment'; the Locarno agreements were, on the German side, largely his work. Stresemann was a man of his word. He was also a civilized man. He did not aim at war, but he was a strong nationalist. He wanted to restore to his fellow countrymen the proud position, the dominating position, which they had held in Europe before 1914. He thought that Germany could attain to this position without war. The trouble was that, from the point of view of other States, no one could foresee what use Germany would make of her power, once she had regained it. Frenchmen, in particular, looking at their resources and numbers in relation to those of Germany, felt that they were taking grave risks in assuming that German policy would always be directed by men who were ready to honour the Locarno agreements.

Stresemann won great victories for Germany. The fact that while he was obtaining concessions from the Allies he was fighting against militant

extremists at home showed the measure of political feeling in Germany, and appeared to confirm the fears of France that the concessions made to Stresemann were being made, not to the more moderate party in Germany, but to those extremists who cared only for the restoration of German armed force. These militarists were powerful beyond their mere numbers owing to the influence which they enjoyed in high places, and to the political independence of the Reichswehr. It must be remembered, for example, that, from about 1920 until Hitler's accession to power, the Reichswehr had a secret working agreement with the U.S.S.R., according to which Germany sent to Russia yearly a number of officers to train the army of the U.S.S.R. and to gain for themselves experience in the use of weapons (tanks, heavy artillery, &c.) forbidden to the German army under the peace treaty.

After Stresemann's death in 1929, the fight of the moderates against the revival of militant nationalism in Germany was a losing one. It was indeed always something of a losing struggle because those who resisted the methods of the extremists were never wholly out of sympathy, and often very much in sympathy with the extremists' aims. The argument was one about means rather than about ends.

Even so, it is not impossible that common sense—and common decency—might at last have found a hold among the German people if there had been no economic depression. The economic depression which spread to Europe from the United States affected Germany with great severity. These effects were due in part to the reckless methods of German

borrowing in the years before the depression, but the responsibility of Germans themselves for a great part of their own misfortunes did not lessen their self-pity. The habit of blaming everything upon the 'dictated' Treaty of Versailles had indeed given to this self-pity something of a pathological turn. Other countries were hard hit by the economic depression. It is probable that the amount of suffering was greater not merely absolutely but relatively in the United States than in Germany, but neither in the United States nor in Great Britain was there much disposition to lay the blame for this suffering on other people. The Germans, on the other hand, put the whole blame on the victors of 1918. In any case, there was no leader in Germany capable of suggesting a 'new deal' other than Adolf Hitler. To Hitler the economic depression was a superb opportunity. Thousands upon thousands of Germans accepted National Socialism because it offered them a simple diagnosis of their sufferings and a simple remedy. They would have been less likely to listen to their quack doctor if they had not heard something of the same patter from more reputable German physicians.

Why National Socialism appealed to Germany

It is often said that the German people never accepted National Socialism, but that National Socialism was forced upon them. The ballot figures of the elections before the electoral machinery fell into National Socialist hands (after this time voting figures were, of course, meaningless, and the Reichstag became, according to a familiar German 'subterranean' joke, 'the highest paid male chorus

in Europe') do not show a majority in favour of the National Socialists. It would, however, be a mistake to give these figures too much weight. The surrender of Hitler's political opponents, the quick successes obtained by National Socialist methods, were not due only to the political ineptitude of the parties of the opposition, or even to the gangster tactics adopted by Hitler and his entourage. Hitler's methods were well known long before he obtained power. His blank hostility to all forms of constitutional government and political liberty was also well known.

The active or passive acquiescence of vast numbers of Germans in National Socialism, the easy submission of all save a small and brave minority, are facts of deep historical significance. An attempt to explain these facts by talk about the 'docility' of the German people is at best only half an explanation, and at worst tautology. The Germans acquiesced in National Socialism because they could understand it. They could understand it because its appeal was typically and thoroughly German. They could understand it the more because it was expressed to them in crude and violent language, and embodied in a group of crude and violent men who represented, in an extravagant way, qualities of temper and a mental outlook firmly rooted in the German nation. This point has not been readily understood in Great Britain and the United States. Among the English-speaking nations Hitler and Göring have been recognized easily as pathological types, displaying their abnormality in every act, word, and gesture of their lives. To Germans Hitler is a heaven-born hero, and

Göring an admirable and 'jolly' kind of man. The speeches of these men—even their voices—grated on our ears long before Germany was at war with us. These harsh sounds have been music to the Germans. Hitler, who promised peace on German terms to his followers, is still, in spite of all, the demi-god. Göring, whose *Luftwaffe* was, by its mere existence, to enforce and guarantee this German peace, is still, in spite of all, a popular figure. Propaganda, skilfully conducted, has done much for this popularity of two psychical degenerates, but one has only to ask how far the best advertising agents in the world and the most lavish expenditure of money could ever have made men such as Hitler and Göring popular in Great Britain or the United States. These creatures have obtained popular acclamation in Germany because they represent the type of man which the average German tends to admire; their ideas have found acceptance because such ideas have not been foreign to the German tradition.

National Socialism has nothing original about it, unless a semi-lunatic exaggeration and pedantry can be taken as marks of originality. There is no single item in *Mein Kampf*, or in the glosses upon *Mein Kampf*, which has not a long history in Germany. Anti-Semitism (well described as 'socialism for fools') was a feature in German politics long before anyone had heard of Adolf Hitler. The programme of National Socialism, taken as a whole, had advocates in Germany and German Austria long before Adolf Hitler. Even the fact that this programme has undergone many fluctuations does not give it novelty. The plain and sinister fact

about National Socialism is indeed its lack of originality. Hitler's appeal to the German masses would have been far less attractive if this appeal had been new and original.

Germany and Europe

The matter can be summed up in a few words. For a long period of time, extending over many centuries, Western thought has been developing on lines which, without attaching to them to-day any special party or denominational significance, can be described as both liberal and Christian. This development of thought has been humanitarian and optimistic. Humanitarian in the sense that the starting-point of Western thinkers, in Great Britain, in the United States, and in France, has been the absolute value of the individual, and hence the equal rights of all individuals. The high problems of law and government and economics have thus become centred upon giving to the individual full opportunities for the development of his personality. Man is a social animal, and individuals live together in societies. Hence it has been necessary to provide means for the proper use of the social faculties of men—their habit of mutual aid and co-operation in large enterprises. Western thinkers and practical statesmen have therefore had to be on guard against two opposite dangers: the confusion of liberty with *laissez-faire*, and the encroachment of social or economic or political institutions upon the freedom of individuals whom these institutions exist to serve.

It would be an idle pretence to claim that these great problems have been solved either in the

political or in the economic sphere, but Western thinkers have been optimistic about their ultimate solution. The record of history shows that, by courage and endurance, by the application of reason, by the increase of knowledge, by sustained and united resistance to economic exploitation and political tyranny, large communities of men have been finding their way towards better conditions of existence and happier states of mind. Within these large communities the main (though not the only) task in our time has been the search for 'social justice'. In the relations between community and community the main task, though here also not the sole task, has been the elimination of war as senseless, cruel, and merely destructive.

For more than a hundred years, and in some respects for a much longer time, certain dominant tendencies of German intellectual life have been hostile to this liberal and Christian way of thought. Long before Hitler, popular writers in Germany had derided Western humanitarianism, denied the very conditions under which Western thinkers regarded improvement as possible, and described as mere foolishness the moral ideals which the majority of English, French, and American writers had taken for granted. The worship of power, a contempt for mercy and gentleness, the sacrifice of the individual to the State, a belief in war as the highest and most ennobling form of human activity, these were the lessons taught to the younger generation in Germany, not merely by the Hitler Youth Movement, but by school teachers in the years before the last war. Moreover, this reversion to an earlier barbarism was accompanied by a strong belief that

the Germans were a race with a mission to enforce their view of life upon other peoples. It followed that, in order to further the increase of German power, every German must subordinate his existence to the German institutions of State, and that, in order to increase the power of this State, all means were justified. These beliefs have been set out and repeated by some of the most honoured names in Germany; they have been adopted with enthusiasm by an active minority, embodied in the German educational system, until several generations in turn have been infected by them and, in our time, the youth of a whole nation holds these and no other beliefs.

Hitler is thus the creature, not the creator, of a German nationalism which justifies every bestiality, every act of bad faith practised in the interests of the increase of the power of the German State. Hitler, Göring, and their like have been admired and followed because they spell out in staring letters a theme which less forceful and less vociferous Germans had adopted for themselves. We must indeed remember Burke's words against drawing up an indictment against a whole nation. It is, of course, true that very large numbers of Germans (many of them are now exiles in Great Britain and the United States) have opposed this theory of a barbaric, unmoral, power-devouring German State.¹ It is also true that German intellectual life has not been limited to the discovery of sophistical reasons for giving full rein to the baser

¹ Just as, for example, it is known to-day that there are cases of complete nervous breakdown among Germans who have seen at first hand the behaviour of their fellow countrymen in Poland.

instincts of human nature; the debt of modern medicine, of modern physics to Germany is known to everyone. These instances could be multiplied, but the grim fact remains that the majority of the German people, and the majority of their leaders, have accepted a philosophy which, to us, is a philosophy of darkness.

It is important for us to remember that this German philosophy is false—false in the simplest sense that it is untrue to fact. It is based upon a distortion of history, a distortion of psychology, a distortion of economics. The paradox into which it has led the Germans has been well described in these words about German theories of economic nationalism.

'In the full tide of the age of Abundance and Interdependence they use the language of the long ages of Drudgery, Penury, and Isolation. Power for them still means the power of man over man rather than the power of man over Nature. A neighbour for them is still a potential enemy, spying for an opportunity of loot. Two neighbours constitute two enemies and a possible war on two fronts, which, with a little exaggeration, becomes an 'encirclement'. Countries endowed with natural resources which their inhabitants are only too anxious to sell in the world-market are stores of treasure jealously withheld from a hungry warrior tribe . . . Political Economy, as we have understood it in the West for 150 years, is discarded—or rather, it is treated as an annex to the art of war. The Quartermaster's office is the centre round which revolves the economy of the Totalitarian State.'¹

Between this apotheosis of violence and our belief that mercy and justice are the qualities of the strong, between our reading of the history of human

¹ Sir Alfred Zimmern, *The Prospects of Civilization* (Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 1, p. 30).

evolution as the widening triumph of intelligence co-operation, and mutual aid, and this 'nostalgie de la boue', there can be no compromise, no hope of appeasement. Indeed our greatest problem after the war will not be the reconstruction of our own shattered economic and social life, but the 'decontamination' of German youth from the death-laden atmosphere with which it has been surrounded.

Here, then, we discover the ultimate origins of this war. We are not fighting for the shifting of boundary posts a few score miles to the north or south or east or west. We are not fighting to maintain a rule of privilege or monopoly in our own country. We are fighting for a particular way of life. This way of life allows for change, and looks for betterment; already, through the sacrifice and energy of past generations it has brought us out from barbarism, and set us towards a reasonable and humane existence. We are fighting against a nation of many millions, strongly compact, brave, crafty, and bound in Dervish-like submission to an opposite way of life. As long as they accept this submission, our good is their evil, and their evil is our good.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

FOR those who wish to read in more detail about the background and causes of the present state of the world, the following notes may be of some assistance.

The best and most up-to-date general picture of England as she was from the rise of Germany in 1870 to the outbreak of the First World War is given in Mr. Ensor's book *England 1870-1914* (15s.), which is Volume 14 of the new *Oxford History of England*. Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell's *History of the Great War 1914-1918* (15s.) may be recommended as the standard one-volume work on the subject. Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy deals with the period between the two wars in his *Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938* (8s. 6d.), a book issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The two volumes of *Speeches and Documents on International Affairs*, edited by Professor A. B. Keith (World's Classics, 2s. 6d. each), and the selection of political writings in Sir Alfred Zimmern's *Modern Political Doctrines* (7s. 6d.) illustrate the conflict of doctrines so much in evidence to-day.

The outbreak of the present war is described and discussed in the lectures by H. A. L. Fisher, A. D. Lindsay, Gilbert Murray, R. C. K. Ensor, Harold Nicolson, and J. L. Brierly, collected and published in one volume under the title *The Background and Issues of the War* (6s.).

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No. 42

WHAT
ACTS OF WAR
ARE
JUSTIFIABLE?

BY

A. L. GOODHART

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ALTHOUGH neither law nor any other human device can make war in itself anything but abominable, the notion that belligerents remain under certain legal obligations to one another has its roots in antiquity and persists to-day. Experience of the laws of war shows that they do make a certain difference. Moreover the fact that those who break the laws of war generally try to make out a legal case, however flimsy, for their acts shows that the existence and authority of those laws are recognized by the civilized world.

In this pamphlet the Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Oxford discusses the nature of these laws and their application to the present war. He contrasts the German theory and practice with that of other States, with particular reference to air warfare and blockade, and the position of the civilian population in 'totalitarian' warfare. He also discusses the important question of reprisals.

Professor Goodhart served as a Captain in the American Army in France during the last war. He is the author of several legal works and is Editor of the Law Quarterly Review.

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WHAT ACTS OF WAR ARE JUSTIFIABLE?

IN the last war Germany torpedoed ships without warning, scattered unanchored mines in the seas, bombarded undefended seaside towns, began the use of poison gas in 1915, killed hundreds of civilians in England and France in indiscriminate air-raids, shot hostages in Belgium, and destroyed the city of Louvain. In each case she claimed that she was acting strictly in accordance with the rules of International Law and morality. In the present war the Germans have again attacked merchant shipping with their submarines, have machine-gunned harmless civilians, have devastated Rotterdam in the most savage air attack in history, and are attempting to do the same to London. Once more they are asserting that their acts are both within the law and morally correct. On the other hand, they claim that Great Britain in enforcing the blockade is acting illegally, and is thereby attempting to murder German women and children. Although each of these problems must be considered separately, they are all part of the larger question, What belligerent acts are justifiable in war? The answer to this depends on whether or not we can say that there are any rules governing the conduct of war, and, if there are such rules, what is their content.

The Laws of War

The pessimistic view is that the phrase 'the laws of war' is a contradiction in terms—'cette monstrueuse association de mots, les droits de la guerre', as a French admiral once put it. 'The laws of war

make one think of the snakes of Ireland' was the equally succinct comment of an English general. This view has, however, been disproved by the experience of past wars in which the laws of war have been recognized by the belligerents to be binding on them. Belligerent States have, of course, violated the law sometimes, just as individuals sometimes violate the civil law, but they have hesitated to challenge its existence and authority. The result has been that the law of war has been of practical importance. Professor Brierly was not putting the claims of International Law too high when he said recently:¹ 'But when all allowances have been made, if we do not pitch our expectations too high by imagining that law or any other human device can make war anything but an utter abomination, experience of the laws of war in operation shows that they do make a certain difference.'

The history of the laws of war goes back to the latter part of the Middle Ages, when the influence of Christianity and of chivalry combined to restrict the cruelty of war. The Thirty Years War was a temporary setback, but the horror which the unrestrained brutality of the soldiers, especially at the siege of Magdeburg, caused throughout Europe brought about a new development. Hugo Grotius in his celebrated work *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1625) did much to advance this by his attempt to state the general principles in concrete form. Further progress was made during the eighteenth century, with the result that the unrestrained cruelty of former

¹ *The Background and Issues of the War*, 1940 (Clarendon Press), p. 131.

times was in large part absent from the Napoleonic wars. It was, however, after 1850 that the most striking advance was made by means of various treaties and conventions in which the rules relating to warfare were partially formulated. Thus the Declaration of Paris, 1856, which was signed by seven States, dealt with warfare at sea in so far as it affected the capture of private property at sea and blockade. Almost all the other maritime Powers acceded to it in the course of time. The Geneva Convention of 1864 was concerned with the amelioration of the condition of wounded soldiers, and a further attempt to limit the cruelty of war was the Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868, which prohibited the use of certain explosive projectiles. Of far greater importance, however, were the two Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. At the second Conference the famous Hague Regulations dealing with the rules governing the conduct of land warfare were adopted. They did not purport to give a complete code, leaving all matters not covered by their provisions to be governed by 'the principles of law as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience'. Some question has been raised as to the binding force of these Regulations as they have not been ratified by all the States, but it cannot be doubted that they are of great authority as a statement of the existing customary rules.

The Laws of War are to be found, therefore, partly in conventions and partly in custom. Their source, as the *British Manual of Military Law* states,

is to be found in 'the dictates of religion, morality, civilization and chivalry'. Rules which began merely as usages of warfare have hardened into rules of law which are regarded as binding by the civilized States.

This idea that the belligerents, although at war, remain under certain mutual legal obligations and duties is no modern one. Over two thousand years ago Plato in *The Republic* (Book v) considered the question, How shall our soldiers treat their enemies? He answered that when Greek fought against Greek they must remember that 'still they would have the idea of peace in their hearts and would not mean to go on fighting for ever'. 'And as they are Hellenes themselves,' he said, 'they will not devastate Hellas, nor will they burn houses, nor ever suppose that the whole population of a city—men, women, and children—are equally their enemies.' It is only when the war is fought against barbarians that these rules, which the Hellenes recognize, are not binding.

But the Germans, while occasionally paying lip-service to the accepted rules of International Law, have always preferred the barbarian point of view. Thus von Clausewitz in his monumental work on War speaks of those 'self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed the usages of International Law'. The authoritative German War Manual, *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*,¹ prepared by the German General Staff in 1902, warns military commanders against the humanitarian tendencies of the times, and refers to the humane principles of the Hague Conventions

¹ Translated by J. H. Morgan, K.C., *The German War Book*, 1915.

as 'sentimentalism and flabby emotionalism'. Moreover, it accepts the distinctively German doctrine that *Kriegsräson geht vor Kriegsmanier* (necessity in war overrules the ordinary rules of war), i.e. that the laws of war are no longer binding when a violation of them is necessary to escape from danger, and that the duty of observance ceases whenever conformity thereto interferes with the attainment of the objects of the war. This doctrine is a negation of all law, and reduces the rules of warfare into traps by which the honest but unwary opponent may be ensnared. Fortunately it has been rejected by almost all the other States. We can therefore answer the question whether there are any rules governing the conduct of war in the affirmative, although we must always remember that their efficacy depends in large part on the honour and conscience of the belligerents.

The Content of the Rules of War

Article XXII of the Hague Regulations states as a general principle that 'the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited'. Like all other general principles this one, while important as a guide to the spirit of the laws of war, does not tell us what the particular rules are. These must be found in the other Articles and in the customary rules which are so important a part of International Law. For the sake of clearer understanding it is convenient to divide these rules into three classes, the first covering belligerent acts against enemy civilians, the second belligerent acts against the enemy combatant forces, and the third

belligerent acts against neutral States and individuals. In the present war it is the first class which has been most under discussion, while in the last war it was the two latter which caused the bitterest controversy, it being the third in particular which led to America's entry into the war.

Belligerent Acts against the Civil Population

In ancient days it was held that the civilian population could be killed or enslaved at will. During the Middle Ages, largely due to the influence of the Church, a milder doctrine was taught, although it was not always practised. Thus Francisco di Vittoria, in his famous *Relectiones* (1532), declared that 'the deliberate slaughter of the innocent is never lawful in itself'. The basis of a just war, he said, was the wrong that had been committed, but as the innocent had committed no wrong it was not permissible to wage war against them. A century later, when the Thirty Years War made Europe realize the horrors of unrestricted warfare, Grotius expressed the contemporary view that war ought not to 'involve innocent persons in destruction'. He laid down particular rules which were applicable to children, women, and men who had not taken up arms, such as priests, farmers, merchants, and artisans. From that period public opinion crystallized rapidly, and Louis XIV's threat to the Dutch during the invasion of their country in 1672, that when the ice melted he would give no quarter to the inhabitants of their cities, met with universal reprobation. It was in the nineteenth century, however, that the distinction between the combatant and the civilian was most

firmly drawn. The majority of the continental writers even went so far as to hold that because war was a relation between States and not between individuals it followed that the subjects of the belligerents were enemies only as soldiers and not as citizens, but this view was rejected as too extreme by British and American jurists. Everyone was agreed, however, on the essential point that the immunity of civilians from direct attack was one of the fundamental rules of International Law. 'Nobody doubts', said Professor Oppenheim in his classic work on *International Law* (6th ed., by Professor H. Lauterpacht, p. 169), 'that they ought to be safe as regards their life and liberty, provided they behave peacefully and loyally; and that, with certain exceptions, their private property should not be touched.'

This clear-cut nineteenth-century division between the civilian and the soldier became less definite during the last war. For one thing the whole male population fit to carry arms was now subject to conscription so that every man became a potential soldier. Even when not enrolled in the army every adult, male or female, was liable to be called on to perform some service in the prosecution of the war. For another, the new weapons developed during the war sometimes made the distinction a difficult one to apply in practice. However anxious the pilot of an aeroplane might be to attack only military objectives, it was only in the most favourable circumstances that he could be certain that his bombs would not destroy civilians. As a result certain writers have taken the extreme view that the

distinction between civilians and soldiers is no longer a valid one, and that the whole structure of rules which has been erected on this foundation must fall to the ground. This counsel of despair has, however, been rejected by most of the authorities. Thus Dr. Lauterpacht, the Whewell Professor of International Law in the University of Cambridge, says that, 'while these factors have had the effect of blurring the established distinction in many respects and of necessitating a modification of some of the existing rules, they have left intact the fundamental rule that non-combatants must not be made the object of direct attack by the armed forces of the enemy'.¹

Thus, even though the distinction between the soldier and the civilian may have been blurred in recent times, this does not mean that all acts of war committed against the latter are justifiable. That there must be some limits is the answer of the conscience of mankind, but to formulate them in precise terms is not an easy task unless one accepts the harsh German doctrine of totalitarian warfare.

The German Doctrine of Totalitarian Warfare

It was in the last war that the Germans for the first time carried the doctrine of totalitarian warfare fully into practice, although the idea itself was far from novel. In his letter to Professor Bluntschli in 1880 General von Moltke said: 'I am in no sense in accord with the Declaration of St. Petersburg when it pretends that the "weakening of the *military forces* of the enemy" constitutes the

¹ Oppenheim, *International Law*, edited by H. Lauterpacht, p. 172.

only legitimate object of war.' Thus the inflexible German mind, which sees no virtue in moderation, reached the conclusion that as modern war is a war between the people as a whole it follows that any act which injures the people, whether civilians or soldiers, is a justifiable act of war. In accordance with this doctrine it was thought permissible in the last war to shell the undefended seaside towns of Scarborough, Whitby, and Hartlepool, and to deport into Germany French and Belgian men, women, and girls to do forced labour in the fields. It is this last instance which best illustrates the German doctrine. When protests were made by neutrals against these mass deportations, the German Minister of War, General von Stein, said:¹ 'To-day it is not armies alone who face each other, but peoples. One cannot leave among his enemies labourers to carry on agriculture and make munitions of war. We have not deported young girls alone, but all the population capable of working.' To-day the Nazis no longer need a thin veneer of excuses for such acts. They have announced with pride that they have seized 500,000 Poles—men and women—and have carried them off to slavery in Germany. In 1917 the whole civilized world stigmatized this practice as an outrage and as an obvious breach of a fundamental rule of International Law, but to-day the Nazis regard it as a legitimate act of war.

The only restriction on the German doctrine of unlimited force is contained in the rule that violence

¹ See James W. Garner, *International Law and the World War*, 1920, vol. i, p. 319.

which has no relation to the conduct of the war ought to be avoided. Thus the German War Manual provides that 'every means may be employed without which the object of the war cannot be attained; what must be rejected, on the other hand, is every act of violence and destruction which is not necessary to the attainment of this end'. This limitation had some restraining influence on the German armies in the past, but it seems to be completely ineffective at the present time. To-day the primary purpose of Nazi strategy is to undermine the morale of the civilian population by terrorization, and therefore the more brutal an act is the more useful it is in attaining this end. In accordance with this doctrine the devastation of the city of Rotterdam was held by the Nazis to be a justifiable act of war. 'This bombardment', M. van Kleffens, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, has said,¹ 'was one of the worst crimes of military history. Two groups, each of twenty-seven aeroplanes, systematically bombed the centre of the town with heavy high-explosive and incendiary bombs, leaving not a house intact, hardly a soul alive. Thirty thousand of innocent victims, among whom were scarcely any soldiers, perished during the half-hour this loathsome raid lasted—old men, young men, women and innumerable children. Who, in the face of such facts, is there to speak of "Deutsche Ehre", of "Deutsche Treue"?' We are back again to the German practices of the Thirty Years War because there is now no act which cannot be justified under this doctrine, for the more cruel and brutal an

¹ *The Rape of the Netherlands*, 1940, p. 177.

enemy appears to be the more likely is he to inspire terror. If we accept this view then there are no limits to enemy action against the civilian population because, as M. Bonfils has said,¹ 'If it is permissible to drive inhabitants to desire peace by making them suffer, why not admit pillage, burning, tortures, murder, violation?'

In only one instance have the Germans insisted on the distinction between the civilian population and the armed forces. When the Anglo-French blockade, in the last war and in the present one, restricted the amount of foodstuffs which the Germans could import, they raised the cry that the Allies were attacking the German women and children. The blockade, they contended, was therefore contrary to 'the basic principles of law and humanity'. The answer to this contention will be discussed below.

Civilians Protected by International Law

In sharp contrast to the German practice is the doctrine of International Law that in so far as civilians do not take part in the fighting, they may not be directly attacked and killed or wounded. Professor Hyde, the distinguished American authority, has stated this briefly:² 'Deliberate attempts to terrorize the civil population by attacks specially directed against them should always be denounced as internationally illegal conduct.' Even though such an attack might prove to be of advantage to the

¹ *Droit International Public*, § 1222.

² *International Law chiefly as interpreted and applied by the United States*, 1922, vol. ii, p. 322.

belligerent by spreading panic he is not justified in adopting this method of warfare. On the other hand, injuries to civilians which are the result of bona-fide military activity are legitimate. Thus, for instance, when a besieged town is bombarded, no violation of the rule has taken place if the inhabitants are injured. But the military operation must be a bona-fide one: there must be a fair balance between the means employed and the purpose to be achieved. An undefended city must not be destroyed even though by doing so a few enemy soldiers may be killed. If this were not so, then there would be no limit to a belligerent's right to ravage and destroy, because even the most peaceful village must contain a potential soldier. To attempt to justify such acts on the ground that they are part of military operations merely adds the contemptible sin of hypocrisy to a brutal and unchivalrous crime.

Although these principles cover all forms of military activity, they are of particular importance at the present time in their relation to air warfare, which we must now consider.

Air Warfare

In 1907 the Second Hague Conference discussed the question of aerial bombardment, although at that time it was balloons and not aeroplanes which were of importance. There was general agreement that while this mode of warfare could not be prohibited it ought to be restricted. The Conference therefore adopted Article XXV of the Regulations which provides that: 'The attack or bombardment *by any means whatever* of towns, villages,

habitations or buildings which are not defended is forbidden.' This rule unfortunately proved of little practical value in the last war because it was always possible for a belligerent to claim that every town was defended. Thus the Germans announced that their bombs had been dropped on 'the fortress of London' and 'the fortified place of Great Yarmouth'. They alleged throughout the war that they were not engaged in indiscriminate bombing. The Allies, with more justification, also claimed that they were only attacking military objectives, although it is fair to point out that a considerable number of German civilians were killed. But whatever the practice may have been, all the belligerents were in agreement that aerial bombardment directed against the civilian population for the purpose of terrorization or otherwise was illegal.

After the war the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments (1922) appointed a commission of jurists to formulate the rules concerning aerial warfare. This commission, under the chairmanship of Professor John Bassett Moore, the leading American authority on International Law, produced in 1923 a code of rules which is known as The Hague Air Warfare Rules. Although this code has never been converted into an international Convention, it is nevertheless of importance in view of the authority of its authors; on occasions some governments have announced that they would act in accordance with its provisions.

The code does not purport to lay down new law, but is an attempt to put into precise form the existing rules. It is based on the fundamental assumption

that a direct attack on non-combatants is an unjustifiable act of war. Its two most essential provisions are as follows:

Article 22: Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or of injuring non-combatants, is prohibited.

Article 24 (1): Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military objective—that is to say, an object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military advantage to the belligerent.

Although some other articles of the code have been the subject of debate, no one has seriously questioned that these two Articles represent accurately the rule of International Law on this point. Deliberately to terrorize or injure non-combatants is no more a proper object of aerial warfare than it is that of land or naval war. Nor is indiscriminate bombing legitimate on the ground that a military objective might possibly be hit—the attack must be directed definitely against that objective. Moreover, that objective must really be of military advantage, and not merely a subterfuge for an otherwise illegal attack on the civilian population.

Judged by these tests, what can be said of the Nazi air-raids on Great Britain? One point is beyond dispute, and this is that the machine-gunning of men, women, and children by German pilots in the streets of London and Southampton is pure terrorization, and is illegal by every conceivable standard. The Nazis have denied the Belgian and French accusations that during the retreat they deliberately machine-gunned the refugees in those

countries, but they cannot deny that they have deliberately shot down women and children in the quiet English streets, because thousands have seen them do it. The 'chivalry' of the German 'knights of the air' has been stressed by the Nazis, but if this is a type of 'chivalry' then, fortunately, the civilized world does not recognize it as such.

Concerning the bombardment of London the Nazis have given two contradictory explanations. The first is that the bombardment is directed against military objectives. If this is true, then the aim of the Nazi pilots has been singularly inaccurate. In the last war bombing, especially at night, had to be more or less haphazard, so that it was difficult to hit a precise target, but to-day it requires more than lack of skill to hit the residential district of Hampstead when aiming at the London docks. This explanation has, moreover, been belied by the Nazi pilots themselves. In a series of broadcasts they have described their attacks on London. They spoke with considerable exaggeration of the destruction of military objectives, but their real enthusiasm was reserved for the description of how the homes of the people had been destroyed. Thus one pilot described his joy when he saw a block of flats crumble under the explosions of his bombs.

The second explanation given by the Nazis is that these raids are a reprisal for the alleged British attacks on German civilians. This explanation, in flat contradiction to the first, recognizes that these bombing attacks are directed against the civilian population, and that they are therefore a breach of

International Law, but they are excused on the ground that the British did it first. This excuse has been repeated in the case of every German violation both in the last war and this, and is in accordance with Hitler's dictum that if only a lie is repeated often enough it will finally be believed.

The German air-raids in so far as they are directed against the civilian population and are intended to act *in terrorem* are therefore illegal by their own standards. That they have proved ineffective for this purpose is not the fault of the Nazis.

The Food Blockade¹

The problem of the British food blockade is closely connected with that of aerial bombardment because the Germans have claimed that they are entitled to bomb the civilian population of Great Britain as a reprisal against the food blockade which, they say, is an attack on the German women and children. This argument was put forward in the Soviet Government's note of 25 October 1939, protesting against the Allied blockade. It said in part:

'It is known that the universally recognized principles of international law do not permit the air bombardment of the peaceful population, women, children, and aged people.'²

'On the same grounds the Soviet Government deem it not permissible to deprive the peaceful population of foodstuffs, fuel, and clothing, and thus subject children,

¹ See Oxford Pamphlet, No. 24, *Blockade and the Civil Population*, by Sir W. Beveridge; and No. 38, *Britain's Blockade*, by R. W. B. Clarke.

² This was written before the Soviet Air Force bombed Helsinki.

women, and aged people and invalids to every hardship and starvation by proclaiming the goods of popular consumption as war contraband.⁷

From this it will be seen that the Soviet Government has the courage of its convictions because it insists that fuel and clothing as well as food must be let through the blockade. Thus coal for the household stoves, and petrol which is necessary for the distribution of food, must not, according to this view, be kept out of Germany, because otherwise the civilian population will suffer hardship. At first sight this contention seems to be a persuasive one, and it has appealed to some sympathetic persons both here and abroad. Why then was it rejected both by the Allies and the United States in the World War, although they were in agreement that attacks on the civilian population of a belligerent were contrary to the rules of International Law? The answer is that the blockade is not an attack, direct or indirect, on the women and children. No one will deny that as an incident of such a blockade the civilian population may suffer hardship, but such incidental injury is part of every legitimate act of war. International law has always drawn a distinction between the act which has a legitimate war aim, even though it may incidentally injure the civilians, and an act the sole purpose of which is to injure them. If this division were not made then all acts of war would be illegal because all of them might affect civilians. The distinction is one which becomes clear as soon as we test the act by the purpose with which it is done. When a bomb is deliberately dropped on civilians, the intent is to kill

those civilians. It is their death which is the direct and essential purpose, because it is hoped that in this way the morale of the country will be destroyed. On the other hand, the purpose of the food blockade is not to kill the women and children, but to deprive the enemy of essential war material. 'An army, like a serpent, travels on its belly', is Frederick the Great's best-known aphorism, and, unlike many other aphorisms, it is true. By reducing the amount of available food in Germany the efficiency of the army will be directly affected. The Germans have spoken much about women and children, but they seem to have forgotten that the English phrase 'women and children first' means that these should be saved first. If they remember this, then it will be the army and the men working in the armament factories, and not the women and children, who will have to be satisfied with reduced rations. From another standpoint, the problem of foodstuffs is also of direct military importance because fats are essential to the manufacture of explosives. There are sufficient fats in Germany and the countries occupied by her to satisfy the essential needs of every person there. It is only because Germany has used this fat for explosives that there is so serious a shortage. The direct result of sending fats to Germany is therefore, not that a German baby will be kept from starvation, but that a bomb will be manufactured which may kill English women and children.

The German contention that a blockade instituted for such a purpose is illegal cannot be supported by reference to any authority on International Law (except, of course, the recent German books on the

subject). It is noteworthy that the British Government made no such claim when the Germans attempted to blockade Great Britain during the last war: it was the method of the blockade, by submarines and mines, and not its purpose which was challenged.

Inhabitants in Enemy-Occupied Territory

The rules of International Law are not limited to protecting the non-combatant against intentional attacks by the enemy military forces; they also protect him when the enemy has occupied his country. The view that the victor might enslave and pillage the vanquished was rejected both in theory and practice during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This principle, accepted by all civilized countries, was stated in Article XLVI of The Hague Regulations which reads: 'Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated.' That the Nazis have completely disregarded every provision of this Article by their actions in Poland, they themselves have stated with some pride. They have deported hundreds of thousands of the inhabitants, they have pillaged their property, and have destroyed their churches. No attempt to justify these acts from the standpoint of International Law or morality can be made: they can only be explained by the primitive doctrine that the conqueror may destroy the conquered. *Vae victis!*

Acts of War against the Combatant Forces

The laws of war include a large number of rules

which deal with the methods of warfare which one combatant is entitled to use against the other. Thus there are provisions concerning the killing of an enemy who has surrendered, the use of flags of truce, the constitution of the armed forces, spying, &c. In the last war the most disputed question in this branch of the law concerned the nature of the weapons which a belligerent was entitled to use, and as it may arise again in this war it is necessary to deal with it briefly.

The first attempt to limit the type of weapons to be used in war was made in 1868, when the Declaration of St. Petersburg prohibited the use of certain explosive projectiles. In 1899 the First Hague Conference prohibited the use of expanding bullets. It also adopted a Declaration stipulating that the signatory Powers would abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which was the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. This was not intended as a new rule but merely put into precise form the customary rule prohibiting the use of poison, a rule which has been described as 'one of the oldest and most generally admitted rules of warfare'. In 1907 The Hague Regulations stated in Article XXIII (e) the general principle that 'it is especially forbidden to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering'.

What is the test of 'unnecessary suffering'? The German doctrine, as Professor Garner has emphasized,¹ is that 'any instrument or method, the employment of which will contribute to the speedy attainment of the object of war, is permissible

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 280.

whatever may be said against it on humanitarian grounds'. Thus the Imperial German Chancellor stated in the *Reichstag* (March 1916) that 'when the most ruthless methods are considered best calculated to lead us to victory, and a swift victory, they must be employed'. The same genial view was expressed by Field-Marshal von Hindenburg. 'One cannot', he said, 'make war in a sentimental fashion. The more pitiless the conduct of the war, the more humane it is in reality, for it will run its course all the sooner.'

This absolute doctrine has not been accepted by the other nations. They hold that the legality of an instrument of war must be judged from two stand-points: (1) its efficacy, and (2) its humanity. If the efficacy is not sufficient to offset its inhumanity then it must not be employed.

This question became of practical importance when the Germans used flame projectors for the first time in 1915. They claimed that these were not illegal as they served a war purpose, but the Allies took the position that this practice was unlawful because it caused unnecessary suffering. The use of flame throwers was abandoned owing to the strong counter-measures taken by the Allied soldiers.

Of far greater importance was the question of poison gas, which the Germans first used in 1915. This came as a complete surprise to the Allies as this method of warfare was recognized as being unlawful both under The Hague Declaration of 1899, and The Hague Regulations, 1907, and under the general principles of International Law. The German defence, in characteristic fashion, included

the following points: (1) that the Allies had been the first to use poison gas, (2) that The Hague Declaration only prohibited projectiles while the German gas came from cylinders, (3) that the gas used was not poisonous and did not inflict permanent injury on those who inhaled it, (4) that it was necessary for the Germans to use it.

The bitterness which the Allies felt at the use of this method of warfare was increased by the feeling that the Germans had deliberately broken a rule of law which they themselves had taken a part in framing. It is a sound instinct that makes people realize that there is a radical distinction between killing within the law and killing outside the law which is murder.¹ To keep the law is a form of good faith, but the Germans have never recognized that there is any duty to keep faith if this is against the interests of their country. Hitler expressed this view when he said that 'he could conclude any pact and yet be ready to break it the next day in cold blood if that was in the interests of the future Germany'.²

In this instance breach of law and breach of faith did not pay Germany because the Allies, as a reprisal, used gas in their turn, and by the end of the war it proved to be one of their most efficient weapons.

¹ It was for this reason that the Nazis attempted to prove that the 'blood bath' of 1934 was legal on the ground that Hitler, as supreme law-giver, had decreed the death of his former associates. Thus Professor Karl Schmitt wrote (*The Times*, July 28, 1934): "The Führer in virtue of his leadership protected the law from the gravest abuse by directly creating law as supreme law lord."

² See Oxford Pamphlet, No. 37, *War and Treaties*, by Arnold D. McNair, p. 9.

In June 1925 a number of States, including the Great Powers, met at a conference convened by the League of Nations and signed a Protocol in which they agreed to the prohibition in war of 'asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices'. In September 1939 Germany announced that she would observe the Protocol of 1925 subject to reciprocity. So far she has done so.

Reprisals

The essence of reprisals is that if one belligerent deliberately violates the accepted rules of warfare then the other belligerent, for the sake of protecting himself, may resort by way of retaliation to measures which, in ordinary circumstances, would be illegal. Thus a soldier who shoots at the enemy who is attacking him is not committing an act of reprisal because it is always lawful to shoot the enemy: on the other hand, the destruction of a village because a soldier has been killed in it by a civilian is an act of reprisal, as such destruction would not otherwise be justifiable.

It has occasionally been said that no acts of reprisal are ever justifiable because two wrongs cannot make a right. The answer is that one wrongful act can make the other act rightful. International Law is therefore correct when it speaks of the *right* to reprisal. This right has been exercised by nearly all belligerents in nearly all wars, so that, whether we like it or not, we cannot close our eyes to its existence.

In the last war the British Government exercised the right of reprisal on three major occasions. In

1915 it announced that it would use gas as the Germans had adopted this type of warfare. The Archbishop of Canterbury wrote to the Prime Minister (*The Times*, 17 May 1915) urging him not to use 'the same infamous weapon'. 'Most earnestly do I trust,' he said, 'that we shall never anywhere be induced or driven to a course which would lower us towards the level of those whom we denounce.'

Mr. Asquith replied:

"The new developments on the part of our enemy, to which you refer, in the scientific organization of barbarism . . . have aroused in our people a temper of righteous and consuming indignation, for which—I believe—there is no precedent or parallel in our national history.

"Let not the sun go down upon your wrath" is a precept which rebukes the petty, personal, unreasoning quarrels of social and national life. But it has no application when the issue is such that freedom, honour, humanity itself is at stake.'

The next day Earl Kitchener announced (*The Times*, 19 May 1915) in the House of Lords that 'our troops must be adequately protected by the employment of similar methods so as to remove the enormous and unjustifiable disadvantage' under which they now suffered. No further protests were made against this reprisal, except by the Germans.

The second British reprisal concerned the German submarine campaign. On 2 February 1915 Germany declared her intention to destroy without warning all enemy merchant vessels which might be found in the waters around the United Kingdom. The British Government thereupon issued the famous Reprisals Order in Council of 11 March

1915 which announced that all goods of enemy destination, origin, or ownership would be detained. This involved a far-reaching extension of the right to seize contraband, but was justified as a reprisal. As Mr. Balfour said in an article in *The Times* (29 March 1915): 'If the rules of warfare are to bind one belligerent and leave the other free, they cease to mitigate suffering; they only load the dice in favour of the unscrupulous.'

The third British reprisal was the air raid upon Freiburg i. Br. on 14 April 1917, in which a number of civilians were killed. This was announced to be a reprisal for the torpedoing of the hospital ships *Gloucester Castle* and *Asturias*. 'It was intended,' Lord Curzon explained in the House of Lords on 2 May 1917, 'as a deterrent to prevent the enemy from repeating his crimes against humanity.'

Of these three reprisals it may be said that the two first were essential steps in winning the war. If Germany had been allowed to carry on her poison-gas and submarine warfare without retaliation by Great Britain, she would thereby have obtained an advantage which would have made the difference between defeat and victory. Whether or not the third reprisal proved of any practical value is doubtful.

The threat of reprisals was also exercised by the British Government on a number of other occasions. Thus when the Germans executed Captain Fryatt in 1915, the Prime Minister's statement that retaliatory steps would be taken in the future if the Germans continued such acts was sufficient to stop further judicial murders. Similarly when in 1917

the Germans threatened that British aviators, who were captured while dropping propaganda leaflets over the enemy lines, would be sentenced to death, the threat of reprisal caused a change in the German attitude.

These various instances illustrate the grounds on which retaliation may be justified. The first is that, as a deterrent, it may induce the enemy to give up his illegal conduct. The second is that it will prevent him from obtaining an unfair advantage in the prosecution of the war. The third is that it is an expression in action of the righteous indignation of the people. The demand for just retribution must be distinguished from the desire for revenge. On this point Sir John Salmond wrote (*Jurisprudence*, 9th ed., p. 147):

‘Indignation against injustice is, moreover, one of the chief constituents of the moral sense of the community, and positive morality is no less dependent on it than is the law itself. It is good, therefore, that such instincts and emotions should be encouraged and strengthened by their satisfaction. . . . There can be little question that at the present day the sentiment of retributive indignation is deficient rather than excessive, and requires stimulation rather than restraint.’

In times of war this sentiment of retributive indignation can only find expression in the form of reprisals.

This does not mean that all reprisals are justified. There are two conditions which must be fulfilled. The first is that the illegal conduct of the enemy must be clearly proved, and the second is that the action which the retaliating State takes is proper as a measure of reprisals. The violation of both these

conditions is illustrated in the infamous destruction of Louvain by the Germans in the last war. Although they claimed that this was a justifiable reprisal for the shooting of German soldiers by Belgian civilians, their action evoked protests throughout the civilized world. This was due to the realization that in the first place it was more than doubtful whether any Belgian civilians had fired on the Germans, and that in the second the reprisal was out of all proportion to the injury suffered. It was therefore accepted by the world as an example of German *Schrecklichkeit* which was intended to overawe the inhabitants by its brutality.

In view of these various considerations the determination whether or not retaliation is justifiable under particular circumstances is frequently a matter of difficulty. But even when it has been decided that retaliation is justified, a Government may hesitate to engage on a course which is likely to lead to a competition in brutalities. The United States *Rules of Land Warfare* therefore prescribe that retaliation shall only be taken as a last resort:

‘Retaliation will, therefore, never be resorted to as a measure of mere revenge, but only as a means of protective retribution, and, moreover, cautiously and unavoidably; that is to say, retaliation shall only be resorted to after careful inquiry into the real occurrence, and the character of the misdeeds that may demand retribution.’

Belligerent Acts against Neutrals¹

The problem of neutral rights during a war has given rise to great difficulty because it involves an

¹ See Oxford Pamphlet, No. 17, *The Blockade 1914-1919*, by W. Arnold-Forster.

inevitable conflict. The position of the neutral is that, as he is not concerned with the war, it is the duty of the belligerents to do nothing which may interfere with his normal rights, while on the other hand each of the belligerents claims that it is his legitimate right to destroy the enemy's commerce even though this may interfere with the neutral's trade. International law has therefore worked out a series of compromises which are embodied in the rules relating to blockade, contraband, and unneutral service.

In the last war the United States protested that both Great Britain and Germany were violating her rights as a neutral, Great Britain by an unjustifiable extension of the doctrine of contraband and Germany by her unrestricted submarine warfare. Why then, if she claimed that both the belligerents were guilty of violations, did the United States ultimately enter the war on the side of the Allies? The answer can be given in Professor Hyde's words:¹

"The United States resented keenly the dire effects of the German operations; it experienced no like sense of outrage on account of the mere diversion of American vessels from the North Sea. This was due to the fact that German submarine operations manifested wanton disregard of human life in attempts to destroy vessels of every class within the proscribed areas.

President Wilson expressed this same view in his *Lusitania* note of 7 May 1915:

"The Government of the United States is contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing

¹ Op. cit., p. 427.

less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every Government honors itself in respecting and which no Government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority.'

It was because the German Government refused to recognize these rights of humanity that the United States finally declared war. In this instance, therefore, the German doctrine that the justification for acts of war depends on their efficacy alone and is not affected by their inhumanity received its condign answer. Frightfulness does not always pay.

After the war the maritime Powers wished to make it certain that unrestricted submarine warfare would never again take place. They therefore entered into the London Naval Treaty of 1930 which provided that 'a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant-vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety'. In 1936 Germany acceded to this Protocol. On Monday, 4 September 1939, one day after the present war began, a German submarine torpedoed without warning the passenger-vessel *Athenia* with the loss of 400 lives.

Conclusion

This summary of some of the laws of war shows that they have been recognized as binding by the nations, and that 'they do make a certain difference'. The most important of them is the rule that non-combatants must not be made the object of direct attack by the armed forces of the enemy. In his well-known work *War Rights On Land* Dr. J. M.

Spaight said (p. 37): "The separation of armies and peaceful inhabitants into two distinct classes is perhaps the greatest triumph of International Law. Its effect in mitigating the evils of war has been incalculable". The Nazis in their indiscriminate aerial bombardment and unrestricted submarine warfare have disregarded this distinction, but this need not make us despair for the future. International Law as recognized by the civilized nations will not cease to exist merely because one State has deliberately violated its provisions. It is true that in the last war Germany broke many of these rules, but it is equally true that this disregard contributed materially to her ultimate defeat. In the present war she has again broken the laws of war, but this is hardly surprising as they are based on 'the dictates of religion, morality, civilization and chivalry'. It is to re-establish these in a world threatened with barbarism that this war is being fought.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

FOR those who wish to read in more detail about the background and causes of the present state of the world, the following notes may be of some assistance.

The best and most up-to-date general picture of England as she was from the rise of Germany in 1870 to the outbreak of the First World War is given in Mr. Ensor's book *England 1870-1914* (15s.), which is Volume 14 of the new *Oxford History of England*. Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell's *History of the Great War 1914-1918* (15s.) may be recommended as the standard one-volume work on the subject. Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy deals with the period between the two wars in his *Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938* (8s. 6d.), a book issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The two volumes of *Speeches and Documents on International Affairs*, edited by Professor A. B. Keith (World's Classics, 2s. 6d. each), and the selection of political writings in Sir Alfred Zimmern's *Modern Political Doctrines* (7s. 6d.) illustrate the conflict of doctrines so much in evidence to-day.

The outbreak of the present war is described and discussed in the lectures by H. A. L. Fisher, A. D. Lindsay, Gilbert Murray, R. C. K. Ensor, Harold Nicolson, and J. L. Brierly, collected and published in one volume under the title *The Background and Issues of the War* (6s.).

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
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
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Dr. R. A. Humphreys is Lecturer in American History at University College, London, and has made a special study of Latin America. He has edited *British Consular Reports on the Trade and Politics of Latin America, 1824-26* (Royal Historical Society, London 1940).

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
LATIN AMERICA

The Land

THE twenty Republics of Latin America cover an area more than two and a half times the size of the United States. Brazil, the colossus of South America, is itself larger than the United States. Argentina, richest of all the Republics, is five times the size of France. Peru, small in comparison with these great States, could comfortably contain the whole of the Union of South Africa, and even those tiny Republics which join the great cornucopia of Mexico to the vast southern continent together occupy an area larger than Spain.

South America itself is roughly a triangle. It lies, for the most part, to the east of the United States, so that at its most easterly extension it is less than 2,000 miles from Africa, and Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires are nearer to Lisbon than to New York. The rims of this triangle are elevated. On the west coast the great chain of the Andes, rising to formidable heights, stretches from Tierra del Fuego to the Caribbean Sea. On the east the highlands of Guiana form the northerly wall of the vast inland world of Amazonia, while the great plateau of Brazil rises steeply from the Atlantic shores. Four river systems—the Magdalena, the Orinoco, the Amazon, and the La Plata basin—drain the continent. More than 2,000 miles up the Amazon Peru has her Atlantic port at Iquitos. Two countries only—Bolivia and Paraguay—are landlocked, and even Paraguay has access to the sea by the Paraguay and Paraná.¹

¹ The Paraguay, the most important tributary of the Paraná, is navigable for boats of 12 feet draft as far as Villa Concepción and for smaller vessels for almost its entire length.



AREAS AND POPULATIONS OF THE 20 LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Each square represents 20,000 square miles, each dot 1,000,000 inhabitants. Based on figures taken from the *Foreign Commerce Yearbook*, 1938, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

(D.R. = Dominican Republic; Sal. = Salvador; H. = Haiti)

Seven per cent. of South America itself is 10,000 feet above sea-level, and in these lands of sudden and surprising climatic and topographical changes, communications remain incredibly difficult. In Mexico the traveller who follows the route of Cortés from Vera Cruz to Mexico City passes within a few hours from the tropical heat of the *tierra caliente* to the chill of the *tierra fría*, more than 6,000 feet up. The journey from Lima to Iquitos takes two weeks by mule, by car, and by boat, so formidable is the mountain barrier. Even on the coast of Brazil to travel from Santos to Pará by any other means than air is as lengthy a journey as from London. No road links the southern to the northern continent. Even Tschiffely, on his famous ride from Buenos Aires to New York, was compelled to dismount near the borders of Panamá and to do that stretch by sea. Of the great Pan-American highway which is to link New York to Panamá and Panamá to Buenos Aires, large stretches still remain untouched and much is incomplete. A network of railways spreads out its antennae from Buenos Aires to connect the third city of the western hemisphere with Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay. In the Peruvian and Bolivian Andes the railroads are miracles of technical achievement. But in Latin America the air unites, the land divides, and the student of Latin American history will do well to call the geographer to his aid.

The People

The whole population of this vast area of Latin America is under 125,000,000. It is unevenly distributed. Brazil contains nearly half the total population of the southern continent. Yet its interior is a 'desert of men' and its population density

less than 13 to the square mile. Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile account for almost another quarter. Yet their combined population is only slightly more than that of Mexico in the northern continent. Nor is the nature of this population uniform. Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica are almost exclusively peopled by whites. In Brazil, the true melting-pot of the western hemisphere, half the population is white, but Indians predominate in the interior, mestizos¹ in the north, and the negro element is strong in Bahia. In Bolivia and Peru, though a small white minority holds the reins of power, the mass of the people is Indian; and elsewhere, in these mainland countries, the native Indian blood, either pure or in varying degrees of admixture, forms the basis of the population. Even in modern Mexico more than fifty Indian languages are spoken.

When the Spaniards came to the New World they found between the great plateau of Mexico and the highlands of Peru native civilizations of extraordinary interest and relatively high complexity. But Aztecs, Chibchas, and Incas, still less the more backward tribes of Indians, were no match for the white man with his guns and armour. In southern Chile, indeed, the mettlesome Araucanians were to preserve their independence till late in the nineteenth century. But, for the most part, there was little serious resistance to the *conquistadores*, and, after the first brutal onslaughts of the conquest, the Spaniards were concerned, not with the extermination, but with the conversion and the exploitation of the Indian. Immigration to the colonies was restricted and controlled. The Indian

¹ The term 'mestizo', in its original sense, denotes a cross between white and Indian blood.

remained the miner and the labourer. Spanish and native blood mingled, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, out of a total population of some 17 millions in Spanish America, only three and a quarter were white to seven and a half Indian.¹

Apart from the thin stream of Spaniards to the Indies and of Portuguese to Brazil in the colonial period, immigration to Latin America, on any considerable scale, thus came comparatively late in the nineteenth century. It was mostly directed to southern Brazil, to Argentina and Uruguay, and to Chile, and though the movement of peoples to Latin America in the nineteenth century and after was not comparable with the migrations to the United States, its relative importance was great. Next to Spaniards and Portuguese, the major elements in this immigration were Italian and German. Of the population of Argentina, 30 per cent. has Italian blood in its veins, and more than a third of all the immigrants entering Brazil between 1820 and 1930 were Italians. There are more than three-quarters of a million people of German stock in Brazil, mostly in the three southern States of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catharina, and Paraná. Argentina has a German-speaking population of a quarter of a million (including Swiss and Austrians) and in south-central Chile three generations of Germans have lived and prospered. Asiatic immigration has been a twentieth-century phenomenon, and the 200,000 Japanese in Brazil are the result of colonization, carefully planned, highly centralized, and swift in development.

¹ Of the remainder about three-quarters of a million were negroes. The proportion of negroes in the Portuguese colony of Brazil was much higher, and negro slavery persisted in Brazil till 1888.

Immigration has given something of a European outlook to Argentine society. It has contributed greatly to the social and material welfare of the River Plate countries and of southern Brazil. It has helped to emphasize the distinctions between the several Republics. For Latin America is not a unity, and the differences between these States are at least as important as the resemblances. There is a certain family feeling. There is a common heritage (except in Brazil) from Spain. There is a common glory in the establishment of independence. There is a sense of Americanism, a consciousness of similar interests and ideals and of a shared experience. But differing in size, race, and population, the twenty Republics differ also in wealth and power, in social and political development. In most of these countries there is a highly developed national consciousness. There is no such strange creature as a Latin American. A Mexican is a Mexican, a Brazilian a Brazilian, citizens of no mean countries.

The Spanish Empire

The Spanish Empire in the New World was built on a gigantic scale. Even at the end of the eighteenth century Spain still held sway (with the exception of the Portuguese colony of Brazil) from California to Cape Horn. In North America the English colonists in the middle of that century sparsely populated a sea-board strip from the Green Mountains of Vermont to the pine woods of Alabama. Their western frontier marked the edge of civilization bordering on the wilderness. A century or more was to elapse before the relentless movement of western expansion had carried that frontier from the Alleghanies to the Pacific, and

before the process of exploration and exploitation of the continent was complete. But in Spanish America this process of exploration and colonization had been more or less completed by the end of the sixteenth century. And in contrast to the slowly moving westward frontier of North America, by the end of the sixteenth century most of what are to-day the chief cities of Spanish America already dotted the map, like Roman *coloniae* at far-flung intervals.

Parts, no doubt, remained unsubdued; parts were never explored. But the achievement was spectacular. And for a further three centuries Spanish America remained a closed and almost unknown continent to the rest of the world. The empire itself was administered as a centralized absolutism, with elaborate checks and balances designed to prevent maladministration on the part of the servants of the Crown. Few codes of law have been more benevolently intended than the Laws of the Indies. But great gulfs existed between theory and practice; and whereas in North America the English colonists from the first were educated to self-government, in Latin America the colonials were almost, if not quite, excluded from the work of government and administration.

The Spanish Empire was not only vast and long-lived; it was fabulously wealthy. In the eighteenth century Spanish (and Portuguese) America still remained the world's greatest source of supply of the precious metals. And Spanish America was not only a source of supply; it was a market of vast potentialities. Yet Spain failed to exploit it, and failed also to participate in the commercial expansion of Europe. The stream of gold and silver which flowed from the New World itself contri-

buted to the perversion of her economic development, and while she rigidly applied and maintained a monopolistic system, she lacked the economic organization successfully to enforce it. Her enemies exhausted her first by plunder, then by contraband; and her economic and administrative reforms in the eighteenth century came too late and did not go far enough. In the colonies themselves they contributed, like the American and like the French revolutions, to a freer play of ideas and a greater intellectual activity, while the control of Spanish American trade by a small group of monopolists became yet more unbearable. Finally, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, threatened on the northern border-lands by the territorial expansion of the United States, faced by the sea power and commercial expansion of England, the empire collapsed.

The Achievement of Independence

The Napoleonic invasions of Spain precipitated the Spanish American Revolution. It began ostensibly as an assertion of freedom from French control. It ended as a war of independence against Spain. And the Latin Americans won their own independence. It was an epic achievement, carried out in the face of incredible difficulties. Though each of the States has its own 'founding fathers', all unite to honour the two greatest of the liberators, San Martín and Bolívar, respectively liberators of the south and the north of the southern continent, whose marches across the snow-clad Andes surpass the passages of the Alps by Hannibal and Napoleon, and who are revered not only as great leaders in battle, but also as statesmen. The tasks, first to achieve freedom, then to organize that freedom,

were stupendous. Their fulfilment by the Latin Americans themselves is a legitimate source of pride to peoples whose past has been too little understood and whose achievements have been too little appreciated.

There are British names associated with this achievement—Lord Cochrane who brilliantly commanded the navy of Chile and carried the army of Buenos Aires from Chile to Peru; Admiral Brown, the Irishman in command of the ships of Argentina; the men of the British Legion who served under Bolívar. And the resources of Britain's merchants and bankers, and still more the protection of her fleet, were of vital importance. 'Only England, mistress of the seas, can protect us against the united force of European reaction', wrote Bolívar in 1823. Lord Castlereagh, one of the greatest of British Foreign Secretaries, had made the position of Great Britain absolutely clear in a famous memorandum circulated to the European courts in 1817. No other Power than Spain should ever be allowed to use force against the Spanish colonies. From that moment the independence of Latin America was assured. What Castlereagh had done was to prevent European intervention on behalf of Spain when the issue was still in doubt. Once again, in 1823, when there were fears of European intervention (fears which we now know to have been groundless), a British Foreign Secretary, this time George Canning, secured from the only European Power that was potentially dangerous, France, a disavowal of any such intention, and appointed at the same time consuls and commissioners to go to the new States with a view to their recognition. It was at this time, too, that President Monroe sent that celebrated message to the United States

Congress which has gone down in history as the Monroe Doctrine—a doctrine whose importance for the future was great. The American continents, declared the President, were not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power; and he could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing or controlling the new States in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition to the United States.

Yet though both Great Britain and the United States stood forth as the protectors of the new States, it is to the Latin Americans themselves that the glory of the achievement of independence must go, and by 1824 that achievement was complete. Latin America was free. By 1830 twelve new republics and one new empire had been added to the number of independent States.¹ Mexico (where the course of the revolution was somewhat different from that in the rest of Spanish America) had passed from colony to empire and from empire to republic. The vast republic of Colombia, which Bolívar had created, had split into the three States of Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela. Brazil, by a singularly peaceful revolution, had thrown off the dominion of Portugal, and in 1822 had established an empire, under the House of Bragança, which was to survive almost till the last decade of the nineteenth century. Great Britain exerted her in-

¹ There were sixteen new Republics if the 'Five Republics of Central America' are counted separately. These, in 1823, were theoretically united in the confederation of the United Provinces of Central America, which survived till 1838. Cuba did not attain self-government till 1902, nor Panamá till 1903. Haiti declared its independence from France in 1804, but the Dominican Republic, after declaring its independence of Spain in 1821, fell under the dominion of Haiti and did not begin its independent life till 1844. It was again incorporated with Spain from 1861 to 1865.

fluence to secure its recognition by Portugal in 1825, and Great Britain also helped to obtain the acknowledgement of the independence of Uruguay by both Brazil and Argentina in 1828.

The boundaries of the new Spanish American States roughly followed old colonial administrative and judicial divisions. But they were ill defined, sometimes unmarked, and frequently disputed. They were to be a major source of inter-State conflict. Independence, moreover, had been achieved at the cost of fifteen years of devastating warfare, and the wars had developed the military rather than the political virtues. Like the earlier revolution in North America, the Spanish-American revolution had been not only a struggle for home rule but a contest to decide who should rule at home. But the masses were poor and uneducated, and for the most part the revolution brought a change of masters rather than of systems. Experience in self-government was lacking, and the brave new world which idealists wished to build was contradicted by the facts of poverty and ignorance, of isolation, and of regional and personal selfishness. Dictatorship was inevitable, even necessary. Self-government and democracy are not to be won overnight. Few peoples have set out on a career of independent nationhood with such initial disabilities.

The Frontiers of Europe

The independence of Latin America ranks with the American and French revolutions as one of the formative influences of modern history. Henceforth, to a degree unequalled before, the frontiers¹ of the Old World lay in the New. It was the policy

¹ I use the term 'frontier' in the American sense of a zone of expansion, not in the European meaning of a political boundary.

of Great Britain to link the new States to Europe and Europe to the new States by every means in her power, and though the United States opposed to this the idea of an American system, both supported in Latin America the principle of the Open Door. Though there were great differences between them, both were conscious of a certain community of purpose. Latin America was not to be the stage on which the European Powers should fight out their colonial and imperial rivalries. The familiar pattern, cause of so many wars, of a disintegrating area subject to partition by the European Powers was not here to be repeated. But if Latin America was an American continent, it was also a European frontier. The door was open to trade and capital investment, open too to European immigrants. The movement of capital and people to the Mississippi Valley and to Argentina in the nineteenth century was part and parcel of the same great process—the rising importance of the Atlantic basin.

The first German settlement in southern Brazil dates back to the eighteen-twenties, and in the troubled forties German refugees sought new homes in Brazil and Chile as well as in the United States. But though the German agricultural communities of Brazil are old established, it was later tides which swept the main contingents of European immigrants to the Río de la Plata as well as to Brazil (as we have seen, the major immigrant areas of Latin America), and in lesser degree to Chile. In the seventy years before 1928 five and three-quarter million immigrants entered Argentina alone (though not all of them, in particular not all of the Italians, remained); nearly four and a half millions entered Brazil in the first hundred years of her independent history.

The migration of capital and the growth of trade,

particularly in the second half of the nineteenth century, were more spectacular. As in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century, so in England at the beginning, capital looked abroad. Britain made the first public loans to Latin America. Her citizens were the first to engage in private enterprise on any considerable scale. Already by 1825 more than twenty million pounds sterling had been invested one way or another by British capitalists in Latin America. By 1914 this sum had grown to nearly £1,000,000,000. From 1914 to 1930 it increased by less than another £200,000,000. United States investments, starting late, and till the Great War lagging far behind, had by 1930¹ passed the total of the British, while French and German investments were considerable.

The New Nationalism

Foreign immigrants, foreign investment in shipping, ports, and public utilities, have played a decisive part in the swift and spectacular rise of some of these States, which to-day are legitimately proud of their civilization and development. Even before the Great War of 1914-18 they were taking their place in the society of nations; the war brought them into closer relations with the world around them; and to-day this large and peaceful area of Latin America is becoming ever more significant in world affairs. The twenty Republics, increasingly self-conscious each of its own individuality, its historical traditions, and its national

¹ In 1930 British investments in South America were still considerably greater than those of the United States. In Central America (including Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic) United States investments left the British far behind. British investments were largest in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, in this order.

ideals, are in different stages of political, social, and economic development. All profess a common democratic faith, though this is frequently the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. All avow a common mistrust of totalitarian theories, of whatever variety, imported from the Old World. But dictatorship remains, particularly in those countries which have large aboriginal populations, a recognized and respectable form of government, though, different in kind from the dictatorships of Europe, it is more and more a dictatorship within limits. Even in Central America (apart from tranquil and democratically inclined Costa Rica) dictators prefer to have their power 'constitutionally' prolonged. Politics, in the Andean Republics¹ (except in Colombia, which claims, with some justice, to be the most democratic of all Latin American countries), is still the monopoly of a small privileged group. Unhappy Paraguay has not yet recovered from a devastating war (1865-70) with Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, in which two-thirds of her people perished, still less from her conflict with Bolivia (1932-5) in the 'Green Hell' of the Chaco; and behind the political disorder which has characterized Bolivia, Paraguay, and Ecuador (though Latin American 'revolutions' frequently resemble European only in name) lie the solid facts of ignorance and poverty, of social and economic distress.

Argentina, however, after a period of anarchy and civil war and the ruthless dictatorship of Rosas, attained her political unity and institutional organization in the decade before the American Civil War (1861), and since then she has advanced with the stride of a giant. With economic progress came also the rise of labour and of a middle class to give

¹ Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia.

increasing stability to politics, and to achieve, in the twentieth century, a growing liberalization of government and political institutions. If political life has shown an exuberance of corruption, it is well to remember Lord Bryce's strictures on United States politics in the eighties. Buenos Aires to-day is the centre of a vigorous intellectual life. In *La Nación* and *La Prensa* it possesses two of the world's leading newspapers, and the work of Argentine historians, scholars, and men of letters displays the increasing maturity of a country destined by nature (it has been well said) to be the seat of a great civilization. In Argentina democracy, if not invariably a practice of government, is a habit of mind.

Across the River Plate, one of the greatest highways of international commerce in the New World, Uruguay escaped, at the beginning of the present century, from a turbulence of politics, if not unrivalled, at least hardly surpassed, in Latin America, and flowered into new and fruitful life. Montevideo (from its association with international conferences) became the Geneva of the New World; and as the State entered into business and industry, embarked on a programme of State socialism and advanced social legislation, Uruguay offered to the world what has been termed 'the first New Deal in the Americas'. Its population doubled. Trade and commerce increased. The smallest of all the South American Republics, and one of the most backward, became in the course of a few years one of the most vigorous and most progressive.

The 'crowned democracy' of Brazil offered in the nineteenth century a marked contrast to her neighbours. That Brazil, a country of strong local patriotisms and competing regional interests, whose frontiers march with every South American State

save one, should have avoided disruption is sufficiently remarkable. But Brazil, also, under the benign rule of her scholar-emperor, Pedro II, enjoyed the reputation of being the most enlightened and liberal of the Latin States until, in 1889, a bloodless revolution prepared the way for the federal republic. The fall of the empire was due to a sudden *coup d'état*. But the great landowners had been offended by the abolition of slavery without compensation; the aged Emperor had become increasingly alienated from the Church and the Army; and Republicanism enjoyed a fashionable vogue amongst the professional classes. The establishment of the Republic was followed by great economic advancement, but politically the consequences were less happy. In 1929 the world crisis destroyed both the political and economic systems, and President Vargas, who came into power in 1930 and has remained there ever since, has established the nearest approach to a totalitarian State in the New World. Yet the most significant features of European totalitarianism are absent in Brazil; and the *Estado Novo* (New State), President Vargas maintains, is exclusively Brazilian, aiming at the establishment of Brazilian unity, at the exploitation of Brazil's great natural resources, at the development of the interior, and at social and economic reform.

Chile, like Brazil, enjoyed in the nineteenth century a reputation for stability, under a landed aristocracy which evolved something approaching a parliamentary system. But power, wealth, and education remained the preserves of an oligarchy, until the rise of industry, labour, and a middle class raised new social and political problems, and made more glaring the great discrepancies in wealth.

Economic dislocation in the nineteen-twenties, the collapse of the nitrate market and its effect on the public revenues, social distress, and the efforts to meet these problems, brought revolution and dictatorship. A Popular Front formed in 1936, composed of middle and left wing parties, came into power in December, 1938, and representing a programme of Chile for the Chileans, and of social reform, is attempting to carry into effect a policy no less and no more radical than the New Deal in the United States.

Latin America to-day is a laboratory of political, social, racial, and economic experiment. The movement for social regeneration in Chile, Uruguay's political and social innovations, President Vargas's régime, all these are evidence of new and vigorous life. Even in the Andean republics of Bolivia and Peru, there are movements for the reincorporation of the native Indian into national life. The Indian, the forgotten man of Latin America, is being discovered anew by painters and poets, folklorists and sociologists, and even by Governments, and it is increasingly obvious that both the Indian and the mestizo are destined to play a more important part in the future of the continent. Mexico, finally, has presented the example of the first genuine social revolution in the New World.

The Mexican Revolution

The Mexican Revolution, with its emphasis on the peasant and the worker, its vigorous nationalism, its trend to socialization, is seven years older than the Russian. It is as distinct from Communism as President Vargas's *Estado Novo* is different from Fascism. It is entirely Mexican, the product of

Mexican history and Mexican conditions, and to identify this remarkable experiment with Communism is to fall into a confusion of thought which engenders more heat than light.

Nine-tenths of the Mexican people are Indian and mestizo.¹ Seventy per cent. of the population is engaged in agriculture—on the 7½ per cent. of the land which is under cultivation. At the end of the colonial period one-fifth of the population (it has been estimated) owned everything, four-fifths owned nothing. The *hacienda*, the great landed estate, had triumphed at the expense of the land-owning village, itself older than the conquest, deep-rooted in tradition and practice, and enjoying, at least theoretically, the protection of the Spanish Crown. For the Indian and the propertyless, independence meant not new freedom but new masters. The war of independence began, indeed, as a social revolution; it ended as a political movement, with separation from Spain as its goal. For the next fifty years the history of Mexico was a tragic record of anarchy and civil war, of economic distress, and of the loss of more than a half of the national territory to the United States. In the middle of the century a liberal reforming movement, primarily associated with the great name of Benito Juárez, swept to a crest, and survived civil war, foreign intervention, and the brief empire of Maximilian of Austria (1864-7). Juárez saved the country; Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911) modernized it. Roads, railways, ports, and telegraphs were built. Foreign capital poured in. The shattered finances of the country were restored. Trade spectacularly in-

¹ In 1921 60.5 per cent. were of mixed blood, 20.9 per cent. were Indian. But the proportion of Indian blood in the mestizo is very much greater than of white.

creased. Administration became efficient. Banditry was suppressed. Outwardly Mexico presented a picture of social regeneration.

Yet when Díaz trod the path of exile in 1911 he left 70 per cent. of his people illiterate. The mineral wealth, the oil resources, the industry of the country were for the most part in foreign hands. Concentration of landholding had advanced at a prodigious speed; and the landholding villages had still further decreased in number. Despite a number of small farms, 'by 1910 the rural inhabitants of Mexico who had no individual property were probably more numerous than they had been at any previous time in the history of the country'.¹ Of the population that tilled the land 95 per cent. owned none of it. From three-fifths to two-thirds of the people were in debt servitude. Agricultural wages had not risen since 1792. Less than three thousand families owned nearly one-half of Mexico, and 27 per cent. of the area of the republic had been sold to a few individuals for less than twelve million dollars.

The revolution which broke out in 1910 was inspired by no particular political or social theory. Unlike that of 1810, it began as a political movement. It ended as a social reformation. Labour wanted relief, the peasant wanted land, and the pent-up passions of the people, the suppressed desires for national and social liberation burst into conflagration. For ten years Mexico passed through the fires of civil war. In 1917 a new Constitution expressed the aspirations of a new order. There were two famous articles. Article 123 guaranteed to labour those rights which labour commonly enjoys in a progressive State. Article 27 declared that

¹ G. M. McBride, *The Land Systems of Mexico* (New York, 1923), pp. 155-6.

the ownership of lands, minerals, and waters is vested in the nation, which may grant a title thereto to private persons and has the right, subject to indemnification, of terminating that grant for reasons of public utility. Villages deprived of their common land were to have that land restored, and all villages were given the right to receive land by outright grant. The size of the great estates was to be limited. Titles to public land alienated under the Díaz régime were to be investigated. It was not till 1920, however, that the work of reconstruction really began. The revolutionary programme, put together in somewhat piecemeal fashion, called for political democracy, education, land reform, labour organization, nationalism, and limitations on the power of the Church. But though Mexico had now begun to move (it has been well said) in a spiral rather than a circle, progress was slow, haphazard, and half-hearted. By 1934 it seemed, indeed, that the revolution had run its course. Tired revolutionaries and enriched politicians doubted the utility of further advance.

Yet the revolution was now to enter on its most advanced and active phase. Under President Cárdenas (1934-40), a sincere idealist as well as a skilful politician, its scope was broadened and its goal became clearer. Land distribution was given a new impetus. In 1930 less than 2,000 individuals still owned one-third of Mexico. By the end of 1939 the Government had distributed sixty-two and a half million acres (forty-four million having been distributed in the last five years); it had embarked on an extensive programme of agricultural development, rural education, and public works; the number of primary schools had increased from 7,500 in 1934 to over 20,000 in 1940; and the ideal of the

village community operating within a nationally planned agriculture had become more precisely defined. At the same time while Government control of industry and labour had increased, labour organization had made rapid strides; and it was made clear that if the peasant was to occupy a more significant part in the nation's agriculture, the worker was to play a more commanding role in the nation's industry. Finally, the trend towards the creation of an independent economy, and the strengthening of national sovereignty by the control of natural resources, was spectacularly illustrated by the expropriation of the foreign oil companies in March 1938; and expropriation became in Mexico the test of national sovereignty and national independence.

What is in progress in Mexico to-day is an attempt to transform Mexico from a colonial to an independent economy, from a semi-feudal to a democratic nation; to Mexicanize the Indian and to make the Mexican master in his own country; to achieve a sort of economic democracy. This programme has met with immense difficulties. Agriculture has been disorganized. Labour problems have been acute. The oil companies boycotted the sale of Mexican oil and were accused of seeking to disrupt economic and political life. But President Cárdenas persisted in his course, though a tendency towards consolidation rather than further advancement has recently been apparent; and despite the prophets of gloom and disaster, in December 1940 the President was able to resign his office peacefully to his successor, President Avila Camacho. That event marked a new stage in the evolution of Mexican democracy, in its progress towards the creation of a free Mexico for free Mexicans.

Economic Development

To-day Latin America is the richest raw material producing area in the world free from the domination of any Great Power. Exports are its life-blood, and nearly 70 per cent. of the exports of almost all of these republics is made up of one or two traditional products. Bolivia is mainly dependent on tin, Venezuela on oil. Nitrates and copper are still the principal exports of Chile, metals and oil of Mexico. Coffee leads in Colombia, with petroleum a growing second. Cuba is the world's greatest exporter of cane sugar. Brazil has turned from sugar to rubber, from rubber to coffee, while cotton is increasingly important. The Central American countries depend on coffee and bananas. Argentina and Uruguay export the products of the farm and the ranch. Argentina is not only one of the world's great granaries, but its largest exporter of beef.

In 1937 Latin America sold abroad one-third of the value of its primary production. Its exports were valued at more than 10 per cent. of the world's total. It accounted for more than three-quarters of the world's exports of coffee and bananas, nearly three-quarters of its maize, nearly a half of its sugar, and more than a quarter of its wheat, cocoa, and copper. Besides this, Latin America supplied to the rest of the world over 60 per cent. of total nitrate exports, and it produced 42 per cent. of the world supply of silver, and 15 per cent. both of petroleum and wool. In general about 40 per cent. of Latin American exports are sold in the western hemisphere and 60 per cent. outside it.

There is, however, a great distinction between the States 'above the bulge' of Brazil and the States below it. The countries of the Caribbean area,

including Colombia and Venezuela, are closely linked to the United States both strategically and economically. The United States has been their principal customer (except for Venezuela), and their principal source of supply. Their economies are, for the most part, complementary to that of the United States, and the influence of the United States in this region has been, and remains, profound. But outside the Caribbean bloc the principal South American countries have found their chief markets in Europe. Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile alone account for more than half of the total exports of Latin America, and the pastoral and agricultural products of Argentina and Uruguay are competitive with those of the United States. In 1938, though the United States took about one-third of the exports of Brazil, it took less than 9 per cent. of those of Argentina, and only one-fifth of those of the West Coast Republics.

With the partial severance of the European lifeline as a result of the war, the immediate and practical problem of the Latin American countries is the problem of the disposal of huge surpluses of foodstuffs and raw materials. But while this problem is vast and serious, the Latin America of 1940 is not that of 1920. A striking change is in progress. The Great War of 1914-18, which changed the United States from a debtor to a creditor nation and in part substituted United States for British capital in Latin America, had already itself demonstrated the dangers of the simple relationship between farmer, rancher, miner, on the one hand, and manufacturer on the other, which had been that of Latin America to Europe. World conditions in the thirties drove home the lesson.

'Having been mined for three centuries and milked

for one, the Republics, particularly the more advanced Republics of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, determined to do a bit of the mining and milking themselves. Beginning early in the thirties with currencies generally devalued, economic nationalism became orthodox south of Panamá. Tariffs went up. Subsidies went in. And the principal South American Republics began to change with disconcerting rapidity from countries everybody used and nobody thought about to countries everybody thought about and fewer and fewer could use.¹

This development was in part spontaneous; it was in part stimulated by the conditions of the outside world. The prices of the principal Latin American exports fell. The flow of capital to Latin America declined. European countries adopted policies which faced the Latin American States with a growing stringency of foreign exchange. The United States tariff of 1930 itself caused difficulties and resentment, particularly in Argentina. The result was a period of great economic strain. Governments defaulted on their debts. The now familiar machinery of exchange control appeared. And while in European States the cry was 'back to the land', imperial preference, and the like, Latin America turned to industrialization, the diversification of exports, and the investment of domestic capital in domestic manufacturing. Brazil developed a textile industry sufficient not only for her own needs but such as to cause concern to Manchester exporters to Argentina. Argentina made great strides in the manufacture of cottons and woollens, and became self-sufficient in the domestic supply of boots and shoes. Industrial activity in Chile increased rapidly, and it has been estimated that probably almost one-third of the gainfully employed

¹ *Fortune*, xvi (December 1937).

population is now engaged in industry. In Mexico the Government entered into business for itself; and in general Latin America learnt to provide itself with a large part of the articles of common consumption.

These developments were accompanied by the growth of a new middle class, while the phenomena of an industrialized, capitalistic society became more apparent. The desire to control foreign trade and foreign capital was enhanced. Governments aspired to buy out foreign interests, and in the face of a new economic nationalism foreign investors found their profits declining and themselves in retreat. Industrialization in Latin America is yet only in its beginnings, and its future is problematical. But it is already causing a change in the basis of the relations of Latin America with the rest of the world. Not all these States have yet attempted to break down a colonial economy. Much in their economies still remains the same. But the frontiers of yesterday are closing to-day. It is a declaration of economic independence that is taking place in Latin America.

Latin America and the United States

The Latin American States cannot cut themselves off from Europe, nor do they desire such a severance. But the new tendency to self-sufficiency, the wish to be masters of their own destinies, is accompanied also by a movement for the strengthening of economic and political relations between the American States themselves. The war has quickened this tendency. 'The present significance of Pan-Americanism', an American expert has observed, 'lies in the acceleration of the tempo at which old, idealistic formulas are being converted

into effective instruments of economic and political co-operation.¹

The first step towards Pan-Americanism is usually considered to have been taken when the Congress of Panamá, called by Bolívar himself, met in 1826. Bolívar, however, had thought primarily of a confederation of the Spanish-speaking peoples of the New World. In later years various attempts were made to give tangible reality to this idea, but without great success, and the United States, though in 1823 it had held up a hand in warning to Europe, displayed little interest in political co-operation with its southern neighbours. As Paris was the intellectual capital of Latin America in the nineteenth century, so London was the financial capital; and it was Britain rather than the United States that exercised a sort of political leadership in Latin America. It was not till 1889 that the first Pan-American Conference met, to establish the institution later known as the Pan-American Union, and the design of this early movement was commercial rather than political.

Between 1889 and 1928 six full Pan-American Conferences were held, besides a large number of other conferences more specific in character. The relations between the nations of the New World became more intimate. The entrance of the United States into the Great War gave her increased prestige in Latin America. Eight of the Latin American Republics followed her example and declared war on Germany. Five others severed diplomatic relations with Germany. But by 1928 close co-operation between the American nations had been attained neither in the political nor in the

¹ Howard J. Trueblood, 'Progress of Pan-American Co-operation', *Foreign Policy Reports*, 15 Feb. 1940.

economic sphere. The most fruitful achievements of the Pan-American Conferences had lain in the fields of international and commercial law, and in the establishment of machinery for the preservation of peace. At the Sixth Conference at Havana in 1928 antagonism to the United States was strongly marked.

While Argentina has claimed for herself a position of hegemony at her end of the continent and has adopted towards Pan-Americanism an attitude somewhat similar to that of the United States towards the League of Nations, while there has been distrust and jealousy amongst the Latin American States themselves, while, further, these States claim for themselves, and exercise, an independence of judgement, the major reason for this comparatively limited achievement was the attitude and policy adopted by the United States towards her nearer neighbours. The Monroe Doctrine of the nineteenth century was primarily a doctrine in defence of United States interests and security. At the beginning of the twentieth century it was transformed—or so it appeared in Latin American eyes—into an assertion of United States sovereignty and supremacy in the Caribbean area. United States capital looked southwards. The Panama Canal became the key to United States naval strategy. Economic and strategic reasons, the interests both of the United States and the European Powers, induced the United States to intervene repeatedly in the affairs of the Island and Central American Republics and to exercise in fact a virtual protectorate.

These measures roused the greatest resentment in Latin America, and the gravest apprehensions of the increasing political and economic power of

the United States. The vital principle of the legal equality and political independence of all the American nations appeared to be infringed, and some of the Latin American States which joined the League of Nations were moved not only by idealism but by the desire to find a counter-balance to the United States. In the late nineteen-twenties, however, came a striking reversal of United States policy. It had been anticipated by President Wilson. Under President Roosevelt it has become famous as the 'Good Neighbour' policy. United States troops were withdrawn from the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua. The United States ceased to act as a debt-collecting agency. It returned to the policy of recognizing *de facto* Governments. It explicitly disclaimed the right of intervention in the affairs of its neighbours.

These measures brought about an equally striking change in inter-American relations. The Montevideo Conference (1933), at which the United States deprecated the policy of intervention, marked a decisive step forward; and the increased cordiality which resulted was reflected both in the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, at Buenos Aires (1936), and in the Lima Conference (1938). The Buenos Aires Conference recognized the joint responsibility of the American republics to prevent the outbreak of hostilities amongst themselves; the nations agreed to consult if any non-American or American country should threaten them; and the Declaration of Lima went far beyond all previous statements of inter-American solidarity. What was in progress at Montevideo, at Buenos Aires, and at Lima was an attempt to establish a Pan-American system of equal States with common action for defence. And this development of political

co-operation found its parallel in the economic sphere. Under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (1934) the United States initiated a more liberal trading policy in Latin America, and it has since launched a broad programme of financial and economic aid to Latin American States whose internal economies have been dislocated by the war and other difficulties. Finally, at Havana, in July 1940, the American States agreed on a common policy in the face of dangers from alien elements within. They reached a closer understanding of common economic problems. They affirmed a common will to prevent the transfer of European territories in the western hemisphere to non-American Powers, and they established diplomatic machinery to carry out that will. And in the interests of 'hemisphere defence' they have shown an increasing tendency towards the co-ordination of their military and naval resources.

Conclusion

The results of this process have been somewhat freely called the 'continentalization of the Monroe Doctrine'. That is an exaggeration. But the Monroe Doctrine has been buttressed by continental support, and the solid facts of neighbourhood and intercourse in the New World have been emphasized as never before. Pan-Americanism is not the result of historical necessity, but of conscious effort towards an ideal goal. There are still great difficulties, economic, psychological, practical, to be mastered in the relations of these States to one another, to the United States, and to the world around them. They still face perplexing problems in their own internal organization. The population is scanty, transport difficult. Poverty and ignorance

remain widespread amid great cultivation and often great wealth. A quarter of the population of Argentina, two-thirds of that of Brazil, three-quarters of that of Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador are illiterate. The problems of nutrition and hygiene are equally serious. Yet great advances have been made, and the past gives confidence for the future. Politically, economically, and intellectually, these countries are destined to play an increasing part in world affairs; and between Latin America, the United States, and the British Empire there are traditional and permanent bonds of mutual sympathy, mutual interest, and mutual ideals. It will be strange indeed if these three great areas of the world's surface cannot work together to solve their own problems, and with these the problems of a new World Order.

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
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No. 44

THE MILITARY
AEROPLANE

BY

E. COLSTON SHEPHERD

EDITOR OF *The Aeroplane*

OXFORD
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The types of military aeroplane with which the combatants started the war have now been tried in many months of intensive air warfare. Some new types are already in use and others, on both sides, will shortly join in the battle. The air war cannot properly be understood without some knowledge of the main classes of military aeroplane—bomber, fighter, reconnaissance machine—and of the way in which they are designed to carry out the different functions they perform; of their limitations and their possible future development; and of the lessons which have already been learned.

This knowledge Mr. Shepherd briefly supplies in this pamphlet. Two points of special interest which he discusses are the functions of the long-range fighter, of which Britain has more than one highly efficient type now coming into service, and the differences, hitherto, between German 'precision'-bombing and British.

Mr. Shepherd is Editor of *The Aeroplane* and author of a previous Oxford Pamphlet (No. 28, *Britain's Air Power*).

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THE MILITARY AEROPLANE

Why Specialization is necessary

PEOPLE in many parts of Great Britain have come to know some of the things which aeroplanes do in war. They are aware, from their own experience, that some drop bombs. They have occasionally seen combats far above their heads, and they know that most bombers have guns for their own defence against fighters which also carry guns. They learn that a good many aeroplanes are engaged on reconnaissance. Sometimes they read that reconnaissance aeroplanes have engaged in bombing or that they have brought down enemy machines. They have even learned that German fighters have often dropped bombs. They have news of float seaplanes which lay marine mines or release torpedoes, of flying-boats which to-day may be bombing a submarine and to-morrow may be bringing help to the shipwrecked crew of an unfortunate merchantman.

By this showing the military aeroplane may be counted a jack of all trades undeserving the specialist attention which was devoted to the creation of this class and that. If the bombed population of London and other British ports and industrial towns should conclude that too much fuss has been made of the bomber and the fighter as such, no one, examining the evidence of this war, could rightly complain.

Germany has tried all the types of machines she possesses in all the forms of combination and improvisation she could think of. That is merely to acknowledge that, with her existing material, she

has found nothing capable of winning for her, despite her large numerical superiority, a quick victory over the British. And that may not be because, in principle, the material is unsuitable. It may be that the British defences are too good, or that the German method of using their equipment is ineffective, or that skill is lacking in some branches of the German air arm, or simply that the British can take a lot of punishment and still go on fighting. Nothing in the experience of the war so far has proved that it pays to use a fighter for bombing or that it is wasteful to design aeroplanes for special work within certain broad divisions.

Fighters and bombers are drawing closer together in the matter of performance, but that tendency has been in progress for many years. Ten years ago the fighter was faster than the bomber by a good 30 per cent.; to-day the fighter's margin represents a bare 15 per cent. The fighter capable of 400 m.p.h. is already flying in Great Britain, in Germany, and in the United States; the bomber which can fly at 350 m.p.h. is expected in two countries at least. Certain characteristics are common to both, but there are so many characteristics in which they differ that the two types are much more distinct than recent experiences have suggested that they need be.

The same experience which has shown the British public how fighters can, in a difficult situation, be used as bombers has also shown that nothing but the fighter is a real defence against the bomber. Anti-aircraft fire can keep the bomber high and can upset its aim and break up the formations so that mass bombing or pattern bombing becomes im-

possible; but only the fighter can destroy the bomber before he can drop his bombs, and make bomber excursions so costly to the raiding force that they must be discontinued. Day bombing in fine weather was virtually abandoned by the Germans after the famous occasion on which the fighters of the Royal Air Force claimed 185 victims in one day. On that day—15 September 1940—the British obtained their first great victory of the war. And it passed without the country's realizing that a victory in the military sense had been won.

That day of tremendous destruction put an end, for the time being if not for ever, to the German belief that it could defeat Great Britain by means of mass air-raids. Thereafter the Germans used their bombers sparingly by day, restricting them mostly to the coastal towns or allowing single machines to make daylight attacks on London only when good cloud cover was to be had. That defeat of a cherished German plan was the equivalent of repelling an invasion. It forced the Germans back on to the uncertainties of night bombing and then to concentrated night raids on the centres of cities when they found that by night they could rarely hit a selected target. It left the Germans with the opportunity to do wanton and vicious damage by night, but it deprived them of the power to do precise and particular damage of military value. Those battles of the autumn of 1940 showed that, given a strong and determined defence, the bombers can still be routed. The air supremacy which guarantees a passage for the day bombers can only be gained by the fighters. The fighters therefore are the key to successful air warfare. They hold

the pass against the raider, and they sweep the sky for the passage of their own raiders.

The double task would appear wellnigh impossible. By the showing of the German fighters over England it might be argued that the opening of a path for a raiding force by day is impossible. The home team, so to speak, would seem always to hold an advantage. It can be the more rapidly reinforced. Its players can the more quickly rearm and refuel when they come to the end of their ammunition and their petrol. They have the stimulus which comes from defending their homeland. And they have the added feeling of security which arises from the knowledge that if they must 'bale out' they will come down in a friendly land.

The Fighters

Making allowance for the better training and finer spirit of the British pilots, the German onslaught on Great Britain was beaten by slightly better fighter aircraft. The superiority was expressed partly in speed, partly in power of manœuvre, partly in armament. By the time the test came, the Spitfire and the Hurricane had been given a little better speed than they had at the beginning of the war. By arranging for them to use specially doped fuel, their top speeds had been raised by something between 5 and 7 per cent. The Spitfires had risen from 362 to about 387 m.p.h. The Messerschmitt 110's speed still stood at about 365 and the Messerschmitt 109's at about 354 m.p.h, while the Hurricane's had been increased from 330 to about 345. Those improvements were invaluable when the enemy fighters had to be intercepted or pursued.

In the matter of manœuvre the British fighters likewise had an advantage. For the weight they carried they had more wing area than the German fighters and that, in association with certain other features of design, meant that they were able to turn within a shorter radius and could, in general, be 'thrown about' with greater ease and sureness. When dogfights developed this fact was of the utmost importance because it meant that British fighters, turning in smaller circles, could get on the tails of their opponents and pump lead into them while the enemy were unable to get into position to reply. When once they opened fire at short range the effect of the battery of eight machine-guns set in the wings of the British fighters was devastating, as the huge collection of Messerschmitts made on British soil during the period may testify.

If Germans during the critical period could have poured the new Heinkel 113's into the fights in sufficient numbers, the outcome of many a combat might have been different, for that new fighter is reputed to have a top speed of more than 400 m.p.h. It would have been far more difficult to intercept or overtake or to avoid on the occasions when a British pilot found himself in too hot a spot. But the Heinkel fighters were only just beginning to appear and Great Britain was well enough served by what she had. When the time comes for her to face the Heinkel 113's in large numbers she will have something better for her own use.

The Need of Long Distance Fighters

The shifts and turns of the Germans in their attempts to overcome the R.A.F. tended to confuse

any onlooker who may have been trying to deduce from the swirling tides of air warfare some general conclusion as to the nature and form of fighter work. The proximity of German air bases to the principal British objectives since the fall of France has also obscured one form of fighter activity which the British have been forced to examine since they lost their advanced bases in France. The British had apparently expected to fight for air supremacy only in the defence of Great Britain and in the neighbourhood of the Army's front in France. That is to say, they believed their fighters would not have to fly great distances but would be engaged chiefly in meeting the enemy near the British coasts and near friendly territory on the Continent. They had assumed that British bombers raiding deep into enemy territory would be able to defend themselves. Great Britain consequently had provided herself with no long-range fighters before the war began.

Germany, on the other hand, had put no faith in the ability of the bomber to defend itself against enemy fighters, and when things were put to the test was proved to be right. But whereas Great Britain had relied on the bomber's powers of self-defence for successful operation by day, Germany had depended on the speed of the bombers to save them from fighter attack. Her mistake in applying that theory lay in her failure to give them sufficient speed. The net result of both policies was that, when the war broke out, neither country had fighters capable of accompanying bombers on long raids. Germany had the Messerschmitt 110 long-range fighter building; Great Britain had the new twin-

engined, single-seat fighter, the Whirlwind, only in prospect. The lack of those fighters on both sides may have been largely responsible for the relative immunity of the warring nations from day bombing during the first year of the war.

Both Great Britain and Germany soon found that daylight raids by the bombers had to be paid for by heavy losses. Great Britain quickly gave up the game temporarily and resorted to night excursions on which for many months only pamphlets were carried. Germany restricted herself to sporadic raids by few aircraft and trusted to the element of surprise to give her an occasional success. Both nations realized that the day bombers, flying many miles over hostile country, would have to have fighter support. And Great Britain, after the collapse of France, soon had cause to look for a fighter with enough duration to stay in the air throughout the hours of darkness to deal with the persistent night raider. Thus as the war progressed the British need of a long-range fighter more loudly expressed itself. The characteristics of the long-range and short-range types differ widely.

The essential performance features of the home defence fighters have already been mentioned in the comparison between the Spitfire and Hurricane on the one side and the Messerschmitt 109 on the other. These are single-engined fighters. When they were designed they could all count on about 1,000 h.p. and no more. The Messerschmitt 109 indeed began life with only 690 h.p. They had therefore to be kept as small and shapely as possible so that the best speed on the available power should be obtained. At the same time they had to be

packed as full of guns as could be conveniently arranged, and they had to carry as big a load of ammunition as space and weight considerations would allow and as the balance between fuel load and fire power made advisable. Ability to manœuvre had to be remembered. Take-off and landing speeds had to be borne in mind. Weight would affect all these matters unless the dimensions of the wings were increased; and if this were done, the speed would fall. In the compromise which has always to be accepted, range or duration was limited. The Spitfire has a normal range of about 600 miles; the Hurricane's is rather more and the Messerschmitt 109's about the same.

These fighters plainly could not be used to escort bombers except on the shortest of journeys. The fighter fit for that duty would have to be based on an entirely different conception. Its armament must be no weaker, its speed must be no less, but its carrying capacity must be much greater. That means that its dimensions must be somewhat bigger and that its power must be largely increased. The answer is the twin-engined fighter which in Germany is represented by the Messerschmitt 110 and in Great Britain by the Whirlwind and another type which must not yet be mentioned. At its most economical cruising speed the Messerschmitt 110 has a range of about 1,750 miles. The truth is that the long-range fighter has many features in common with the day bombers it may expect to escort. Take for instance the fastest British day bomber of which full particulars have been made public. The latest mark of the Blenheim, with a top speed of 295 m.p.h., can carry 1,000 lb. of bombs 1,900 miles.

The Messerschmitt 110, when it is used as a bomber, can carry two 500-lb. bombs, externally, at the price of some reduction in its speed. The capabilities of certain new British fighters cannot yet be disclosed.

Essential Qualities of the Fighter

The essential qualities of the two classes of fighter are thus yet to be discerned. The home-defence fighter can sacrifice long duration in the interests of a high rate of climb and ease of handling. The escort fighter, because of its bigger dimensions and its twin-engined design, must sacrifice something in manœuvre for the sake of long range and plentiful armament. The two types are bound to meet and theoretically the escort fighter, as conceived by Germany, should have the better of the match. It has more of the guns of big calibre and it has a rear gunner to protect it from stern attacks. Yet the Messerschmitt 110, with its four forward firing machine-guns and two cannon, to say nothing of its speed of 365 m.p.h., has often been shot down by the older Hurricanes capable of only 330 m.p.h., and carrying only eight machine-guns, which have a shorter effective range and less penetrative power against armour than the cannon. The secret has lain in the power of the Hurricane to turn more quickly than the bigger machine and so to give it bursts of fire from positions in which it could not reply.

Subject to the ability to manœuvre quickly, the question of fire-power is one of the most important in a fighter, and the British have certainly not neglected the small air cannon. The latest mark of the Spitfire is armed with cannon. The cannon used so far in aeroplanes fires a 20 mm. or 35 mm. shell

and is thus of quite small calibre. Probably the ideal fighter would be one about 50 m.p.h. faster than the best bomber and armed with eight small cannon able to fire shells at the rate of 600 a minute each for a period of about three minutes. If to these characteristics could be added a range of 2,000 miles, an initial rate of climb of 4,000 feet a minute and a ceiling of 45,000 feet, then the lucky air force would have obtained an instrument which would take the heart out of its opponents. Before the war is over there may be such a fighter.

Bombers

For the present the nations have to be content with something less formidable. Fighters have not yet passed out of the stage of mixed armament—machine-guns and small cannon. Bombers are still a good deal slower than the fighters which oppose them, and they are still at the stage in which self-defence is allowed to conflict with speed. The best that Germany has yet put into service is the Junkers 88. It has a top speed of 317 m.p.h., and this represents a fair advance on the 274 m.p.h. of the Heinkel 111, Mk. V, with which Germany confidently started the war. Much better may be expected of both the chief combatants now that the course of the war has shown the value of speed to the day bomber.

Experience, as has been remarked, has discounted some of the more advanced ideas of the peace period. A few years ago the light bombers were frankly described as day bombers and the heavy machines as night bombers. When the power-operated gun turret became available in Great Britain, the view which came to be generally

accepted was that the big bomber, given good powers of self-defence, could be used by day as surely as the lighter type.

The old distinction of night and day bomber was abandoned. Every bomber became a medium bomber. In theory it could be used by day or by night. Its range and the load of bombs it could carry were to determine its tactical employment. Its speed was a minor consideration. The Wellington and the Hampden had speeds of 265 m.p.h. The Blenheim began with 285 m.p.h. and raised that in a later version to 295 m.p.h. With the prospect of meeting fighters capable of 350 m.p.h., these bombers clearly had to rely on their massed formation fire to get them through. Flying in 'V' formation the bombers could generally expect to bring several of their movable guns to bear on enemy fighters no matter which quarter the attack might come from. British bombers have on occasion done well in such circumstances. A British bomber often shoots down an enemy fighter in these days and sometimes in these nights. Yet latterly when day bombers have been used on either side they have relied more on cloud cover than on fire power to save them from fighter attack.

That might be no more than an acknowledgement of the fact that the bomber's prime task is to bomb and not to fight—a dogma which has been reinforced by the proof in action that the well-armed bomber is not particularly good in combat with a fast and manœuvrable fighter. Its orders usually forbid it to stop and fight. It is expected to keep as steadily as possible on its way, keeping good formation with its fellows and contributing its share to

the protection of the whole. If the formation gets broken, the single machine may have to 'take evasive action', but it will not attempt to dogfight. It may dodge and dive, or it may release its bombs and climb according to the circumstances in which it finds itself. It may thus get down to sea-level and save itself from underneath attacks, or it may get into clouds and shake off its assailants by a little ingenious blind flying or even by circling in the patch of cloud until the fuel of the fighters begins to run low.

Whereas the fighter wants nothing so much as a good fight, the bomber accepts a fight only if there is no reasonable way of avoiding it. Many a German bomber in daylight raids over England has accepted failure rather than 'mix it' with the British fighters which came to dispute with it. That is to say, it has turned away before reaching its target, has dropped its bombs on something less important, and has run for home with all the power at its service. When British bombers have been required to press through their attacks on particular objectives, the casualties have generally been heavy. The first V.C. won by the R.A.F. in this war was awarded to the leader of a formation of Battle bombers detailed to destroy bridges over which the enemy were advancing into Belgium. Only one of the nine machines returned. The theory of protective fire as the safeguard of a bomber formation has been proved in war to be somewhat faulty.

What is required of the Bomber

The reasons are to be found in the type of work the bomber has to do and in the design character-

istics which cater for it. The three important things in a bomber are the ability to fly far enough to reach its most likely targets; to carry a bomb load big enough to do serious damage to such objectives; and to be fairly sure of hitting its mark without coming so low as to foul the cables of barrage balloons. The third point does not apply to the bombers designed for diving attacks, nor to the torpedo bombers which attack ships, but these are specialist bombers and are discussed separately below. The greater part of most bomber forces consists of types intended for precision bombing at all heights up to their service ceiling—the height at which climbing is still theoretically possible but not profitable. Before the war the R.A.F. had provided itself with ranges for practice bombing at heights up to 30,000 ft. There has been no news yet of bombing from that height, but there are frequent reports of bombers having made their journeys to the targets at heights above 20,000 ft. The crew of the bomber is thus almost as accustomed to taking oxygen while it works as the pilot of the single-seat fighter.

Rarely does the bomber require high powers of manoeuvre or a fast rate of climb. Instead, it has to be able to get a big load off the ground and carry it with certainty to the place where its bombs must be dropped. Arrived there, it must be able to depend on steady level flying while the bomb-aimer gets the target in his bomb-sight, and it must be sure of releasing its missiles at the precise moment which will secure their striking the ground close to the target. Having delivered the goods it should be able to find its way home again—a distance perhaps of

1,000 miles—even if the weather should have closed in behind it and A.A. fire makes it dangerous to fly low in search of landmarks. It may be out on a particular raid for ten hours, and a measure of comfort for the crew is most desirable. Thus the bomber tends to be rather more capacious than the fighter, though this may not continue to be the case as the long-range fighter is developed. It will still have to differ somewhat from that fighter because its total load will probably be greater.

At present the bomber goes in largely for self-defence as well. The British bomber usually has a rotating turret, driven by hydraulic power or by electricity, in the nose and tail and some sort of gun station amidships. In the Wellington, the Junkers 88 and the He. 111 K, guns can be fired out of the side windows. But the bomber's guns, as we have seen, are much a matter of fashion. In the next phase, guns may be replaced by more speed and the weight of the turrets (nearly a ton each in the big British bombers) will go to swell the load of petrol or the load of bombs according to the length of the journey. Whatever happens to the bomber in that respect, it must still remain a vehicle in which work of precision can be done.

Precision Bombing : British and German compared

The difficulty of hitting a target like a bridge or factory or power station or railway station with a bomb has been made evident to everybody who lived in London during the autumn of 1940. The extremely local effect of a bomb-burst has likewise been impressed on the minds of those whose houses were far enough from the blast to allow them to

form an unbiased opinion. In the average case a bomb which misses its target by 200 yards does no harm whatever to the target, beyond breaking a few panes of glass. A distance of 200 yards is nevertheless a small error in a projectile which may have fallen 15,000 ft. and travelled forward a mile and a half in the course of its descent. It is an error which can easily occur if all the influences acting on the bomb in the course of its fall have not been allowed for.

Height and forward speed are easy to discover and transfer to the bomb-sight. They are shown on a sensitive altimeter and on an airspeed indicator, though the speed reading needs correction for height and temperature according to ascertained scales. A less certain quantity is found in the wind. Its strength and its direction in relation to the path of the falling bomb have to be estimated and added to the calculations which the bomb-sight automatically makes. The sight is then ready for the bomb-aimer to use in order to get the aeroplane into the position from which the bomb should be dropped if it is to hit a target.

If the bomber deviates slightly from its straight path, the resultant course of the bomb will be deflected. If the nose of the aeroplane is tilted upwards or downwards, the bomb will take a slightly more flat or steep course on leaving the bomb-rack. If the height is varied after the bomb-sight is set, the bomb will strike the ground too soon or too late to demolish the target. If there is the slightest lag in the operation of the release gear, the bomb will overshoot its target. The results of such influences can be seen in wrecked houses, shops, offices, and other

non-military objectives all over London. Possibly other influences account for some of the bad misses by the bombers of the Luftwaffe. The Germans are not sufficiently interested in accurate bombing to give their bombs a good streamline form or to carry them in such an attitude in the machine that they are pointing in the direction they must take at the moment of release.

For economy in space most German bombers carry the bombs vertically, nose uppermost, ignoring the fact that for some seconds after they are released they must travel forward on a path almost parallel with that of the machine they have left. German bombs, dropped vertically when they have to follow a virtually horizontal course, usually turn over and over at the beginning of their fall and so introduce an incalculable factor into those estimates of bomb behaviour on which the design of the bomb-sight must be based. Some further irregularity in rate of fall and in the path they follow may also occur from their cylindrical form.

From all of this it will be seen that a bomber which does not afford a steady bombing platform is rather like a gun on a boggy emplacement. Nobody can be quite sure where its projectiles will go. The British insistence on stability in bombers has certainly given good results. Before the war many bomber units on practice bombing could be sure of dropping 80 per cent. of their bombs 'within the target area' from heights up to 10,000 ft. Their work against hundreds of specified objectives in Germany suggests that equal accuracy can be obtained even by night when once the target is located and identified.

Range of Bombers

In some circumstances, the bomber has little need to consider range. That is true of the bombers which come, chiefly by night, from bases in Northern France, to attack London. It was true of those British bombers which hammered the invasion ports on the French coast at the time when the Germans first assembled an expedition to subdue Great Britain. It was true of the dive bombers which supported the strokes of the German army against France and Belgium. All these bombers were making short journeys, and the dive bombers stand in a special category as substituting dash and courage for the cool processes of scientific bomb-aiming. Precision bombing demands accurate data for the bomb-sight and a steady platform for the aiming of the bomb. Dive bombing means coming down within range of the A.A. and Bren gun fire, so that the aeroplane itself may be aimed at the target and the bomb may be brought so close to the target before release that it can hardly miss.

Dive Bombers

The Germans have made a great song about their dive bombers. The ones they used in Poland and France were Junkers 87's—machines of poor performance, for their top speed is only 242 m.p.h. and their range a bare 500 miles. The type can carry a single bomb of about 1,000 lb. weight. Yet these machines were of great help in the military undertakings of Germany rather because of the moral effect of aeroplanes diving on gun crews and troops in action than because of the damage their bombs

did, serious though that was on occasion. Since the campaigns ended, the Junkers 87 has been tried against shipping with only moderate success. The interesting thing is that dive bombing was invented for precisely that purpose.

It was started by the British as an alternative means of bombing naval vessels. When a ship is manœuvring to avoid bombs two methods of ensuring a hit are available. One is to employ a bomber formation to set a pattern of bombs about it, arranged on a plan which makes it mathematically impossible for the ship to escape them all, no matter which way she may turn. The other is to dive the bomber at the ship and release the bomb at a height of about 1,500 ft. and sometimes even lower, thereby giving true direction and a high initial velocity to the bomb. The R.A.F. were practising dive bombing in association with the Navy during joint exercises in 1933, but having learned something about the art, the British left the Germans to discover a military use for it and to apply it.

When the war began, the R.A.F. had no bomber designed specifically for dive bombing, while the Fleet Air Arm had the Skua in small numbers. Germany had her 'Stukas' (Junkers 87's) in great numbers and she was following up that single-engined machine with the twin-engined Junkers 88 which could be used either for dive bombing or for ordinary precision bombing. History will probably show that the Air Council was right in not equipping some of the R.A.F. squadrons with dive bombers. The success of the German campaigns in Poland and France have given a fictitious reputation to the dive bomber. In a hastily created air force like that

of Nazi Germany it is a means whereby mediocre bombers and poorly trained but courageous pilots can be flung into action in support of an army. Dive bombing is a costly way of employing good bombers and good pilots, for the casualties which must be accepted are enormous.

Losses in dive bombing are likely to be heavier still now that troops are becoming accustomed to being dived upon. The temptation to duck as the bomber dives can soon be overcome, and then the diving aeroplane, unable to twist or turn as it comes screaming down, presents a continuously improving target to the gunner who can coolly await to get it well within range of whatever his weapon may be—Bofors, Bren, or machine-gun. It is a still better mark when, having delivered itself of its mischief, it flattens out and begins laboriously to climb to a safer height or to race away just above the surface of the sea. For what it is worth the dive bomber has won itself a reputation and its cult will certainly persist through this war, if only because the dictators are content to accept heavy casualties in any arm for the sake of success in offensive operations; yet all that it can do may be as well done at smaller cost by precision bombing. Since the type has gained a place for itself, the peculiar characteristics of the dive bombers may be examined. They introduce a few novel points.

What usually happens in dive bombing is that the aeroplane comes along at the side of its target so that it may have it constantly in view up to the moment of beginning the attack. Arrived level with the target the bomber turns right or left in a stalled turn which starts it diving. Starting at a height of 8,000

to 10,000 feet the pilot has plenty of time to sight his aeroplane on to the target just as the fighter pilot aims his machine at his quarry to bring his guns to bear on it. The engine of the dive bomber is kept running to pull the machine downwards in a straight line towards its mark, and with the joint force of engine power and gravity, a high speed can be reached. Here arise two possible disadvantages. High diving speed means uncomfortably high rates of revolution in the engine with the possibility of heavy vibration in the aeroplane if nothing worse. The dive bomber is equipped, therefore, with diving brakes designed both to limit the speed of the dive and to give the machine greater steadiness in the dive.

In the German machines, the dive brakes are slats which lie flat under the forward part of the wing during level flight and are swung downwards to face the direction of the dive just before the dive is begun. In the British Skua, the ordinary landing flaps on the trailing edge serve the same purpose in diving as the brakes of the German bombers. The angle of the dive also may introduce complications. If it is unduly steep, the flow of the air over the tail organs may be so disturbed as to upset control. Few dives therefore exceed an angle of 70 degrees from the horizontal. German dive bombers brought down in England have been found to have lines painted on the side windows of the cockpit to enable the pilot, by glancing out at the horizon, to check the diving angle of his machine.

Torpedo-bombers

The dive bomber evidently needs no fine instruments. Its pilot needs little skill. Apart from its

problematical value as a means of attacking ships, there is little to be said for it. In principle it may seem to have an affinity with the torpedo-bomber, though in fact the functions of the two are widely different. The dive bomber, when used against naval vessels, must rely on doing vital damage by blows struck above the water-line; the torpedo-bomber, like the submarine, seeks to hit its target below the water-line and, as the exploit of the Fleet Air Arm at Taranto in November 1940 showed, stands an excellent chance of doing serious damage. On that moonlight night, Swordfish torpedo-bombers of the Navy found a large part of the Italian battle fleet at anchor in Taranto harbour. They launched torpedoes at them from the air and crippled a capital ship and badly damaged two other battleships, two cruisers and two supply ships. The Swordfish had been flown off the deck of the new aircraft carrier *Illustrious* and, when the raid was over, all but two of them landed again on the deck of their flying aerodrome.

The Fleet Air Arm has always had a goodly supply of torpedo-bombers. The Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force too keeps a number of such units to deal with enemy naval vessels which may appear in the narrow seas. A few of them are float seaplanes but the majority, like the Swordfish of the aircraft carriers, have wheel undercarriages and carry the torpedo between the legs of the undercarriage. Both Germany and Italy have torpedo-bombers but they have made little use of them, preferring to trust to the bomb rather than the torpedo as a means of disabling ships from the air. The torpedo-bomber has generally had to approach

to within a few hundred yards of its victim and release its torpedo at a height of not more than 50 feet. If the torpedo were released at a greater height, it would hit the water so hard as to upset its mechanism and interfere with its subsequent course towards the side of the ship.

Torpedo dropping has always been regarded as one of the most hazardous flying jobs, yet the small casualties suffered in the Taranto raid contradict that belief. A war-time development in the art of torpedo dropping would account for that if one were free to describe it. For the present, it must suffice to say that the torpedo which an aeroplane delivers is of the ordinary naval type, though it is not usually as big as the biggest used in naval warfare. The one most commonly carried by torpedo-bombers weighs 1,750 lb. It is slung beneath the fuselage, its nose pointing forward. In making its attack, the aeroplane comes down to the appropriate height, flies towards the side of the ship and, at the proper range, lets go the torpedo just as though it were a bomb. The speed of the aeroplane starts the torpedo on its course and, as soon as it enters the water, its own mechanism keeps it going on the same course.

Torpedo-bombers are load carriers. The Swordfish, for instance, is only a single-engined machine, yet its useful load is more than one and a half tons. It thus needs fairly large wing-area and that means that, with the power available, it cannot have high speed. Its top speed indeed is only 154 m.p.h. Its requisite wing area is obtained in compact form by employing the biplane design which, in turn, simplifies the folding back of the wings so that the

machine may go up and down in the lifts between the flying deck and the hangars of the aircraft carrier. The biplane wings also confer on the Swordfish the boon of easy manœuvre which gives it a chance to turn away quickly out of the line of fire as soon as it has sped its projectile. Lightened of so big a load, it has also a good rate of climb—a rate almost as good as that of the Bristol Blenheim which has a top speed of 295 m.p.h.—and so is able quickly to get up to a height at which the anti-aircraft gunners have a poorer chance of destroying it. Its chance of escape is, for these reasons, better than that of the dive bomber, which continues to sink for some time after it has pulled out of the dive and during that period of losing its downwards momentum is almost a stationary target.

Reconnaissance Machines

In general, it may be said that the torpedo-bomber belongs by right to naval forces. Reconnaissance machines are essential alike to navies, armies, and air forces, for all three must have information, in photographic form for preference, of what is happening on the enemy side of the fence. The Royal Air Force, for example, collected much information about the massing of barges and small ships in the ports of France, Belgium, and Holland before it embarked in September and October 1940 on the intense bombardment of the 'invasion ports'. The Fleet Air Arm no doubt made a careful reconnaissance of Taranto before it set out on its raid. While the British Expeditionary Force was in France, a daily watch was kept on the German lines for any sign of unusual activity and over a

period of some weeks a complete photographic record of the Siegfried Line was compiled. Those are the obvious forms of reconnaissance for the three Services. There is another form which is concerned with the defence of our coasts and with the protection of shipping in the seas near home. A separate command of the R.A.F.—the Coastal Command—is charged with this work, and some hundreds of aeroplanes of various kinds are constantly engaged on what is virtually offensive reconnaissance.

These aeroplanes have to sweep the seas and watch the enemy harbours. They have to attack enemy submarines and surface raiders. Often they go bombing ships or supply depots in enemy-occupied ports. In association with the Navy, they keep British shores free from naval attack and they protect British shipping at the approaches to the ports. Their work is often challenged by enemy fighters and they have had to fight their way out of tight corners. Much of their work is monotonous, but their devotion is occasionally rewarded by a slice of excitement like the destruction of a submarine or the location of the *Altmark* in a Norwegian fjord and the guiding of the Navy to that prison ship. A regular duty which falls on the Coastal Command is that of locating, marshalling, and helping to escort the vessels of convoys on the last stages of their homeward voyages. Another job it undertakes at times is that of laying mines.

The work which falls on these reconnaissance machines is as various as that which is undertaken by the Navy. The Coastal Command, except that it lacks fighters, is an air force in miniature. It has

flying-boats which can drop bombs, landplane reconnaissance craft which can also carry bombs, bombers which can also undertake photographic reconnaissance work, and torpedo-bombers which at need can take bombs instead of torpedoes. All these craft have to work mostly over the sea, unescorted by fighters and usually far from the zones in which the home defence fighters operate. They have to work in the wireless silence imposed by the Navy, and they have to do without the help of directional wireless in keeping the watches allotted to them and in finding their way home at the end of them. They have therefore to be able to defend themselves and the crews have to be able to rely on themselves for accurate navigation. Strangely enough, one of the most successful of the landplane types is a converted American air liner, the Lockheed Hudson, which is simply the Lockheed 14 supplied with two Browning guns to fire forward and a rotating turret near the tail for protection against stern or beam attacks. For the purposes of celestial navigation it has a small transparent dome in the roof. Many people may have travelled in similar aeroplanes before the war, for the Lockheed 14 was used by British Airways on its services to Brussels, Hamburg and Scandinavia.

Many people too may have flown in the prototype of the biggest and most formidable of the Coastal Command's craft. The four-engined Sunderland flying-boat is developed from the Empire flying-boat which Imperial Airways put on its long routes more than three years ago. In its military form this boat has a gun turret in the nose, another at the very tip of the stern behind the tail organs,

and it has two gun stations amidships in the upper part of the hull. It also carries a rack of bombs on a sort of yard-arm which can be swung outwards through a hatch in the side of the hull when the time for bombing comes. It has plenty of living space for its crew of six. This allows sleeping and cooking facilities to be provided. The top speed of the Sunderland is 210 m.p.h. and, with full military load, it can carry enough fuel for a flight of 2,800 miles. That means that it can go out from a home port, locate shipping 500 miles out in the Atlantic, and keep a fatherly eye on the convoy for eight or nine hours before it has to start its journey back. That represents patrol and reconnaissance work at its highest. In lesser degree, all the machines of the Coastal Command have duty of a similar kind to perform. They link up home defence with the work of the Navy in defending the sea routes and in resisting attempts to break the British blockade or to impose a blockade by means of submarine and aeroplane on Great Britain. As the Fighter Command deals with threats by air to British soil, so the Coastal Command deals with threats by sea, as an associate and companion of those naval forces which operate in the narrow seas.

Army Co-operation

The Army, like the Navy, and the Air Force, needs air reconnaissance, and especially trained squadrons of the R.A.F. have been available for the service of the Army ever since the last war. But the modern Army needs more than reconnaissance from the Air Arm. It needs fighters to save it from interference by enemy bombers and it needs

bombers to help break down enemy resistance in the fast developing situations of certain battles in which artillery cannot be brought forward quickly enough. At other times it needs bombers to impede enemy preparations for a battle or to isolate the enemy's advanced units from his supports and supplies in the rear. A separate command of the R.A.F. is now at the service of the Army. It bears the title of the Army Co-operation Command and it numbers among its units all the squadrons designed specifically for Army work. It has a call on other units—bomber and fighter squadrons—which have had training in giving air support to Army formations in manœuvres and exercises. When the Army embarks on its offensive, the Army Co-operation Command will be with it in such force as the scale of the operations may warrant.

Aeroplanes of special kinds, apart from those which undertake tactical reconnaissance and sometimes direct the fire of the guns, are not likely to be prescribed for the Army Co-operation Command. The work of the fighter is much the same whether it is holding an umbrella over an Army in a battle or over the factories and workshops which give that Army its striking power and its mobility. The bomber unit is trained to find and destroy its target whether it be a goods yard at Hamm, or an ammunition dump in the rear of an Army, or a concentration of tanks awaiting the order to advance. In some circumstances there may be occasion for the bomber to come down close to the battle and make sure of smashing particular centres of opposition by dive bombing. The cult of dive bombing is so

strong that the Army would probably not be content with air support which failed to include a proportion of dive bombers. Yet one sees no reason why such machines must be dive bombers of the wasteful and uneconomic German pattern, sacrificing bomb load and performance for the special diving equipment and facing heavy casualties for the moral effect of coming down close to the troops to release their bombs. Some of the existing bombers, like the Blenheims and certain of the types arriving in quantity from the United States, are capable of modified dive bombing. New bombers can be designed with the dual purpose of precision bombing and the not-too-steep dive bombing, and that would be the most profitable line of development with the interests of the Army as well as of general air strategy in view.

Probable Future Developments

The war has driven the progress of the military aeroplane hard along two urgent courses. It has made it seek speed and more speed, and it has compelled it to seek a means of detecting and intercepting raiders by night. Of the steps taken to improve the night fighter's chance of interception nothing can be written. In any case they are scientific as much as aeronautical steps. Of the devices employed to give bombers speed equal or nearly equal to that of the fighter something has already been said. Competition in that department will be keen, for the day offensive, which must eventually give the intensity, persistence, and accuracy that night raiding alone cannot achieve, will depend in great measure on the production

of the fast bomber. Germany has given ample evidence of complete conversion to that creed. Great Britain will not be able to resist the lessons the war has taught.

In another sense, height will become important. The Germans have given particular attention to this and have been helped by their determined development of direct petrol injection in their engines instead of supplying the more familiar mixture of petrol gas and air through carburettors. Great Britain is tackling the question from another angle and may show as good results. But it is well to acknowledge that the Air Force which can count on a ceiling only 2,000 feet above that of its opponents will have won a most valuable advantage. The most important factor in determining maximum height is engine power. As the air becomes rarer at great heights, less support or lift is obtained from it at a given speed than is derived at sea-level. At the same time the air serves the engine's processes of combustion less efficiently, so that just at the time when more speed is wanted to improve the lift, less power is available to secure it unless some reasonably cheap means of pumping quantities of the thin air into the engine can be arranged.

In all those respects which matter most, the British aeroplane so far has been just the little superior to the German which suffices to turn the scale. One result of that is that the spirit of the men who fly Great Britain's aeroplanes has never suffered from a sense of having to use inferior apparatus. Some of the fighter pilots became 'war weary' in the intense operations of September and October 1940. Squadrons have had to be rested

since. But never have the British units been out-matched. The time when new types on both sides may be expected to go into full squadron service is approaching as these words are written. The secrets of both sides are well kept and details of the new machines will be slow in gaining currency, but the names and characteristics of some are already known. The Tornado fighter with its new Vulture engine should have a speed of more than 400 m.p.h. The modified Spitfire III should be not far behind it. The big four-engined Stirling bomber and the Botha reconnaissance landplane and torpedo-bomber represent other aspects of the British effort to maintain superiority in performance. There are newer machines in prospect which must still remain secret. Both sides are striving above all for speed. The war in the air has shown that he who goes fastest by day has the best chance of getting to his target, and that even by night, he who goes fastest has the best chance of escaping the guns and the intercepting fighter. And since it is the bomber and not the fighter which wins an air war, the bomber must set the pace.

OXFORD BOOKS ON WORLD AFFAIRS

THE best and most up-to-date general picture of England as she was from the rise of Germany in 1870 to the outbreak of the First World War is given in Mr. Ensor's book *England 1870-1914* (15s.), which is Vol. 14 of the *Oxford History of England*. Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell's *History of the Great War 1914-1918* (15s.) may be recommended as the standard one-volume work on the subject. Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy deals with the period between the two wars in his *Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938* (8s. 6d.).

The two volumes of *Speeches and Documents on International Affairs*, edited by Professor A. B. Keith (World's Classics, 2s. 6d. each), and the selection of political writings in Sir Alfred Zimmern's *Modern Political Doctrines* (7s. 6d.) illustrate the conflict of doctrines in evidence to-day.

The outbreak of the present war is described and discussed in the lectures by H. A. L. Fisher, A. D. Lindsay, Gilbert Murray, R. C. K. Ensor, Harold Nicolson, and J. L. Brierly, collected and published in one volume under the title *The Background and Issues of the War* (6s.). The deeper issues at stake are summed up in Lord Halifax's famous Oxford address, *The Challenge to Liberty* (3d.), which is included in the volume of his *Speeches on Foreign Policy* (10s. 6d.).

The economics of 'total' warfare are described in Mr. Geoffrey Crowther's *Ways and Means of War* (2s. 6d.), an enlargement of his two Oxford Pamphlets (Nos. 23 and 25).

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By
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OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS
No. 45

THE JEWISH QUESTION

BY
JAMES PARKES

OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1941

This pamphlet attempts to remove the prejudice and misapprehension and confused thinking which befores the Jewish question, and to examine it realistically and in its essence. The 'problem' of the Jews is shown to arise from two sources: Jewish *tradition*, which has inculcated in Jews the need to keep themselves separate, if they were to survive as Jews, and Jewish *experience* at the hands of the peoples among whom they have lived. Among the Jews themselves two main programmes have been proposed and followed: assimilation with their countries of adoption, or the foundation of a Jewish National Home (Zionism).

The special causes of modern antisemitism are examined, and it is shown to be due to two main factors: the persecutions in Tsarist Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, which led to the flooding of Western Europe and America with several million Jewish refugees from a totally different level of culture; and the fever of nationalism which followed on the heels of the 1914-18 war, and which made life difficult for all minorities.

Mr. Parkes is also author of Oxford Pamphlet No. 31 on *Palestine*.

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THE JEWISH QUESTION

THE Jews of to-day are the representatives of the oldest surviving civilization of the Western world, and it is still as a 'civilization' that it is most accurate to regard them. They are not a 'race', for they are of an origin more mixed than many other peoples. Nor are they a 'religion' in the individualistic sense in which that word is used to-day. For among Jews, as among Christians, the majority are little more than formal adherents to any religious faith. And, in this particular case, not only do men not think of Judaism when they think of the Jewish problem, but they find the problem present among people who are personally Christians, but are Jews by descent. For, whether they are adherents to 'Judaism' or not, they are the heirs of a tradition built up by their prophets and rabbis, and moulded by their experience, through more than three thousand years of history. The qualities which have made them unique among the peoples of the world, and have often made them also a problem to the peoples of the world, are the products both of this *tradition* (which is their own creation) and this *experience* (which has usually been imposed upon them by the rulers and people of the countries wherein they lived).

Jewish Tradition

It is significant for the whole of their subsequent history that the Jewish religion assumed its classical form in exile or in subjection. Their brief period of independence was already drawing to its close when their great prophets and lawgivers arose, and

the religion which they created has been able to survive, not only the loss of independence, but even the loss of a country or any geographical centre. Geography *naturally* induced the inhabitants of Britain ultimately to blend themselves into a single society. It was conscious teaching which created this unity for Jews. It is therefore not surprising if they still show a tendency to remain distinct from the societies within which they live; for it is to the persistent inculcation of that need to keep themselves separate that they owe their survival.

Of course they have to pay a price for this unwillingness to be completely absorbed into the mass of the population. It is natural, especially in times of stress, that unthinking people should automatically assume that every difference is dangerous; so that it is important to discover wherein the difference of the Jews consists. Does Judaism, as anti-semites constantly assert, make it impossible for Jews to be good citizens? Is it based on ineradicable hostility to all outside the Jewish fold? The answer to these questions is much easier to find than is usually assumed. The basic authority of Judaism is the Old Testament, a book shared by the Christian Churches; and the mass of literature which subsequent Jewish generations have built up on that foundation may be extraordinarily dull and confusing to the outsider, but it is neither mysterious nor secret. And its main principles are quite simple.

Judaism is primarily an intellectual not an emotional religion, and it is much more interested in *ethics* or behaviour than in *theology*, or speculation about the nature of God. It is interested as much in the community as in the individual, and

it has a tendency, which may seem to others odd and exaggerated, to define with precision ethical obligations. It is a commonplace accusation that Judaism is 'legalistic', but that, after all, is a matter which concerns Jews rather than others; it does not make for bad citizens. But on three points which do concern others, the teaching of Judaism is quite straightforward. Firstly, it has taught, from the earliest times of the dispersion, the duty of loyalty to the State within which Jews are residing. Secondly, on relations with non-Jews, it is interesting that among the earliest Jewish laws, going back perhaps to the time of Moses, is the command to pay especial attention to the well-being of the fatherless, the widow, and *the stranger*. Thirdly, injunctions to be especially honest in dealings with non-Jews, for the sake of the reputation of the community, are common in Jewish literature of all centuries. At the same time the command to keep separate was equally frequently repeated, and the whole system of Jewish life was built up to preserve the distinction between Jew and non-Jew. This distinction was in its intention neither selfish nor arrogant. It was based on the idea of the service a holy community should render to the world by its faithfulness to the revelation given to it.

Such is the religious tradition, and while a minority which wishes to keep itself separate will usually create a certain social irritation, it is clear that Jewish religious leadership recognized this, and by its political and social attitude did all it could to ensure the loyalty of the community. But it is also inevitable that any minority which wishes to remain distinct should have to carry the responsi-

bility for its offenders. The fact that as a community Jews wish for the privileges of having their special days of rest, their food prepared in special ways, their own marriage regulations makes it inevitable that the public should also think of the Jewishness of Jewish offenders against the law or against social custom, when it would remain quite indifferent if the offender were a member of the Anglican Church or the Conservative party.

Jewish Experience

The Jewish problem is the product of both Jewish *tradition* and Jewish *experience*. The difficulties caused by *tradition* are not serious. On the non-Jewish side there is the possible irritation caused by a group wishing to remain separate; and on the Jewish side there is the inevitability of being held responsible for all offenders who happen to be Jews. More difficulties are created for both sides by the inheritance of the experience of Jews at the hands of the majorities under whom they have lived.

Historians can show many periods when relations between Jews and their neighbours were perfectly friendly, and where the distinction of tradition was more than counterbalanced by general mutual respect and co-operation. But unfortunately periods of bad relationships have been common, and have left their mark on both sides. For a long period the hostility was religious. Where Jews lived in the midst of a degenerate paganism, they passed many regulations to prevent the taint of idolatry entering into Jewish life, and their laws sometimes showed intense hostility to their pagan

neighbours. But as Europe became Christian its laws showed equal hostility to Jews.

Religious intolerance soon leads to other than religious consequences. The exclusion of Jews from many occupations led to their concentration in those still open to them. Then these in turn were denounced as overrun by Jews; and in this way Jews were gradually forced down the social scale. From the standpoint of their future history, the most important change was that which made them merchants and money-lenders in the Middle Ages. It was no racial aptitude, but the accident of history; and even in the Middle Ages there was never a period when they possessed a monopoly of the trade. But they became identified with it in the popular mind, and incurred all the odium which borrowers generate towards creditors. To the hatred begotten by religion was added detestation of the usurer, and it is in these two facts that the background of modern antisemitism is to be found.

It would not be surprising if there were much bitterness in the attitude which experience has led Jews to assume towards non-Jews; it is surprising rather that there is so little. The explanation lies in a simple fact—the extraordinary optimism which is an inheritance of their religious tradition. Optimists are too busy thinking of the future to spend their time working out plans for revenge!

Such bitterness as there was showed itself in the only way possible within the narrow confines of Jewish occupations—in overreaching their neighbours in business and commerce. In the conflict between lofty religious principles and the bitterness engendered by constant humiliations it is not among

Jews alone that the latter often prevails. But it is here, and not in any teaching of the Jewish religion, or fundamental principle of the Jewish people, that the explanation is to be found of the commercial antagonism and suspicion which undoubtedly Jews often arouse.

In the nineteenth century the small but important Jewries of Great Britain and Western Europe came to enjoy equal civic rights with their non-Jewish neighbours, and, together with the rapidly increasing Jewish population of America, they found most of the doors which had been closed to them for centuries gradually opening. As the nineteenth century was a period in which the emphasis passed from land-owning to commerce and industry, and from the country to the town, and as Jews were by their history largely town-dwellers and occupied with commerce, they soon became unexpectedly prominent. What was but a natural consequence of the general situation was regarded as a deliberate plot by those to whom the developments of the nineteenth century were distasteful.

The result was that political and economic freedom was not always accompanied by social acceptance. In court and official circles, and by the Church, these new-comers were regarded with suspicion, and they were regarded as the causes of a situation of which they were, in fact, only the symptoms. For none of the main developments of the century owed their existence to the presence of Jews. They owed far more, for example, to the British for their industrial development, or to the French for the free thought and republican philo-

sophy which had sprung out of the French Revolution. But as Jews seized upon the opportunities which British and French developments offered, they were conveniently used to concentrate popular opinion against those developments by those who preferred the old order; and modern anti-semitism was born.

Jews thus came to be identified with all the malpractices of modern commerce and industry, and with all the extravagances of nineteenth-century speculation and free thought. Of course there were Jews who were correctly so identified, but so were also many who were not Jews, while the majority of the Jews were innocent of the charges made against them.

A similar explanation underlies the alleged identification of Jewry with Communism. Actually few Jews are Communists, but the proportion which rises to leadership makes it natural to assume that they represent a much larger following than is really the case. Interest in social questions is an inheritance of Judaism. Hence the innumerable Jewish gifts to hospitals and for educational purposes. Treat a young and enthusiastic intellectual as a social pariah—as Jews were treated in most countries of Eastern Europe—and the result is often to create a revolutionary. And, being better educated than most members of revolutionary parties, he is likely to come to the top.

Such being the Jewish *experience* it is not surprising that it has posed another dual problem akin to, but very much more serious than, that posed by Jewish religious tradition. It is, in fact, here that the roots are to be found of 'the Jewish question'

as it presents itself to both Jews and non-Jews in the world to-day. The problem itself can be posed in a nutshell, and it is the same for both sides. It is the problem of undoing the effect of abnormal history—not unhappily a *past* history, for the sufferings of the Jewish people under Nazi rule, or where Nazi influence has penetrated, are more severe to-day than they have ever been. It is a very sick society which cannot digest the petty difficulties inherent in the desire of *an ordinary minority* to retain its distinction—Jews on this score often present less of a problem than, for example, the Society of Friends who do not accept military service. But it is only a healthy society which has the patience, the elasticity and the good humour to allow *an abnormal minority* the time and the assistance which it requires to recover its normality. The treatment of the Jews in any community is, therefore, an excellent guide to the moral health of that community.

The Problem is not Insoluble

Because people think that there is only *one* Jewish problem, which has existed for centuries, and exists to-day wherever there are Jews, they constantly assume that it is insoluble. In fact there have been and are various different 'Jewish problems', and they have frequently been solved. In the eighteenth century the arrival of a considerable number of German and Polish Jewish refugees in England constituted a considerable problem. They were said to indulge in every crime from highway robbery to coining. By the middle of the nineteenth century they had settled down into a

thoroughly law-abiding and estimable middle-class community, causing no problem to their neighbours or to the authorities. Yet they still maintained their separate community and their religious customs. There was no Jewish problem in modern Italy, although Jews had lived there continuously since Julius Caesar's time, until Mussolini consciously created it. A Jewish community, allowed the time to settle down to a normal life and granted political equality and religious toleration, has never presented a problem to its neighbours except on one condition: where there is an appreciable difference in general level of civilization between the Jewish minority and the majority. When the level of the Jewish community is higher, there is likely to be exploitation on one side and jealousy on the other. When it is lower, there is likely to be ostracism and resentment on one side and corresponding reactions on the other. But these two situations obviously create two quite different 'Jewish problems'.

What has made the problem acute for both Jews and others in our day is a twofold misfortune. Violent persecutions in Tsarist Russia between 1881 and 1905 led to the uprooting of a quarter of the whole Jewish people, and to the flooding of Western Europe and America with several million Jewish refugees who came from a totally different level of culture, civilization and commercial practice, and had never enjoyed political liberty. They came in masses; they naturally settled together, for they felt themselves in a totally alien atmosphere, and they *did* provide a meal which it would take the strongest digestion some

generations to absorb. But before these immigrants could be digested, the fever of nationalism which spread over the world after the last war made life difficult for all minorities, and, especially since the rise of Hitler, for the Jewish minority in particular. The figures of the flight from Germany are much smaller than those of a couple of generations earlier, but economic capacities to absorb new citizens had also shrunk throughout the world, and it proved even more difficult to swallow ten thousand refugees of equal social and cultural standards in 1933 than it had been to absorb ten times that number coming from a totally different level at the time of the flight from Russia.

On the other hand we know much more about the nature of the problem now. We possess accurate and scientific studies of the question; we have seen the effects of past experience, and with planning and co-operation there is nothing in the Jewish problem which need cause pessimism or despair on either side.

The Jewish Population of the World

It is sometimes thought that the Jews are a very small people, and that there must therefore be some sinister explanation of the number of Jews who attain prominence. They are not a particularly small people; there are over sixteen millions in the world, and it must be remembered that by far the larger number of these live in countries where they have historically been excluded from the profession of the bulk of humanity—agriculture—so that the majority of Jews live by industry, commerce, the professions, and other urban occupa-

tions. That a people, numbering sixteen millions, and with a long tradition of commercial and intellectual life, should produce a considerable number of great bankers, scientists, and business men is only to be expected. And it is still more to be expected in that this is a commercial and industrial age. What is surprising is that half a million Jews have gone back to agriculture during the past century, mostly in a conscious effort to redress the balance of centuries of restriction.

Undoubtedly a considerably larger number *could* take up agriculture if they wished; there is no legal bar to their doing so for the five million Jews of America, the two million Jews of Western Europe, or the three million Jews of Soviet Russia; but the general trend of the age is away from agriculture, and all humanity, including Jewish humanity, is conservative. Statistics show that the tendency of sons is to seek the same kind of occupation as their fathers, even when they have migrated half across the world from their ancestral homes. Saxon villages in Transylvania still bear their German stamp after centuries of separation from Germany. German, Danish, Finnish towns in the United States or Canada can still be distinguished from each other by the survival of national ways of living.

The Organization of Jewry

There is no central government of Jewry. There are national communities and international voluntary organizations. There are Jewish communities of over one thousand members in sixty-five different countries—the United States, Poland, and the Union of Soviet Republics each containing

communities of several millions. In some countries, in England for example, the Jewish community has a statutory basis as a religious community; in others, for example the United States, its organization is completely voluntary; in pre-Nazi Germany all members of the Jewish community, like all members of the Christian Churches, paid a compulsory tax for the upkeep of the community which was collected through official channels.

Even where Jewish communities are officially recognized their powers are very limited, and extend only to religious matters, charity, and control of Jewish food. But they possess no legal powers, and Jewish courts have only the status of courts of arbitration which cannot enforce their decisions if they are not voluntarily accepted. It is often forgotten that a Jewish community has no legal power over the commercial or professional morality of those whom the general community chooses to consider 'Jews'.

In addition to its central body, most Jewish communities of any size possess synagogues, mutual benefit societies (akin to such societies as the Oddfellows), sport societies, educational societies, as well as hospitals, homes for orphans and the aged, and burial societies. In a few countries they have well-equipped theological colleges and Institutes of Research. There is only one Jewish University containing the general faculties to be found in other universities, and that is the new Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

The international organizations of Jewry arose from a single cause. The Jews of Western Europe became citizens of the countries in which they lived

at various periods from the French Revolution in 1789 onwards. The more numerous, but much poorer, Jews of Eastern Europe had to wait for the end of the last war—and many have found little reality in the citizenship then obtained on paper. International organizations came into being in Western Europe to relieve and provide modern education for the poorer brethren of the East, to assist their emigration, and to fight for their political freedom. At the end of the nineteenth century, when violent outbursts of antisemitism made even some Jews of Western Europe feel insecure, an international body of a different kind came into being, the Zionist Organization, whose aim was to find a more radical solution of the Jewish problem by finding a territory where Jews could again form a homogeneous national community, living the normal life of the other nations of the world.

Conflict of Opinions in Jewry

The emergence of Zionism, and its official acceptance by the Allied Powers during the last war, brought to a head a conflict of opinion in Jewry which had been steadily growing during the previous half-century. It posed anew the question: what are the Jews? Are they a religious community, or are they a nation? Those who accepted the former definition demanded only that personal freedom to practise their religion which is accorded to all in a civilized State. Politically and socially they desired no distinctions to be made between themselves and their neighbours. This was the predominant feeling among the more prosperous Jews of the West. They desired to be 'assimilated',

in all but religion, to their British, French, or German environment. Those who believed themselves members of a 'nation'—and this feeling was more common among Jews of Eastern European origin—felt that they were deprived of two rights naturally accorded to other nations, firstly a home of their own—and here they would accept only their ancient homeland of Palestine—and, secondly, in countries where they lived in large numbers, rights as a national minority controlling its own social, educational and religious welfare. The 'Balfour Declaration', approving the idea of constituting a National Home in Palestine, appeared to concede the first in 1917; the Minority Treaties, signed by the Allies with the countries of Eastern Europe in 1919 and 1920, would, it was hoped, provide the second. In neither case did the matter turn out as simple as at first appeared. The one encountered an Arab opposition on which it had not reckoned (but a remarkable community of already over half a million Jews has been established in Palestine in spite of it), and the other foundered in the rising tide of European Nationalism.

In spite of the conflict between them both, Assimilation and Nationalism represent legitimate developments of Jewish history, and assimilationist and nationalist have as much to contribute to a healthy Jewish life as different political parties in any normal democratic community.

Parallel to the political conflict in Jewry is the religious conflict. The decline of organized religion, noticeable among the Christian Churches, is equally noticeable in Jewry; and the efforts made to stem the tide are similar in both religions. 'Reformed'

synagogues have arisen somewhat similar to 'Modernist' movements within Christendom. The struggle, however, has peculiar features, based on the peculiar situation of the Jews. Any religion becomes conservative and rigid when it is constantly on the defensive; and orthodox Judaism, having been a minority within Christendom for over fifteen hundred years, is apt to be especially rigid and unyielding on points which appear trifling to newly emancipated generations. Reform Jewry, on the other hand, tends to be as much influenced by its Christian, especially Protestant, environment as by its historic Jewish inheritance.

There is only one sense in which Jews can be spoken of as a united people. Like all others they unite in the face of persecution, and the solidarity of Jewry in relief of the refugees, first of Russia then of Germany, has led people to imagine their unity to be much more deeply rooted than it is. The most conspicuous characteristic of Jewry, to those who know it, is the extent and violence of its internal divisions. In any ordinary discussion on 'the Jewish question', or any point of Jewish policy, if there are ten Jews present, there will be at least eleven opinions!

The Jewish Problem—what the non-Jew has to face

The presence of a Jewish community within a non-Jewish society provides a problem either for both sides or for neither. Of course individuals may dislike all Jews on principle, and any Jewish community may possess criminals. But personal dislike does not constitute a national problem, and every human community must be allowed in the

present state of the world to have its quota of unsatisfactory individuals.

If there is a problem, then, on the non-Jewish side it is because the majority has to decide on its attitude towards a minority claiming special privileges, and, possibly, occupying a particular place in its national economy; and the Jew has to decide wherein he desires to remain separate, and wherein he desires to be absorbed; what rights he can legitimately claim, and what duties he properly owes.

These are real problems, and neither side can evade them. The Jews are in a unique position in that they are a people of considerable size, but without a home of their own, so that they are compelled to live in 'other people's countries'. While Palestine may provide a solution for a certain number of Jews, it is out of the question at the present stage of history either to find an empty country capable of absorbing sixteen million people, or to discover means by which a migration of sixteen millions could be effected in a short period. Any consideration of the question must therefore start from the assumption that a Jewish minority exists and will go on existing in most countries of the world.

In a civilized community the decision whether equal citizenship can be refused to individual residents just because they are Jews does not constitute 'a problem'. Conditions for acquiring citizenship differ from country to country, but whatever they may be they must be open to all equally. The attempt to base citizenship on 'blood' and 'race' leads to results of which the world has become painfully aware. The German theory is not ac-

cepted by any scientist of standing in any free country in the world, and every State is a racial mixture, as is every individual. In fact a large number of non-Jews live in 'other people's countries' just as much as Jews do. Thousands of good Englishmen trace their descent from Germans, Dutchmen, French, or Poles, and have lived in England no longer than many Jewish families. The difference is that *all* Jews except those living in Palestine are in this position.

The first real problem for the non-Jew arises out of the fact that as a *community* Jews inevitably require a minimum of special privileges in order that they may maintain their religious observances. These privileges are threefold: permission to observe the Sabbath as a day of rest and to maintain the Jewish festivals; permission to maintain Jewish law in relation to circumcision and marriage; and permission to maintain slaughter-houses for the ritual killing of Jewish food.

Most civilized communities will be prepared to grant these privileges. The observance of a special day of rest creates certain difficulties in mixed communities, for it arouses a certain amount of commercial jealousy and it has led occasionally to unfair advantage being taken of the right. But these are not serious difficulties, for they can be dealt with by proper legal regulations. Such disadvantages as accrue from inability to work on days when others are working are a Jewish affair, and if they are prepared to accept them out of loyalty to their religion, that does not concern the non-Jew. Circumcision and marriage offer no problem; but ritual slaughter has at times upset people who have

felt it to be less humane than the method in force in ordinary slaughter-houses. It is certainly less pleasant to see, but the question is one for expert rather than emotional opinion; and the experts, including such bodies as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, do not consider that it involves cruelty.

In a State composed of various nationalities, such as were all the States of Eastern and Central Europe, a further set of possible privileges come into view. In Western Europe or America Jews speak the language, and attend the schools, and vote in the elections of the majorities. In Eastern Europe there are 'minorities' of all kinds. Most have a certain geographical homogeneity, but the Jewish minority is usually scattered throughout the territory. That the presence of minorities is a fruitful source of trouble the present age knows only too well. For in addition to possible religious privileges, an organized minority demands educational, legal, linguistic, and cultural autonomy. It requires a share of the State budget for these purposes, the recognition of its language in official documents and transactions, a statutory position for its communal organization, and communal control of its schools. This raises more complicated issues, and it is well known that the States of Eastern Europe only accepted the Minority Treaties imposed after the last war, with the greatest reluctance and under the strongest protest. Events have proved many of their fears well grounded, but it is also an important question whether their own conduct was not largely responsible for the disloyalty or difficulties created by the minorities.

Looking back on the experience of the past twenty years, it might be suggested that a minority is entitled to the following rights:

- (a) A communal organization, recognized as a public body, and with control over primary education, and teachers' colleges, charitable foundations, and cultural activities.
- (b) Religious freedom, and authority in religious matters (where the minority is also a religious minority).

On each point the majority has certain rights. It is entitled to insist that its language be taught in the primary schools in addition to the language of the minority, so that secondary education may perform its function of binding the different elements in the State into a unity. Two other points concern certain minorities, but not Jews. A majority can object to the cultural activities of a minority inculcating separatism and disloyalty, and it may refuse to allow religious practices which offend the morality of the majority.

But one problem arising out of the position of a minority concerns Jews more than others. Is a minority entitled to as many positions in the public or economic life of the general community as it can obtain? To this question both Poland and Hungary have replied 'No', and even in the United States universities have adopted means to limit the number of their Jewish students. And it was one of the main planks of Nazi antisemitism that Jews, who were but 1 per cent. of the population, occupied a disproportionate number of important places in the universities, medicine, the law, and elsewhere.

The problem is not always simple, even when the exaggerated figures usually given of Jewish participation in a profession are reduced to their proper size. The natural reply is: 'Why not, if they have gained their places by fair means and are the best qualified for them?' And it is certainly true that no one has yet been able to show that the mere fact that a doctor is a Jew *proves* him to be a bad doctor. In fact all the evidence is in the other direction. Jews have made extraordinary contributions to modern medicine, contributions which certainly are out of all proportion to their numbers. And as a client is free to go to the lawyer whom he most trusts, it might be said that natural selection will fix the number of Jews who can make a living by the law. And the same answer might be given about the commercial activities of Jews. They will find their own level.

In well-established countries, with well-developed and stable economies, this natural answer is probably sufficient, but in new or backward countries there is something to be said on the other side, especially where the Jewish community demands a definite status as a 'minority'. In Poland, for example, university education was free, but accommodation was limited. In the earliest days of the Polish Republic over 30 per cent. of the students were Jews, and there was a considerable number of Jewish students abroad who hoped to return to Poland to practise their professions. Jews were accustomed to town life; Jewish students could live cheaply at home or with relatives; they were accustomed to intellectual activities. The Poles were a country folk; they were much slower to pick up

education than the Jews; they were just as poor, but had fewer facilities in the towns; thus measures to protect the Poles were neither unnatural nor unjust. In post-war Hungary the middle class of what had been a large empire had suddenly to seek new ways of living in a tiny State. Before 1914 it was a matter of indifference to them that Jews were numerous in law, medicine, journalism and similar professions. The army and civil service offered ample scope. Again competition was not equal, and the Hungarian middle class felt it legitimate that some protection should be given to its sons in learning a new way of life. In Poland again one of the most necessary measures for social betterment was the development of co-operatives among the peasants and urban workers. Such co-operatives were inexperienced; they had little chance against the experienced Jewish businesses. A measure of protection was legitimate. And in all these cases such protection could scarcely help taking the form of 'anti-Jewish' measures. While the propaganda of antisemitism attacks the press as 'Jew-controlled' instead of attacking the corruption of the press, whoever controls it, here it really was a case of a single group being, or appearing to be, in a too favourable position.

The same problem presents itself to-day in a somewhat different form in countries such as Great Britain and America, where there is no question of the Jewish minority being able to dominate the highly developed societies around them. Yet anti-semitic feeling is growing in both the countries mentioned. But instead of claiming that Jews monopolize such or such professions it is said

rather that they *set the tone* to them, and that this tone is in conflict with the ethical ideal towards which the community as a whole is said to be striving. Thus in medicine, in the law, in many sections of commerce and industry, and especially in the entertainment profession, Jews are said to be acting as a solvent of standards laboriously acquired by previous generations. It is quite true that such a fall of standards has been frequently commented on; and it is equally true that Jews are frequently found among the delinquents. But the experience of Germany is a warning against accepting the easy theory that the elimination of the Jew is the solution of the problem. For no observer would claim that German professional or commercial standards had risen since 1933.

In actual fact the course of events would seem to be as follows. In a growing and developing profession or business new-comers are quickly absorbed and little noticed. Then follows a period of stabilization, and of fixing of standards. 'Outsiders' who come in accept the standards that they find. But we are living in a third period, a period of breakdown of our social and economic order. Shrinking markets and opportunities, the 'over-production' of entrants into professions where opportunities are not increasing at a similar rate, make it doubly difficult for a new-comer to earn a living. He is easily persuaded to accept the lowest professional standard which he finds, to the indignation of his older-established competitors.

As the main sources from which new-comers have entered Western societies in the last half-century have been first Russian and then German

Jewry, it is easy to see how this decline is associated with 'the Jews', and the fact is forgotten that Jews in established positions *are not* showing these qualities, and that others, who are not Jews, *are* showing them. The decline, where it exists, is merely part of that whole breakdown of civilization which has led us to our present juncture, and which was most evident to the ordinary man in the political field—a field in which it would be difficult to link together 'Jews' with the chief agents of decline, either in the Totalitarian or in the Democratic States. In actual fact it is impossible to identify either side with any one 'racial' or social group, and the kind of propaganda which does so is merely inviting disaster, by misleading people as to the real nature of the problem which confronts them. The use of antisemitism by Fascist propagandists comes almost entirely within this category.

We need then carefully to distinguish two quite different situations. In countries like Great Britain or the United States the raising of 'the Jewish question' is a dangerous red herring, for it is not of importance whether the group whose conduct is debasing the community's standards contains a high or low proportion of Jews. The decline must be attacked *as such* and the attack is merely made futile when, as in Germany, Jews of the highest character are lumped together with offenders, and 'Aryan' offenders remain untouched, because they are not Jews. But in the situations described earlier, in pre-war Poland or Hungary, the position is different, and in these cases it may have to be conceded that the non-Jewish majority may have to exercise a certain discrimination against its Jewish citizens. The

tragedy in pre-war years has been twofold. In the first place Jews have been excluded from or limited in participation in certain occupations, but no effort has been made to open to them, and to encourage them to enter, other occupations. In the second place the necessity of compulsory emigration has been urged, without any recognition that such a policy may have to be accepted at times as an extreme measure, but can in no sense be inflicted on a section of the population as a punishment, as though it had committed a crime by becoming a problem, through no fault of its own, to the majority among which it was living.

The progress of the war has altered the whole situation, and those who imagine a settlement of Eastern Europe along the lines of redrawn frontiers and more skilfully elaborated Minority Treaties are living in a world of illusion. But it is still necessary to bear in mind what has been called 'the anti-semitism of facts'. There *were* too many Jews in various countries of Eastern Europe for the national politics *as they were* to digest, and, in themselves, both limitation and emigration were policies which, however delicate to apply, were entitled to consideration.

Now, however, we are facing a new situation, the reconstruction from the bottom of social structures within a new framework. But we still need to guard against a re-creation of conditions in which the anti-semitism of facts will again lend itself to skilful propaganda, and the antisemitism of men. Professional redistribution and emigration will be questions affecting much more than just the Jewish minorities, and the essential will be the planned

provision of alternative lives for those who cannot or do not wish to return to their homes.

The essential task of the non-Jew in facing this aspect of reconstruction is the facing of the Jewish question as a whole, and the co-operation with the Jewish people in the provision of such conditions as will make it unlikely that subsequent Fascist agitators may skilfully exploit the abnormalities of Jewry to the undoing of democracy.

The Jewish Problem—what the Jew has to face

While many aspects of the Jewish question are seen to be insoluble without the official or unofficial co-operation of the non-Jewish world, the main burden of the problem, and a great deal of the initiative, must lie on the Jews themselves. But even here they are entitled to the sympathy and understanding of all men of goodwill. For a very large number of their problems are not of their own creation, and very few of their problems are of their own choice.

The basic problem confronting Jews, compelled as they are to live as minorities amongst other peoples, lies in the view which they take of their status. Do they wish to be considered merely a *religious* minority, allowing themselves to be completely absorbed, except for religious privileges which create no problem? Or do they wish to be considered a separate *national* minority, entitled to preserve their distinction in any field which seems to them essential? To-day, partly as a result of the shock of German antisemitism—for Germany was a country in which Jews were almost more assimilated than anywhere else—the majority of Jews

incline to think of themselves as a *national* minority. And if the negative side of this feeling be reaction against treatment in Germany, the positive side is pride in the achievements of the Jewish *National Home* in Palestine. In either case Jews will obviously and rightly fight for their individual equality as citizens in the countries where they live. In the second case they will also fight for some form of minority rights which do not, at the same time, lessen the full citizenship of the individual Jew.

Where the main issue is confined to individual equality the problems which remain are more often social than legal or political. There is no doubt that a great deal of avoidable irritation and hostility is aroused by the fact that it takes a considerable time for Jewish families or groups to adjust themselves to the general habits and customs of the people among whom they live. Here, where no religious principles are involved, it is the clear duty of the minority to do all it can to avoid such irritation.

The difficulties which arise out of political minority status have already been shown. Jewish action towards the abnormal position created in countries like Poland had been twofold. It is not surprising if they have used all their power to fight against discrimination, and have refused to consider its occasional justification. For no assistance has been given them in finding other occupations. It was a true statement of the position when the President of the Jewish Student Association of Warsaw remarked that if they were allowed to be tram-conductors, large numbers of young Jews would never have tried to be students.

At the same time protest has not been their only reply. For more than half a century Jewish leaders have recognized the serious problem created by the narrow concentration of Jews into a few occupations where they inevitably acquire an unwelcome prominence. With local funds, and with help from the richer Jewries of Western Europe and America, loan banks and training centres have been brought into being all through Eastern Europe, which are steadily introducing young Jews to agriculture, and to craftsmanship. While no Jew would accept it as an obligation that part of any Jewish community should emigrate, a chain of offices throughout the world assists emigration, reports on conditions, prepares emigrants, guarantees their settlement, and smooths their way into the new country. Such work is slow and expensive, but no reproach can be levelled at the Jews by any non-Jew on this score. They have worked with little help and little sympathy from outside.

It is often assumed that Jews do not need outside assistance, for their own wealth is adequate to the burdens they have to shoulder. The small Jewries of the West, and the large Jewry of the United States, are indeed prosperous, but so are the non-Jewish communities within which they live. The bulk of Jewry lives in Eastern Europe in conditions of deep and increasing poverty. Of course there are rich Jews who flaunt their wealth and take no part in the burdens of the community, but the majority of wealthy Jews tax themselves to an extent of which the non-Jew has absolutely no idea. For the refugees from Germany—of whom 15 per cent. were not Jewish—it has been calculated that

the average Jewish contribution per head in Great Britain has been between ten shillings and a pound, while the Christian contribution has been less than a penny; and in the early years the Jews had to take responsibility not only for their own refugees but for many Protestant, Catholic, and other refugees as well, since there were no Christian funds available to help.

The problem of settlement, with which the future of the National Home in Palestine is intimately linked, is the biggest problem which confronts contemporary Jewry. And it is made more difficult by the fact that Hitler has made the world 'Jew conscious', and that the spread of antisemitism in every country has been a definite plank in the platform of all pro-Nazi and Fascist parties. Jewry has to confront these problems against a background of increasing hostility, misrepresentation and calumny.

What figures, what countries may be involved it is still impossible to foresee, but it is possible to foreshadow the main lines of possible solutions, by stating the alternatives before us. These are only two.

The National Home in Palestine has been the main achievement of the Jews of the last half-century. Either future settlement is definitely linked to what has already been achieved in Palestine, or it has to make a new start in one or more other scattered centres. In the second case, it must depend on what is the general programme of migration after the war, for the Jews are not the only people in need of living space, and in some way or other some means must be found for

alleviating the pressure of population on the peasant half of Europe. But if the specifically Jewish resettlement is to be linked mainly to Palestine, then it is already clear that it can only succeed if two developments take place within Zionist circles.

The achievements of Zionism in Palestine are remarkable from many points of view. They have not only achieved considerable economic and social success, but they have produced results in a more difficult, but equally essential field. Part of the problem of undoing an abnormal history is to restore the self-respect and inner integrity of the victim of that history; and there is no doubt that a share in the rebuilding of the National Home has had that effect on tens of thousands of Jews, especially of younger Jews, from Central and Eastern Europe. But in the political field there are, as yet, no comparable successes to record. Zionists have achieved neither inner political stability among themselves, nor statesmanship in dealing with external problems; and progress in these fields will be essential before Palestine can make any real contribution to the post-war Jewish problem.

The old and weary battle of the Balfour Declaration *versus* the promises to the Arabs must be abandoned once and for all, and a *new* basis sought for the acceptance of the Jews among the peoples of the Near East. There are signs already that Jewish groups in Palestine are recognizing this, but the movement has still very far to go. And, though they can prepare the ground, nothing final can be done on this subject by the Jews themselves. Jewish plans will be invaluable, Jewish consent and co-operation essential, but a new basis can only be

established as part of a general Near Eastern policy, in which the main responsibility must lie on Great Britain.

The ultimate problem of Jewry is the rediscovery and reassertion of the fundamental spiritual and social realities of Judaism to which both Assimilation and Zionism are capable of offering soils already prepared. The care of the seed must inevitably be the task of the Jew, but the value of the harvest cannot be great if the ground is perpetually resown by the non-Jew with the weeds of antisemitism, and surrounded with an impenetrable hedge of ignorance and indifference.

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GERMANY'S
'NEW ORDER'

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DUNCAN WILSON

OXFORD
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IN the late summer of 1940 the German propaganda orchestra triumphantly announced a new theme and began to play variations on it, designed to attract a wide variety of audiences. This theme was of a 'New Order' which was to dawn in Europe, and it was well chosen. It was calculated to appeal to a continent in chaos, and at the same time had the flexibility and vague emotionalism which the German propagandists had found so useful in such catchwords as 'living-space', 'encirclement', 'race' and so on.

The reforms and benefits promised by the German propagandists are primarily economic. Accordingly in this pamphlet Mr. Duncan Wilson, after discussing the various forms in which the 'New Order' has been announced to the world, describes the German economic system since Hitler's accession to power in 1933, and in the light of this examines the probable effect on Europe's economy of Germany's plans for the future. He shows that the essence of the 'New Order', in whatever guise it is presented, is the political and economic domination of Europe by Germany. Europe would be largely turned back from industrialism to agriculture, in the interests of German industrial hegemony, with a consequent general fall in the standard of living—outside Germany.

Mr. Duncan Wilson had a distinguished academic career at Oxford, and since the beginning of the war has been engaged in a study of the German war economy, and of German economic propaganda.

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GERMANY'S 'NEW ORDER'

THE 'NEW ORDER' PROPAGANDA: ITS ORIGIN AND VARIETIES

MUCH has been heard in the course of the last seven months of a 'New Order' which Germany will introduce, or is introducing, in Europe. The phrase is at first sight attractive; there is a widespread desire for order, particularly economic order, in Europe after the chaos of war and preparations for war.

The Versailles Treaty failed to take economic factors sufficiently into account; and the events of the years 1919-39 have led many peoples throughout the world to set a higher value than ever before on economic security. Particularly the peoples of the Americas want to see their interests safeguarded by an economic stabilization of Europe, with which their normal trade relations could be restored. The 'New Order' is therefore most often presented as an economic order, and must be discussed as such.

The Timing of the Propaganda Campaign

The 'New Order' propaganda meets an existing demand, and therefore needs careful analysis. But it is important that the German propaganda should first be seen in its proper setting. For like all German propaganda campaigns, it is clearly timed to fit in with a strategic plan. The 'New Order' in Europe has not been an avowed German war-aim since September 1939; it made its appearance only when Germany had gained control of Western Europe by the defeat of France in June 1940; and

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although there was a steady propaganda barrage throughout July and August, it did not reach its fullest intensity till after Germany had lost the first great Battle of Britain in August and September. The 'New Order' propaganda was in fact not fully developed till the moment when there was clearly no immediate prospect of success in the war against Britain; and at that moment the 'New Order' took its place as the main theme of the German propaganda offensive. The resistance of opponents and possible opponents to German ambitions was to be sapped by the promises of a better world now being organized by the Germans—a Utopia whose realization was only delayed by the senseless resistance of the British. The disturbances to European and American economy could be blamed by the German Propaganda Ministry entirely on the British blockade.

This propaganda technique is remarkably similar to that by which the Nazi party achieved power in Germany itself. In 1933 an anti-social enemy was conjured up—the power of Jewry and Marxism—and the Nazis promised employment to the workers of Germany, stable prices to the farmers, new markets to the industrialists. In 1940 and 1941 the technique is the same; the enemy is Britain, wielder of a mythical economic supremacy in Europe, and the promises are bigger and better, addressed to the workers, peasants, and industrialists of the European continent.

What does the 'New Order' offer?

One great difference between 1933 and 1940 is that the people of Europe and the Americas are not so credulous as the people of Germany. After some

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experience of the Nazi régime the world is suspicious; but there is still a wide demand to know what the German programme can offer, and what Europe and the world have to gain from it. It is not enough to reject the German plan because of the suspicious circumstances in which it was put forward. The plan must be examined for what it is worth. Unfortunately, it is difficult to give any concise analysis and criticism of this plan; there is no single and authoritative enunciation of a German economic programme for Europe which can be approved or disapproved point by point. The theme of the 'New Order' is taken up repeatedly but variously. In a great number of cases the plan as explained by the Germans consists of nothing more than the abolition of a mythical and world-wide tyranny exercised by the British. There are other and more serious pronouncements, but they exhibit considerable differences. Some common factors may be found in most of them, but even so, the settings differ greatly. A discussion of the German 'New Order' cannot therefore take the form of a debate on particular economic proposals, which may be embodied in a draft constitution for Europe. We have to sift first what the Germans are saying about their scheme and to find out what its main features are meant to be, without becoming embedded in economic details.

There is, for instance, a measure of agreement in German pronouncements on some of the technical economic means which will help to establish the 'New Order'. The abolition of the gold standard, in particular, and the setting up of a multilateral clearing system¹ for Europe have been from time

¹ See p. 10 below.

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to time much publicized. From some economists' point of view there is much to be said in favour of such measures, which might simplify many problems of international exchange. But they do not by themselves make or mar the German plan. To approve or disapprove of them has little to do with upholding or condemning the 'New Order'. What people want to know about Germany's 'New Order' is whether it is planned for the economic benefit of Europe and the world, or only for that of Germany, the planner. The abolition of the gold standard or the introduction of multilateral clearings might, while excellent things in themselves, be features of a plan designed solely for Germany's benefit.

The essential question is, therefore, what benefits Germany's programme has to offer to the people of Germany, Europe, and the world beyond Europe.

German Versions of the 'New Order'

It would naturally be supposed that German propaganda would leave us in no doubt of the blessings to be enjoyed under the 'New Order'. Its benefits are, however, depicted variously according to the audience which is being addressed.

The German people themselves are promised a higher standard of living, and the enjoyment of European production, rationally planned and fully developed, of food and raw materials. At the same time, Europe's markets will be expanded to take the industrial products of Germany, its sole supplier. Berlin will take London's place as Europe's financial centre. Free from British interference, the Germans will find a place in the sun in Africa, which can provide Europe with any resources which it

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lacks. These are the most moderate prophecies in which the German leaders indulge. At times they promise far more to the German people.

To the inhabitants of the occupied countries the emphasis of German propaganda is different; the great benefits which they are to enjoy, and are already enjoying, from the 'New Order' are the abolition of unemployment, the sale to Germany of their agricultural surplus, and the fixed prices which Germany pays for it.

The European inhabitants of Africa are told that under the 'New Order' the resources of Africa will be properly developed in order to supplement those of an otherwise autarkic Europe.

At the same time and without regard for contradiction, the peoples of the Americas are assured that under the 'New Order' they will be free from the tyranny of the British Navy, and will be able to sell all their surplus produce, now being wasted, in a Europe pacified at last, where demand and prices will have been finally stabilized.

These are the main themes of German propaganda on the 'New Order', and it is difficult to construct from them any coherent picture of its general nature. The promises to develop and absorb African resources 'from cotton to coffee' and at the same time to extend trade in the same commodities with the Americas are obviously inconsistent. Even the more moderate of the promises made to the German people (and there are plenty of extravagant ones), when compared to those made to the people of the occupied territories, suggest a somewhat unequal distribution of benefits. In one case the emphasis is on prosperity, in the other on stability.

Which if any of the themes of German propa-

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ganda on the 'New Order' represents Germany's true intentions? A study of the various statements of the German case, with all their ambiguities and inconsistencies, is bound to excite the suspicion that the 'New Order' is variously disguised to suit its different audiences, and planned in the interests of Germany alone. But to answer the question fully it is necessary to turn from the evidence of German propaganda, and to examine the trend of German economic planning now and since the Nazis came to power.

THE GERMAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM 1933-41

Germany

It is by now possible to see the outlines of German economic policy since 1933. Both at home and abroad it has been directed to one single end, the strengthening of the German war-potential. The German economic system has been one of exploitation under various forms, and its first victims were the German people themselves. In this case the means of exploitation were at first comparatively orthodox. On the one hand, there has been a vast increase in taxation, of various kinds, including indirect taxation in the form of compulsory contributions to social services such as the *Winterhilfe* fund. The most curious example of such indirect taxation is the enforced payment for the much-advertised 'People's Car' which has not yet been, and is not likely ever to be, made available to contributors. A more brutal and effective part of the economic mobilization of Germany was the appropriation of Jewish wealth and property by the Nazis.

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On the other hand, while the resources of the German people were being mobilized, measures were taken even in peace to limit the choice of goods which could be bought with the money still available to the German consumer. Germany's foreign exchange was required to purchase materials to supply her war machine, or to form war reserves. It could not be used to provide materials for the satisfaction of normal consumers' demands. In a recent lecture¹ General Thomas, chief of the War Economic and Armaments Office in the German High Command, was quite frank about the aims of Nazi economics. He emphasized that the organization of the German armed forces on a war economy basis during the years of peace was the making of the effective instrument for war, and among the decisive factors of war economic organization he stressed reserves of raw materials and facilities for the requisitioning of raw materials that were lacking. The war-time system of rationing and regulations is only an extension of the system that already existed in Germany. In fact, Germans themselves have admitted that from an economic point of view the transition from peace to war conditions was hardly noticeable.²

The Balkans

The German system of exploitation has extended beyond the borders of Germany under different forms. The economy of the Balkan countries was for some years before the war being adapted to

¹ Reported in the *Völkischer Beobachter*, 1 Dec. 1940.

² The German policy of economic self-sufficiency ('autarky') and its effect on the German consumer in the years before this war are fully discussed in Professor A. G. B. Fisher's pamphlet *Economic Self-sufficiency* (No. 4 of this series).

supply German needs, particularly of agricultural produce. Germany offered these countries the chance of disposing for years in advance of their agricultural surplus, and they could not afford to neglect such a chance. They might in return receive goods for which they had little use—such as the famous aspirins, and mouth-organs—or insufficient quantities of the industrial products which they did need. There was always danger that the Germans would raise the prices for their exports. But the Balkan countries could not afford to break with Germany, for in that case they forfeited all chance of being paid. In the meantime they had to extend and adapt their agriculture to the German need for animal fats and oil-seeds, for whose cultivation companies were formed under German management; and they were forced to discourage their own industries in order that a market might be left for Germany's industrial exports.

Clearing Agreements

The main instruments of the German order operating in the Balkans were, as they still are, clearing agreements involving the fixing of trade quotas, exchange rates, and, sometimes, prices.

A clearing agreement is an instrument of barter trade. Ideally the import and export of goods under a barter agreement should balance exactly, although in practice there will be periods over which one country will import more goods than it exports, or vice versa, so that debits or credits will accumulate on the clearing account. If a country continues to accumulate debits, it is importing goods without having to pay for them immediately in goods,

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services, or foreign exchange. Under normal conditions countries will try to prevent other countries from accumulating large debit balances by restricting exports to the debtor countries.

In the two years before the outbreak of the war there was a strong tendency for Germany to accumulate debit balances with most of the countries with which she had made clearing agreements. This was particularly serious for certain Balkan countries, which were sending goods to Germany and not receiving sufficient in return; but it was difficult for them to restrict exports since they were so closely tied to the German market. Indeed, it was not till 1940 that this increase in German debts came to an end. This was due partly to bad harvests, and partly to the closing of many of Germany's normal export markets, whereby supply of German goods available for the Balkans was increased. The change in the trade balance put Germany in the position of being able to demand increases in the exchange value of the mark which made imports from the Balkans correspondingly cheaper for her, and in some cases (e.g. Hungary) to suggest that German clearing credits might be used to buy up shares in industrial concerns. Thus Germany was able to take advantage alike of her debit and credit balances.

Occupied Europe

In the occupied territories the position is even simpler, since questions of trade and exchange rates are not even formally the subject of free negotiations, but are simply the result of the decisions of the occupation authorities. The machinery of clearing agreements remains the same, as if to attract

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attention to the continuity of German economic policy. The results are on a far grander scale. Denmark, the only country for which clearing figures are published, may be taken as an example. After only eight months of German occupation the Danes had a credit balance of over 400 million kroner in Berlin. This figure does not represent the full extent of the exploitation to which the Danes have been subject. To it must be added the costs of the German occupation which are covered by credits of the Danish National Bank.

The importance of the German method is that the semblance of normal trade is preserved. The Danes receive good prices for their products which go to Germany, but payments to Danish exporters are only made possible by the issue of credits by the Danish National Bank. In return the bank gets nothing but a credit in the German clearing account.

On their side the Germans have imported all that they could take, and given in return only what they chose to spare. Although German exports are still very considerable, their direction is governed largely by military and political rather than by commercial factors. The Danes who need coal and possess credits in Berlin may not use the credits to buy coal; the Germans prefer to send it to the Italians, who probably have no credits in Berlin. The Germans maintain that after the war their export capacity will be such that the clearing debt will very soon be repaid. Nevertheless it is doubtful whether they will be able to provide Denmark with the raw materials necessary for the rehabilitation of her agricultural industry, whose capital has been largely lost as a result of the German occupation.

A dangerous consequence of the large excess of

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Danish exports has been the flood of paper money which has been issued. Inflation, which the Germans themselves must avoid at all costs, has been exported, and trade exchanges between Germany and Denmark have amounted indeed to no more than the barter of inflation for plenty.

There is no reason to assume that the case of Denmark is particularly unfavourable to Germany. The same features of the German economic order may be observed in other occupied territories. Raw materials and finished products have been imported into Germany, and many sections of industrial, commercial, or agricultural life are being stripped of working capital and left to decay.¹ Whatever Germany may be willing to send them after the war, it is unlikely that these enterprises can be revived without extensive replenishments of raw materials. These Germany certainly cannot provide.

The details of the workings of German exploitation naturally vary from country to country. In the case of France particularly, the fixing of a very high exchange rate for the mark (20 francs) has made it easier for German soldiers and traders to buy up French goods. There are further refinements by which German clearing debts are prevented from increasing too rapidly. In France, for instance, the occupation costs of 400 million francs a day pay for a very large part of the French goods acquired by the Germans, while in Yugoslavia a similar effect is produced by the enforced payment to German creditors of old debts of the Kingdom of Serbia dating from before 1914.

¹ For a summary account of German depredations in the occupied territories, see Viscount Maugham's pamphlet, *Lies as Allies*.

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GERMAN PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

Is the 'New Order' already in Operation?

There is therefore abundant evidence for the existence of a German economic order now in operation. The Germans themselves, it is worth noting, frequently claim that it is the 'New Order' itself which is operating throughout the occupied territories. In a talk from the German-controlled Radio Hilversum it was actually stated that the 'New Order' began to function in Germany in 1933. The nature of that German order has been sketched briefly above, and differs widely from the Utopian conditions now put forward as German peace-aims. Another fact casts doubt on the good faith of the German 'New Order' propaganda, namely, that its stock economic phrases are used euphemistically to describe the process of spoliation by clearing agreement and exchange rate now going on. Thus we are assured that Danish and Norwegian exporters are enjoying great prosperity owing to Germany's unlimited capacity to absorb their surpluses. Holland is congratulated on the possession of such a wonderful 'hinterland' as Germany can provide for her vegetables and dairy products. We have heard almost exactly the same terms used to describe the ideal conditions which Europe as a whole will enjoy under the 'New Order'. It is difficult in the circumstances to quell the suspicion that what is euphemism in one case will be nothing but euphemism in the other, and that the 'New Order' will be but the present 'Order' writ large.

Such suspicions do not amount to conclusive proof. It remains to be seen whether the Germans

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are simultaneously producing anything that could be called a 'New Economic Order' to replace their present system. When forced to take a defensive attitude about present conditions in Europe, they admit that the 'New Order' cannot yet be realized. They say that its realization is deferred by British resistance, and above all by the British blockade, which they blame for all the disturbance caused since the outbreak of war to European economy. This defence deserves a more careful examination. If it could be shown that the Germans had any economic plan conceived for the general benefit of Europe, which they could put into execution at the end of the war, then, in spite of their past and present record of exploitation, German propaganda for a 'New Order' could not be completely discredited. The war and all preparations for it could then be represented by the Germans as the birth-pangs necessary to produce their European Utopia.

German Long-term Plans

In fact there is plenty of evidence more concrete than the generalities of the 'New Order' propaganda about German long-term plans for the future. There is the evidence of their own leaders' words which, when speaking at home on concrete issues, they do not trouble to harmonize with the professions of good faith put out for foreign consumption by the Propaganda Ministry. More important, there is the evidence of their actions in occupied territories ; the exploitation by clearing agreements and exchange rates is limited by the amount which can be immediately removed from the countries exploited. In Denmark, for instance, it seems that the peak of exploitation is now passed.

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But Germany has, by her own confession, longer-term plans for the mobilization of the resources that remain in the occupied territories—capital, manpower, and production.

Control of Industry, Banks, &c.

In a speech of 1 September 1940 Dr. Funk observed that under the 'New Order' nations 'would be free to develop their own resources and to trade with one another but only according to the German principles and methods'. Since the date of his speech, German principles and methods of developing other nations' resources have been fully illustrated. While Germany is engaged in the self-imposed task of freeing Europe from the 'domination of foreign capital' she is replacing this largely imaginary domination by a direct or indirect control imposed on business and financial concerns in the occupied and neutral countries of Europe. In this way Germany is already beginning to fulfil the role which she has allotted to herself in the 'New Order'—that of Europe's sole big industrial power. The great textile factories of Poland, which add some 15 per cent. to the existing productive capacity of textiles in the German Reich, have been taken over, mainly by the big German companies, Glanz-Stoff A.G. and Thuringian Zellwolle A.G. The heavy industry of Belgium and Northern France has also fallen under German control, as illustrated by the amalgamation (at present only partial) of the steel company Otto Wolff of Cologne with the famous Belgian company of d'Ougrée-Marihaye.

In general, the Germans can dominate most industries in the occupied territories without any

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formal amalgamation, by their control of stocks and imports (if any) of raw materials essential to industry, and in some cases by the mobilization of skilled labour throughout their European Empire for their own use. German control is also extended to banking and financial operations. The banking system of Alsace, for instance, has been detached from that of France, and German banks have started to operate. In Holland steps have been taken to bring the insurance companies into German hands.

This process is not confined, any more than the clearing system, to countries under German occupation. In Yugoslavia, for instance, the capital of the Yugo-Slavischer Bankverein has recently been increased from 60 to 100 million dinars, and the new shares have been taken over by the Credit-Anstalt Bankverein of Vienna. The Germans in fact control a majority of the shares of what is now the biggest private financial concern of Yugoslavia. It hardly needs emphasizing that those who gain from the extension of German industry and banking are not even the German people as a whole, but principally the big shareholders, who are often identical with the Nazi leaders.

The peoples of Europe are not likely to be the only ones to suffer from the German grip on their industries. As the Germans gain control over European industry and financial institutions, they are putting themselves into a position not only to regulate European production (and in particular the production of armaments), but also for the future to control Europe's imports of raw materials, and her overseas export markets. Dr. Funk foreshadowed what such control would mean to the world outside Europe in his speech of 25 July 1940.

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'The economic solidarity of Europe will give it a favourable bargaining position *vis-à-vis* other countries.' The 'New Order' which the German planners are thus establishing over European industry can clearly be reckoned as a long-term plan, not as an improvisation forced on them by the exigencies of war. And this National-Socialist plan as manifested so far could not be more exactly described than by the formula 'Imperialist Capitalism'.

Re-Agriculturalization of Europe

While the Germans will control what industry remains in occupied Europe, industry, as the Germans have frequently and explicitly stated, will under the 'New Order' be concentrated in Germany. In fact many industries in Western Europe which depend on imports of raw material are already being forced to close down, since the Germans have seized all industrial stocks (of copper, rubber, &c.) that are of value to their war-machine. In the circumstances, the Germans say that the occupied territories were over-industrialized, and that a rational plan for European production, such as they are putting into execution, demands a return to the land by the peoples of Western Europe.

Plans to increase the cultivated area of all the occupied countries, and their self-sufficiency as regards foodstuffs, have been publicly discussed: but it is to France, which under normal circumstances already produced enough cereals, potatoes, and sugar to feed its population, that the propaganda of 'back-to-the-land' is most particularly addressed. German propagandists touring in the wake of the

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German armies discovered that agriculture had been strangely neglected in Northern France (where production has in fact compared favourably with that of Germany's agricultural districts): Marcel Déat supported them with the prophecy that 'France will once more become a country of peasants, to its own advantage' and the *Völkischer Beobachter* summarized German views in the statement that German organization could make the fullest use of France's natural resources, and that the Germans were as much interested in next year's harvest as the French themselves.

It is in fact highly unlikely that any sanely planned agricultural development could absorb a large proportion of the urban population, thrown out of employment by a large-scale de-industrialization of France. Further, it is improbable that French agriculture would benefit greatly by any large 'back-to-the-land' movement. In the Balkan countries, where a large proportion of the population is engaged in not very highly developed agriculture, the proportion is too large for the highest agricultural efficiency to be achieved. In France under the suggested German plan, families would return to the soil, not in order to redress the balance between town and country, but simply because other occupations had been forbidden them.

Exploitation of Labour

The proposed re-agriculturalization of Europe, while it may be forced on the Germans by the difficulties under which European industries suffer in war-time, is also part of their long-term policy. It is a corollary of their attempt to turn Germany into

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the great industrial centre and the only armament centre of Europe; it serves an incidental purpose by increasing Europe's self-sufficiency in foodstuffs and lessening the need to import from the Americas in particular. More important, it will serve indirectly to increase Germany's own supply of imported labour. At present there are over 1.4 million foreigners working in Germany, exclusive of prisoners of war. About a million Poles (mainly prisoners) have been forcibly conscripted, and work under conditions far worse than those of the average slave of the classical age. All kinds of inducements and threats are employed to attract 'voluntary' labour from the other occupied territories, where Germany has to keep up appearances. In Holland the unemployed who refuse to take work in Germany when it is offered to them are not entitled to any unemployment benefit. This redistribution of labour is at present, as the Germans are never tired of pointing out, some kind of solution of the unemployment problem which the German war has forced upon the occupied territories. But the gradual de-industrialization of the occupied territories will create a permanent unemployment problem for them; and the forced redistribution of labour, which Germany needs, is intended as a permanent solution for this problem. The point has been made explicitly by Dr. Stothfang, of the German Ministry of Labour: 'Germany, owing to its central position in the New European Order, will continue to attract foreign labour reserves . . . especially as a continuous shortage of German workers is to be expected. The foreign countries, on the other hand, mainly of an agricultural character, have large population surpluses which will

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need an outlet.'¹ The Germans do not trouble to conceal that this theory applies to the co-founders of the 'New Order', the Italians, who already enjoy the title of 'harvest-helpers'. A lecturer reported in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* (31 October 1940) that the passive trade-balance, which Italy was bound to have with Germany, would be remedied by 'Germans travelling in Italy and Italians working in Germany'.

Economic Version of 'Herrenvolk' theory

These are the main features of the long-term economic plan which the Germans are adopting (as their words and deeds prove)—control and centralization in Germany of European industry, and resulting from that, the re-agriculturalization of Europe, and a forced redistribution of labour. These plans pay no attention to the welfare of the countries under German domination, and in fact could only be achieved at the cost of a terrible fall in their standard of living. They represent a continuance and fulfilment of the German tradition of exploitation, as applied already to Germany itself, the Balkans, and the occupied territories. The 'New Order' of 1933 is developed, but remains in operation and is not succeeded by any 'Newer Order'. It appears then that only one of the various types of 'New Order' propaganda run by the Germans need be taken very seriously—that addressed to the German people themselves, and promising them untold benefits at the end of the war.

That is the one propaganda theme which does

¹ It is possible that in the long run German demand for foreign labour could not keep pace with the surplus population of a re-agriculturalized Europe.

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not run counter to the whole trend of German thought and practice.

The 'New Order' turns out on examination to be no more than the economic expression of the official German political theories. Inside Germany the prevailing economic regimentation results from the same distrust and contempt for the mass of the people which Hitler expressed in *Mein Kampf*. Thus we read in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (13 October 1940) that 'the public is obviously unreasonable. It is quite useless to appeal to its reason and to safeguard the just distribution of goods by enlightening the public. The only expedient is to use force psychologically or physically.' At the same time the despised German public is the destined master of the world, a *Herrenvolk* to dominate other peoples; and as the 'New Order' embraces peoples outside Germany, it is revealed as the economic form of the *Herrenvolk* theory still being expounded by German thinkers and enforced by German soldiers. In the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of 7 October 1940 it is written that 'We Germans are born to rule Europe and must show that we are masters of our destiny'. This political doctrine was translated into its simplest economic terms by Dr. Ley as long ago as 31 January 1940. He laid it down that 'A lower race needs less food, less clothes, and less culture than a higher race', and the simplest illustration of this economic proposition is the double scale of rationing now enforced in Poland, by which a German gets nearly twice as much food as a Pole. The attitude of Germany to her junior partners in the 'New Order' finds classical expression in *Das Reich* of 6 October 1940: 'The German people as the pivot and leaders of Europe's

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new era must avoid the temptation to devote their energies to the good of others. That temptation was never so strong as to-day.'

THE 'DYNAMIC' OF THE GERMAN SYSTEM

In the face of the Germans' declared intention to convert the economic system of Europe to their own ends, it is impossible to take seriously their promises of a golden age bringing general prosperity, or their excuses that only war conditions prevent them from introducing their brave 'New Order' immediately. Even if they could introduce such an order, they evidently have no intention of doing so. But a still more fundamental criticism of the German economic system is possible. Even if it were allowed, by a colossal stretch of imagination, that the Germans at the end of a victorious war would suffer a change of heart, and organize a 'New Order' acceptable to the rest of the world which did not leave Germany as the sole military and industrial power of Europe, the question remains whether they would be able to put such a plan into execution. The final answer to German propaganda is that the Nazi régime could hardly by now introduce any reasonable 'New Order', even if they won the war and intended to do so.

The War-machine cannot go into Reverse

The main reason for this is that the great war-machine, on which their precarious domination depends, cannot be put into reverse gear. At present the German economic order imposed on the occupied countries can only be maintained by

force or the threat of force and the German war-machine is necessary. But supposing the Germans introduced an economic system which would be freely supported by the other nations of Europe and accepted by nations outside Europe, it would be unnecessary for Germany to maintain an army on the vast scale of recent years, nor could Germany do so from her own resources alone. The natural outcome would be a reversal of the war-machine and a return to the organization of a peaceful economy. But to this development there would be two insuperable objections for the rulers of Germany. First, the Nazi chiefs would oppose disarmament since they and their friends are the people who profit directly and largely from the German armaments industry.¹ Secondly, and more important, the reversal of the German war-machine would produce for them and for the German people as a whole another problem of the utmost gravity—a sharp increase in unemployment. For any country the transition between a war economy and a peace economy is difficult. But in Germany it has been the chief boast of those responsible for social policy that unemployment has been finally abolished. Now unemployment has only been abolished by mobilizing the labour resources of Germany to work for the war-machine, and so ultimately for war. To adapt the huge armament and munition factories of Germany to peaceful uses and to demobilize the

¹ It is curious to observe in this connexion how the German gibes at pluto-democracy can be turned against the National-Socialist system. Hitler deduced from Chamberlain's prophecy of a three-year war that Chamberlain could not draw sufficient profits from armament shares in under three years; he should have remembered that Marshal Goering, one of Germany's biggest shareholders and directors, declared himself ready for a war of five years.

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great German army would have to be a very slow process, all the slower in Germany than elsewhere since Germany had been preparing so long and so completely for war. The large-scale conversion of swords into ploughshares would be a matter of great difficulty, and any serious slowing-down of the German war-machine would mean unemployment for millions of German workmen.¹ Employment is the only benefit which Hitler's social policy has had to offer the German people in return for many hardships and restrictions. Unemployment is the trouble which Hitler's régime could not face.

The Need for Continual Expansion

The war-machine will therefore remain, if it is not broken in war, as the centre and driving force of the whole Nazi system. It provides the 'dynamic' of which the Germans boast, and is bound to initiate a terrible sequence of events. The origins of this 'dynamic' may be political or psychological, but its nature and consequence can best be explained in economic terms. Goering presented the German people with a choice of economic means to satisfy their political ambitions—the choice of guns or butter. The choice was in fact a far more momentous one. The Germans were asked not merely to buy guns instead of food with their spare cash; they were asked to invest in armaments rather than in, say, merchant ships or bridges. The essential difference is that under normal conditions, while the merchant ships are in use, money is earned which contributes to the cost of their upkeep and eventual

¹ Even allowing for the fact that the first to lose their jobs would be the foreign workmen whom Germany is importing in increasing numbers.

replacement. No money is earned by using the gun; when it needs repair or has to be replaced, fresh resources are needed which it has done nothing to provide. The gun may in fact need to be replaced before it has even been fully used, since armaments become obsolete fairly quickly. In brief, armaments unlike most other investments have no earning power and are not cumulatively productive.

The Germans invested their wealth in armaments, in a war-machine which had constantly to be fed and replaced by fresh resources. As the resources of Germany itself were exhausted by requisitioning, taxation, and enforced saving, other countries had to be exploited to feed the war-machine. The resources of Austria and Czechoslovakia were soon absorbed, those of Poland, the occupied territories of the West, and Rumania are now being digested. They will not last for ever, and a further expansion in search of further wealth will become necessary.

This economic expansion in space is the 'dynamic' vaunted by the Germans and the 'determinism of history' which Dr. Goebbels likes to invoke. It is as part of this vast outward movement, necessitated by the war-machine which cannot feed or reproduce itself, that the successive exploitations of Germany, the Balkans, and the occupied territories and the German economic plans for the future should be viewed. The nature and direction of the German economic order was determined by the decision to build up the war-machine. Its nature does not undergo any fundamental change and its direction cannot be reversed. It cannot in fact produce any really 'New Order'. The one and only German 'New Order' was born in 1933.

THE WEAKNESS OF THE 'NEW ORDER'

Reaction in Germany and Occupied Territories

The Germans are forced to export the 'New Order' to feed their own war-machine, but the process is hastened for political reasons. Only by the promise of benefits to come can they reconcile the victims of the 'New Order' to its hardships, and such benefits can most easily be gained by wars of expansion. The dynamic of the 'New Order' is therefore amongst other things a sign of its greatest weakness, the resistance it has provoked among the countries incorporated in it.

The best evidence for the reaction against the German system in Germany and much more in the occupied territories are the newspaper articles and broadcasts by which the Germans seek to counteract it and to reassure themselves and their victims. In Germany itself the economic foundations of the 'New Order' are secure. But even there, where the successes of the war-machine bring far greater gains, material and psychological, than in the occupied countries, there is an increasing weariness born of seven years familiarity with what are virtually war-time restrictions. There is no immediate prospect of an end to these restrictions. It has been stated in the German press that the rationing system was likely to extend for at least a year after the war, and that there would be a prolonged shortage of consumption goods. Dr. Ley's descriptions of the social horrors of Great Britain and of the wonderful benefits which the German worker will enjoy after the war are therefore becoming more and more highly coloured. The English pluto-democracy is

exposed by descriptions of factory conditions in the 1840's; the Germans are led on by promises of three-roomed flats with shower-baths planned by the Führer, and luxury cruises on Strength-through-Joy liners.

It becomes more and more difficult, however, for the Germans to justify their works to the occupied countries. In the Balkans the immediate benefits offered by Germany concealed for a considerable time the dangers of close connexion with the German system. But the case is different in the occupied countries of Western Europe. There producers were for a short time satisfied with the paper money paid to them in large quantities, regardless of what goods could be purchased with it. But that stage by now seems to have passed. Dr. Fischböck, speaking in Holland, admitted 'an excess of means of payment, and a shortage of consumption goods', but thought it wrong to speak of inflation. The distinction is hard to follow, and does not seem to have reassured the inhabitants. An increasing number of official warnings against hoarding and dealings on 'black markets'¹ show that people by now prefer to keep any solid assets that they have, or at least to sell them at their own price.

Resistance strains German administration

The scarcity of consumers' goods, and particularly of foodstuffs, in the occupied countries, resulting from the German exploitation, has far-reaching results. It automatically ranges producers in the country who do not want to part with their stock against consumers in the towns who are going short;

¹ Secret dealings at prices in excess of the official maximum.

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and that means considerable difficulties for the administration of the occupied countries and ultimately for the German authorities.¹

There is also more deliberate opposition.

It is now clearly and generally realized that the Germans have little to offer in exchange for the system of 'cards, clearings, and regulations' which, in the words of a German broadcaster to Holland, are 'rules of the German game'. The Danish press in particular has published complaints of the artificial rate of exchange imposed by the Germans, and of the lack of German goods sent to Denmark in return for Danish produce. "There is plenty of goodwill on the German side", said a Danish official spokesman on 13 October 1940, "but a considerable lack of transport."

The fruits of a German victory look increasingly more remote, and in any case they are mainly reserved for the German people. In the meantime, the employment which the Germans offer takes the form of building up what the Germans themselves have destroyed, or of work far away in Germany. Security of markets for the producer seems to mean that the Germans take all that they can transport back to Germany, while war-time conditions, if nothing more, prevent import of goods on a corresponding scale. Stability, which the Germans have promised so often, proves to be only a relative stability; certainly the peoples of the occupied countries are tied without release to the German war-machine, but it itself is involved in an inexorable movement of expansion until it is destroyed.

¹ For instance, there are now 3,000 price controllers, including motorized units, to deal with hoarding and black markets in Belgium.

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All this the people of the occupied countries are beginning to realize, and as they realize it, they are less and less inclined to collaborate in the German plan.

The German plan of exploitation is designed to control all spheres of consumption and production, and to impose from above a rigid plan for the benefit of the *Herrenvolk*. The change from the normal system is symbolized by a typical change of name—the Market Place where men worry out their own economic problems becomes the Adolf Hitler Place where they fulfil their economic duty to the Führer, without enjoying corresponding rights or opportunities.

The attempt to impose the rigidly planned 'New Order' on the unwilling majority of people in Europe must involve an immense strain on the German administrative machine, and even on the German army, and the strain is only likely to be increased by any new addition to the German empire. On the one side, there may be immediate economic and strategic gains; on the other side, there will be the further complications involved for the machinery of government, and perhaps the necessity of devoting a still larger proportion of Germany's productive capacity to her military machine.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion of our examination is that the bulk of German propaganda on the 'New Order' is nothing but bluff. The 'New Order' is only the old order of exploitation, successively manifested in Germany, the Balkans, and the occupied territories of Western Europe since 1933; its most usual

instrument up to now has been the clearing agreement and manipulated rate of exchange. But the Germans are planning exploitation on a grander scale than anything yet attempted; industry, capital, and labour are to be mobilized throughout Europe, in the interests of the *Herrenvolk*. That is all that Europe can expect from the Germans; the programme of territorial expansion and total exploitation is forced on them by the unsatisfied needs of the war-machine to which they have tied themselves. Its abolition would involve social problems which the German régime could not face, but its upkeep involves them in the perpetual expansion which is the only dynamic of the German system. The weakness of the system, based as it is on force, is the resistance that it excites and which involves ever increasing strain on the German administrative machine.

The German 'New Order' propaganda is designed to minimize this weakness, to make the 'New Order' of exploitation acceptable to its present victims, and to conceal its true nature from those who would later be called on to resist it. With this end in view, the Germans have put up a smoke-screen of economic jargon, which should not be mistaken for a detailed economic plan. They are playing skilfully on the general desire in Europe and America for economic stability. They promise that the 'New Order' will bring this stability, and do not mention either the price of complete political subjection which has to be paid by its victims in Europe, or the dominating position which the 'New Order' would give to Germany in the markets of the world. The propaganda trick is remarkably similar to some of those by which the Nazis came to power in

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Germany. There it was the promise to relieve unemployment that won them millions of votes; the promise was fulfilled because the Germans were willing to pay the necessary price—economic and political. But the Germans had far more to gain in all fields from Hitler's 'New Order' than its present victims and those who would be destined in the future to subjection, if the 'New Order' were not smashed in war. German plans for the exploitation of industry, capital, and man-power, already beginning to operate in the occupied territories, show how little will be left to those who accept the 'New Order'. The inevitable expansion of the German system constitutes a threat even to those continents which are at present outside it. The 'New Order' is a modernized feudalism which will benefit only the German ruling caste with their soldiers, policemen, and propagandists as the counterpart of barons and priests. The secure status of a serf is all that the Germans can offer other races to compensate for the miseries of serfdom. No amount of specious economic theory can hide the fact that this is a bad bargain.

OXFORD BOOKS ON WORLD AFFAIRS

THE best and most up-to-date general picture of England as she was from the rise of Germany in 1870 to the outbreak of the First World War is given in Mr. Ensor's book *England 1870-1914* (15s.), which is Vol. 14. of the *Oxford History of England*. Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell's *History of the Great War 1914-1918* (15s.) may be recommended as the standard one-volume work on the subject. Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy deals with the period between the two wars in his *Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938* (8s. 6d.).

The two volumes of *Speeches and Documents on International Affairs*, edited by Professor A. B. Keith (World's Classics, 2s. 6d. each), and the selection of political writings in Sir Alfred Zimmern's *Modern Political Doctrines* (7s. 6d.) illustrate the conflict of doctrines in evidence to-day.

The outbreak of the present war is described and discussed in the lectures by H. A. L. Fisher, A. D. Lindsay, Gilbert Murray, R. C. K. Ensor, Harold Nicolson, and J. L. Brierly, collected and published in one volume under the title *The Background and Issues of the War* (6s.). The deeper issues at stake are summed up in Lord Halifax's famous Oxford address, *The Challenge to Liberty* (3d.), which is included in the volume of his *Speeches on Foreign Policy* (10s. 6d.).

The economics of 'total' warfare are described in Mr. Geoffrey Crowther's *Ways and Means of War* (2s. 6d.), an enlargement of his two Oxford Pamphlets (Nos. 23 and 25).

The prices quoted above are net and held good in March 1941, but are liable to alteration without notice.

OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS

1. THE PROSPECTS OF CIVILIZATION, by SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN.
2. THE BRITISH EMPIRE, by H. V. HODSON.
3. MEIN KAMPF, by R. C. K. ENSOR.
4. ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY, by A. G. B. FISHER.
5. 'RACE' IN EUROPE, by JULIAN HUXLEY.
6. THE FOURTEEN POINTS AND THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, by G. M. GATHORNE-HARDY.
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CANADA

By
GRAHAM SPRY



**OXFORD PAMPHLETS
ON WORLD AFFAIRS**



MAP I. CANADA'S POSITION IN THE LAND HEMISPHERE

SINCE the development of the Americas by Europeans, the Atlantic, in Mackinder's words, has become the 'Mediterranean Ocean' and western Europe not the terminus but the centre of the modern, industrialized, populated land masses of the globe. Columbus not only discovered the position of America but changed the significance of the Atlantic Ocean and of Britain and France.

On sea (or air) routes Canada occupies a favourable North American position on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Eastern Canadian ports are nearer Europe and western Canadian ports nearer the Orient than American ports. Halifax, the naval base, and St. John, N.B., are nearer Liverpool, London, Brest, Gibraltar, Capetown, and Rio de Janeiro than New York is.

Sea Routes—Nautical Miles

Montreal-Liverpool .	2,750	Montreal-Rio de Janeiro	5,325
Halifax- "	2,425	Halifax- "	4,625
Churchill- "	2,925	New York- "	4,800
New York- "	3,050	Plymouth- "	4,850
Montreal-Capetown .	7,100	Vancouver-Yokohama .	4,275
Halifax- "	6,475	San Francisco- "	4,525
Plymouth- "	5,950	Liverpool (Suez) "	11,100
New York- "	6,800	" (Panama) "	12,650

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No. 47

CANADA

BY
GRAHAM SPRY

OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1941

CANADA is now Britain's most powerful ally against Germany, and to Britons it seems the most natural thing in the world that Canada and Britain should be fighting together. Yet Canada is a sovereign nation, free to choose between war and neutrality, she is separated by 3,000 miles of ocean from the heart of the war, and her great neighbour, the United States, has for eighteen months remained a neutral. It is the aim of this pamphlet to describe the nation that Canada is, and to show how her national unity has been influenced by geography, economic dependence, race, federalism, and by European and North American associations. Such a background of knowledge is indispensable for a proper appreciation of Canada's attitude towards the war, and of the daily news from the transatlantic Dominion.

Mr. Graham Spry is a Canadian who came to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, and is now manager of one of the Standard Oil Companies and director of two other oil companies in London, England. He was for some years in Canadian politics.

NOTE

A special Canadian series of Oxford Pamphlets is published by the Oxford University Press, Toronto. These Canadian Pamphlets, to which Mr. Spry's furnishes an admirable introduction, are obtainable in Great Britain (Price 6d. each). The first eight titles are:—

- C 1 *All Right, Mr. Roosevelt*, by Stephen Leacock.
- C 2 *Canada and United States Neutrality*, by B. K. Sandwell.
- C 3 *The Ukrainian Canadians and the War*, by Watson Kirkconnell.
- C 4 *What the British Empire means to Western Civilization*, by André Siegfried. Translated by G. M. Wrong.
- C 5 *Canada and the Second World War*, by C. P. Stacey.
- C 6 *War for Power and Power for Peace*, by Lionel M. Gelber.
- C 7 *North America and the War: A Canadian View*, by Reginald G. Trotter.
- C 8 *Trends in Canadian Nationhood*, by Chester Martin.

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THE Dominion of Canada, as events have revealed, was not less and perhaps not more threatened than other nations on the continents of North and South America by direct German aggression or the consequences of a German conquest of Europe. The government and peoples of Canada, like those of other American nations, were free to decide between the policies of neutrality and intervention. Canada alone in the Americas declared war on Germany.

This declaration of war has been largely taken for granted by the people of Britain and the United States. Canada's membership of the British Empire has seemed sufficient explanation. This explanation is valid but incomplete. Canada, in fact, declared war on Germany through her own King, government, and parliament on 10 September, and for seven days after Britain was at war Canada was a British neutral. The British connexion has powerful practical and sentimental values for the Canadian people; Canada is the only nation in the Americas whose relations with a European mother country have never been broken. But Canada did not enter the war either wholly or predominantly because of this connexion, or of any decisive numerical preponderance of Anglo-Saxons or British-born in her population. Least of all was Canada's separate declaration of war due to any compulsion by or subordination to the British Government. Canada's sovereignty and constitutional powers are as complete in fact as those of Eire; geographically, Canada is more remote from either British control or German attack; economically, she is less dependent than Eire. Eire in the war zone is neutral and Canada in a neutral hemisphere is at war.

Because of her British associations or her American position, Canada is usually interpreted as a projection or expansion of Britain or of the United States. Canada is both

British and American, as indeed Canada is also French; but the pattern of Canada, the pattern formed by geographic influences and history, by racial composition and economic conflicts, by political practice and institutions, is a Canadian pattern. Canada is not 'the fourteenth colony' as Benjamin Franklin anticipated in 1774 nor 'the very image and transcript' of England as Col. John Simcoe, Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, hoped in 1792. The Canadian people's concept of nationhood is significantly different from the nationalism of the United States, their concept of the Commonwealth confirmed in the Statute of Westminster, 1931, was different from either the colonial separation or the centralized empire policies advocated by English political leaders in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Canadian life has flowed from so many sources, and is so new and varied compared with that of the older, deeply rooted, racially homogeneous nation-states of Western Europe that many interpretations of Canada are possible. Baldwin and Lafontaine, the Fathers of Confederation, Macdonald, Laurier, Borden, and Canadian statesmen and people of to-day have seen their task as the task of building a nation without severing relations with Britain or annihilating racial and cultural distinctions at home.

Through this task has run a delicate problem of unity and at times its corollary, the question of survival. A French observer, André Siegfried, has described the Dominion as 'a precarious creation'. This doubt few Canadians have shared: their statesmanship has been equal to the challenge, the people have had faith in themselves. Canada to be understood must be interpreted not only by her associations and her origins but as a nation and a Canadian nation. It was as a free nation that Canada declared war.

Peoples: Race and Religion

The Canadian population was nearly trebled in the sixty years of confederation from 3,689,257 in 1871 to 10,376,786

in 1931. The present estimates approach 12,000,000. This population is scattered in a thin fringe along the waterways and trans-continental railways across a territory wider than Europe. Four-fifths of the people live within 200 miles of the American frontier. Some 700 miles separate the centres of population in the Atlantic provinces from those of central Canada, 900 miles of rock and water separate central Ontario from the prairies, 400 miles of mountain divide the Pacific Coast from the prairies.

Race further divides the population, religious distinctions largely coincide with those of race: both in a measure coincide with the sectionalism of geography and economic resources. Quebec, northern New Brunswick, and north-eastern Ontario are largely French and Catholic. Ontario, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia are predominantly Anglo-Saxon and Protestant. The three prairie provinces are less than half Anglo-Saxon, and there are significant groups of Germans, Scandinavians, and Slavs.


The Scandinavian and the older German populations quickly assimilate and have played an admirable part in Canadian life. The Slavs, particularly the Ukrainians, have been settled in 'blocs' within the last two generations and as yet form definite racial groups in the population. Assimilation to the Canadian mode of life is proceeding, and historically, whatever the future may hold, relations between older Canadians and 'New Canadians' have not yet raised very serious problems. Canadians of every race are represented in the divisions overseas. In the Royal Canadian Regiment, the senior regular regiment, for example, about one-quarter are French-Canadians, and the Intelligence section commands the use of 16 languages.¹

Almost a quarter of the Canadians were born outside Canada. For other Canadians, Canada has been a half-way

¹ The Hon. Vincent Massey, High Commissioner in London, recently quoted Stephen Leacock's comment on New Canadians: 'Leave them alone and pretty soon the Ukrainians will think they won the Battle of Trafalgar.'

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house to the United States.¹ The trend of population in a new country is difficult to prophesy. Two Canadian statisticians, Hurd and McLean, have estimated a population of 16,642,000 in 1971. Professor Hurd estimates that in 1971,



Racial origins and religious denominations of the Canadian people by percentages of total population, census of 1931. In the last ten years the percentage of British origin has fallen below 50. Canadian-born formed 77.76, British-born 11.42, American-born 3.32, and foreign-born 7.50 per cent. Protestants form 54.9 per cent. of the religious denominations.

if present trends continue, the French race will be 39.6, the British 38.9, and non-British and non-French 21.5 per cent. Canada's future population may well be small or intermediate in size but high in its standard of living.

When Lord Durham's Report in 1839 spoke of 'two nations warring in the bosom of a single state' he was speaking of the relations between the descendants of the original

¹ Canadians, like the Scots, get about. In recent years from Canadian-born there might be cited as evidence—a Prime Minister of Great Britain, a member of the present War Cabinet, United States Senators, a United States admiral, a member of the American delegation to the Versailles Conference, a director of the Bank of England, Cardinals of Rome, a director of the London *Times*, an officer of the American federal reserve bank, a governor of a West African colony, a general officer commanding an expedition in North-West India, the officer commanding the R.A.F. in Libya, and university or college presidents in the United States, India, Rome, China, French North Africa, and Great Britain, as well as Norma Shearer, Mary Pickford, Deanna Durbin, and Beatrice Lillie.

18,000 people of French race and tongue who migrated to Canada before 1713 and the Anglo-Saxons who came from the British Isles and the American states after the fall of the French empire in America in 1759.

Each of these two main races in Canada almost fiercely retains and develops its own language and culture. The differences are, indeed, not biological but essentially of language, religion, and culture. The French-Canadian 'ideology' has the virtues of largely Latin, Catholic, hierarchical civilization derived from Rome and north-western France of the *ancien régime*. The English-Canadian 'ideology' is Anglo-Saxon with a strong Scotch or north country flavour, Protestant, liberal and derived from England or New England—from United Empire Loyalists of eighteenth-century revolutionary New England or nineteenth-century and modern Britain. It is significant that both races felt revulsion rather than attraction towards the two great revolutions of the eighteenth century.

The different environment and experiences of the two races transplanted to Canada have modified but not yet harmonized the differences between them. The French-Canadian population has not been increased by immigration from France since 1713, and has become deeply rooted in the Canadian soil. New France (Quebec) was one of the typical examples of the *ancien régime*, but before the French Revolution, George III, as Burke said, had displaced Louis XVI in Quebec, and French Canada shared none of the revolutionary experiences of France, either political or religious. French-Canadian life has been shaped by its profound Catholicism, by the Canadian physical environment, by association and conflict with predominant Anglo-Saxon North America, and by Canadian adaptations of the British institutions of monarchy, and representative and responsible government. Religious and cultural loyalties, conscious policies of group concentration and isolation, and three centuries of life in the well-defined St. Lawrence homeland have preserved the

French-Canadian people and given them a unique unity and strength. This people is perhaps the most sturdily Canadian and conservative in the Dominion.

The characteristics of the British stock are those of modern America or modern Britain. When the English-speaking Canadian looks abroad, he looks to London or to New York; the French-Canadian looks more perhaps to Rome than to either, but almost more to London than to Paris. The English-Canadian looks to the State for welfare, the French-Canadian to the Church. The English-speaking tend to be Scotch liberals, the French ultramontane conservatives: the kilt and the cassock flutter through the pages of Canadian history.

Each race feels in the other some measure of rivalry if not of menace to its individuality and integrity; bitter quarrels at times flare into flame. The question of French language and religious instruction in the provincial educational systems of predominantly English-speaking provinces was a deep political issue for fifty years. The enforcement of conscription by the English majority upon the French minority in the last war shaped the structure of the political parties for a generation and created a solid Quebec bloc of Liberals in the House of Commons.

The races live side by side but have not merged. They nourish their own language and individuality in their own clubs, societies, holidays, churches, business houses, and political associations. There is little inter-marriage. The school systems are Provincial and the French education is largely clerical, the English largely lay. There are two different and almost hostile interpretations of Canadian history. But there is growing, against all barriers, a common view of Canada's future which statesmanship and the dark challenge of this war may help to nourish. In the past the two peoples, in Siegfried's terms, may have shared only a 'modus vivendi without cordiality', but the idea of Canadian nationhood, the striving for unity rather than uniformity, the recognition of

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differences rather than their destruction, common sense, and wise forbearance can slowly 'blaze the trail' to happier relations. Unsatisfactory as these at times have been, they have seldom passed beyond the degree of serious misunderstanding and rivalry.

To the French Republic in the instant of its anguish, Mr. Winston Churchill on 16 June 1940 offered a Solemn Act of Union with the British people. If this Union is offered again when Britain and Canada and their allies have re-won for France her freedom, the century and a half of peace and co-operation, though not always of harmony, between the British and French peoples in the Canadian federation stands as a hopeful and not unworthy model for Europe.

Geography: A Mari usque ad Mare ¹

In the vast Canadian estate, as great as the whole of Europe, stretching from a latitude almost as southern as Rome and Madrid to the North Pole and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, there are few geographic influences to aid the hands of men in the ready shaping of a single nation. The Appalachian and Acadian region occupied by the three Maritime Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island; the vital system of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes waterways uniting the heart of the continent—Ontario, Quebec, and the American middle-west—with the Atlantic; the steppe-like prairies of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, and the great bulk of the Rocky Mountains rising sheer from prairies on the east and the salt sea on the west are all northern projections of similar regions in the United States.

Three geographic factors—the Canadian rivers, the Canadian Shield, and the climate—differentiate the Canadian

¹ The term 'Dominion' was taken from the verse in Zechariah, chap. ix, reading: 'And his dominion shall be from sea even to sea, and from the river even to the ends of the earth.' This is represented on the Canadian coat-of-arms by the words 'a mari usque ad mare'.

territory from the American. The St. Lawrence river penetrates the Appalachian and Laurentian barriers inland to the Great Lakes and from the lakes, rivers point the way north and westward. This river system laid the foundations of a commercial and later a political union between the east and west. The railways and the airways of Canada to-day roughly follow the routes of that instrument of the fur-trade, the canoe.

Canada, from the beginnings of settlement in Nova Scotia (1605) and Quebec (1608), was first a projection of France and later of Britain across the ocean to the valley of the St. Lawrence. At Montreal (1642), a nodal point in the natural communications of the continent, the St. Lawrence led to the great lakes and thence by short 'portages' over the watersheds to the second continental river system of the Mississippi valley; the Ottawa river led north towards the 'portages' into the prairies and into Hudson Bay; the Lake Champlain-Hudson river system and its tributary the Mohawk led to the site of New York. A political factor, the presence of fur-trading rivals allied with the Iroquois Indians, closed this southern route and Canadian development was given its east-west direction. This initial momentum has never been lost, but always it has been in conflict with the 'pulls' of the north-south direction of the coasts, of the mountain barriers striking across it, and of the warmer, easier climate of what became the United States.

The colder winter of Canada, sealing the waterways and ports of the inland systems, the St. Lawrence, and the Great Lakes, marks off much of Canada from most of the United States and for five months deprives Canada of the competitive advantage Montreal might have, closer to the economic centre of the continent, over New York the gateway to the continent open to the sea in every month of the year.

The Canadian or Laurentian shield of basic Pre-Cambrian rock marches in a swooping crescent around Hudson Bay from the shores of the Lower St. Lawrence across Quebec,

through central Canada and the north-western provinces to the Arctic Circle north of Alberta, and at only two points penetrates American territory.


More than half the Canadian estate is formed by the bold red, purple granites of these age-eroded, glacier-ground mountains and their wild, tumbling rivers, their still dark lakes, and shaggy forests of spruce and balsam, birch and jackpine. Here, agricultural land exists only in tiny pockets, but it was the domain of the fur trade from the seventeenth century, of the timber trade in the nineteenth century, and to-day it enriches and helps to sustain Canada with its gold, nickel, copper, lead, zinc, its wood pulp and newsprint, its winter and summer attractions to millions of American tourists, and its abundant, steady water-powers.

The Shield contributes by its north-western sweep to the east-west axis of the river systems, but by its unsuitability for settlement, it confines Canadian population to the St. Lawrence Lowlands of Ontario and Quebec, to the great plains of the west and to the valleys of the Rocky Mountains and the Appalachians. Canada's *Lebensraum* is not equal to Canada's area: not more than, perhaps not as much as, 20 per cent. of the Canadian soil is arable. Three-fifths of Canada is Laurentian rock, another fifth mountain, with ranges from five to ten thousand feet and peaks higher than Mont Blanc. These are geographic barriers, driving through the east-west axis of the waterways; they have been barriers to Canadian settlement and to the unity of Canadian minds.

Canadian history might be seen, indeed, not only as a conflict between man and geography but as a conflict between rival geographic influences. The coastal provinces of the Atlantic and the Pacific have natural sea routes to near-by American markets and sources of supply. The prairies of Canada are divided by no natural frontier from the prairies of the United States. The St. Lawrence route has its richer, warmer rivals in the Hudson river system and in the Mississippi. The striving first of the French and later of the British

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based on Montreal to link the centre of the continent based upon the Mississippi with the St. Lawrence route to the coast and Europe is the substance of much of the struggles of the continent. The French held not only what is now eastern



The Position of Montreal and New York. The rivers St. Lawrence and Hudson with their tributaries penetrate the highland barriers of the Canadian Shield and the Appalachians. They form the principal gateways for trade and settlement leading from the Atlantic into the heart of the continent.

Canada but, for a brief span, the whole of the empire of the Ohio and Mississippi; the horse and the turnpike roads over the shorter lines of communication with New York defeated the canoe and the long river communications with Montreal, and that early Canadian empire became the American empire. The canalization of the upper St. Lawrence in the early nineteenth century sought to cheapen transportation between the American states south of the Great Lakes, and to make Montreal the trading entrepôt of most of the continent. But the American canals and railways between Lake Erie

and New York early won the day. The present proposal to deepen the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence waterways to a depth of 27 feet from Lake Superior to the Atlantic for coastal and ocean shipping has its relation to this old struggle for the trade of the centre of the continent.

In the past, when wars between rival empires shaped, on the battlefields of Europe or in the valleys of America, the political structure of the continent, and to-day in the era of economic competition, the St. Lawrence penetrating from the Atlantic 2,000 miles into the heart of the continent, and linking that heart with Europe and the western world, is for the United States one *via* among several; for Canada the St. Lawrence is *vita*.

Economy: The Export of Staple Products

The rich harvest of cod and other fish first attracted Europeans across the North Atlantic to Canadian shores. Beaver fur drew them inland up the St. Lawrence, the Ottawa, and their tributaries into the Canadian Shield and over the 'portages' across the heights of land to Hudson Bay, the great plains and, by 1793, through the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific. The square timber trade followed the receding supply of fur, and as the 'stands' of white pine were exhausted, wheat was sown in the clearings. The expansion of wheat-growing to the prairies after 1870 gave farming and settlement supremacy over the fur trade in the north-west and confirmed the foundations of the economic unity fur had laid between the St. Lawrence valley, the West, and the Rocky Mountains.

At each stage of these four hundred years of economic history, Canada's livelihood depended upon the export of one or a few main staples to European markets. Cod, beaver, pine, wheat—these were the successive economic foundations of Canada.

At each stage, the export staples called into being, or imported and adapted, equipment, transportation, trading


relationships, political programmes, and constitutional forms appropriate to them: the canoe, the snow-shoe, the chartered company, the mercantilism, the feudal governance of a fur-trading colony of the old French régime; the canals, the ports, the wooden sailing-ships, and representative government of nineteenth-century merchants; nationhood, the Industrial Revolution, trans-continental railways, canals and ports, steamships, the manufacturing industries of central Canada, the lumbering and coal mining of both east and west, the banks and trust companies 'geared to the production of wheat'. In the twentieth century 'the whole economy prospered or suffered with the changing fortunes of the prairie farmer'.

Each of these stages has had its own peculiar problems and results, but throughout Canadian history persistent characteristics may be observed. Canada has been rich in resources, and now grows, mines, or manufactures a widening variety of products. But at no stage has Canada been self-sufficient and she has always been dependent upon selling through a competitive world system a few staples to a few markets. Originally, France alone was the market; to-day, Canada is dependent upon the United States and Britain. In 1938, 77·8 per cent. of Canada's export trade and 79·1 per cent. of her import trade were with United States and Britain.

This dependence is increased by the circumstance that Canadian mining, agriculture, and industry have adopted American techniques and largely employed American machinery, and that Canadian consumers have much the same tastes as American consumers. Canada is even more linked to and dependent upon the United States for imports than a simple percentage may indicate. Similarly, Canada is more seriously dependent upon Britain for the sale of her products than a figure may indicate. Canadian trade has been mainly triangular; exports to Europe have supplied a large proportion of the exchange to pay for American imports. The loss, then, of the British market would be to Canada a catastrophe

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and would compel harsh and fundamental readjustments in the basis of Canadian production.



Distribution of Canadian imports and exports in millions of dollars, and in percentages of total. Imports from the British Empire were valued at \$233.2 millions (29.2 per cent.) and from the British Empire and the United States combined \$720.5 millions (90.8 per cent.). Total imports were valued at \$799.1 millions. The figures for exports were: British Empire, \$517.4 (48.3 per cent.); British Empire and United States combined, \$940.5 (87.8 per cent.), and total exports, \$1,070.2. The figures are for the fiscal year ending 31 March, 1938.

Modern Canada imports iron ore, petroleum, coal, tin, rubber, cotton, and the whole range of tropical and sub-tropical products. These must be bought and paid for by a small if increasing number of exports. This dependence upon the export of a few staples at prices set by the world competitive system makes Canada highly vulnerable to world changes of demand and price; Canadian income is rendered irregular and unstable.

Being a new country, Canada has required, and been until recently unable herself to supply, the capital to finance the transportation and other equipment for her development. Dependent upon an external market for the sale of her products, she has also been dependent upon external sources for finance. Her income from selling natural products has been fluctuating and uneven; her debt charges have been large, high, and relatively rigid. The cost of her manufactured imports is similarly large and tends to be rigid.

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In consequence of this twofold dependence, the cycles of world depression strike the Canadian economy with great severity. Canadian income, as the price or demand for primary products declines, falls steeply and rapidly; the cost of imports and debts remains relatively the same or is adjusted more slowly.


This relationship between Canada and external markets for exports or for capital has its counterpart in the dependence of new areas of production in Canada on Canadian capital markets in older centres like Montreal and Toronto. The farming areas of the west, the mining of the Canadian Shield, the timber regions of east and west, borrowing capital from Montreal or Toronto to build railways, roads, schools, or government buildings, similarly face the problems of fluctuating income and fixed costs.

The impact of depressions upon Canada also varies sharply between different regions, industries, and classes, and influences the degree of national unity. In the great depression following the decline of world prices in 1928, Canada's national income was cut by one-half from an estimated \$6,121 millions in 1928 to \$2,969 millions in 1933. Export areas were struck first, and farm income fell more steeply than the price of manufactured goods or interest rates. Industrial unemployment followed the collapse of income earned from natural products, and the number of wage-earners fell from a peak of 2,444,000 in 1929 to 1,788,000 in 1933. At one stage of the depression some 11 per cent. of the population was maintained by direct relief from the State. Political conflict between debt areas and credit areas, between farmers and manufacturers, between employers and workers, between provinces and the dominion, even, in a measure, between race and race, spread through Canada. The unity of the old national political parties was strained, an avowedly separatist and racial political party gained office in French-Canada, the Social Credit movement of Mr. Aberhart, champion of the farm debtor, swept into power in Alberta, the

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first socialist movement on a national scale took shape; in all, five new political parties sprang into influence.

The depression was complicated by a further characteristic feature of Canadian economic history. It coincided with a fundamental change from one main staple, wheat, to dependence on another group of staples, base metals, newsprint,



The distribution of Canadian net production for 1937 in percentages between provinces and industries. The gross production was valued at \$5,658 millions and the net production at \$2,970 millions. Net production means the value left in the producer's hands after the deduction of the value of materials, fuels, and supplies used in the process of production. (Chart from 'Canada, 1940', Ottawa.)

and the tourist trade as well as wheat. With this relative decline in the importance of wheat in Canadian exports, and the relative increase in the importance of newer staples, the east-west 'wheat' axis across Canada to Europe weakened and the north-south axis with the United States strengthened. This trend was stiffened as London ceased after the last war to be, and New York became, the source of Canadian imports of capital. One-quarter of Canada's manufactured products are made in American-owned factories.

Canada has invariably surmounted the worst difficulties of the world depressions and internal economic change; at no stage in the depression of 1929-33 was the credit of the Dominion Government shaken, and in 1932 when American banks were closing their doors in every part of the union, not

a single Canadian bank failed. The economic power and status of Canada has grown, and Canada is one of the first six or eight industrial nations. Her standard of living is second only to that of the United States. Before the present war, Canada was fourth or fifth and is now the third exporting nation in the world and the world's largest exporter of wheat, newsprint, and non-ferrous metals. Her national income, in the meaning of the term used in Mr. Geoffrey Crowther's book *Ways and Means of War*, is equal to twice that of Czechoslovakia, three times that of Belgium, two and a half times that of the Netherlands, four times that of Norway and Denmark combined, half that of France; it is equal to that of Italy, a quarter of Britain's, and a quarter of Germany's and Austria's together. In productive power, Canada is Britain's first ally.

Governance: The Art of the Possible

Canadian institutions, like the Canadian people, have been transplanted from Europe and adjusted to Canadian conditions. External influences still exert their weighty pressures, but native forces have shaped the institutions to a Canadian pattern, and in some respects those institutions, and the political thinking behind them in their turn, have influenced those of other countries. From a status of 'perfect subordination' Canadian powers of government have come to embrace in fact all those of a sovereign State; some limitations exist, but not one that the Canadian people, if they would agree, could not instantly remove. Autonomy has been achieved without narrow nationalism, revolution, or rupture. This process since the fall of Quebec has been decisive in shaping the modern concept of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and to a degree the principles which underlay the 'Covenant of the League of Nations.

The principles of autonomy and free co-operation might in fact express the underlying content of Canadian political thinking. It has its expression in the constitution of the

Commonwealth, in the relations between the races and the provinces. The suggestion might even be extended to other spheres of Canadian life—the constitution of protestant churches, of political parties, of the wheat and cattle marketing co-operatives; to canoeing, ice hockey, and air fighting, each of which rests upon a high measure of individual or local initiative and 'team play' rather than upon supreme central direction. A contrary aspect, however, is seen in the strongly centralized control of the great Canadian industries.

Canadians, if their strong individualism is first emphasized, might perhaps be described as federal-minded. The architects of the confederation of the British North American provinces, with the example of a civil war on the issue of 'states rights' across the American border, leaned towards a stronger and unitary constitution, but the character and opinion of the original four provinces imposed federalism. The provinces were united as the Dominion of Canada by an Act of the British Parliament and upon that Act and the unwritten conventions of the British constitution Canadian governance has developed.

The Dominion or federal government legislates upon the subjects assigned to it by the British North America Act of 1867, and the Provinces legislate upon subjects assigned to them. The distribution of powers between the Dominion and the Provinces is subject to judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court of Canada or the Privy Council at Westminster, and with the vast changes that have occurred in Canadian problems since 1 July 1867, judicial interpretation has been frequently invoked. Provincial governments and publics are keenly jealous of their powers; conflict is persistent. Residual powers were granted by the constitution to the Dominion, and it was the intention of the Fathers of Confederation that the Dominion should develop greater unity on matters of national significance. This intention has been defeated by native sectionalism and by English judicial

decision. The Dominion Government was found incompetent to legislate on such national subjects as wheat marketing, insurance, price control, minimum wages, arbitration in industrial disputes, maximum hours of labour, and unemployment insurance. The fissures which developed in the unity of Canada in the depression years were in a measure due to the inability of the national government to meet national problems on a national scale.

To the divisive influences of geography, race, and religion was 'added the disintegrating force of provincial sovereignty'. The Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations appointed in 1937 to investigate the distribution of powers and revenues between the ten Canadian governments has made its report, and the Dominion and seven of the Provincial governments have expressed general support for its recommendations. The conference of the ten governments opened in Ottawa on 15 January 1941, however, made little progress towards an agreed acceptance of these recommendations, and the opposition of two or three governments, in particular that of the largest and wealthiest Province, Ontario, may result in indefinite delay. The Royal Commission recommended no rewriting and rebuilding of the constitution, but a revision of the powers exercised by the Provincial as well as the Dominion governments in the light of seventy years' experience. Some modernizing of the taxing and legislative powers of the Dominion and Provincial governments is urgently required to enable each more efficiently to perform its functions. In particular, the national government in the field of economic policy and social services requires the powers to do national things nationally and to reverse the trend of weakening federal authority.

Federal-Provincial relations form much of the substance of Canadian party and sectional politics. French-Canadian racial claims are defended and advanced by the Quebec Legislature. The legislatures of the three prairie provinces

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have championed the free-trade views of the western farmers against the protectionist views of industrial Ontario cities, the views of Maritime shipping, exporting and fishing interests are fought for by the Atlantic legislatures. Thus, the Provinces are not only the means of safeguarding local interests through local legislatures—a necessary condition of national unity—but are as well the instrument of different races, regions, and economic groups. Confederation extended the east-west axis of Canada from coast to coast; the rise of the Provinces has tended to cut across that axis.

Canadian political parties are conditioned by these sectional and provincial differences. The national party organizations are federations of provincial party associations. Their role in Canadian governance is essentially different from that of British political parties, and the names Liberal and Conservative represent only some of the content of similar parties in Britain. Canadian political parties are not primarily the means by which a majority is won to implement a defined national policy. They represent trends in national policy rather than clean-cut issues. A Conservative in the low tariff west may hold tariff views different from those of a Conservative in protectionist Ontario cities, a French-Canadian Liberal in Quebec have quite a different view on foreign and imperial relations from an English-speaking Liberal in Nova Scotia or British Columbia, and the railway worker in the socialist Co-operative Commonwealth Federation thinking in terms of wage levels see the question of freight rates very differently from the C.C.F. wheat farmer of Saskatchewan thinking in terms of costs.

The national political parties in Canada have been not only instruments of local and provincial opinion but also a means of effecting compromise, some measure of accommodation and agreement between provincial opinions. The national parties are a powerful instrument of national unity.

They are the plane upon which the sections have been related to one another and to the whole. In the party caucus, where the members of parliament from every part of the Dominion meet during the sessions, the issues are faced, thrashed out, interpreted, toned down, bought off, appeased, or over-ridden. The national party caucus meeting in the crowded, smoke-ridden conference rooms of the Parliament Buildings above the old fur-trade route of the Ottawa river is in its long-term influence a reinforcement and expression of the east-west axis of Canada.

The problem of Canadian governance is supremely the problem of national unity. National unity—the easing of stresses and strains, the softening of rivalries, the diversion of grievances that may nourish ideas of secession, the buying off or conciliation of battling economic groups—this is the task of any truly Canadian Prime Minister or party. Progress may be made only by consent, and the consent not of a mere numerical majority but of each important section. A policy must be found acceptable to the dominant current feelings and deeper interests in each province or section, each race or economic group. There are thus two kinds of Canadian politician: those who represent provincial and sectional interests, and those who are 'nation-minded' and seek to harmonize and ease the differences. Entry into Canadian politics is easiest through the representation of a section, race, or industry. The task of the national leaders, and particularly of Prime Ministers, is at once heavy and delicate. Policy must be formulated, it might almost be said, more as a British Prime Minister formulates foreign than domestic policy. It is a truism in Cabinet, Senate, House of Commons, and Civil Service that 'Canada is a difficult country to govern'.

Politics in Canada is eminently the art and science of the possible. Compromise and precise timing are the first essentials. Each Cabinet seeking to advance some new legislation is not unlike a man seeking to cross a Canadian river when

the grip of winter has been broken, when the suns of spring have melted the dark frozen waters, and the crunching ice rushes down the flooding stream. Not the largest chunk, or that which first comes near will bear him steadily across: he must await, perhaps at each leap, the right relation, the exact conjunction and approach of several chunks, adequately large, adequately strong to carry him as they sweep down fast-driven by the deep, unseen currents from sources far away.

Unity and Foreign Policy

In Canada, foreign policy, like national policy, must secure the consent of all sections in some measure if national unity is to be sustained. Unanimity is too strong a term, but no policy on a great issue can be pursued if it is inimical to the interests or outrages the feelings of any substantial group in the Dominion.

In 1937 the prospect of a united Canada in the approaching war seemed difficult if not remote. On the surface at least, unity seemed to be severely strained. The slow, uneven recovery from the depression left controversial problems of social services and provincial finances. The national income returned to a figure between that of 1929 and 1933, but the contrast between continuing distress in one region or industry and improving prosperity in others remained. Quebec, governed by a party which played with the vision of a solely French-Canadian dominion, and Ontario, richer because of gold resources and President Roosevelt's new price, but intransigent in its relations with Ottawa, both quarrelled with the national government. The change from an economy based predominantly on wheat to an economy based on wheat, newsprint, base metals, and tourists caused readjustments between region and region. Mr. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister and leader of the Liberal party, on 19 July 1937 said, in a broadcast, 'Not to have a realization of the many strains and cleavages which are imperilling

Canadian unity is to shut one's eyes to the problem of government in Canada to-day.'

Foreign issues in the past have also been factors of disunity and revealed innate differences of outlook between the races. English-Canadian opinion has been much more 'interventionist' than French-Canadian, but when the Catholic Church is involved French-Canadians respond to the interests of Rome rather as English-Canadians do to those of London. The Papal 'zouaves' who left Montreal to share with Napoleon III's troops in the defence of Rome in 1870 represented an attitude of intervention similar (if in degree quite different) to the English-Canadian attitude of intervention in the South African War. English-Canadian newspapers have shown little interest in the recurring struggles of clericals and anti-clericals in the Latin American States, but French-Canadian papers have been markedly aware of them.

The general Canadian sympathy for the League of Nations varied in degree between the two peoples, and central European minority questions brought before the League had their repercussions among 'New Canadians'. The Spanish civil war had its strong pro-Franco partisans among French-Canadians and Catholics, while English-Canadians, though more divided, were inclined to sympathize with the Republicans. The bitter feud which arose between French and English in Canada at the end of the last war still exerted its influence in Canadian politics.

Canada in 1937, moreover, seemed a very different country from Canada in 1914. Canada in its cohesion is molecular—an arrangement of systems, not atomic—a single system; twenty years had re-formed and changed its arrangement. The proportion of British race in the population had declined. The importance of 'New Canadians' from continental Europe had increased. The new export staples sold in the United States strengthened the American over the Atlantic axis. The improved trade following the Ottawa

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Conference had not seriously changed Canada's predominant interest in American over British imports. The insistent assertion of independence, the stiffening sense of national as against 'imperial' views, the mounting importance of commercial, population, literary, publishing, and broadcasting influences from the United States, all suggested that Canada might remain neutral or enter the war deeply divided. Critics of British foreign policy in the Orient and Europe were influential, and various schools of 'North Americanism', 'Hemisphere unity', and 'Isolation' came into prominence. There seemed much sympathy for the view that 'European troubles are not worth the bones of a Toronto Grenadier'.

Parliament debated foreign issues as rarely as possible. The Government pursued a policy of refusing commitments and avoiding controversy. The discussion of foreign affairs, however, was active and widespread in the Press, through the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, in numerous luncheon clubs, study groups, and lecture societies. The co-operative news service of 89 Canadian daily newspapers, the Canadian Press, cabled thousands of words a day from Europe to its members. If Parliament preferred silence, the public preferred information: whatever may be said of the causes which led Canada into the war, ignorance was not among them.

American broadcasting with its correspondents in the heat of every European turmoil, the great American press services used by the largest Canadian papers, and the large circulation of American magazines added to Canadian sources of information. Indeed, it is almost true to say that the information upon which the Canadian people based their conclusions in 1939 was as much from American as from Canadian and more than from British sources.

Yet the Canadian people in September 1939 drew different conclusions from those of the United States or South America. The United States legislated neutrality; Canada declared war.

required in the creation of federations. The extension of confederation and the Canadian Pacific Railway across the prairies was a conscious policy of defence against American expansion. In the early years of Canadian history there were several American invasions, and in those conflicts it was British strength and British prestige which protected Canada.

Those years have passed, Canadian self-confidence has grown, the fear of 'annexation' has disappeared with the American groups that advocated it, and no two peoples have such intimate and friendly relations. But power is a fact and Canadian policy in diplomacy, commerce, or strategy must recognize the role of both States in Canadian security. Canada, as indeed the Monroe doctrine of the United States, has been defended from the predatory nations of Europe by Britain's sea power and supremely important strategic island position in the centre of the populated, industrialized land masses of the globe. The Canadian-American defence agreement which had its origins before the war is a recognition of that common danger to North America if British sea power should be weakened. In the Pacific, Canadian security is similarly involved, though less immediately threatened. Canada, like Australasia, is also interested in the Panama Canal and strategic Pacific islands.

When Germany hurled her forces upon Poland in August 1939, Canadian opinion had crystallized in favour of intervention. Indeed, Canadian opinion was reasonably clear in the Commons debates in March 1939 after the occupation of Czechoslovakia. A state of war with Germany was declared by the King on 10 September on the advice of his Canadian Ministers, supported by an almost unanimous Parliament, and soon after by decisive national and provincial elections. National unity was not weakened but again demonstrated as it had been demonstrated during the visit in the previous summer of the King and Queen. Their visit, indeed, was, in Canadian eyes, perhaps more a demonstra-

tion of Canadian than of imperial unity, and the Crown, valued for its constitutional functions in commonwealth and nation alike, assumed also the role of a unifying influence between French and English, Catholic and Protestant, new Canadians and old, east and west.

If the war had come earlier, in 1937 or 1938, the conjunction of forces supporting a united Canadian policy of intervention might well have been less favourable and the unity less complete. By 1939, the issue and the threat to fundamental Canadian national interests were clear. Canada's relations with the North Atlantic power of Britain were at stake, and Canadian intervention would not disrupt the relations with the North American power of the United States. In perhaps two respects, Canada was further influenced by her North American relationships; the Canadian people held stronger but little different views of Germany than the American. But a policy of only 'giving all aid short of war' or limited participation would have had the twofold consequence of emphasizing American against British associations and dividing every province in the Dominion. Any policy but a policy of intervention would have shattered Canadian unity. 'For the sake of unity', said Mr. Lapointe, the French-Canadian leader and Minister of Justice on 9 September, 'we cannot be neutral in Canada.' It was the theme of Mr. Thorson, a Canadian of Icelandic race representing a largely Ukrainian constituency, and it recurred throughout the parliamentary debates from the representatives of every section of the Dominion. Several French-Canadian speakers argued that Canadian interests were not involved and the C.C.F. group of seven members took a stand, which they have not vigorously pressed, that Canada should send no military forces and extend only economic aid. But so few were the opponents of a declaration of war that no vote was called. Hitler had united Canada.

Each race, each group, each section, each religious faith felt the threat of a resurgent Germany. The British-Cana-

dians were influenced by deep sentiments of attachment to Great Britain and to the institutions of Britain. French-Canadians shared none of the racial affinities but felt some of the same attachment to British institutions. The German persecution of the Catholic Church, as well as the invasion of Catholic Poland and the Russian-German agreement uniting the two anti-Catholic forces of Communism and Fascism, strengthened the conviction that other French-Canadian interests were involved. The German menace had its own impact upon Canadians with Polish, Ukrainian, Jewish, or Scandinavian origins. The British and the European associations proved decisive.

Powerful sentiments were operating, but there was a cold and discerning appreciation of the issues and of the consequences of a German domination of Europe. Canadian opinion in the years after the rise of Hitler went through some of the same stages as American opinion is now entering. Canadian opinion, however, has been uninfluenced historically by any tradition of 'no entangling alliances' or of revolutionary separation from Europe, and could more readily appreciate the dependence of America upon British sea power. For an American to state that the fate of the United States is bound up with the fate of Europe and to admit that British sea power is a factor in American security has meant, until recently, opposing a deep-seated American conviction and teaching. For a Canadian, such a statement is an expression of Canadian experience and history.

The imponderables, the 'Britishness', the sense of community with Britain shared by groups dominant in numbers or influence throughout Canada should not be minimized; nor the reasoned, clear-sighted appreciation of solely Canadian national interests. This appreciation of Canadian national interests is, in fact, a projection, not only of Canadian interests, but of the combined national or continental interests of North America. That Canada has felt part of the world and not merely part of the continent or hemisphere may

prove significant beyond estimate now in the development of an international order in which the American continent and hemisphere must ultimately share.

The Canadian people as a whole felt definitely menaced not so much (until the fall of France) by direct aggression as by the threat to the shape of the world in which a Canadian nation could grow: the North Atlantic world embracing both western Europe and America. It is this world which has produced the democratic system of government, the ideals of freedom of thought and peoples, and of social welfare. This world has most richly enlarged the gross and scope of scientific endeavour since the Renaissance. This is the world of the Industrial Revolution and the greatest measure of material progress and international trade. It is now the principal bulwark of Catholicism and Protestantism, of Christendom. The German doctrines of racial supremacy, the war-state, and totalitarian thought struck at each of these. Combined, these formed the world Canadians wished to live in and believe in. The leaders of both the great American political parties and the bulk of the American people have come to the same conclusion.

A war on a less globe-shaking scale or involving less serious national and moral issues would have won no such measure of unity among the Canadian people even if Britain were engaged. The combination of profound national interests and clear moral issues produced a unity that is 'British' not only because Britain is at war but because Britain and Canada share the same world, the same principles, the same dangers.

A Canadian Corps under Lieut.-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, C.M.G., D.S.O., composed of two divisions with armoured brigades and R.C.A.F. squadrons, is helping to man the threatened shores of Britain. Two more divisions are in Canada, a fifth (armoured) division is forming, and the number in all services approach 400,000. Canada, after one year of war, supports as many divisions as in four years of the last. The Royal Canadian Navy has increased from 15 to 155 ships

the largest of which are armed merchant cruisers and destroyers, and the personnel will number 20,000 in 1941. The Empire Air Scheme in Canada will train at 120 air stations and schools 25,000 to 50,000 Canadian and other British airmen annually. In the first year, Canada's expenditure for military purposes approached that of the four years of the last war.

The economic contribution is mounting. North American techniques of production and the great resources of hydro-electricity make man-power no sufficient measure of the size of that Canadian contribution. In the number of motor-car units for military purposes, Canada's production of 600 a day exceeds the production of any other country. Three thousand tanks are on order. Early in 1941 every service type of rifle, machine gun, and artillery will be produced in Canada. Aircraft production is of the order of 400 a month—Hurricanes, Bolingbroke, Lysanders, flying-boats, and training machines—and in the past year the total Canadian aircraft production, though smaller than American, exceeded the export of American aircraft to Britain. Eventually, American war production will quite surpass Canada's, but at the end of the critical year 1940, Canada's war production for Britain exceeded that of the United States. Canada entered the war with even less preparation and no more enthusiasm than Britain, but now her effort is unstinted. The nation that was once the colony of Britain has become her first and principal ally.


History, national self-interest, European associations, and dominating issues as well as skilful, discerning statesmanship brought Canada into this alliance a united nation. Will war and statesmanship confirm that unity or let the problems of peace renew the forces of division? The great forces in Canadian life are to-day working towards new strength and harmony. Will these be lost? External influences of the North Atlantic and of North America 'roll on mixed up together' and mixing together add to the unity of Canada.

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Will the international or the continental, the European or the American influences shape the policy and determine the measure of Canadian co-operation in the post-war world? The answers rest with the pattern formed by the forces which shaped Canada in the past and united Canada in this war. 'Knowledge insufficient for prediction may be useful as guidance.'

NOTE

FOR further study of Canada reference may be made to: *Canada Looks Abroad* (R. A. Mackay and E. B. Rogers, Oxford, 1938), *Canada, an American Nation* (J. W. Dafoe, New York, 1935), *Canada To-day* (F. R. Scott, Oxford, 2nd ed. 1939), *Canada, America's Problem* (J. MacCormac, London, 1941), *Canada* (A. Brady, London, 1932), and *Le Canada, Puissance Internationale* (André Siegfried, Paris, 1937). For statistics, *The Canada Year Book* (annually, King's Printer, Ottawa). For economics, reference may be made to the volumes of Professor H. A. Innis and in particular to *Problems of Staple Production in Canada* (Toronto, 1933) and *The Fur Trade in Canada* (New Haven, 1930). For government, *Empire and Commonwealth* (Chester Martin, Oxford, 1929) and *The Constitution of Canada* (W. P. M. Kennedy, Oxford, 2nd ed. 1938). For foreign relations, *Canada, Hitler and Europe* (Watson Kirkconnell, London, 1940).



MAP 4. CANADA, POLITICAL DIVISIONS, PHYSIOGRAPHY, AND RAIL COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

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
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FOREIGN POLICY

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OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1941

ITALY'S performance in the first eighteen months of the war has raised a number of questions: Why did the Italians wait nine months before declaring war? Why did they enter the war against their old allies on the side of an hereditary enemy? Why, above all, now that they are in the war, has their record been one disastrous series of defeats?

It would be impossible in the length of one pamphlet to give an exhaustive study of the Italian position but an attempt is made here to answer these more obvious questions by putting them in their historical perspective. Italy's policy has, on the whole, been remarkably consistent and the failures of her arms and diplomacy to-day were already predictable when she started her career as a great Power some seventy years ago.

Miss Barbara Ward is the author of Pamphlet No. 34 on *Russian Foreign Policy*, and is assistant editor of *The Economist*, and author of *The International Share-out*, in Messrs. Nelson's series of Discussion Books.

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ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Italy achieves Unity

IT was Italy's misfortune to achieve national unity, and with it the possibility of Great Powerhood, in the fiercely competitive, heavily industrialized, imperialistic Europe of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Greatness was measured in railway mileage, in steel mills and coal-mines, in foreign markets, and above all in colonial territory and big battalions. A State which desired to enter the comity of Great Powers had to compete on their terms and Italy, great in her history, growing in her population, and occupying a potentially commanding position in the Mediterranean, was determined to enter the arena in the struggle for national status and aggrandizement. From the first hour of unity in 1870 until to-day dreams of empire have haunted Italian politicians, and expansion in the Mediterranean has been a *Leitmotif* of Italian foreign policy.

Unhappily for Italy's ambitions the country is not naturally equipped for Great Powerhood in the modern sense of the word. She has very little coal, no iron, no oil. Her soil is poor and cannot even support all the Italian people, thousands of whom used until the last war to emigrate year by year to America. Industrialization had barely begun in 1870 and Italy's lack of all the more important raw materials meant that the country was bound to remain predominantly agricultural, and therefore weak from the military point of view.

Besides, the human material was not really suited to Great Powerhood. For other kinds of greatness, yes; but for imperial greatness in the jostling, brutal, militaristic, competitive world of the late nineteenth

ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY

century the Italians were too peaceable, good-natured, and indifferent. Anyone who has lived in Italy will long since have discounted the myth of Italian laziness. Few peoples are so hard-working when they can see the point. But war and aggrandizement seemed rather pointless. There is little reason to suppose that the majority have changed their minds.

The Principles of Foreign Policy

These two aspects of the Italian position—on the one hand, the ambition and expansionism of the few, on the other, the material poverty and emotional indifference of the many—are at the basis of Italian foreign policy. As a late comer in the imperial field, Italy has been a consistently revisionist Power since 1870. The end has not varied. But the means are conditioned by weakness. If possible, Italy would rather obtain her goal without fighting. The Italians are unenthusiastic soldiers, the country has not the reserves for a long war and it is one of the easiest states in Europe to blockade. If fighting there must be, then Italy must have allies; and if allies, preferably those who look in advance as though they can finish the work victoriously, quickly, and without making too great a call on Italian resources. But revision by negotiation or after only a show of force remains the ideal course.

The coming of Fascism has made little difference to the fundamentals of Italian foreign policy. The Duce declared in 1924 that 'foreign policy is never original. It is determined by a certain order of facts, geographical, historical, and economic.' Fascism has perhaps given more vigour and bombast to the ambitions of the few, but the ambitions themselves

ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY

are not really different from those of the Giolitti era. Italian newspapers in the eighties of last century were writing very much in the tone of the newspapers in the thirties of this. To give only one example—from 1885: 'Italy must be ready. The year will decide her fate as a Great Power. It is necessary to feel the responsibility of the new era; to become again strong men afraid of nothing with the sacred love of the fatherland in our hearts.'

Italy enters the Arena

In 1870, when Italy achieved national unity, the Mediterranean, her obvious sphere of influence, was already dominated by the Turkish question, which, until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, was to condition Italian policy. In 1870 the Ottoman Empire had already advanced far towards complete disintegration and the Great Powers were collecting hopefully round its death-bed. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had just given an added and much greater strategic and economic importance to the Levant. Turkey's suzerainty over the lands bordering the Mediterranean was obviously shaken. France already possessed Algeria. There were French and Italian settlers in Tunis. Austria and Russia watched each other jealously across the Balkans. Germany's interest in Austria's Balkan expansion was already apparent. Russia sought to edge down towards the Dardanelles. France had her traditional interest in the Levant. Britain in 1875 bought up shares in the Suez Canal and the importance of the new route to India was beginning to make an indelible mark on her imperial consciousness.

Thus there was no lack of competitors when Italy entered the arena and, since she had neither eco-

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conomic wealth nor military standing, it was hardly surprising that she was shouldered out and came away from the Congress at Berlin in 1878 with clean but empty hands. In 1881 her inferior status was again brought vividly home to her when, with Bismarck's connivance, France seized Tunis which Italy had marked out as her own.

The Triple Alliance of 1882

In 1882 Italy joined Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance. This action was the first example of Italy's alliance policy—an essential part of her diplomacy. By it she recognized, first, that she was not strong enough to obtain any advantages when standing alone. Next, she consciously joined herself to a *bloc* of Powers with whom she was not particularly friendly in order to bring pressure to bear on another Power who, in her view, blocked her path to territorial expansion. In this case the Power was France. It was a procedure which was to be repeated in the following century.

The Alliance achieved its main purposes. It gave Italy a place among the European Powers. Allied with Austria and Germany, she was no longer negligible and she was able to use Germany's diplomatic support in striking a bargain with France. By the turn of the century the relations between the two countries had improved and France had agreed to an Italian occupation of Tripoli, should France decide to move into Morocco. When in 1902 the Triple Alliance was renewed, Italy insisted on Austrian recognition of the project.

In spite of its diplomatic usefulness, the Alliance was fundamentally unstable. Austria and Italy could never be allies, for Austria occupied Italian

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territory—the *terre irredente* ('unredeemed lands') of north Italy—and national unity was thus still incomplete. Since she was too weak to obtain treaty revision by herself, Italy accepted the alliance as an opportunity of keeping a close watch on Austria, but once the diplomatic support of the Central Powers had secured Italy an understanding with France, the Alliance began to drift to dissolution.

War in Tripoli

The effectiveness of Italy's diplomatic balancing act was put to the test when in 1911 the French troops' entry into Morocco set Italy free to invade Tripoli. The campaign showed that her ten years of diplomatic preparation had been sufficient—but only just. The Great Powers looked on with suspicion and when, in the course of the war, she occupied the Dodecanese Islands, they forced her in the Treaty of Ouchy to promise to return them to Turkey. Only the accident of the Balkan wars left them in her possession when the Great War broke out.

In 1914 the balance-sheet of thirty-four years as a near-Great Power was only moderately satisfactory. Italy was still nominally in the Triple Alliance and Trieste and the Trentino were still unredeemed. She had achieved some meagre expansion in the Mediterranean—in Tripoli and the Dodecanese—but only on sufferance from the West. An attempt in the eighties and nineties to 'find the keys of the Mediterranean in the Red Sea' had given Italy the colony of Eritrea, but the episode had ended ingloriously in defeat at the hands of the Abyssinians at Adowa in 1896. In the Balkans only Austro-Russian rivalry kept either Power from swallowing

up the whole peninsula and with it any freedom of action for Italy in the area facing her across the Adriatic.

The Great War and the Secret Treaties

Italy remained neutral until May 1915 and in the course of the first winter of the war conducted negotiations with both belligerents. Austria's unwillingness to part with Trieste and the Trentino, and Turkey's intervention on the side of the Central Powers, decided Italy's choice. Negotiations were opened with Britain, France, and Russia, and by the Secret Treaty of London Italy was to receive all that she had demanded of Austria (the *terre irredente* of Trieste and the Trentino) as well as Dalmatia. In addition, if France and Great Britain increased their colonial territories in Africa at Germany's expense, Italy was to have the right to 'equitable compensation', and 'in the case of a total or partial division of Asiatic Turkey, she should obtain an equitable part in the Mediterranean region adjoining the province of Adalia'. Italy accordingly entered the war on the side of the Allies.

One secret treaty, however, was insufficient to settle Italy's claims. In May 1916 Russia, France, and Britain signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement over new principles of division in Anatolia. Italy was not informed of the treaty, and when the news leaked out her anger had to be pacified by fresh negotiations, this time at St. Jean de Maurienne in April 1917, when a fresh treaty was concluded which defined Italy's 'equitable part' as including all southwest Anatolia, with the towns of Adalia, Konia, and Smyrna. Italy, in prospective possession of the second city in Turkey, whose southern approaches

she already commanded in the Dodecanese, bade fair to become the greatest Aegean Power.

The Peace Settlement

Her hopes were to be disappointed at the Peace Conference. The ratification of the St. Jean de Maurienne Treaty had been made conditional upon Russia's signature. But at the end of 1917 Bolshevism replaced Tsarism and the new Government would have none of the 'imperialist' treaty. In the meantime the Greeks had entered the war on the side of the Entente, and Venizelos put forward ethnic claims to the Smyrna district. A small bid-dable Power on the Aegean suited France and Britain far better than the presence of an aggrandized Italy, and, pleading Russia's failure to sign (which the Italians regarded and resented with some justification as a legal quibble), they supported the Greek claim to Smyrna and made it possible, as Mr. Lloyd George tells us, for 'Venizelos to get a Greek force into the town whilst the Italians were still hesitating'.

Italy's opposition to this betrayal of her ambitions might have been more sustained and effective had not the decay of public order at home deprived the Government of the security necessary for a 'forward' policy. But the Italian retreat was not wholly dictated by weakness. Kemal Ataturk had appeared upon the Anatolian scene and the Italians were shrewder than the English in assessing the likelihood of his success. In March 1921 they concluded a secret peace with the Kemalist Government, and when in August Ataturk's troops advanced on Constantinople, the Italian force was hurriedly withdrawn.

In the Treaty of Lausanne signed in July 1923 the Allies wrote *finis* to the chronicle of negotiations, treaties, ambitions, rivalries, violated pledges, and betrayals which had made up the history of the Eastern Mediterranean for the last fifty years. With the coming of Fascism, Italian foreign policy had returned to its old dynamism and the Government insisted on the final annexation of the Dodecanese by Italy. Nevertheless, Mussolini made no effort to retrieve the lost lands in Anatolia and became a signatory to the Straits Convention of 24 July 1923.¹

This moderation was the more surprising in that Italy had reason to feel misused and disgruntled. Her chief gains from the Peace were of course Trieste, the Trentino, and the annexation of South Tirol. But in the sphere of colonial aggrandizement she met nothing but disappointment. Article IX of the Treaty of London covered not only Asiatic Turkey but the entire Ottoman Empire, and the Allies had undertaken to consider Italy's interests should any modification of the territorial *status quo* take place. They emerged from the War, France invested with her Syrian mandate, Great Britain in control in Palestine, Trans-Jordania, and Iraq. The German colonies too were shared between Britain and France while Italy went empty-handed.

Italy's crumb was the final annexation of the Dodecanese, of which she had already been in possession before the War broke out. In other words, Italy's war gains in the colonial sphere amounted only to Jubaland, which Great Britain in 1925 ceded to the Italians in compensation for

¹ This Convention established that, under the control of an international Straits Commission, the commerce of all nations should use the Straits unrestrictedly in peace and war and laid down conditions governing the use of the Straits by warships.

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their colonial claims. At the same time, owing to her military preoccupations in Europe, Italy could not consolidate her hold on the imperfectly conquered provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. In 1922 these lands had slipped from her control, and the next ten years were spent in reasserting her sovereignty by methods which, in Cyrenaica at least, left her with an unenviable reputation of brutality.

The Italian Balance-sheet

With the Treaty of Lausanne the shape of the new Europe was virtually complete. The Duce, looking round, did not find it altogether to his liking. It was, of course, a very different continent from the one in which Italy had struggled to unity and then to Great Powerhood. The Central Powers had gone. In their place was a beaten and humiliated Germany and an Austria reduced to a tragic rump-state of six millions, whose strategic value to Italy as a buffer State the Duce was quick to realize. From 1923 until 1937 Italy was consistently opposed to the *Anschluss* and in 1934 threatened Germany with war after the attempted Nazi *coup d'état*.

In the Balkans, the old rivalry between Austria and Russia was dead, but in its place there grew up a new rivalry between Italy and France. The Balkan States which had profited by the War—Jugoslavia and Roumania—turned to France as their natural protector and joined her and Poland and Czechoslovakia in an alliance system designed to safeguard the *status quo*. Italy resented French influence in the Balkans, which she chose to regard as lying within her economic and diplomatic sphere of interest, and Jugoslavia's possession of a long coastline on the Adriatic and various frontier disputes

over Fiume increased the tension. Only in Albania, which in the next two decades moved from semi-independence to the status of an Italian protectorate under King Zog and finally in 1939 was annexed as a colony to the Italian crown, did Italy feel her dominance to be secure and complete.

In the Eastern Mediterranean the Ottoman Empire was gone. But Kemalist Turkey had taken its place and neither Greece nor Turkey overcame their suspicions of Italy nor their conviction that she wished to expand at their expense. In 1919 the Nitti Ministry had declared that Italy could not disinterest herself in 'the immense resources of raw materials in Asia Minor'. The Turks were angry over Italy's continued possession of the Dodecanese. The Greeks were outraged by the Corfu incident. Relations remained hostile and suspicious until 1928, and even then the efforts at reconciliation barely lasted until the invasion of Abyssinia and Sanctions. For the rest, the Mediterranean was bordered by British and French Mandated, Protected, or Allied States—with the exception of Italy's insecurely held Libyan coastline.

The Duce supports Revision

Thus when Mussolini examined his position in 1923, the fact which emerged most clearly was the extent to which his ambitions were balked by France and Britain who, the one by policy and the other by indifference, upheld the *status quo*. Nothing had changed in Italy's revisionism. The War with its disappointing settlement had on the whole made her more insistent and ambitious. But whichever way her ambitions turned—to the Balkans, the Mediterranean, or East Africa—the way was blocked

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either by France's *status quo* policy of security and the League or by the actual physical barrier of French and British territory.

The Fascist régime did not, any more than the earlier Liberal Governments, abandon the policy of expansion on account of its inherent difficulties. They set themselves to overcome them. In the first place, the nation was dedicated to imperialism and war. The policy is well summarized in one of the Duce's bouts of oratory—in this case delivered as early as 1927.

'The paramount . . . duty of Fascist Italy is that of putting in a state of preparedness all her armed forces on land, sea, and in the air. We must be in a position . . . to mobilize five million men, and we must be in a position to arm them. Our Navy must be reinforced and our air force must be so numerous that . . . the span of its wings will hide the sun from our country.'

In accordance with this policy Italy greatly strengthened her position in the Mediterranean. By fortifying the island of Pantellaria and developing air and naval bases in Sicily and Tripoli on the one hand and constructing first-class bases at Leros in the Dodecanese and Tobruk in Libya on the other, she claimed to hold two offensive and defensive lines capable of cutting off all connexion between the Western basin of the Mediterranean and the Eastern basin, Suez and the Dardanelles. Her armaments were especially adapted to warfare in enclosed and sheltered waters. Weight was sacrificed to speed, light craft and submarines made up her tonnage rather than capital ships.

Her long duel over naval parity with France is interesting in this context. Although France accepted the principle of naval parity at Washington

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in 1923, she later retreated from her position, realizing that in fact, since Italy had no Atlantic seaboard, parity meant Italian supremacy in the Mediterranean. France therefore claimed that the parity only covered battleships and aircraft carriers. Italy insisted on complete parity, and, after the failures to reach agreement at London in 1930 and Rome in 1931, all attempts to formulate the relationship were abandoned. The relative position¹ appeared to give a marked advantage to Italy on the outbreak of war in 1939.

Italy, nevertheless, remained extremely vulnerable from the point of view of a blockade, and all her efforts since 1929 to achieve autarky have not diminished her dependence upon outside supplies. Before the war, some 85 per cent. of her imports arrived by sea, and, although she was self-sufficient in foodstuffs and a few minerals, and although she had developed her electricity supply and increased her continental coal purchases, the sinews of war still continued to reach her shores from beyond the Mediterranean, and by far the largest proportion (some 50 per cent. of her total imports and 48 per cent. of her petrol) from beyond Gibraltar. Thus in spite of her undoubted growth in stature as a Military Power, there could be no change in her

¹ *The French and Italian Navies in 1939*
(excluding ships under construction)

	Battleships	Heavy Cruisers	Light Cruisers	Aircraft Carriers	Destroyers	Submarines	T.Bs.	M.T.Bs.
Italy .	4	7	14	..	61	104	70	72
France .	7	7	12	3	59	75	12	1

From *Jane's Fighting Ships*.

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policy. She still had to try to avoid at all costs a general war and to secure treaty revision and territorial expansion if possible by negotiation. She still needed allies ready and able to reinforce the 'moral pressure' she could put behind treaty revision and bear the brunt of the consequences if the demand for revision led to war.

The Search for Allies

In post-War Europe the search for allies who supported revision was by no means easy. France, Britain, and a string of small Powers were committed to the League, Security, and the *status quo*. The revisionist States in Eastern Europe—Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria—moved closer to Italy and cordial relations with Hungary were established as early as 1926. But these were small fry. Of the Great Powers, Germany was still prostrate. There remained only Russia.

When in February 1924 Mussolini recognized the Soviet Government and concluded a first commercial treaty with the U.S.S.R., he was calling in a new world to redress the balance of the old. By achieving closer relations with Russia he hoped to secure a backing for any claims that he might care to put forward in the Mediterranean against France and, in a more general way, to secure acceptance for his thesis of revision with which Russia was also officially identified.

Differences in ideology presented no difficulty. The Italian Government took the line that the Comintern was dead and that a country's internal régime was its own concern. Fascist extremists even suggested that Russia, cold-shouldered by 'ultra-parliamentary France and ultra-democratic

Britain', was nearer to the Fascist mentality than either of the Western 'pluto-democracies'.

The more tightly France attempted to screw down her own conception of security and the *status quo* upon Europe, the more openly Italy paraded her Russian connexion. The U.S.S.R. had agreed to participate in the preparatory work of the Disarmament Conference. To her chagrin France found Italy, Russia, and Germany united in a common front against her and systematically opposing her view of Security in the preliminary discussions. When in 1930 Briand launched his scheme for a Pan-European Union (on the basis of existing frontiers), Italy insisted that Russia must be invited to participate, an attitude which drew a wail of disgust from the French press.

Indeed about this time (1930-1), when Franco-Italian relations were in a deplorable state (over the naval question and Tunis amongst other things), Italy's flirtation with Russia went to quite serious lengths. Russian statesmen returning from Geneva would break their journey at Milan. Italian industrialists made organized tours in Soviet territory. Russian technicians arrived in great numbers to learn Italian methods. Naval squadrons exchanged visits (this aroused France's particular suspicions) and a really important trade agreement between the two countries came into force during 1931. Italy earnestly hoped to make use of her Russian friendship against France, and France's all too complaisant associate, Britain, and her insistence upon Russian co-operation was at least one of the factors which helped to wreck the attempts of the ultra-conservative French Government to establish their own conception of Security in Europe.

Russia deserts Revisionism

The Russo-Italian idyll (like so many other brief connexions) came to an end as a consequence of the Nazi Revolution. The rise of Hitler to power, combined with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, opened Stalin's eyes to Russia's isolation. And France overcame her prejudices against Bolshevism. The non-aggression pacts signed by Russia and her immediate neighbours during 1933 and her first pact with France were signs of a radical reorientation in Russian policy. Arguing that Germany would demand revision (possibly at her expense) Russia edged away from it. Thus, from the Italian standpoint, the whole value of the Russian connexion began to disappear. If Russia were to adhere to the French conception of Security, the new world, far from redressing the balance of the old, would tilt it down still farther on the side of the *status quo*—in which case, what was to become of Italy's policy of treaty revision to her own advantage?

Mussolini made one last effort in 1933 to secure acceptance of his revisionist thesis. The Four-Power Pact was an attempt to supersede the League (thus sidetracking the French conception of the *status quo*) and to set up a Concert of European Great Powers. It was ominous from the Italian standpoint that Russia associated herself with the protest raised by the States of Eastern Europe at having their affairs settled over their heads. Undismayed, Mussolini made a final effort to retain Russian support for his revisionist attitude by the Italo-Russian Treaty of Friendship which, signed on 2 September 1933, was declared by Italy to

frustrate the attempt made by France and the Little Entente to draw Russia into their camp.

The pact itself was unsensational, and an air of unreality clung to the whole negotiation, for Soviet policy had already acquired a new and decisive bent. In the following year Russia entered the League, in 1935 she signed Treaties of Mutual Assistance with France and Czechoslovakia. In other words, she entered completely and fully into the *status quo* camp.

The Year of Sanctions

In the past Italy had often urged that to insist on Russia's absence from the League was to sin against the light of political realism. But the Russia that she envisaged had been an 'outcast' like herself and not a Russia, 160 million strong, industrialized, militarized, and associated by treaty with the West. Russia's sudden volte-face, which made possible an overwhelming concentration of strength on the side of the *status quo*, left Italy in a quandary. True, this strength was directed and concentrated against Germany, but it could with equal effect oppose treaty revision elsewhere, in the Mediterranean or the Red Sea or even East Africa where preparations for the annexation of Abyssinia were already well advanced. Italy had to change her tactics. The Russian connexion was allowed to slip from her political vocabulary and, for the first time in ten years, articles violently hostile to Russia began to appear in the Italian press.

The alternative of friendship with Germany was still out of the question.¹ Italy therefore tried the expedient of turning to the Western Powers and

¹ Although, by 1935, Mussolini declared that only the question of Austria held them apart.

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joining with them at Stresa in their indignant anti-Hitlerian front. In particular she composed her difficulties with France, and there is reason to believe that the negotiations which established their common interest in resisting Nazi aggression¹ also covered a certain degree of French connivance should Italy at last begin to put her revisionism into practice—at the expense of the Abyssinians. France's unwillingness to participate in the application of Sanctions in the autumn of 1935 bears out this conjecture.

In September 1935 Great Britain pledged herself to a policy of Collective Security, and when in October the Italians invaded Abyssinia she led an unwilling France and fifty-one other nations into the application of Sanctions. The attempt proved disastrous, not from any inherent defect in the policy itself but from the deplorable manner in which it was carried out. Laval believed that he had just brought Italy into his anti-German front and found it grotesque and illogical that Britain, so long opposed to Security and the League as a means of keeping Germany in tutelage, should come out as a warm defender of Collective Security now that it would operate not against Germany but against France's new-found ally, Italy. The British statesmen, on their side, were not prepared to push Sanctions to the point of war and the question of an oil sanction was shelved. Thus, between a recalcitrant France and a hesitant Britain, the policy of Sanctions failed in every sense, for it was effective enough to arouse the Italians' deep resentment, but quite insufficient to achieve its purpose and stop the war.

¹ The Laval talks in Rome, January 1935.

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The Sanctions episode was a turning-point in Italy's relations with Great Britain and France. Her resentment against their material possessions and *status quo* policy had been gathering strength ever since the Peace Settlement. It was brought to fever pitch by the opposition of the old and successful 'Imperialist' Powers to Italy's young imperialism. At the same time, its abject failure confirmed Italy's suspicions that France and Britain were not so formidable as they seemed, that they might even be 'decadent', and that a territorial revision in the Mediterranean at their expense might be brought about without a major war.

Nevertheless, even if they were showing their first signs of inherent weakness, they still had a powerful ally. France's alliance with Russia covered the *status quo* in Central Europe. In the summer of 1936 a new link was forged by the adherence of Britain, France, Russia, Turkey to the Montreux Convention. Faced with this hostile combination and with the memory of 'Sanctions' still rankling, Italy fell back on the only alternative still left open to her, and in the course of the summer and autumn of 1936 the *rapprochement* between Italy and Germany took place which was to develop, on the battle-fields of Spain, into the close alliance of the Axis.

The Montreux Convention

On 10 April Turkey asked the Powers to agree to the remilitarization of the Straits. A conference assembled at Montreux at the end of June to discuss the question, and although the original Turkish Note had only concerned itself with the militarized zone, Turkey now brought up the whole problem of the Straits and demanded a revision of the

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Straits Convention of 1923. Italy, awaiting the repeal of Sanctions, refused to attend the conference, and, even after the League had decided to end the Sanctions débâcle, feelings of prestige and a conviction (which was very mistaken) that no conference concerned with Mediterranean problems could be successfully concluded without her still kept her away. Her abstention was a serious blunder, for on the one hand she increased Turkey's hostility and distrust; on the other, the outcome was considerably more unpalatable to her than it might have been, had she been present.

The new Convention (signed on 20 July) was the result of the combined pressure of Russia, Turkey, and France upon Great Britain to secure acceptance of what was in fact the Soviet point of view. Great Britain was anxious to introduce no new factor into the Mediterranean balance, but France (governed by a Popular Front government) was now as anxious as Italy had been six years earlier to redress the diplomatic balance by bringing in the new Russian world. If the Russian fleet could secure unrestricted entry into the Mediterranean, then the value to France of the Franco-Soviet Treaty would be enormously increased.

Great Britain, alone in her objections, was overborne and, in fact, the new Convention conformed to Russia's wishes. In times of peace, while limits were placed on the tonnage and number of warships entering the Black Sea, no limit was placed on those of the Black Sea Powers when coming out of the Black Sea, provided that they came out singly. In war, if Turkey were a belligerent, the passage of warships was left to her discretion, if not, no war vessels were to pass except in fulfilment of

obligations under the Covenant or under treaties of mutual assistance registered with the League and binding on Turkey.

This provision caused great consternation in Italy. Fifty-two nations had just imposed Sanctions on her 'in fulfilment of their League obligations'. The implication was obvious—that France could now count on Russian reinforcements in the Mediterranean. Here was a factor upsetting all Italy's careful calculations of naval parity and balance. Germany likewise lodged a protest, for the connexion of the new arrangement with the Franco-Soviet Pact (duly registered with the League) was all too obvious. Neither Power had any specific objection to the U.S.S.R. as such. Hitler had renewed the Treaty of Rapallo; Italy's good relations with Russia we have already followed. But Russia, the fellow 'outcast', was worlds removed from Russia, the powerful ally of the West. Italy and Germany began to feel their way towards new tactics for dealing with this shadow of encirclement lying across Central Europe and the Mediterranean. The need of a policy (which in the course of 1937 was to develop into a full-blooded Anti-Comintern Pact) was reinforced by events in Spain.

The Axis is forged in Spain

General Franco's revolt practically coincided in date with the Montreux Conference. Italy determined to help Franco from the first, and she 'responded to the first call of Franco on 27 July 1936'.¹ When, however, France's fears for her exposed flank and Russia's fears for the security of her French ally induced them to begin inter-

¹ *Informazione Diplomatica*.

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vention on their side, Italy and later Germany determined on the counter-measures which forged the Axis, gave the Anti-Comintern Pact its substance, and brought Europe to the brink of war. Two of the Powers supporting the Republican Government in Spain had, against the wishes of Great Britain at Montreux, just secured the free passage of Russian fleets into the Mediterranean. The Italians argued that the defeat of General Franco would have meant the establishment of an anti-Italian *bloc* in the Western Mediterranean at a time when Italy's position in the Eastern basin was already precarious.

Italy and Germany, faced with the same hostile concentration, determined to forge a weapon to break it up. This weapon was the Anti-Comintern Pact. Under the guise of an ideological campaign, it was quite simply a policy designed to break the links between Russia and the West. It was *not* directed against the integrity of Soviet territory. How could Italy even interest herself in so remote a possibility? It was directed against the *status quo* (Mediterranean and Continental) established by the West, which France had persuaded Russia to join in guaranteeing.

Had Britain fully supported France's policy, the Axis could hardly have achieved success, but the truth is that the British Government was perturbed at the thought of increased Russian strength in the Mediterranean and was anxious to restore the comparatively friendly relations with Italy which had existed before Sanctions. On Italy's side was the realization that the Axis and Germany's growing military strength held dangers for Italy in the Balkans and eventually, perhaps, in the Mediterranean too. Hence the final division of Europe into

two hostile *blocs* was circumvented and delayed by the series of negotiations between Italy and Britain which achieved first a Gentleman's Agreement in 1937 and then the Anglo-Italian Pact of March 1938, both designed to preserve the *status quo* in the Mediterranean (and thus, indirectly, to keep Russia out).

The Turning-point : Munich

The crisis came to a head in September 1938. Great Britain's unwillingness to commit herself to France's conception of defending the *status quo* in alliance with Russia steadily weakened France's enthusiasm for the policy and the end was hastened by the fall of the Popular Front government in 1937. When the test came over Czechoslovakia, neither the French nor the British were prepared to call on Russia to join them in supporting the Czechs, and at Munich Russia was excluded. Thus the Axis saw the triumph of its policy of destroying Russia's alliance with the West and the guarantee it gave to the European *status quo*.

The repercussions in the Mediterranean were immediate. Italy realized that the hostile combination which had held her spirit in bond for the last three years was shattered. Russia had withdrawn. Significantly the Anti-Comintern campaign disappeared from the Italian press as suddenly as it had arisen, and Italy's rejoicing at the annihilation of the French *status quo* and France's consequent loss of prestige burst out in a clamorous cry for 'Corsica, Tunis, Nice'.

The 'Mediterranean Munich'

It is as well to appreciate Italy's position at the beginning of 1939. Ever since the 'Sanctions' episode,

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France and Britain had been in ignominious retreat. At Munich they had acquiesced in an act of revision exactly after the Italians' own heart. Under pressure they had given way on a major point, sooner than risk war. Italy, in close alliance with the power which had forced them to submit, felt strongly that her turn had now come, and throughout the winter of 1938-9 the Italian press was full of confident assertions that now that Hitler had achieved treaty revision in Central Europe, the time had come for a 'Mediterranean Munich', in other words, an abandonment by the West of their positions in favour of Italy. 'Corsica, Tunis, Nice' meant exactly that.

Nevertheless, there was a note of urgency and anxiety in Italy's assertions that the turn of the Mediterranean had come. In the two years of the Axis the German partner had been going from strength to strength. It was Germany who had rescued Italian intervention in Spain from fiasco after Guadalajara and in return Italy had had to sell the Austrian pass into the Balkans—with the result that in every Balkan market and in every Balkan intrigue she had been ousted by the Nazis. It was already all too obvious who was the dominant partner. Italy's cry for a 'Mediterranean Munich' was not a demand but a reminder and a request.

The answer was the occupation of Prague, the seizure of Memel, and the opening of Germany's era of pre-belligerency *vis-à-vis* Poland. The 'Mediterranean Munich' was swept aside in the torrent of Hitler's European advance, and with that advance the conditions for a settlement achieved by pressure politics on the one hand, and weak surrender on the other—a settlement, that is to say, in accordance

with the necessities of Italian policy—disappeared as well, however little the Italians realized it at the time. For Britain the epoch of retreat ended with the guarantee given to Poland, and France was—at least for a time—stirred from her apathy, disunity, and discouragement by the jackal cries for ‘Corsica, Tunis, and Nice.’ The full offensive and defensive alliance signed by the Axis in May 1939 did not—as it was designed to do—intimidate the West, and in September France and Britain took up arms in defence of Poland.

Non-Belligerency

Italy did not enter the war at once. The decisive reason was, of course, Germany’s belief that her ally would be more useful as a ‘non-belligerent’. It is doubtful whether in the first month of the war Hitler took seriously the Allies’ intention to fight to the finish and he may well have expected another patched-up Munich after the destruction of Poland. Italy had proved her metal as an intermediary in 1938. She might fulfil the same function in 1939.

When, however, Hitler’s October ‘peace offensive’ was received with indifference and the belligerents settled down to some six months’ military inactivity, Italy continued to be more valuable as a non-fighting ally. Both France and Britain were anxious to conciliate her and, misled by the analogy of 1915, believed that if sufficient economic concessions were made, Italy would at least remain neutral throughout the conflict and a benevolent neutral at that. Thus Italy was able during the winter of 1939–40 to modify the working of the British blockade and to become Germany’s chief channel to the markets of the world.

The Home Front

The policy of non-intervention suited Italy's needs as well. Economically, militarily, and psychologically she was unprepared for war. Her reserves and equipment had been depleted by the campaigns in Abyssinia and Spain; the dismissal of Guarneri and the appointment of Ricci to the Ministry of Supply in October 1939 covered the discovery of gross inefficiency and even peculation in the vital sphere of military supply; a costly and complicated process of reorganization was hardly completed in the army, and the flow of aircraft to the *Regia Aeronautica* was considered very unsatisfactory. There were apparently insufficient supplies of certain essential raw materials to keep abreast with the newer types. Finally, no amount of propaganda could counteract the intense unpopularity of Germany and the Italian people's fierce dislike of fighting a war in company with their hated ally. When on 16 December 1939 Count Ciano said that Italy was not ready for war he was saying nothing more than the truth.

Italy enters the War

Germany's rapid campaigns in the West in the spring of 1940 brought the period of Italian non-belligerency to an end. With the collapse of the West and the apparently imminent end of the war, Germany no longer needed Italy primarily as a gap in the blockade. And with France stricken and defenceless, Italy at last saw the 'Mediterranean Munich' within her grasp. By entering the struggle it seemed certain that she would secure revision

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without the necessity of fighting a costly war. Whether or no the Nazis had planned to see their ally enter the last phase of a victorious war in which they had borne the burden and the heat, nothing could have restrained the Duce at this point, and on 10 June Italy entered the war. Ten days later France was suing for an armistice and Italy seemed to have won the immense gamble of her Axis policy.

The disastrous development of the war for Italy since that day in June springs from the miscalculation which brought her in. Mussolini was convinced that, with the collapse of France, Britain would accept defeat and that the war was over. The Italian nation entered the struggle to triumph and not to fight, and it followed that the military preparations were inadequate. There was no full mobilization, no large reinforcement of the Libyan garrison,¹ and the Duce himself complained in February 1941 that the Italians were caught unawares.

Economically the nation was unprepared. Rationing had barely been introduced, supplies had been passed on to Germany. On the propaganda front matters were even worse. The Italian populace were given nothing but tales of immediate victory and magnificent vistas of easy conquest. There was no hint at first that they would even have to fight. Thus, when, in the grim days of early July, Britain was left stranded, deserted, and outnumbered in the Mediterranean and Egypt, and the Italians might perhaps by a swift and brutal campaign have pressed on to the Suez Canal, they did not stir. They held victory parades in Italy and in Africa waited for the end. Even when weeks had passed and Britain was

¹ Marshal Graziani later attributed his defeat to lack of equipment. There is no reason to suppose that his account was inaccurate.

still in the war, they took the line of least resistance and instead of striking at Egypt took British Somaliland.

Britain holds out

In August the German offensive against Britain opened and German bombers were blasted from the skies. The Nazis needed a diversion to draw off Britain's defenders and Italy by her complete inactivity in the Mediterranean was failing to provide one. Pressure was probably brought to bear on the Duce and he was hardly in a position to resist it. The armistice with France had been couched in moderate terms in order to entice the Bordeaux Government into surrender. There was no mention, for example, of Corsica, Tunis, and Nice nor, while Germany occupied two-thirds of France, was a single Italian soldier allowed to stand on French territory. If Italy hoped to secure her share of the Mediterranean spoils, she would have to take a more active part in settling the conflict. By September there were ominous signs that Hitler was prepared to win Vichy's favours at Italy's expense.

In the Balkans, too, Roumania was dismembered and occupied without reference to Rome, and Balkan statesmen, travelling to Berchtesgaden or Berlin, began to omit the customary visit to Rome. Italy had already lost the substance of her Balkan influence to Germany. Now it looked as though she were to lose the outward seeming too. In September, after judicious warnings in the Italian press that after all the war might last, and the introduction of severe rationing restrictions, Graziani advanced into Egypt. At Sidi Barrani he stopped.

The Need for a Diversion

Meanwhile the battle for London went ill for the Nazis. Britain remained obstinately undefeated. German aircraft littered the English soil and the United States was galvanized into enthusiastic 'non-intervention' by the heroism of millions of anonymous Londoners. For Italy the situation grew daily more awkward. Roumania was now a German province and Nazi infiltration was pushing south. In October Hitler held conversations with Pétain and General Franco at which Italy was not even represented. We may imagine that any attempt on Italy's part to remind the Nazis of her claims was met with a contemptuous reference to the entirely ineffectual part played by the Italian forces. The Italians had to prove themselves, and, against the advice of the entire High Command, Mussolini chose Greece for the experiment.

If the Duce's first miscalculation was his belief that Britain would give up the struggle, he made his second on 19 October, this time in the certainty that the Greeks would not fight. The choice of Greece as a testing-ground for Fascist valour was conditioned in the first place by Germany's insistence that some diversion of Britain's resources must be secured. But the Duce's fear that Hitler would swallow up the whole Balkan peninsula unless Italy staked out her claim must also have played a part.

Disaster

Whatever the reasons which dictated the choice, it was disastrous. Within a month every Italian soldier had been driven from Greek soil and the Greeks were advancing into Albania along the whole front.

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Hard upon this first retreat came the British raid on Taranto in which the Italian navy, after constantly refusing action on the high seas, was battered at anchor in its own base. Then on 7 December the Army of the Nile struck at Sidi Barrani and in a lightning campaign of two months drove Graziani's army not only from Egypt but from the whole province of Cyrenaica. And with the R.A.F. shooting the Italians from the skies above the Channel, Albania, Libya, and the Mediterranean, there was not a front upon which all three branches of the Italian armed forces had not been catastrophically defeated.


The sensational resignations in December of Marshal Badoglio, the Italian Commander-in-Chief, and the High Command of the Navy, together with the reports of rioting and unrest from many Italian cities, have led people to canvass the possibility of an internal collapse and of a revolt against the Fascist régime. Germany, however, has provided the answer. The *Luftwaffe* is now doing the work of the Italian Air Force in Sicily and elsewhere, German motorized units have arrived in Africa, and Germany's armed intervention in the Balkans has put an end to the daily scandal of Italy's performance in Albania. We need not doubt that such sweeping efforts to shore up Italy's crumbling military edifice have been undertaken by Germany only at the price of equally sweeping concessions from Italy in the sphere of government and the High Command. Nearly all the principal Fascist ministers have been sent to the front. We do not know, but we may surmise, that it is Hitler's men who have taken their place.

In other words, until Germany's military might

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is broken, there will be no collapse in Italy. A man does not fall out of a strait waistcoat into which he has once been securely strapped.

Seventy years' diplomacy as a Great Power have reduced Italy to colonial status as a dependency of the German Reich. The possibility of such a humiliation was always inherent in her policy of seeking aggrandizement without the military strength necessary to secure it single-handed; and it will only be banished in a society in which Great Powerhood ceases to be measured in colonial empire and military strength. In a fully organized European society of nations, Italy could play a leading part. In an international jungle she is condemned to the jackal's part—a hard lesson perhaps, but the disasters of to-day may yet serve a purpose if they bring that lesson home.



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The Kingdom of the Netherlands, less correctly but more conveniently known to us as Holland, was, before the Germans invaded it, one of the most prosperous countries in the world. Its democratic institutions and its high standard of civilization made it in many respects a model state. In its relations with its neighbours, including Germany, it did nothing which could have excused an act of aggression. Professor G. N. Clark's pamphlet gives a picture of Holland as she was before the invasion—her economics, her social structure, and her constitution—and against this background describes her foreign policy during recent years, and the circumstances of her entry into the war as Great Britain's ally, an ally with powerful material resources in her East Indian Empire.

Fuller information on Dutch foreign relations will be found in the annual volumes of the *Survey of International Affairs* published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In *The Rape of the Netherlands* (1940) Dr. E. N. van Kleffens, the present Dutch Foreign Minister, has eloquently described the invasion and the course of events before it. The internal history of the country down to 1923 is described in Professor A. J. Barnouw's *Holland under Queen Wilhelmina* (1923); and the same author's book *The Dutch: a Portrait Study of the People of Holland* (1940) gives intimate pictures of many aspects of private and public life. The short articles in the *Annual Register* give the most accessible English accounts of domestic events in the most recent years. For the Netherlands Indies there are full studies on the political side in the second volume of Dr. A. D. A. de Kat Angelino's *Colonial Policy* (1931), and on the economic side in Mr. J. S. Furnivall's *Netherlands India* (1939).

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HOLLAND AND THE WAR

OFFICIALLY the country of our Dutch allies is known as 'the Kingdom of the Netherlands', but we usually call it 'Holland', and this is the most convenient name though, strictly speaking, it is not correct. It is the official name of one part of the country only, the part now divided into the two provinces of North and South Holland; but Dutchmen themselves often use it for the whole country, just as we often say 'England' when we mean the United Kingdom. 'Holland' is a shorter and handier name than 'the Netherlands', and 'the Netherlands' is confusing because the Southern or Spanish or Austrian Netherlands, often mentioned in historical books about former centuries, are the country which we now call Belgium, and scarcely even overlap with the present 'Kingdom of the Netherlands'. 'The Low Countries', which is another way of saying 'the Netherlands', is used more vaguely to describe the whole region, mostly low-lying, which includes Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg.

Before the German invasion Holland was one of the most prosperous countries in the world. For one thing, it had a lower death-rate than any other country. The 'expectation of life' was greater than anywhere else: a girl born in Australia could look forward to a slightly longer life than a Dutch girl, but, with this one exception, Holland took the first place: even the Australian boy had the prospect of a shorter life than the Dutch boy. This was the more remarkable because a low death-rate usually goes with a low birth-rate, but in Holland the birth-rate was high. Another test of prosperity is national income. In average real income per head of population, in the period 1925-34, Holland was amongst the richest

continental countries of Europe. It was one of the five continental countries which were so rich that they had money to lend abroad.

This prosperity was due to good management profiting from natural opportunity.

Economic Geography

The area of the European part of the kingdom is slightly less than that of the six northern counties of England. While these six counties have a population of more than twelve millions, Holland has a little more than eight and a half, but even this makes it one of the most densely populated countries of Europe. The reasons for this close concentration of people are geographical. Holland is a delta-land. Two of the great inland waterways of Europe, the Rhine and the Meuse or Maas, flow through Dutch territory to the sea. Neither of them has a single estuary: they break up into a number of channels, and these are connected with one another, and with the rivers of Belgium, France, and Germany, by a network of canals. These waterways are vital links in the transport system of western Europe, and not only of western Europe but of the world, for Holland lies in the centre of the world's most highly industrialized zone. Rotterdam was the chief inlet for ore and other overseas supplies to the industrial district of the Ruhr, and the chief outlet for the export of its finished products overseas. Amsterdam, connected with the North Sea by a ship canal, shared with Rotterdam the seaborne trade of the vast and populous basins of the Rhine and Meuse and the country bordering the Danube as far as Budapest. The German ports of Hamburg, Bremen, and Emden, and the Belgian port of Antwerp, though their chief business was with the areas flanking this hinterland of the Dutch ports, were to a certain extent competitors

within it; but the geographical advantage of the Dutch ports was never overcome either by political measures like tariffs or by expenditure on competing waterways.

For centuries past the Dutch have taken advantage of their geographical opportunities by following the sea, with the result that they had important fisheries, a considerable merchant fleet (the eighth largest in the world), a great shipbuilding industry (the third largest in the world, and in some ways highly specialized), and various subsidiary industries. Their forefathers have handed down to them a great colonial empire, exceeded in population only by those of Great Britain and France, and containing some of the richest of all colonial territories. The Dutch East Indies produce more than one-third of the world's rubber, one-fifth of its palm-oil products, nine-tenths of the cinchona bark from which quinine is made, 30 per cent. of all coco-nut products, 17 per cent. of tea, and a high proportion of tin and mineral oil. Besides these East Indian islands the Dutch have two possessions in the Western Hemisphere, Surinam on the north coast of South America and the island of Curaçao, where the oil from Venezuela is refined. They are vigorous and enlightened colonial administrators, and they have made great contributions to all the sciences on which colonial administration depends—tropical medicine, agriculture and economics, and the studies of the laws, languages, customs, and religions of the East Indian peoples. Their empire provided employment for a surprisingly large proportion of the educated class, and materials for a number of light industries like the cigar-manufacture and the refining or processing of cocoa, sugar, rubber, rice, oil, coffee, and tea. From it was derived a considerable part of the wealth which made Amsterdam a capital-market. The outside world benefited from

the generous open-door policy of the Dutch. The trade of all nations had access to her colonies, and, more than that, foreign capital was welcomed in their development, and foreigners, including many Germans, were appointed to technical and other posts in the Government service there.

Agriculture

After the seaports and waterways and the colonial empire, agriculture was the most decisive factor in Holland's economic position. Dutch agriculture was in many ways like British agriculture. As in England, there is very little forest-land. Dutch agriculture, like British, had to stand up against foreign competition and also against the domestic competition of the towns for labour and investment. It gave employment to about one-fifth of the population, a greater proportion than in Britain, but much less than in Denmark or France, where the proportion was about one-third. There is a class of landless labourers like those of Great Britain, more numerous in proportion than the agricultural 'proletariat' of any other continental country. Dutch, like British, agriculture was very varied. About half the land is cultivated by its owners themselves, and about half rented from landlords. More than half the farms are very small. Holland has to support a far denser rural population than Great Britain: it has four times as many agriculturists per acre of land as Great Britain has. Consequently agriculture was an export industry: in prosperous times about half the agricultural output was sold abroad. Since permanent pasture predominated considerably over arable, there were also food imports, especially of cereals: in the proportion of food imported Holland stood between France and Belgium.

The Dutch farmers were well educated, technically

efficient, and good business men, successful in working co-operative organizations. The chief standing problem was how to maintain the great and growing agricultural population at a satisfactory standard of life. One method of tackling this was the reclamation of land from the sea and lakes, in which the Dutch have been experts for centuries. The draining of the Zuyder Zee, which was begun more than twenty years ago, is the greatest reclamation scheme in the world, and when it is completed it will have added 7 per cent. to the area of the country's agricultural land.

Industry

Until after the war of 1914-18 Dutch industry was relatively unimportant; but in the last twenty years there has been a growth of industry resembling in some ways the industrialization of England south of the Trent. There is, however, this great difference that Holland has no native mineral resources except coal. The coal-field of Limburg produced in 1937 more than four times as much as in 1917, or slightly less than half the production of Belgium. About half was exported and half kept for home consumption. There were more than 30,000 miners, of whom many were foreign immigrants—Poles, Czechs, and about 8,000 Germans. Some of the mines are State-owned; of the privately owned mines the majority were in French and Belgian hands. Most of the other industries are 'light' industries. Foreign sources supplied the raw materials for the textile industry (mainly cotton, mainly in the district of Twente), and for the manufacture of margarine, electrical supplies, artificial silk, boots and shoes, and glass. The oil and margarine industries were connected with great combinations in which British capital predominated. Assembling plants for aeroplanes employed about 6,000 men; the manufacture of aero engines was begun

only in 1939; there was one assembling factory for motor vehicles.

Economic Policy

A generation ago the Dutch were a free-trade people: both at home and in the colonies they based their economic policy on free imports and sound money. By degrees they have departed from this tradition, but slowly and reluctantly. The decisive steps resulted from the great depression of the nineteen-thirties. The fall in the prices of primary products hit both the colonies and Dutch home agriculture; shipping was laid up as it was everywhere else; the transit trade declined; there was grave unemployment; the revenue from taxation dropped. The State applied, to begin with, the traditional remedies of liberal economics: it cut down government expenditure of all kinds, including that on official salaries; it increased taxation; it provided relief for the unemployed. But the restrictive measures themselves increased the hardships of the population, and the attempts of other states to protect themselves against the depression made matters worse. Great Britain, at that time second only to Germany and later surpassing even Germany as a market for Dutch exports, found herself compelled to restrict agricultural imports by quotas, and this meant that a great part of the demand for Dutch dairy and market-garden produce disappeared. By the Ottawa system again Great Britain granted preferences to her own colonies which restricted the markets of Dutch colonial produce, and, again, when Great Britain left the gold standard Dutch exporters and shipowners suffered a disadvantage. What Great Britain felt compelled to do in these ways was only what the other great nations had begun long before, and continued to do in increasing measure. The Dutch had no

choice but to follow suit. For a comparatively small nation and empire this forced movement towards autarky had none of the attractions which it seemed to offer to greater economic units; the Dutch, in the Treaty of Ouchy of 1932, therefore attempted a mutual lowering of trade barriers with the Belgians, which might have been extended to other countries. It would have required, however, a renunciation on the part of Great Britain and other states of their existing 'most favoured nation' rights, and this they were unwilling to grant. The Dutch consequently had to act alone.

On the monetary side they moved slowly. When Great Britain went off gold, the Dutch kept to the gold standard; but lively controversy went on for several years between those who held the traditional doctrines of sound currency and those who wished to devalue and so to encourage exports and diminish unemployment. In September 1936, however, France and Switzerland gave up the gold standard and Holland too went over to a managed currency.

Commercial policy also was transformed by a series of improvisations which, by 1939, had settled down into a definite system. Imports were subjected to a system of quotas. To encourage colonial exports and to protect Dutch exports to the colonies against foreign, and especially Japanese, competition, the quota-system was applied to the colonial trade. The Dutch colonies participated in the action of the international controls of rubber, tea, sugar, and tin. Home agriculture was drastically controlled. The dairy herd, the pigs, and poultry, and the other exporting branches were reduced; and agricultural exports were heavily subsidized by taxing the home consumer through charging him a higher price. On the other hand, the home production of cereals was expanded in order to lessen the expenditure on imports. Altogether from

1934 to 1936 one-third of their gross receipts was paid to the farmers by the State.

The result of these and similar measures was that at the outbreak of war in 1939 the Dutch economic system was one of controlled capitalism. There was general regimentation by state authorities. This new system brought with it inevitable changes in the structure of industry, especially a tendency to concentration in the hands of large firms. It mitigated, though it did not solve, the problem of unemployment. On the whole it brought the Dutch through the period of crisis with their economy sound and capable of recovery, but at the price of hardships similar to those which Great Britain had to endure in the same period. The Dutch were able to achieve so much while at the same time avoiding acute social strife because their democratic system of government responded to the demands made upon it.

Social Structure

The Dutch nation was socially and politically sounder than any of its continental neighbours; and this soundness had deep roots in history and tradition. Holland, like England, was a business nation, with a rich inheritance of culture and public spirit.

Although there was no hereditary element in the legislature, there was a nobility, but it was neither feudal nor plutocratic. Among the five or six hundred families which enjoy hereditary titles there are a few with ancient countships of the Holy Roman Empire, and a few higher titles have been created by the Dutch Crown; but the majority have the title of *Jonkheer* which, like the others, descends to all the sons of each of its holders, not, like English titles, only to the eldest son. This title was given, when the Kingdom of the Netherlands was formed in 1814, to

all those who could prove that their ancestors had been for three generations members of the patriciates of the Dutch cities in the former republican days. They were thus members of a governing class but not of a landed class; and in spite of Dutch conservatism the governing class steadily widened through the nineteenth century, very much as it did in England, by the addition of new elements from the world of business and the professions which took their place beside the old hereditary elements. The pathway to employment in official positions was not kept open in the same way as in England. There was no Civil Service Commission, providing equality of opportunity by means of competitive examinations; each government department made its own appointments, and influence of various kinds, including both social influence and party influence, was useful in getting these appointments; but a high standard of competence was demanded, and the general result was a system not very dissimilar from ours.

Until quite recently the daily intercourse of different classes in Holland was noticeably less familiar than in England: social distinctions were more emphasized; but custom in these matters was altering. The general outward tone of Dutch social life was democratic. There was no servility anywhere, and life in general was free, indeed it was almost free and easy. A great deal of Dutch life was summed up in the fact that among eight million people there were four million bicycles. The roads were flat and many of them had bicycle tracks. People of all classes rode on them for business or pleasure, from workmen going to work to army officers with clips on their bicycles to hold their swords. When petrol was short the Queen herself pedalled through the streets. The democratic push-bike was a symbol of a genuinely democratic society.

Education

The Dutch are one of the most highly educated peoples in the world. As linguists they probably hold the first place in Europe, in the sense that a larger proportion of them than of any other nation read, speak, and write foreign languages. As a small nation surrounded by great nations they need this knowledge if they are to use their opportunities to the full; but they do not learn foreign languages only for utilitarian reasons: they have a correspondingly wide understanding of foreign nations, their literatures and points of view. Not only in language-teaching but in the teaching of all subjects their schools are excellent. The great majority of boys and girls of all classes are educated in day-schools of various grades, many of which are co-educational. Among the Dutch as among ourselves there has been a long series of controversies about religious education. The system now in force is that confessional schools are subsidized by the State in the same way as the neutral schools which, in earlier days, had an exclusive right to state support.

The Dutch regard their universities and their other institutions for higher education with well founded pride. Leyden, the oldest of them, has been since the sixteenth century one of the world's greatest centres of learning and science. The other Dutch universities are worthy of the same traditions. It is natural that they should be specially famous for their Oriental studies; but there is no faculty in which Holland has not some of the living leaders of the world's thought. Utrecht and Groningen, like Leyden, are state universities: and it is characteristic of Dutch freedom that there are side by side with them, in friendly rivalry and co-operation, three private universities, the municipal university of Amsterdam, the Free University of the same city, which is Calvinistic, and the Catholic

University of Nymwegen. The great Technical High School at Delft is a state institution granting degrees in every branch of engineering and industrial technology.

This admirable educational system has a marked effect on the quality of Dutch private and public life. It gives a high standard of general culture and of professional competence. The administrative work of the senior officials of the Dutch ministries, as exemplified, for instance, in their reports and memoranda, strikes everyone who comes into contact with it as extremely well done. The Dutch newspapers before the German invasion were suited to an educated public. They were solid, well informed, and sober in expression.

The Diversity of Dutch Life

Although Holland is a small country, Dutch life is rich in variety. Influences flow in from the colonial world and from the great neighbouring foreign nations. There is less centralization than in England and France, so that the provinces are less provincial. The seat of the court, the parliament, the government departments, and the highest law-courts is The Hague; but Amsterdam, the greatest city, is nominally the capital, and various activities which in many countries are concentrated in the capital are here spread through other towns.

The diversity of Dutch life does not arise from racial diversity. There is indeed one local linguistic minority: the Frisians have their own language, which though closely akin to Dutch is more closely akin to English, and to the Dutch is a foreign language which they cannot understand. It is spoken by some three hundred thousand country-people in the province of Friesland and by a few thousands in the North Frisian islands, which belong to Germany and Denmark.

These are the remnants of the Frisian people, who once covered a much wider area. There has of late years been a Frisian movement; the language is now taught in rather more than 100 of the elementary schools in Friesland (about one-fifth of the whole number) and consequently it is holding its ground. The Frisian movement is not, however, a political or nationalist movement; the Frisians are good Dutchmen, and to Dutch life generally the province contributes a specially respected element, men with a reputation for uprightness and character. At the present moment both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister are Frisians, the former a Frisian-speaker to whom Dutch is a second language, as English is a second language to Mr. Lloyd-George.

Its geographical position and its international commerce have for centuries past attracted many foreign immigrants to Holland, most of whom in the course of time have been absorbed into the native population; but there are two foreign colonies which have not been fully assimilated. The proportion of Jews is higher than in any other country of western Europe. There was not, however, a 'Jewish problem' in the Netherlands except in so far as the refugees created a new problem after 1933. In this respect, and in the relations between the Jews and the rest of the population, Holland was similar to Great Britain: there was no native anti-Semitism of a virulent kind. There was, however, a German problem. The Germans permanently resident in Holland numbered more than a hundred thousand of every class in society; and among them the various official and semi-official organizations for Germans abroad had great numbers of adherents. The more dangerous political activities of the German colony were, however, secret, and few people knew how serious they were.

The other foreign colonies in the country were far

less numerous and are not worth mentioning among the elements of variety in Dutch life. One of the roots of that variety is diversity of religion: there is no western country in which religion has a greater influence on public life. Englishmen often think of the Dutch as a nation of Calvinists; but this is a mistake. The Dutch have official statistics of the numbers of adherents of the several churches. According to these the Netherlands Reformed Church, the largest single body, which was once the established church of the State, includes about one-third of the population. Other Protestant sects, not all of which are Calvinistic, account for about the same number, while more than a third are Roman Catholics. The Roman Catholics are strongest in the southern provinces, North Brabant and Limburg, where they form a great majority of the population, and where they have the Belgian and German Catholics as neighbours. They are a noticeable element in most of the other provinces as well, and as they tend to have larger families they are a growing element. They have maintained themselves ever since the Reformation side by side with the Calvinists in many places, often through local and personal accidents. Of the two famous neighbouring villages where British tourists used to stare at the picturesque costumes of the fisher-folk, Volendam is Catholic and Marken is Protestant. It is only in the northerly provinces of Groningen, Friesland, and Drente that the Catholics are a small minority.

Constitution

Holland was governed by a democratic constitutional monarchy. The position of the monarchy is in general, though not in every detail, similar to that of the British monarchy. The Queen is the symbol of the unity and freedom of the nation. Though they have worn a crown only since 1814, her family gave the

Dutch republic its stadholders, who were its first servants in war and peace, its principal officers throughout almost the whole of its existence from the time when William the Silent stood forward as the hero of their first war of independence.

The legislature is a parliament of the regular western type. The Lower Chamber (which is called, rather confusingly for British readers, the Second Chamber, a name we usually give to the upper chamber of a legislature) has 100 members elected for four years by proportional representation, the whole country forming a single constituency. The First, or Upper, Chamber has fifty members, elected for six years by the states, or local government assemblies, of the eleven provinces, which in turn are chosen every four years by popular vote. Treaties, in consequence of a constitutional amendment of 1922, require the consent of both Chambers. The Ministers are not members of either Chamber and members who become Ministers vacate their seats; but they have the right to sit and speak in either Chamber, so that they answer questions and pilot their business through the parliament in much the same way as ours, though far less of their time is spent in managing parliamentary business.

The Dutch system of government was thus, like our own, parliamentary democracy. The most distinctive features of its practical working arose from the system of proportional representation. This system gave great power to the electoral organizations of the parties. The details of the system were modified after it was first introduced in order to restrain the evil, common to most systems of proportional representation, of the small freak party; but it was not completely freed from this evil, and it made the working of democracy different in various ways from what we are used to here.

Most of the members of the Chambers owe their

importance to their political activities; few of them have, like so many British politicians, a position of their own in the social or business life of the country as prominent as any they can win by a political career. In the Upper Chamber there are a few men of this standing, such as landowners or retired generals, and there the proportion of substantial business men is greater than in the Lower Chamber; but the majority in both are professional men, with, characteristic of Holland, some ministers of religion, both Catholic and Protestant. There are both Social Democrats and Catholics of working-class origin; but these, as in other countries, have worked their way up as trade-union officials, political journalists, or party organizers. Altogether the two Chambers consisted of adequate but not very authoritative members.

Parties

Party feeling in the Netherlands ran high, partly because the element of religious difference was involved in it. The parties are many, but they fall into groups of which the first is that of the confessional religious parties. The largest single party is the Roman Catholic party. Like the Catholics in some other countries the Dutch Catholics agree on educational and many other matters, but in social questions are divided into conservatives and a more democratic wing. The party which represents the Dutch Reformed Church is the Christian Historical party, while the nonconforming Protestant sects, strong among the lower middle class, have the Anti-Revolutionary party. The present Prime Minister, Professor Gerbrandy, and his predecessor Dr. Colijn both belong to the Anti-Revolutionary party. The Liberals represent the secularist middle class of professional and business men: they have sunk in numbers to a small fraction of the electorate, but they

still include some of the country's best brains and abilities. The 'Vrijzinnig' (independent) Democrats are a small party of liberals or radicals.

The Social Democratic party, although it had a similar basis in trade unionism, was until recent years both more revolutionary and less practical than the British Labour party. The Dutch are conservative in many ways and particularly in matters affecting property. They have, for instance, never given formal recognition to the Soviet régime in Russia. The distrust of Socialists as advocates of lavish expenditure by the State and by local authorities was very widespread. They were the last nation in western Europe to include Socialist ministers in their cabinet.

The party system under proportional representation necessarily led to complicated coalitions: since that system came into force there has never been a simple one-party government. From 1918 to 1925 there was a Christian coalition, a Roman Catholic prime minister being supported by the orthodox Calvinists; but after 1925 government could be carried on only by non-party cabinets of experts who took charge of the government departments but did not command parliamentary majorities. This unsatisfactory state of things came to an end with the economic depression, the return of the danger of war, and the consequent demand for a national policy. In 1933 Dr. Colijn, a strong man with wide experience in the colonial army, in business and politics, became prime minister at the head of a coalition of all the non-socialist parties. He carried through the changes in economic policy, and set about the task of rearmament; but by the summer of 1939 he was no longer able to hold together in his cabinet the advocates of greater social expenditure and the orthodox liberal economists. A few years earlier the Socialists had virtually dropped their republicanism, and in 1937 they had abandoned

their opposition to all military expenditure. The path to office was thus open to them, and Dr. Colijn made way for the government which is still in office, though in exile. It is a coalition mainly of the Catholics, Socialists, and Christian Historicals: three of the ministers belonged to other parties, but two of them had not had parliamentary careers, and the third, Professor Gerbrandy, who became prime minister in 1940, joined as an individual, without committing his party. The Minister of Defence, Colonel Dijkhoorn, belongs to no party.

National Socialism in Holland

Outside the normal party system are the extremist groups, of Communists and National Socialists. Communism in Holland has gone through the same stages as in other countries, but it has never been strong. The National Socialists have played a more prominent part, though they have never been a factor of first-rate importance in Dutch political life. Apart from some minor dissident formations, they are organized in the N.S.B. (*Nationaal Socialistische Beweging*) which was founded in 1931 by A. A. Mussert, its present Leader. Mussert was a civil engineer who had a respectable position in the Government service. He first took part in politics in 1925-7 as an organizer of the nationalistic opposition to the Treaty with Belgium.¹ As a demagogue he is second-rate. His ablest colleague is the fanatical M. M. Rost van Tonningen, who was financial representative of the League of Nations in Austria from 1931 to 1936. The Germans have put him in charge first of the Dutch labour organizations and now of the Netherlands Bank; but he has the disadvantage, for a National Socialist, of having East-Indian blood. The N.S.B. was organized on the familiar German model

¹ See below, p. 23.

and Mussert worked by propaganda on anti-Semitic and racialist lines, by infecting the public services, by creating 'incidents', and by arming and drilling his followers. The popularity of the movement may be judged from its electoral history, which consisted of a rise and a fall. During the depression the N.S.B. was able to exploit the discontent of the peasants, of the lower middle class, and of the youth generally. It obtained financial support from some employers who supposed that in Germany National Socialism was saving capitalism from its enemies; and it appealed to some of the conservative elements of society. Consequently in the elections for the Provincial States in 1935 it obtained 7.9 per cent. of all the votes cast; but it never did so well again. The course of events in Germany was against it. The open militarism of the German Nazis set the pacific and individualist Dutchmen against them; their excesses disgusted both trade unionists and employers. Finally the German aggressions of 1936-9 aroused apprehensions for Dutch independence and led people of all classes to rally to the House of Orange. Consequently the popularity of the movement fell away and in 1939 it won only 3.7 per cent. of the votes for the Provincial Estates. It never had more than four of the hundred seats in the Lower Chamber.

The attitude of the N.S.B. to Dutch independence was cunningly deceptive. Its leaders always professed to be patriots and denounced the internationalism of Catholics and Socialists; but the object of their patriotism was not the Dutch kingdom but the 'Dietsch' race. This race, the existence of which is more than questionable from the point of view of ethnology and history, is that of which the Dutch are said to form a part, the other parts being first the Flemings¹ who live in Belgium and a small corner

¹ The Flemings live in the more northerly parts of Belgium and

of France, and secondly the Dutch of South Africa. The N.S.B. were not the first to use the idea of the Dietsch race in politics. From the 1890's there grew up a sympathy among some Dutchmen, mainly students and 'intellectuals', for Flemish nationalism, and an ill-defined desire for Dutch-Flemish co-operation. This movement, to which at one stage the name of 'the Great Netherlands idea' was given, led to no practical result except that it may have contributed to the gradual realization of Flemish demands in Belgium. Some of its Dutch supporters were liberals in the wider sense of the term: with the rise of the German danger these, as patriotic Dutchmen, became anti-German. The N.S.B. with its cruder appeal took up the Dietsch idea, and used it, as German propaganda did, to support Flemish extremism against Belgian unity, and to attack British imperialism in South Africa. Clear-sighted men knew that the pretence of patriotism was a mere camouflage for pro-German treachery, and in the course of the year 1939 the insolence of the N.S.B. and its association with treasonable activities opened the eyes of some of its dupes. It was not, however, until the German invasion that it came out openly in its true colours.

Frontiers

The modern period of Dutch foreign policy began with the separation of Holland and Belgium, which were united under a Dutch king from 1814 until the Belgians revolted and proclaimed their independence in 1831. It was not until 1839 that the Dutch, the Belgians, and the Great Powers finally agreed on the terms of the separation. It was in this settlement that

their language is Dutch, but it is spoken in a variety of dialects. In 1930 43 per cent. of the population of Belgium spoke only Flemish, 38 per cent. only French, and 13 per cent. both languages. The dividing line between the two languages is shown on the map: Brussels, the capital, is a town of mixed speech.

Holland got her present southern frontiers. Her frontiers do not follow prominent geographical features; they cut across the great rivers; but that does not mean that they are artificial. They are historic and national. Their course was determined by events which happened centuries ago, and by the simple fact that, because of their history, the people on one side of the line are Dutchmen while the people on the other side are Germans or Belgians. From the North Sea to the River Waal the frontier was laid down, though it was not a new line even then, in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The frontier with Belgium is practically the same as it was in 1790 (before the French revolutionary wars); and except in one part this frontier of 1790 had been the same since 1648 and earlier.

Two points about this Dutch-Belgian frontier need to be explained. There is a small isolated piece of Dutch territory, Dutch Flanders, on the left bank of the mouth of the Scheldt. This is very important strategically because it means that the Scheldt at its mouth runs through Dutch territorial waters. But there is nothing accidental or anomalous about Dutch Flanders. Its population is completely Dutch, and it has been Dutch for more than three centuries. The other part of the frontier that looks odd on the map is the 'Limburg appendix'. This piece of Dutch territory running down between Belgium and Germany on the right bank of the River Maas is about twenty-five miles long from north to south and at its narrowest point only about four miles wide. It bars some of the routes between Belgium and Germany; but the Dutch could not possibly defend it unless they were in alliance with either the Belgians or the Germans. It is Dutch because the town of Maastricht, at the principal crossing of the Maas in this region, has been Dutch since 1648, but until 1831 was an isolated

enclave, and, at the separation from Belgium the rest of Limburg had to be divided between the Belgians and the Dutch. The Dutch king was also Grand Duke of Luxemburg.¹ He handed over part of his Luxemburg duchy to the Belgians and in exchange received as a territorial indemnity part of the Belgian province of Limburg. In sentiment this is now completely Dutch.

Relations with Belgium

Holland and Belgium are neighbours and part of their boundary is the River Scheldt. A régime for this waterway was agreed upon in 1839; but no such agreement could last for ever without revision. When Belgium was released from compulsory neutrality in the Treaty of Versailles adjustments were needed, and there was a negotiation on the whole question of old and new waterways which was broken off by the Belgians in 1920. It was afterwards resumed and agreement was reached in 1925; but the Dutch Upper Chamber refused its consent, fearing that the treaty would give Antwerp advantages to the detriment of Rotterdam. It was not until Belgian policy towards the Great Powers fell into line with that of Holland² that the two nations came closer together. As the fear of German aggression grew, their mutual relations improved, and the exchange of royal visits in 1938 and 1939, to celebrate the completion of a hundred years of peace after the separation, marked a real political friendship.

Foreign Policy

Throughout the modern period until 1940 Holland constantly followed a policy of which the main prin-

¹ The personal union with Luxemburg came to an end at the accession of the present Queen of the Netherlands in 1890.

² See below, p. 26.

ciple was neutrality in the quarrels of the Great Powers. Holland was not compelled by treaty to be neutral, like Belgium or Switzerland. The neutrality of Belgium was imposed by the Powers at the time of the separation and was accompanied by the guarantee which Germany broke in 1914; but, Holland, although her geographical position was almost as dangerous as Belgium's, remained free to make alliances and received no guarantee. There never was a time, however, when Dutch statesmen were seriously tempted to make an alliance with any of the three Great Powers concerned. Great Britain was not a military power on the Continent before 1914 and could offer the Dutch no assistance by land if they were attacked. She was indeed a great naval power, and the Dutch navy was not strong enough to defend the Dutch Indies against a Great Power, but this was no reason for an English alliance. On the one hand, no one ever imagined that Great Britain would covet the Dutch Indies, while, on the other hand, it was certain that Great Britain for her own reasons, without any treaty of alliance, would come to the defence of the Dutch Indies if any other Power were to attack them, for the Dutch Indies lay on the flank of her route from India to China and made a line of stepping-stones from Singapore to Australia. At the Washington Conference of 1921 the Great Powers interested in the Pacific did indeed undertake to respect the rights of the Dutch in the East Indies; but this promise given to the Dutch did not amount to a guarantee.

The rivalry of France and Prussia was the one great fact of continental power politics which overshadowed Holland from near at hand, and Dutch neutrality meant first and foremost that the Dutch would not take sides in this dispute. After the war of 1870 the danger of aggression came from the side of Germany,

and the Dutch recognized this fact when they fortified their eastern frontier and modernized their system of defence by inundations shortly after that time; but there were strong reasons why they should not seek their safety in a defensive alliance with the French. For one thing France was not their immediate neighbour and could not give them help by land except through Belgium, which was bound to neutrality. For another thing Holland depended for a great part of its livelihood on German trade, and so on German friendship. The ambitions of German expansionists threatened the small states of Europe; and pan-Germans often spoke of the Dutch as a kindred people very suitable for absorption in greater Germany. But the Dutch believed that the best way to escape this danger was not to obtain guarantees but to behave with absolute fairness and correctness to all the Great Powers.

The policy of neutrality was interpreted differently by different schools of Dutch thinkers. Some thought that it was a positive contribution to the peace of Europe and the improvement of international relations; and they contrasted the pacific internationalism of the Dutch with the warlike rivalries of the Great Powers. Others thought that it was a regrettable but necessary consequence of Dutch weakness. But there was overwhelming agreement that there was no practical alternative; and Dutch governments, in times of peace, meticulously avoided even the appearance of serving the interests of any other state.

In the war of 1914-18 both sides kept their promises to respect Dutch neutrality on land. The Dutch army was mobilized throughout the war to prevent any violation of the territory, but it never went into action because neither side did violate Dutch soil. At the end of the war there was for a short time some fear that the victorious Powers might reward the Belgians and

punish the Dutch for their neutrality by settling in Belgium's favour some of the complicated disputes over waterways or even by handing over Dutch Limburg and Dutch Flanders. Great Britain, the United States, and France, however, had no such intention, and it seemed that Dutch neutrality during the war had succeeded. The Dutch had undergone economic hardships from the blockade and counter-blockade, but they had been spared what the Belgians had suffered. They did, however, at this time depart from their policy of neutrality by becoming members of the League of Nations. The League was intended to be not an alliance against any state but a general association of states; and its attempt to organize European security offered the same promise to the Dutch as to the rest of Europe.

In the twenty years which followed the League, as an organization for European security, gradually broke down. The Dutch in League matters took the same general line as the other small western and northern states. From a very early stage their confidence in collective security was qualified by anxiety for themselves. After the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the breakdown of sanctions against Italy these small Powers lost faith in the League's ability to protect them and by 1938 the Dutch Government, with others, no longer held itself bound either to take part in collective action or to permit the passage of troops which were to enforce the Covenant. This was a full return to the old policy of neutrality; but neutrality now did not seem to mean such complete isolation as that of 1914-18. In the first place, Belgium, which had been released in 1919 from its obligatory neutrality, had in 1935 abandoned its policy of alliance with France and announced a neutrality policy on the Dutch model; so that Holland would not stand alone but would have another neutral as neighbour. Secondly, these two

states were loosely associated with the four northern states, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. As early as 1930 some of these states had met at Oslo and formed the 'Oslo Group' which held common deliberations, sometimes joined also by Switzerland, on questions relating to their economic affairs and the law and practice of neutrality.

Neutrality seemed less lonely; but the grim fact of German power taught the Dutch that they, like all the threatened states, must look to their armaments. They were much more exposed to the danger of a German attack than in 1914. The eastern frontier of Belgium had in the meantime been heavily fortified; and if the Germans wanted to turn the left flank of the French and British armies it would be much harder to do it by attacking only Belgium, so that there was a far greater inducement than in 1914 to attack Holland as well. Unfortunately, Dr. Colijn's government had at the same time to cope with the economic depression, and rearmament was tied up with the division of opinion over saving or spending. When a European war was seen to be imminent in 1939, the Dutch, in conjunction with the other Oslo states, appealed to the consciences of the Great Powers. The group held a one-day conference at Brussels on the 23rd of August, and King Leopold of the Belgians on their behalf broadcast an appeal for peace that evening. By that time, however, war was certain. The German minister at The Hague gave, with unusual emphasis, an assurance that Germany would respect the sanctity and integrity of Dutch soil. Preparations for the defence of neutrality were pushed on. Mobilization was ordered, between three and four hundred thousand men were called up. Economic regulations, for ensuring stocks of food and raw materials, were put into force. As a last attempt King Leopold and Queen Wilhelmina on the 28th offered their good offices to Germany,

France, Great Britain, Italy, and Poland; but in vain.

For the first eight months of the war the Dutch followed with absolute consistency the policy so begun. When Poland was beaten Hitler made a speech which was described by the Germans as a peace offer: the Dutch Government thought that it might lead to a settlement, and therefore on the 7th of November the Queen, again in conjunction with the King of the Belgians, made a second tender of good offices; but again without success. Holland could now do no more than look after the welfare of its own people and avoid giving just cause of complaint to either side. The economic problem at home was difficult: blockade and counter-blockade imposed restrictions which had to be met by the strengthening of controls at home, and by fresh government expenditure on supplies and on relief for the growing numbers of unemployed. In asserting their trading rights, in protesting against flights of belligerent aircraft over their territories, in protesting against the sinking of their ships, the Dutch punctiliously fulfilled the duties of neutrals under international law. It is true that they had far more to complain of against the Germans than against the French and British: while one side confiscated contraband, the other committed wholesale murder on the high seas and, in the Venlo incident of November 1939, violated their territory by land. In every case, however, the Dutch Government behaved correctly to both sides. As the weeks went on it became more and more clear that correctness could not exorcise the German danger. Three times news was received which led to preparations for resisting an immediate invasion. Each of these alarms blew over; and we do not yet know how much there was behind them; but besides these alarms there was a general worsening of the attitude of Germany. There were

threats and complaints in the German press; there were spies everywhere; traitors had to be arrested; the N.S.B. was ominously busy.

The Invasion and the War

At dawn on the 10th of May the Germans invaded Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and France by land and air. The Dutch did their duty and did it bravely; but their resistance was battered down by an enormous preponderance of force, and, as we all remember, by the surprise of parachutists and the ubiquitous treachery of Germans behind the front. A mechanized column pushed northwards across the Moerdijk Bridge, taking the main defences, the line of inundations between the Zuyder Zee and the Waal, in the rear. When the Dutch air force had been practically annihilated the German bombers perpetrated the crime of Rotterdam. With French and British help resistance was maintained for a few days in Zeeland; but the main Dutch forces had no choice but surrender. The Queen and her Government moved to London.

From there they are directing the war effort of the Dutch navy, of the colonies, and of free Dutchmen all over the world. In Great Britain there is a Dutch Legion consisting of the troops which escaped from Holland, and the recruits who have been added by the conscription of Dutchmen resident here. The Dutch navy, as we hear from time to time when its exploits are reported, is co-operating with the British. The Dutch merchant fleet is an important factor in the Allied effort at sea. The economic resources of the Dutch empire, with its great fund of organizing ability, are thrown into the struggle.

The German Occupation

German occupation is much the same in all countries; the chief difference is the order in which the

various forms of oppression come in. In Holland there was at first a pretence of mildness. From the first the press was controlled and there were wholesale requisitions; but no quisling government has been set up, if only because the N.S.B. cannot muster sufficient men of experience and ability to man a large municipality, let alone a government. At the head of each department of state is its 'Secretary-General', in normal times the official permanent head under the Minister. The Secretaries-General are now under Seyss-Inquart, the German Governor-General. The pretence of mildness did not last long. When the Germans saw that there was no response to their clumsy blandishments, they brought in their familiar devices, the Gestapo, wholesale internments in concentration camps, compulsory transference of workmen to Germany, closing of universities, permission for the N.S.B. to form storm-troops, anti-Semitic laws, provocations which ended in street fights and led on to repression. Members or supporters of the N.S.B. have been made governors of the provinces of Limburg and Utrecht, and burgomasters of Amsterdam and other towns where there were strikes or disturbances. Huge financial exactions and the plundering of food and raw materials have made the country poor and wretched.

The Dutch people have never loved the Germans and now they hate them. Some bold spirits have secretly organized resistance, and fifteen were executed in March 1941, on what evidence we do not know. The time when open resistance can bring success has not yet come; but courageous protests against injustices have been made by the churches. There is proof that the nation is loyal to the House of Orange and refuses to be convinced by German propaganda.

Since the parliament cannot sit, and since the people have gone through and are still going through terrible experiences, there is a widespread desire for discus-

sion and the expression of political ideals. This has led to the formation of the Netherlands Union (*Nederlandsche Unie*), which began in July 1940 and is said to have attained the astonishing membership of more than half a million. The great majority of the members of the Union seem to have joined it as a demonstration of patriotic feeling, and in some of their statements its leaders have stood out boldly against germanization; but they have made mistakes which savour of political inexperience, for instance, in hoping to press on with social reforms during the occupation, and some of their statements do not match well with the parliamentary tradition. In a recent broadcast the Queen expressed the true national view: 'It is not open to any doubt that our political order will have to take into account the changed circumstances and the experiences of recent times. As soon as possible after our liberation the first cuttings for this will have to be planted.' But not till then.

Holland's Aims in the War

The neutrality which had given Holland a hundred years of peace was destroyed by the Germans on the 10th of May, 1940. Germany had obtained such a lead in armaments, especially in mechanized troops and aircraft, that no Dutch armaments would have been adequate to keep the invader out of the country. The first purpose of the Dutch resistance is to win back the freedom of the country, but Dutch war aims are not confined to this one point. Although they came into the war by an entirely different road from ourselves, and although they are making their contribution as a fully independent ally, not as a satellite state, still they are fighting for the wider aim of the Allies, a just and stable international order. As Lord Halifax said in New York: 'It is not possible now to draw detailed plans for the future structure of the

community of nations. 'These must naturally await discussion in free council by those concerned.' One of the questions for that discussion is this: how can the small nations enjoy their independence without continual danger not only to themselves but also to their neighbours, even their greater neighbours, from the menace of the aggressors?

The freedom of the Netherlands is valuable to us not merely on strategic grounds. It has been of immense value to the civilization of all Europe and all the world. Dutch independence has been the foundation of the greatness of Dutchmen in many generations who have given to the world new and living thoughts and experiences and beliefs. For nearly four hundred years the Dutch people have stood up for their freedom against the tyranny of successive invaders; and the free nations who have welcomed them as Allies recognize that the world needs them as a free nation. Just as their freedom must be restored by the joint effort of the Allies, so its preservation, once it is restored, must depend on the collective strength and wisdom of the friends of justice. In a recent speech Prince Bernhard, the Queen's soldier son-in-law, expressed his heartfelt wish that the close ties of friendship and co-operation which now linked Great Britain and the Netherlands might always be maintained. He said: 'Many great responsibilities we share, and I believe that the influence of our present brotherhood in arms may reach far beyond the war issue of the moment.'

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THE best and most up-to-date general picture of England as she was from the rise of Germany in 1870 to the outbreak of the First World War is given in Mr. Ensor's book *England 1870-1914* (15s.), which is Vol. 14 of the *Oxford History of England*. Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell's *History of the Great War 1914-1918* (15s.) may be recommended as the standard one-volume work on the subject. Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy deals with the period between the two wars in his *Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938* (8s. 6d.).

The two volumes of *Speeches and Documents on International Affairs*, edited by Professor A. B. Keith (World's Classics, 2s. 6d. each), and the selection of political writings in Sir Alfred Zimmern's *Modern Political Doctrines* (7s. 6d.) illustrate the conflict of doctrines in evidence to-day.

The outbreak of the present war is described and discussed in the lectures by H. A. L. Fisher, A. D. Lindsay, Gilbert Murray, R. C. K. Ensor, Harold Nicolson, and J. L. Brierly, collected and published in one volume under the title *The Background and Issues of the War* (6s.). The deeper issues at stake are summed up in Lord Halifax's famous Oxford address, *The Challenge to Liberty* (3d.), which is included in the volume of his *Speeches on Foreign Policy* (10s. 6d.).

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NOT only the winning of the war, but the future of civilization depends upon some kind of collaboration between the United States and the British Empire, and the meeting in August 1941 of President and Prime Minister on the waters of the Atlantic, that both divides and joins America and Britain, symbolizes the supreme importance of this collaboration.

When two democratic groups go into partnership, the foundations must be laid on mutual understanding and knowledge of each other by the people of each group. Nowhere is this knowledge more necessary—or the lack of it more likely to lead to misunderstanding—than in the field of foreign policy. In this pamphlet Professor Brogan describes the traditional outlook of America on world affairs, the policy which she has followed in recent years, and the machinery by which that policy is carried out. He clears up many difficulties for the British reader—such as the real meaning (or meanings, for it has varied from time to time) of the Monroe Doctrine; the reason why America has time and again renounced all participation in European affairs, but is time and again drawn back into them; the nature of Pan-Americanism; the occasional striking apparent discrepancy between the high moral line taken in foreign affairs by American public opinion, and the much more 'realistic' attitude of the State Department. Particular attention is devoted to the development of policy since 1918 and the gradual weakening of the extreme isolationist position, and the most controversial subjects, such as the League of Nations, War Debts, and the Neutrality legislation, are dealt with with admirable detachment.

Professor Brogan is the author of *The U.S.A.: An Outline of the Country, its People and Institutions* in 'The World To-day' series.

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The United States and the World

IT is not a mere accident of language that in American speech 'frontier' means not the area bordering on neighbouring states, but an ever-changing internal area, the region won in any generation from the wilderness and the Indian and, in a more general way, the whole process of settling and civilizing the vast empty areas of the North American continent. Nor is it unimportant that of the two wars that have left an abiding mark on the American national memory, the first, which the British call 'the War of Independence', is known to the Americans as 'the Revolutionary War', while the second is known to all the world (except the South) as 'the American Civil War'.¹ Other wars have created military reputations or have provided political issues, but no war, not fought on the present territory of the United States, has left a permanent mark on American life, has really entered into the national tradition. This is true of the wars with Mexico and Spain and even of the American share in the World War of 1914-18. There is in the American attitude to these conflicts something of the spectator's attitude, something of the attitude, too, of the man who regrets a youthful folly. Few Americans feel the equivalent of Rupert Brooke's 'corner of a foreign field that is for ever England' and the main effort of American piety after the last war was not to create great war cemeteries in France, but to bring back to America the bodies of her dead.

For the greater part of its history, the United States has been able to ignore the power politics of less fortunate regions. It has no near neighbours who are in the least

¹ In the South it is known as 'the War Between the States'.

degree formidable to it. It is not only that until very modern times the United States had no need to fear any but naval power, but that no European power, no matter what its character and ambitions, could risk the immense extension of its ambitions across the Atlantic or Pacific, because no power was sufficiently secure at home to dare turn its back to Europe or Asia and bring into its own orbit any part of the New World. Without being conscious of it, the United States benefited from a balance of power that kept Europe disunited and left the United States potentially the strongest power in the world—and gave it time, if need be, to turn that potentiality into actual fact.

It was natural, then, for American statesmen, and still more for American public opinion, to regard foreign policy as something of a luxury. American diplomatic history, save for brief moments like the period of the Civil War, does not consist of elaborate manœuvres, of treaties and alliances, but of claims for compensation for injury to American citizens in Russia, China, Ireland, in disputes over the admission of pork to the German market, or Japanese to California. The American minister or ambassador was by definition a wall-flower. He watched the diplomatic dance, he did not join in it.

The composite character of the American population helped to make this attitude part of American political tradition. There were too many emotional links between various American and European groups to make it prudent for the United States to take a line in world politics which would lead to the reproduction, in America, of the age-old feuds of Europe, and for many a reasonable and generous American, one of the worst results of American intervention in the last war was the bitterness it bred between German-Americans and other Americans. To the average American, an active and continuous foreign policy has the same repellent quality as a rigorous and long-continued health regime has to a normally robust man.

The U.S. as Missionary of Freedom

Yet there are certain permanent characteristics of American foreign policy and of American public sentiment towards questions of foreign policy. Deeply engraved on the American mind is the belief that 'righteousness exalteth a nation' and if the sin that is 'a reproach to any people' is more easily imputed by Americans to other nations than to themselves, that is merely to say that Americans are human. But there always has been in the United States, ever since its foundation, a constantly vigilant minority, becoming from time to time a majority, that has criticized, opposed and altered the policy of the Union. In the long run, no policy that is merely self-regarding, merely prudential, has commanded continuous American support and whether the alleged victims of American oppression have been Indians a century ago or Nicaraguans in the last twenty years, the conscience of America has been aroused by men and women convinced that the United States owes the world a higher standard than the mere pursuit of the maximum advantages made possible by her position and her power.

This view of the United States as, in a special sense, a trustee for the hopes of mankind, a force making for progress and enlightenment, dates in part from the Puritan founders of New England, but more directly from the makers of the Republic. They, or the democratic section of them, were convinced that the new nation had a great role as a teacher by example. The old bad days of tyranny and darkness were over in the United States and the vision of America as the home of 'liberty enlightening the world was early cherished'—and not only in America but in Europe as well.

It was this belief that America was the great exemplar of liberty, of democracy, that is the basis of Lincoln's most famous speech. If the Union fails, so ran his brief argument at Gettysburg, the possibility of the survival of

a nation 'conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal' will be held to be disproved. For democracy, the belief in equality, is the American political religion. He who in Europe or in Britain makes these matters of little moment, talks of mere 'idiosyncrasies' of political behaviour, cuts himself off from the living waters of American life. For that life is based on Jefferson's belief that the day had come when it was evident in America that 'the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favoured few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God. These are grounds of hope for others.'

No 'Entangling Alliances'

This view of the United States as a missionary of freedom is, at first sight, incompatible with another equally strong American tradition, the doctrine preached by Washington in his Farewell Address. 'The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible.'¹ But the circumstances of the age explain Washington's attitude well enough. He was concerned to warn his countrymen against the dangers of their taking sides, passionately, in the great controversies over the French Revolution. His warning was as much addressed to the dangers of what we call a 'Fifth Column' as against too active a foreign policy. But it was undoubtedly a warning against too great concern with the then remote continent of Europe which had 'a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation'. That the United States was not strong enough, or united enough, to play a part in European politics was the judgment of all the Founding Fathers. She grew stronger, but she did not, in this field, neces-

¹ It is almost universally believed that Washington warned his countrymen against 'entangling alliances'. That phrase is Jefferson's

sarily grow much more united. And Europe, torn with dynastic and national feuds, was not a theatre in which America could act naturally or with ease. American opinion was puzzled and angered by the apparently endless tale of blood, and grateful that 3,000 miles and sound political institutions separated her from the incorrigible continent.

American Sympathy with Democracy

Yet this political reserve was not incompatible with sympathy with democratic movements. Greeks, Hungarians, Italians, Poles, Irish, Armenians, Chinese—all the peoples whom American ways of thought identified with the good fight—got sympathy and aid and comfort from Americans, if not from the United States. It was not only the realization of how deep was the gulf between the imperial German government and the United States that made it possible for Wilson to lead the American people into the war in 1917, but the collapse of the Tsardom, the symbol for most Americans of dynastic tyranny and corruption.

On the plane of sentiment, American public opinion and American policy have swung from realization of her geographical remoteness and ignorance to passionate sympathy with those who spoke or seemed to speak her political language. If the pendulum has usually swung back to an isolationist policy, which, it is asserted, is sanctified by the advice of Washington, it has done so because Americans have been pained and disillusioned to discover that a community of ideals is not enough, that there must be a community of interest and of continuing effort. For as Chesterton pointed out after the last war, 'The world will never be made safe for democracy; it is a dangerous trade.' *Eternal* vigilance is the price of liberty and, like other peoples, the Americans are tempted to lie back and regard as permanently won the victory that each generation must win over again, the victory of liberty and

law. When it has become plain that the battle has to be fought again, the American people has remembered its charter, the Declaration of Independence, which declares for all men, not merely for Americans, the right to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness'.

The Machinery of American Foreign Policy

The American constitution, too, imposes special obstacles to diplomacy. In the words of the Constitution the President has 'power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur'. The framers of the Constitution in 1787 thought it possible that the Senate would act as a kind of Privy Council, that it would both propose treaties to the President and advise him during the course of negotiations; but although both have been done, in normal practice the Senate's control over foreign policy becomes operative only when the President has negotiated a treaty and demands its ratification.¹ That is, the division of power between an executive, the President (whom Congress cannot get rid of) and the legislature, Congress (which the President cannot dissolve), is carried over to the field of foreign affairs. The Constitution, by forbidding cabinet officers to sit in Congress, has made it necessary to find other means of collaboration. Therefore the Secretary of State² has constantly to deal with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and especially with its Chairman.

This provision of the American constitution can be defended to-day for the same reasons that caused its adoption in 1787. To grant unlimited power of treaty-making to the President would be to abandon a large part

¹ The consent of the Senate is also required for the appointment of ambassadors, ministers, etc., but this power is seldom used to control policy.

² The American Foreign Office is known as the Department of State. Although its work is almost exclusively diplomatic, it has a few formal functions in domestic affairs.

of the legislative power to him, for treaties, like ordinary federal statutes, are part of 'the supreme law of the land'. It was so evident that such a grant was contrary to the separation of powers of the federal constitution, that it was originally proposed to exclude the President from treaty-making altogether. But so much diplomatic business must, in fact, be executive in character, that this plan was recognized as equally impracticable; the conjunction of the Senate and the President in treaty-making was thus inevitable.¹

More difficult to justify is the requirement of a special, two-thirds majority for the ratification of treaties. As each State has the same representation in the Senate, regardless of its size and population, the one-third plus one that may veto a treaty may represent a great deal less than a third of the American people. Quite a small minority can block an international policy desired by a large majority. Yet the two-thirds rule can be justified. It reflects the fact that the United States is very large, very diversified and that a foreign policy that has not a very wide backing, fairly distributed over the whole union, is dangerous.

Yet American constitutional rules make American diplomatic action very difficult. A President negotiating a treaty may bear in mind the probable reactions of the Senate; he may consult leading Senators; he may use them as negotiators; but he can never be sure that the most carefully drafted treaty will not be so altered in the Senate that he will be unprepared to act on it, or the foreign nation will refuse to accept the senatorial amendments, or the Senate will itself refuse to ratify the treaty in any version. As amendments can be made by simple majorities, it is possible for a succession of amendments to

¹ When treaties involve the expenditure of money, in addition to senatorial ratification of the treaty it is necessary to have a Bill voting the money passed by a majority of each House. In such cases, it is difficult to prevent the merits of the Treaty itself being debated in the House of Representatives, without whose action the Treaty would in effect remain a dead letter.

be passed which produce a final version of the treaty so inconsistent or so unworkable that the necessary two-thirds majority cannot be found.

Then, as in all congressional business, the role of the relevant committee is of great importance. It is in the Committee of Foreign Relations that the treaty is first debated and amended or rejected. That committee may be filled with Senators of the party opposed to the President or by dissident members of his own party. Its members have not the pressure of responsibility for action that drives Presidents to seek to do something; reasons for not doing anything are not hard to come by. On the other hand, most members of this committee go on to it because they are interested in foreign affairs; membership has prestige value but is not of immediate political importance in domestic affairs. Normally weight in the Committee goes by length of service, which ensures that the leading members have had a long experience of diplomatic business. On the other hand, mere seniority may bring to the chairmanship of the Committee a Senator who is unfit for his job, or bitterly hostile to the President.

Lastly, the constitutional control of foreign affairs by the Senate encourages debate on all issues of foreign policy. Petitions, delegations, public-opinion polls, even interruptions from the gallery, even picketing of Senators whose views are disliked by any organized group, ensure that Senators will not forget that they are representatives of the people, not irresponsible legislators. The barrage of appeal and counter-appeal may intimidate some Senators and baffle others and it ensures that foreign policy is discussed in an atmosphere of heat which, in some cases, almost more than outweighs the advantage that it is discussed in the light.

Areas of Special Interest : The Pacific

It is natural that we should think of American foreign policy in terms of European conflict, but, in fact,

American policy has been far more concerned with what in America is called 'the Orient' and with the rest of the American continents than it has been concerned with Europe.

American interest in the Pacific dates from the early days of the Republic, when the American merchant and sailor found in China one of their most profitable fields of action. Soon there was added the great missionary interest which, in political and emotional power, came to eclipse any purely commercial connection. By making over its share of the indemnity imposed on China after the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 to a fund for educating Chinese in America, the United States further tightened the bonds between herself and the new China. The Chinese Revolution of 1912 was in great part the work of American-trained Chinese and still more has the personnel of the Kuomintang party been under American influence. For China, millions of Americans feel a moral responsibility and a moral interest they do not feel for any other country.

Although it was an American squadron that forced open the gates of Japan in 1853 and although there have always been important business connections with Japan, American opinion has never been as sympathetic to the island Empire as to the great continental agglomeration. The only Oriental state to become a great power, Japan was in a position to deal with the United States on equal terms. Despite the limitations accepted at the Washington Conference of 1921, the Japanese Navy in its home waters was a match for the American Navy. It was both because of reliance on the permanence of British control of the Atlantic and because of a realization that it was probably in the Pacific that American physical power might have to support moral influence, that the main American fleet was moved to the Pacific bases and that Honolulu became the chief American fortress. Yet American opinion was far behind naval opinion in its

appreciation of the realities of power politics in the Pacific. It was in agreement with the policy of ending American control of the Philippines, acquired in 1898 from Spain. It opposed the fortification of Guam: and it was content with a defence policy based on Hawaii, a policy that gave Japan, strategically, a free hand in the Asiatic half of the Pacific.

When, despite its treaty obligations, Japan took advantage of this free hand to seize Manchuria in 1931, American public opinion was indignant, but its reaction was confused. Mr. Hoover's Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson,¹ was anxious to oppose, with all the means in his power, the Japanese aggression. But it was not very clear (given American public opinion) what means were in his power. And informed American opinion was less angered by British hesitation to launch out on a bold policy in which the Hoover administration might not be able to follow, than distressed by the forensic skill and, indeed, by something that might almost be called warmth, with which the then British Foreign Secretary² put the Japanese case. As the Manchuria 'incident' has developed into the 'China incident', that is, into a first-class war, American opinion has become increasingly hostile to Japan, prepared to support lavish economic aid for China, but still holding off from any steps that might make a move from moral and economic to military support inevitable or even likely.

Yet American interest in China is deep and genuine. There was probably more real indignation over the bestialities that followed Japanese victories in China than over formally more provocative acts like the bombing of the American gunboat *Panay* in the Yangtse (1937). As the European situation has got more critical, the implications of the Axis for American security have become

¹ Now Mr Roosevelt's Secretary of War.

² Lord (then Sir John) Simon.

clearer; the nuisance value to Germany of Japanese threats has been noted and resented; and the decision to build a 'two-ocean' navy reveals the death of the illusion that, in the contemporary world, moral example or aid are enough in themselves.

Latin America and the Monroe Doctrine

Even more involved in American emotions, historical traditions and economic and strategic interests, is the rest of the American continents. Canada can be dismissed in a few words. It is hardly regarded as a foreign country, though the odd illusion that it is 'owned' by Britain still survives. All but a few cranks admit that the protection of Canada is a fundamental interest of the United States. Less easy to define or illustrate is the attitude of the United States to Latin-America, that mass of traditions, policies, precedents, interests covered by the magic term 'the Monroe Doctrine'

According to American legend, an apparently respectable citizen was about to be lynched despite his frenzied protests. He was rescued by the Sheriff who asked what was his offence. 'He said that he didn't believe in the Monroe Doctrine'. 'It's untrue. I love the Monroe Doctrine; I admire the Monroe Doctrine; I'd die for the Monroe Doctrine. All I said was that I didn't know what it was.'

Indeed, the Monroe Doctrine has not merely meant different things at different times; it has never meant to the average citizen anything very concrete; it has been rather an attitude than a policy; while, for the rulers of America, it has been a useful phrase, respectable and emotionally potent, which could be used to cover up a realistic and utilitarian policy whose utility the man in the street might not have been able to appreciate, had the policy not been guaranteed by its identification with the mysterious dogma.

Historically, the message of President Monroe of

2 December 1823 was directed against schemes deemed dangerous to the interests and sentiments of the American government. It was directed against a revival of European projects of expansion on the north American continent; here the immediately dangerous power was Russia, which was advancing down the Pacific coast to California from Alaska. The United States had a good reason to dislike claim-staking of this kind, for not wishing any part of the American continents '... [to] be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers'. In North America, at least, the United States was resolved to be the dominant power and to be the universal legatee for all collapsing empires. In less than a generation after Russia had been politely requested to stay out of California, the United States had conquered and annexed that remote dependency of the young Mexican Republic. The Monroe Doctrine was in no sense a self-denying ordinance, although the valid claims of existing European powers in the Americas were excepted from the Doctrine's ban.

The message of President Monroe was an announcement to all whom it might concern that the United States had an interest in the status quo, including in that status the independence of the newly-established States of Latin America. But it did not, in its first form, guarantee these States against aggression from the United States. The first generation, at least, of the Doctrine was also the age of 'Manifest Destiny', the belief that as the strongest, most energetic, most progressive power in America, the United States would be only anticipating the inevitable march of history if she abolished such anomalies as the survival of British rule in Canada and Spanish rule in Cuba and Puerto Rico. Nor was this all. As Mexico passed through revolution after revolution, it came to be widely accepted that American power 'and therefore rights' could and should be extended to cover all North America down to Darien, as it was taken as in the nature of things

that when the time came to build a canal across the isthmus of Panama, the United States would do it.

Yet it must be pointed out that the United States resisted several tempting opportunities to annex Cuba; that when she occupied Cuba she carried out her promise to make the island independent; and that her rule in Puerto Rico has been financially generous and as humane and tolerant as the permanently unsatisfactory economic condition of that over-crowded island permits. The United States did make war on Mexico in 1846, but she imposed terms of peace far less rigorous than the prostrate Mexicans could have been forced to accept, and one result of that moderation is that to this day the greatest of American western rivers, the Colorado, enters the sea through Mexican territory, which is highly inconvenient to the United States. In the long run, it was the United States which built the Panama Canal, but she was generous to the heirs of the French pioneers, and if she insisted on being freed from the shackles of the old treaties that tied her hands, President Wilson was able to induce Congress to repeal legislation giving American shipping preferential rights in the canal built by American money and American skill.

The second aspect of the Monroe Doctrine was vaguer, more ideological. Alarmed by hints conveyed by the British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, the American government protested against designs attributed to conservative European powers, 'the Holy Alliance', of restoring Spanish rule in the revolted States of South America by means of a French expeditionary force. The United States in 1823 was not powerful enough to have prevented a French fleet and army being transported to Buenos Aires, a region more remote from New York than from Cherbourg. But there was no serious intention of sending such an expedition, and it was natural that a strong United States should, in later generations, have exaggerated the effect of this declaration of sentiment into a potent affirmation of policy.

This historical exaggeration soon acquired independent historical force. It became an accepted maxim of American policy that the independence of the Latin-American States and their territorial integrity was a major interest of the United States, which had a right—and a duty—to protect them against aggression from European enemies, but not from each other or from the United States.

This policy could have been attacked on narrowly prudential grounds. The southern nations of South America were remote in space, in institutions, in culture and in sentiment from the United States. It was a mere accident of nomenclature that they and the United States were located on two continents, each of which bore the name America, and which were physically joined by a narrow isthmus. Nor did economic interest furnish links that history and geography had neglected to provide. In all but mere geographical nomenclature, Argentina had more links with Britain than with the United States. The mental habit of looking at maps designed to be read from north to south, rather than looking at maps designed to be read from east to west, reinforced a political attitude that was, until the twentieth century, prophetic rather than actual. In objecting to British or French or Spanish aggression in Mexico or in the Caribbean, the United States was acting as a great power normally does. In talking as if her interest in the quarrels between Peru and Chile or the diplomatic difficulties of Venezuela and Britain were interests of the same kind as those arising from Mexican or Cuban revolutions, the United States was acting romantically. Yet it should be remembered, that had there not been this romantic sense of Pan-American duty, of the relation of a big brother to weak and foolish youngsters, there would not only have been less well-meaning interference in the remoter parts of South America, but, probably, less willingness to recognize that what went on in such close neighbours as Cuba and

Mexico *was* the business of the United States. The Monroe Doctrine was a window, a stained-glass and deceptive window, through which the United States looked out on the world. But without the Doctrine, she might not have looked out at all.

With the completion of the Panama Canal in 1914 and the outbreak of the first Great War, the Monroe Doctrine acquired a new realistic character. The canal brought the Pacific nations closer to the seat of power in the United States, the Atlantic seaboard. The war, by destroying German and crippling British business activity in South America, gave an opportunity to American business, which it took. The political course of the war made the United States, for a time, the most courted and feared of the great powers and made her permanently one of the two great naval powers, and the dominating naval power in the western Atlantic and the Pacific. Compared with any of her American neighbours, even with Brazil, the United States was a colossus, and the long tradition that made her, in the eyes of the American people, especially the guardian of the weaker American nations, ensured that, at a time when any activity in foreign affairs was condemned by American public opinion, the magic formula 'Monroe Doctrine' would justify activities that, without the cover of the formula, could not have been attempted at all.

The 'Good-Neighbour' Policy

In the decades following the armistice of 1918, United States policy evolved from the friendly but patronizing attitude of an overwhelmingly powerful uncle, into what was to be called by President Franklin D. Roosevelt the 'good-neighbour' policy. Latin-American opinion had been roused to suspicion and hostility at the beginning of the century largely by the activities of President Theodore Roosevelt, above all by the support given to the Panama Revolution of 1903, a revolution that freed the United

States from the necessity of coming to terms with Colombia in order to build the Panama Canal, a convenience paid for in the suspicion and ironical scepticism that was aroused in Latin-America. Intervention in Central American and Caribbean republics to 'restore order' added to the *malaise*. President Wilson had disclaimed all annexationist intentions, and although years of Mexican revolution and counter-revolution gave the United States many legitimate grievances and many opportunities of armed intervention, Latin-America remembered General Pershing's pursuit into Mexico of the 'patriot' or bandit Pancho Villa, who had raided an American town (1916) and the less defensible occupation of Vera Cruz (1914), which was a means of bringing pressure to bear against the Mexican dictator, Huerta, whose methods of attaining power had shocked President Wilson. What was—given the immense preponderance in power of the United States and the provocations offered by various Mexican warring factions—extraordinary moderation, was not seen as such by proud and fearful Latin-Americans. 'Dollar diplomacy', the forcible collection of the external debts of ill-governed and bankrupt little republics, continued to make for bad blood. Yet American opinion, in this as in every other sphere of foreign relations, was increasingly pacific and negative. The Coolidge administration (1923-29) came to terms with Mexico; the Hoover administration (1929-33) carried farther the liquidation of all direct political commitments; and the Roosevelt administration both gave up the special rights it had in Cuba¹ (which had been freed by American arms) and abandoned the high moralistic position of the Wilson administration which had refused to recognize governments which came into power by a revolution.

The way was psychologically prepared for a more genuine 'Pan-American' policy than had been possible in

¹ Generally known, from the Senator who sponsored the limitations on Cuban sovereignty, as 'the Platt amendment'.

the past. A series of conferences, at Montevideo (1933), Lima (1938), special conference of foreign ministers at Panama (1939) and Havana (1940) sought to tighten the political and economic relations between the American powers; and the last two, held in the shadow of the new world war, tried to develop a common defence policy. But even as late as 1939, the Panama Conference was content with declaring that American waters (roughly 300 miles from the shore) were to be freed from belligerent activity. But there was no corresponding willingness to take action to enforce this declaration, and in fact there took place almost at once, in these waters, the first serious naval action of the war, the destruction of the *Graf Spee*.

In this policy there was implicit the belief that, whatever the course of war in Europe, the territorial and strategic *status quo* in the Americas was not in danger. The Roosevelt administration and American public opinion did not, indeed, display indifference to the results of the war, but it was possible to believe before May, 1940, that 'river stay away from my door' was a practical policy.

European Possessions in the Western Hemisphere

The collapse of France made a long neglected aspect of the Monroe Doctrine suddenly come to the front. Were the spoils of France to include French possessions in the western hemisphere? The American chargé d'affaires informed the German government that the U.S.A. 'would not recognize any transfer of a geographical region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power'. The German reply was not comforting; it pointed out that the Monroe Doctrine so interpreted 'would amount to conferring upon some European countries the right to possess territories in the Western Hemisphere and not to other European countries'. The American reply, in effect, agreed that this

was so; the Monroe Doctrine accepted the *status quo* of 1823, but that was all. It opposed any change in the existing territorial system of the western hemisphere as far as it affected the territories of European powers and it was designed to 'make impossible any further extension to this hemisphere of any non-American system of government imposed from without'. Germany would not be allowed to step into the shoes of France, first because European powers were regarded as mere lieutenants of their American holdings, with no powers of transfer and no non-American heirs, and because the potential heir of France, in this case, was not merely geographically but politically alien to America. Both the territorial and the ideological sides of the Doctrine barred German acquisitions in the Americas.

A generation before, the United States might have undertaken to impose this ban by her own strength alone. But although now stronger, absolutely at least, she preferred to develop the 'good-neighbour' policy, and to associate in a common policy all the American republics. So the Act of Havana (29 July 1940) provided that 'when American islands or areas at present held by non-American nations are in danger of becoming the subject-matter of exchange of territories or sovereignty, the American republics, having in mind the security of the continent and the opinion of the inhabitants of such islands or areas, may establish regions of provisional administration'. There were provisions for the establishment of an 'emergency committee' to decide on action, but with a prudent regard for the speed of events it was laid down that 'if necessity for emergency action be deemed so urgent as to make it impossible to await action of the committee, any of the American republics, individually or jointly with others, shall have the right to act in a manner required for its defence or the defence of the continent'. And as an indication of the abandonment by the United States of any aggressive tendencies she may

have had in the past, it was laid down that as 'the peoples of this continent have a right to self-determination, such territories shall either be organized into autonomous territories, should they appear capable of constituting or maintaining themselves in such a state, or be reinstated to the former situation'.

Destroyers exchanged for Bases

This self-denying ordinance was not enough for some ardent spirits who demanded the immediate seizure of European possessions in the West Indies as payment of the defaulted war debts or on general grounds of safety first. The American government and public opinion refused to imitate Hitler. But the dangers implicit in the situation were not wholly met by a declared readiness to prevent the seizure of Martinique. For the effective defence of the western hemisphere necessitated the use of the outer bastions of the continents. Fortunately for the United States, all these bastions were in the hands of nations either at war with Germany (Britain and Holland), or occupied by Germany and helpless (like Denmark and France).¹ These powers could not resist American demands and, in the case of Britain and Holland, had not the slightest wish to do so.

The acceptance from Britain of the right to build bases in British territory in return for the transfer of fifty American destroyers was a legitimate development of American policy. The fortification of West Indian bases was to the advantage of the United States and so was the transfer of the destroyers, for they increased British power of resistance and so, at the lowest estimate, gave the United States time to prepare her new defensive positions. But it was significant that the transfer was made by presidential action, without consultation of either house of

¹ I have treated Greenland as politically part of the West Indies and the legally worthless protests of the Copenhagen Government against the agreement made in Washington in 1941 by the Danish

Congress. Critics of the transfer who confined their criticism to this point, revealed their pedantry rather than their wisdom, for no one doubted that the American people wanted the transfer or that if it were put up to Congress, the will of the people would only be carried out after a long and dangerous delay. More substantial was the criticism which insisted that the transfer was an unneutral act. By American precedent it was. If it was a breach of neutrality for the British government to allow a private shipbuilding firm surreptitiously to build a warship for the South in the Civil War, what was it for the American government openly to transfer fifty of its own warships? But it was realised that neutrality in the old sense was gone; without any formal breach with Germany, the United States was aiding Germany's enemies. Whether this was or was not a belligerent act would depend, not on American, but on German policy—and German policy would ignore American actions as long as it suited German interests and German needs.

It is generally realized in the United States that until the 'two-ocean' navy is built (which will not be before 1946), the power of the United States to implement the Monroe Doctrine is limited. It is also realized that fleet-building is a game that two can play at, and that Hitler, in undisturbed command of the resources of Europe, could, with his Japanese partner, outbuild the United States. The Roosevelt administration and the majority of the American people accept this truth and draw the conclusion that Hitler must not be allowed to get undisturbed command of the resources of Europe, above all of Britain. They support, that is, the extension of aid to Britain to carry on the war against Hitlerism as at worst the buying of time and at best the buying of relief from this nightmare. But although most isolationists deny the danger, some are more candid and consistent. They admit that, faced with a victorious Axis, the United States could not help China, or the Dutch East Indies, or even the great

republics of South America. The United States would be forced to retire within her new island barriers, make the great economic readjustments necessary and, armed to the teeth, make of North America a new ark, waiting if necessary for generations before it would be possible to send out the dove of peace and get something back other than a heavy bomber.

The United States and the World Crisis

In their attitude to the developing crisis in Europe, the American people revealed their belief that history could and did repeat itself, but that it could be prevented from doing so by skilful legislation. Over all American foreign policy, from 1920 to 1933, lay the shadow of the national disillusionment with the results of the war fought to 'make the world safe for democracy'. Being human, the American people did not assess very objectively the share their own refusal to enter the League of Nations had in this break-down. They were easily made victims of the same type of German propaganda against the territorial settlement that had so great a success with the sentimental and ignorant of all classes in Britain. They were also impressed by the more reasonable criticism that was directed against the economic results of the Peace of Versailles—and, at the same time, reluctant to see that by putting a stop to immigration, by going back to a system of high tariffs and by insisting on the payment of Europe's debts, the United States was contributing at least as much to the economic misery and so to the political instability of Europe as the peace-makers of Versailles had done.

Not only did the United States refuse to enter the League, she refused (or the Senate refused to permit her) to join the World Court, despite the recommendations of every President from Harding to Roosevelt. Not until the Roosevelt administration came to office in 1933 did she even risk joining the International Labour Office.

The War Debts

One of the chief links uniting America to the post-war Europe was that of the war debts. Altogether, the United States lent its associates nearly \$13,000,000,000, a sum whose psychological importance may be grasped when it is remembered that it is more than thirteen times the total American national debt when the United States entered the war in 1917. No attempt was ever made to collect the whole sum, or to exact interest rates on an actuarial basis. Congress authorized the negotiation of separate debt settlements with the various countries involved, settlements based on ability to pay, a statesman-like move which had, from the point of view of Britain, the awkward consequence that she had to pay interest on 80% of her debt, while, at the other extreme, Italy had only to pay on 25% of her debt. Nor was this all, Britain was a debtor of the United States but a creditor of the other Allies and, of course, a creditor of Germany for reparations. To British public opinion it seemed plain that all these debts were linked, politically and economically, if not legally. This point of view was put forward in the unfortunately worded Balfour Note of 1922 which tentatively offered to forgive British debtors provided that we were forgiven our debts. The Balfour note was angrily received in America as an attempt to impose the odium of debt-collecting on the United States. The American attitude, summed up in the famous words of President Coolidge, 'they hired the money, didn't they?' was taken in Britain to show American ignorance of the true nature of international trade and international debt and, especially, the difference between debts arising from genuine commercial transactions and those arising from so completely uneconomic an enterprise as war.

The war debt settlement, based as it was on sixty-two yearly payments, was as unrealistic as any other part of the post-war settlement could be said to be. It assumed a

political and economic fixity which the extraordinary changes in the price-level, if nothing else, made it impossible to believe in. Indeed, while the last war-debt agreements were being made, the United States was indirectly sponsoring the first of the revisions of the economic terms of Versailles, called, after the American ambassador in London, the Dawes Plan. Five years later another and 'final' readjustment was again made which bore the name of its chief American sponsor, the Young Plan. Nor was this all. Although the average American did not understand what was happening, American capital was financing the recovery of Europe or, more specifically, the recovery of Germany, which borrowed in the United States all the money she paid as reparations and a good deal more. Other countries borrowed too.

In effect, the payments made by Europe, whether for war or commercial debts, were transformed into new loans to Europe until the boom and smash of 1929, by cutting off supplies from America, brought about the economic collapse of Germany. This became evident, and President Hoover took the bold step in 1931 of offering a suspension of the current year's war-debt payments for a suspension of the reparations payments for the same period. This lifebelt was grasped at with eagerness by Britain and Germany, with less enthusiasm by France, and all European powers knew that reparations payments, once suspended, would never be resumed. This truth was admitted by the European creditors of Germany, but with an election coming no American President or presidential candidate could admit the corollary, evident to all Europeans, that it was politically impossible for the late associates of the United States to go on paying interest on the war debts while the late enemy of the United States was excused all reparations payments.

Under various disguises, the European debtors of the United States ceased to pay, and American opinion was further confirmed in its judgement that power politics was

a game in which it was bound to be swindled. The last chance of restoring the old economic order in Europe, the Economic Conference of 1933, was destroyed by the refusal of the new Roosevelt administration to consent to a general currency stabilization, and, with that refusal, the last tie binding America to Europe's troubles seemed to have been cut. The Johnson Act of 1934, forbidding the raising of public or private loans in the United States by the defaulting war debt powers, was intended not only as a rebuke, but as a proof that, at last, the United States had got free from the results of 'entangling alliances'.

America and Hitler

But the world in which this policy was realistic was already dead. Herr Hitler came into office two months before Mr. Roosevelt. From the beginning American opinion saw the Hitler regime as it was. It was not misled (as British opinion was) by the testimony of doubtless well-meaning persons who were able to see the bright side of the darkness that had descended on Germany. The basic German doctrine of race loyalty was seen to be profoundly dangerous for a country so mixed in origin as America. If people of German or Italian origin owed a special loyalty and duty to the country of their birth or ancestry, the internal security of the United States was threatened. Nor was the true character of the Nazi regime easily hidden from a people that had its own gangsters. At the most, the American 'appeasers' argued that it was foolish to ignore the fact that Hitler was there and seemed likely to stay; a prudent business man in Chicago in 1930 had to deal with Al Capone; no nation could afford to keep too tender a conscience. Yet even this view was not widely popular and its exponents found their motives misunderstood—or understood.

American opinion was bitterly hostile to Hitler, but at first not willing to do much about it. For, to the American, the case was simple. Largely thanks to American

aid, the western powers had secured overwhelming military superiority over Germany as a result of the first world war. Now that Germany was palpably threatening to renew the war, why not act while there was yet time?

As it became more and more evident that the western powers would not act while there was yet time, American opinion became pre-occupied with the problem of how to keep America out of the war that was coming. Mr. Roosevelt tried to prevent or delay, by diplomatic pressure, the outbreak of war; Congress tried by legislation to prevent America getting into war if it came.

As is usual in human affairs, the motives for this policy were mixed. Much was due to the human reluctance to endure the risks and losses of another war. Although by European standards, American losses in the last world war had been slight, they had occurred far from home and for a cause which the results of the war seemed to show had been betrayed. The world had not been made safe for democracy.

Isolationism and Neutrality Legislation

Propagandists, most of them honest and zealous, some of them emotionally or personally linked with the German cause or with the minority which had opposed entrance into the last war, helped to spread the view not only that America and the world had gained nothing from the last war, but that the ostensible motives for American intervention were not the real ones. A Senate committee investigating the munitions industry not only discredited the 'Merchants of Death' who were still active, but attempted to show that it was as a result of the activities of the munitions industry between 1914 and 1917 that America had been led to the disastrous step of intervention in a quarrel which was none of hers. It was the contention of Senator Nye that one of the main causes of American intervention was the creation of a great vested interest in Allied victory. The great crime of the Wilson

administration had been to allow American industry to become geared up to the Allied war machine. If the United States had not entered the war in 1917, so the argument ran, the Allies would have been unable to continue their purchases and there would have been an immediate and catastrophic slump. That this consideration had any effect on Wilson's policy in the critical months before the final breach with Germany is not only not proved but, as far as a negative can be proved, is disproved. But it should be noted that side by side with a warm and, sometimes, sentimental appreciation of moral ideas, there is present in the American mind a kind of moral diffidence. To admit that the United States entered the last war for non-material interests would be to admit that the United States is often not narrowly realist in her attitudes, and many Americans would rather appear as dupes or cynics than as crusaders. Finally, it was to the interest of those parties and sections which wished to cause America to withdraw from European commitments to belittle the moral claims of the cause for which the United States fought in 1917 and 1918.

A practical consequence of this 'hard-boiled' view of the cause of American intervention in 1917 was the adoption of legislative policies that were designed to prevent America being dragged into a new war by the same forces that, it was asserted, had dragged her into the last world war.

If law laid down in advance that America should not supply belligerents with munitions, European powers would not be encouraged to fight by the thought that they could draw on America, and America would be saved, in advance, from the temptation of the fairy gold of munitions profits. Legislation beginning in 1935 and given final form in 1937 imposed an embargo on the export of munitions when war broke out. Combined with the Johnson Act of 1934, which forbade public or private loans to countries defaulting on their war debts to the

United States, this legislation was designed to keep America out of war as far as destroying financial interest in the success of one belligerent could do so. It ignored, of course, the serious financial interest that the United States might have in the victory of one belligerent rather than the other, quite apart from war loans or munitions contracts.

It was not this consideration, however, that shook American faith in this legislation. The Spanish Civil War provided the first test and, although the original legislation did not deal with civil wars, the Roosevelt administration, following a British lead, induced Congress to amend the law to apply the embargo to Spain. This was an administration triumph that later plagued the victors, but it was significant that some of the warmest supporters of the general arms embargo did not wish it applied to Spain. More serious was the growing realization that a great crisis was coming in Europe or had, in fact, begun. The mass of American opinion was in favour of 'standing up to Hitler', was opposed to appeasement, was highly critical of the Munich policy, and yet it was realized that the readiness of the western powers to stand up to Hitler was likely to be greatly increased if they could be sure that they could rely on their superior naval and financial strength to draw supplies, especially aircraft, from the United States.

The Roosevelt administration made a determined effort in the summer of 1939 to secure the repeal of the embargo but unsuccessfully. Many Senators preferred to believe Senator Borah when he asserted that his information, which was better than that of the President, showed that there would be no war.

The 'Cash and Carry' Policy

When war came, the President imposed the embargo and again appealed to Congress for an alteration of the law. After a lengthy and bitter debate, the Administra-

tion scored a victory, but not an unconditional victory. The new neutrality law was designed, said a wit, 'to keep the United States out of the war of 1914'. It allowed the export of arms but on rigorous conditions. Before they could be delivered to the European purchaser, every American claim on them must have been extinguished. It was the so-called 'cash and carry' policy. Munitions had to be paid for in cash (and the purchasing government under the Johnson act could not borrow). More than that, no American ship could sail with any kind of cargo to ports in the belligerent countries and the President was authorized to extend the prohibited zone by naming 'combat areas'. Technically neutral ports were to be actual belligerents were thus debarred from American shipping. On the other hand, some technically belligerent ports in America, Africa and Asia were not debarred to American ships though they were not to carry munitions to them.¹

American ships, since they would be kept out of areas where fighting was going on, would be safe from attack. American citizens in general were debarred from travelling on belligerent ships. So, it was asserted, American ships and American citizens would not be sunk or drowned as the 'incidents' that had given a moral covering to the economic commitments of the munition industry in 1914-1917 could not occur.

Against this was set the new freedom to export munitions in belligerent vessels, a change in the law of the United States which certain legal purists held was profoundly unneutral. But this charge had no great effect on the American public mind, for in 1939, unlike 1914, the vast majority of the American people made up their minds at once. Germany was the aggressor. A German defeat was to the interest of the United States and the world. In 1914, President Wilson had asked the American people to

¹ Certain Canadian ports were excluded from this relaxation of the ban.

neutral in thought as well as in action. President Roosevelt made no such appeal in 1939; neither he nor the majority of the American people concealed their preferences or their hopes.


But some illusions survived the outbreak of the war. The clearly character enabled the isolationists who had declared that there would be no war, to declare that this was a 'phoney' war. The invasion of Norway, followed by the invasion of Holland, was a great shock to many Americans, who had believed that neutrality was a happy state to which any nation could attain by wishing for it. It had long been asserted that in the last war, Holland and Norway had shown that, by a rigid neutrality, it was possible to stay out of war. Each new aggression by Hitler, down to and including the invasion of Russia, drove deeper home the truth that neutrality was a state that lasted as long as it suited Germany and not a day longer.

Support to the Democracies

But even more important than the destruction of the legal house of cards of neutrality was the collapse of the strategic house of cards of American immunity. The majority of the American people not only wanted the Allies to win, but expected them to win. The collapse of France suddenly brought them face to face with the disturbing possibility of a Hitlerized Europe. It was under the threat of this event that they accepted peace-time conscription, that they disregarded the protests of the purists against the transfer of destroyers to Great Britain in return for the right to fortify bases on British West Indian islands, that public opinion forced Mr. Wendell Willkie on the Republican party as its presidential candidate, and that breaking one of the most sacred of American political traditions, President Roosevelt was elected for a third term.

Once re-elected, President Roosevelt cut loose from the

timid legalities of the neutrality legislation and in his 'lease-and-lend' policy accepted the fact that the defence of Britain was the defence of America. Industrial production was speeded up, greater and greater power over the national life was taken, more and more the American people revealed its willingness to take whatever measures were necessary to defeat Hitlerism. They still shrink from war, but they realize that the decision as to war and peace is not necessarily in their hands, that at any time war may be thrust on them by the ruler of Germany. And they realize that now, as much as in the crisis of the Civil War, on their action it depends whether 'government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth'.



UNITED STATES

MEXICO

Miles
0 200 400 600

THE DEFENCES OF THE PANAMA CANAL