288	THE   RISE    OF   ITALIAN   FASCISM
yesterday but we are cleverer than they.5 Probably this
was the explanation given him by Mussolini ; but his
manoeuvre was subtler than it appeared to his enthusiastic
colleagues. Mussolini could well afford to talk about
elections, as he was sure to win big successes in them. On
October 16 and 23 the administrative elections "in the
provinces of Rovigo and Reggio Emilia resulted in big
majorities for the fascist lists. The socialists, victorious in
November, 1920, had to give up the struggle. In Milan
Popolari and democrats joined the national coalition list
together with the fascists in order to win the town council
from the socialists.1
The negotiations with Giolitti had fallen through, but
Mussolini still thought of the c march on Rome ', or rather
the mobilisation of the military forces of fascism, as a means
of enforcing the solution that Giolitti did not want. As he
had explained at the meeting in the Hotel Vesuvio, the
movement must insist on £ the formation of a ministry which
includes at least six fascists in the most important posts \
Even after October 16 Mussolini did not surrender himself
entirely to the myth of the c march \ For him it was still a
means like any other, more dangerous than the others, and
one which in his heart he hoped he would not have to use.2
The officers of the militia and the leaders of the squads,
on the other hand, could conceive of no other solution.
At the Naples meeting it was they who had demanded
' immediate mobilization to gain our ends'. Mussolini
tried to keep his hands free and went on negotiating without
giving the other fascist leaders any detailed information,
and sometimes without saying a word, as in the case of his
dealings with Nitti. It must have been about this time that,
according to Massimo Rocca, he exclaimed in irritation
against the impatient partisans of direct action : c For the
second time I have made myself a personal force in fascism,
and if fascism does not obey me I will crush it.' The deputy
1	P. 280.
2	According to the instructions drawn up in Naples for the march :   e If
armed resistance by the government is encountered, avoid clashes with the
troops as far as possible, and show them sympathy and respect.   Do not accept
any help that regiments may offer to the squads.   This possibility will be
examined by the Quadrumvirate only if fighting actually takes place.'