THE INTERNAL CRISIS OF FASCISM 137
the syndical workers of the north. Giolitti thus initiated
the economic policy he had followed before the war, and
he hoped that this economic collaboration would result In
the socialist leaders, or at least the syndicalist leaders, joining
the government. But he never gathered the fruits he had
planted. Five days after Mussolini's speech Giolitti's ministry
was defeated over a motion presented by the socialists and
backed by the fascists. He was succeeded by Bonomi.
But even with Giolitti removed, Mussolini's way was far
from clear. Inside the fascist movement itself obstacles
rose up and blocked his way to power. There was dis-
content among his followers on account of his attitude
towards the Treaty of Rapallo and d'Annunzio's Fiume
adventure.1 He was compelled to devote some of his speech
at Trieste on February 6 to defending himself: c In Novem-
ber 1920, the idea of a revolution to annul a peace treaty
—that of Rapallo—which for better or worse was accepted
by 99 per cent of the country, was out of the question . . .
and equally so to become embroiled in armed opposition
against the treaty conducted from an outpost of the nation,
Fiume.5 And to those who reproached him for not having
started a revolutionary movement to save Fiume, Mussolini
replied with a summary of his views on tactics which
showed his complete superiority in this respect over his
followers and also over the so-called revolutionary socialists :
6 The fasci di combattimento? he said, £ never promised
to start a revolution in Italy in the event of an attack
on Fiurne, especially after Millo's defection. Personally
I never wrote to or told d'Annunzio that revolution in
Italy depended on my whim. Revolutions are not
jack-in-the-boxes, which can be jumped off at will. . . .
History, a collection of dead facts, teaches people little,
but daily events, which are history in the making, should
be more profitable. They show that revolutions are made
with armies and not against them ; with arms, not
without them ; with disciplined groups and not with
shapeless masses assembled at meetings. . . . Revolutions
succeed when the majority surround them with a halo
1 P. 83-85.