THE MARCH ON ROME 245
the right-wing socialists—it is to their credit that they did
raise it and to their shame that they had not done so earlier
and more boldly—was not how to c pick up trifling
advantages ', but how to rescue, together with c bourgeois'
democracy, in short with democracy altogether, the bare
conditions for the existence and development of the working-
class and socialist movement. By the beginning of October
1922, and even earlier, the question was no longer whether
the £ revolution3 was being thwarted, but whether the
victory of fascism and its attainment of power could be
prevented. The rather dull minds of the Italian maximalists
had not grasped this fact within four weeks of the march
on Rome,
For the reformists, who had now regained their liberty
of action, the situation was no less dramatic. What use
could they make of the freedom they had gained ? Breaking
with the communists in January 1921 and with the maxi-
malists in October 1922 had meant breaking with so great a
porportion of the masses that even if their new policy was
still practicable it could only count on a very limited support
in parliament and in the country. The article in the
reformist paper, quoted at the end of the previous chapter,1
after pointing out that the policy of collaboration and that
of the general strike had been adopted too late, had reached
the following conclusion : e The cause of this delay lies in
the fundamental confusion of method which is still the bane
of the Socialist Party, The Rome congress ought to tear
up the Bologna programme of 1919 and go back to the Genoa
programme of 1892 '.2 Actually it is doubtful if this return
to first principles would have been of any assistance in face of
the existing situation, for by then there was just as much
risk of its being inadequate and too late.
But even after August 1922 the triumph of fascism was not
absolutely inevitable. In spite of everything fascism was
still only an army of occupation. Its numbers were increas-
ing in swarms^ but it was not a solid force, and it was very
far from sweeping away the nation. A victory for the
forces of anti-fascism alone was no longer possible ; nothing
short of a complete mobilization of the nation would have
1 Pp. 231-232. 2 p. 54.