THE MARCH ON ROME
completed ; Mussolini agreed to meet d'Annunzio and
Nitti, and the latter was to travel with two cars, accompanied
by the fascist deputy, Aldo Finzi, his friend, Schiff Giorgini,
and one Brambilla, the owner of the villa in which the three
chiefs were to meet. All was ready when a telephone message
came through : c D'Annunzio is dying.3 The Commandant
had fallen out of a window of his museum-convent-bachelor
retreat of a villa after a quarrel between two of his lady
friends, his c sisters * as he liked to call them. This put
him out of action for some wreeks and left him in a very weak
state, though he did not abandon his plans. On Septem-
ber 12, the anniversary of the march on Ronchi, he issued
an appeal, in which he regretted that he had not his legion-
aries round him, hoped that in their minds c liberty and
light would be one ', and to the slogan they already knew,
sine sir age vici, added a word of hope, c insperata floret \
The Popolo d* Italia published this message on its fourth
page without comment. Mussolini's craving for power was
stronger than ever. The idea of a march on Rome was in
the air. It would be the natural outcome of the fascist
c offensives', which were becoming wader and wider in
scope, moving on to the annexation of new territories from
those which were already subdued.1 The whole Po valley,
all central Italy, Tuscany, Urnbria and the Roman
Campagna were occupied by the blackshirts. By October
only a few towns still remained c free9 : Turin, Parma,
besides the south, more or less neutral. The impetus
attained by the expeditions and fascist adunate was bound to
reach Rome ; it was logically inherent in the whole move-
ment just as much as in the determination of Mussolini
and the other fascist leaders. During the strike in August
Facta had yielded up Milan, Genoa, and Leghorn to the
fascists in return for a promise that they would not occupy
Rome. Accordingly the advance of fascism and the feeble-
ness of the government combined to make Rome the last,
the key position, on whose fate depended that of the regime,
and which the fascists had got to seize or lose all their
previous gains.
There were other pressing reasons why power must be
1 See Mussolini's article of July 15, quoted on pp. 203-204.